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Population Dynamics
in the Mediterranean
A Demographic
Convergence?
SpringerBriefs in Population Studies
Yoann Doignon · Isabelle Blöss-Widmer ·
Elena Ambrosetti · Sébastien Oliveau
SpringerBriefs in Population Studies
Advisory Editors
Baha Abu-Laban, Edmonton, AB, Canada
Mark Birkin, Leeds, UK
Dudley L. Poston Jr., Department of Sociology, Texas A&M University, College
Station, TX, USA
John Stillwell, Leeds, UK
Hans-Werner Wahl, Deutsches Zentrum für Alternsforschung (DZFA), Institut für
Gerontologie, Universität Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany
D. J. H. Deeg, VU University Medical Centre/LASA, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
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Yoann Doignon · Isabelle Blöss-Widmer ·
Elena Ambrosetti · Sébastien Oliveau
Population Dynamics
in the Mediterranean
A Demographic Convergence?
Yoann Doignon
IDEES UMR 6266, CNRS
Mont-Saint-Aignan, France
Elena Ambrosetti
MEMOTEF Department
Sapienza University of Rome
Rome, Italy
Isabelle Blöss-Widmer
MESOPOLHIS UMR 7064, CNRS
Aix-Marseille University
Aix-en-Provence, France
Sébastien Oliveau
MESOPOLHIS UMR 7064, CNRS
Aix-Marseille University
Aix-en-Provence, France
ISSN 2211-3215 ISSN 2211-3223 (electronic)
SpringerBriefs in Population Studies
ISBN 978-3-031-37758-7 ISBN 978-3-031-37759-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37759-4
© The Author(s) 2023. This book is an open access publication.
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Preface
“La démographie en Méditerranée: situation et projections” (Economica, 2001) has
been released more than 20 years for Plan Bleu. I am delighted to see a new publi-
cation on the topic, delighted for several reasons. First of all, it was a much needed
and highly anticipated work on a part of the world that concentrates number of
issues that are highlighted by demography. I am also delighted as this publication
adopts a holistic approach, successfully achieving the difficult feat of producing a
complex and changing territory. Finally, I am delighted as I know the team that
has been working on this publication for several years and because this publication
is a result of a long-term project carried out by the Mediterranean Demographic
Observatory—DemoMed, which is attached to the University of Aix-Marseille.
The Mediterranean is a region experiencing global challenges. While some may
have seen it as a “clash of civilisations” and others as a “convergence of civilisations”,
it is, in fact, a place of meetings and exchanges dating back thousands of years.
Throughout the publication, the authors demonstrate the convergence of demographic
trends in the various Mediterranean countries. The most recent statistics were used,
although national statistics were not used as frequently, this was the only realistic
option for conducting a harmonised analysis of the phenomena for the Mediterranean
as a whole. The publication makes sure, however, to look at developments over more
than half a century and does not shy away from projecting the possible future of the
region.
The authors, in a rather novel way, sometimes propose sub-national analyses,
which remind us that countries are not homogeneous blocks, and that certain regions
on one shore are more similar to regions on another shore than to regions in neigh-
bouring countries. The choice of conducting a global analysis, as opposed to focusing
on certain specific places, has the virtue of offering a truly comparative vision and of
putting each situation into context. The desire to go beyond the irreducible unique-
ness of places runs through all the chapters. At the same time, however, the reading
of the phenomena focuses on the particularity of certain countries or regions of the
Mediterranean.
In a very fluid manner, the four authors begin by describing the settlement of the
region as a favourable, but restrictive, geographical setting that welcomes a variety of
v
vi Preface
populations with diverse, but ultimately convergent trajectories, with the exception
of those where the political situation is particularly difficult (Israel, Palestine). This is
followed by analyses of fertility, mortality and migration, classic themes in population
analysis, which they use as a driving force to understand the transformations of the
societies studied, both in terms of habitat (coastalisation, urbanisation) and social
(gender relations, elderly care) or economical (windows of opportunity, demographic
dividends) dimensions. These elements are all challenges that are fuelled by transition
processes and population dynamics.
To fully understand the will that motivated this group of researchers and the
originality of the angle chosen to produce this work, it is worth recalling that out
of the four colleagues who wrote it, two are demographers, one a geographer and
one (the first author) a disciplinary hybrid, which his doctoral thesis on ageing in
the Mediterranean has already demonstrated. For more than 10 years now, the four
of them have been in charge of the Mediterranean Demographic Observatory—
DemoMed at the Maison Méditerranéenne des Sciences de l’Homme in Aix-en-
Provence (France). This observatory brings together a network of colleagues from
teaching and research institutions around the Mediterranean driven by the same
desire to understand the changes taking place in this geographical area in the field of
population studies. This publication brings together their expertise from the different
scientific fields of demography, geography, statistics and sociology. It is just like
them: diverse in its approaches, demanding in its methods, but also richly documented
and illustrated.
It is therefore without hesitation that I recommend reading this publication, as
its contribution to the knowledge of this part of the world is as essential for those
who live there as for the rest of the world. The Mediterranean is a concentration
of humanity where many phenomena that are in fact universal are played out and
thwarted: declining fertility, declining mortality, changing family structures, ageing
and also migration and development.
Demographer, Former Senior Researcher at the French Institute for Demographic
Studies (INED)
Paris, France Youssef Courbage
Acknowledgements
This publication would not have been possible in its present form without the help of
various individuals and institutions, whom we would like to thank now. It is the result
of work carried out since 2010 by the Mediterranean Demographic Observatory—
DemoMed—within the Maison Méditerranéenne des Sciences de l’Homme (MMSH)
at Aix-Marseille University.
We would like to thank its directors, Brigitte Marin and Sophie Bouffier, for all
their support from the very beginning of the project.
We would also like to thank the staff of our parent institutions for their help
and understanding, especially those from the MESOPOLHIS laboratory, IACCHOS
(UCLouvain), the MMSH and La Sapienza.
We would like to thank all our colleagues and the students and trainees who worked
with us over the years, particularly for their help with data collection and analysis,
and with the logistics of the final drafting of the manuscript, especially Elise Lévêque,
Quentin Godoye, Clément De Belsunce, Jean-Baptiste Cortese, Florent Kuntzmann,
Marc Soler, Thomas Finiels and Claire Vandemoortele.
We would like to thank Ami Saji for her careful review of the final manuscript.
We would like to thank Youssef Courbage who has honoured us by writing the
preface for this work. It is a testimony of which we are very proud.
We would like to thank La Sapienza University of Rome, the Maison Méditer-
ranéenne des Sciences de l’Homme (MMSH, UAR 3125) of the University of Aix-
Marseille, the Institute for the Analysis of Change in Contemporary and Historical
Societies (IACCHOS) of the University of Leuven, and the MESOPOLHIS labora-
tory (UMR 7064) for their financial support, which has allowed us to publish this
book as open access and, in turn, make it accessible to the largest possible number
of people.
We sincerely thank Evelien Bakker, Corina van der Giessen, Aarthi Padmanabhan,
Bernadette Deelen-Mans and Prashanth Ravichandran from Springer for their trust,
patience and professionalism.
Last, but not least, we would like to thank our loved ones for all their support.
vii
Contents
1General Introduction: A Study of Mediterranean Populations ..... 1
1.1 A Book Addressing the Lack of Pan-Mediterranean
Demographic Studies ..................................... 1
1.1.1 In Search of Human Unity in the Mediterranean ........ 2
1.1.2 The Mediterranean and Population Sciences ........... 4
1.1.3 A Lack of Pan-Mediterranean Demographic Studies .... 5
1.2 Approach and Commitment ................................ 6
1.2.1 What Do We Mean by the Mediterranean? ............. 6
1.2.2 International Comparisons Over Time ................ 8
1.2.3 Grid Convergence to Analyse Demographic
Phenomena ....................................... 11
1.2.4 Data Used ........................................ 11
1.3 Structure of the Book ..................................... 13
References .................................................... 14
2Spatial Distribution of Population and Urbanisation .............. 19
2.1 Introduction ............................................. 19
2.2 Uneven Distribution of the Population ....................... 20
2.3 Far from Determinism: Opportunities and Constraints
of Mediterranean Areas ................................... 24
2.4 A Very Coastal and Increasing Urbanisation .................. 25
2.5 Settlement Challenges in the Mediterranean .................. 29
References .................................................... 30
3Sex Ratio, Age Structure and Population Ageing ................. 33
3.1 Introduction ............................................. 33
3.2 Gender Inequalities in the Mediterranean .................... 34
3.3 An Ageing Population .................................... 36
3.4 Ongoing Significant Differences in Age Structure Between
Regions ................................................. 37
3.5 Implications and Consequences of Age Structure
Differences .............................................. 40
ix
xContents
References .................................................... 41
4The Various of Demographic Transitions ........................ 43
4.1 Introduction ............................................. 43
4.2 Demographic Transition “Models” .......................... 46
4.2.1 Type 1: Ancient Transition
with Pseudo-Equilibrium in the 1970s
(Spain, France) .................................... 46
4.2.2 Type 2: Transition with Pseudo-Equilibrium
in the Late 1990s (Cyprus, Montenegro, Malta) ........ 47
4.2.3 Type 3: Rapid Transition with Late
Pseudo-Equilibrium from the 2000s Onwards
(Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo) ....................... 47
4.3 Completed Demographic Transition
with a Post-Transitional Decline Regime ..................... 49
4.3.1 Type 4: Transition with Pseudo-Equilibrium
in the 1980s–1990s (Italy, Portugal, Greece,
Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria) ......................... 50
4.3.2 Type 5: Transition with Pseudo-Equilibrium
in the 2000s (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina) ............ 50
4.4 Completed Demographic Transition
with a Post-Transitional Regime with Sustained
Population Growth (Type 6: Israel) ......................... 50
4.5 Recent and Rapid Demographic Transition, Now Being
Finalised ................................................ 52
4.5.1 Type 7: Transition Already Underway in 1950
(Lebanon, Turkey) ................................. 53
4.5.2 Type 8: More Recent Transition (Libya, Morocco,
Tunisia) .......................................... 54
4.6 Possible Demographic Counter-Transitions (Type 9:
Egypt, Algeria) .......................................... 56
4.7 Recent and Ongoing Transition, Slower Decline in Birth
Rate (Type 10: Jordan, Palestine, Syria) ..................... 58
4.8 A Diversity of Demographic Transitions Despite a General
Convergence ............................................. 58
References .................................................... 60
5Fertility Intensity and Timing .................................. 63
5.1 Introduction ............................................. 63
5.2 A Global Fertility Convergence ............................ 64
5.3 The Intersection of Birth Timing and Fertility Intensity ........ 66
5.3.1 Mean Age at Childbearing .......................... 66
5.3.2 Fertility by Age Group ............................. 69
5.4 Specific Contributions of Age Groups ....................... 72
5.5 (Un)certainties for the Future of Mediterranean Fertility ....... 75
References .................................................... 78
Contents xi
6Family Formation and Dissolution .............................. 81
6.1 Introduction ............................................. 82
6.2 Major Marriage and Divorce Trends ........................ 82
6.2.1 Marriage ......................................... 82
6.2.2 Divorce .......................................... 85
6.3 Changes in Marriage ...................................... 88
6.3.1 An Increase in Age at Marriage ...................... 88
6.3.2 Permanent Celibacy ................................ 92
6.3.3 Summary of Family Models ......................... 94
6.4 Conclusion .............................................. 96
References .................................................... 97
7Mortality Profiles ............................................. 99
7.1 Introduction ............................................. 99
7.2 Mortality at All Ages: Life Expectancy at Birth ............... 100
7.2.1 A Very Heterogeneous Picture in 1950 ................ 100
7.2.2 General Convergence Since 1950 .................... 102
7.2.3 Decreases in Life Expectancy at Birth ................. 103
7.2.4 Gender Inequalities ................................ 104
7.3 The Different Mortality Profiles ............................ 105
7.3.1 Infant and Child Mortality (Under 5 Years Old) ........ 106
7.3.2 Adult Mortality (15–64 Years Old) ................... 108
7.3.3 Mortality at Advanced Ages (65 Years Old or Older) .... 109
7.4 The Health Transition ..................................... 111
7.5 Conclusion .............................................. 113
References .................................................... 114
8The Mediterranean Migration System ........................... 117
8.1 Introduction ............................................. 117
8.2 Migration in the Mediterranean (1950–1995) ................. 119
8.3 Migration in the Mediterranean in the XXI Century ........... 121
8.4 Two Emerging Phenomena: High Skilled and Irregular
Migration ............................................... 125
8.5 Conclusions ............................................. 127
References .................................................... 128
9Population Dynamics and Their Components .................... 131
9.1 Introduction ............................................. 131
9.2 Evolving Power Relations ................................. 132
9.3 Natural and Migration Dynamics: Which Combinations
Exist in the Mediterranean? ................................ 135
9.3.1 Natural Dynamics: South and East ................... 135
9.3.2 Migration Dynamics: Sending Versus Receiving
Countries ......................................... 137
9.4 Growth Outlook to 2060: What Can We Expect? .............. 138
References .................................................... 142
xii Contents
10 Conclusions. An Overview of Population Dynamics
in the Mediterranean .......................................... 145
10.1 Major Demographic Developments Since 1950 ............... 145
10.2 An Assessment of the Book’s Overall Approach .............. 148
References .................................................... 151
References ........................................................ 153
About the Authors
Yoann Doignon holds a Ph.D. in population geography from the Aix-Marseille
University, France. He is Researcher with the French National Centre for Scientific
Research (CNRS), affiliated with the UMR 6266 IDEES (Rouen, France). He is too
an Associated Researcher at the Center for Demographic Research (UCLouvain,
Belgium) and at the UMR 7363 SAGE (Strasbourg, France). He has been a collabo-
rator of the Mediterranean Demographic Observatory (DemoMed) for several years.
He specialises in Mediterranean populations. His Ph.D. focused on territorial and
spatial convergence of the ageing population in the Mediterranean. Additionally, he
has been studying population decline in France and Southern Europe, and on spatial
diffusion processes of demographic phenomena, especially family changes in Europe
and fertility decline.
Isabelle Blöss-Widmer holds a Ph.D. in demography from University Paris I –
Panthéon Sorbonne. She is Associate Professor at Aix-Marseille University, and
a researcher at the UMR 7064 MESOPOLHIS. She is the head of the Mediter-
ranean Demographic Observatory at the Maison Méditerranéenne des Sciences de
l’Homme. Her current research is mainly on the demography of Mediterranean coun-
tries, in particular, the causes and consequences of demographic ageing examined at
different administrative scales of the territories.
Elena Ambrosetti holds a Ph.D. in demography from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques,
Paris, France. She is Associate Professor of Demography at the Faculty of Economics
and affiliated to the Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and
Finance—Sapienza University of Rome, Italy. Since October 2022 she is research
fellow of Mesopolhis, Aix-Marseille University, Sciences Po Aix & National Centre
for Scientific Research (France). She is member of the Mediterranean Demographic
Observatory (DemoMed). She has extensively worked on the demography of the
Mediterranean countries with special attention to the demographic transition in Egypt
and in Northern African countries and to population ageing and its consequences in
Italy and in the Southern European Mediterranean countries. Additionally, she is
xiii
xiv About the Authors
an expert on international migration, with particular focus on migrants’ integration,
migration policies and demographic behaviour of migrant populations.
Sébastien Oliveau holds a Ph.D. in geography from University Paris I, France
(2004) and a Habilitation from Aix-Marseille University (2011). He is the director
of the Large Research Infrastructure PROGEDO (https://progedo.fr) and researcher
at MESOPOLHIS, Mediterranean centre in Sociology, political science and history,
France (UMR 7064, CNRS). As Assistant Professor at Aix-Marseille University, he
has supervised s everal PhDs since 2010. His research focuses on the spatial analysis
of populations. He is currently working in the Observatoire démographique de la
Méditerranée (DemoMed).
Chapter 1
General Introduction: A Study
of Mediterranean Populations
Abstract The Mediterranean region has been much studied by human and social
sciences. The length of its written history, and the variety of civilisations sharing a
common history (going back to the Roman mare nostrum), of course, go some way to
explaining this wealth of studies. However, the Mediterranean has only recently been
studied as a global study area, rather than as separate sub-regions. We note that there
is a lack of recent general publications, or writings in general, providing a synthesis
or inventory of the various demographic phenomena on a pan-Mediterranean scale.
The aim of this publication is to provide an overview and detailed description of the
demographic trends of the last 70 years for the populations of the Mediterranean as
a whole.
Keywords Mediterranean ·Population studies ·International comparison ·
Demographic convergence
1.1 A Book Addressing the Lack of Pan-Mediterranean
Demographic Studies
The Mediterranean region has been much studied by human and social sciences. The
length of its written history, and the variety of civilisations sharing a common history
(going back to the Roman mare nostrum), of course, go some way to explaining this
wealth of studies. However, the Mediterranean has only recently been studied as a
global study area, rather than as separate sub-regions.
© The Author(s) 2023
Y. Doignon et al., Population Dynamics in the Mediterranean,
SpringerBriefs in Population Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37759-4_1
1
2 1 General Introduction: A Study of Mediterranean Populations
1.1.1 In Search of Human Unity in the Mediterranean
The very word “Mediterranean” was coined in the eighteenth century and refers only
to the fact of “being inland”1 (Bourguet et al., 1998). The Mediterranean was little
studied before the nineteenth century, owing to its lack of scientific significance. It
was thought of rather as a space of division and separation between very different
populations. It was not until three French scientific expeditions to Egypt (1798–
1799), the Morea (1829–1831) and Algeria (1839–1842) that the Mediterranean
became an object of study in itself. The research thus carried out attempted to give
consistency to the Mediterranean area by seeking to identify common elements on
both sides of this geographical area, which would make it possible to affirm the unity
and homogeneity of the region.
The botanists on the Egyptian expedition discovered species common to Syria,
the Barbary Coast and Southern France. Pyramus de Candolle (1820) considered the
Mediterranean to be one of the world’s 20 botanical regions. This led to the notion
of a Mediterranean region, although it was not recognised as having any specific
character. The Mediterranean was said to be a transitional botanical region between
the three continents, along a north–south and east–west gradient.
It was not until the 1830s that a s cientific discourse developed on the cultural unity
of the Mediterranean, based in particular on ancient history (Roman and Philhellenic
legacies). Thus, this geographical area is less and less perceived as a barrier or
a space of division between civilisations, but as an interface linking the different
shores, where the sea facilitates the exchange of ideas and trade more than the land
(Reclus, 1876).
The Vidalian approach, prominent at the end of the nineteenth century, broke
with tradition by positing that the physical homogeneity (climate and landscape)
of the Mediterranean had an influence on the lifestyles of its populations. The sea
is becoming less important than the land (Sorre & Sion, 1934). This idea of the
Mediterranean as a human unit cumulates with the work of Braudel (1949). He
was one of the first to articulate the concept of a Mediterranean world. He viewed
the Mediterranean as a permanent place of maritime and land exchanges, which
changes its meaning throughout history (Roncayolo, 2002). In particular, he empha-
sised the continuity throughout history, but also the homogeneity of the societies
surrounding the Mediterranean Sea. Landscapes are considered as major elements
of this homogeneity, in accordance with a certain geographical determinism of the
Vidalian approach, which has been vigorously criticised (Péguy, 1986). However,
Braudel deserves credit for taking on the Mediterranean and establishing it as an
object of study in the human and social sciences.
1 This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows:
“ce qui est au milieu des terres”.
1.1 A Book Addressing the Lack of Pan-Mediterranean Demographic Studies 3
Other scientific fields have been involved in this question of the geographical,
historical and cultural unity of Mediterranean societies. In particular, anthropolo-
gists have researched the common characteristics of social life, marking a coher-
ence of the Mediterranean world. For example, Peristiany (1968, 1976) proposed
the concept of “Mediterranean modes of thought”. Pitt-Rivers (1963) compared the
social structures of rural communities in several Mediterranean countries across the
different shores. He argued that Mediterranean unity stems from geomorphological
and climatic characteristics. Continuities over time would therefore be little affected
by political or religious changes. Others identified concepts and values characteristic
of social relations on both sides, such as honour and shame, the male virility complex
and patronage (Albera, 2006; Peristiany, 1966; Tolosana, 2001).
These aspects can also be found in the field of history of the family. Peter Laslett
(1983) proposed four patterns of family and household formation in historical Europe,
one of which was explicitly identified as Mediterranean. Subsequently, the testing
of this “Mediterranean model” quickly became one of the objectives of family and
marriage historians in Southern Europe and the Middle East (Sacchi & Viazzo, 2014).
Historians of the family have tended to dismiss the possibility of commonalities
between Mediterranean marriage and family patterns (Sacchi & Viazzo, 2014). On
the other hand, some have hypothesised a long-standing regional contrast between
Mediterranean Europe and the rest of the continent, and a very long-term continuity
of the different shores of the Mediterranean (Smith, 1990).
The human and cultural unity of the Mediterranean has been widely debated since
the 1960s. Anthropologists criticise, for example, the relevance of human unity as an
anthropological mirage and a sum of stereotypes of northern researchers, especially
of British anthropology (Herzfeld, 1987; Pina-Cabral, 1989). Some researchers reject
the category of the Mediterranean (Horden & Purcell, 2000) and question the very
existence of the object (Kayser, 1996).
At present, there is a growing consensus that rejects the vision of the Mediter-
ranean as a culturally homogenous area (Huebner, 2016). The human unity of the
Mediterranean no longer structures the frames of reference (Deprest, 2002). Never-
theless, it is possible to recognise a certain scientific coherence to the Mediter-
ranean without denying its heterogeneity. Bromberger and Durand (2001) believe,
for example, that it would be a mistake to present the Mediterranean as the ultimate
place of mixing and blending. Exchange, migration and spatial proximity do not
necessarily imply merging. However, without speaking of homogeneity, they recog-
nise a “family resemblance”2 between Mediterranean societies and cultures. This
can be explained by the circulation of ideas, human migration, a similar ecological
context and monotheism. Bromberger and Durand (2001) noted that the Mediter-
ranean is defined more by its differences than by its similarities. The specificity of
the Mediterranean space would be defined precisely by these differences, neither
too close nor too far away. The Mediterranean would then constitute a stimulating
study area for “understanding the whole range of possible relations with the other
2 This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows:
“air de famille”.
4 1 General Introduction: A Study of Mediterranean Populations
which is neither too close nor too far, neither too small nor too big”3 (Bromberger
and Durand, 2001), and would ultimately be an implicit tension between unity and
diversity of its characteristics (Von Kondratowitz, 2013).
1.1.2 The Mediterranean and Population Sciences
This overview, which is deliberately not exhaustive, reveals the extent to which
the Mediterranean area has been the subject of much research and intense debate
since the nineteenth century. Thus, in several social sciences disciplines (geography,
history, anthropology, etc.), the Mediterranean continue to constitute a relevant study
area. A specific field of research has emerged (Mediterranean studies), and there are
research structures dedicated to it, such as the Maison Méditerranéenne des Sciences
de l’Homme (MMSH) of the University of Aix-Marseille in France.
However, we note that this liveliness of studies and debates on the Mediterranean
is almost absent from the population sciences, the scientific field under which this
publication falls. The Mediterranean does not seem to be a geographical frame of
reference for population studies. The latter are largely concentrated on portions of
the Mediterranean area of varying size, but much less so on the Mediterranean
as a whole (on a pan-Mediterranean scale). The national scale remains the most
commonly adopted, with many monographs on a particular Mediterranean country
or sub-national regions. There are also regional studies which deal with a specific
region (in the broad sense) of the Mediterranean, such as the Maghreb (Fargues,
1990;LeBris, 2021; Ouadah-Bedidi et al., 2012; Sebti et al., 2009), the Near East
(Courbage, 2008; Fargues, 1995), the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediter-
ranean (Courbage, 1997, 1999, 2015; Fargues, 2000a; Rashad, 2015; Tabutin &
Schoumaker, 2005), the Balkans (Deslondes, 2004; Lerch, 2018; Sardon, 2001), and
the countries of Southern Europe (Avdeev et al., 2011; Doignon et al., 2016; Pfirsch,
2011).
Thus, compared with the numerous national and macro-regional monographs,
there are relatively few pan-Mediterranean demographic studies (Anastasiou et al.,
2020; Attané & Courbage, 2004; Carella & Parant, 2016; D’Addato, 2010; Doignon,
2019, 2020; Doignon et al., 2016; Fargues, 2000b; Fargues and Salinari, 2011; ITAN,
2015; Matthijs et al., 2016; Oliveau and Doignon, 2014; Salvini, 2023;Troisi&Von
Kondratowitz, 2013; Wilson, 2005; Zagaglia, 2013). This is probably due to the
demographic contrasts across the Mediterranean, which many researchers in the
population sciences consider to be too great to constitute a coherent study area.
Indeed, the shores of the Mediterranean are generally presented in terms of contrast:
a declining, low-fertility and ageing Northern shore facing a fast-growing, highly
fertile and young Southern and Eastern shore. However, this dichotomy does not take
3 This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows:
“appréhender toute la gamme des relations possibles avec l’autre qui n’est ni trop proche ni trop
lointain, ni trop petit ni trop grand”.
1.1 A Book Addressing the Lack of Pan-Mediterranean Demographic Studies 5
into account the dynamic nature of demographic phenomena in terms of time and
space. Mediterranean demography is in a state of flux, whether in terms of structures,
dynamics or demographic behaviour: the rapid spread of declining mortality and
fertility rates, the deceleration of population growth, the circulation of sociocultural or
family models and ideas, etc. Consequently, the disparities that so well characterised
the populations of the Mediterranean in the past are not necessarily of the same
intensity today. By shedding light on the spatial dichotomy between the shores in light
of recent demographic changes, it becomes possible to rethink the Mediterranean not
just as a space of contrasts, but as an area in the process of homogenisation.4
1.1.3 A Lack of Pan-Mediterranean Demographic Studies
In light of these various elements, we note that there is a lack of recent general
publications, or writings in general, providing a synthesis or inventory of the various
demographic phenomena on a pan-Mediterranean scale. For instance, the few existing
demographic studies on the Mediterranean as a whole often focus on a particular
demographic aspect. At this level, international migration remains perhaps the most
studied demographic phenomenon at the scale of the Mediterranean as a whole, as
the latter is conceptualised as a coherent migration system (Ambrosetti et al., 2016;
Wihtol de Wenden, 2019).
From a certain perspective, this lack of analysis of the demography of Mediter-
ranean populations as a whole is harmful. Population is the foundation of many
other socio-economic phenomena. Studying the population allows us to understand
the intimate aspects of a society, such as the fact of dying, giving birth, marrying,
migrating, etc. Often considered as basic, these phenomena are nevertheless essen-
tial for a detailed understanding of contemporary societies and their evolution. This
understanding would be more than welcome in the case of the Mediterranean, at a
time when there are various initiatives for regional integration and cooperation in the
Euro-Mediterranean region: Plan Bleu, the 5 + 5 Dialogue, the recent 2019 Summit
of the Two Shores of the Mediterranean, the Union for the Mediterranean, the NATO
Mediterranean Dialogue, the Centre for Mediterranean Integration, and the European
Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed). By updating our knowledge of population
dynamics in the Mediterranean, we would be able to generate interest and fuel discus-
sions in several fields, such as the social sciences, geopolitics, political sciences, etc.
This is all the more important when demography is used to study international rela-
tions. The clash of civilisations (Huntington, 1993) for example conceptualises the
youthfulness of Arab-Muslim societies (against the ageing societies of Europe) as a
determining cause of a war between civilisations. Today’s demography is thought to
be timeless, making political unrest and conflict in the Mediterranean inevitable at
4 By the term “homogenisation” we mean a reduction of contrasts, not a perfectly similar situation
shared by all Mediterranean populations.
6 1 General Introduction: A Study of Mediterranean Populations
the same time. The reduction of demographic contrasts is therefore a strong argument
against the clash of civilisations and its conflicting predictions.
The aim of this publication is to provide an overview and detailed description of
the demographic trends of the last 70 years for the populations of the Mediterranean
as a whole. From this point of view, we are in line with the approach taken some
20 years ago by Attané and Courbage (2004) in their publication Demography in the
Mediterranean region: situation and projections.
1.2 Approach and Commitment
1.2.1 What Do We Mean by the Mediterranean?
Firstly, we need to define the project’s study area. The delimitation of the Mediter-
ranean has been the subject of much debate, with no real consensus having been
reached. First of all, it is pertinent to consider the Mediterranean Sea as the essen-
tial element of the Mediterranean area, especially as it is easy to circumscribe. On
the other hand, the task becomes more complicated when it comes to delimiting
the Mediterranean land: we know where to start, from the Mediterranean shore, but
we do not know apriori where to stop. Thus, there are several delimitations of the
Mediterranean.
The Mediterranean has a characteristic climate with the concomitance of the dry
period and the hot period, and a very marked seasonal alternation. However, with
a width of 3,800 km, there are great climatic differences, both in terms of rainfall
and temperature. Indeed, the summer drought lasts between 2 and 3 months on the
Northern Shore of the Western Mediterranean, compared to 6 to 7 months on the
Eastern Shore (Clément, 2002).
Geographers of the nineteenth century choose to use the olive tree as the boundary
of the Mediterranean. This tree is said to be a shared symbol in the Mediterranean as
it is a gift from Athena to the Athenians, an idealised image of Abraham in the Old
Testament, the tree that introduces the Light in the Qur’an, and a representation of
justice and peace in many Mediterranean societies. However, the biogeographical and
bioclimatic limits would be insufficient and too stringent (Roncayolo, 2002). They
have the disadvantage of “revealing only one facet of the Mediterranean environment
and would always be an imperfect approximation”5 (Clément, 2002, 37).
Yves Lacoste (2001) proposed a geopolitical delimitation of the Mediterranean
from Morocco to Turkmenistan and Iran, passing through the Caucasus region and
the Gulf countries, and including the countries that are part of NATO (for example
the United Kingdom).
5 This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows:
“de ne révéler qu’une facette du milieu méditerranéen et constituent toujours une approximation
imparfaite”.
1.2 Approach and Commitment 7
Finally, other researchers, such as Robert Ilbert (2006), considered that there is
no fixed limit between the Mediterranean and the non-Mediterranean. The Mediter-
ranean would be characterised precisely by an absence of limits, since it would be a
territorial space limited by edge and not by a limit.
In this publication, we will delimit the Mediterranean in the following way. A
first simple geographical criterion is to choose the countries with direct access to the
Mediterranean Sea. However, national borders changed during the twentieth century
and problematic cases easily emerged, for example in the Balkans. At the end of the
First World War, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, i.e. today’s Croatia,
Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, was created and later called
Yugoslavia. Until the period between 1991 and 1995, this country had access to
the sea and could be considered Mediterranean. However, it is currently divided
into several different countries. Thus, what are now Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia
would no longer belong to the Mediterranean region due to their lack of access to the
sea. However, we believe that the Mediterranean character is not lost in the course
of political change. Some countries do not have direct access to the sea, but are
nevertheless extremely close: regions of Portugal, the West Bank, Jordan, Kosovo,
Serbia, Macedonia and Bulgaria are often located less than 250 kms from the sea
(Fig. 1.1).
For example, France and Algeria are considered Mediterranean. However, regions
in the north of France are as close to the Mediterranean Sea as some regions of the
Caucasian countries, Russia, Poland and Ukraine. Without extending the scope so
far, we chose to include countries with at least a portion of their territory within 250
kms of the Mediterranean Sea. We made an exception with Austria, Switzerland and
Distance (km)
[ 750 ; 1000 ]
[ 500; 750 [
[ 250 ; 500[
[ 0; 250 [
500 km
DISTANCE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA
N
Author: Doignon Y. (2023)
Fig. 1.1 Distance to the Mediterranean Sea
8 1 General Introduction: A Study of Mediterranean Populations
Table 1.1 Composition of the geographical categories used in the publication
SOUTHERN SHORE EASTERN SHORE NORTHERN SHORE
North Africa Near East Balkans Southern Europe
Algeria Cyprus Bulgaria Portugal
Egypt Lebanon Croatia Spain
Libya Turkey Montenegro France
Morocco Israel Albania Italy
Tunisia Jordan Serbia Malta
Syria Bosnia-Herzegovinaa
Slovenia
Macedonia
Greece
Kosovo
a For ease of reading, we use “BiH” in this book to mean “Bosnia-Herzegovina”
Hungary, which are not oriented towards the Mediterranean. Thus, our study area
consists of all countries with direct access to the sea, plus Portugal, Jordan, Kosovo,
Serbia, Macedonia and Bulgaria. Andorra, Monaco and San Marino, located less
than 250 km from the Mediterranean Sea, are not included in the study area as their
populations are too small.
Mediterranean countries are commonly classified according to the shore to which
they belong: the Southern Shore (African shore), the Eastern Shore (Asian shore)
and the Northern Shore (European shore). We will use this categorisation for the
representation of the data, to which we will add four regional clusters, an intermediate
categorisation between countries and shores: North Africa, the Near East, the Balkans
and Southern Europe (Table 1.1,Fig. 1.2).
1.2.2 International Comparisons Over Time
The general approach of this publication is to give a global vision of the demographic
phenomena of the Mediterranean region. To this end, we have five commitments that
we try to maintain throughout the different chapters.
First, we will not limit ourselves to describing the current demographic situa-
tion. Indeed, focusing only on recent developments would run the risk of losing the
global perspective. Instead, we choose to place them in the long term, thus making
it possible to put recent trends into perspective or, on the contrary, to underline their
unprecedented character compared to past trends. Depending on the data available,
our study will cover the period from 1950 to present day.
