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A preliminary engagement withthespatiality ofpower
incyberwar
CameranAshraf
Accepted: 4 August 2023 / Published online: 22 August 2023
© The Author(s) 2023
Abstract The growing prevalence of cyberwar
highlights rapidly shifting conceptions of geopo-
litical space in global politics. However, critical geo-
graphical engagement with the topic remains limited,
leaving the geopolitical spaces of cyberwar criti-
cally unexamined. To facilitate greater geographical
engagement with cyberwar, this paper proposes a
spatiality of power model to examine how political
space and power might manifest in cyberwar. The
model proposes four ways in which political space
and power manifest offline and how the model can be
applied towards cyberwar. The utility of the model
is then applied as a framework for examining three
well-known cyberwar case studies: the Estonia–Rus-
sia 2007 cyberwar, the Georgia–Russia cyber and
kinetic war in 2008, and the U.S.-Iran cyberwar from
2010 to 2013 with a focus on the Stuxnet malware.
Keywords Internet· Cyberspace· Geopolitics·
Cyberwar· Stuxnet
Introduction
Geographical research has engaged with the Inter-
net through studies on economics (Zook, 2000,
2008), the geoweb (Crampton et al., 2013), neoge-
ography (Haklay et al., 2008), crowdsourced infor-
mation (Zook et al., 2010), digital labor (Graham
etal., 2017), the digital divide (Warf, 2013), Internet
infrastructure (Malecki, 2002), virtuality (Kinsley,
2013), and more. However, research related to space
and power in cyberwar is lacking (Barnard-Wills &
Ashenden, 2012; Crampton, 2018; Kaiser, 2015;
Warf & Fekete, 2016; Warf, 2015a). Despite a cyber-
war budget of over $17 billion (Ratnam, 2019) in the
United States, and factoring heavily in the strategic
outlooks of the European Union (Ilves etal., 2016),
China (Zhang, 2012), India (Baig, 2019), Russia
(Connell & Vogler, 2017), and elsewhere, cyberwar
remains on geography’s periphery. Given cyberwar’s
importance, limited critical geographical perspectives
on the issue deprives academic scholarship important
spatial insights.
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to offer a pre-
liminary geopolitical engagement between states,
space, and power in cyberwar. It does so by taking a
spatiality of power model developed by Durand etal.
(1993), Lévy (2007), and expanded by Agnew (1999,
2003) and utilizing it as a conceptual lens through
which to view cyberwar geographically through three
famous cyberwar case studies.
C.Ashraf(*)
Department ofPublic Policy, Central European University,
Quellenstraße 51, 1100Vienna, Austria
e-mail: AshrafC@ceu.edu
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Framing space andpower ontheinternet
Early Internet scholarship focused on its emancipa-
tory potential to create a separate distinct cyberspace
(Graham, 2013). This vision was famously articulated
by John Perry Barlow in his ‘Declaration of the Inde-
pendence of Cyberspace’ which stated that cyber-
space was independent and ‘the new home of Mind’
(Barlow, 1996). Nation-states, Barlow’s ‘weary giants
of flesh and steel’ were antiquated and the Internet
would give people a new and democratic voice (Dia-
mond, 2010).
This early cyber-utopianism would not last. As a
result of the 1998 Moonlight Maze cyberattack where
Russia exfiltrated classified data, the United States
moved towards securitizing cyberspace (Haizler,
2017). This attack resulted in Presidential Decision
Directive 63, which defined critical infrastructure to
be protected in cyberspace and created the Joint Task
Force Computer Network Defense to defend cyber-
space (Haizler, 2017). Soon, other countries incorpo-
rated cyberwar into their armed services and passed
laws to defend their domestic Internet (Flournoy &
Sulmeyer, 2018). These efforts have continued, with
the current U.S. cybersecurity budget exceeding $17
billion (Ratnam, 2019). But defending the ‘cyber
homeland’ is not new: in the 1980s, the former Soviet
Union pioneered the creation of ‘national cyber-
space’, including cyberwar operations in official mili-
tary doctrine (FitzGerald, 1997).
