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HISTORIA I ŚWIAT, nr 12 (2023)
ISSN 2299-2464
e-ISSN 2956-6436
Punsara AMARASINGHE (Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa, Italy)
Revival of the Silk Road legacy. Examining how China
uses history to legitimize its ‹‹Belt and Road Initiative››
https://doi.org/10.34739/his.2023.12.23
Abstract: This article is an interdisciplinary inquiry into the usage of historical silk routes by the Chinese
as a popular narrative for the modern BRI. While looking at the archaeological trace, the historiography
and other dimensions, this article would unfold how the nostalgia on the ‘Silk Routes’ have been
rejuvenated for an ambitious geopolitical project. Taking both land and maritime silk routes into
the consideration, this paper would further consider the position of historical narratives for the geo-
political ambitions of the 21st century.
Key words: History, China, Silk Routes, Geopolitics, Power
Introduction
The Silk Road produced fascinating stories. It influenced many generations of
researchers as a favourite field to unveil the contributions made by one of the most
important movement corridors in the human history. The narratives that existed among
the scholars on the historiography of the Silk Road took a different direction when
Chinese president Xi Jinping announced his ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) initiative
in 2013. In 2015, China changed the name OBOR and adopted ‘Belt and Road Initia-
tive’ (BRI) as the new title of their ambitious project.
The overwhelming economic growth of modern China has exceeded the old
prosperity of the Spanish Empire in the 16th century and even the memories of the in-
dustrialisation of Europe.1 The ardent interest of Chinese state apparatus towards
succeeding in their mammoth venture of reviving Silk Road legacy shows the indo-
mitable flare sparking within a nation to become an epitome of a global player. The ra-
pid economic influence of China in every continent has given them a greater potential
which is likely to vanquish the US hegemony. It was in 2016 that China replaced
the USA as Germany’s most important trading partner showing the rapport between
Corresponding Author. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9539-7770.
punsara.amarasinghe@santannapisa.it
1 Shambugh, 2016.
Page | 380
Beijing and Europe. The most important historical reality that one cannot ignore is Xi
Jinping’s initiative of OBOR is not China’s maiden attempt of soaring its power glo-
bally as it can claim a long history of being a global key player.
It is a common understanding that The Silk Road was largely dominated by
the Chinese presence. The shared narrative is as follows; Chinese influence was in
the apex during the periods of Han (206-220 CE) and Tang dynasties (618-907 CE) as
the Middle Kingdom. Romans and later Byzantines were eager to acquire the best
Chinese silks (hence the name), and other commodities came from the Silk Road
through Central Asia and the Middle East. The archaeological evidence has also
left traces illustrating the Chinese influence through the ancient Silk Road. Also,
the (hi-)stories of legendary figures such as Marco Polo, Ibn Battuta and many other
ancient travellers who travelled through the Silk Road have affirmed the abundance of
power held by the Chinese as a global ‘superpower’ in the past.
However, the normative historical reading of the Silk Road above is proble-
matic. The first is prevalent to the immemorial Chinese domination of the Silk Road.
In the archaeological record, nor in textual sources, is there any evidence of a Chinese
dominance in Silk Roads trade until the early medieval period. Long before the Han
Dynasty joined the trade networks outside its borders, multiple complex routes had
already existed between East Africa, the Indian Subcontinent, Arabia and the Medi-
terranean. The archaeological evidence is remarkably scarce – and also all textual
sources confirm that China was, in fact, the very last of the ancient Empires to even
join in the trade networks. The Indian Maurya Empire was one of the first, so were
Ptolemaic and then Roman Egypt, Aksum, and many pre-Islamic Arabian kingdoms.
It was actually because Han emperor Han Wudi heard about all the trade opportunities
outside the walls of the Chinese empire, that he decreed to open up the Jade gate
(in Xinjiang) to allow trade to happen in front of this gate with international traders.
Not until the much later Tang Dynasty however, were any foreigners allowed onto
Chinese soil.2
The second problem is about the lack of archaeological evidence for creating
grand narratives. There is only one brief textual mention of Roman interest in Chinese
silk (by Pliny the Elder)3 – and no other data to date confirm this. The lack of hard
evidence from the Antiquity is concerning when it comes to accurate assessment
of historiographies.
Finally, the Silk Road as it was told by the legendary figures’ sources are all
from the early to late medieval period – this is a very different time than Antiquity
(and the Han or even early Tang era). China became very powerful trade-wise in me-
dieval times, and a main partner especially of the Islamic Golden Age empire (where
2 Frankopan, 2015.
3 Pliny the Elder, 1991: 123.
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trade centres stretched from Mali to Samarkand) – but the origin of the networks was
not Chinese, and the situation (and power dominance) in Antiquity was very different.