1.2 Approach and Commitment 9
500 km
N
Paris
Rome
Tunis Valletta
Sfax
Tripoli
Benghazi
Sofia
Ankara
Athens
Istanbul
Thessaloniki
Izmir
Antalya
Aleppo
Homs
Madrid
Algiers Constantine
Oran
Milan
Naples
Turin
Marseille
Lyon
Strasbourg
Barcelona
Valencia
Seville
Toulon
Rabat
Casablanca
Tangier
Porto
Fes
Lisbon
Cairo
Alexandria
Port Said
Nicosia
Damascus
FRANCE
ITALY
ALGERIA
MOROCCO
TUNISIA
MALTA
LIBYA
TURKEY
BULGARIA
GREECE
SYRIA
CYPRUS
PORTUGAL SPAIN
2
1
34
5
6
7
8
9
Northern Africa
Near East
Balkans
Southern Europe
Regional cluster MEDITERRANEAN
COUNTRY
Capital city
Main city
SEA/OCEAN
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Zagreb
Ljubljana
Sarajevo
Belgrade
Tirana
Skopje
Pristina
Podgorica
SLOVENIA
CROATIA
BiH
SERBIA
MONTENEGRO
ALBANIA
KOSOVO
MACEDONIA
9Beirut
LEBANON
10 ISRAEL
11 PALESTINE
LOCATION MAP OF THE MEDITERRANEAN
Author: Doignon Y. (2023)
EGYPT
BLACK SEA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
RED SEA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
JORDAN
10
11
Amman
Gaza
Tel-Aviv Ramallah
Jerusalem
Fig. 1.2 Location map of the Mediterranean
10 1 General Introduction: A Study of Mediterranean Populations
Secondly, we will carry out a global international comparison of the Mediter-
ranean. Our unit of comparison is the country, not preconceived regional categories.
We will not compare the Balkans with North Africa for example, but all Mediter-
ranean countries with each other simultaneously.6 The interest of this approach is
to go beyond a vision of the Mediterranean in terms of regional blocks that oppose
each other, just like the three shores. The Mediterranean is a maritime basin in
which the shores move closer together and further apart (Brunet, 1995). Contrasts
and disparities therefore change over time. By using existing regional categories, we
would perpetuate differences that are perhaps less alive today. It is true that there is no
longer a consensus on the human unity of the Mediterranean, but refusing to compare
all the Mediterranean countries is tantamount to refusing to consider possible trans-
Mediterranean formations and their dynamics (Deprest, 2002). Refusing apriori to
compare would not allow the discovery of new differences and new regionalisations,
or the emergence of unexpected scenarios. We believe that there is a need to update
our analytical frameworks, particularly the regional categories, to ensure that they
are currently consistent.
The third commitment is to describe the main demographic trends. It is clear
that there are specific challenges for each country and region cluster. However, our
aim is neither to analyse the specificity of each country nor to comment on short-
term developments. On the contrary, we want to study the major movements that
have characterised the demographic evolution in the Mediterranean over the last
70 years. Our aim is not to demonstrate that the Mediterranean is homogenous from
a demographic point of view. Studying the Mediterranean countries as a whole will
perhaps highlight the structural contrasts between the different shores. But it is also
possible that it will show contrasts between unexpected groups of countries, thus
renewing the demography of the Mediterranean. However, it is difficult to know
until this global international comparison exercise has been carried out.
Moreover, we have chosen not to carry out any systematic forward-looking reflec-
tion, as the objective is above all to offer a synthetic vision of the major past
and current demographic trends. However, we will look to the future and present
forward-looking reflections where we consider it useful.
Finally, most of our analysis is done at the country level. Of course, we are aware
that there are large disparities within countries, and that a sub-national analysis would
reveal these. However, we have made this choice because we believe that there is
already enough to comment on by staying at the level of the Mediterranean countries.
Again, however, sub-national analyses will be offered where necessary to clarify a
more specific point. In fact, comparison on a sub-national scale requires ad hoc data
that are not available everywhere for all subjects and at administrative levels that can
be harmonised on the Mediterranean scale.
6 Except for some graphs, where countries will be grouped by regional clusters. Indeed, a graph
with 27 countries is difficult to read. However, the interpretation of these graphs will not be based
on regional clusters, but on the countries as a whole.
1.2 Approach and Commitment 11
1.2.3 Grid Convergence to Analyse Demographic Phenomena
To analyse the major trends of the Mediterranean countries as a whole in the long
term,7 we used the concept of convergence, i.e. the reduction of disparities and
inequalities within a study area. We wanted to measure the evolution of disparities
between Mediterranean countries. Have the gaps between these countries narrowed
or increased? Are Mediterranean countries more similar today than in the past?
However, lower disparities between countries do not imply an absence of disparities.
Thus, observing convergence should not be interpreted as a deterministic process
where all populations are destined to be perfectly similar in the short or long term.
Converging trends should simply be interpreted as a reduction in disparities, not as
a sign of continued convergence in the future.
The spread of the demographic transition in the world has led to a convergence
of several demographic phenomena, such as birth rate and mortality (Wilson, 2001,
2011). It will come as no surprise that it is expected that there will be a convergence in
the Mediterranean. However, our aim is not to demonstrate demographic convergence
in the Mediterranean, but to analyse the extent to which this convergence is or is not
taking place, and even to envisage cases of divergence. If there is convergence, our
aim is then to analyse its intensity, pace, persistent disparities, etc.
Similarly, through the analysis of a possible convergence, our aim is not to prove
any kind of demographic homogeneity (or unity) of the Mediterranean. We simply
wish to highlight the converging and diverging areas, to provide elements for reflec-
tion on the fact that the Mediterranean is a more integrated demographic area today
than in the past.
1.2.4 Data Used
In the absence of an integrated statistical system specific to the Mediterranean (Blöss-
Widmer, 2019), we choose to use major international databases. Conventional demo-
graphic indicators are reliable for international comparisons as their definition is
fairly widely shared. When analysing indicators such as birth rate, mortality or life
expectancy at birth, we are not comparing incomparable things.
The main source of data for our publication is the World Population Prospects
20228 of the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social
Affairs. This database provides a wide range of demographic indicators for all coun-
tries around the world. Unlike a national statistical office, the UN does not collect data.
It produces population estimates from existing data sources, such as surveys (national
and international), population censuses, civil registration data, etc. A specific section
7 See Doignon (2016) for a discussion of the concept of convergence and an application to
demographic ageing in the Mediterranean.
8 https://population.un.org/wpp/.
12 1 General Introduction: A Study of Mediterranean Populations
of the World Population Prospects9 lists the sources used by the UN for each country.
The quality data sources in some countries are scarce or incomplete, which makes
demographic estimation even more difficult. In these countries, the data should there-
fore be interpreted with caution. The World Population Prospects thus consists of
two parts: retrospective data since 1950, which includes UN population estimates,
and population projections up to 2100. Moreover, UN estimates and projections
have sometimes been criticised, in particular in relation to Mediterranean countries
(Courbage, 1999). However, it should be stated that they have the undeniable advan-
tage in providing good quality international comparative data over a long period of
time, which is very useful when it comes to analysing major demographic trends,
which is the objective of this publication.
In terms of territorial boundaries, the World Population Prospects considers
current and UN-recognised states or territorial entities. The UN has therefore recon-
structed the retrospective data so that it corresponds to the States (or territorial enti-
ties) in their current borders. This requires several clarifications in the case of the
Mediterranean:
•Western Sahara has been considered as a non-self-governing territory by the UN
since 1963. For this reason, estimates for this territory are made from Moroccan
data sources, such as the population census.
•For the countries of the former Yugoslavia, the UN has reconstructed the demo-
graphic data of the Yugoslav period for each country within their current borders,
using in particular the Yugoslav censuses which made it possible to distinguish
the different territorial entities that made up Yugoslavia.
•Kosovo refers to the United Nations administered region under security council
resolution 1244. For statistical purposes, the data for Serbia do not include this
area.
•The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not recognised by the UN. There-
fore, the data refer to the population of the whole island of Cyprus, without
distinguishing between the two political entities.
•The UN considers Palestine within its 1967 borders. Referred to as the “State of
Palestine” in the data, Palestine thus comprises Gaza and the West Bank, including
the Arab populations of East Jerusalem and excluding Israeli citizens residing in
the occupied Palestinian territories. Population estimates are based, among other
things, on data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
In this publication, for the sake of clarity, we use “Macedonia” for “North Macedo-
nia”, “Palestine” for “State of Palestine”, and “Syria” for the “Syrian Arab Republic”.
Similarly, for convenience, we use the term “country” to refer indiscriminately to
the countries or territorial entities of the UN. These two choices are in no way an
expression of opinion regarding the legal status of a country, its authorities or the
delimitation of its borders.
When the World Population Prospects 2022 is not sufficient to study a subject,
we use other international data providers to complement it. These are other UN
9 https://population.un.org/wpp/DataSources.
1.3 Structure of the Book 13
databases (UNdata,10 International Migrant Stock,11 World Marriage Data,12 etc.),
and data from other international institutions (International Organization for Migra-
tion, WorldPop,13 etc.), along with international surveys (DHS,14 MICS,15 etc.). The
additional sources used are always indicated below the figures or in the text.
1.3 Structure of the Book
For a publication that aims to provide a global perspective of the population in the
Mediterranean, we felt it was important to start by recalling how this population
has been distributed in the area concerned. The second chapter therefore deals with
settlement and urbanisation in the Mediterranean.
The third chapter focuses on the age and gender composition of the population,
analysing the sex ratio of the population and the age pyramids of the Mediterranean
sub-national regions.
The fourth chapter deals with demographic transitions, i.e. the evolution of birth
and death rates. It proposes a typology of Mediterranean countries according to
several characteristics of the process. It highlights the great diversity of demographic
transitions in the Mediterranean.
Secondly, we wanted to take a closer look at each of the phenomena that make
up the demographic transition. Thus, the fifth and sixth chapters analyse fertility
and the formation and dissolution of unions respectively. The seventh chapter deals
with mortality, with the evolution of life expectancy at birth, the decomposition of
age-specific mortality, and an overview of the health transition.
The eighth chapter deals with international migration, where the Mediterranean
is a migration system, which has undergone major changes since the 1950s.
Finally, the ninth chapter concludes the publication with an analysis of population
dynamics, i.e. the evolution of the number of inhabitants in each country, and its
components (natural and migration). It will also take UN projections to consider the
future distribution of the population around the Mediterranean.
There will be a general summary conclusion, the main objective of which will be
to take stock of the analysis of the demography of the Mediterranean countries as a
whole and of the question of the convergence of this area over the last 70 years.
10 https://data.un.org/.
11 https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock.
12 https://population.un.org/MarriageData/Index.html#/home.
13 https://www.worldpop.org/.
14 https://dhsprogram.com/.
15 https://mics.unicef.org/surveys.
14 1 General Introduction: A Study of Mediterranean Populations
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Chapter 2
Spatial Distribution of Population
and Urbanisation
Abstract Populations are not randomly distributed across the Earth’s surface. Some
regions are almost empty, while others concentrate with a large proportion of the
human population. Analysing the spatial distribution of a population is an exercise
involving geography and demography. It takes place on different scales, both global
and local, as given the striking uneven distribution of populations in the Mediter-
ranean and all over the world. This chapter will begin by describing the Mediterranean
settlement, emphasising the contrasts that exist at different scales, and then identi-
fying regularities and explanatory factors. We will end by looking at the phenomena
structuring the contemporary distribution of the population: metropolisation and
coastalisation.
Keywords Urbanisation ·Settlement ·Spatial distribution of the population ·
Coastline ·Mediterranean
2.1 Introduction
Populations are not randomly distributed across the Earth’s surface. Some regions
are almost empty, while others concentrate with a large proportion of the human
population. Analysing the spatial distribution of a population is an exercise involving
geography and demography. It takes place on different scales, both global and local,
as given the striking uneven distribution of populations in the Mediterranean and all
over the world.
These spatial contrasts in population distribution are an important element in the
functioning of societies, i.e. in their organisation and their future. While the spatial
distribution of a population provides an image of societies at a given time, it is
also the result of phenomena that characterise human time: the short-time duration
of individuals and generations, population dynamics and the long-term duration of
societies. It is also the consequence of populations adapting, more or less, to their
environmental constraints (accessibility of places, available resources, quality, etc.),
i.e. their capacity to take advantage of the latter to settle and live there.
© The Author(s) 2023
Y. Doignon et al., Population Dynamics in the Mediterranean,
SpringerBriefs in Population Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37759-4_2
19
20 2 Spatial Distribution of Population and Urbanisation
We will begin by describing the Mediterranean settlement, emphasising the
contrasts that exist at different scales, and then identifying regularities and explana-
tory factors. We will end by looking at the phenomena structuring the contemporary
distribution of the population: metropolisation and coastalisation.
2.2 Uneven Distribution of the Population
Spatial distribution of populations is quite heterogeneous throughout the world.
Differences according to the chosen scale or the level of observation are always
important. To describe this uneven distribution, it is customary to use population
density, an interesting indicator since it relates a population to a given area.
The population density in the Mediterranean is 65 hbts/km2 in 2020, which is
slightly higher than at the world level (60 hbts/km2). However, this average value
hides great disparities (Oliveau & Doignon, 2014). There are marked inequalities
between the two shores: the Southern Shore is much less populated than the Northern
Shore (35 hbts/km2 and 125 hbts/km2 respectively), and if we look at the Eastern
Shore, the population concentration is similar to that of the Northern Shore (125
hbts/km2). Two out of three Mediterranean countries have a density between 60
and 130 inhabitants/km2. However, Libya has only 4 hbts/km2 and Algeria 15 hbts/
km2, as the extent of the desert regions is considerable in each of these countries.
In contrast, the four most densely populated Mediterranean countries in 2020, apart
from the city-states1 (Monaco, Vatican, San Marino), are Israel (400 hbts/km2),
Lebanon (550 hbts/km2), Palestine (830 hbts/km2) and Malta (1640 hbts/km2). This
shows the extent to which the Near East, and especially its coastal strip, is one of the
world’s settlement centres.
If we look at the evolution of population densities since the middle of the twentieth
century (Fig. 2.1), we see a general upward trend. The Mediterranean countries
have seen their density multiply by an average of 2.5 between 1950 and 2020. The
countries on the Northern Shore have generally experienced a weaker evolution:
their density has been multiplied by less than 1.8, excluding Kosovo and Albania,
where the multiplication coefficient is 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. On the other hand, the
densities of the countries on the Southern and Eastern s hores have been multiplied by
at least 3, sometimes by more than 5 (Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Libya, Israel), and by
25 for Jordan. This sustained evolution is the result of later and faster demographic
transitions than on the Northern shore, resulting in high rate of natural change (see
Chap. 4). Migration can sometimes accentuate this population growth, as in Israel
and Jordan (Chap. 9), but also occasionally, as in Lebanon in 2013–2015 with the
arrival of Syrian refugees.
1 In 2020, the population density is 24,780 hbts/km2 in Monaco, 2,000 hbts/km2 in the Vatican and
557 hbts/km2 in San Marino.
2.2 Uneven Distribution of the Population 21
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Inhabitants/km²
Egypt
Morocco
Tunisia
Algeria
Libya
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Inhabitants/km²
Cyprus
Jordan
Syria
Turkey
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Inhabitants/km²
Malta
Palestine
Lebanon
Israel
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Inhabitants/km²
Italy
France
Portugal
Spain
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Inhabitants/km²
Kosovo
Albania
Slovenia
Serbia
Macedonia
Croatia
Greece
BiH
Bulgaria
Montenegro
Fig. 2.1 Evolution of the population density in the Mediterranean (1950–2020) (Source Worl d
Population Prospects 2022. Note the most densely populated countries (Israel, Lebanon, Malta,
Palestine) are placed in a separate graph so that the evolution of the other countries can be seen
more clearly)
Although the general trend over the period 1950–2020 is towards an increase, we
nevertheless observe decreases in population density in certain countries, as envis-
aged 20 years ago by Attané and Courbage (2004). This concerns a large part of the
Balkan countries since the 1990s (Albania, Croatia, Serbia), or the 2000s (Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Greece). These downward trends are mainly due to a declining demo-
graphic regime (Chap. 4). Kosovo and Bulgaria show interesting trajectories. The
22 2 Spatial Distribution of Population and Urbanisation
former saw a sharp drop in population density following the Kosovo war (1998–
1999), from 200 hbts/km2 in 1997 to 170 hbts/km2 in 2000. The country then experi-
enced significant emigration, leading to a continuous decrease in population density,
which reached 150 hbts/km2 in 2020, the level of the early 1980s. Bulgaria’s popu-
lation density has been decreasing since the early 1980s, and in 2020 it returned
to the same level as in 1950, a unique case in the Mediterranean (Doignon, 2023).
Very recently, some Southern European countries are starting to see their population
density decrease as well, such as Portugal and Italy.
An analysis of population densities at the country level provides a general
overview of the situation. Nevertheless, strong disparities in population density are
generally visible at the sub-national level. France has an average density of 115 hbts/
km2, but this masks the wide variations that exist: the least dense communes have less
than 5 hbts/km2 and the densest ones exceed 20,000 hbts/km2. Similarly, a country
like Egypt has an average density comparable to France (of 110 inhabitants/km2),
but due to the size of the Saharan regions, it is actually mostly empty. In contrast, the
Nile, and more particularly its delta, has very high densities. Rural areas can exceed
1,000 hbts/km2, which is unusual outside monsoon South and East Asia, and Cairo
reaches 40,000 hbts/km2 (Oliveau et al., 2023).
Thus, the contrasts are reinforced when the Mediterranean settlement is mapped
at a finer level (Fig. 2.2). Two main spatial structures can be observed. Firstly, there
is the contrast between large, densely populated urban areas and less populated rural
areas. This division is clearly visible in Spain with Madrid and Barcelona, in Turkey
with Istanbul and Ankara, in Bulgaria with Sofia and in France with Paris. The second
spatial structure is the contrast between the coast and inland. Of those living within
200 km of the Mediterranean,2 about half are less than 50 km away, and 30% less than
10 km. This shows the extent to which the Mediterranean population is concentrated
on the coast. On the Southern and Eastern shores, this difference is very marked
between the large concentrations of populations on the urbanised coastlines and the
much less dense desert inland region. This phenomenon is particularly striking in
North Africa (from Morocco to Benghazi in Libya) and in the Near East (from the
northern Sinai Peninsula to the Cilicia plain in Turkey). Egypt is a unique case in the
Mediterranean. Indeed, unlike other regions, its settlement is not structured by the
contrast between the coast and the inland region, but by a general contrast between
the Nile and the rest of the country, even if some parts of its coastline are densely
populated.
This coastal-inland spatial structure is also visible in Southern Europe, but with a
less dense coastal strip. On the other hand, it is hardly found in the Balkans, where
the densely populated areas are not located on the coast, but rather in the inland
plains or valleys of the mountain ranges.
In general, and for several decades, the inland regions of the various shores of the
Mediterranean have been marked by a population decline (Coudert, 2013; Liziard,
2013).
2 Only the population of the countries we have defined as Mediterranean is included in this
calculation (see introduction of this book).
2.2 Uneven Distribution of the Population 23
Inhabitants/km²
≥ 1000
[ 250 ; 1000 [
[ 100 ; 250 [
[ 50 ; 100 [
[ 25 ; 50 [
[ 0 ; 25 [
500 km
POPULATION DENSITY IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN (2020)
N
Author: Doignon Y. (2023)
Source: WorldPop (2018)
Fig. 2.2 Population density in the Mediterranean (2020) (Source WorldPop [2018] [Population Density, Unconstrained UN adjusted,3 1 km resolution])
3 Only the population densities of Kosovo are not adjusted by those of the UN. Indeed, WorldPop used the World Population Prospects 2019 data, in which
Kosovo’s data were still aggregated with Serbia’s.
24 2 Spatial Distribution of Population and Urbanisation
2.3 Far from Determinism: Opportunities and Constraints
of Mediterranean Areas
It is always tempting to look for determinants of observed density inequalities in phys-
ical conditions, but “simplistic attempts to justify densities by physical constraints
have failed. The distribution of people seems, a priori, remarkably poorly correlated
with climate, or even with vegetation”4 (Dubresson et al., 2011). This observation
made for Sub-Saharan Africa also applies to the Mediterranean area, which is char-
acterised by a typical climate bearing its name, with hot, dry summers and mild, wet
winters.
Nevertheless, the dominant role of water remains visible. The sea is the struc-
turing element of this area, where the coastlines are generally densely populated
regions. Rainfall is a major constraint on agriculture, while rivers offer opportunities.
However, situations cannot easily be fitted into standard models, and it is necessary
to consider the various combinations of factors, always with possible retroaction.
Thus, distance to the sea (and to water in general) seems to be an important
element, although not the only explanatory factor. For instance, Mediterranean
populations are mainly located in direct proximity to the sea (Fig. 2.3).
The population density within 10 km of the sea exceeds 400 hbts/km2 in 2020,
then decreases rapidly with distance, reaching about 100 hbts/km2 from 40 km of
the Mediterranean. However, the situation in Libya and Egypt reminds us that this
general relationship is not so simple and is not observed everywhere, as areas near
the sea have very low densities. Further north, although there is no desert, the low
densities of the Balkan coast of the Adriatic Sea stand in stark contrast to the high
densities of the western coast in Italy. The first is characterised by a very mountainous
coastline, notably with the Dinaric Alps. Only the Albanian coastal plain with high
population densities seems to be an exception.
Mountains are also part of the Mediterranean landscape. It should be remembered
that the Latin name for the Mediterranean, mare Mediterraneum, means “sea in the
middle of the earth”. Mountains are present almost everywhere, but their relationship
to human settlement is varied. In the Libyan desert, Jebel Akhdar offers a green space
which saw the establishment of the ancient city of Cyrene and which remains today
one of the rare populated areas of the country, with the region of Tripoli, at the foot
of Jebel Nefoussa. Conversely, the mountains of Provence are much less populated
than the plains, and the same is true in Italy and Lebanon (Verdeil et al., 2007). As for
the Balkans, whose very name refers to the mountain range (Balkan Mountains/stara
planina) crossing Bulgaria, the mountains are omnipresent, but do not determine
human settlement. In contrast, the highest densities are found in the inland plains,
such as the southern Pannonian Plain in Croatia and Serbia, or in the valleys of the
mountain ranges.
4 This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows:
“les tentatives simplistes de justification des densités par des contraintes physiques ont fait long
feu. La répartition des hommes paraît, a priori, remarquablement mal corrélée au climat, voire à la
végétation”.
2.4 A Very Coastal and Increasing Urbanisation 25
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Inhabitants/km²
Distance to the Mediterranean sea (km)
2020
2000
Fig. 2.3 Population density according to distance from the Mediterranean in 2000 and 2020 (Source
WorldPop [2018] [Population counts, Unconstrained UN adjusted, 1 km resolution])
However, water is the only element that seems to play a dominant role everywhere.
The sea coast, as we have already said, but more generally the rivers, strongly structure
the Mediterranean settlement, more than any other environmental element. We could
take the example of the Nile to convince ourselves of this, as it is the most visible.
However, the structuring effects on the settlement of other rivers are just as obvious
if we look at the Rhône, the Loire and the Seine (France), the Po and the Tiber (Italy),
the Ebro and the Guadalquivir (Spain), the Jordan (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel,
Palestine), the Euphrates and the Khabur (Syria) or the Tigris and the Gediz (Turkey).
There are of course exceptions, the low densities of the Rhône Delta in France being
a good counter-example to the concentrations observed in the Nile Delta.
2.4 A Very Coastal and Increasing Urbanisation
The Mediterranean is a place of ancient settlement and urbanisation. Mediterranean
societies at the beginning of the modern era were characterised in particular by a
peasant population settled in villages or small towns rather than in scattered settle-
ments (Huebner, 2016), especially in North Africa (Tabutin et al., 2002). As an area
of great circulation, the Mediterranean was very early on woven with cities and ports,
the traces of which are still visible today, in a more or less visible way depending
26 2 Spatial Distribution of Population and Urbanisation
0
25
50
75
100
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Urbanisation rate (in %)
Malta
Spain
France
Italy
Portugal
0
25
50
75
100
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Urbanisation rate (in %)
Greece
Bulgaria
Montenegro
Albania
Macedonia
Croatia
Serbia
Slovenia
BiH
0
25
50
75
100
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Urbanisation rate (in %)
Libya
Algeria
Tunisia
Morocco
Egypt
0
25
50
75
100
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Urbanisation rate (in %)
Israel
Jordan
Lebanon
Palestine
Turkey
Cyprus
Syria
Fig. 2.4 Urbanisation rates in the Mediterranean (1950–2020) (Source World Urbanization
Prospects 2018)
on the region. Nevertheless, the populations of the countries bordering it were still
predominantly rural in the mid twentieth century (Fig. 2.4).
Indeed, 7 out of 10 Mediterranean countries had an urbanisation rate5 below 50%.
As a regional average, 34% of the Mediterranean population lived in a city in 1950.
Some countries had very low levels, such as Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Libya
5 The urbanisation rate measures the proportion of the population living in cities. When it is below
50%, it means that a majority of the population lives in rural areas.
2.4 A Very Coastal and Increasing Urbanisation 27
and Slovenia, where less than 20% of the population lived in urban areas. Conversely,
6 countries had a predominantly urban population, mainly in Southern Europe (Spain,
Italy, France, Malta), and also in Israel and Greece.
Since 1950, there has been an increase in urbanisation in all countries without
exception. In 2020, 70% of the Mediterranean population was urban (regional
average). All countries have an urbanisation rate above 50%, with the exception of
Egypt (43%). The least urbanised countries are mainly found in the Balkans (Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia), and also in Syria. Egypt’s trajectory is
unique, as its urbanisation rate increases between 1950 and the mid-1970s, and then
stagnates until the present day. Other countries have seen their urbanisation rates
stagnate, such as Macedonia and Cyprus since the mid-1980s. Malta is the most
urbanised country in the Mediterranean, with an urbanisation rate of almost 95% in
2020, and already 90% in 1950.
This general increase in urbanisation indicates a progressive concentration of the
population in small areas (cities). In fact, the Mediterranean population is becoming
increasingly concentrated in space. As we have already noted, the coastline concen-
trates populations, but these populations are also attracted to the cities, and the coastal
villages are becoming urbanised.
According to the World Urbanization Prospects 2018 data, there were 163 urban
agglomerations in the Mediterranean with more than 300,000 inhabitants in 2018
(Fig. 2.5). Of these cities, about 1 in 4 has more than one million inhabitants, and
60% of them are on the Southern and Eastern shores. In addition, there are 3 cities
with more than 10 million inhabitants: Cairo (18.8 million), Istanbul (14.1 million),
and Paris (10.7 million). The first two are among the 20 largest cities in the world.
Since 1950, although almost all the cities in the Mediterranean countries have seen
their populations increase, they have done so at different rates. The population growth
of the cities on the Northern Shore has generally been more moderate. In fact, 80%
of the cities on the Southern and Eastern shores saw their population multiply by
at least 5 between 1950 and 2015, while the population of those on the Northern
shore multiplied by 2 on average. In some cases, the increase has been particularly
significant, such as Antalya (Turkey), which has gone from 27,000 inhabitants to 1.5
million today, a 40-fold increase in population. Amman, the Jordanian capital, has
seen its population increase from 100,000 to over 1.7 million (a 20-fold increase). As
a result of this very rapid urbanisation on the Southern and Eastern shores, partly due
to a rural exodus and demographic transition, the large cities have seen the emergence
of slums (Puschmann & Matthijs, 2016). These trends partly explain the significant
increase in population density in coastal areas (Fig. 2.3).
The cities of the Mediterranean countries are characterised primarily by their
coastal location. Indeed, 25% are located within 5 kms of the Mediterranean Sea, and
50% within 100 kms. Thus, many of the cities with more than one million inhabitants
are ports: Barcelona, Marseille, Naples, Athens, Istanbul, Antalya, Izmir, Alexandria,
Port Said, Tangiers, Haifa, Beirut, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, etc. 8 countries bordering
the Mediterranean have a coastal capital, thus underlining the long-standing role of
this sea in international trade. Some of these cities are also very old, generally dating
back to antiquity, especially in the Middle East (Reba et al., 2018). This is particularly
28 2 Spatial Distribution of Population and Urbanisation
18 820
6 934
1 827
244
Total population
in 2015
(thousands)
Expected population
growth rate between
2015 and 2035 (%)
≥ 2.2
< 0
[ 1.6 ; 2.2 [
[ 1.1 ; 1.6 [
[ 0.7 ; 1.1 [
[ 0.3 ; 0.7 [
[ 0 ; 0.3 [
500 km
THE POPULATION OF THE MAIN URBAN AGGLOMERATIONS
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (2015-2035)
N
Author: Doignon Y. (2023)
Source: World Urbanization Prospects 2018
Paris
Rome
Tunis
Tripoli
Zagreb
Sarajevo
Belgrade
Tirana
Skopje
Sofia
Ankara
Athens
Madrid
Algiers
Rabat
Lisbon
Cairo
Amman
Tel-Aviv
Beirut Damascus
Jerusalem
Fig. 2.5 Population of agglomerations with more than 300,000 inhabitants (2015), and projected population change between 2015 and 2035 (Source World
Urbanization Prospects 2018)
2.5 Settlement Challenges in the Mediterranean 29
evident between Istanbul and Alexandria, where there are many agglomerations with
more than 300,000 inhabitants. The s pecific situation of the Balkans, where, with
the exception of Greece, none of the countries has a coastal capital and where there
are few large cities, should be recalled here.
Today, the settlement pattern is changing, and these cities are mainly taking
advantage of longstanding benefits which they are converting to maintain their
regional primacy. Urban settlement is spreading inland and the coastal location often
becomes an asset for tourism or quality of life, rather than a necessity for the indus-
trial or agricultural economy. From urbanisation, which concentrated inhabitants
in cities, we have moved on to metropolisation, which agglomerates them in vast
spaces comprising the central city, its suburbs and its outskirts sometimes over great
distances. In France, for example, the urban fabric is now almost continuous along
the Mediterranean coast and sometimes penetrates up to 50 km inland (Aix-Marseille
metropolis). The same phenomenon can be observed in Spain, and to a lesser extent
in many other countries, such as Libya, where the Tripoli conurbation now stretches
almost 150 km from west to east (Moriconi-Ebrard & Pascal, 2020).
Tourism plays an important role in these settlement developments in several coun-
tries. In Western Europe, the shores of the Mediterranean attract a population of
seasonal tourists, and also migrants who come to enjoy the living environment for
their retirement (Doignon et al., 2017). In addition to these populations, there are also
migrant populations who come to work from within the country or from abroad. These
different populations can sometimes have a significant impact on the settlement. This
is particularly the case in Spain, where the flow of retired foreign residents and the
flow of workers to the Mediterranean coasts make it possible to maintain population
growth in these regions (Oliveau et al., 2019).
Projections from the World Urbanization Prospects 2018 envisage that this urban-
isation trend will continue to 2035, reinforcing both the urbanisation of all coun-
tries and the littoralisation of their population. For instance, the urbanisation rate
in Mediterranean countries is expected to reach 80% by 2050. The population of
agglomerations with more than 300,000 inhabitants in 2018 is expected to continue
growing until 2035. This growth will again be greater in the cities of the Southern
and Eastern shores, but at a lower rate than between 1950 and 2015 (Fig. 2.5).
2.5 Settlement Challenges in the Mediterranean
To conclude this chapter, we now turn to the settlement challenges that Mediterranean
areas will face in the coming decades. Although the Mediterranean population is very
heterogeneous and it is difficult to characterise it by a single trait, the populations
share a common sea, a typical climate and fragile natural environments.
Although the degree to which the coasts are inhabited by humans is heteroge-
neous, the high level of coastal population poses real problems of pollution. The
Mediterranean is one of the most polluted seas in the world, especially with plastics
(Alessi & Di Carlo, 2018). Pollution of maritime waters is a real issue, too often left
30 2 Spatial Distribution of Population and Urbanisation
to the goodwill of States. This is significantly exacerbated by the poor management
of waste generated by mass tourism, and the ever-increasing concentration of the
population on the coastline. Pollution of maritime waters is also dependent on pollu-
tion, particularly industrial pollution, carried by the large rivers that flow into the
Mediterranean, as is the case with the heavy metals discharged by the Rhône or the
nitrates transported from agricultural areas. These various forms of pollution threaten
one of the Mediterranean’s major reservoirs of marine and coastal biodiversity.
Human pressure on the coasts is already very strong and is expected to increase,
accentuating the constraints on nature and the human beings that occupy it. In the
summer of 2021, fires were exceptionally widespread along the entire Mediterranean
coastline (in Italy, Greece, Algeria, Turkey and the Balkans). Fires are one of the
major threats facing the Mediterranean, as are tensions over water resources, coastal
flooding, etc. Human pressure is therefore felt not only by nature, but by the settlement
itself. It is true that climate change increase (also of human origin) is an aggravating
factor; however it is primarily the presence of humans that is to blame. These fires
are perhaps only the most dramatic part of the effects of climate change. Floods and
flash floods are also increasing, due to the combined effect of land artificialisation
on the one hand, and changes in rainfall patterns on the other.
Ultimately, the current settlement of the Mediterranean raises the question of
its effects on ecosystems. Natural hazards are a real problem for societies (Laria,
2008). They will be accentuated by the densification of the population, the significant
littoralisation of the population, urbanisation and climate change. The question is
therefore that of the sustainability of the settlement in these conditions, and of the
adaptation of societies, since the changes brought about will be inevitable (Borderon,
2023).
References
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WWF. https://www.wwf.fr/sites/default/files/doc-2018-06/180608_rapport_plastiques_medite
rranee.pdf
Attané, I., & Courbage, Y. (2004). Demography in the Mediterranean region: Situation and
projections. Économica.
Borderon, M. (2023). Migrations, changements environnementaux et climatiques. In Y. Doignon &
S. Oliveau (Eds.), Dynamique du peuplement mondial. Comment la population habite le monde.
Encyclopédie Des Sciences. ISTE Editions.
Coudert, E. (2013). Une approche régionale de la population et de l’urbanisation en Méditerranée,
rétrospective et projections à 2025. In J.-P. Carrière (Ed.), Villes et projets urbains en Méditer-
ranée (pp. 21–31). Perspectives Villes et Territoires. Presses universitaires François-Rabelais.
Doignon, Y. (2023). Dépeuplement et dépopulation dans un monde en croissance. In Y. Doignon &
S. Oliveau (Eds.), Dynamique du peuplement mondial. Comment la population habite le monde.
Encyclopédie Des Sciences. ISTE Editions.