Efforts to territorialize cyberspace extend beyond
cyberwar to the development of ‘Internet borders’
with online censorship and Internet shutdowns. This
idea of Internet ‘balkanization’ along national borders
first appeared in scholarship in the year 2000 (Kesan
& Hayes, 2011). The trend continues with 2020 mark-
ing the ninth year of increases in global Internet cen-
sorship (Shahbaz & Funk, 2020). Currently, 2.1 bil-
lion people live under a censored Internet—more than
at any period in the Internet’s history (Shahbaz &
Funk, 2020). Additionally, 2019 saw the highest num-
ber of national Internet shutdowns: 213 shutdowns in
33 different countries, up from 196 shutdowns in 25
countries in 2018 (Taye, 2020). These states argue
that they have full sovereignty over their cyberspace
(Mueller, 2019).
Beyond states, corporations and private users exer-
cise powers to create and re-create spaces online.
For Lambach (2019), corporations create private
territories through sign-up requirements and the lack
of interoperability between their platforms while
users create ‘virtual territories’ through private
encrypted chats and curated content. Other geogra-
phers have explored related avenues of digital crea-
tions of digiplace, geographies of information and
information geographies, neogeographies, and private
and public spatialities (Adams, 1998; Graham, 2015;
Kitchin & Dodge, 2011; Zook & Graham, 2007;
Zook etal., 2004).
The idea of Westphalian sovereignty in cyberspace
has been contested, most notably by Milton Mueller
who argues that states do not seek territory but ‘align-
ment’ of their Internet with national interests (Muel-
ler, 2017). In security studies, however, scholars have
reinforced the idea of territory in cyberspace, lead-
ing to contested engagement with the relationship
between states, space, and power online (Hughes &
Colarik, 2017; Libicki, 2007). Indeed, a multiplicity
of perspectives exist on the future of space and power
on the Internet –framing it as a choice between lib-
eration and control (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010),
increasing democracy (Diamond, 2010), or surveil-
lance and capitalism (Dobson & Fisher, 2007).
Geographers have also wrestled with the Internet,
space, and power. Adams argued that ‘the integra-
tion of society through computers facilitates control
and territoriality’ (Adams, 1997, 168) while Gregory
(2011) articulated key spatialities in cyberwar, ques-
tioning where borders begin and end in cyberspace.
Warf has examined cyberspace from multiple per-
spectives, including Arab and North Korean internets,
Internet censorship, cyberterrorism, and arguing for
cyberwar to be a focus of geographical work (Fekete
& Warf, 2013; Warf & Fekete, 2016; Warf, 2007,
2011, 2015a, 2015b). Geographers have also seen
cyberspace as disguising a multiplicity of interactions
in a spatial metaphor (Graham, 1998), as a distinct
geographical domain (Holloway, 2018), multiscalar
(Kellerman, 2016), inscribed with power (Sassen,
1997), as an interdependency between the physical
and digital (Zook & Graham, 2007). Others, such as
Kitchin and Dodge (Kitchin & Dodge, 2005, 2011),
have emphasized space and code, moving from cyber-
space as disembodied metaphor and towards a space
of continual becoming.
Although territory and territoriality have a long
history of contestation (Elden, 2010, 2013b; Gott-
mann, 1973; Sack, 1986), the tendency in cyberwar
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studies has been to eschew definitional complexity
and compartmentalize cyberwar within the Westphal-
ian system (Gartzke, 2013; Hughes & Colarik, 2017;
Nye Jr, 2011; Robinson etal., 2015). Non-state actors
are framed as ensconced within state cyber-territory
regardless of their allegiance (Clarke & Knake, 2012;
Healey, 2011; Sanger, 2019). The few engagements
in geography have also framed cyberwar within the
Westphalian model and ‘territorial trap’ of fixed sov-
ereign space, domestic/foreign polarity, and the state
as societal container (Elden, 2013a; Gregory, 2011;
Kaiser, 2015).