Thus, our concern is to unpack how and why in much scholarship today we see
a shift of focus to China in studies of the ancient Silk Roads – a projection of the domi-
nance that came to be in medieval times. What makes the scholarship to overlook or
brush over the important difference between the ancient and medieval Silk Roads
networks; in fact, a very different picture emerges in Antiquity when China is
concerned.
The recent revival of nostalgia towards the Silk Road under the BRI raises
some fundamental questions.4 The cardinal issue of the new Silk Road or BRI is using
a road as a power project. Furthermore, the BRI produces some ambiguities on the sta-
tus of nation states who have exposed their sovereignty for China’s ambitious mission.
In this paper, I seek to examine the political importance of the Silk Road for the BRI
and highlight how and why China (mis)uses history to promote its current BRI poli-
cies. In a larger schema, this paper will also attempt to document how a historical spa-
ce can transform into a contested space tethered with modern political and economic
motives. Perhaps, it is by no means an exaggeration to describe the Silk Road as
the most important road in global history that influenced and still continues to
influence nations, states and cultures as a project based on complex political agendas.
In the Beginning
As any emergent communication and transportation network, there is no single
genesis story of the Silk Road. About 5500 years ago Eurasian steppe nomads
domesticated the horse and drastically altered the course of human history. The Bac-
trian camel soon followed the same fate and burdened the bulk of transportation
between Eastern and Western civilizations for centuries.5 People who were utilizing
these animals were naturally contributing to the formation of roads in Central Asia.
The archaeological evidence suggests that the road network had been functioning as
early as the 3rd millennium, with further intensification in the 2nd millennium BCE.6
While organically developed road networks can be considered as the precursors of
the Silk Road, two key periods can be associated with its top-down foundation:
the Achaemenid Period (500-330 BCE) and the expansion of Greek empire into
Central Asia (329 BCE-10 CE) initiated by the Alexander the Great. The Achaemenid
Empire had an extensive road network mainly connecting Susa and Sardis and
extending further east, to Kandahar, India, and Bactra.7 An efficient road network was
4 Cheng, 2016.
5 Potts, 2004.
6 Kuzmina, 2008: 108.
7 Colburn, 2013: 31.
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necessary for sustaining this vast empire. The imperial roads were maintained and
guarded, and an efficient postal system was established for high-speed communi-
cation.8 The second major phase started with Alexander’s march which extended as far
as the Hyphasis River in India.9 With the conquests of proceeding kingdoms and
empires further towards the east, Silk Road, or at least its state-motivated foundations,
started to become more pronounced.10 In 43 CE, the Roman geographer Pomponius
Mela mentioned the people of “the Silk country”,11 suggesting an effective road had
been already in use and silk was considered as a commodity. But, one should note here
the continuous absence of a given name for the road.
In current historiography, the official opening is attributed to the Silk Road to
Zhang Qian’s visit to the West in 138 BCE,12 yet this traditional interpretation is open
to debate. This decree by Han Wudi (following Zhang Qian’s reports) marks the mo-
ment when China opened up to international trade – and joined an already centuries old
network of trade. This was not the beginning of the ‘Silk Roads’ – but the moment that
China decided to join. Furthermore, the term itself was coined after two millennia by
German geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen in 1877. The term appeared in the first
volume he published from the collections of volumes he compiled about his stay
in China between 1868 to 1872. Not surprisingly, von Richthofen had originally named
the road as ‘Seidenstrasse’, yet the English translation and equivalent was picked up by
the scholarship.13 Nevertheless, the European invention of the term is much deceiving
and misleading, because none of the old textual narratives written by the travellers of
this route used a term called ‘Silk Road’, but it became a cultural phenomenon feeding
the globalization’s fashionable nostalgia.14 As a matter of fact, the Silk Road was not
a single road leading from one destination to the other. It was rather a network of many
unmarked paths led through rough geographical regions such as mountains and deadly
deserts. Besides the famous overland network, the maritime Silk Road which
connected China with different continents beyond seas was expanded through many
avenues.15
The core of the Silk Road known as the Middle Silk Road (in medieval times,
but not in Antiquity) connected three cultural and political and economic superpowers
Iran, India and China. Eastern Iran happened to be the starting point of the Middle Silk
Road, moving through a town called Merw in the West and the road further expanded
to the Gobi Desert. The road was connected with Dunhuang from the east and Kashmir
8 Colburn, 2017: 875.
9 Howe & Müller, 2012.
10 Juping, 2009.
11 Pomponius Mela, 1998: 184.
12 Kuzmina, 2008: 2.
13 Richthofen, 1877; Nobis, 2018: 723.
14 Thorsten, 2005: 301.
15 Rezakhani, 2010.
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was linked from the south creating a unique blend of geopolitical cultures. Following
the Middle Silk Road, the Eastern Silk Road made it connectivity towards Chinese
trade towns from Dunhuang via Anxi and via Tianshui and Baoji to Chang’an. Western
Silk Road had its direction to cover major trade ports in the Mediterranean Sea.