Doignon, Y., Blöss-Widmer, I., & Oliveau, S. (2017). Half a century of ageing in France: Dynamics
and specificities of the Mediterranean coastline. In T. Blöss (Ed.),Ageing, lifestyles and economic
crises: The new people of the Mediterranean (pp. 82–100). Routledge Studies in the European
Economy. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
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Dubresson, A., Moreau, S., Raison, J.-P., & Steck, J.-F. (2011). L’Afrique subsaharienne: Une
géographie du changement (3rd ed.). Armand Colin.
Huebner, S. (2016). A Mediterranean family? A comparative approach to the ancient World. In
S. Huebner & G. Nathan (Eds.), Mediterranean families in antiquity: Households, extended
families, and domestic space (pp. 3–26). John Wiley & Sons.
Laria, S. (2008). L’avenir en Méditerranée se jouera dans les villes. Annales Des Mines -
Responsabilité Et Environnement, 49, 56–61. https://doi.org/10.3917/re.049.0056
Liziard, S. (2013). Littoralisation de la façade nord-méditerranéenne: analyse spatiale et prospec-
tive dans le contexte du changement climatique. Ph.D. Thesis in Geography, Nice, Nice Sophia
Antipolis University. https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00927492/document
Moriconi-Ebrard, F., & Pascal, R. (2020). Peuplement et urbanisation de la Libye: construction
d’une information cartographique. Géoconfluences. http://geoconfluences.ens-lyon.fr/inform
ations-scientifiques/dossiers-regionaux/la-mediterranee-une-geographie-paradoxale/articles-
scientifiques/demographie-libye
Oliveau, S., & Doignon, Y. (2014). Ever closer to the water: Recent developments in Mediterranean
settlement patterns. South-East European Journal of Political Science, II, 22–30. https://halshs.
archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01070622
Oliveau, S., Larue, Q., Doignon, Y., & Blöss-Widmer, I. (2019). Mapping foreign nationals in
Spain: An exploratory approach at local level. Genus, 75,5.
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Oliveau, S., Doignon, Y., & Blöss-Widmer, I. (2023). Population distribution: Follow the Nile. In
H. Bayoumi & K. Bennafla (Eds.), An atlas of contemporary Egypt (pp. 56–57). CNRS éditions.
https://books.openedition.org/editionscnrs/58390
Puschmann, P., & Matthijs, K. (2016). The demographic transition in the Arab world: The dual role
of marriage in family dynamics and population growth. In K. Matthijs, K. Neels, C. Timmerman,
J. Haers, & S. Mels (Eds.), Population change in Europe, the Middle-East and North Africa:
Beyond the demographic divide (pp. 119–165). International Population Studies. Routledge,
Taylor & Francis Group. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315601496
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pendant le deuxième millénaire. Document de Travail 15. Centre de recherche en démographie.
Verdeil, E., Faour, G., & Velut, S. (2007). Population et peuplement. In Atlas du Liban: Territoires et
société (pp. 64–90). Contemporain Co-Éditions. Presses de l’Ifpo, CNRS Liban. https://books.
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32 2 Spatial Distribution of Population and Urbanisation
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Chapter 3
Sex Ratio, Age Structure and Population
Ageing
Abstract It is vital to examine the population composition, i.e. how the population
being studied is structured. In demography, to understand the phenomena studied
(firstly, births and deaths), it is common practice to examine the number of women
in relation to the number of men and to distinguish the distribution of individuals by
age. The most common representation of this gender and age composition is the “age
pyramid”. It is important to know the age and gender composition, as this largely
determines a population’s demographic dynamics. Elements relating to gender and
age composition will enable better understanding of the dynamics outlined in the
following chapters. In this chapter therefore, we will present the composition of the
Mediterranean population from the perspective of sex ratios on the one hand, and the
age distribution of populations on the other. We will also consider the implications
of differences between countries at the sub-national level.
Keywords Age pyramid ·Population ageing ·Gender inequalities ·Sex ratio ·
Mediterranean
3.1 Introduction
While studying the spatial distribution of a population is an important aspect to
understanding it (see Chap. 2), it is also vital to examine its composition, i.e. how
the population being studied is structured. There are several indicators to describe
a population’s composition. In demography, to understand the phenomena studied
(firstly, births and deaths), it is common practice to examine the number of women
in relation to the number of men and to distinguish the distribution of individuals
by age. The most common representation of this gender and age composition is the
“age pyramid”.
It is important to know the age and gender composition, as this largely determines
a population’s demographic dynamics. For example, the birth rate is firstly the result
of the number of women of childbearing age (between puberty and menopause),
and secondly the intensity of fertility by age group (Chap. 5 examines to aspects of
© The Author(s) 2023
Y. Doignon et al., Population Dynamics in the Mediterranean,
SpringerBriefs in Population Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37759-4_3
33
34 3 Sex Ratio, Age Structure and Population Ageing
differentials fertility). Elements relating to gender and age composition will enable
better understanding of the dynamics outlined in the following chapters. The birth
rate, as we have said, but also mortality (Chap. 7), migration (Chap. 8) and population
dynamics (Chap. 9).
In this chapter therefore, we will present the composition of the Mediterranean
population from the perspective of sex ratios on the one hand, and the age distribution
of populations on the other. We will also consider the implications of differences
between countries at the sub-national level.
3.2 Gender Inequalities in the Mediterranean
The human species is characterised by an almost equal numerical balance between
the sexes. On average, 105 boys are born for every 100 girls, but as the mortality
rate for boys is slightly higher than for girls, the ratio between the two sexes reaches
an equilibrium around the age of 20 and is maintained today until the age of 60.
Secondly, the gap tends to widen between men who die earlier on average, and women
(Chap. 7). Obviously, these orders of magnitude vary from one society to another, and
have evolved over time. These inequalities in mortality can be explained by natural
differences, but also by differences in personal behaviour and social constraints.
The male/female ratio, also known as the sex ratio, is the consequence of biological
constants that cannot be explained, but also of differentiated cultural practices. Thus,
in some countries there are imbalances in the sex ratio from birth. India and China
are regularly cited in this regard, with a sex ratio that favours girls (Guilmoto &
Oliveau, 2007). Around the Mediterranean, most countries have sex ratios at birth
that follow the norm of 105 boys per 100 girls. In the 1970s and 1980s, excess female
mortality was present in some countries on the Southern and Eastern shores (Locoh &
Ouadah-Bedidi, 2014; Tabutin & Schoumaker, 2005), but this is no longer visible
today (according to the World Population Prospects 2022 data at least). However,
other countries did show sex ratio imbalances at birth: Albania, Montenegro, and
Macedonia. All three countries show an unbalanced sex ratio at birth, indicating
strong discrimination against girls (Fig. 3.1).1
These imbalances were particularly high in the past, and are now decreasing.
Albania, for example, saw the sex ratio imbalance worsen in the mid-1990s, peaking
at 113 boys for every 100 girls in the mid-1980s, and declining steadily since. The
trends are different for these three countries, but they have all at some point had a
sex ratio at birth that has exceeded 108 in the last 30 years. In 2020, they reached a
level of around 107, higher than that observed in Southern Europe or the European
Union.
This preference for boys is complex to explain, as it is based on cultural practices
and lineage structures that are not explicit and are generally unconscious. Discrimi-
natory practice, while there is no doubt, is not being claimed here. Nevertheless, for
1 For at the sub-national level analysis of the sex ratio in former Yugoslavia, see Buisson (2016).
3.2 Gender Inequalities in the Mediterranean 35
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Number of male births per one female birth
Macedonia
Albania
Montenegro
Kosovo
Southern
Europe
Europe
Fig. 3.1 Evolution of the sex ratio at birth in select South European countries (Source Wor ld
Population Prospects 2022)
the preference for boys to be expressed by the disappearance of girls, there would
have to be legal and medical contexts that allow for it. Thus, the development of
ultrasound scans and abortion facilitated the use of prenatal selection. The develop-
ment of these practices from the 1990s onwards is, for instance, visible in regions
with a large Albanian population (Guilmoto & Duthé, 2013).
Nevertheless, traces of discrimination at birth may be erased over time in the
composition of the general population, through a higher mortality of boys and then
men, or through sex-differentiated migration, which can ultimately change the overall
sex ratio. From this perspective, international migration can severely impact the
overall sex ratio. This is the case for Albanian men who leave their country in greater
numbers than women, thus rebalancing the overall sex ratio.
Finally, in general, men’s mortality is higher than women’s, and even more so at
older ages (Chap. 7). As a result, countries with ageing populations generally have a
sex ratio in favour of women. Delbès et al. (2006) summed it up well about Europe
when they wrote that “women grow old alone, but men grow old with a partner”.
36 3 Sex Ratio, Age Structure and Population Ageing
3.3 An Ageing Population
Looking at a population in terms of its age structure enables understanding of the
demographic potential in terms of replacement level, ageing, development oppor-
tunities, etc. The determinants of age structure are both the births and deaths rates
(which are themselves the result of a cross between the fertility/age-specific mortality
rates and the structure of the population by age and sex), and the effect of inward
and outward migration. In 1950, the Mediterranean’s age pyramid had a broad base
and a rather thin top, which is a sign of a high average birth rate and an even higher
mortality rate at advanced ages (Fig. 3.2).
The higher the birth rate, the greater the number of young people and the wider the
base of the pyramid. This initially creates needs (in terms of educational infrastructure
in particular), but also rapidly opportunities (through the influx of workers into the
labour market). In 2020, the Mediterranean pyramid evolved. Its base was narrower,
with a lower weight of young people in the population. In addition, there are more age
groups above 30 than in 1950, and the top of the pyramid is much fuller. The weight
of older people has increased, and the population has aged, generating many socio-
demographic challenges (Blöss, 2018). This change in the age pyramid between
1950 and 2020 is the result of the demographic transition (Chap. 4), withasharp
drop in fertility, which fell below the generation replacement level in several countries
(Chap. 5), a significant drop in mortality and improved survival to old age (Chap. 7).
In societies in transition from a demographic regime of high births and high deaths
to a demographic regime of low births and low deaths (Chap. 4), there comes a time
when there are still few old people and few young people. This leaves plenty of room
15 10 5 0 5 10 15
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75-79
80-84
85-89
90-94
95-99
100+
%
MEN WOMEN
1950
2020
Fig. 3.2 Age pyramid of the Mediterranean in 1950 and 2020 (Source World Population Prospects
2022)
3.4 Ongoing Significant Differences in Age Structure Between Regions 37
for people of working age, creating what is known as a demographic window of oppor-
tunity for the economy: the number of working people is greater than the number of
people who depend on them (children and the elderly). A summary measure of this
situation is the “dependency ratio”, which relates the population aged under 20 and
those aged 65 or over to the population aged 20–64. If the ratio is above 100, then
there are more inactive than active people, and if it is below 100, then the number
of active people is higher than the number of inactive people, suggesting a greater
possibility of productivity in society.
This dependency ratio in the Mediterranean decreases significantly between 1950
and 2020, from 105 to less than 75 (Fig. 3.3). This decrease indicates a lower amount
of young and old people in the population. This trend is primarily related to the
falling birth rate (Chap. 4), which narrows the base of the pyramid. As the number
of young people decreases, the dependency ratio decreases. However, there has been
a recent increase in the dependency ratio in Balkan countries, Southern European
countries and also in Israel. This is due to the ageing of the population, where
more people are surviving into old age, increasing the amount of the elderly in the
population. Countries on the Southern and Eastern shores retain higher dependency
ratios than countries on the Northern Shore (Ambrosetti, 2020), particularly in the
Near East, which is mainly due to a higher birth rate and thus a higher presence of
children in the population. Two countries stand out due to their ratio trajectories.
First of all, Israel has maintained a high ratio (>80%) since 1950, combining an
improvement in the longevity of its elderly with a relatively high fertility rate. The
second country is France, whose ratio is currently the highest on the Northern shore,
due to a combination of a birth rate that has not fallen to the same extent as elsewhere
in Europe, immigration that provides a steady supply of workers, and an ageing
population.
3.4 Ongoing Significant Differences in Age Structure
Between Regions
Looking at ratios at the country level is interesting and already shows remarkable
differences. It is nevertheless more pertinent to approach the subject at a finer level
in order to offer a more precise understanding of the age composition of the Mediter-
ranean area. We have therefore constructed age pyramids at a sub-national level for
each country that is as comparable as possible from one country to another in terms of
average area (Doignon, 2020; Doignon & Oliveau, 2015). In order to allow for carto-
graphic analyses, we have established a typology for age pyramids, which consists
of 7 profiles (from the youngest to the oldest) and uses a hierarchical ascending
classification (Fig. 3.4).2
The first profile type is an age pyramid with a very broad base and a narrow top.
It represents a very young population, with a high birth rate (characteristic of a fairly
2 The period represented is 2010–2015 due to data availability.
38 3 Sex Ratio, Age Structure and Population Ageing
50
75
100
125
150
175
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Total dependency ratio (%)
France
Italy
Portugal
Spain
Malta
50
75
100
125
150
175
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Tot al dependency ratio (%)
Egypt
Libya
Algeria
Morocco
Tunisia
50
75
100
125
150
175
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Total dependency ratio (%)
Palestine
Syria
Israel
Jordan
Lebanon
Turkey
Cyprus
50
75
100
125
150
175
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Total dependency ratio (%)
Kosovo
Albania
Montenegro
BiH
Macedonia
Greece
Slovenia
Croatia
Bulgaria
Serbia
Fig. 3.3 Total dependency ratio in the Mediterranean (1950–2021). (Source World Population
Prospects 2022. Note The total dependency ratio is the ratio of population aged 0–19 and 65 + per
100 population aged 20–64)
high fertility rate), and a low proportion of elderly people (on average less than 3%
of the population is aged 65 or over). It includes part of the Nile Valley in Egypt,
Palestine, Jordan, Syria, and also Turkish Kurdistan (with a higher fertility than the
rest of the country) and some Saharan regions of Algeria.
The second type corresponds to a situation where the birth rate has started to
decline, but is still high. People aged 65 and over still represent only 4.2% of the
population. This type of age pyramid is essentially found in much of the Maghreb,
and in the Nile delta in Egypt.
The third type is very similar to the second, but with the base of the pyramid
showing the beginning of a recovery, indicating that a decline in fertility is taking
place over time. It represents the situation in Libya, southern Morocco, the urban
regions of the Maghreb (Casablanca, Rabat, Agadir, Oran, Algiers, Tunis, etc.), a
large part of Tunisia, and Turkey, in the regions of Istanbul and Ankara, and on its
southern border.
The fourth type represents the average characteristics of the Mediterranean area.
The base of the pyramid is slightly sunken, indicating rather low fertility, and the
top is fuller than the previous types. The share of elderly people in the population is
about 9%. This type is found on all shores of the Mediterranean. It is characteristic
3.4 Ongoing Significant Differences in Age Structure Between Regions 39
Fig. 3.4 Age structure in the Mediterranean (2010–15) (Source National Institutes of Statistics and authors’ calculations)
40 3 Sex Ratio, Age Structure and Population Ageing
of Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia, Lebanon and Cyprus, along with a large part
of Turkey and certain localised rural areas of the Maghreb. Finally, some large urban
centres have this profile, such as Paris, Lyon and Toulouse in France (as well as
the departments bordering Switzerland, which attract many young workers), and Tel
Aviv and Haifa in Israel.
The fifth type embodies European ageing, with a rather low birth rate. People
aged 65 or over represent almost 15% of the population. This pattern is found in
the Iberian Peninsula, southern Italy, and much of the Balkans, almost equal to the
seventh type. The only exception is France on the Northern shore.
The French regions are represented by the sixth type which is specific to them.
Despite the ageing population (15% of the population is 65 years or older), the birth
rate remains high compared to other European countries (see Chap. 4), which gives
the age pyramid a typical shape, still somewhat narrow at its base, but with a full top.
The seventh and last type is an even older age pyramid than the fifth type. The
base of the pyramid is very narrow and the top is very wide. The proportion of people
aged 65 or over in the population reaches 19% (1 in 5 people). This seventh type is
found in the same regions as the fifth type, i.e. the Iberian Peninsula, Northern Italy
and the eastern Balkans.
As evidenced, the model of contrasting shores between north, south and east needs
to be rethought. The Mediterranean is a highly heterogeneous area. While profiles
1, 2 and 3 are not present in the north, they are differentially distributed in the south
and east and are clustered locally. Type 4 is thus present everywhere, although it
is over-represented in the east. Types 5 and 7 correspond only to certain countries
on the Northern Shore (Bulgaria, Greece, countries of the former Yugoslavia, Italy,
Spain, Portugal) and therefore do not constitute a particular model. Moreover, type
4 regions are interspersed. Finally, type 6 is a reminder of France’s demographic
uniqueness, even if the country is not perfectly uniform.
3.5 Implications and Consequences of Age Structure
Differences
This heterogeneity in age composition of Mediterranean populations is above all the
consequence of demographic transitions whose pace and intensity have differed and
still differ between countries (Chap. 4). What interests us here are the implications
of these observed differences.
Throughout Mediterranean societies, the relationship between men and women
will change. The situation remains difficult to summarise. On a global scale, the sex
ratio is unlikely to changes between now (98.9 males per 100 females in 2020) and
the next 30 to 50 years (99.5 males per 100 females in 2050 and 2070). However, this
stability hides a strong convergence of sex ratios between countries. In fact, countries
where women have been in the minority (general sex ratio of the population greater
than 100) are trending towards a better balance between the sexes. In fact, while in
References 41
1950 there were only 6 countries with a sex ratio greater than 105, in 2020 there was
only 3 and in 50 years-time there will likely only be 2. At the same time, countries
where women were in the majority (overall sex ratio of the population below 100)
are also trending have been towards 100. 11 countries had a sex ratio below 95 in
1950 and 6 countries in 2020. However, in 50 years, only France is predicted to
have a sex ratio below this value. The French case is once again different from the
Mediterranean model, as its sex ratio will be even lower than 90! With this exception,
the projections show a strong convergence of sex ratios towards a better numerical
gender balance in all societies.
The reduction in the labour force could also lead to a greater demand for female
labour, which, together with better education, could lead women to renegotiate their
place, even within societies that some believe are still stuck in fairly traditional
patriarchal forms of organisation.
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42 3 Sex Ratio, Age Structure and Population Ageing
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Chapter 4
The Various of Demographic Transitions
Abstract Since the eighteenth century, and at different periods, the world’s popula-
tions have been undergoing, or have undergone, a process of demographic transition.
The Mediterranean countries present a great diversity of demographic transitions
in terms of timing, pace, intensity, etc. The aim of this chapter is to take stock
of demographic transitions in the Mediterranean by identifying the different types
of demographic transition that have occurred since 1950. This typology makes it
possible to place the national demographic transitions within a general model, while
also highlighting the contrasting situations that exist in the Mediterranean.
Keywords Demographic transition ·Demographic counter-transitions ·Birth
rate ·Mortality rate ·Natural change of population ·Convergence ·Mediterranean
4.1 Introduction
Since the eighteenth century, and at different periods, the world’s populations have
been undergoing, or have undergone, a process of demographic transition.1 The
Mediterranean countries present a great diversity of demographic transitions in terms
of timing, pace, intensity, etc. (Doignon, 2020). The aim of this chapter is to take
stock of demographic transitions in the Mediterranean by identifying the different
types of demographic transition that have occurred since 1950. This typology makes
it possible to place the national demographic transitions within a general model
1 See Box 4.1 for an overview of the demographic transition.
© The Author(s) 2023
Y. Doignon et al., Population Dynamics in the Mediterranean,
SpringerBriefs in Population Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37759-4_4
43
44 4 The Various of Demographic Transitions
(Box 4.1), while also highlighting the contrasting situations that exist in the Mediter-
ranean. Using data from the UN’s World Population Prospects, 2022, we will
construct a classification of demographic transitions according to four criteria:
• The status of the demographic transition in 1950, to indicate whether the transition
has already begun, what step it is at, or whether it is already complete (pseudo-
equilibrium2 of mortality and fertility) (Fig. 4.1).
• The status of the demographic transition in the most recent period (2015–20193 ).
• The type of post-transitional regime reached at the end of the transition: a zero
natural change, a positive natural change or a negative natural change.
• The levels of mortality, birth rate and natural change.
By combining these four criteria, we will obtain 10 types of demographic tran-
sition, which we will then group into 6 broad types: demographic transitions that
conform to the theoretical model (types 1, 2 and 3), transitions leading to a post-
transitional regime of decline (types 4 and 5), the specific transition of Israel whose
post-transitional regime retains strong population growth (type 6), recent and rapid
transitions (types 7 and 8), cases of a sustained rise in birth rate (type 9), and recent
and slow transitions (type 10).
Box 4.1: The demographic transition model
Demographic transition is the passage between two different demographic
regimes, called “pre-transitional regime” and “post-transitional regime”, corre-
sponding to the demographic regimes in force before and after the transi-
tion respectively (Chesnais, 1992). This transition is usually formalised by a
four-step process (Fig. 4.1).
2 By pseudo-equilibrium we mean a situation where there are fluctuations in the mortality and birth
rates, but where the overall trend is balanced.
3 The graphs in this chapter will represent the period 1950–2022. However, the typology did not
take into account the 2020–2022 period to avoid bias from cyclically differentiated effect of the
Covid-19 pandemic.
4.1 Introduction 45
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Demographic transition
Mortality (Crude Death Rate)
Natality (Crude Birth Rate)
Rate of Natural Change
Time
Rate (‰)
(a)
(b)
(c)
THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION
0
Pre-transitionnal
Stage
Post-transitional
Stage
Fig. 4.1 Descriptive model of demographic transition (Figure created by Doignon Y.)
The first step is the pre-transitional regime, i.e. a demographic pseudo-
equilibrium over the long term, resulting from a high birth rate (measured by
the Crude Birth Rate4(CBR)) and a high death rate (measured by the Crude
Death Rate5(CDR)). The second step is a reduction in mortality. This phase is
initiated when a decline in mortality begins while the birth rate remains high.
During this step, the natural balance (measured by the Rate of Natural Change
(RNC6)) increases. The third step is a decline in the birth rate. It begins when the
birth rate starts to fall. The natural balance then also decreases. The second and
third steps constitute a period of strong demographic imbalance caused by the
difference in timing between the decrease in mortality and the decrease in birth
rate. The last step, the post-transitional demographic regime, is characterised
by a low birth rate, low mortality and consequently a low natural balance.
Through the specific characteristics of each transition, this descriptive model
makes it possible to identify different forms of demographic transitions. We
can observe variations in the duration of the transition as a function of the
time lag between the two declines and their pace, original phasing, such as a
birth rate that decreases before mortality, or different types of post-transitional
regime. In this respect, three types of post-transitional regimes can be distin-
guished according to the RNC: a surplus regime (regime a in Fig. 4.1), a deficit
regime (regime b) and a balanced regime (regime c). As this is a model, not
all populations have the same demographic transition, but they all experience
a convergence of their mortality and fertility towards lower levels than in the
pre-transitional regime.
46 4 The Various of Demographic Transitions
We will now present the different types of the typology obtained, starting with
the demographic transition “models”.
4.2 Demographic Transition “Models”
This group of demographic transitions is consistent with the theoretical model: the
process results in a low pseudo-equilibrium of mortality and births, and a positive,
but very low natural dynamic. The transitions corresponding to this case are already
in the third step7 of the demographic transition in 1950, i.e. both the birth rate and the
death rate are already falling. We distinguished three types of demographic transition
according to the progress made in the second step in 1950, and the date at which
pseudo-equilibrium is reached: an early transition with third step tending to end in
1950 and a pseudo-equilibrium reached from the 1970s onwards (Spain, France)
(type 1); a transition in the middle of third step in 1950, and a pseudo-equilibrium
reached in the 1990s (Cyprus, Montenegro, Malta) (type 2); and a rapid transition at
the very beginning of third step in 1950, with a pseudo-equilibrium reached in the
middle of the 2000s (Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo) (type 3).
4.2.1 Type 1: Ancient Transition with Pseudo-Equilibrium
in the 1970s (Spain, France)
This type is characterised by a demographic transition that is almost completed by
1950: mortality and birth rates are balanced, and the RNC is already around 10%.
In 1950, the transition was clearly at the end of the third step of the process. A low
pseudo-equilibrium has been observed since the mid-1970s for France and since the
beginning of the 1990s for Spain (Fig. 4.2). The RNC tends to become very low. It
has even become negative very recently in Spain. If the trend were to continue in the
future, this country would have to be classified in another category of the typology,
as the low pseudo-equilibrium would then be negative.
4 The Crude Birth Rate (CBR) is calculated by dividing the number of live births in a year by the
average population in that year.
5 The Crude Death Rate (CDR) is calculated by dividing the number of deaths in a year by the
average population in that year.
6 The Rate of Natural Change (RNC) is calculated by subtracting the CDR from the CBR. For ease
of reading, we use the annotations “CBR, “CDR” and “RNC” in this chapter instead of “Crude
Birth Rate”, “Crude Death Rate” and “Rate of Natural Change” respectively.
7 In this chapter, the word “step” refers to the different stages of the demographic transition outlined
in Fig. 4.1.
4.2 Demographic Transition “Models” 47
Fig. 4.2 Demographic transition in Spain and France (1950–2022) (Source World Population
Prospects [2022] Calculations made by the authors. Note The time units used are five-year periods)
4.2.2 Type 2: Transition with Pseudo-Equilibrium in the Late
1990s (Cyprus, Montenegro, Malta)
In 1950, countries experiencing this type of transition were in the middle of the third
step, with a relatively high CBR (≈ 30%) and a balanced mortality around 10%
(Fig. 4.3). The RNC became quasi-stable and weak starting at the end of the 1990s:
the process ends later than the previous type.
4.2.3 Type 3: Rapid Transition with Late Pseudo-Equilibrium
from the 2000s Onwards (Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo)
In 1950, this type of transition occurred at the end of second step (Albania) or at the
beginning of third step (Macedonia) (Fig. 4.4). This is a demographic transition that
is in line with the theoretical model, one that is also occurring rapidly. The decline
in mortality reached a pseudo-equilibrium in the late 1970s. The birth rate has been
rapidly converging to very low rates (≈ 10% in 2015–2019). The pseudo-equilibrium
of these countries has been achieved late, from the 2000s onwards, except for Kosovo
where the CBR has continued to decrease since the 2010s.
Out of 26 countries, 8 have experienced a transition in line with theoretical model.
The other 18 countries have thus shown different transitions. We will begin with those
with a post-transitional decline regime.
4.3 Completed Demographic Transition with a Post-Transitional Decline … 49
Fig. 4.4 Demographic transition in Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo (1950–2022) (Source World
Population Prospects [2022] Calculations made by the authors. Note The time units used are five-year
periods)
4.3 Completed Demographic Transition
with a Post-Transitional Decline Regime
This group of transitions is distinguished from the previous one by a post-transitional
demographic regime of slight decline, i.e. one with a slightly negative natural balance
(number of deaths exceeding the number of births). We differentiate two types of
transition: those occurring early, at the end of third step in 1950 with a pseudo-
equilibrium reached in the 1980s–1990s (Italy, Portugal, Greece, Slovenia, Croatia,
Bulgaria) (type 4); and those occurring later, in the middle of third step in 1950
and reaching a pseudo-equilibrium only in the 2000s (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina)
(type 5).
50 4 The Various of Demographic Transitions
4.3.1 Type 4: Transition with Pseudo-Equilibrium
in the 1980s–1990s (Italy, Portugal, Greece, Slovenia,
Croatia, Bulgaria)
In 1950, demographic transitions of this type occurred at the end of third: mortality
stabilised at 10% and fertility at around 20% (Fig. 4.5). Over the 1950–2019 period,
the CBR gradually decreased to reach the CDR in the 1990s (1980s for Italy and
Bulgaria), resulting in a near-zero RNC. Thereafter, the CDR exceeded the CBR, and
the RNC became negative. In 2019, the demographic regime of these countries corre-
sponds to Adolphe Landry’s “contemporary regime” (1934) or Frank Notestein’s
“incipient decline” (1945), i.e. regimes characterised by a negative natural balance
(regime binFig.
4.1).
4.3.2 Type 5: Transition with Pseudo-Equilibrium
in the 2000s (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina)
Such demographic transitions were in the middle of third step in 1950, with a still
relatively high CBR (28–38‰). The inversion of the CDR and CBR and their pseudo-
equilibrium can be observed in the 2000s (Fig. 4.6). These transitions differ from
those of the previous type in two respects: a post-transitional regime of decline
reached somewhat later, and a generally lower RNC. The temporary increase in the
CDR in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s was due to the war in Yugoslavia.
4.4 Completed Demographic Transition
with a Post-Transitional Regime with Sustained
Population Growth (Type 6: Israel)
Israel’s demographic transition is very specific. In 1950, the country was at the very
end of third step, i.e. mortality was already low and the birth rate was about to stabilise
(Fig. 4.7). The transition ended with an early pseudo-equilibrium in the early 1960s.
However, the birth rate has been balanced at above 20% for 30 years now; mortality
has also been stable at around 6% throughout this period. The post-transitional demo-
graphic regime is thus balanced, but with a high RNC (15–20%). This sustained
birth rate is often explained by the implications of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on
the demographic patterns of these two territorial entities. Indeed, the preoccupation
with being in the majority numerically has led to a “cradle war”8 between the two
populations. Youssef Courbage (2008) describes the very high fertility (more than 7
8 This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows:
“guerre des berceaux”.
52 4 The Various of Demographic Transitions
Fig. 4.6 Demographic transition in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina (1950–2022) (Source World Popu-
lation Prospects [2022] Calculations made by the authors. Note The time units used are five-year
periods)
children per woman in the 2000s) of ultra-Orthodox Jews and religious nationalists
as “combat fertility”.9 Palestinians also engaged in “militant natalism”10 (more than
8 children per woman in the mid-1980s), during which time Yasser Arafat is said to
have advocated that each family should have 12 children, 2 for the couple and 10 for
the cause (Courbage, 2006).
4.5 Recent and Rapid Demographic Transition, Now Being
Finalised
This group brings together demographic transitions that have started late but have
been occurring at a faster pace than the European transitions. They are also currently
being finalised. However, their post-transitional demographic regime could be char-
acterised by a more sustained natural dynamic (RNC above 10%) than that of the
Northern shore countries, whose RNC is below 5%. Among this group, we distin-
guish transitions according to timeframe: transitional processes with declines in the
CBR and CDR already underway in 1950 (Lebanon, Turkey) (type 7) and later
transitions (Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) (type 8).
9 This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows:
“fécondité de combat”.
10 This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows:
“natalisme militant”.
4.5 Recent and Rapid Demographic Transition, Now Being Finalised 53
Fig. 4.7 Demographic
transition in Israel
(1950–2022) (Source Worl d
Population Prospects [2022]
Calculations made by the
authors. Note The time units
used are five-year periods)
4.5.1 Type 7: Transition Already Underway in 1950
(Lebanon, Turkey)
In 1950, the demographic transition of these countries was at the beginning of third
step, i.e. both births and deaths had started to decline (Fig. 4.8).
Fig. 4.8 Demographic transition in Lebanon and Turkey (1950–2022) (Source World Population
Prospects [2022] Calculations made by the authors. Note The time units used are five-year periods)
54 4 The Various of Demographic Transitions
The CBR however still remains high. The CDR balances out at around 4–5‰ in
the 1990s in Lebanon,11 and in the 2000s in Turkey. The rate of decline in the CBR
has been slowing down since the 2000s, and seems to be levelling off in Lebanon,
as in Turkey despite a downward trend. The demographic transition thus appears to
be in the process of being finalised. On the other hand, the RNC is close to 10%,
i.e. a higher level than in the Northern shore countries. The next 10–20 years will
certainly reveal whether the post-transitional demographic regime of these countries
will have almost no or low natural dynamics (like type 1 countries) or will be more
sustained.
Note that the current level of mortality in these two countries (≈ 4–5%) is lower
than that of the countries on the Northern shore, whose CDR is generally above
8%. This may seem counter-intuitive, but it is not. This difference should not be
interpreted as better sanitary conditions in Lebanon and Turkey compared to the
countries on the Northern shore. This is because the CDR (and CBR) do not take
into account the age structure of the population. These two indicators reflect both
the health conditions and fertility of the populations, but also the age structure of
countries. Thus, under equal health conditions, fewer deaths will occur in a younger
population than in an older population. The fact that the countries on the Southern
and Eastern shores are on average younger than those on the Northern shore partly
explains their lower CDR.
4.5.2 Type 8: More Recent Transition (Libya, Morocco,
Tunisia)
These are demographic transitions that have occurred relatively late. In 1950, the
process seems to be in the middle of second step, i.e. the decline in mortality has
started, but not yet for the birth rate (Fig. 4.9).
Libya is unique in that it is the only Mediterranean country where virtually all the
step of the demographic transition can be observed over the period 1950–2019. The
decline in the birth rate began in the 1960s, thus later than in most Mediterranean
countries. The decline in the CBR was very rapid, from almost 50% to 20% in about
30 years in Tunisia and Libya, and in 45 years in Morocco. In the 2000s, the birth rate
stabilised at around 20%, a level higher than those of the Northern shore countries.
A pseudo-equilibrium of mortality and birth rate seems to have been found, and one
could conclude that the transition was over. However, the birth rate has resumed
its decline since the 2010s for all three countries, and it is difficult to say what
kind of post-transitional demographic regime these countries are heading towards.
11 The increase in the CDR in Lebanon in the mid-1970s was due to the war (1975–1982).
4.5 Recent and Rapid Demographic Transition, Now Being Finalised 55
Fig. 4.9 Demographic transition in Libya, Morocco and Tunisia (1950–2022) (Source World Popu-
lation Prospects [2022] Calculations made by the authors. Note The time units used are five-year
periods)
Indeed, the RNC in the 2000s was quite high (between 10 and 20%), but it has been
continuously decreasing to now around 10%.