Understanding thespatiality ofpower
The relationship between state, space, and cyberwar
remains largely unexamined in geographical litera-
ture. Indeed, the engagement has situated spatialities
of power in cyberwar as operating in opposition to,
or contrasted with, the territorial state. This has main-
tained the territorial state as the sole unit of spatial
analysis on the Internet around which other forms of
space and power revolve.
In his influential Terror and Territory, Elden
(2009) argues that the U.S. War on Terror and terror-
ism call into question the relationship between states,
sovereignty, and territory. Elden argues that the terri-
torial trap of the ‘sovereignty-territory bind’ requires
a re-thinking of the two concepts. He cites contin-
gent sovereignty in the War on Terror or humanitar-
ian intervention that belies the idea that states have
a territorial monopoly on violence. Cyberwar, with
its fuzzy battlefronts, uncertain distinction between
combatant and non-combatant, ease of embedding
resources in a country to attack that country, rapid
dissemination of disinformation, attributional ambi-
guity challenge this territorial trap.
The most recent U.S. Department of Defense
Cyber Strategy (United States Department of
Defense, 2023) articulates this contingent sover-
eignty by stating that the United States will actively
‘defend forward’ by pre-emptively infiltrating the
computer networks of foreign countries (Sanger,
2019). In the same report, the United States
declares cyberspace a ‘warfighting domain’ with
cyber-assets considered part of the homeland’s crit-
ical national infrastructure. Sovereignty is stressed
as inviolable for the U.S. and held as contingent
for its opponents. This collapses what Elden calls
‘the sovereign fiction that states have a monopoly
of legitimate violence within their territory’ (Elden,
2009, 177). This fiction rests on three geographical
assumptions, known as the territorial trap: (1) that
all states have exclusive power over their territory;
(2) that the domestic and foreign are separate spaces
governed by different rules; (3) that the boundary of
the state is the boundary of society (Agnew, 2015,
43). However, the territorial trap as a state-centered
conceptual framework cannot adequately frame the
complexities of cyberwar. What is needed are theo-
retical interventions to go beyond it.
To accomplish this, the paper uses a spatiality of
power model originally developed by Durand et al.
(1993) and Lévy (2007) as a geographical lens to
examine cyberwar. This model is a way to think about
the globalizing world in four different spatialities,
extended by Agnew (1999, 2003) as seeing ‘beyond
geopolitics’.
The model corresponds loosely with the spatial-
ity of power in historical epochs of human political,
social, and technological development. As originally
presented, it emphasized how actors, space, and
power relate when power is not tied to a territorial
state. These four spatialities are: ensemble of worlds,
field of forces, hierarchical network, and world
society.
Ensemble of worlds
This model echoes early pre-Columbian world cul-
tural regions. Here, cultures and societies are isolated
except for sporadic trade interactions. In Fig. 1 this
is represented by black dots of varying sizes sepa-
rated by white space. Power is directed towards the
maintenance and sustenance of the culture within its
Fig. 1 Ensemble of worlds (Agnew, 1999, 505)
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‘natural’ boundaries. Space is perceived as an obsta-
cle to overcome or manage, and regions have a sense
of significant difference beyond their boundaries with
little idea of other regions.
Field of forces
This model maps existing states with rigidly
defined territories in a geographical zero-sum game
in which territorial gains come at the expense of
others. The dominant approach to space is through
states which contains the society’s political, eco-
nomic, and social actions with clearly articulated
rights and responsibilities within demarcated
boundaries. These boundaries are created, modi-
fied, and reified through technological interventions
(Elden, 2007; Rose-Redwood, 2012). In Fig.2 poli-
ties have expanded through geographical space and
have encountered other polities, with this expansion
represented by arrows.