From Merw through Mashhad, Teheran and Baghdad to Palmyra. From Palmyra it was
again divided into two sub- routes: one led to Constantinople through Aleppo,
Antiochia and Tyros whereas, the other route took the southwest direction to reach
Cairo and Alexandria via Damascus and Gazza.
The salient feature prevailed throughout the expansion of the Silk Road was
not necessarily the trade relations as it has been always depicted. The Silk Road also
paved the path to culturally connect major political powers.16 But, it is essential to re-
member this connectivity was not always rooted in peaceful engagements and con-
frontations among the major powers appeared as a challenging factor in the Silk Road.
Furthermore, the narrative is about medieval trade networks and also power/state-
centred. the archaeological records may be also indicating that the trade networks
actually moved with great flexibility in between all the great powers, and the powers
reacted to the workings of these routes.
The power politics in the Silk Road appeared as a major obstacle for both
Romans and Chinese to accomplish their trade interests. Parthians were the major
adversary power in the Silk Road between the Chinese and Romans.17 In 97 CE, Chi-
nese ambassador Kan Ying commenced a journey along the Silk Road with the ex-
pectation of reaching Rome. His attempt to reach Rome as a Chinese envoy got nipped
in the bud after reaching Mesopotamia.18 From where Kan Ying anticipated sailing
to Europe, but Parthians did not want Chinese to be in direct contact with Romans.
The reason which compelled Parthians to hinder Chinese attempts to reach Romans
was mainly based in their reluctance to lose the massive profit they earned as the midd-
lemen in the Silk Road between the Roman Empire and the Chinese.19 We should also
note that the information about the Chinese envoys in from the Hou Hanshu text, and it
is only a single paragraph long, casting doubt on the accuracy of claims about Parthian
motivations.
It was in 115 BCE Parthian king Mithridates II made a pact with the Hun
emperor Wu Ti to facilitate the trade in the Silk Road. This political alliance uplifted
Parthian prosperity for many decades until they were defeated by the Romans in
Emperor Trajan’s campaign in 117 CE which resulted in the decline of Parthian’s
influence in the trade of the Silk Road. The long delayed direct contact between two
empires was eventually accomplished in 166 CE when emperor Marcus Aurelius
16 Beckwith, 2019: 17.
17 Maksymiuk, 2021.
18 Whitfield, 2019.
19 Beckwith, 2019: 137.
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dispatched a Roman envoy to China. The complexity existed between Chinese and
Romans over the trade in the Silk Road and Parthians role as felicitators and how it
waned before strong empires indicates the evasive political gambles in the Silk Road.20
Revival of The Silk Road and China’s Ambition to Global Governance
The nostalgia on old Silk Road and its heyday was revived after Xi Jinping
became the Chinese president and his vision of increasing China’s participation
in the global governance was a notable factor even before he took power from his
predecessor. In his own words “China will work with people of all countries to push
the world order and global governance system towards a more just and reasonable
direction”.21 In pursuit of a new global governance, China needs an ideology and
a palpable vision. But, the Maoist ideology that have been reigning in China internally
is not susceptible to aggrandize China’s image globally.
Revival of Silk Road legacy under OBOR or BRI appears to be China’s new
narrative. From one side it stands as a pacific project reviving the old tradition of
uniting civilizations through trade following the same historic destinations of the old
Silk Road, but from the other side it challenges the national integrities of the states
affected by BRI as in the same manner how politics erupted in the old silk roads.
The juxtaposition of these two faces of BRI have rendered a sense of scepticism
towards the implementation of this project. The scepticism also stems from China’s
domestic policy plans: the country aims to circumvent Russia to reach European
markets,22 to cut commodity transportation times, to reduce its energy dependency via
establishing political connections with Central Asian countries, and to politically
stabilize its western provinces.23
Bottom Reality
The political discontent looming before Chinese project of reviving the Silk
Road is a reminder of the chaotic political order that used to be prevalent throughout
the old Silk Road in the past. The nomadic tribes who persistently sabotaged the trade,
Parthian rivalry with Romans were just a few of those reminiscences of the volatile
nature of the politics in the Silk Road. Ambivalence of many states to become partners
of the Belt and Road Initiative has clearly hindered Chinese dream of new globali-
zation through the silk road legacy. Thus far India has been a strong opponent to BRI
despite its intertwined history with the old Silk Road and India’s hesitation to become
20 Schippmann, 1998.
21 Berlie, 2020: 42.
22 but see Cheng, 2016.