56 4 The Various of Demographic Transitions
4.6 Possible Demographic Counter-Transitions (Type 9:
Egypt, Algeria)
This type of demographic transition is an exceptional case which, like the previous
one, is found only in North Africa. Like the countries of type 8, the transition was
late, since 1950 the transition was at the beginning of third step (Egypt) or in the
middle of second step (Algeria) (Fig. 4.10). The demographic transition of Egypt
and Algeria are singular, but currently share a sustained natural dynamic, as the RNC
remains around 20%.
Egypt is considered a “demographic exception” (Ambrosetti, 2011). The process
seems rather slow and hesitant in the sense that the decline in the birth rate has been
disjointed. The demographic transition was interrupted between 1970 and 1985,
during which time the CBR even increased, before picking up again in the late 1980s
(Doignon et al., 2021). By the end of the 1990s, the CBR stabilised at a high rate
(≈ 25‰) before increasing again from the late 2000s (Al Zalak & Goujon, 2017;
Goujon & Al Zalak, 2018). During this period, the CDR remained at a low level.
Between 1995 and 2010, a pseudo-equilibrium was reached for mortality and birth
rates. This would seem to be a pause in the downward movement of the birth rate,
and not a post-transitional equilibrium with a more sustained natural dynamic, since
the birth rate had been falling again since the beginning of the 2010s.
Algeria shows a later, but less hesitant and more rapid decline in the birth rate.
The CBR started to fall sharply in the 1970s. At present, there is no equilibrium
in the birth rate, unlike for the death rate. The CBR reached the 20% threshold in
2000–2005, but then increases to 25% in 2010–2015, only to decrease again since
the late 2010s.
Fig. 4.10 Demographic transition in Egypt and Algeria (1950–2022) (Source World Population
Prospects [2022] Calculations made by the authors. Note The time units used are five-year periods)
4.6 Possible Demographic Counter-Transitions (Type 9: Egypt, Algeria) 57
These particular trajectories, whether a hesitant decline or a significant increase
in the birth rate,12 raise questions about the process of demographic transition. Are
these erratic trends, i.e. a temporary rise before a future fall, as was the case for
Egypt in the 1970s? Or is it rather a real increase, where the post-transitional birth
rate is stabilising at a higher level than theoretically expected? As this rise in the birth
rate calls into question the possible equilibrium of the CBR, it is difficult to make a
statement on the status of the demographic transition in Algeria, for example.
Moreover, this increase in the birth rate is not only explained by a greater
proportion of women of childbearing age (structural effect), but also by an increase
in fertility (see Chap. 5). Youssef Courbage (2015a, 2015b) calls it a “counter-
transition”.13 Many recent increases in fertility have been observed in some European
countries where fertility levels have fallen very low, for example Sweden in the 2000s.
Nevertheless, it is atypical that fertility above 2 children per woman would rise signif-
icantly. From this point of view, Algeria and Egypt are not global exceptions. Let us
not forget the baby boom in Europe, for example. In France, the total fertility rate rose
from 1.85 (1941) to 3.03 (1947), before falling back to 1.82 in 1976. However, at the
time, the baby boom was not seen as a ‘counter-transition’ because it calmed fears
about the population’s decline. For Egypt, it is difficult to conclude on the signifi-
cance of the rise in birth rate, as it is very recent and only cover a relatively short
period of time before falling again. In the case of Algeria, the trend has lasted longer.
Is this increase in fertility comparable to the European baby boom, in a post- “Black
Decade”14 context? Could this be a data-related effect? Did the latter underestimate
fertility until the early 2000s due to poor recording quality? The current increase
would then be a consequence of improved civil registration. Zahia Ouadah-Bedidi
et al. (2012) believe that a decrease in the age at marriage is partly responsible for the
rise in fertility (see Chap. 6), that also suggest that couples may be moving towards
a three-child model rather than the two-child model of Morocco and Tunisia. One
could also envisage that Algerian fertility reached a minimum in 2000–2005. The
rise would then constitute an adjustment towards the post-transitional level, in the
same way as in Eastern Europe where some countries are currently seeing a rise in
fertility.
12 Increases in fertility are also observed in other Mediterranean countries, such as Kosovo and
Tunisia in the 2000s. However, the intensity of the increase and its duration are not of the same
order of magnitude as in Algeria.
13 This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows:
“contre-transition”.
14 The “Black Decade” is a term used to describe the Algerian civil war (1991–2002).
58 4 The Various of Demographic Transitions
4.7 Recent and Ongoing Transition, Slower Decline
in Birth Rate (Type 10: Jordan, Palestine, Syria)
These demographic transitions have started late and have only occurred in the Near
East (Fig. 4.11). In 1950, these transitions were at second step, i.e. falling mortality,
but note for the birth rate. The latter was high (≈ 50%) and the decline was less rapid
than the other late transitions (types 8 and 9). In fact, the CBR was still strong in
2015–2019 (≈ 20–30%), producing an even higher RNC (between 20 and 30%) as
the CDR is very low (4–5%). Only mortality reached a balance in the 1990s. The
demographic transition is therefore still underway, as the birth rate continues to fall.
Palestine’s demographic transition has been disrupted by the political situation and
continued to be characterised by a high birth rate (although it has been declining
since the early 1990s), despite a significant level of f emale education. The birth
rate in Syria had slowed in the 1990s and stabilised at around 30% in the 2000s.
This development is similar to that of Egypt or Libya in the same period. However,
given the political situation in Syria, UN data after 2010 should be interpreted with
great caution. The decline in birth rate, for example, from 30‰ to 20‰ in less than
10 years, should be attributed more to the Syrian conflict than to any possible rapid
progress in the demographic transition.
4.8 A Diversity of Demographic Transitions Despite
a General Convergence
This typology of demographic transitions in the Mediterranean highlights two essen-
tial characteristics. The first is a general convergence of births and deaths towards low
rates. All Mediterranean countries are engaged in this transitional process. However,
and this is the second characteristic revealed by the typology, this generalised conver-
gence of mortality/birth rates towards low rates masks great diversity. The process
does not take place in the same way in all countries: there is no single model of
demographic transition in the Mediterranean, but several models. Finally, few coun-
tries have a “model” transition with almost zero population growth. The diversity
of transitions is striking, whether in their form, pace, timing or the nature of the
post-transitional regime.
The transitions of the Northern shore countries are those that best fit the theoretical
descriptive model. Indeed, these transitions are different in terms of timing and pace,
but their mortality and birth rates all stabilise at levels that result in low natural
dynamics, whether positive or negative.
Countries on the Southern and Eastern shores, on the other hand, tend to have
a higher RNC, due to a higher birth rate and lower mortality. This can partly be
attributed to a younger age structure. With the inevitable ageing of the population,
mortality is likely to increase, and the birth rate and RNC to decrease structurally.
It is also possible that the countries on the Southern and Eastern shores will achieve
4.8 A Diversity of Demographic Transitions Despite a General Convergence 59
Fig. 4.11 Demographic transition in Jordan, Palestine and Syria (1950–2022) (Source World Popu-
lation Prospects [2022] Calculations made by the authors. Note The time units used are five-year
periods)
different post-transitional demographic regimes from those on the Northern shores,
with, in particular, higher natural growth and an increasing population (without taking
into account migration). Some of these countries, such as Israel and Tunisia, have
achieved (or have nearly achieved) a pseudo-equilibrium in mortality and birth rates,
but at levels that generate rather sustained natural growth. On the other hand, most
of the countries on the Southern and Eastern shores have not reached a pseudo-
equilibrium at present, either because the transition is ending or because the transition
is still ongoing. On the other hand, there have been some rather unexpected trends,
such as in Egypt or Algeria, with a recent and sometimes prolonged increase in the
birth rate. It is therefore difficult to determine the type of post-transitional regime
for most of the countries on the Southern and Eastern shores, i.e. whether it is a
60 4 The Various of Demographic Transitions
regime with weak but positive natural dynamics, or a r egime characterised by more
sustained natural growth than the Northern shore countries, as has been the case in
Israel for more than 30 years.
Finally, it should be remembered that these broad trends observed at the country
level also conceal a variety of local dynamics. Transitions can vary regionally in
timing and intensity, and differences between urban and rural areas often exist
(Coale & Watkins, 1986).
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/orientxxi.info/magazine/egypte-une-transition-demographique-en-marche-arriere,0956
Doignon, Y. (2020). Les transitions démographiques des pays méditerranéens depuis 1950.
Géoconfluences. http://geoconfluences.ens-lyon.fr/informations-scientifiques/dossiers-region
aux/la-mediterranee-une-geographie-paradoxale/articles-scientifiques/transitions-demograph
iques
Doignon, Y., Ambrosetti, E., & Miccoli, S. (2021). The spatial diffusion of fertility decline in Egypt
(1950–2006). Genus, 77, 23. https://doi.org/10.1186/s41118-021-00131-9
Goujon, A., & Zalak, Z. A. (2018). Why has fertility been increasing in Egypt? Population &
Societies, 551. https://doi.org/10.3917/popsoc.551.0001
Landry, A. (1934). La révolution démographique: études et essais sur les problèmes de la population.
Sirey.
Notestein, F. W. (1945). Population: The long view. In P. T. Schultz (Ed.), Food for the world
(pp. 36–57). University of Chicago Press.
Ouadah-Bedidi, Z., Vallin, J., & Bouchoucha, I. (2012). Unexpected developments in Maghrebian
fertility. Population and Societies, 486. https://doi.org/10.3917/popsoc.486.0001
World Population Prospects. (2022). United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
Population Division. https://population.un.org/wpp/
References 61
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Chapter 5
Fertility Intensity and Timing
Abstract This chapter looks at the comparative evolution of fertility since 1950
through several synthetic indicators of fertility intensity (average number of chil-
dren per woman) and timing (age at childbearing, all birth ranks combined). The
Mediterranean area is still a fairly contrasted area in terms of fertility levels, but the
reduction in the gaps between countries has been clear and rapid since the 1970s.
Fertility is still relatively high in some Southern and Eastern Mediterranean coun-
tries and is decreasing noticeably, while very low levels can be observed on the
Northern Shore (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, etc.). The chapter also presents the
most probable fertility trends in this region of the world by returning to the under-
lying hypotheses. Is the hypothesis of a sustainable convergence of fertility at the
level of the replacement fertility rate between the shores foreseeable and, if so, over
what time horizon?
Keywords Total fertility rate ·Fertility intensity ·Age-specific fertility rate ·
Fertility timing ·Mean age at childbearing ·Mediterranean
5.1 Introduction
This chapter looks at the comparative evolution of fertility since 1950 through several
synthetic indicators of fertility intensity (average number of children per woman) and
timing (age at childbearing, all birth ranks combined). The Mediterranean area is still
a fairly contrasted area in terms of fertility levels, but the reduction in the gaps between
countries has been clear and rapid since the 1970s. Fertility is still relatively high in
some Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries and is decreasing noticeably,
while very low levels can be observed on the Northern Shore (Spain, Portugal, Italy,
Greece, etc.). The chapter also presents the most probable fertility trends in this
region of the world by returning to the underlying hypotheses. Is the hypothesis of
a sustainable convergence of fertility at the level of the replacement fertility rate
between the shores foreseeable and, if so, over what time horizon?
© The Author(s) 2023
Y. Doignon et al., Population Dynamics in the Mediterranean,
SpringerBriefs in Population Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37759-4_5
63
64 5 Fertility Intensity and Timing
5.2 A Global Fertility Convergence
Through the process of demographic transition (see Chap. 4), the Mediterranean
countries have seen their fertility decline according to different timing, currently
reaching levels lower than in the past (Fig. 5.1).
The fertility gap between the most and least fertile countries has thus fallen from
5.5 children per woman in 1950 to only 2.6 children in 2020. The highest fertility
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.5
Children per woman
Malta
Portugal
France
Spain
Italy
Replacement level
fertility (2,1)
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.5
Children per woman
Algeria
Libya
Egypt
Tunisia
Morocco
Replacement level
fertility (2,1)
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.5
Children per woman
Kosovo
Albania
Macedonia
BiH
Montenegro
Slovenia
Serbia
Croatia
Greece
Bulgaria
Replacement level
fertility (2,1)
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
4,0
4,5
5,0
5,5
6,0
6,5
7,0
7,5
8,0
8,5
Children per woman
Palestine
Syria
Jordan
Turkey
Lebanon
Israel
Cyprus
Replacement
level fertility (2,1)
Fig. 5.1 Comparative fertility evolution in the Mediterranean (1950–2022) (Source World Popu-
lation Prospects, 2022)
5.2 A Global Fertility Convergence 65
rates in the 1950s were over 7 children per woman, while the lowest were around 2.4
children per woman, compared to 3.8 and 1.3 children per woman respectively today.
In the 1950s, none of the 27 Mediterranean countries had a fertility rate below 2.1
children per woman, a symbolic figure known as the population replacement level,
whereas today there are 17. While the countries on the Northern shore were already
well advanced in their transition in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s (see Chap. 4), the
countries on the Southern and Eastern shores did not experience a significant or very
rapid decline in their fertility until the 1970s, with the exception of Cyprus and Israel,
where the decline in fertility began before 1950.
This vast movement of convergence in the fertility between the countries of the
Southern and Eastern shores and those of the Northern shore is, however, incomplete,
and has occurred “albeit not always smoothly”1 (Courbage, 1999). Figure 5.1 shows
not only the different periods of decline, but also the fact that the majority of countries
are now below the replacement level, in contrast to countries that still have relatively
high fertility. This fertility rate of between 3 and 4 children per woman can be
seen in highly populated countries such as Egypt and Algeria, along with more
intermediate-sized states such as Palestine, Jordan and Israel.
While this decline in fertility in the countries of the Southern and Eastern
shores had been cautiously envisaged (Seklani, 1960) or more so automatically
been announced on account of the “universal” theory of demographic transition
(see Chap. 4), other authors2 did not think that it could be observed in the Arab-
Muslim countries. However, with nuances depending on the region, the delay in the
age of marriage3 coupled with the spread of contraception has finally led to a decline
in fertility in these countries (Fargues, 1989). At the same time, it was not rejected
that this region of the world, plagued by a number of other “misidentified factors”,
could deviate from the expected course.4 Although greatly attenuated today, differ-
ences between the behaviour of the populations of the Northern Shore (low fertility)
compared to those of the Southern and Eastern shores (on average more fertile) are
still clearly visible (Fig. 5.1) and subject to discussion. It should be noted, however,
that the fertility of several countries on the Southern and Eastern shores (Cyprus,
Lebanon, Turkey, Tunisia, and to a lesser extent Morocco and Libya) has reached
levels close to or below the replacement level.
Will the higher fertility rates of Egypt, Morocco, Libya and Israel, which seem
to have reached a pseudo-equilibrium, stabilise at a level above 2.1 children per
1 This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows:
“non sans à-coups”.
2 “Dudley Kirk (1966) was one of the earliest demographers to note that Muslim populations tended
to have high fertility, that there was no evidence of decline, and that in a given country, Muslims
tended to have higher fertility than adherents of other religions” (Jones, 2006, 250).
3 See Chap. 6 for an analysis of nuptiality rates and age at marriage.
4 “The demography of this region escapes, in more than one case, the paradigm of transition which
has been imposed as a scheme for explaining demographic change” (Courbage, 1999,1).
This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows:
“La démographie de cette région échappe, dans plus d’un cas, au paradigme de la transition qui
s’est imposé comme schéma d’explication des évolutions démographiques”.
66 5 Fertility Intensity and Timing
woman? Will fertility rates in the Palestinian Territories, Jordan and Syria fall signif-
icantly further? If so, to what level? Or will they remain above 2.1 children per
woman? Are trend reversals or sustainable recoveries to be expected, as suggested
by recent fertility trends in some countries (e.g. Egypt, Algeria) (Ouadah-Bedidi
et al., 2012)? Is it possible to observe a homogenisation of fertility behaviour of
all Mediterranean women, regardless of their nationality? Is a fertility rate of 1 or
2 children per woman a sustainable objective throughout the Mediterranean? The
Euro-Mediterranean geopolitics (the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Syrian, Turkish
and Greek situation, and the Balkans, etc.), and the different traditional and/or reli-
gious models of union formation (see Chap. 6) and of attachment to the family and to
children in Mediterranean societies, lead us to reflect on these past evolutions and to
formulate hypotheses on the future evolution of fertility in a singular Mediterranean
context.
In an attempt to clarify this, an in-depth comparative analysis of indicators of
fertility timing (the age at which women have children) and fertility intensity at
different ages is carried out successively. It provides a clearer picture of the expected
trends in women’s fertility in this region of the world by pinpointing the common
patterns and highlighting the exceptions.
5.3 The Intersection of Birth Timing and Fertility Intensity
5.3.1 Mean Age at Childbearing
For a given period, the mean childbearing age is an indicator of when a woman
gives birth, through it mixes the behaviour of several different generations. Like
any average, it needs to be interpreted carefully and be reconciled with fertility
levels. If, however, we describe the evolution of the mean age at childbearing in the
Mediterranean since 1950, we will be surprised to see that its value has changed
only slightly, from 29.5 years on average in the region to 30 years at present. This
overall situation can then be separated in several groups of countries (Fig. 5.2). While
some countries show a virtually stable indicator throughout the period, others have
experienced a V-shaped (sharp) or U-shaped (gentler) evolution: respectively, a rapid
decline in the mean age at childbearing until the mid-1980s, followed by a rapid r ise;
or a slower decline until the 1990s, followed by a steady rise until the present.
The first group covers 7 countries (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon,
Palestine, Syria), where the mean age at childbearing has never fallen significantly
over the past 70 years. Two other countries can also be added to this group (Libya,
Israel). The mean age in Libya has risen steadily from 30.8 years to 31.9 years today.
Stable until the mid-1970s, the increase in age accelerated and stabilised at almost
33 years between 1995 and 2005, before decreasing to what it is now. The mean age
in Israel has hardly ever fallen in the last 70 years, but has increased from 27.6 years
in the 1950s-1970s to 30.6 years today. The mean childbearing age for this group of
5.3 The Intersection of Birth Timing and Fertility Intensity 67
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
Mean age at childbearing (year)
Spain
Italy
Portugal
France
Malta
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
Mean age at childbearing (year)
Libya
Algeria
Tunisia
Morocco
Egypt
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
Meana
geatchil
dbearing (year)
Cyprus
Israel
Jordan
Syria
Lebanon
Palestine
Turkey
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
Mean age at childbearing (year)
Greece
Slovenia
Croatia
Montenegro
Kosovo
Serbia
BiH
Macedonia
Albania
Bulgaria
Fig. 5.2 Mean age at childbearing in the Mediterranean (1950–2019) (Source World Population
Prospects, 2022)
countries has remained high (between 28 and 33 years) and fairly constant since 1950
(29.6 years in 1950, 30.3 years in the 1980s, 30.4 years today). They are all located in
North Africa and the Near East. In these countries, the contraceptive discontinuation
has not led to a reduction in the mean childbearing age, as it has been compensated
for by the concomitant postponement of the age at marriage (see Chap. 6). This
could mean that contraception is mainly used in these countries once the desired
number of children has been reached, as already noted by Fargues (1989). Some of
68 5 Fertility Intensity and Timing
the countries in this group reach some of the highest levels in the Mediterranean,
such as Algeria and Libya, where the mean age at childbearing is currently 31.5 and
31.9 years respectively. However, there is no convergence for these countries towards
a single mean age. There is a clear dispersion of the childbearing ages.
The 9 other countries (Greece, France, Spain, Portugal, Slovenia, Montenegro,
Italy, Cyprus, Malta) that make up the second group, shows a much earlier and more
marked change in the average fertility age (V-shaped curve5 ). These countries are
those in which contraceptive discontinuation has led to a reduction in the mean age
at childbearing, as fewer unplanned births have been occurring at earlier ages. In a
second phase, women in these countries have been postponing and spacing out the
birth of their first (rank 1) and second (rank 2) child at increasingly advanced ages,
leading to a rise in the mean age of mothers. Following this mechanism, there was a
sharp fall in the mean age between the 1950s and 1980s, followed by a spectacular
rise to very high levels in 2015–2019: 32 years for Spain and Italy, 31.4 years for
Greece and 30.6 for France. These countries, unlike the previous ones, seem to be
converging towards a similar mean childbearing age. What these countries have in
common is that they have low fertility rates.
The third group consists of Bulgaria, closely followed by Croatia and Serbia.
These countries had the lowest mean age at childbearing over most of the study
period, never exceeding 28 years until recently. Since the early 1990s, however,
the birth timing in these countries has been on the rise, reaching 28–29 years in
2020. They seem to be following suit of the previous group. Turkey can also be
included in this group, as the age at childbearing has always been low, through
notwithstanding its higher fertility relative to other countries in this group. Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Macedonia, which started out with a childbearing age two years
older than their Serbian and Croatian neighbours in the 1950s, now have the same
U-shaped profile and have thus caught up to them. A convergence towards higher
mean ages at childbearing in this group is underway.
We conclude this section with the three countries with atypical developments:
Egypt, Kosovo and Albania. In the latter, the decline in the childbearing age has
been almost continuous since 1950, from 31 to 27.5 years. It has hovered around
this value since the mid-1990s, but appears to be rising again in 2015–2019. Kosovo
follows a similar trajectory, but its age at childbearing stagnated at a higher level
(29 years) between the 1980s and the late 2000s. As for Egypt, whose demography
has been defined by Ambrosetti (2011) as exceptional, it has a rather stable age which
mothers give birth, with a recent slightly downward trend (28.5 in 1950, 27.7 years
2020). Unlike the other Mediterranean countries, the mean age at childbearing is not
increasing, but has been decreasing since the end of the 1980s, a sign of a specific
fertility regime.
These mean ages at childbearing summarise a variable fertility according to
women’s age group. We will therefore analyse age-specific fertility rates in order to
identify different age-specific fertility profiles, which will help highlight the different
5 With the exception of Malta, which has a more U-shaped curve.
5.3 The Intersection of Birth Timing and Fertility Intensity 69
ways in which age groups contribute to fertility intensity and timing in different
countries.
5.3.2 Fertility by Age Group
A typology of fertility rates by age group for the 27 countries in 2015–2019 shows
more precise age-specific fertility profiles (Fig. 5.3). The higher the curves, the higher
the fertility intensity, i.e. the higher the number of children per woman. The more
they are shifted to the right, the higher the mean age at childbearing.
Two countries, Egypt and Palestine, have more or less the same profile with high
fertility in the younger age groups. This distinguishes them from Israel, Jordan and
Syria, who have a later fertility. At the other end of the spectrum, it is striking that
about one in two Mediterranean countries now belongs to the category of countries
with very low fertility. So far, this very low fertility is only found on the Northern
Shore (Southern Europe and the Balkans). These very low fertility Mediterranean
countries have an average fertility of 1.4 children per woman in 2015–2019. These are
Cyprus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Malta, Montenegro, Macedonia,
Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia and Spain. A third group, Bulgaria and Albania, has very
low fertility like the countries in the previous group, but high fertility among young
women, bringing their age-group fertility profile closer to that of Egypt and Palestine.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Births per 1,000 women
Age group
Egypt, Palestine
Israel, Jordan, Syria
Algeria, Libya, Morroco
Tunisia, Lebanon, Turkey,
France
Bulgaria, Albania
Cyprus, BiH, Croatia, Greece,
Italy, Malta, Montenegro,
Macedonia, Portugal, Serbia,
Slovenia, Spain, Kosovo
Fig. 5.3 Typology of fertility rates in the Mediterranean (2015–2019) (Source World Population
Prospects, 2022)
70 5 Fertility Intensity and Timing
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Births per 1,000 women
I
TALY
1950-1955
1980-1985
2015-2020
Childbearing mean age : 29.7
27.7
31.8
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Births per 1,000 women
P
ORTUGAL
1950-1955
1980-1985
2015-2020
Childbearing mean age : 30.2
27.1
31.2
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Births per 1,000 women
S
PAI N
1950-1955
1980-1985
2015-2020
Childbearing mean age : 30.6
28.3
32.1
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Births per 1,000 women
G
REECE
1950-1955
1980-1985
2015-2020
Childbearing mean age : 29.9
26.2
31.4
Fig. 5.4 Evolution of mean age at childbearing and fertility rates in Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain
(1950–2019) (Source World Population Prospects, 2022)
Among these countries that are below the replacement level fertility, four are
emblematic of a very low fertility rate that has been in place for several decades.
These are Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain (Fig. 5.4).
These countries have low fertility at all ages (less than 100 births per 1000 women),
as well as a mean age at childbearing of around 32 years (which is the same as the age
at birth of the only child) which will continue to increase.6 These ageing countries
have been affected by various economic crises and have been slow to introduce
genuine birth policies. This prolonged low fertility explains the negative natural
balances of these countries (Chap. 4). It also creates a depopulation mechanism,
which at the sub-national level can be accentuated by internal migration and an
increasing number of elderly people (Doignon et al., 2016).
6 It is possible to calculate for each age group how many women have already given birth to a
child and to assess the evolution of this age-specific fertility from one period to the next. When the
curves fall from one period to the next, it means that the number of children born to women of a
given age group has decreased over time: girls have fewer children than their sisters, let alone their
mothers at the same age. The fertility timeline reflects the mean age at which women have children.
A postponement of the age at which women have their children is observed concomitantly with
a decrease in fertility intensity (and vice versa). When the curves shift to the right, it means that
births are occurring later on average. This decline in the age at which children are borne is a sign
that the population has mastered modern contraception. This has spread throughout the population
and is a sign of a transformation in the value and place of women in society. In order to analyse this
evolution of the fertility timeline, in relation to intensity, it is useful to observe them simultaneously.
5.3 The Intersection of Birth Timing and Fertility Intensity 71
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Births per 1,000 women
TUNISIA
1950-1955
1980-1985
2015-2020
Childbearing mean age : 30
30.4
31
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Births per 1,000 women
T
URKEY
1950-1955
1980-1985
2015-2020
Childbearing mean age : 28.4
27.4
28.7
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
15-19 2 0-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Births per 1,000 women
F
RANCE
1950-1955
1980-1985
2015-2020
Childbearing mean age : 28.2
27.2
30.5
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Births per 1,000 women
L
EBANON
1950-1955
1980-1985
2015-2020
Childbearing mean age : 29.2
28.8
29.4
Fig. 5.5 Evolution of mean age at childbearing and fertility rates in France, Tunisia, Turkey,
Lebanon (1950–2019) (Source World Population Prospects, 2022)
Other populated Mediterranean countries (France, Turkey, Tunisia, Lebanon) are
also in a situation of low fertility, but whose level makes it possible to maintain a
positive natural balance. These countries, unlike the previous ones, belong to different
Mediterranean shores. They have a fertility rate around the replacement level, thus
well above the previous group. These countries are experiencing a postponement of
the age at which women have children, but with a more sustained intensity, especially
over the age of 30 (Fig. 5.5).
France, Lebanon and Tunisia now have relatively similar characteristics: fertility
around the replacement level and shifting towards older ages, although the history
of fertility decline in Tunisia is much more recent7 and rapid than in France. Turkey
is included in this group because its fertility is at the replacement level. However, it
differs in that its fertility intensity among 20–24 year-olds is much higher (almost
double that of France and Tunisia). Turkey could have been in the Algeria/Morocco
group, but was distinguished from these countries because of its long-standing lower
fertility and its much lower fertility intensity at older ages.
7 The history of fertility decline in the Maghreb and Tunisia in particular, is well documented
(Fargues, 1989; Gastineau, 2012). As soon as they became independent (1956 for Morocco and
Tunisia, 1962 for Algeria), these countries adopted very different population policies. Tunisia
resorted to a very firm policy of limiting births since the 1960s (Lévêque, 2017; Ouadah-Bedidi et al.,
2012). As a result, it had the earliest and most pronounced fertility transition, which many explain
by a c hange in the family code that recognises equal rights between men and women (Fargues,
1989).
72 5 Fertility Intensity and Timing
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Births per 1,000 women
A
LGERIA
1950-1955
1980-1985
2015-2020
Childbearing mean age : 30
30.8
31.5
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Births per 1,000 women
M
OROCCO
1950-1955
1980-1985
2015-2020
Childbearing mean age : 28.7
30.7
30.3
Fig. 5.6 Evolution of mean age at childbearing and fertility rates Algeria, Morocco (1950–2019)
(Source World Population Prospects, 2022)
The other three groups identified in Fig. 5.3 cover intermediate to relatively high
fertility situations.8 The fertility profiles of Algeria and Morocco (Fig. 5.6), for
example, differ from the previous group (Tunisia, France, Turkey, Lebanon) in that
their fertility is more sustained after the age of 30. Births of rank 3 or 4 children are
still very present in these societies, helping to boost fertility. Together with Libya, they
are the only two countries9 with such high mean ages, above 31 years, a characteristic
more commonly found in the countries of the Northern shore.
5.4 Specific Contributions of Age Groups
By analysing the quantiles of fertility rate distributions by age group, we are able
to the distinguish two large groups: one made up of 13 countries, the other of 14
(Fig. 5.7).
The first group’s fertility is marked by a fairly early mean age at childbearing
(below 30 years), whereas the second group’s age is much older (above 30 years).
Bulgaria, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Jordan,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon, Montenegro and Kosovo are countries where births
take place earlier on average (irrespective of their fertility levels, which may be very
8 The difference in fertility behaviour between the Maghreb and the Near East can be explained
in part by the colonial heritage and t he strong influence of the diaspora, which is rather oriented
towards Europe in the case of the Maghreb, and towards the Gulf countries in the case of the Near
East (see Chap. 8). In the Maghreb, these factors constitute “the main and direct agent of European
cultural influence” (This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in
French is as follows: “l’agent principal et direct de l’influence culturelle européenne”) (Courbage &
Todd, 2014). Libya’s behaviour is close to the Maghreb, as is Egypt’s with Near Eastern countries
(Lévêque, 2017).
9 Unlike Tunisia, Algeria did not have the necessary means to control its population’s fertility
after independence. Nevertheless, fertility fell rapidly, particularly as a result of the lowering age
of marriage, before the first birth control programme in 1983 was introduced and subsequently
accelerating the phenomenon among all age groups (Ouadah-Bedidi et al., 2012).
5.4 Specific Contributions of Age Groups 73
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 7 8 12
13 12 17
10 14 15 13 10 10
19
12
18
10 14
20 20
13
20 19 23 21 23 20
25 21
30 23
35
26
28
25
30 26 31
26 21
33
25
33
25
30
34 30
27
30 31
32 33 33
25
28
27
29
29
33
29
30
34
29
26
32
36
35
29
34
29
36
33
27
25
35
26 28
24 26 25
23
21
23
19 23
15
21
18
23 19
20
17
20
25
13
21
14
21
16
12
16 18 13 13 12 11 11
16
14 15
10 10
3
9
5 6 6 9
4 5 7 3 5 3 5 3 2 5 3 4 3 3 2 2
9
5 6 3 2
2 1111121 1
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
Fig. 5.7 Contribution of each age group to total fertility in % (2015–2019) (Source World
Population Prospects, 2022. Calculations made by the authors)
different10 ). In contrast, births are more likely on average to be due to older women
in the following countries: Malta, Portugal, Croatia, Spain, Greece, Italy, Tunisia,
Algeria, Israel, Libya, France, Slovenia, Morocco and Cyprus.
In the first group with early fertility, 30% of total fertility is already reached at
25 years of age on average, and about 60% at 30 years. In the second group where
births are occurring later in a woman’s life, only 16% of total fertility is reached at
age 25 on average and 43% at age 30.11 In other words, 4 out of 10 births are to
women over 30 in the first group compared to 6 out of 10 in the second.
Using this method, it is possible to identify a potential explanation for the decline
in fertility in the first group with early fertility: it is due to the fertility behaviour of
the youngest women. Will women aged 15–19, and especially aged 20–30, postpone
the arrival of their first child and any subsequent children until later in life? Or will
they continue to start their fertile life well before the age of 30? Increasing access
to school and higher education, rising living standards, urbanisation and changing
10 The higher fertility level of young women can therefore be found in countries where fertility
is still high (Egypt, Morocco, Palestine, Turkey, Syria, Jordan), but also, though less intuitively,
in countries on the northern shores (Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia, Albania), where the low total
fertility level is largely due to the fertility of young women. For example, almost 12% of Bulgaria’s
total fertility is accounted for by 15–19 year olds, whereas in other countries with very low fertility
(Italy, Portugal, Greece, Spain, etc.) this group contributes only 2 to 3%.
11 From this point of view, Morocco is an exception, because despite an age at childbearing of over
30 years, the fertility level of young women (15–24 years) remains higher than that of the other
countries in this group. Similarly, the fertility of women aged 30–39 is lower.
74 5 Fertility Intensity and Timing
gender relations promote greater equality are likely to be determinants for post-
poning to have children plans. Several studies highlight the different places coun-
tries are in vis-à-vis school transition (Lévêque, 2017; Lévêque & Oliveau, 2019).
The close correlation between urbanisation and schooling is thus highlighted after
analysing fertility according to women’s qualifications in the Mediterranean. This
shows that the urbanisation of countries is a fundamental factor in the variations
observed, since it leads to an increased spread of education accompanied by a decline
in fertility. However, other “political, ideological and economic system factors, such
as free-trade liberalism or dirigisme (…) can also influence the course of fertility”12
(Courbage, 1999).
In contrast, in countries with later fertility, half of total fertility on average is
accounted for by women aged 30–40. Fertility in the countries of Southern Europe
and the Balkans (with a few exceptions already mentioned), but also in some Maghreb
countries (Tunisia, Algeria, Libya) is dominated by the contribution of 30–34 year
olds. In these countries, more than one third of total fertility is accounted for by
women aged 30–34 alone. The fertility of these intermediate age groups in low total
intensity countries is a sign of women’s willingness to carry a pregnancy to term
once a certain number of conditions are met (housing, professional situation, marital
stability, etc.).
In a large number of Balkan countries (Bosnia, Albania, Slovenia, Montenegro,
Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia), a notable contribution to fertility is made by 25–29 year
olds. This contribution of the youngest is rather singular in that it only concerns
countries with very low fertility. Thus, even among low fertility countries, it is still
possible to introduce distinctions. The low fertility of the Balkans is still due to young
or even very young women, while the low fertility of the largest countries in Southern
Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal) and Greece is due more to older women.