Hierarchical network
The hierarchical network moves from rigid state
spaces towards cores, peripheries, and semi-periph-
eries connected by flows. These nodes exist in a
global network where the dominant connections are
trade, information, labor, and finance. Figure3 rep-
resents this through arrows representing flows and
larger dots representing cores, smaller dots repre-
senting semi-peripheries, and the smallest dots being
peripheries. This is a pattern consistent with contem-
porary globalization where power is based on relative
location to global centers. This model’s spatiality is
networked, focused on nodes, areas, and a global flow
hierarchy of people, information, capital, and trade
goods (Agnew, 1999).
World society
The world society model is focused on globally-
integrated and structured communities, identity,
and economics. Problems, such as climate change
or inequality, become increasingly framed and dis-
cussed globally and transcend rigid state borders.
Communications are unhierarchical amongst net-
works whose spread and growth is ‘rhizomatic’.
The centers of power revolve around social groups
rather than bounded entities or location. Space and
time are reciprocal, and time-based activities can
be framed in terms of space, and vice-versa. Real
and virtual spaces also operate reciprocally and are
in many ways indistinguishable. Figure4 represents
this through polities of different sizes connected
via lines representing multidirectional connections
between the entities.
Fig. 2 Field of forces (Agnew, 1999, 505)
Fig. 3 Hierarchical network (Agnew, 1999, 505)
Fig. 4 World society (Agnew, 1999, 505)
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The spatiality ofpower inaction: case studies
To illustrate how the spatiality of power model can be
used as an analytical tool for cyberwar, this paper will
examine three well-known case studies.
The first case, the 2007 cyberwar between Rus-
sia and Estonia, was the first international event to
be broadly described as cyberwar. It precipitated a
state of national emergency in Estonia with calls for
a potential armed response by NATO. The second
example, the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008,
was the first-time cyberwar was used in a direct coor-
dination with kinetic ground conflict. The third case,
a series of cyberconflict incidents between Iran and
the United States, features the world’s first and most
sophisticated cyberweapon.
Russia and Estonia cyberwar: 2007
The Russia/Estonia cyberwar began in 2007 after
a parliamentary proposal to relocate a statue (com-
monly known as the “Bronze Statue) commemorat-
ing Soviet soldiers who died liberating Estonia from
Nazi Germany to a military cemetery. Ethnic Rus-
sians, comprising nearly a quarter of the population
(Greene, 2010), viewed the monument as a symbol
through which their minority rights were respected
while many ethnic Estonians saw it as a symbol of
totalitarianism (Ehala, 2009).
Tensions reached a critical point in April 2007
during a series of violent protests and riots called the
‘Bronze Night’ (Kaiser, 2015). Over a thousand eth-
nic Russians rioted for more than two days, burning
cars and buildings, resulting in one death, hundreds
of arrests, and over 100 injuries (BBC, 2007). At the
same time, protesters in Moscow besieged the Esto-
nian embassy, attacking anyone who attempted to
leave or enter the building, including the Estonian
ambassador. The siege prompted diplomatic interven-
tion by the European Union (Finn, 2007).
On the first night of the protests, April 27, Rus-
sian discussion forums, chat rooms, blogs, and social
media were filled with calls to action against Estonian
Internet targets (Schmidt, 2013). These websites pro-
vided easy-to-use tools and a list of targets for Rus-
sians to attack. The posts and tools became popular,
allowing non-technical citizens to participate. The
initial list of targets included the Estonian parlia-
ment, presidency, and various government ministries
(Traynor, 2007). This began a Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attack, flooding websites with traf-
fic, rendering them inaccessible. The success of the
attacks encouraged more users to participate, sending
over 4 million data packets per second to the country
in contrast to Estonia’s usual traffic of 20,000 packets
per second (Davis, 2007).
More advanced hackers defaced government web-
sites and replaced images of elected officials with
images of famous Nazis (Herzog, 2011). The sophis-
tication of the attacks grew with the use of networks
of hijacked computers (‘botnets’) to augment the
cyberattacks. At the peak, Estonia was attacked by
over 1 million computers—nearly matching the coun-
try’s population (Thilek, 2009). There were over 125
separate DDoS attacks, and mass-emailing systems
were used to overwhelm and shut down government
email servers (Thilek, 2009). These attacks were
severe enough to cause physical damage to routers
and email servers (Thilek, 2009).