23 Brugier, 2014.
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a part BRI is rooted in her long political clash with China since Sino-Indian War
in 1962. But, the most compelling cause rendered India to boycott BRI is based on In-
dia mistrust towards Beijing as an indomitable threat to their reginal hegemony.24 India
showed disinclination for China-Pakistan economic corridor as a clear threat for Indian
territorial sovereignty. Furthermore, the Chinese presence in Himalayan territory,
mainly in the landlocked country Nepal has raised India’s suspicion dramatically.
Hemmed by Indian influence at large, Nepal has turned to Chinese promise of infra-
structure development and other benefits as a geopolitical blessing. Given these cir-
cumstances Nepal has gleefully become a part of BRI by allowing Chinese in China-
Nepal economic corridor in 2017 has raised India’s concern. Both Pakistan-China eco-
nomic corridor and Nepal-China economic corridor have been viewed by India as new
strategic tools of China to encircle India.25
The India’s antagonism towards the implementation of BRI in South Asia is
a stunning example for the power politics of the roads. Ironically, old Silk Road had
expanded its path along India as Indian subcontinent served a decisive location for old
Silk Road interests. The ancient Indian cities like Varanasi, Patali Putra were flou-
rished under the Silk Road, but at that India did not have a monolithic political identity
to maintain.26 As an alternative viewpoint, one can also suggest that, in the time of
the Maurya empire, from 300 BCE, Pataliputra was a main capital of a uniform Indian
empire. Under the Gupta Empire (which mostly coincides with the early Tang era) we
also see such a unified identity across most of the Indian subcontinent. And it was es-
pecially during these unified periods that trade in India flourished and expanded
enormously. Anyhow, the ambition grew in Indian psyche in its post independent era
to become great power has been always antagonistic towards the external influences
in South Asia. The doctrine initiated by then Indian prime minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi
in 1983 particularly emphasized the crucial importance of India for the stability of
the region.27 In such a dominating context, it is less surprising the way Indian sta-
tesmen treats Chinese BRI with an utter sense of scepticism.
Besides India’s concern of seeing BRI as a strategic project which would even-
tually cut her grip in the region, there are some other serious concerns arising in South
Asia in the aftermath of initiating BRI. In particular, the evasive manner of the part-
nership between China and the other member states in the new Silk Road in South Asia
has shown how BRI is gradually becoming a neo colonial project that intends to
challenge the territorial sovereignty of its member states. As Xi Jin Ping’s official
foreign policy, the overarching agenda of the BRI has been described by Beijing as
a fair project creating a win-win situation for both China and other member states.
24 Thaliyakkattil, 2019: 50.
25 Stobdan, 2019.
26 Frankopan, 2015: 89.
27 Dixith, 1997.
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Ostensibly China appears to be a state willing to invests in countries that are des-
perately looking for foreign investments and simultaneously China extends her
assistance in building roads and other infrastructure facilities in the member states of
BRI. The highway development project, Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport and
Hambantota International Harbour in Sri Lanka are the ideal examples showing
Chinese bonhomie. But the ulterior motives of China were exposed when Sri Lanka
had to hand over their port Hambantota for 99 years lease to China in 2017 as an ex-
change for debt relief.28 Situation in Sri Lanka exposed just a tip of the iceberg. Sri
Lanka being a part of China’s vision in maritime silk road sought the indulgence of
Chinese debt in the expense of losing its economic sovereignty.
A similar situation is likely to happen in Pakistan with the intensity of Chinese
presence. Both China and Pakistan have maintained a good rapport with both countries
in the past and the China-Pakistan economic corridor as a pivotal factor in the BRI has
provided rosy expectations to Pakistan as a project which lead to boost country’s
economy. On the contrary, the dominating Chinese presence in Pakistan under the ban-
ner of BRI has increased the resentment in Pakistan public largely.29 Especially
Islamabad’s inability to negotiate with Chinese proposals has resulted in relying
on Chinese aid the infrastructure development such as railway lines and harbour
projects. However, none of the projects carried under China-Pakistan economic
corridor has generated employment opportunities for Pakistanis as Chinese have
preferred to employ people from their nationality. In 2017 Chinese consulate in Balu-
chistan was attacked by a separatist group which claimed Chinese as oppressors in
the region along with Pakistani forces.30 At this point, we should also dully note that
the Diamer Basha Dam to be built under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will
displace thousands of people and submerge another thousands of rock carvings dating
as back as the 6th millennium.