Fertility in the Maghreb countries remains marked. In addition to the contribution
made by younger women who nevertheless postpone their first childbirth, a signif-
icant contribution is made by the older age groups, those aged 35–39 and 40–44.
Spain, Italy, Portugal and even France, which have much lower fertility, also have
fertility that has been driven by women over 35, but it does not resonate in the same
way. In the Maghreb, it still represents a progression margin which may make it
possible to imagine a drop in total fertility once these generations have disappeared.
The fertility of women over 45 contributes little to fertility (between 0.1 and
1.8% of the total). A hierarchy of countries according to their regional affiliation
is however noted. More than 1.5% of total fertility in Morocco and Libya is still
accounted for by women aged 45 or over. This was followed by Algeria (1.3%),
Syria (1%), Lebanon (0.9%), Greece (0.6%), Egypt and Israel (0.5%). Despite this
small contribution, the late fertility in North African or Near Eastern countries is a
sign that stopping fertility may not be established in all strata of society and reveals
12 This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows:
“facteurs politiques, idéologiques et sur les systèmes économiques: libéralisme libre-échangiste ou
dirigisme, (…) peuvent également infléchir le cours de la fécondité”.
5.5 (Un)certainties for the Future of Mediterranean Fertility 75
potential differences between urban and rural areas. Higher order fertility (3 or more)
has not completely disappeared and is probably due to older women.
The geographical distribution of these two groups is interesting. Indeed, it seems
to extend the Hajnal line (Hajnal, 1965) into the Mediterranean. The latter divides the
European continent along a north-east/south-west axis, from St Petersburg to Triest.
It distinguishes two historically persistent European family patterns, with earlier
fertility to the east of this demarcation than to the west. Thus, the countries in the
first group are mainly found in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin, i.e. from Bosnia-
Herzegovina to Egypt. In contrast, the countries in the second group are located in
the western basin. This geographical demarcation also holds true for age at marriage
and permanent celibacy (see Chap. 6).
In addition to the fact that these analyses make it possible to examine jointly
the situation of all the Mediterranean countries with regard to the fertility timeline
in 2015–2019, they make it possible to identify the age groups likely to modify
their fertility behaviour from one generation to the next. By identifying the most
fertile ages when it comes to fertility, it is possible to go beyond the United Nations
projections and propose individualised scenarios on fertility changes.
5.5 (Un)certainties for the Future of Mediterranean
Fertility
According to the median scenario of the World Population Prospects (2022), the
fertility gap between the most and least fertile Mediterranean countries by 2060
will be less than 1 child per woman (0.8 children to be precise), whereas it is
currently 2.5. This scenario highlights a significant reduction in fertility disparities
in the Mediterranean (Fig. 5.8).
The estimated average fertility in the Mediterranean will fall from the current
2 children to 1.7 children per woman. This situation is unprecedented since this
threshold, which does not allow for the level replacement of generations (one couple
is replaced by less than one couple in adulthood), is foreseen in the median scenario.
Figure 5.8 shows that in this median scenario,13 only 3 countries remain above
2.1 children per woman (Israel, Palestine, Egypt) to which can be added Jordan,
13 “Probabilistic projections are based on statistical models, mostly parametric. Uncertainty about
certain components of the population can be captured by error terms, as in the case of time series, but
it can also come from Bayesian inference of the model parameters. The whole point is to quantify
the uncertainty about the future population. This can be done using the stochastic approach, the
Bayesian approach, or even a combination of both” (Costemalle, 2021, 32).
This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as
follows: “Les projections probabilistes reposent sur des modèles statistiques, la plupart du temps
paramétriques. L’incertitude sur certaines composantes de la population peut être captée par des
termes d’erreurs, comme dans le cas des séries temporelles, mais elle peut aussi provenir d’une
inférence bayésienne des paramètres du modèle. Tout l’objectif est de quantifier l’incertitude sur
la population future. Pour cela, on peut utiliser l’approche stochastique, l’approche bayésienne, ou
même une combinaison des deux”.
76 5 Fertility Intensity and Timing
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Children per woman
France
Malta
Portugal
Spain
Italy
Replacement level
of fertility (2.1)
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Children per woman
Egypt
Algeria
Morocco
Libya
Tunisia
Replacement level of
fertility (2.1)
1
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
Children per woman
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Montenegro
Serbia
Kosovo
Croatia
Macedonia
Albania
BiH
Greece
Replacement level
of fertility (2.1)
2.5
3
3.5
4
Children per woman
Israel
Palestine
Jordan
Syria
Lebanon
Turkey
Cyprus
Replacement level
of fertility (2.1)
1
1.5
2
Fig. 5.8 Comparative fertility perspective for the Mediterranean, by country (2015–2055, median
variant) (Source World Population Prospects, 2022)
Syria and Algeria (slightly below 2 children per woman). Of course, the fertility
situation in the Mediterranean in 2060 varies according to the projection scenarios,
and the confidence intervals considered for the probabilistic scenarios. For example,
if we consider the upper bound of the 80% confidence interval (CI) of the median
scenario, this would mean 10 countries would have a fertility rate above 2.1 children
per woman instead of just 3 countries. Conversely, all countries would be below
this threshold with the lower bound of the same CI. However, in all three cases,
5.5 (Un)certainties for the Future of Mediterranean Fertility 77
the projections demonstrate an overall fertility convergence in the Mediterranean
(Fig. 5.8): convergence towards an average fertility rate of 1.35, 1.7 or 2.1 children
for the lower limit of the 80% CI, the median scenario and the upper limit of the 80%
CI respectively.
In view of the findings articulated in this chapter and based on the same observation
made by other demographers specialising in the Mediterranean,14 we wish to carry
out a more individualised prospective reflection for the Mediterranean as a whole.
Instead of a generalised convergence of the Mediterranean countries towards a single
fertility level, it seems possible to envisage in the future a convergence by groups of
countries (Doignon, 2020). The challenge would therefore be to take into account
socio-political situations and territories on the basis of both their demographic history
and recent developments so as to be able to anticipate reversals in the situation.
To contribute to this prospective exercise, we propose first of all to closely monitor
the evolution of timing and fertility intensity in countries with very low fertility,
in particular the countries of Southern Europe, the Balkan countries (Bosnia and
Herzegovia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Albania), but also Cyprus. These countries are at the
top of the list of countries with the lowest fertility in the world (along with Taiwan,
Macao, Hong Kong, Singapore and Moldova), and ahead of or not far behind Japan,
Germany and Italy. This very low fertility rate has been established over time and it
is easy to imagine that it will remain stable or even continue to fall to historically low
levels. This hypothesis is corroborated by the cumulative results of several surveys
which show, despite the persistence of the two-child model, the rise in preferences for
the one-child family model as well as for childless families (Sobotka & Beaujouan,
2014). In this way, the Balkans, Cyprus and Portugal could form a group in which a
pattern of very low fertility (1.3–1.5 children per woman) would continue.
In Bulgaria and Albania too, surprises are to be expected from the younger gener-
ation. If the latter end up delaying their timing of fertility, the decline in fertility
at younger ages will have a significant impact on overall fertility, allowing these
countries to move into the group of countries with low fertility and late timing.
Israel’s fertility is rather atypical in the sense that its fertility has been more or less
stable since the mid-1980s at around 3 children per woman. This trend does not argue
for a convergence to low levels within a 35-year time horizon. It is therefore likely
that Israel’s fertility will remain around 3 children per woman. It is more difficult to
say for Palestine, as its fertility is still declining at present and the level at which it
will stabilise is still uncertain.
Jordan and Syria are notable for the regularity and rapidity of their fertility decline,
like Palestine. The latter, however, still has a fertility rate that is almost 1 child on
average above Jordan and Syria. The future development of Jordan is still uncertain,
as it is still decreasing at the moment, after a stagnation in the 2000s. For Syria, despite
a pro-natalist policy, the political and economic crisis that affected the country from
the 1980s onwards had a lasting effect on the population and led to a considerable
14 We thus support the observation of the demographer Youssef Courbage, who already in 1999
insisted on the need to supplement these indispensable United Nations projections with methods
that take into account specific situations.
78 5 Fertility Intensity and Timing
drop in fertility (Lévêque, 2017), which is still ongoing. Fertility has certainly been
affected by the conflict since 2011, although it is difficult to quantify this impact.
When the conflict ends, fertility can follow several possible developments. Will there
be catch-up fertility (and thus an increase in fertility) or will fertility rates during
the Syrian conflict be maintained? There is therefore uncertainty about the future of
Syrian fertility and the level at which it will stabilise.
Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Egypt are also countries whose fertility trends are
uncertain given the situation observed in recent years. Their respective situations
deserve to be studied separately. The Moroccan fertility rate is a source of concern
since, after a sharp decline until the early 2000s, there have been periods of plateau
and recovery (Ouadah-Bedidi et al., 2012). In Morocco, one interpretation given
to the emergence of this resistance is the slowing down of the rate of progress of
education as well as the geographical isolation of the country described as quite
remote from the rest of the Arab world by Courbage and Todd (2014). Despite a
very recent decline in fertility, one could imagine Morocco’s fertility converging
around 2.5 children. This is also true for Algeria and Egypt, which are showing signs
of resistance to rejoining replacement level fertility due to early births, but which
still extend into old age. It might be more likely that the threshold of 2.5 or even 3
children is a convergence threshold for the latter two countries. Turkish fertility, like
Lebanese fertility, is likely to decline if younger women delay having children more.
Otherwise, it could remain stable at around 2 children per woman.
The aspirations of a growing proportion of women of the new generations (see
Chap. 6), which are very different from those of their sisters and mothers, will
undoubtedly be factors that will weigh and argue in favour of lower fertility scenarios
throughout the Mediterranean. However, different cultural models, changing gender
relations and the geopolitics at work in this complex geographical area all work
together to slow down these declines and reach thresholds. In the next few years, we
could expect to see a decrease in the differences between countries where the fertility
level amongst the most educated is already low. In countries where the fertility level
of the most educated is still high, the trends will depend in part on the openness of
local communities to globalisation and the openness of attitudes, as Fargues argues
(2000).
References
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Chapter 6
Family Formation and Dissolution
Abstract The question of the unity of the family models in the Mediterranean has
been the subject of much debate in the field of generations history. Some researchers
have put forward the much disputed hypothesis of a past unity in the Mediterranean
area in relation to marriage and the family. In modern times, however, we are dealing
with very heterogeneous situations in this area. Apriori, the populations on the
different shores of the Mediterranean do not have much in common, with diversified
Western family models on one side, and a very specific Arab-Muslim family model
on the other. Although different on both sides of the Mediterranean, family models
have nevertheless undergone profound changes over the last 70 years: some discuss
a “marriage revolution” for the populations of the Southern and Eastern shores,
others a second demographic transition in the European countries. In the same way
that researchers envisage a convergence of family models in the world towards the
Western family model could there be a convergence of Mediterranean family models
due to these contemporary family changes? Without directly answering this question,
this chapter will attempt to provide some food for thought. Therefore, among the
many possible elements for analysing family models, we decided to focus on the
formation and dissolution of marriages. We will present the evolution of demographic
indicators relating to these two phenomena, starting with marriage and divorce rates,
followed by indicators relating to age at marriage and the significance of permanent
celibacy. Unlike, the other demographic phenomena, we were unable to use the large
international databases to study all the Mediterranean countries since 1950 for these
family formation and dissolution related topics. We had to instead collate data from
different data providers to create long series.
Keywords Marriage ·Divorce ·Family formation ·Family dissolution ·Age at
marriage ·Permanent celibacy ·Family model ·Mediterranean
© The Author(s) 2023
Y. Doignon et al., Population Dynamics in the Mediterranean,
SpringerBriefs in Population Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37759-4_6
81
82 6 Family Formation and Dissolution
6.1 Introduction
The question of the unity of the family models in the Mediterranean has been the
subject of much debate in the field of generations history (Sacchi and Viazzo, 2014).
Some researchers have put forward the much disputed hypothesis of a past unity
in the Mediterranean area in relation to marriage and the family (Goody, 1983). In
modern times, however, we are dealing with very heterogeneous situations in this
area. Apriori, the populations on the different shores of the Mediterranean do not
have much in common, with diversified Western family models on one side, and a
very specific Arab-Muslim family model on the other.
Although different on both sides of the Mediterranean, family models have never-
theless undergone profound changes over the last 70 years: some discuss a “marriage
revolution” for the populations of the Southern and Eastern shores (Tabutin and
Schoumaker, 2005), others a second demographic transition in the European coun-
tries (Lesthaeghe, 2014). In the same way that researchers envisage a convergence
of family models in the world towards the Western family model (Goode, 1963;
Thornton, 2001) could there be a convergence of Mediterranean family models due
to these contemporary family changes? Without directly answering this question, this
chapter will attempt to provide some food for thought. Therefore, among the many
possible elements for analysing family models, we decided to focus on the forma-
tion and dissolution of marriages. We will present the evolution of demographic
indicators relating to these two phenomena, starting with marriage and divorce rates,
followed by indicators relating to age at marriage and the significance of permanent
celibacy. Unlike, the other demographic phenomena, we were unable to use the large
international databases to study all the Mediterranean countries since 1950 for these
family formation and dissolution related topics. We had to instead collate data from
different data providers to create long series.
6.2 Major Marriage and Divorce Trends
6.2.1 Marriage
Historically, marriage is an important institution, but it does not necessarily occupy
the same place in every society. It is therefore interesting to first analyse the frequency
of marriages in Mediterranean countries, which has undergone major changes since
1950. We are using a nuptiality rate which relates the number of marriages in a time
period to the population aged 15 years or older.1
1 Usually, the crude nuptiality rate relates the number of marriages to the average total population
in the same year. However, we prefer to relate it to the population of marriageable age (15 years or
older). This makes it possible to control somewhat for the effect of the age structure and to compare
more easily the nuptiality rate intensity in the Mediterranean countries.
6.2 Major Marriage and Divorce Trends 83
First, nuptiality rates are heterogeneous in the Mediterranean at the beginning
of the observation period, no real difference between the Northern shore and the
Southern and Eastern shores (Fig. 6.1). Indeed, they range from 9% (Malta) to 28%
(Jordan) in the early 1960s. The lowest values (around 10%) are found in Southern
Europe (Malta, France, Spain, Italy), and also in Cyprus and Libya. For higher
values, countries from different shores are mixed. For example, the highest values
(above 14%) are Jordan, Egypt, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. During this period,
many European countries experienced a “golden age” of marriage. The nuptiality
rate experienced a strong post-war increase, which lasted until the mid-1960s in
Northern Europe and the 1970s for Southern Europe. In Spain, for example, in the
1956–1975 period, the nuptiality rate was almost at its highest for the twentieth
century (Muñoz-Pérez & Recaño-Valverde, 2011). It is interesting to note that the
vast majority of Mediterranean countries exceeded the nuptiality rate levels reached
during the “golden age” of marriage by Southern European countries. This is because
marriage is a religious duty in Islam, and it is universal (Locoh & Ouadah-Bedidi,
2014), meaning that the vast majority of adults are married.
The evolution of the nuptiality rate, up to the present day, has varied from region
to region, but there has been a general downward trend. Southern Europe shows
the simplest pattern, since from the 1970s onwards, the nuptiality rate has been
decreasing continuously, until stabilising eventually at a low level (with the exception
of Malta). In most cases, the nuptiality rate in Southern European countries has
reduced by more than a factor of 2 and is now among the lowest in the European
Union.
The Balkan countries generally follow the same trend, but with some excep-
tions. In terms of timing, the decline in t he nuptiality rate does not begin in the
1970s everywhere: sometimes earlier (Slovenia as early as the 1950s) and some-
times later (Albania in the early 2000s). Moreover, the nuptiality rate achieved at
present is highly variable from one country to another, with sometimes very low levels
(Slovenia, Bulgaria) similar to those in Southern Europe, and sometimes rather high
levels (>10%); such as in Albania and especially in Kosovo; the other Balkan coun-
tries showing intermediate levels (between 5 and 8%). Over the entire period, the
nuptiality rate has strongly decreased, as it has been divided by 2 (or more) in the
majority of Balkan countries, and by more than 3 in Slovenia.
In North Africa, the evolution of the nuptiality rate has generally taken place in
three distinct phases. First, rates increased (except in Egypt and Algeria where they
decreased) until the 1970s; then they decreased until reaching levels below 10%. In
contrast to previous trajectories, however, there has been a significant increase in the
nuptiality rate towards high levels during the 2000s. This last phase coincides with
the recent increase in fertility in these countries (see Chap. 4). Egypt stands out, over
the entire period, for having a higher nuptiality rate than the other North African
countries.
Finally, the trajectories of the Near Eastern countries are on the decline over the
period, with sometimes uneven developments (Jordan, Lebanon, Cyprus). However,
the declines in these countries are generally smaller than those observed elsewhere
84 6 Family Formation and Dissolution
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Malta
Spain
France
Italy
Portugal
Marriages / population aged 15+ (‰)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Marriages / population aged 15+ (‰)
Greece
Bulgaria
Montenegro
Albania
Macedonia
Croatia
Serbia
Slovenia
BiH
Kosovo
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Marriages / population aged 15+ (‰)
Libya
Algeria
Tunisia
Egypt
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Marriages / population aged 15+ (‰)
Israel
Jordan
Lebanon
Palestine
Turkey
Cyprus
Syria
Fig. 6.1 Nuptiality rate in the Mediterranean (1950–2019) (Sources Demographic Statistics
Database, National Office of Statistics, Eurostat, Demographic Yearbook [UN], World Popula-
tion Prospect 2022. Calculations made by the authors. N. B. 1 The number of marriages is related to
the population aged 15 years and over [not to the total population]. N.B. 2 Jordan’s values between
1950 and 1970 are off graph. N.B. 3 The evolution of the indicator is using averages calculated for
5-year periods)
6.2 Major Marriage and Divorce Trends 85
in the Mediterranean. Only Palestine and Syria are exceptions, with the former expe-
riencing an increase since the mid-2000s in line with North African countries, and
the latter having a higher nuptiality rate today than in the 1950s.
These analyses show differentiated developments. They have finally led to a diver-
gence since the 1980s, as the relative disparities are now higher. In 2015–2019, the
nuptiality rate in the Mediterranean was spread over a wide range of values, from
single to triple. This means that the frequency of marriages in societies is significantly
different on either side of the Mediterranean. Moreover, unlike at the beginning of
the period, the three Mediterranean shores are visibly different today. Indeed, the
countries on the Northern Shore have the lowest values, and those on the Southern
and Eastern shores the highest (despite the decrease in their nuptiality rate since the
1950s–1960s). There are some exceptions, with high values for Albania and Kosovo,
and intermediate values for Israel and Cyprus.
This geographical contrast is partly explained by the age structure. For the same
population, the age groups with the highest probability of marrying (20–40 years)
will account for a larger share in the young population, resulting in a higher number
of marriages, and thus a higher nuptiality rate than the older population. Thus, as
the countries on the Southern and Eastern shores (but also Albania and Kosovo)
are on average younger than the countries on the Northern Shore (including Israel
and Cyprus) (see Chap. 2), it is not surprising that their nuptiality rates are higher.
However, this difference in nuptiality rates between these two groups of countries
can also be explained by other factors that we will discuss later in the chapter, such
as the rate of remarriage.
6.2.2 Divorce
Divorce analysis measures the frequency of divorces in a population. We use divorce
rates to conduct a comparison.2
The evolution of the divorce rate in the Mediterranean highlights several inter-
esting elements (Fig. 6.2). The first is the higher level of divorce in Muslim-majority
countries compared to Catholic-majority (or traditional) countries, especially before
the 1980s. This is not surprising, as divorce/repudiation is a regulatory mechanism
in the Arab-Muslim matrimonial system (Fargues, 1986). Unlike Catholicism, Islam
allows a marriage to be broken via a mechanism other than by death. Divorce/
repudiation is therefore a very common practice in Islam, although in reality it is an
indicator of male dominance. Indeed, before the introduction of modern family law
in some countries, divorce (repudiation) was initiated by the man (Locoh & Ouadah-
Bedidi, 2014). However, this high divorce rate does not lead to an over-representation
of divorced people in the population. On the contrary, there are few divorced people,
2 As with marriage, we relate the number of divorces to the population aged 15 or over, and to the
total population.
86 6 Family Formation and Dissolution
as remarriages are very common and quick. In Egypt, for example, divorcees repre-
sent less than 2% of the 15–59 year olds in 2017, for both men and women. By way
of comparison, in France, in 2016, they represent about 6% for men and 8.5% for
women, while the divorce rate is lower. This link between divorce and remarriage
also helps to explain the higher nuptiality rate in the countries of the Southern and
Eastern shores and is observed in the previous sub-section, a significant part of which
is due to remarriage.
Despite this characteristic of the Arab-Muslim matrimonial system, disparities
exist within the countries concerned from the beginning of the observation period.
Even if divorce has been declining since the beginning of the twentieth century
(Fargues, 1986), some countries still had very high levels (more than 4%3 )inthe
1950s, for example Egypt and Jordan, or Libya in the early 1970s. Others have lower
levels (less than 2%), such as Tunisia, Turkey, Syria and Lebanon. In general, these
levels contrast with the divorce rates of the Northern shore countries, which generally
did not exceed 1% in the 1950s, with the exception of Serbia and Albania.
In terms of divorce rate changes, what is important now is the heterogeneity of
trajectories. In Southern Europe, the divorce rate was rather low in the 1950s. It then
gradually increased, starting in the late 1960s in France, in the mid-1970s in Portugal,
and in the early 2000s in Spain. A maximum of around 2.7% was reached by these
three countries, before experiencing a decline in the 2010s. Italy has only recently
experienced an increase in its divorce rate. Malta only allowed divorce in 2011, the
last European country to do so, and has low levels at present. In the Balkans, the
divorce rate is on the whole increasing over the whole period (though sometimes
alternating between increasing and decreasing). However, the Balkan countries do
not reach Southern European levels, as their divorce rates are generally between 1
and 2%. Serbia and Kosovo are the only countries to see a decrease in divortiality
over the study period.
The trajectories are quite different on the Southern and Eastern shores. The evolu-
tion generally takes place in two stages, with varying timing: a decrease and then
an increase in the divorce rate. Some of the declines are impressive: Egypt’s divorce
rate, for example, fell by a factor of 3 during a 50-year period before doubling in the
10 years that followed. Cyprus and Lebanon are exceptions to this general pattern, as
their divorce rates only increase throughout the period, a trajectory similar to those
in Southern Europe. Tunisia also shows a different trajectory, as its divorce rate
has essentially stagnated since the 1960s. Today, the countries of the Southern and
Eastern shores reach rather high levels of divorce since the vast majority exceed 2%.
In other words, divorces are more frequent today in Egyptian, Palestinian or Jorda-
nian societies than in France, Spain or Portugal, which have nevertheless experienced
an unprecedented increase in their divorce rate since 1970.
3 A level of 4‰ may seem low compared to other crude rates, such as crude birth or death rates.
This is due to the choice of denominator for the indicator, in this case the population aged 15 years
or over. If we had chosen 15–60 year olds, the indicator would have been even higher. In addition,
the number of divorces, or marriages, is generally lower than the number of births or deaths.
6.2 Major Marriage and Divorce Trends 87
0
1
2
3
4
5
Divorces / population aged 15+ (‰)
Libya
Algeria
Tunisia
Egypt
0
1
2
3
4
5
Divorces / population aged 15+ (‰)
Israel
Jordan
Lebanon
Palestine
Turkey
Cyprus
Syria
0
1
2
3
4
5
Divorces / population aged 15+ (‰)
Malta
Spain
France
Italy
Portugal
0
1
2
3
4
5
Divorces / population aged 15+ (‰)
Greece
Bulgaria
Montenegro
Albania
Macedonia
Croatia
Serbia
Slovenia
BiH
Kosovo
Fig. 6.2 Divorce rates in the Mediterranean (1950–2019) (Sources Demographic Statistics
Database, National Office of Statistics, Eurostat, Demographic Yearbook [UN], World Popula-
tion Prospect 2022. Calculations made by the authors. N.B. 1 The number of divorces is related to
the population aged 15 years or more (and not to the total population). N.B. 2 The evolution of the
indicator is based on averages calculated for periods of 5 years. N.B. 3 The sharp increase in Turkey
in the late 1990s is due to a break in the series)
88 6 Family Formation and Dissolution
These different trajectories lead to a convergence of the divorce rate in the Mediter-
ranean, but in a different way from that observed for the total fertility rate (Chap. 4)
or life expectancy at birth (in this chapter). For the latter, it is a convergence by
catching up that is observed. Here, on the contrary, there is a convergence caused by
the decline in high divortiality of the Southern and Eastern shores and the growing
low divortiality of the Northern shore. Divorce rates in the Mediterranean today are
mainly between 1 and 2.5%. The current relative disparities, although not negligible,
are less significant than in the 1950s–1960s. Thus, at the end of the 2010s, there is
still a contrast between the shores of the Mediterranean, even though some Southern
European countries (France, Spain, Portugal), and to a lesser extent Albania, have
similar (or even higher) levels of divorce than several Muslim countries.
These major trends point to far-reaching social changes in the Mediterranean.
Generally speaking, and despite the variety of marriage trajectories, marriages are less
frequent today than 60–70 years ago. In the 1960s, the vast majority of Mediterranean
countries had a nuptiality rate of over 10%, today it is less than a third. At the same
time, the frequency of divorce has increased in countries where it was low, and
decreased in countries where it was high.
6.3 Changes in Marriage
In order to appreciate the changes in marriage in the Mediterranean, we will examine
two important dimensions, namely the evolution of the age at marriage and permanent
celibacy.
6.3.1 An Increase in Age at Marriage
One of the most dramatic changes is the increase in age upon first marriage for both
men and women (Fig. 6.3). In this chapter, we use the singulate mean age at marriage
(SMAM4 ) indicator to estimate the age upon first marriage.
In the 1950s–1960s, there were only four countries with an age upon first marriage
for women5 above 24. This age has increased everywhere in the Mediterranean, so
much so that at present only Palestine and Egypt are below the age of 24.6
Before the 1970s, women could sometimes marry very young. This was partic-
ularly the case in North Africa where the age upon first marriage for women was
4 The SMAM is an indirect method for estimating age upon first marriage from age-specific marital
status.
5 Only the age upon first marriage of women is shown here, as the age at first marriage of men
shows a broadly similar trend.
6 Turkey also has an age upon first marriage for women below 24 years, but following a recent
decrease.
6.3 Changes in Marriage 89
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Singulate Mean Age at Marriage (year)
France
Italy
Portugal
Malta
Spain
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Singulate Mean Age at Marriage (year )
Algeria
Egypt
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Singulate Mean Age at Marriage (year)
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Greece
Croatia
Montenegro
Serbia
BiH
Macedonia
Albania
Yugoslavie
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Singulate Mean Age at Marriage (year)
Cyprus
Israel
Jordan
Lebanon
Palestine
Syria
Turkey
Fig. 6.3 Age upon first marriage of women in the Mediterranean (1950–2019) (Sources Worl d
Marriage Database [2019], Demographic Statistics Database, Demographic Yearbook [UN]. Calcu-
lations made by the authors. N. B. age upon first marriage is estimated with the singulate mean age
at marriage [SMAM])
below 20 in the 1950s (except in Egypt), in the Near East (Turkey, Jordan), and in
some Balkan countries (Albania, Bulgaria). Conversely, the countries where women
married later (over the age of 22) were mainly in Southern Europe, but also in the
Balkans (Yugoslavia, Greece) and the Near East (Cyprus, Palestine).
90 6 Family Formation and Dissolution
The age upon first marriage of women has therefore gradually increased to some-
times very high levels. In Southern Europe, there was first a decline in the age of
marriage in the 1960s, which represented the “golden age” of marriage. It was not
until the late 1970s or early 1980s that women’s age at marriage began to increase;
now, it is generally above 30 years. The trends are similar in the Balkans. The differ-
ence with Southern Europe lies in the levels reached in the 2010s. They are much
lower in the Balkans, where they generally do not exceed the age of 27 years. The
only exceptions are Slovenia, Bulgaria and Greece, the first two of which reach ages
above 32.
In the Near East and North Africa, the age upon first marriage of women is
increasing significantly, sometimes reaching very high levels today. This is the case,
for example, in Algeria, Libya, Lebanon and Tunisia where the age is 28. Only Egypt
and Palestine have had a moderate increase or even a stagnation in their age upon first
marriage for women at around 22 years. From the 2000s onwards, the indicator starts
to decrease in some countries (Algeria, Tunisia, Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco),
generally those with a recent increase in fertility. Finally, the dichotomy between the
Mediterranean shores of the 1950s and 1960s no longer exists today. In fact, it is now
conceivable that the age upon first marriage for women is similar across different
countries of the Mediterranean shores.
This increase in age at marriage can be explained by several factors. Firstly, the
progression in education is decisive in this area, since by spending more time at
school (primary, then secondary and increasingly university), individuals postpone
the age at which they get married. Secondly, economic crises lead to uncertain and
precarious living conditions, encouraging the postponement of marriage. In a neo-
local system,7 young couples form their own household upon marriage, and do not
move in with the husband’s parents. To do so, they must have sufficient resources
to move out of the parental home and form a new household. Worsening socio-
economic conditions (high youth unemployment, declining living standards, etc.)
can hamper household formation for young couples, who have to wait longer to
gather the necessary resources to establish their own household. Similarly, the rising
cost of housing in large cities, and the increasing cost of marriage (dowry, festivities,
etc.) in Arab-Muslim societies, also delay the union formation among young couples,
and by extension the age at which they marry.
This increase in the age upon first marriage has two direct effects. The first is the
decrease in the age gap between spouses, which is the result of a more rapid increase
in the age upon first marriage for women than for men. In the 1950s, Arab-Muslim
countries could have age gaps between spouses of more than 6 years,8 while in other
countries they were less than 4 years. However, despite this decrease, the age gaps
7 A neo-local system implies that newlyweds form a new household, separate from of the husband’s
or wife’s parents.
8 The age gaps between spouses presented here are calculated from the singulate mean age at
marriage (SMAM), which generally underestimates the actual gap compared to those calculated
with micro-data (Ausubel et al., 2022).
6.3 Changes in Marriage 91
Women
No
age-gap
+ 2 years
+ 4 years
+ 6 years
Men
302826
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
32 34 36
Slovenia
France
Libya
Portugal Greece
Tunisia
Lebanon
Malta
Serbia
Croatia
Cyprus
Israel BiH
Syria
Montenegro
Spain
Morocco
Albania
Jordan
Palestine
Macedonia
Egypt
Turkey
Algeria
Bulgaria
Italy
Northern Africa
Balkans
Southern Europe
Near-East
Fig. 6.4 Age difference of male and female singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM) in the Mediter-
ranean in the 2010s (Sources World Marriage Database [2019], Demographic Statistics Database,
Demographic Yearbook [UN]. Calculations made by the authors. Reading tip: the dotted lines repre-
sent an age gap between spouses. For example, the points on the line “ +2 years” are countries where
men are on average 2 years older than their spouses. The colour of a dot represents the regional area
to which a country belongs)
between spouses in Arab-Muslim countries and in Albania, remain the largest in the
Mediterranean (Fig. 6.4).
This is not surprising since the large age gap between spouses is one of the
important characteristics of Arab-Muslim marriage, which has some of the highest
levels in the world (Weeks, 2020). The age gap in the Mediterranean is on average
just under 4 years, with a minimum of about 1.6 years in France and Slovenia.
Surprisingly, this gap has been increasing recently in some countries, for example
in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco, where it is again as high as 6 years (Ausubel et al.,
2022).
The second consequence of the increase in the age upon first marriage concerns
early marriage. An important feature of traditional Arab-Muslim marriage is the
early marriage of girls (Rashad et al., 2005). In the 1960s in Morocco and Algeria,
for example, more than half of all women were married before the age of 20. It was
40% in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and 30% in Turkey and Jordan. Early marriage
also concerns countries on the Northern shore, as it was 30% in Albania and 20%
in Bulgaria. With the increase in the age upon first marriage, and especially thanks
to better education, fewer and fewer women are married before the age of 20. Early
marriage has almost disappeared from the Mediterranean, since in the vast majority
of countries the proportion of women married between the ages of 15 and 20 is less
92 6 Family Formation and Dissolution
than 10%. The only notable exceptions are Egypt and Palestine, where the proportion
has recently increased to 27 and 15% respectively. These situations show that trend
reversals are possible even in cases where that seemed like a given.
6.3.2 Permanent Celibacy
In demography, the notion of celibacy is linked to the legal marital status of indi-
viduals. A single person is a person who is not married, but who may well be in a
relationship. A permanent celibate is generally defined as a person aged 45–49 who
has never married. They may, however, have already been in a relationship, or be in
a legal union other than marriage (e.g. civil union). We have seen previously that the
age upon first marriage has increased everywhere in the Mediterranean, this however
implies that the population is marrying later on average, and not necessarily that it is
marrying less. In this context, permanent celibacy makes it possible to estimate the
proportion of a generation that has lived a large part of adult life without marrying,
and in turn to assess the extent to which marriage remains an important institution
for family formation.
Permanent female celibacy has generally increased in the Mediterranean
(Fig. 6.5). In the 1950s, the vast majority of countries had levels below 5%. In contrast,
high levels of permanent female celibacy could be found in Southern Europe, where
levels reach 15% in Italy, Spain and Portugal, and even almost 25% in Malta. The
evolution of permanent female celibacy in Southern Europe is singular in the Mediter-
ranean, since it decreased until the 1990s, and then increased very rapidly to exceed
the levels of the 1950s. At the end of the 2010s, permanent female celibacy reached
20% in Portugal and Italy, and over 30% in France. Only Malta has seen a continuous
decline in its proportion of permanent single women. Spain, on the other hand, has
experienced a very moderate increase in comparison with other Southern European
countries: permanent female celibacy barely exceeded 10% in the 2010s.
In the other Mediterranean countries, there is also a clear trend towards an increase
in permanent female celibacy. This increase is often moderate, but sometimes signif-
icant. In the majority of countries, the current level of permanent female celibacy
does not exceed 8%. However, s everal countries on both sides of the Mediterranean
exceed 10%. In a number of countries, permanent celibacy is also at a high level:
about 15% in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon and Bulgaria, and even 28% in Slovenia.