The revival of the Silk Road under BRI has created a dilemma in South Asia as
it leads the states in the region to lose their sovereign rights. Malaysian premier
Mahathir Mohammad cancelled all the BRI projects initiated by the previous gover-
nment stating that Chinese BRI as a resemblance of a neo-colonial project.31
The utilization of resources amid conflicts for own benefits has been another notable
aspect of the BRI and the example in Myanmar is an apt illustration to it. The project
initiated by China in Myanmar with the military government to develop China-
Myanmar economic corridor portrayed a holistic picture providing some sanguine
hopes to the waning economy in Myanmar. However, the number of infrastructure
projects started by Chinese in various regions in Myanmar have caused a strong protest
28 Maces, 2020.
29 Jain, 2018: 12.
30 Jain, 2018: 18.
31 Erickson, 2019.
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from the people in Myanmar as those projects have hindered the environmental
stability in the regions. Also, the largest and most controversial project under BRI
in Myanmar is the Myitsone Dam, a 6,000-megawatt hydropower project that would
have displaced over 10,000 villagers in Kachin state. This project was revived in 2019
at the second Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, where Chinese promised Myanmar
government to provide one billion Yuan grant for improving the livelihood of the peo-
ple affected by the civil war. But, the severe damage caused by Chinese-Myanmar
economic corridor in certain regions cannot be healed or diminished by a financial
grant. In particular, Kachin state has seen a steeping increase of deforestation which is
attributed to road building project under Chinese funds and it has further opened a path
to transport timber from Kachin to Chinese territory. All in all, Myanmar is just one
example along with Pakistan and Sri Lanka in South Asia as bitter witnesses to
the revival of the Silk Road in the 21st century.
Some of the critics have pointed out the rise of Chinese presence and expan-
sion of BRI would undermine the decision-making ability of the sovereign states
creating a new type of colonialism. The gravity of BRI and its influence in state appa-
ratuses in its partner states are akin to the way how British East India company trapped
princely states in Indian sub-continent before subordinating India by force in the colo-
nial past. However, in examining the reality of the history of the Silk Road, it becomes
purely evident the Chinese hegemony in acquiring the best profit has been always
robust motive since the very beginning of the Silk Road. According to economic histo-
rian Andre Gunder Frank, China had been an economic heavyweight in the ear of
the old silk road and the whole global economic order was Sinocentric until the era of
European colonialism.32 Ancient network of the Silk Roads provided a greater momen-
tum in the Chinese economy and most importantly the political fragmentation in
the Silk Roads was based on Chinese dominance over the small states. Subordinate
small states in East Asia provided tributary for China and in doing so they admitted
the political authority of China. Gundar Frank has pointed out “Chinese civilization
through the Silk Road provided a common intellectual, linguistic and normative
framework in which to interact and resolve the conflicts”.33 The modern attitude of
China towards the state parties in the BRI or the modern avatar of the ancient Silk
Road legacy reminds of the old superior status perceived by Chinese. The notion of
global governance of Xi Jinping and his flair for China -centric globalization has
generated dozens of practical questions. Furthermore, the broadness of BRI and
the questions arising from it regarding sovereign rights of the states and some potential
threats to the environment are not mere rhetorical quibbles to ignore. Above mentioned
32 Frank, 1992.
33 Frank, 1992: 89.
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examples that have been already stemmed from South Asian states have raised the con-
cern about the objectivity of Belt and Road Initiative.
Using Archaeology as a way of legitimacy
Archaeology is a theme that has a long-standing affinity with colonialism
which had harboured and to a certain extend fortified the motives of Western imperial
missions in the 19th century. After increasing the capital through labour exploitation
and its rapid colonial expansion, Victorian England in the 19th was obsessed with ma-
king a resemblance of themselves and the Greco-Roman antiquity. The predilection
pervaded in the minds of British administrators in the 19th century affirmed that
British empire reflected the same virtues practised in ancient Rome.34 The archae-
ological expeditions led by British archaeologists in Ottoman ruled Greece and divided
Italy received rather welcoming attention in Britain as it was portrayed as their fate
to be the successor of Greco-Roman grandeur. For the French colonial archaeologists,
the parallel between their colonial quest and Roman legacy was still visible in North
Africa as the whole region happened to be colonized by them. David J Mattingly has
pointed out how zealously British and French archaeologists tried to make similarities
between the colonial possessions of their countries and Roman empire.35 In that con-
text, the usage of archaeology in colonial era was oriented in self-aggrandizement.
It seems to be ironic that the recent revival of China’s 21st century interest
in invoking their past and seeking the archaeological traces of the ancient Silk Road
follows the same ambition of the European colonialists used in the 19th century.
Through its actions, the Chinese government is claiming the Silk Road was an inven-
tion of theirs and the Chinese was the natural bearer of the movement landscapes;
in Antiquity, China was the last to join the networks, and only in Medieval times did
Chinese trade become more dominant. The reality is contrary to narrative of Chinese
hegemony of the Silk Road from time immemorial. To create this narrative, Beijing
has led a massive campaign in revisiting the Silk Road archaeology across Asia toward
Africa with the Belt and Road Initiative. The geopolitical trajectory of China’s usage of
archaeology is grounded on the conspicuous motive of gaining the legitimacy for
the BRI through evidence stemming from the past. The Chinese technical support
in preserving the Buddhist archaeological sites in Pakistan is just one example from se-
veral other incidents that underpins the argument showing how China has been fas-
cinated with the past as tool to legitimize its ambitious project. The cultural agreement
signed between Chinese minister of culture Luo Shugang and Pakistani minister of sta-
te for information and national history Marriyum Aurangzeb in 2018 was intended
34 Lawrence, 2003: 27.
35 Mattingly, 2014.
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to consolidate the longstanding historical ties with two countries that have derived
from the silk road legacy.36 It is worth noting that, the Pakistan’s nostalgia to restore its
archaeological excavation on the silk route saw a sudden revival after the visit of
Chinese leader Xi Ji Ping to Pakistan in 2015, where Chinese leader overwhelmingly
focused on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as an essential feature to the overall
success of Belt and Road Initiative. The technical and financial support promised
by China in Pakistan to preserve its archaeological heritage has been received a gesture
of camaraderie by Pakistani government of premier Imran Khan. But, from a critical
perspective, there is a strong contention that one can make on China’s passionate effort
in aiding the silk road preservation archaeology as a strategy oriented in the civili-
zational legitimacy. The same level of enthusiasm has been upheld toward Africa
as China considers African countries as crucially important members to the BRI.
The revival of China’s interest in tracing its historical roots in African continent has
created a new discourse about Zheng He’s maritime expedition to East African
countries in the 15th century.37 The naval expeditions of Zheng He under the Ming
dynasty denote the maritime strength possessed by the Chinese before Europeans
envisaged it, however, the modern fascination of China on revisiting Zheng’ expe-
ditions to Eastern African coast is an apt illustration of showing its strategy toward
Africa in bolstering its presence.38 As we noted, the sheer objectives of granting bene-
volent support in preserving the silk route archaeology symbolizes the self-aggran-
dizement of Beijing as the rightful custodian of the ancient Silk Route and Beijing is li-
kely to use it as a powerful tool to strengthen BRI objectives.
Academic Discourse around the BRI
At this point, we would like to open a parenthesis for academic work related
to the BRI. Due to the intricate nature of the topic, our focus is on the environmental
impact of the new Silk Road project, and the scholarly work built around it. We inten-
tionally choose the environment as a theme, because it has better chances to offer
scientific consensus across the globe. However, we investigate BRI related environ-
mental work not for their scientific integrities and validities, but for the ways in which
colleagues support their scientific narratives. We provide lengthy quotes with the hopes
of reducing our own bias.
The brief literature review suggests that most of the environmental work rela-
ted to the BRI comes from Chinese scholars. A thematic issue in Environmental Earth
Sciences, which is published by Springer, aims to find “harmony between the envi-
36 Storozum & Li, 2020.
37 Lin, 2011: 23.
38 Wekesa, 2015: 117.
Page | 390
ronment and humanity” and explores “balance between environmental protection and
economic growth” due to the Silk Road initiative.39
All the authors in the thematic issue agrees on the fact that the new Silk Road
will have detrimental effects for the countries it will pass through, but especially China
itself. The impact, however, should be mitigated with sound science and through
the cooperation of participating countries. Because, the project will bring “immense
economic benefit to the undeveloped northwest part of China and Eurasian countries,
especially central Asian countries”.40 However,
“[t]he countries of Central Asia need to recognise that the economic success of
the proposed new ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ hinges on their ability to develop
programs that can ensure the region’s water resources are managed in a sound
and sustainable manner...External pressures from neighbouring Russia and Chi-
na are likely required to make this happen”.41
In fact, China should play the leading role and help other countries to mitigate
the environmental impact of the BRI since
“the New Silk Road could become a great ‘river of knowledge’ connecting
China and Central Asian countries such as India and Pakistan, with the Middle
East and Europe. As the seed to this initiative, a research institute needs to be
established under the auspices of the Chinese central government that would be
responsible for conducting, managing and supervising pioneering research in
support of the New Silk Road project. This institute could be based in Xi’an,
where the road starts, with subbranches of the parent institute created in other
countries as the road grows and the ‘river of knowledge’ develops”.42
In their work, our colleagues assume, but do not show the new Silk Road will
bring economic benefits to Eurasia. The assumption is feeding from the success stories
of the historical Silk Road and scientific work is finding refugee in historical nar-
ratives; it appears as the fantasy of the BRI has already became concrete in scientific
circles. Furthermore, since the BRI will be realized inevitably, the ‘smaller’ countries
of the Central Asia should find ways to mitigate the environmental impact of the mega-
infrastructure project. China (and Russia) will need to police these mitigation efforts
since in their current status these countries will not be able to accomplish the task
themselves. Finally, the last hegemonic move will come from the academia and China