These levels should be compared with those reached by Western European countries
at the beginning of the twentieth century. A characteristic of the family model in this
region was late marriage and a high proportion of permanent celibacy. In 1900, it was
generally above 10% for women, and reached 12% in France, 10% in Germany, 15%
in Britain, and up to 20% in Portugal (Engelen & Puschmann, 2011). In this respect,
the current levels reached by some Mediterranean countries are comparable and can
be considered high, even unprecedented in the case of Arab-Muslim countries.
6.3 Changes in Marriage 93
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Share of singles among women aged 45-49 (%)
France
Italy
Portugal
Spain
Malta
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Share of singles among women aged 45-49 (%)
Algeria
Morocco
Tunisia
Libya
Egypt
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Share of singles among women aged 45-49 (%)
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Greece
Croatia
Montenegro
Serbia
BiH
Albania
Yougoslavia
Macedonia
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Share of singles among women aged 45-49 (%)
Lebanon
Israel
Jordan
Palestine
Cyprus
Syria
Turkey
Fig. 6.5 Permanent female celibacy in the Mediterranean (1950–2019) (Sources World Marriage
Database [2019], Demographic Statistics Database, Demographic Yearbook [UN], MICS. Calcu-
lations made by the authors)
We can see how there is no homogeneity within the Arab-Muslim countries, or
even within each shore. Similar levels of permanent female celibacy can be found in
countries on all shores.
With the increase in the age of marriage and the end of early marriage in most
countries, we are witnessing the emergence of singlehood in society, and in particular
among women. In many Mediterranean countries, people who have never married
94 6 Family Formation and Dissolution
0
20
40
60
80
100
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59
Share of singles (%)
Age group
A
LGERIA
1977 2012
0
20
40
60
80
100
15-1920-24 25-2930-34 35-3940-44 45-4950-54 55-59
Share of singles (%)
Age group
P
ORTUGAL
1977 2012
Fig. 6.6 Share of single people aged 15–59 (both sexes) in Portugal and Algeria (Sources Wor ld
Marriage Database [2019], Demographic Statistics Database. Calculations made by the authors)
represent a larger share at each age group. The evolution is sometimes striking in
some countries, for example in Algeria and Portugal (Fig. 6.6).
Whereas celibacy often only applied to a minority of age groups in the 1970s,
it now concerns a much larger proportion, and sometimes a majority, of people in
an age group. The 25–29 year olds in Algeria, for example, were only 20% single
in 1977, but over 55% in 2012. We note that in this age group, but also in others,
that the share of singles is higher in Algeria than in Portugal. These two countries
illustrate how celibacy has become a mass phenomenon as it concerns a significant
part of the population, in generally larger proportions than before.
6.3.3 Summary of Family Models
Finally, we propose a simple typology of current family models based on the
following two characteristics: permanent female celibacy and female age at marriage
(measured by the SMAM). Of course, a more complete typology of family models
would take into account many other factors. The aim here however is to summarise
the trends outlined above. The result is shown in Fig. 6.7.
There is a general difference between a matrimonial regime with rather low perma-
nent female celibacy and where women marry relatively early, and a matrimonial
regime with high permanent female celibacy and high age at marriage. Paradoxically,
there is no distinction, either between the different shores of the Mediterranean, or
between Arab-Muslim societies and Western societies. Rather, there is a difference
between the Western Mediterranean and Eastern Mediterranean. On the Southern
and Eastern shores, the “Petit Maghreb”9 differs from the Near East; and on the
Northern shore, Southern Europe and Slovenia stand out from the Balkan countries.
9 This term refers to the western part of North Africa, i.e. Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.
6.3 Changes in Marriage 95
SMAM < 28 years
Never married women aged 45-49 < 10%
SMAM < 28 years
Never married women aged 45-49 > 10%
SMAM > 28 years
Never married women aged 45-49 < 10%
SMAM > 28 years
Never married women aged 45-49 > 10%
500 km
SIMPLE CLASSIFICATION OF FAMILY MODELS
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (2010’s)
N
Author: Doignon Y. (2023)
Sources: World Marriage Database (2019), Demographic Yearbook, MICS
Fig. 6.7 Typology of current family models in the Mediterranean (Sources World Marriage Database [2019], Demographic Statistics Database, MICS.
Calculations made by the authors. N.B. The dates used in each country are those most recently)
96 6 Family Formation and Dissolution
Thus defined by these two dimensions, the current family model in the Balkan coun-
tries resembles that of the Near Eastern countries more than that of the Southern
European countries.
This geography is reminiscent of the Hajnal line (Hajnal, 1965), which divides
the European continent along a north-east/south-west axis, from St. Petersburg to
Trieste. It distinguishes two historically persistent European family models. To the
west of this demarcation, women marry at a rather late age, the age gap between
spouses is rather small, and a large share of adults have never married. Conversely,
to the east of this line, women marry much younger, the age gap between spouses is
greater and marriage is almost universal, with little permanent celibacy. In our case,
it is as if the Hajnal line was extended into the Mediterranean Sea to distinguish
a western and an eastern basin. Of course, this general dichotomy is not so clear
cut, as intermediate situations exist. Morocco and Israel’s current family model is
characterised by a low age of marriage for women and a high level of permanent
celibacy for women. To contrast, Malta, Greece and Libya are in exactly the opposite
situation.
This typology of family models in the Mediterranean is based on the current
situation, but it would be a mistake to consider the resulting geography as destined
to remain fixed. Indeed, as we have seen throughout this chapter, phenomena are still
evolving in many countries, and trend reversals sometimes occur, for example the
recent drop in the age at marriage in the Maghreb. Furthermore, we have deliberately
constructed a typology with only two dimensions in order to identify types that
are relatively simple to understand. Of course, it is not our intention to claim that
countries in a given category have a family model that is similar in every respect, as
a family model is much more complex than the two dimensions considered here. If
we had included the age gap between spouses, for instance, the typology would have
further distinguished Arab-Muslim populations from others.
6.4 Conclusion
If we take a step back, we can see that the Mediterranean countries are experiencing
similar family changes, despite differences in timing or intensity. In a way, therefore,
there is a convergence of the demographic indicators used. The evolution of the
nuptiality rate shows a decrease i n the frequency of marriages. The relative disparities
in divorce rates are smaller today than they were in the 1950s. Age at marriage and
permanent celibacy (and celibacy in general) have increased, sometimes significantly.
And the age gap between spouses has generally narrowed.
We must measure the importance of these family changes, which constitute a real
revolution in several respects. In the populations of the Southern and Eastern shores,
the main characteristics that made Arab-Muslim marriage distinct have profoundly
changed over the last 60 years: marriage has become less universal, early marriage
has disappeared in most countries, the divorce rate has been decreasing, and the
age gap between spouses has been reduced. A similar observation can be found in
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ultimately a parenthesis in relation to past trends. These countries traditionally had
a late marriage family model that was not universal.
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Population Division. https://population.un.org/wpp/
98 6 Family Formation and Dissolution
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International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
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Chapter 7
Mortality Profiles
Abstract The Mediterranean is currently characterised by rather low mortality.
Indeed, life expectancy at birth exceeds the global average in almost all countries
of the region. But this was not always the case. Mortality in the Mediterranean has
fallen sharply since 1950: average life expectancy at birth was 78 years in 2019
compared to only 53 years in 1950. This dramatic increase in life expectancy at
birth is a sign of great convergence between Mediterranean countries, but also of a
profound shift in mortality patterns concerning both causes of mortality and ages at
which people die. Despite these general trends of overall convergence in mortality,
disparities persist between countries. This chapter takes a look at the evolution of
mortality in the Mediterranean since 1950. We will start by describing trends in
overall mortality by studying the indicator of life expectancy at birth. We will then
analyse mortality by major age groups: child mortality (0–5 years), adult mortality
(15–64 years) and mortality at advanced ages (65 years or older). Finally, to explain
the identified mortality differences, we will take a look at the health transition in the
Mediterranean in relation to the major causes of mortality.
Keywords Mortality ·Mortality profiles ·Infant and child mortality ·Adult
mortality ·Mortality at advanced ages ·Health transition ·Mediterranean
7.1 Introduction
The Mediterranean is currently characterised by rather low mortality. Indeed, life
expectancy at birth exceeds the global average in almost all countries of the region.
But this was not always the case. Mortality in the Mediterranean has fallen sharply
since 1950: average life expectancy at birth was 78 years in 2019 compared to only
53 years in 1950. This dramatic increase in life expectancy at birth is a sign of
great convergence between Mediterranean countries, but also of a profound shift in
mortality patterns concerning both causes of mortality and ages at which people die.
Despite these general trends of overall convergence in mortality, disparities persist
© The Author(s) 2023
Y. Doignon et al., Population Dynamics in the Mediterranean,
SpringerBriefs in Population Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37759-4_7
99
100 7 Mortality Profiles
between countries. This chapter takes a look at the evolution of mortality in the
Mediterranean since 1950.
We will start by describing trends in overall mortality by studying the indicator of
life expectancy at birth. We will then analyse mortality by major age groups: child
mortality (0–5 years), adult mortality (15–64 years) and mortality at advanced ages
(65 years or older). Finally, to explain the identified mortality differences, we will
take a look at the health transition in the Mediterranean in relation to the major causes
of mortality.
7.2 Mortality at All Ages: Life Expectancy at Birth
7.2.1 A Very Heterogeneous Picture in 1950
In 1950, overall mortality levels were very disparate in the Mediterranean (Fig. 7.1).
Life expectancies at birth (e0)1 ranged from 34 to 68 years. This meant that some
countries were already progressing well in the transition from high to low mortality
rate, while others still had a way to go. The former had e0s above 60 years as seen
in Southern Europe and in the majority of the Balkans, along with some countries in
the Near East (Israel, Lebanon and Cyprus to a lesser extent). On the other hand, the
latter were characterised by much higher mortality levels. Life expectancies at birth
in North African countries were thus generally less than 40 years and those in the
Near East between 45 and 50 years, corresponding respectively to the mortality trends
of France at the beginning of the nineteenth century and Italy in the 1920s. Balkan
countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia) were in an intermediate
situation with e0s approaching 50 years of age.
Despite sometimes high mortality levels, the situation in 1950 would indicate
that the Mediterranean populations were all nevertheless engaged in the process
of mortality transition. Indeed, before mortality began to decrease with the Indus-
trial Revolution in the late 18th to the early nineteenth century, the e0 generally did
not exceed 30–35 years in Europe (Weeks, 2020). However, all the Mediterranean
countries more or less exceeded this threshold in 1950, showing that the mortality
transition had potentially begun before the Second World War. For example, Egypt
and Algeria saw their mortality gradually decrease from the beginning of the twen-
tieth century (Fargues, 1986; Tabutin et al., 2002). This characteristic of the mortality
transition in the Mediterranean is surely explained by the “Mediterranean hygieni-
sation”2 (Pouget, 2021). Indeed, rich exchanges of knowledge and medical practices
have taken place between all the shores of the Mediterranean since the nineteenth
century (Speziale, 2018). Doctors, nurses, sisters and missionaries were the vectors
of the Pasteur revolution during the first half of the twentieth century.
1 For ease of reading, we use the annotation “e0” in this chapter to mean “life expectancy at birth”.
2 This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows:
“hygiénisation méditerranéenne”.
7.2 Mortality at All Ages: Life Expectancy at Birth 101
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)
France
Italy
Spain
Malta
Portugal
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)
Algeria
Libya
Tunisia
Egypt
Morocco
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)
Greece
Bulgaria
Croatia
Montenegro
Slovenia
Serbia
Kosovo
BiH
Macedonia
Albania
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)
Israel
Lebanon
Cyprus
Turkey
Palestine
Syria
Jordan
Fig. 7.1 Evolution of life expectancy at birth in the Mediterranean (1950–2021) (Source Wor ld
Population Prospects 2022. Calculations made by the authors. Note The time units used are five-year
periods)
Nevertheless, even though mortality declined relatively early in the Mediter-
ranean, the health situation in many countries was still dire in 1950: child mortality
was particularly high and few people reached old age. Indeed, a life expectancy at
birth of 35 years, as in Egypt in 1950, meant that about one in four children died
before one year and only 30% of a generation reached the age of 65. By way of
comparison, during the same period, the proportions were respectively 2 children
102 7 Mortality Profiles
out of 10 and 50% in Macedonia (e0 of 50 years), or 5 out of 100 and 68% in
France (e0 of 66 years). Thus, within the Mediterranean of the 1950s, there were
very contrasting demographic realities, with populations located at an early stage of
the mortality transition and others at an advanced stage.
7.2.2 General Convergence Since 19503
Since 1950, mortality has declined significantly across the region, currently
exceeding an e0 of 70 years in all Mediterranean countries (Fig. 7.1). Mediterranean
populations are all in a phase of low relative mortality: everywhere less than 2%
of children die before the age of 1, and more than 75% of a generation reaches the
age of 65. Great strides have been made to reduce mortality; previously, death was
a serious threat to human society.
This decline in mortality has not occurred at the same rate everywhere though.
It was particularly rapid for countries in a mortality transition that had just begun
in 1950. France took almost 120 years to go from an e0 of 40 to 70 years. Italy
and Spain have done this in about 70 years, while Morocco and Egypt have done
it in just under 60 years, Jordan in 40 years and Libya in 30 years. With this very
rapid increase, the countries with the highest mortality in 1950 have bridged much
of the gap that separated them from the populations most advanced in the mortality
transition. It might be expected that some lagging countries would catch up with,
or even overtake, the earlier countries and that the ranking of countries at the end
of the period would be different from that at the beginning of the period. On the
contrary, there is no upheaval in the hierarchy that prevailed in 1950. However, some
trajectories are interesting to note, such as Lebanon and Turkey whose current e0
equals (and exceeds) that of several Balkan countries, even though they experienced
a more unfavourable situation in the 1950s. In 2019, Turkey’s e0 (77 years) was
slightly higher than that of Serbia and Montenegro, whereas it was lower by more
than 11 years in 1950. Also noteworthy is the particular situation of Bulgaria, which
with an e0 of 75 years is among the lowest life expectancies in the Mediterranean
while it was among the highest in 1950.
A great convergence of mortality has therefore taken place and the current situation
is much less heterogeneous than it was before. Mortality gaps in the Mediterranean
have narrowed significantly since 1950. However, contrasts remain: 12 years separate
the lowest e0 (Egypt) and the highest (Italy) in 2019 and at least 5 years separate the
e0 of most North African countries (e0 < 76 years) and that of Southern European
countries (e0 > 81 years).
3 In this chapter, even if some graphs represent the period 1950–2021, we will cover (unless
otherwise stated) the period 1950–2019 in order to not take into account the mortality related
to the Covid-19 pandemic (2020–2022). Indeed, the effects of this pandemic on life expectancy are
not yet fully known. We would like to focus on the mortality situation of Mediterranean countries
outside of any great shock (or almost).
7.2 Mortality at All Ages: Life Expectancy at Birth 103
7.2.3 Decreases in Life Expectancy at Birth
This tremendous victory over death must not make us forget that this progress can
be reversed. If the e0 increased in all the Mediterranean countries between 1950 and
2019, the evolution was not always steady and some setbacks were experienced. For
example, the convergence of the e0 observed in the Mediterranean has slowed down,
and even came to a halt in the 1990s, a period from which the curves evolve almost
in parallel. This is the effect of a slowdown in the rates of increase in the risk of death
by age, particularly in the countries with the lowest e0. While the relative disparities
between countries reduced by a factor of four between 1950 and 1990, they have
remained almost at the same level since then.
We also observe declines in e0 in several Mediterranean countries during the study
period. The most notable are attributable to wars and conflicts: the Algerian war
(1954–1962), the Lebanese war (1975–1982), the Yugoslav war (1992–1995), wars
and political destabilisation in Libya in the 2010s and the Syrian conflict since 2011.
The increase in mortality over a short period of time is sometimes striking: annual
data from the World Population Prospects 2022 show that Bosnia-Herzegovina lost
about 20 years of e0 between 1990 and 1993 for example. In addition, post-conflict
recovery time varies from country to country. Whereas Bosnia-Herzegovina seems
to have taken 2 years to regain its pre-war e0, Lebanon took about 10 years. Syria,
meanwhile, still has not reached its 2010 e0, despite being in recovery for several
years.
The COVID-19 pandemic has also led to a more or less significant decrease in
e0 almost everywhere in the Mediterranean in 2020–2021. The impact of the virus
varied by country: they were not affected at the same time and did not suffer the same
number of waves of excess mortality. According to World Population Prospects 2022
data, Mediterranean countries lost an average of 1.5 years of e0, with large disparities
within the region (Table 7.1). The countries with the greatest loss of e0 (greater than
2 years) are located in the southern Balkans, along with North Africa and Lebanon.
Table 7.1 Loss of life expectancy at birth during the COVID-19 pandemic (2020–2021)
Scale of e0 loss Country
e0 loss < 1 year Cyprus, Syria, Morocco, France, Israel, Libya, Malta, Portugal,
Montenegro
1 year < e0 loss < 2 years Egypt, Greece, Italy, Croatia, Slovenia, Spain, Palestine, Jordan,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey
2 years < e0 loss < 3 years Algeria, Tunisia, Kosovo, Serbia, Albania
e0 loss > 3 years Bulgaria, Macedonia, Lebanon
Source World Population Prospects 2022. Calculations made by the authors
104 7 Mortality Profiles
7.2.4 Gender Inequalities
As elsewhere in the world, inequalities in mortality between men and women are
significant in the Mediterranean. Mortality risks for men are generally higher than
those for women. This difference in favour of women may be attributed to a biological
advantage in the form of immune function, although it is difficult to measure this
effect (Weeks, 2020). Thus, in the Mediterranean, the e0 of men is lower by 5 years
on average than that of women. However, the extent of the gender gap is not the
same in all countries. It depends on social factors relating to the status of women in
society. Thus, when a small gap is noted, it reflects an excess mortality of women,
which reflects a rather deteriorated status. The gender gap in e0 is also a function
of progress in the mortality transition: the gaps between men and women, which
are rather reduced at the beginning of the transition, are accentuated during the
transition by the faster increase in women’s e0, and they finally decrease when men’s
e0 progressively catches up with that of women. To illustrate this relationship, we
use the evolution of the gender gap of e0 of France since 1806 in comparison with
that of other countries of Southern Europe (Fig. 7.2).
Before the transition, the gap in e0 between men and women was generally quite
small. In France, the gender gap was almost stable until the early 1860s and it was
less than 2 years (excluding exceptional periods). During the mortality transition,
women’s e0 increased faster than men’s, widening the gap. France has experienced
a gradual increase in the gender gap since the 1860s. Apart from periods of war, it
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Gender gap in life expectancy at birth (years)
France
Italy
Portugal
Spain
Bulgaria
Fig. 7.2 Evolution of the gender gap in life expectancy at birth in some Southern European countries
(Source Human Mortality Database, Human Life-Table Database. Calculations made by the authors)
7.3 The Different Mortality Profiles 105
reached a maximum of slightly more than 8 years in the early 1990s, when it began
to decrease until the present time (bell curve). This decrease in the gender gap can be
explained both by a certain masculinisation of female behaviours (increase in tobacco
and alcohol consumption, etc.), but also by changes in the epidemiological profile that
we will discuss i n the last part of this chapter. The other Southern European countries
in Fig. 7.2 have the same evolution model, with some differences compared to that
of the French. For Bulgaria, for example, once a maximum was reached, there was
no decrease in the gender gap, but a stagnation for 30 years.
The evolution of the gender gap of e0 in the Mediterranean since 1950 highlights
a diversity of trajectories. We have classified them into 5 groups (Fig. 7.3).
The first brings together countries with the same bell-shaped trajectory presented
previously, and whose gender gap has been decreasing for at least 20 years (or more).
These are the countries of Southern Europe (except Malta), plus Croatia and Slovenia.
Similar trajectories with stagnation (or a slight decrease) once the maximum has been
reached make up the second group, which is almost exclusively comprised of Balkan
countries. The third group concerns only countries on the Southern and Eastern
shores, with gender gap trajectories increasing over the entire period. The fourth
group includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cyprus, whose trajectories are
downward over the entire period. Finally, the trajectories of the last group (Algeria,
Kosovo, Lebanon and Palestine) do not have a clear evolution over the entire period.
Across the board, the conflicts are clearly identifiable, showing how men’s e0 is more
affected during these periods of instability.
The more rapid increase in the e0 of women during the decline in mortality leads to
sometimes considerable time lags between the two genders. In Bosnia-Herzegovina,
for example, men in 2019 had an e0 that women in the same country had reached
almost 25 years before. There are considerable disparities, with a gap of about
10 years for Morocco and Algeria, and 30 years for Serbia, Tunisia and Croatia.
The maximum was reached by Bulgaria with a lag of 60 years, meaning that in 2019
men reach an e0 that women had in 1960.
7.3 The Different Mortality Profiles
Life expectancy at birth is a synthetic indicator of the mortality of a population. It
gives indications of the health of a population at a given date, but potentially masks
different age-specific mortality profiles for the same value (mean age at death).
Different mortality patterns can correspond to the same life mean at birth. To better
understand the mechanisms underlying the convergence of e0 in the Mediterranean
since 1950, as highlighted above, we will now analyse mortality broken down into
3 major age groups: infant and child mortality (under 5 years old), adult mortality
(15–64 years) and mortality at advanced ages (65 years or more).
106 7 Mortality Profiles
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Gender gap in life expectancy at birth (years)
Croatia
France
Portugal
Slovenia
Spain
Italy
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Gender gap in life expectancy at birth (years)
Albania
BiH
Cyprus
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Gender gap in life expectancy at birth (years)
Kosovo
Palestine
Lebanon
Algeria
1980 1990 2000 2010 20201950 1960 1970
Tunisia
Libya
Egypt
Jordan
Morocco
Israel
Syria
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Gender gap in life expectancy at birth (years)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Gender gap in life expectancy at birth (years)
Bulgaria
Montenegro
Serbia
Greece
Malta
Macedonia
2000 2010 2020
Fig. 7.3 Evolution of the gender gap in life expectancy at birth in the Mediterranean (1950–2021)
(Source World Population Prospects 2022. Calculations made by the authors. Note Thetimeunits
used are five-year periods)
7.3.1 Infant and Child Mortality (Under 5 Years Old)
For most of human history, infant and child mortality (i.e. children under 5 years
old) remained at very high levels. It was not until the nineteenth century that it began
to decline in European countries, then in other countries of the world according to
7.3 The Different Mortality Profiles 107
Under-Five Mortality Rate (
5
q
0
) 2015-2019 (
‰)
Under-Five Mortality Rate (
5
q
0
) 1950-1954 (
‰)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
/20
/10
/15
/30
Egypt
Syria
Libya
Albania
Algeria
Tunisia
Palestine
Jordan
BiH
Macedonia
Portugal
Morocco
Turkey
Israel
Malta
France
Greece
Lebanon
Bulgaria
Serbia
Cyprus
Italy Spain
Croatia
Kosovo
Slovenia
Montenegro
Northern Africa
Balkans
Southern Europe
Near-East
Fig. 7.4 Child mortality in the Mediterranean (1950–2019) (Source World Population Prospects
2022. Graphic developed by the authors. Reading tip the dotted lines represent the change between
1950–1954 and 2015–2019. For example, points on the “/30” line have child mortality that has been
divided by 30 between the two periods. The colour of a dot represents the regional area to which a
country belongs)
various timing. In 1950, the infant and child mortality rate (U5MR)4 at the global level
stood at 225‰; in 2019, it reached the low level of 38‰ in 2019, thus representing
a drastic reduction in a short time on a historical scale. Over the same period, in the
Mediterranean, the U5MR decreased on average from 180 to 20‰.
In 1950, U5MR values spread over a wide spectrum, ranging from about 40‰ to
over 350‰ (Fig. 7.4). This disparity meant that more than 90% of children reached
the age of 5 in some countries, and only 55% in others. However, this proportion
exceeded 70% in the vast majority of Mediterranean countries. This infant and child
mortality strongly converged towards lower levels throughout the Mediterranean,
with sometimes very large reductions in some countries. In 2019, the values were
concentrated in a narrower spectrum than in 1950: there were indeed 10 Mediter-
ranean countries above the world average in 1950, while there were none in 2019.
No country (except Syria5 ) has a U5MR above 25‰. More than 97% of children
survive up to 5 years across the Mediterranean. Infant and child mortality is now low.
4 For ease of reading, we use the expression “U5MR” (Under-five Mortality Rate) in this chapter
to mean “infant and child mortality”.
5 This is mainly due to the war, as Syria’s U5MR was below 20‰ at the end of the 2000s.
108 7 Mortality Profiles
In 1950, there was a contrast between countries that were well underway in the
health transition and those that were still at an early stage. The former had a U5MR
of less than 150‰, and included the countries of the Northern shore plus the more
advanced countries of the Southern and Eastern shores (Israel, Lebanon and Cyprus).
The latter had a U5MR higher than 200‰, and were mainly on the Southern and
Eastern shores, but also on the Northern Shore (Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina). This dichotomy can still be seen in 2019, but with much smaller
gaps between countries. Figure 7.4 thus shows that the most spectacular increases
in the decline of the UM5R concerned countries such as Libya, Turkey and Albania
(countries located below the right marked “ /30”, indicating a division by 30 of infant
and child mortality).
7.3.2 Adult Mortality (15–64 Years Old)
Whilst the highest risks of death are concentrated at the younger and older age groups,
adult mortality (considered here as mortality between 15 and 65 years) should not
be underestimated. Indeed, the odds of dying before age 65 were not negligible in
1950, even after surviving to the age of 5; in fact, differences are still observed today.
Adult mortality also contributes to inequalities in life expectancy between men and
women due to excess mortality following childbearing and pregnancy.
In 1950, all Mediterranean countries saw at least 25% of people who reached
the age of 5 die before the age of 65. This proportion reached more than 60% in
some countries (Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Libya). Since 1950, adult mortality has
declined throughout the Mediterranean (Fig. 7.5).
The intensity of this reduction is not commensurate with the reduction in infant
and child mortality. While the latter has been divided by a factor of 10 in almost
all countries, adult mortality has been divided by a ratio of “only” between 2 and
5, which is nevertheless far from negligible. The current situation is much more
enviable than it was 70 years ago, because in all the Mediterranean countries, at least
75% of people who have reached the age of 5 can expect to reach the age of 65.
In 1950, there was clear opposition between the Northern Shore (with Turkey,
Cyprus, Israel and Lebanon) with adult mortality levels below 400‰, and the
Southern and Eastern shores (with Bosnia-Herzegovina) with levels above 400‰.
In 2019, we no longer see this geographical contrast. The highest levels (>200‰)
are mainly on the Southern and Eastern shores (Egypt, Syria, Libya, Bulgaria). In
contrast, lower levels of adult mortality are routinely found in countries on all shores
of the Mediterranean. For example, adult deaths between 120‰ and 175‰ concern
countries in North Africa (Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria), the Near East (Palestine,
Jordan, Turkey) and the Balkans (Montenegro, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Macedonia, Kosovo). This means that similar adult mortality conditions can be shared
by countries on both sides of the Mediterranean.
7.3 The Different Mortality Profiles 109
Adult Mortality (
50
q
15
)
2015-2019 (
‰)
Adult Mortality (
50
q
15
) 1950-1954 (
‰)
250
225
200
175
150
125
100
200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650
75
50
0/2
/3
/4
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia
Jordan
Palestine
Algeria
BiH
Syria
Egypt
Montenegro
Serbia
Turkey
Croatia
Slovenia
Albania
Kosovo
Lebanon
Malta
Spain
Greece
Italy
Israel
France
Portugal
Macedonia
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Northern Africa
Balkans
Southern Europe
Near-East
Fig. 7.5 Adult mortality in the Mediterranean (1950–2019) (Source World Population Prospects
2022. Graphic developed by the authors. Reading tip The dotted lines represent the change between
1950–1954 and 2015–2019. For example, points on the “/4” line have an adult mortality that has
been divided by 4 between the two periods. The colour of a dot represents the regional area to which
a country belongs)
7.3.3 Mortality at Advanced Ages (65 Years Old or Older)
In 1950, we saw that the high levels of infant, child and adult mortality in the Mediter-
ranean meant that a significant part of a generation did not reach the age of 65 (with
great variability between countries). Once this age is reached, how many more years
can a person expect to live? To measure this, we use the life expectancy indicator at
age 65 (e65),6 which is the number of years an individual will live on average if they
have the same probabilities of death as previous generations at the same time.
All Mediterranean countries had an e65 between 10 and 14 years in 1950 (Fig. 7.6).
It increased everywhere by 4.5 years on regional average from 12 to 16.8 years (in
2019). However, developments vary greatly from country to country. Over the study
period, in contrast to infant and adult mortality, there is a trend over the period
towards divergence in the e65. Indeed, differences between countries increased, as
many of the countries with the highest e65 in 1950 were also those that’s experienced
the highest increase (see Sect. 7.4 of this chapter). Southern European countries
and Israel have all seen their e65 increase by more than 50%, even though their e65
was already among the highest in the region in 1950 (>13 years). They have thus
6 For ease of reading, we use the annotation “e65” in this chapter to mean “life expectancy at
65 years”.
110 7 Mortality Profiles
Life expectancy at 65 (e
65
)
2015-2019 (
year)
Malta
France
Spain
Israel
Italy
Portugal
Turkey
Bulgaria
Greece
Croatia
Kosovo
Albania
Algeria
BiH
Palestine
Jordan
Morocco
Tunisia
Libya Syria
Egypt
Slovenia
Montenegro
Serbia
Macedonia
Cyprus
Lebanon
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
9 101112131415
+25%
+50%
+75%
+100%
Life expectancy at 65 (e
65
) 1950-1954 (
year)
Northern Africa
Balkans
Southern Europe
Near-East
Fig. 7.6 Life expectancy at age 65 in the Mediterranean (1950–2019) (Source World Population
Prospects 2022. Graphic developed by the authors. Reading tip: the dotted lines represent the change
between 1950–1954 and 2015–2019. For example, points on the “ +75%”linehavealifeexpectancy
at age 65 that was increased by 75% between the two periods. The colour of a dot represents the
regional area to which a country belongs)
widened the gap with the other Mediterranean countries, most of which have had a
more moderate rate of growth.
Unusual trajectories are also a noteworthy. Bulgaria had the second highest e65
in the Mediterranean in 1950, but it only increased by 2 years, thus arriving at 17th
place in 2019. Malta, meanwhile, saw its e65 almost double over the study period,
moving from 24th to 3rd place.
As a result, countries’ e65s are spread over a wider range of values in 2019 than
in 1950. There were 9 Mediterranean countries with an e65 below the world average
in 1950, and 15 in 2019. This situation illustrates the divergence in life expectancy
at age 65 that has occurred in the Mediterranean between these two dates.
It is possible to distinguish 4 groups of countries in 2019, reflecting differences
between the shores of the Mediterranean. The first group is made up of the countries
of Southern Europe and Israel, with an e65 over 20 years; they clearly stand out
from the other countries. Cyprus, Croatia and Greece form the second group. With
an e65 between 19 and 20, they follow the previous group. The third group (Syria,
Egypt, Morocco, Libya) has the lowest e65 (less than 15 years). The last group brings
together all the other countries, from all sides, with an e65 between 15 and 18 years.
7.4 The Health Transition 111
7.4 The Health Transition
This general convergence of the e0 in the Mediterranean, linked to declines in
mortality at different ages, actually reflects a profound change in the diseases causing
mortality (epidemiological profile) in a population (Frenk et al., 1991; Omran, 1971).
Historically, the epidemiological profile has long been dominated by infectious
diseases. In industrial countries, the increase in e0 from the end of the eighteenth
century until the 1960s was essentially due to the fight against infectious diseases
(Vallin & Meslé, 2004). This progress can be attributed to various factors, both
sociocultural and medical: the control of major epidemics, the disappearance of
famines and food shortages due to food production and distribution improvement; the
improvement of nutrition, health and hygiene policies; progress in the distribution of
drinking water and sanitation systems; and finally vaccines and antibiotics. The main
implication of the massive decline in infectious diseases was the drastic reduction
in infant and child mortality, and more generally the decline in mortality under the
age of 50. This is why the e0 was able to increase beyond the ancestral level of
30–35 years.
In the Mediterranean, the general convergence of the e0 is explained by the timing
lags in this victory over infectious diseases. Countries with high e0s in 1950 had
been fighting these diseases for a long time and had virtually eliminated them. On
the other hand, this was not the case for countries with low e0s whose infectious
diseases still kept infant and child mortality at high levels. These countries benefited
from the transfer of public health knowledge and medical technologies developed
in Europe and North America. By making them available to all their populations,
their e0 increased very rapidly and these countries have made up some of the ground
lost to the pioneer countries. In 2019, infectious diseases also accounted for only
2% of deaths in the Mediterranean, with the prevalence of AIDS being low in this
region. Current differences in infant and child mortality between countries are mainly
explained by the management of neonatal conditions (prematurity, etc.).
The historic triumph over infectious diseases does not mean that they are definitely
a thing of the past, as the COVID-19 pandemic has reminded us. We have seen the
emergence of new infectious diseases since 1950, such as AIDS, Ebola, Zika, SARS,
West Nile virus, H1N1, H5N1 and so on. They still pose major threats to populations,
especially when air travel allows diseases to be spread around the world within hours.
With the control of infectious diseases, societies now face other causes of
mortality: chronic diseases (cardiovascular, tumours/cancers, diabetes, etc.) and
society diseases (smoking, alcoholism, suicide, homicides, road accidents, etc.).
The inability to fight against these various diseases leads to a stagnation of the e0
or at least a much more moderate increase in it. The e0 of Western countries, for
example, reached similar levels at the end of the 1950s thanks to their control of
infectious diseases. On the other hand, there was a stagnation in their e0 in the 1960s,
as the main causes of mortality were more chronic diseases and societal diseases
(Vallin & Meslé, 2014). It was not until the 1970s that effective ways of combating
cardiovascular diseases were discovered. This “cardiovascular revolution” thus
allowed a new progression of the e0.