39 Li, Qian & Zhou, 2017.
40 Zhang, et al., 2016: 938.
41 Howard & Howard, 2016: 976.
42 Li, et al., 2015: 7270.
Page | 391
will provide the necessary knowledge and expertise for the potential environmental
crisis which it will create. Chinese state apparatus is indeed destabilizing postcolonial
studies.43
It is also claimed that the BRI will help participating countries in converging
their energy efficiencies (EE). However, to provide a stable groundwork for the BRI,
scientists should “clarify whether the initiative will narrow the gaps in EE among
the member economies or not, and also provide practical information for policy makers
in China and the other BR countries”.44 They conclude that their study “cannot esti-
mate empirically the impact of the BR initiative on EE convergence directly due to
the nascent status of the BR. However, there is no better way to predict the impact of
the BR. In future, when the BR is in effect, conducting an empirical test of its impact
on EE convergence would be a highly valuable contribution to all concerned”.45
Therefore, one should rely on these scholars’ intuition.
Such inferences do not surprise the reader as it is common for the higher
education and research to follow dominant state ideologies.46 Kamola uses an Althus-
serian analysis and shows how the US higher education underwent structural trans-
formations serving the needs of daily, but also global material practices envisioned
by the neo-liberal doctrines of Thatcher and Reagan. A subject (an academic subject
in this case) produces an imaginary relationship thorough “repetition of particular
actions within the context of structured material apparatuses”.47 However, since there is
no single ideology and different apparatuses have the potential of producing multiple
ideologies, one should talk about not an imaginary relationship, but relationships. What
makes the Chinese academic knowledge production peculiar is the fact that it is satu-
rated with nationalist ideas in state, intellectual, and popular domains.48 Yet, the BRI
narrative is overtly transnational and points at a future unified region. Then, it is no
surprise there is great scepticism towards the BRI across the globe.
Conclusion
China’s use of Western-coined term ‘Silk Road’ is unusual as it intends to evo-
ke positive images of the past and promote an understanding of prosperity and connec-
tivity.49 This aim, however, is based on uncertain socioeconomic, political, and cultural
narratives as discussed throughout this paper.
43 Vukovich, 2017.
44 Han, et al., 2018: 113.
45 Han, et al., 2018: 121.
46 see Chomsky, et al., 1997.
47 Kamola, 2014: 523.
48 Wu, 2016.
49 Van Noort 2020: 186.
Page | 392
The first issue is the mechanism Chinese government deploys in order to
broadcast a positive image of the BRI. The mechanism selectively constructs the past;
BRI is a prime example of using archaeology to legitimize modern state endeavours.50
Foremost, the political landscapes of the historic Silk Road and the BRI are drastically
different. Silk Road was running through four empires (Han, Parthian, Kushan and
Roman) which were lined up in a unique historical setting and stretching between
the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. These empires had provided some sense of security
within their borders and had mutual agreements where parties were benefiting from
the trade one way or the other. Modern-day China, on the other hand, single-handedly
negotiates with a series of nation-states with entirely different modus operandi.
As a matter of fact, self-claimed romantic universalism spearheaded by China should
deal with the issues generated by the governments of India and Pakistan, which are
heavily motivated with nuclearization. The new Silk Road landscape also includes
contested territories of oil-rich Caucuses, and Iran, one of the major ‘Axis of Evil’
countries.51 As a geopolitical project, the BRI fuels the struggle between powers of
the region within constantly shifting framework. The spill over of this struggle is
immense for local regions. For instance, China intended to build a deep-water port
in Crimea to bypass Russia for commodities delivery to Europe. The project was halted
when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in the aftermath of 2014 Ukraine revo-
lution. Ukraine had agreed to be part of the BRI in 2013.52 However, in 2015 Russia
agreed to integrate the Eurasian Economic Union (EUU) with the BRI.53
The emergence of China cantered globalization is another objective behind
the gigantic project of BRI with its overarching portrayal as Chinese method of
‘peaceful rise’ or ‘Harmonious Society’ contrary to Western colonialism through harsh
military strategies.54 The Chinese vision posits a utopia which is intended to be built
upon a past filled with self-proclaimed nostalgia which was mainly idealized through
Western orientalism and China has forged it suitable for its project. But it is quite
palpable that this depiction becomes antithetical with the real geopolitical strategy that
China has been using in the member states of BRI. The loss of territorial rights before
Chinese debts and other undue influences of BRI are much akin to a new type of colo-
nialism in the 21st century, which is rather paradoxical to what China promotes in its
Silk Road narrative as a peaceful project connecting the world.55 The conspicuous
reality of the BRI is leading to China’s globalization and the usage of the silk road ro-
mance seems to have embodied the China’s leading role in the history as a dominant