112 7 Mortality Profiles
However, it is more difficult to reduce mortality from cardiovascular disease than
it is for infectious diseases (Meslé & Vallin, 2006). Firstly, medical prevention is
more complicated, as the population needs to be made aware of the important risk
factors related to diet and lifestyle, in order to change their individual behaviours.
This objective is hence more difficult to implement than the prevention of infectious
diseases, which relies mainly on vaccination and antibiotics. Secondly, treatment
technologies are much more expensive and are not attainable for all countries, which
is especially the case for cardiovascular diseases and cancers.
In Europe, Western countries managed to fight against cardiovascular diseases
and saw their e0 increase. It is these countries that also saw increased life expectancy
at advanced ages. Conversely, the countries of Eastern Europe were unable to take
advantage of the new means of combating this type of disease, and thus had an
e0 which stagnated or even decreased (Vallin & Meslé, 2014). This may be due to
economic difficulties, which have not allowed for the dissemination of treatment
technologies, but also to the highly centralised political system which has proven to
be less effective when individual responsibility was needed. Thus, from the 1970s
onwards, there was a divergence in e0 between the countries of Eastern and Western
Europe, even though the former had closed most of their e0 gap.
Similarly, the Mediterranean countries have not been equal in the face of
cardiovascular diseases (Fig. 7.7).
The richer ones were able to take advantage of the new control methods and see
their e0 continue to increase (and now exceed 80 years). In contrast, for the other
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
%
Cardiovascular diseases Cancer Chronic respiratory diseases Diab etes Other Non Communicable Diseases
Fig. 7.7 Distribution of causes of death among non-communicable diseases (2019) (Source NCD
Data [WHO])
7.5 Conclusion 113
countries, economic difficulties and a certain political centralism may have been
an obstacle and the increase in e0 was more moderate. This inequality in the fight
against cardiovascular diseases is reflected in the burden of these diseases in the
Mediterranean (Fig. 7.7). In half the countries, these diseases account for more than
50% of deaths from non-communicable diseases.7 In contrast, they represent less
than 30% in the most advanced countries in the fight against these diseases (e.g.
Israel, France and Spain).
This inequality in mortality from cardiovascular diseases gives rise to different
epidemiological profiles in the Mediterranean countries. In general, countries that
manage to control cardiovascular diseases are more likely to face cancers and
neurodegenerative diseases (Fig. 7.7). Cancers account for 25% of deaths from
noncommunicable diseases on average in the region. They exceed 30% in coun-
tries such as France, Slovenia, Israel, Turkey or Portugal (although cancer mortality
has been decreasing for some decades now) and represent less than 20% in all North
African countries and in Albania, Bulgaria and Montenegro.
This unequal situation with regard to cardiovascular diseases and cancers is partly
responsible for the divergence in e65 observed between 1950 and 2019, and also for
the current disparities in adult mortality. The progression of e65 is correlated with the
ability to manage chronic diseases that occur with age, cancers, neurodegenerative
diseases and accidents.
Moreover, not all Mediterranean populations are affected with the same intensity
by societal diseases. Arab-Muslim countries are generally much less affected by
alcohol-related deaths (three times less than in other Mediterranean countries) and,
to a lesser extent, by smoking-related deaths. In contrast, road traffic deaths are
higher, particularly in Algeria, Libya and Jordan, which may explain some of the
current disparities in adult mortality.
Finally, the Mediterranean countries are very unevenly affected by obesity, which
is a risk factor for cardiovascular diseases and diabetes in particular. It is particularly
high in countries on the Southern and Eastern shores, which affected one in three
adults over the age of 18 on average in 2015, compared with one in five in other
countries.
7.5 Conclusion
In 1950, Mediterranean societies experienced very different mortality conditions.
Since then, there has been a great convergence of life expectancy at birth, driven
by the decline in infant, child and adult mortality with the control of infectious
diseases. All countries are now in a low mortality phase. However, the convergence
of life expectancy at birth stopped about 30 years ago and the analysis of the data even
7 The WHO classifies deaths into three main categories: communicable, maternal, perinatal and
nutritional diseases; noncommunicable diseases; and accidents. We focus on non-communicable
diseases, as they comprise the bulk of chronic and societal diseases.
114 7 Mortality Profiles
reveals a divergence of mortality after 65 years. These trends can be attributed at least
in part to the uneven capacities of Mediterranean countries to combat cardiovascular
disease, neurodegenerative diseases and cancer. There is no doubt, however, that an
improvement in these capacities could lead to a resumption of the convergence of
mortality after age 65, and thus of life expectancy at birth. This is an important issue
because the number of older people will continue to increase by 2060 (see Chap. 2).
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Chapter 8
The Mediterranean Migration System
Abstract Together with the border between the US and Mexico, the Mediterranean
is the largest migration area in the world. The stock of migrants resident in the
Mediterranean countries was 42.6 million in 2020. About 2/3 of these interna-
tional migrants are found in 4 countries (France, Spain, Italy, Turkey) and 20%
in the rest of the Near East (Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Syria, Palestine). The abso-
lute number of these international migrants can vary greatly from one country to
another; the migrants can thus represent a significant share of the overall population.
The Mediterranean Basin has been historically characterised by a regular circulation
of people within the region. The period after World War II till today (1948–2022)
has been characterised by several changes in the Mediterranean migration system,
which were largely driven by economic and political factors. Through a chronolog-
ical approach, we can identify five periods that synthetise the evolution of migration
in the Mediterranean region during this period.
Keywords International migrations ·Migration system ·High skilled migration ·
Irregular migration ·Mediterranean
8.1 Introduction
Together with the border between the US and Mexico, the Mediterranean is the largest
migration area in the world (Venier & Oliveau, 2023). The stock of migrants resident
in the Mediterranean countries was 42.6 million (Fig. 8.1) in 2020. About 2/3 of
these international migrants are found in 4 countries (France, Spain, Italy, Turkey)
and 20% in the rest of the Near East (Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Syria, Palestine). The
absolute number of these international migrants can vary greatly from one country to
another; the migrants can thus represent a significant share of the overall population.
For example, they represent more than 20% of the population in Malta, Jordan,
Lebanon and Israel.
46.1 million people (representing 16.4% of all international migrants) is the stock
of emigrants whose country of origin is one of the Mediterranean countries and
© The Author(s) 2023
Y. Doignon et al., Population Dynamics in the Mediterranean,
SpringerBriefs in Population Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37759-4_8
117
118 8 The Mediterranean Migration System
6 000
3 000
1 500
500
Stock of international
migrants in 2020
(thousands)
Share of international
migrants in the total
population (in %)
≥ 15.43
[ 11.27 ; 15.43 [
[ 7.22 ; 11.27 [
[ 2.27 ; 7.22 [
< 2.27 500 km
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (2020)
N
Author: Doignon Y. (2023)
Source: International Migrant Stock 2020
Fig. 8.1 Stock of migrants and share of total population (in %) in the Mediterranean (2020) ( Source International Migrant Stock [2020] [United Nations])
8.2 Migration in the Mediterranean (1950–1995) 119
who have emigrated all over the world (including other Mediterranean countries)
from their country of origin. Indeed, a significant proportion of these Mediterranean
emigrants moved within the Mediterranean region: 22.6 million emigrants moved
from their home to another country belonging to the Mediterranean Basin.
The migration in the Mediterranean region is largely influenced by the unequal
age structure of the resident population which is a consequence of the s o-called
demographic transition. As discussed elsewhere in this book (see Chaps. 3 and 4),
the countries of the Mediterranean Basin are at a different transition stage. As a
consequence, while the median age in most of the ageing countries of the North
Mediterranean is over 40 years (except Albania and Montenegro), in the Southern and
Eastern shores, the median age is less than 30 years, resulting in a much younger age
structure. This favourable demographic situation, known as a youth bulge, has great
potential from an economic point of view: according to the demographic dividend
theorists, it may cause rapid economic growth due to a higher level of education
and labour market participation (Bloom et al., 2017). However, countries of the
Southern and Eastern region of the Mediterranean have not yet benefited from the
demographic dividend. The youth population is much more educated and qualified
compared to the generations of their parents, nonetheless, the economic opportunities
for these generations are still yet to come. Indeed, the labour supply is higher than the
demand, resulting in high unemployment rates. High inflation rates and increasing
income inequalities characterise the economy of most of the countries. Therefore,
the young generations belonging to the youth bulge, instead of benefitting from the
demographic dividend, were at the heart of the protests, which culminated in the
so-called Arab Spring, at the beginning of the second decade of the 2000 (Martin &
Bardak, 2011). Political and economic problems affecting the Arab Mediterranean
countries act as a major driver of migration to European and Near Eastern countries
(Etling et al., 2020).
The Mediterranean Basin has been historically characterised by a regular circu-
lation of people within the region. The period after World War II till today (1948–
2022) has been characterised by several changes in the Mediterranean migration
system, which were largely driven by economic and political factors (De Haas, 2011).
Through a chronological approach, we can identify five periods that synthetise the
evolution of migration in the Mediterranean region during this period: 1950–1995
(1950–1963; 1963–1973; 1973–1995), then 1996–2022 (1996–2010; 2011–present).
8.2 Migration in the Mediterranean (1950–1995)
One of the main characteristics of the first period (1948–1963) of this first large
period is the post-war reconstruction of Northern and Western European countries.
The main region of origin were Southern European countries. In the early 1960s, the
number of immigrant residents in Western Europe attained the record number of 7.6
million. Another characteristic of this period is that migration in the Southern and
Eastern Mediterranean countries was mostly internal.
120 8 The Mediterranean Migration System
The main characteristic of the following period (1963–1973) is a sharp decrease
in the flows from Southern Europe to Western European countries and an increase in
migration flows from Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries to this region.
More specifically France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and Austria were the main
destination countries. France and Germany were the main receiving countries in
Europe during this phase: in France there was a strong presence of migrants from the
Maghreb, while in Germany the number of migrants from Turkey steadily increased,
replacing migrants from Southern European countries, in particular from Italy.
The early 1970s, characterised by the oil crisis of 1973 mark a slowdown of
migration flows in the Mediterranean and correspond to the beginning of the third
period (1973–1995). These major changes were largely affected by the process of
globalisation, implying a restructuring of the world economy (De Haas et al., 2020).
One of the main consequences of this process has been the growth of inequalities
within and between regions. The new economic and political configurations had a
huge impact on international migration leading to new trends. Coming back to the
Mediterranean area, the most important new trend is the change of migration policies
in the European countries that have traditionally received migrants. Strongly affected
by the economic crisis, they are no longer able (or at least do not have the political will)
to receive foreign workers. This new political (and economic) configuration in the
Northern shore of the Mediterranean is characterised by restrictive entry policies with
the aim of stimulating en masse return of migrants to their countries of origin. This
policy change has a massive impact in the nature and destination of migration flows.
From the 1980s onwards, there is a strong increase in the flow of refugees and asylum
seekers to Europe. Family reunification becomes very important because it allows to
circumvent the restrictive entry regulations. Migration to this region does not stop,
however it changes dramatically assuming different forms compared to the past. One
of the main consequences of the new policy configuration is the transformation of the
countries of Southern Europe from countries of origin into countries of destination
of international migrations. Indeed, the countries of Southern Europe, long-standing
labour exporters to other European countries and to America and Oceania, became
host countries for migrants originating from countries on the Southern shore of the
Mediterranean, from sub-Saharan Africa, from Latin America and, after the fall of
the Berlin Wall, from Eastern Europe. Another important (unintended) consequence
of the oil crisis is the emergence of Persian Gulf countries and Libya as important
poles of attraction for international migration, particularly from South-East Asia and
the Arab countries, due to strong economic growth. Moreover, in this period Egypt
became one of the main regional labour suppliers because of the opening (infitah)to
emigration decided by Anwar Sadat and the strong population growth.
Two important political changes, the fall of the Iron Curtain and the first Gulf
War, characterised the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, generating
new migration flows and weakening existing ones. During this period, the countries
of Southern Europe, particularly Italy and Spain, have become the favourite desti-
nation countries for several populations originating from the Southern shore of the
Mediterranean, especially from the Maghreb countries.
8.3 Migration in the Mediterranean in the XXI Century 121
Another important political event has characterised the mid-1980s. In 1985,
member countries of the European Union signed the Schengen Agreements marking
an important breakthrough for the region’s migration: a zone of free movement
was established within Europe (the effective implementation of the agreements only
began in 1995). The internal borders of the Union no longer existed (except for the
United Kingdom and Ireland): the internal space of the EU thus became a migration
system that includes 26 countries (including non-EU European countries: Iceland,
Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein). On the other hand, the EU’s external borders
became increasingly controlled and inaccessible to all those subject to the Schengen
visa regime, particularly for countries of the Southern and Eastern shores of the
Mediterranean (Wihtol de Wenden, 2013). From this period onwards, there is the
emergence of a new phenomenon, as a direct consequence of the entry restrictions in
the Schengen zone, significant flows of irregular migration was followed by massive
regularisations.
Lastly, high skilled migration is also increasing; it is characterised not only by the
mobility of highly skilled workers but also by the increasing mobility of students.
8.3 Migration in the Mediterranean in the XXI Century
A new migration phase in the Mediterranean region (1996–2010) started at the turn
of the late 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s; thanks to a positive economic
situation, a new migration sequence began (Fig. 8.2). It is a period during which new
poles of attraction emerge beyond traditional ones.
In the Northern shore of the Mediterranean, Spain and Italy confirmed their role
as poles of attraction for unskilled l abour, especially migrants from Southern shore
countries employed in agriculture, family services, restaurant services, small retail
trade and construction. In the first decade of the 2000s, Spain and Italy became host
countries for migration flows, particularly from Maghreb countries and Egypt. On
the other hand, in these new hosting countries, there is a low incidence of migrants
coming from the Eastern shore of the Mediterranean, in particular of migrants
from Turkey. The other European countries that traditionally import foreign labour
continue to welcome family migration and highly qualified migrants.
Important changes are taking place on the Southern and Eastern shores of the
Mediterranean. In some cases, major transformations are taking place: for example,
Turkey is turning into a destination country for migration flows. Other countries in
the region are becoming transit countries to Europe for migrants from Sub-Saharan
Africa and Asia. Migration to the Arab countries of the Gulf and to Jordan continues
to be central, especially for Egypt and the Palestinian territories.
The first decade of the 2000s ends with two disruptive events that could have
dramatically altered migration flows: the global economic crisis of 2008 and the
Arab Spring in 2010. Contrary to the crisis of 1973, the global economic crisis that
began in 2008 did not have a strong impact on migration: the decline i n migration
flows was rather small. Labour migration to Southern European countries, especially
122 8 The Mediterranean Migration System
0
2,500
5,000
7,500
1990 2000 2010 2020
Stock of international migrants (thousands)
France
Italy
Spain
Malta
Portugal
0
2,500
5,000
7,500
1990 2000 2010 2020
Stock of international migrants (thousands)
Algeria
Libya
Tunisia
Egypt
Morocco
0
2,500
5,000
7,500
1990 2000 2010 2020
Stock of international migrants (thousands)
Greece
Bulgaria
Croatia
Montenegro
Slovenia
Serbia
BiH
Macedonia
Albania
2, 500
5,000
7,500
Stock of international migrants (thousands)
0
1990 2000 2010 2020
Israel
Lebanon
Cyprus
Turkey
Palestine
Syria
Jordan
Fig. 8.2 Stock of international migrants in the Mediterranean countries (1990–2020) (Source
International Migrant Stock [2020])
Spain was largely affected by the crisis. However, other kinds of migration (family,
asylum, etc.) did not change or even increase because of the crisis (Bonifazi &
Strozza, 2019).
A major disruptive factor for the entire Mediterranean region (and beyond)
involving migration and mobility is linked to the season of institutional transition,
known as the Arab Spring, that began in 2010. The political unrest in several countries
on the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean has radically changed the
institutional landscape of the area. It has triggered non-linear and on-going regime-
change processes and structured, in essence, the so called “refugee crisis”. In other
words, while some policy makers have claimed that economic migrants make up the
majority of those arriving, the wars in Syria and Iraq, as well as continuing violence
and instability in Afghanistan and Eritrea, were the “real” main drivers of the crisis.
The new political configuration marks the beginning of the ongoing new era
of migration (2011–present). At the beginning of the period, thousands of Tunisians
8.3 Migration in the Mediterranean in the XXI Century 123
(60,000) and Libyans (26,000) escaped from their home countries which were under-
going a period of political instability to Europe. The Italian Island of Lampedusa
become the main entry channel to Europe. The so-called “refugees crisis” has shaken
the entire region. Between 2011 and 2014, the significant reduction of the state’s
control on the socio-economic settings of most of North African countries has acutely
affected the regional and international migration flow dynamics, further growing the
relevance of the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) the itinerary referred to as the
migration flows coming from Northern Africa towards Italy and Malta across the
Mediterranean Sea. In the first stage of the new period, Italy and Malta in the CMR
have been at the front stage for rescuing and welcoming migrants.
However, the CMR became much less relevant in terms of flows by the end
of Operation Mare Nostrum (OMN), a year-long naval and air search-and-rescue
operation promoted by the Italian government in October 2013. Indeed, during 2015,
Greece served as the main portal of entry to Europe.
The International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) Displacement Tracking
Matrix flow-monitoring system counted 1,005,504 irregular arrivals across the
Mediterranean in 2015, including migrants journeying by a or sea to Greece, Bulgaria,
Spain, Italy, Malta or Cyprus, with just 3% coming by land. To contrast, there were
280,000 arrivals by land or sea for the whole of 2014. The 2015 surge of migration into
Europe (going far beyond EU countries bordering the Mediterranean) was unprece-
dented in scope, producing a massive humanitarian crisis and creating a political and
moral impasse for European governments.
From 2011 onwards, refugee flows toward Europe—which had recorded a
declining trend since 2005, have increased: the European countries most affected
by these new waves have been Germany, Sweden, Italy and France. According to the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data, the main countries of origin
of asylum seekers in 2019 were Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Serbia and Kosovo and
Eritrea. It is important to stress that migrants are often taking unsafe journeys to
Europe: according to IOM estimates, more than 8,000 people died in the Mediter-
ranean Sea between 2014 and 2021 in an attempt to reach Europe (Missing Migrants
Project, 2023).
Despite the large attention received by the new and unprecedented number of
arrivals and asylum applications faced by European countries, in reality the coun-
tries on the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean were the most af-fected,
not only numerically speaking, by the crisis. First of all, from the numerical point
of view, they have received the largest part of refugees and asylum seekers from
neighbouring countries. More specifically Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Egypt are
the countries welcoming the highest number of refugees. These coun-tries have been
in the past a major recipient of refugees from Palestine, Iraq and Sudan, and they are
now hosting Syrians, Palestinians and Somalis. Overall, in the Mediterranean region,
there was a steady increase of the total stock of refugees and asylum seekers during
the last 10 years: in 2010 they were around 3 million, while in 2017 they reached the
record figure of 14.8 million (Fig. 8.3).
As already mentioned, the major receiving countries are located in the Southern
and Eastern shore of the region: most of them are internally displaced in Syria
124 8 The Mediterranean Migration System
0
2 ,000
4 ,000
6,000
8 ,000
10 ,000
12,000
14 ,000
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Stock of refugees (thousands)
Fig. 8.3 Stock of refugees in the Mediterranean countries (1951–2021) (Source Refugees/Migrants
Emergency Response, UNHCR [2023])
(7 million) or hosted in Lebanon (over 1 million), Turkey (almost 4 million), Egypt
(almost 300 thousand) or Libya (around 375 thousand). In reality, only a minority
of asylum seekers and refugees succeeded in reaching the richer countries of the
Northern Shore: France (400 thousand) and Italy (354 thousand) being the major
host countries among those bordering the Mediterranean. The top countries sending
refugees are mainly Syria, Iraq, the horn of Africa (through Libya), Afghanistan,
Kosovo and Albania. With the current crisis, Ukraine should also be added to the list
of major sending countries at least for Northern Mediterranean receiving countries.
The unbalanced share of asylum seekers and refugees hosted in the Mediterranean
countries is in part the results of political and economic agreements. For instance,
Turkey has become from 2015–2016 a major receiving country of refugees in the
Mediterranean region, together with Lebanon (and Jordan). Turkey has become more
involved than ever in the reception of refugees because of the agreement made by the
Turkish government with the European Union (EU) in March 2016. According to the
so-called EU-Turkey “Joint Action Plan”, in exchange of its assistance in control-
ling EU borders from irregular migration, Turkey has received from the EU up to 6
billion euros, has been granted visa liberalisation and has been able to reinvigorate
talks about its accession to the EU (Panebianco, 2022; Wihtol de Wenden, 2019).
The agreement allows EU countries to send back to Turkey irregular migrants who
crossed the Turkish borders to reach an EU country. Another important agreement
was a bilateral one, involving Italian and Libyan governments. In 2017 the Italian
government and Libyan authorities signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
in order to train the Libyan Coast Guard and to control land borders. The MoU
8.4 Two Emerging Phenomena: High Skilled and Irregular Migration 125
has been endorsed by the EU, thus the Libyan Coast Guard is trained by European
forces (not only Italian). These agreements with third countries were deemed neces-
sary because the new configuration of migration in the region has caused a great
discontent among EU states. In 2015, the countries most affected by the arrivals of
refugees, namely EU countries on the Mediterranean shore (Italy, Greece, Malta,
etc.) have been asking for a burden-sharing scheme for welcoming refugees among
EU countries according to their wealth and population. After long negotiations the
then EU commission President Jean-Claude Junker, proposed in May 2015 to imple-
ment a burden-sharing agreement. However, far from being cooperative, the response
of the EU non-Mediterranean countries, and more specifically of Eastern European
countries belonging to the Visegrad group (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and
Croatia), was to close their borders to the entrance of newcomers across the Balkan
route. Only after the summer of 2015, the proposal to relocate 160,000 refugees, was
finally accepted by EU member states.
The agreements signed with Libya and Turkey are not new to EU policies; on the
contrary, they are part of the well-established European migration policy of the past
two decades. Indeed, migration policies of EU countries were based on the signature
of bilateral and multilateral agreements with third countries, with the aim to exter-
nalise migration control (Triandafyllidou, 2013). This process is also characterised
by a policy of border externalisation, implemented by externalising to third transit and
sending countries some migration control responsibilities (Sterkx, 2008). Therefore,
we have to stress that the EU approach has focused predominantly on “securitised”
elements such as cooperation agreements on irregular immigration, external border
controls making use of logistical and surveillance technologies, and development
cooperation in third countries designed to stop irregular migration. However, given
the enduring reality of gross global inequalities and continued economic and political
instability in the Global South, we hypothesise that this approach will continue to
push forced migrants to rely on smugglers, thereby increasing the risk of exploitation,
abuse and death. The recent past has shown that in the presence of durable crisis,
fighting off migrants and refugees will come to a dead end. We should be aware
that there is a continuity (of migration flows) notwithstanding the crises of different
nature. The Mediterranean area can be defined by a migration system (Ambrosetti
and Strangio, 2016): a system of principles and rules of admission for aliens that is
resilient to changes in economic conditions and other exogenous shocks.
8.4 Two Emerging Phenomena: High Skilled and Irregular
Migration
More recent migration flows in Europe are characterised by high skilled migration. A
common legislation on high skilled migration was adopted by the European Council
with the Directive on the EU Blue Card (Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009
recently reformed by Directive (EU) 2021/1883 of 20 October 2021). The Directive
126 8 The Mediterranean Migration System
aims at facilitating the entry and the mobility of highly skilled migrants and of the
members of their families and to harmonise procedures for entry and residence in
the member countries. High skilled migration has increased in all EU countries since
2010. However it declined in 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Among the
EU countries, those belonging to the Northern shore of the Mediterranean do not
attract a lot of skilled migrants: among those countries only France is attractive for
the category of researchers. A large part of EU Blue Cards are issued in Germany.
Highly skilled migrants are mainly of Chinese, Indian, American and Russian origin.
Undocumented migration has been identified as one of the main characteristics of
the “Southern European model of migration” (King, 2000). As such, undocumented
migration is a phenomenon largely widespread and debated in the Mediterranean
region. However, estimating the number of undocumented migrants is a complex
exercise, made on the basis of several sources of data, including the number of
applications for regularisation.
Estimates of undocumented migration is complicated by its very nature, addition-
ally at the European level, the definitions and categories are not uniform. In the past,
the European Commission has funded the Clandestino project (between 2007 and
2009). The project was responding to a specific need for reliable information; at that
time, media and the public had a growing interest in this type of migration, who is
using “creative” figures. The aim of the project was to harmonise data sources and
methodology used to study undocumented migration, in order to build a database on
undocumented migration and to guide policies on this difficult topic in Europe.
The Frontex Agency (the European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union)
was created in 2004 by the European Council and it is operational since October
2005 with the aim to promote, coordinate and develop European border management.
Within its tasks, Frontex collects data on flows of illegal crossings of external borders
and flows of illegal migrant detections reported within European borders. According
to Frontex data, illegal crossing of the external EU borders has been stable between
2009 and 2013 (around 100,000 passages). In 2014, because of the worsening of
the Syrian crisis, approximately 283,000 illegal crossings were spotted by Frontex,
with 60% (170,000) crossing the maritime border of the centre-road Mediterranean
(Italy and Malta) (Frontex, 2015). Illegal border crossing increased in 2015, because
of the above-mentioned refugees crisis, and it has reached the record figures of 1.82
million in 2015. Starting from 2016 on, the figures started to decrease when 511,047
illegal border crossings were detected. In 2017, the drop in illegal border crossing
continued, decreasing by 60% with respect to 2016, reaching 204,719 detections. The
figures followed a decreasing trend in 2018 with 150,114 illegal border crossings. In
2019 and 2020, the number of illegal border crossing was even smaller than 2018,
reaching its lowest record in 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, the
numbers of illegal border crossing increased to about 200,000.
It should be stressed that the data provided by Frontex refer to detections of illegal
border crossings, rather than the number of persons, as the same person may cross
the external EU border several times. Since 2015, with the worsening of the so-
called “refugees crisis”, the European Commission and international organisations
8.5 Conclusions 127
such as the UNHCR and the IOM, put additional efforts in the data production in
the Mediterranean region. Data on death at seas and on flows of individuals crossing
the borders are nowadays more systematically collected by these agencies. Therefore
from 2015, arrivals by sea and land borders in the Northern shore of the Mediterranean
are collected by UNCHR and available on their portal, broken down by country of
origin, age and gender.1 2015 was, as already mentioned in the previous section,
a record year for illegal border crossings: more than 1 million. From 2016, there
has been a continuous decrease in border crossings because of the above-mentioned
agreements with Turkey and Libya. The lowest figures were recorded in 2020 because
of the COVID-19 pandemic (95,720). A slow recovery has characterised the last two
years with respectively 123,540 and 160,057 sea and land arrivals recorded.
Missing Migrants Project (2023) is an project of IOM aiming to record people
who die in the process of migrating to an international destination, regardless of their
legal status. It has been implemented in various regions of the world, including the
Mediterranean region since 2014.2 Since 2014, 25,405 missing migrants and 8,216
deaths of migrants were recorded in Mediterranean by the Missing Migrants Project.
8.5 Conclusions
The Mediterranean migration system has undergone many changes since 1948. While
migration from the Southern and Eastern shores to Western Europe was numerous
from the 1960s onwards, European countries implemented restrictive entry policies
with the oil crises of the 1970s. We are witnessing the emergence of new poles of
attraction for international migration, such as the countries of Southern Europe, which
have long been labour exporters, but also Libya, Turkey and Jordan. International
migration is changing, with an increase in the migration of highly skilled people,
including students. More recently, the Arab Spring of the 2010 decade has brought
the Mediterranean into the “refugee crisis”. Migration flows of asylum seekers and
refugees are becoming unprecedented, with a peak of almost 15 million in the late
2010s. The countries most affected by this “refugee crisis” are those on the Southern
and Eastern shores.
Given the demographic, economic and political situation, the Mediterranean
region’s migration scenario of the future could be characterised by a strong migration
pressure, particularly by young adults from the South-East to Europe. This migration
of young adults could be beneficial for the ageing countries of the Northern shore of
the Mediterranean. This would, for example, cope with their domestic labour short-
ages, in particular with the segmentation of the labour market and the need to find
care workers to partially respond to structural demographic ageing. Even if interna-
tional migration will not be able to deal with the massive demographic ageing of the
Northern shore countries, it will certainly be able to do so in a partial way in certain
1 https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean.
2 https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean.
128 8 The Mediterranean Migration System
sectors. To realise this benefit, one path to follow could involve (re-)opening the legal
channels of migration, for both humanitarian and economic migrants, making immi-
gration a structural and not a transitory phenomenon. For European countries, this
would be an alternative to the migration policy paradigm based on securitisation and
solidarity with the poor, and would mitigate political discourse and policy actions
dominated by security and emergency issues.
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the copyright holder.
Chapter 9
Population Dynamics and Their
Components
Abstract The Mediterranean has an average annual population growth rate of
around 1%, which is about the same as the world population growth rate. With a f ew
rare exceptions, this growth is not principally fuelled by migration flows. However,
it is closely linked to the demographic transition still underway in many Southern
and Eastern Mediterranean Countries, i.e. by the excess of births over deaths (natural
balance). In these countries, average annual natural change of about 1.6% (higher
than the world average and a fortiori that of the Mediterranean as a whole) have been
observed. This chapter gives an account of the evolution of the differentiated growth
rates of the populations of the Mediterranean region since the 1950s, distinguishing
between the development of natural, migration and overall growth rates. This will
make it possible to characterise the countries whose growth has been stimulated more
by natural than migration growth depending on the period, thus heralding the sustain-
ability of future growth rates. To achieve this, the chapter will propose a ranking of
growth rates for different countries over time, as well as the expected developments
in terms of projections while discussing the assumptions.
Keywords Natural dynamics ·Migration dynamics ·Population dynamics ·
Population growth ·Projections ·Mediterranean
9.1 Introduction
The Mediterranean has an average annual population growth rate of around 1%,
which is about the same as the world population growth rate. With a few rare excep-
tions, this growth is not principally fuelled by migration flows. However, it is closely
linked to the demographic transition still underway in many Southern and Eastern
Mediterranean Countries, i.e. by the excess of births over deaths (natural balance). In
these countries, average annual natural change of about 1.6% (higher than the world
average and a fortiori that of the Mediterranean as a whole) have been observed.
This chapter gives an account of the evolution of the differentiated growth rates of
the populations of the Mediterranean region since the 1950s, distinguishing between
© The Author(s) 2023
Y. Doignon et al., Population Dynamics in the Mediterranean,
SpringerBriefs in Population Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37759-4_9
131
132 9 Population Dynamics and Their Components
the development of natural, migration and overall growth rates. This will make it
possible to characterise the countries whose growth has been stimulated more by
natural than migration growth depending on the period, thus heralding the sustain-
ability of future growth rates. To achieve this, the chapter will propose a ranking of
growth rates for different countries over time, as well as the expected developments
in terms of projections while discussing the assumptions.
9.2 Evolving Power Relations
The population of the Mediterranean countries amounted to approximately 571
million inhabitants in 2020. It has increased 2.5 times in 70 years. The annual rate
of growth was on average very strong until the mid-1980s (exceeding rather contin-
uously 1.4% per year) before beginning to decline (Fig. 9.1). At the start of the
twenty-first century, the growth rate of the Mediterranean population was around
0.9% per year, the same rate as that of the world population. While all countries are
experiencing a slowdown in their growth, the heterogeneity between major regional
clusters is still notable. North Africa and the Near East still have annual population
growth above 1.3%, despite a steady decline since the mid-1980s. In 1950, growth
was of the order of 2% per year, a significant rate, because it represents a doubling of
the population in 35 years. The evolution of population growth in the Near East high-
lights the impact of cyclical events, such as the insurgency in Syria (1978–1982), the
war in Iraq in the 2000s and the reception of refugees in several Near Eastern coun-
tries. In contrast, Southern Europe and the Balkans have zero and negative growth
respectively (-0.4%). The period when several Southern European countries became
receiving countries with a positive net migration (see Chap. 8) can be seen on the
graph with a significant increase in population growth in the 2000s, followed by a
decrease after the 2007 crisis.
If we focus on countries with more than 10 million inhabitants, we notice that the
3 most populated countries in the Mediterranean in 1950 are all Southern European
countries (Italy, France, Spain), ahead of Egypt and Turkey (Table 9.1). There are
only 5 countries with more than 10 million inhabitants in the 27 Mediterranean coun-
tries. In 1980, two new countries (Morocco and Algeria) joined the group of most
populous countries, while the demographic breakthrough of Turkey and Egypt was
already visible, with Spain moving up from third to fifth place. In 2020, the order of
the shores reversed since Egypt and Turkey were the two most populous countries
in the Mediterranean largely ahead of the three Southern European countries, with
respectively about 109 and 85 million inhabitants (Blöss-Widmer, 2022). Together,
they represent 34% of the Mediterranean population, the same order of magnitude
as India and China represent in the world population. 5 new countries exceeded
the threshold of 10 million inhabitants in 2021: Syria, Tunisia, Jordan, Greece and
Portugal. Seven of the 12 countries with more than 10 million inhabitants are located
on the Southern and Eastern shores. This ranking highlights the reversal of the demo-
graphic order that prevailed in the 1950s. As a result of the demographic transition
9.2 Evolving Power Relations 133
-1.0
-0.5
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Annual population growth rate (%)
Northern Africa
Middle-East
Mediterranean
Southern Europe
Balkans
Fig. 9.1 Mediterranean comparative annual growth rate (%) by regional groups (1950–2020)
(Source World Population Prospects, 2022. Calculations made by the authors)
(see Chap. 4), the populations of the Southern and Eastern shores have increased
sharply and their weight in the Mediterranean population has increased consider-
ably. Indeed, the Northern shore represented 68% of the Mediterranean population
in 1950, and the Southern and Eastern shores 32%. These proportions stood at 39%
and 61% respectively in 2020. In other words, while the majority of the Mediter-
ranean population was on the Northern shore in 1950, the situation is exactly the
opposite at present where 60% of the Mediterranean population is on the Southern
and Eastern shores. It should be noted that almost 40% of the Mediterranean popula-
tion is located in North Africa, 24% in the Near East, 32% in Southern Europe, and
only 7% in the Balkans.
Some countries have therefore experienced an impressive increase in their popu-
lation since 1950 (Fig. 9.2). Egypt and Turkey have experienced growth rates of
more than 2% per year for more than 30 years. Their population has multiplied by 5
and 4, respectively. The most spectacular trajectory is that of Jordan, which had less
than 500,000 inhabitants in 1950, but more than 11 million in 2021. This increase
represents a more than 25-fold increase in the population in 70 years. The countries
of the Southern and Eastern shores have seen their population growth by more than
4 times since 1950, compared to 1.5 for the countries of the Northern shore.
This growth is largely a consequence of the various demographic transitions
described in Chap. 4. It depends firstly on the level of the natural balance (number of
births minus number of deaths), a component that varies according to the stages of
the demographic transition. The rate of population change also increases by the size
of the net migration (estimate of the difference between arrivals and departures from
134 9 Population Dynamics and Their Components
Table 9.1 Countries with more than 10 million inhabitants in 1950, 1980 and 2021 (population
numbers in millions)
(Source World Population Prospects, 2022)
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
100,000
110,000
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Total population (thousands)
Egypt
Turkey
France
Italy
Spain
Algeria
Morocco
Syria
Tunisia
Greece
Jordan
Portugal
Fig. 9.2 Comparative population evolution in Mediterranean by country (1950–2021) (Source
World Population Prospects, 2022)
9.3 Natural and Migration Dynamics: Which Combinations Exist … 135
each country for each period). These two elements, the components of population
dynamics, can jointly stimulate growth (positive natural balance and positive net
migration), work against each other (positive natural balance/negative net migration
or vice versa) or contribute to a general decline (negative natural and net migration).
In order to fully understand the population dynamics of the Mediterranean coun-
tries, it is therefore necessary to analyse its two components (natural and migration)
in order to derive several profiles of dynamics.
9.3 Natural and Migration Dynamics: Which
Combinations Exist in the Mediterranean?
With regard to the natural component, the average annual rates of all countries have
fallen considerably since 1950. The demographic transition generates an undeni-
able phenomenon of convergence of rate of natural change towards lower levels (see
Chap. 4). However, there are still marked differences from one shore to the other:
several demographic regimes still coexist in the Mediterranean. As for migration
dynamics, they cannot be easily summarised for many countries, as they are essen-
tially linked to the economic situation (economic, reception of refugees, etc.) and to
specific migration policies (see Chap. 8). It can sometimes be of relative importance
for the total population dynamics for certain countries. Figure 9.3 presents the two
demographic components of the Mediterranean countries for 3 periods (1950–1954,
1990–1995 and 2015–2019).
9.3.1 Natural Dynamics: South and East
The majority of Mediterranean countries have been in constant natural growth since
the 1950s. The level of this natural growth averaged over 2% per year until the
early 1990s and then halved on average. These countries, stimulated by their natural
growth, belong very much to Northern Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya) and the Near East (Palestine, Turkey, Syria). The majority of these countries
are therefore, logically, those whose demographic transition began later, but much
more rapidly, than the others (Chap. 4). The gains in life expectancy due to declining
mortality in Northern Africa and the Near-East have been concentrated among the
youngest and adults, increasing their probability of survival and thus automatically
lowering deaths at all ages (see Chap. 7). This phenomenon, which increases the
probability of survival for everyone, contributes to a structural increase in births
from generations of fertile age newly preserved from death. It is also combined with
a fertility decline that occurs on a delayed mortality timing, still generating many
births (Chap. 5). The natural growth levels of Northern Africa and Near East countries
136 9 Population Dynamics and Their Components
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
Jordan
Israel
Albania
Lebanon
Kosovo
Morocco
Algeria
Turkey
Egypt
Syria
Malta
Macedonia
Tunisia
Montenegro
BiH
Cyprus
Libya
Greece
Serbia
Palestine
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Croatia
France
Italy
Spain
Portugal
‰
Rate of Natural Change
Net migration rate
1950-1955
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
Jordan
Palestine
Syria
Israel
Egypt
Libya
Algeria
Tunisia
Lebanon
Turkey
Kosovo
Cyprus
Morocco
Malta
Greece
Spain
Montenegro
France
Slovenia
Italy
Portugal
Albania
Serbia
Croatia
Bulgaria
Macedonia
BiH
‰
Rate of Natural Change
Net migration rate
1990-1995
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
Jordan
Malta
Palestine
Egypt
Algeria
Israel
Libya
Turkey
Morocco
Tunisia
Syria
Cyprus
Spain
Slovenia
France
Macedonia
Albania
Montenegro
Portugal
Italy
Serbia
Greece
Croatia
Bulgaria
Kosovo
BiH
Lebanon
‰
Rate of Natural Change
Net migration rate
2015-2020
Fig. 9.3 Participation of natural and migration components on total growth for Mediterranean coun-
tries at different periods (1950–1955, 1990–1995, 2015–2020) (Source World Population Prospects,
2022)
9.3 Natural and Migration Dynamics: Which Combinations Exist … 137
are relatively high and similar, rising over the period from 2.6% per annum to 1.7%
per annum.
Some countries have not broken with natural growth, despite the fact that demo-
graphic ageing started earlier. France, Cyprus, Malta, Montenegro, Macedonia,
Kosovo and Albania have managed to maintain positive natural growth for reasons
related to higher fertility by age of women, combined with age structures that are still
favourable. However, with rates of no more than 0.5% per year for decades (except
for Kosovo), the level of natural growth in these countries is much lower than in the
Near-East or Northern Africa.
In contrast to the previous countries, nine Mediterranean countries have expe-
rienced a weak and downward natural dynamic since the 1950s, with episodes of
natural decline (excess of deaths over births) that have appeared and continued
for some for as long as 30 years (Chap. 4). None of these less dynamic countries
are located on the Southern and Eastern shores, all are on the Northern shore:
Slovenia, Spain, Italy, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Portugal, Greece,
and Croatia. Their average annual rate of population dynamics over the period
contrasts with previous countries, having increased from about 1.2% on average in
the 1950s to −0.3% in 2015–2020. These countries are experiencing a slowdown
in their natural dynamics as their populations age and younger generations reduce
their fertility. Gap age effects have sometimes accentuated the phenomenon. It is
from the years 1990–1995 that negative natural dynamics began to be observed in
Italy, Croatia and Bulgaria, rapidly followed by Slovenia and Serbia (1995–2000),
Portugal (2005–2010), Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina (2010–2015) and Spain
(2015–2020). Thus, while these 9 countries all had moderate but positive natural
growth in the early 1990s, they were all (except Slovenia) in 2020 remarkable for
their negative natural dynamics.
9.3.2 Migration Dynamics: Sending Versus Receiving
Countries
Although the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries are known more as
sending countries (negative migration balances) and those of Southern Europe as
receiving countries (positive migration balances) (Chap. 8), a detailed analysis
makes it possible to show this, to measure the temporalities and to reveal exceptions
(Fig. 9.3).
Among the countries that have been in continuous natural growth for 70 years, a
large part has been, at the same time and over a large part of the period, more senders
of migrants than receivers (negative net migration). This includes Palestine, Egypt,
Algeria, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo and
the Syrian. The intensity of negative net migration has been variable since the 1950s,
contributing more or less to tempering the pace of total growth. All these countries,
which are naturally dynamic but have had largely negative net migration since the
138 9 Population Dynamics and Their Components
1950s, are therefore in North Africa, the Near East and some in the Balkans. No
Southern European country has had a consistently negative net migration for 60 years,
this regional grouping being more characterised by periods of migration alternation
(receivers or senders in balance depending on the period) (Chap. 8).
Only 3 countries out of 17 with positive natural growth in the three periods also had
positive migration growth: Israel, France and Jordan. France is truly an exception,
since it is not only one of the three Mediterranean countries whose two components
(natural and migration) are positive, but it is the only Southern European country to
have this characteristic.
The countries of Southern Europe and the Balkans have experienced a natural
downward trend over the past 60 years. Their migration attractiveness is often erratic,
and partially (or not at all) compensates for periods of decline. A rather critical demo-
graphic dynamic of decline has thus gradually taken hold in Southern Europe and the
Balkans. Two countries, for example, combine their natural dynamics (sustained until
the 1990s and then much weaker, or even negative) with a migration dynamic that
has constantly been negative for 60 years: Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These
countries lost more people than they gained through migration over the whole period,
which did not help to offset their negative natural dynamics. Other situations with
negative net migration combined with depopulation (negative natural balances) have
been noted in recent periods, such as in Serbia, Greece, Croatia, followed closely
by Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Italy where one of the components is negative.
Depending on the economic situation, these countries are sometimes attractive and
sometimes repulsive from a migration point of view. Positive migration balances
over a few periods almost never compensate in level for the low number of births in
view of the rise in deaths recorded as a result of demographic ageing.
9.4 Growth Outlook to 2060: What Can We Expect?
By 2060, the median scenario of the United Nations projections forecasts a Mediter-
ranean population of nearly 685 million. Less than half of the countries are experi-
encing this growth, with the other half projected to lose more of its population each
year than it gains from low fertility and population ageing. For the latter countries
of Southern Europe and the Balkans, which are in decline, even the hypothesis of a
net migration attraction forecast for some (Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain, Slovenia
and Malta) would not be enough to compensate for the negative natural balance that
has lasted for a long time (Fig. 9.4).
As a result, the weight of the Southern and Eastern shores would continue to
increase, since they will represent 72% of the Mediterranean population, compared
to 61% at present (Table 9.2). One in two inhabitants of the Mediterranean by 2060
will be in Egypt, Turkey or Algeria. As for Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, all
four would lose inhabitants, with the last two even falling back below the 10 million
mark. Southern Europe would then represent less than 30% of the Mediterranean
population, compared with 39% in 2020 and the Balkans less than 5%. According
9.4 Growth Outlook to 2060: What Can We Expect? 139
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
Palestine
Israel
Egypt
Syria
Jordan
Algeria
Morocco
Libya
Tunisia
Cyprus
Lebanon
Turkey
France
Malta
Slovenia
Montenegro
Kosovo
Portugal
Macedonia
Greece
Spain
Croatia
BiH
Italy
Serbia
Albania
Bulgaria
‰
Rate of Natural Change
Net migration rate
2060-2065
Fig. 9.4 Projection of participation of natural and migration components on the total growth for
the Mediterranean countries (2060, median variant) (Source World Population Prospects, 2022)
to the median scenario, many countries would have fewer inhabitants in 2060 than
in 2020, the vast majority being on the Northern shore, but Lebanon also falls into
this category.
Chapter 5 on fertility trends, however, has shown how much uncertainty still exists
when it comes to making projections over somewhat distant horizons. Indeed: “Not
only is there no longer a general theory capable of indicating the direction in which
fertility should significantly evolve, but the future of mortality, which as we have
seen weighs heavily on the projections, is the subject of a lively debate, without
mentioning migration” (Vallin & Caselli, 2006). Demographic projections are less
subject to uncertainty than economic projections, due to the nature of the projected
quantities, the inertia of demographic phenomena, and the heavy trend they represent.
However, as noted again recently by Adam (2021) in the article entitled “How far will
global population rise? Researchers can’t agree”, it is common for the methods and
scenarios used by the different research teams to1 lead to quite contrasting results.2
1 We are thinking in particular of the scenarios of the United Nations (World Population Prospects
2022), of those of CEPAM (Joint Research Centre [European Commission], 2018), of Lutz et al.
(2014) and of Vollset et al. (2020).
2 For example: “World population projections for the twenty-first century as produced by the United
Nations Population Division and by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
have changed quite a bit over time as a function of different long-term fertility and mortality
assumptions, and the incorporation of most recent observed empirical trends and analysis. In their
most recent assessments, the UN (2017) projects continuous growth of world population for their
medium variant, reaching more than 11 billion people by the end of the century. Whereas IIASA
(…) with its medium scenario (SSP2), projected a peak population of 9.4 billion in 2065–2075,
followed by a slight decline to 9 billion by the end of the century (…) This difference is mostly due
to different methods of deriving long-term fertility assumptions for the different parts of the world,
where the UN relies primarily on statistical extrapolation models and IIASA gives more weight to
expert arguments and scientific reasoning” (Joint Research Centre [European Commission], 2018,
117).
140 9 Population Dynamics and Their Components
Table 9.2 Population (in thousands) and share of Mediterranean population (in %) in 2020 and
2060, by countries and regional area
Countries Population (in thousands) Share of Mediterranean
population (in %)
2020 2060 2020 2060
Egypt 107,465 174,311 19 25
Turk ey 84,135 96,017 15 14
France 64,480 64,903 11 9
Algeria 43,452 63,554 8 9
Italy 59,501 48,233 11 7
Morocco 36,689 46,214 6 7
Spain 47,364 41,257 8 6
Syria 20,773 41,042 4 6
Jordan 10,929 16,131 2 2
Tunisia 12,162 14,512 2 2
Israel 8,757 14,332 2 2
Palestine 5,019 10,036 1 1
Libya 6,654 8,762 1 1
Portugal 10,298 8,683 2 1
Greece 10,512 8,506 2 1
Serbia 7,358 5,238 1 1
Lebanon 5,663 4,947 1 1
Bulgaria 6,979 4,656 1 1
Croatia 4,097 3,067 1 0
BiH 3,318 2,523 1 0
Albania 2,867 2,218 1 0
Slovenia 2,118 1,920 0 0
Macedonia 2,111 1,784 0 0
Kosovo 1,671 1,575 0 0
Cyprus 1,238 1,404 0 0
Montenegro 629 560 0 0
Malta 515 507 0 0
Northern Africa 206,421 307,354 37 45
Near-East 136,514 183,909 24 27
Balkan countries 39,989 30,471 7 4
Southern Europe 182,158 163,582 32 24
Southern and Eastern Shores 342,935 491,263 61 72
Northern Shore 222,147 194,053 39 28
Mediterranean 565,083 685,317 100 100
(Source World Population Prospects, 2022)
9.4 Growth Outlook to 2060: What Can We Expect? 141
Although assumptions are difficult to make and subject to discussion, we have
nevertheless identified groups of countries whose fertility does not seem, for the
time being at least, to reach low fertility levels (Chap. 5). Consequently, the growth
dynamics of the regional clusters of Northern Africa and Near East could be more
sustained than what all the recent projections predict. Conversely, the projections of
decline for the countries of Southern Europe and the Balkans seem less uncertain, as
they are part of an inevitable context of ageing and a preference for small families.
And if declining countries were to shift their fertility upwards to counter the rate of
growth of the elderly, they would have to reach levels of around 3 children per woman
(Blanchet, 2001). However, this does not seem to be consistent with the number of
desired children reported by families in international comparative surveys.3
With regard to migration, Chap. 8 showed the importance of the movements to
be anticipated towards ageing Southern Europe. However, regardless of the size of
net immigration to these countries over the next 40 years (the evolution of which
is the most unpredictable of all the components), this solution would not, a priori
make it possible to halt the expected phenomena of decline, because the ageing of the
population leads to the observation of too rapid an increase in the number of deaths.
As early as the 2000s, a United Nations report (Population Division et al., 2000)
modelled an adjustment of imbalances by migration flows. The main conclusions
were that controlling ageing through migration would require migration balances
twice as high as those experienced by the most attractive countries in the world
such as the United States; and some simulations of migration balances needed to
maintain dependency ratios in ageing developed countries are even described as
“totally unrealistic”4 (Blanchet, 2001, 523), because certainly not acceptable to the
populations of these same countries, nor realistic.
In conclusion, in the Mediterranean, the average annual growth rates have
continued to decline in all countries since the 1950s with the spread of the demo-
graphic transition towards the countries on the Southern and Eastern shores. While
growth differentials have narrowed, on average much faster rates are still recorded
in the Near East and Northern Africa compared to Southern Europe and especially
in the Balkan countries. The population dynamics of the vast majority of countries
are mainly due to the natural component (excess of births over deaths). If migration
dynamics temper the demographic dynamics of sending countries,5 it is expected to
sustain, but with difficulty, that of the receiving countries with the lowest fertility
3 We are thinking in particular of the responses given to surveys such as: The European Values Study
(EVS), International Social Survey Program (ISSP), World Values Survey (WVS), Generations and
Gender Survey (GGS), Afrobarometer and Anna Lindh Foundation.
4 This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows:
“totalement irréalistes”.
5 “Anyway, according to CEPAM Medium (SSP2) scenario, migration would not be able to affect
significantly the MENA population size and structure: (…) It implies that population changes would
be mainly driven by fertility and mortality behaviours under this scenario” (Joint Research Centre
[European Commission], 2018, 69).
142 9 Population Dynamics and Their Components
and the highest life expectancies, since most of them are expected to lose inhabitants
by 2060.6
References
Adam, D. (2021). How far will global population rise? Researchers can’t agree. Nature, 597, 462–
465. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-02522-6
Blanchet, D. (2001). L’impact des changements démographiques sur la croissance et le marché du
travail: Faits, théories et incertitudes. Revue D’économie Politique, 111, 511–564. https://doi.
org/10.3917/redp.114.0511
Blöss-Widmer, I. (2022). Make way for numbers: The age race in the Mediter-
ranean. IEMed Mediterranean yearbook 2022. European Institute of the Mediter-
ranean (IEMed). https://www.iemed.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Make-Way-Numbers-
Age-Race-Mediterranean-Bloss-Widmer-IEMedYearbook2022.pdf
Joint Research Centre (European Commission). (2018). Demographic and human capital scenarios
for the 21st century: 2018 assessment for 201 countries. Publications Office. https://data.europa.
eu/doi/10.2760/41776
Lutz, W., Butz, W. P., & Samir, K. C. (2014). World population and human capital in the twenty-first
century. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198703167.001.0001
Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and United Nations Secre-
tariat. (2000). Replacement migration: Is it a solution to declining and ageing popula-
tions? https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/
unpd-egm_200010_un_2001_replacementmigration.pdf
Vallin, J., & Caselli, G. (2006). The United Nations’ world population projections. In G. Caselli,
J. Vallin, & G. J. Wunsch (Eds.), Demography: Analysis and synthesis (Vol. III, pp. 197–234).
Elsevier.
Vollset, S. E., Goren, E., Yuan, C.-W., Cao, J., Smith, A. E., Hsiao, T., Bisignano, C. et al. (2020).
Fertility, mortality, migration, and population scenarios for 195 countries and territories from
2017 to 2100: A forecasting analysis for the global burden of disease study. The Lancet 396.
Elsevier: 1285–1306. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30677-2
World population prospects. (2022). United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
Population Division. https://population.un.org/wpp/
6 “If the current demographic trends continue as in the presented scenarios the main driver of change
in population size of EU-28 countries would be migration” (Joint Research Centre [European
Commission], 2018, 33).
References 143
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Chapter 10
Conclusions. An Overview of Population
Dynamics in the Mediterranean
Abstract This book has made it possible to review the main demographic devel-
opments of the last 70 years. Above all, it has made it possible to highlight the
rapid global homogenisation of several demographic behaviours in the Mediter-
ranean, to point out certain exceptions and to identify the global challenges that
await Mediterranean populations.
Keywords Mediterranean ·Population studies ·International comparison ·
Demographic convergence
10.1 Major Demographic Developments Since 1950
This book has made it possible to review the main demographic developments of
the last 70 years. Above all, it has made it possible to highlight the rapid global
homogenisation of several demographic behaviours in the Mediterranean, to point
out certain exceptions and to identify the global challenges that await Mediterranean
populations.
From a geographical point of view, the Mediterranean appears to have extremely
heterogeneous populations, since it includes some of the most densely populated
regions in the world as well as desert regions. Nevertheless, most of the Mediterranean
countries are experiencing a strong coastalisation of its population. In addition, there
are several coastal cities. The role of water, the sea and also the rivers in shaping
human settlement in the Mediterranean is a characteristic that is present in the entire
area studied (the Nile being the most archetypal example). The Mediterranean is
undergoing rapid urbanisation, from a predominantly rural population in 1950 to an
urban population of 70% by 2020. The urban agglomerations on the Southern and
Eastern shores account for most of the Mediterranean’s urban population growth
between 2000 and 2020. This phenomenon has led to a higher concentration of the
population in the area, especially on the coastlines. This human pressure on the
natural environment is not without consequences in terms of maritime pollution, the
© The Author(s) 2023
Y. Doignon et al., Population Dynamics in the Mediterranean,
SpringerBriefs in Population Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37759-4_10
145
146 10 Conclusions. An Overview of Population Dynamics in the Mediterranean
degradation of the environment and biodiversity, fires, pressures on water resources,
etc.
From a demographic point of view, however, the rate of growth has been steadily
decreasing for all Mediterranean countries since the late 1970s. However, due to
the inertia of the demographic phenomena, the populations of the Mediterranean
countries have more than doubled, reaching around 570 million inhabitants in 2020.
This increase in Mediterranean populations is mainly driven by the Southern and
Eastern shores. Indeed, while the Mediterranean as a whole has gained 110 million
inhabitants between 2000 and 2020, the countries on the Northern Shore have only
contributed 11 million. This trend explains why today 2 out of 3 Mediterranean
people live in a country on the Southern and Eastern shores (compared to 1 out of
3 in 1950), and also why Egypt and Turkey are the most populated Mediterranean
countries in 2020, and no longer Italy and France as in 1950.
The slowdown in the rate of population growth in the Mediterranean, which is
currently lower than in the past, can be explained by the demographic transition
generalising to the whole region. All Mediterranean countries have seen their birth
and death rates fall, thus limiting population growth. Nevertheless, we have managed
to identify that there are significant disparities behind these overall trends. There is
no single demographic transition model in the Mediterranean. On the contrary, there
are several types, differing in their pace, course, and post-transitional demographic
regime. The transition has been much faster in some countries than in others. Some
post-transitional regimes are characterised by declining growth (Bulgaria, Croatia,
Italy, etc.), others by low or moderate growth (France, Cyprus, Tunisia, Kosovo,
Turkey, etc.), and a few are still experiencing relatively high growth (Egypt, Palestine,
Jordan, Algeria, Israel). Thus, the slowdown in the rate of growth is leading some
countries to lose population, while others continue to gain population.
If the Mediterranean is increasing its number of inhabitants, it is above all, expe-
riencing a rapid transformation in the composition of its population. In fact, the most
striking development noted is that of demographic ageing, with an increase in the
number of elderly people in the population and a decrease in that of the young.
Currently, the elderly (65 years of age or older) represent 12% of the Mediterranean
population, and the young (under 15 years of age) about 24%. In general, the popula-
tions of the countries on the Northern shore are older than those on the Southern and
Eastern shores: in 2020, people aged 65 or over represented 21% on average for the
former, and 6% for the latter. However, the gap between countries is slightly smaller
today than it was in 1950. This phenomenon will continue at an even faster pace
in the coming decades, with demographic ageing definitively establishing itself as a
concern shared by all Mediterranean countries. Indeed, the UN projections (median
scenario) will expect that people aged 65 or over represent about 22% of the entire
Mediterranean population in 2060, with about 34% for the Northern shore and 17%
for the Southern and Eastern shore.
With the demographic transition process, fertility levels have been reduced in all
Mediterranean countries. Despite this convergence towards lower levels than those
of the pre-transitional regimes, fertility differences still persist in the Mediterranean.
Our analyses reveal first of all that some countries have reached a fertility level well
10.1 Major Demographic Developments Since 1950 147
below the population replacement level (2.1 children per woman). With the exception
of Cyprus, all of these very low fertility countries are not on the Southern and Eastern
shores. Other groups of countries have a fertility level around the replacement level,
such as France, Tunisia, Turkey or Lebanon; and finally, other fertility situations are
noted as remaining fixed well above this threshold (more than 3 children per woman),
such as Jordan, Egypt, Israel and Palestine. In light of the predicted convergence of
the demographic transition, our analyses suggest that Mediterranean countries could
stabilise at different fertility levels, potentially generating different demographic
regimes in the future. For example, two groups can be distinguished in terms of
fertility timing: countries where the childbearing age is lower and those for which
it is higher. However, this is not a shore-based divide, as there are countries from
all shores in both groups. The determinants of these birth timing seem to be very
heterogeneous from one country to another, thus fuelling the possibility that fertility
in the Mediterranean will not fully converge in the end.
However, family formation and dissolution behaviours have converged in some
ways over the last 70 years. In the Mediterranean, there has not only been a decrease
in the frequency of marriages and a reduction in the disparities in divortiality, but also
an increase in the age at marriage and in permanent celibacy. These contemporary
family changes have been interpreted as a profound challenge to the institution of
marriage in Western Europe, and as a marriage revolution in Arab-Muslim countries.
However, lifelong commitment is still expressed in various forms in Europe and
marriage continues to endure and structure family models on the Southern and Eastern
shores. Permanent celibacy and postponement of the age of marriage may then be less
about questioning the institution of marriage itself than of worsening socio-economic
conditions, such as high youth unemployment, greater precariousness and uncertainty
about the future, or the cost of housing or marriage being too high. Similarly, not
being married does not imply the same social reality. In Arab-Muslim societies, this
means waiting longer for social independence and economic autonomy, or being
unable to start a family. Thus, similar trends in demographic indicators may conceal
very different social situations.
The Mediterranean has also seen a broad convergence of mortality, with a historic
increase in life expectancy at birth for all countries. The disparities of the 1950s
have narrowed considerably, with countries with the lowest life expectancy at birth
catching up rapidly. However, convergence has not been observed for about 30 years.
The control of infectious diseases, and later of cardiovascular diseases, has led to a
reduction in infant and adult mortality. On the other hand, the unequal capacity of
Mediterranean countries to fight against societal diseases, neurodegenerative diseases
and cancers, has led to a divergence in life expectancy at age 65. Massive ageing will
therefore inevitably lead to a significant increase in the number of deaths in these
countries, as survival probabilities at older ages are unlikely to increase rapidly.
Finally, with regard to international migration, the book showed that the Mediter-
ranean constitutes a real migration system, and above all one of the largest migration
areas in the world. Migration from the Southern and Eastern shore countries to Euro-
pean countries was intense in the 1960s. However, the various economic crises from
the 1970s onwards led to increasingly restrictive entry policies in Europe. Southern
148 10 Conclusions. An Overview of Population Dynamics in the Mediterranean
European countries have been gradually becoming host countries. Since the 2000s,
there has been a recomposition of the poles of attraction in the Mediterranean, with
the emergence of Turkey for example. Finally, the number of refugees and asylum
seekers has increased considerably since the “Arab Spring” and the various ensuing
conflicts, to the point of talk of a “refugee crisis”. The issue of international migra-
tion is, along with that of the urbanisation/littoralisation of the common sea and the
ageing of populations, a challenge shared by the entire Mediterranean area.
10.2 An Assessment of the Book’s Overall Approach
The introduction to this publication set out a number of approaches, including the
implementation of a comparative approach. Now that the project is drawing to a
close, what heuristic lessons can we draw from it? First of all, regarding out choice
to study Mediterranean populations over a long demographic period (i.e., over the
last 70 years), we can commend ourselves, which has proven particularly fruitful. It
is indeed by putting recent trends into perspective within long-term developments
that has allowed us, for example, to identify the broad movements of convergence
that have taken place in various fields. Situating the present in a historical perspective
allows for an account of underlying trends rather than short-term fluctuations. Thanks
to this approach, it is also possible to affirm that the disparities have been reduced over
time, and that the Mediterranean populations are closer and more similar today than in
the past. The Mediterranean is therefore well and truly in the process of demographic
homogenisation on the whole, despite persistent heterogeneities in certain areas.
This choice of studying it over the long term has also made it possible to show that
the demographic history of the Mediterranean countries is not always monotonous,
but on the contrary is sometimes punctuated by changes in pace, breaks in trends or
even reversals. This historical perspective sometimes makes it possible to put certain
recent economic developments into perspective and to interpret them more accurately
and also makes it possible to avoid considering demographic developments as being
one-way or predetermined. Indeed, recent reversals in trends have again reminded us
of this, such as the decline in life expectancy at birth with the COVID-19 pandemic.
Some of these may be surprising at first glance, but are less so when hewed from
an historical perspective. Increases in fertility in Egypt and Algeria, for example,
may appear as notable exceptions to the theory of demographic transition. However,
fertility increases have already taken place in the past in the Mediterranean, with
baby booms observed in many European countries in the 1950s and 1960s, and in
Egypt in the 1980s, putting the current increases or surges in fertility into perspective.
The question is to what extent these trend reversals reflect backtracking, a temporary
change or even a new behavioural trend.
Our second approach was to implement an overall international comparison, with
countries as the level of analysis, rejecting any predefined geographical framework.
The analyses in this publication have therefore not sought to reiterate the classic
10.2 An Assessment of the Book’s Overall Approach 149
contrasts,1 such as the Northern shore vs. the Southern and Eastern shores, or the
Balkans, Southern Europe, North Africa vs. the Near East. On the contrary, we
opted for a bottom-up approach, allowing groups from all Mediterranean countries
to emerge, regardless of their geographical location.
This choice showed the extent to which the Mediterranean is a complex region
that cannot be reduced to a simple demographic opposition between two blocks
(Northern Shore/Southern and Eastern shore). Beyond the traditional contrasts, this
method made it possible to highlight the internal diversity of each of the blocks
in many areas. Surprisingly, some countries are closer to countries on other shores
than to their neighbours. For example, Tunisia has a demographic regime closer to
France than Algeria or Morocco. Similarly, the demographic regime of France is
more similar to that of Tunisia than to those of Italy or Spain. This is also the case for
certain Balkan countries (Serbia, Montenegro, etc.) whose life expectancy at birth is
similar to that of countries on the Southern and Eastern shores (Turkey, Lebanon).
This option, which consists of taking all the countries without first grouping them
together, has made it possible to show once again that the overall contrast between
the shores of the Mediterranean is still coherent for a certain number of demographic
phenomena. However, even when contrasts between shores are noted, the situations
are less often caricatured and there are exceptions for each shore. Indeed, in several
chapters, our analyses highlight countries or particular groups of countries that would
not have been identified by any other method. This concerns, for example, the partic-
ular position of specific Balkan countries (Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, etc.), which
are quite systematically closer to the countries of the Southern and Eastern shores than
to the other Balkan countries in terms of several demographic phenomena. This char-
acteristic had already been highlighted for Albania by Attané and Courbage (2004).
The same applies to Israel, Cyprus, and sometimes Lebanon, for the Southern and
Eastern shores, which stand out as atypical in the region.
In addition, certain demographic phenomena reveal contrasts between countries
from different shores. This is the case, for example, for adult mortality, age at child-
bearing or age at marriage. It is by refusing to perpetuate existing regional categories
that it has been possible to obtain a renewed understanding of the Mediterranean, we
have identified trans-Mediterranean formations (grouping together countries from
different shores), and regionalisations beyond the Northern shore and the Southern
and Eastern shores divide.
This publication is therefore not a juxtaposition of regional monographs, or a bibli-
ographic synthesis of national studies. It is an integrated, bottom-up demographic and
geographical approach based on data. This approach has been fruitful in proposing
an original synthesis of the major demographic phenomena over the last 70 years,
and thereby offering up-to-date insights of demography in the Mediterranean.
The aim of this publication was to provide an overview of the demographic trends
over the last 70 years for all populations of the Mediterranean. To this end, we chose
to analyse the classic demographic phenomena. On the other hand, some aspects have
1 Throughout the publication, only the graphical representations have used broad regional groupings,
for reasons related to practicality and consistency.
150 10 Conclusions. An Overview of Population Dynamics in the Mediterranean
not been developed or have only been partially developed. These are all avenues to
be developed further with an approach similar to that of this publication. We mention
three of them here, but there are obviously many others.
Firstly, we did not focus enough on educational progress and the status of women.
Both have considerable influence on demographic behaviour, in particular on the
decline in fertility and the nuptiality rate. The Mediterranean area is varied from
the point of view of women’s place in society, whether one compares the countries
or the different social and geographical sub-areas specific of each country studied.
The status occupied by women varies between and within societies, just as the place
of residence (urban or rural) or the community to which they belong influences a
couple’s plans to have children.
Secondly, it is imperative to obtain an improved understanding of representations
and values in the Mediterranean countries, particularly those associated with the
couple, the family, motherhood and children. We are thinking of, for example, the
ideal number of children,2 the importance of family life, the acceptability of giving
birth to a child out-of-wedlock, the importance of work for a woman, the values
transmitted from parents to children, etc. It is rather difficult, despite opinions being
collected via relevant international comparative surveys, to construct a complete
picture of the Mediterranean situation. However, there are some elements that can
provide food for thought. A number of opinion questions are asked to male and
female respondents from different countries. As such, it is possible to pinpoint and
measure the transformation of norms and the conception of marriage and the family
in the Mediterranean and to imagine their future.
Finally, this publication mainly uses countries as the level of analysis, as it was
already rich enough to offer a synthesis of demographic phenomena in the Mediter-
ranean. However, we are aware that the lessons learned at the national level mask
regional inequalities. The analyses carried out at the sub-national level in this publi-
cation, for population density or age structure for example, have shown the extent
to which very contrasting situations can co-exist within the same country, and that
homogeneous geographical groupings can include regions of several countries. There
is now a desire to encourage international comparative studies at a sub-national
level, as has been done for demographic ageing in the Mediterranean (Doignon,
2016, 2020). However, this approach remains painstaking for several reasons. This
is because international databases only cover countries. It would therefore be neces-
sary to obtain data from national statistical offices, international institutions (e.g.
Eurostat) or major international surveys. This raises the question of data access, as
well as data availability and comparability. All these aspects are unequal from one
Mediterranean country to another and vary according to the topic. While it would
therefore be time-consuming to study all the Mediterranean countries at the sub-
national level, it seems to us that the analytical potential of such an approach is very
high. We would thus be highly supportive of any initiative aiming to undertake a
systematic sub-national demographic comparison.
2 See Ambrosetti et al. (2021) for the case of Egypt.
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International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
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