50 Harrison, 2013.
51 Thorsten, 2005: 303.
52 Brugier, 2014.
53 Cheng, 2016.
54 Bijian, 2005.
55 Iqbal, Rahman & Sami, 2019.
Page | 393
player. However, in fulfilling this mission China has embraced a past created by
the West that resulted in making an anomaly to what China perceives as their alter-
native to the West centric globalization. In doing so China has shown an ardour of
using the archaeological traces of the roads for the legitimacy. As an example, the way
how, China uses its soft power strategies to reduce the perception that China is the do-
minant actor in BRI is based on Chinese attempt of portraying the historical links
between China and other states through the silk road in the past. Nevertheless, this pre-
mise appears to be a problematic one as the so-called roads of the past cannot be aptly
applicable in the present projection of BRI by virtue of the geopolitical discontents
around it.
This image also generates a new way of Orientalism. As Nobis succinctly puts
China produces a “utopian future by extensively relying on a non-existent, and thus,
utopian past – a past created by Richthofen, Verne, Marco Polo, and their likes.
Interestingly and symptomatically, the Chinese project of this silk global utopia draws
to the past, which is the invention of Western Orientalism”.56 Through this Self-Orien-
talism, I claim, China falls into the trap of creating an East-West divide while at the sa-
me time, creating an image of a shared destiny also created by the new silk road pro-
ject.57 The problem is further complicated by the fact that archaeological data pertai-
ning to the ancient trade networks (up to the Han Empire) are still misread or wrongly
interpreted by historians (like Beckwith and Frankopan, and also by the Chinese autho-
rities). The Self-Orientalism that China yearns to aggrandize has been used as a stra-
tegy in the partner states of BRI in order to legitimize the civilizational romance with
China as the paternal state that continues to nourish all the other states. The annals of
Chinese history are a far better witness in proving China’s infatuation with dominance
over other states as historically the country portrayed herself as Middle Kingdom
wherein states in the periphery beyond Chinese empire were seen as subordinate states
to China.58 The Chinese interest in portraying the civilizational narrative in the member
states of BRI is just a reminder of China’s hegemonic attitude towards the neigh-
bouring states in the antiquity. For example, the new silk road diplomacy that China
aptly uses to accomplish its grand objectives in BRI is consisted of patronizing the aca-
demic institutes and financially sponsoring the pro Chinese think tanks in the member
states. On the other hand, the enthusiasm shown by the Chinese in reviving the histo-
rical links with the member states of BRI denotes the subtle way China has been
utilizing the archaeological space in a politicalized project. The Chinese attempt of
creating Silk Road narratives of the past which mainly exaggerates the historical role
of China in the Silk Road. Such an attempt driven by sheer power ambition may result
in accelerating the distance between the West and the Orient. The kaleidoscopic history
56 Nobis, 2018: 728.
57 Van Noort, 2020: 203.
58 Ruskola, 2013.
Page | 394
that China reverently glorifies parallel to their ambitious BRI project essentially needs
a focus on the shared destiny of the Silk Road rather than relying on China’s own
selective historical narratives.
The BRI is a problematic project. It has unknown future socioeconomic, politi-
cal, and cultural consequences while Chinese state hegemony keeps spilling over
Eurasia in multiple domains, including academia. Nevertheless, BRI is not unique
in the sense that state hegemony operates and produces fictive images. In general,
public perception considers roads as connective infrastructures since they herald
improvements in mobility, economics, and political integration.59 Furthermore, roads
help in the creation of imaginative geographies of security in contested landscapes.60
The BRI carries these historical and archaeological imaginations to trans-national
levels in the 21st century.
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To cite this article: Amarasinghe, P. (2023). Revival of the Silk Road legacy. Examining how
China uses history to legitimize its ‹‹Belt and Road Initiative››. Historia i Świat, 12, 379–396.
https://doi.org/10.34739/his.2023.12.23
© 2023 The Author(s). This open access article is distributed under
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