The initial target list of political websites expanded
to include businesses, banks, Internet service provid-
ers, and email addresses of all members of the Esto-
nian parliament and government agencies (Lesk,
2007). The attacks rendered inaccessible the websites
of the Estonian presidency, parliament, most govern-
ment ministries, many political parties, the three larg-
est news agencies in the country, most of the coun-
try’s banks, the national Internet service provider,
and most private Internet service providers (Thilek,
2009).
Citizens were unable to withdraw money from cash
machines, government systems were unable to be
updated, and email communications between citizens,
government, and business was shut down (Thilek,
2009). Despite the scale of the attacks, Estonia took
steps to defend itself but was quickly overwhelmed.
As a result, Estonian Internet service providers were
forced to disconnect users from the Internet, and at
the national level Estonia resorted to blocking all traf-
fic originating from outside its borders, isolating itself
from the rest of the world. Automated financial trans-
actions, regulatory filings, and criminal justice pro-
ceedings, were also disrupted (Schmidt, 2013).
Through digital forensics, researchers determined
that the initial attacks started on Russian language
forums (Schmidt, 2013). The second wave, utiliz-
ing global botnets was more difficult to locate. Given
the parallels between targets and attacks, security
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researchers assumed that the source behind the bot-
nets was Russia. This was supported by discoveries
implicating IP addresses used by Russian criminal
organizations in previous attacks, admissions of guilt
by the state-sponsored Russian Nashi youth move-
ment, and the refusal of Russian authorities to coop-
erate with Estonian and EU investigations (Clarke &
Knake, 2012; Schmidt, 2013).
The severity of the attacks prompted the Esto-
nian Minister of Defense, Jaak Aaviksoo, to consider
invoking NATO’s Article 5 requirement that the alli-
ance aid members under attack (Davis, 2007). He
stated that:
All major commercial banks, telcos, media
outlets, and name servers—the phone books of
the Internet—felt the impact, and this affected
the majority of the Estonian population. This
was the first time that a botnet threatened the
national security of an entire nation. (Davis,
2007).
NATO declined to intervene, citing lack of prec-
edent and believing that the attack was insufficiently
dangerous (Kaiser, 2015; Wolff, 2014). Eventually,
the attacks slowed, allowing Estonia to regain control
over its cyberspace. As a result of these attacks being
‘the birth of cyberwar’, NATO established its Coop-
erative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD-
CoE) in the Estonian capital Tallinn in 2008 (Kaiser,
2015).
Russian invasion of Georgia: 2008
Russian and Georgian claims over the regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia had caused conflict
between the two states since the fall of the Soviet
Union (Hollis, 2011). Under the Soviet Union, the
region of South Ossetia was autonomous, and Rus-
sia had encouraged South Ossetian separatism since
1990 (Cohen & Hamilton, 2011). At the same time,
Abkhazian separatists received military support from
Russia while Georgia fought two wars to regain con-
trol of these breakaway regions in the years following
Soviet collapse (Cohen & Hamilton, 2011). In both
instances Georgian troops were defeated by a mixture
of local secessionists and Russian irregular troops
(King, 2008). As a result, the regions enjoyed de facto
independence and were recipients of Russian foreign
aid (Kolossov & O’Loughlin, 2011).
In 2008, Georgia accused Russia of shoot-
ing down an unmanned drone operating in or near
Abkhazia (BBC, 2008). Days later, Russian troops
moved into Abkhazia under the pretext of defend-
ing Abkhazia from Georgian aggression. Almost
simultaneously in South Ossetia, separatists broke
a cease-fire and began attacking Georgian troops.
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, who had
promised to regain the breakaway regions, sent
troops into South Ossetia (King, 2004). This inter-
vention prompted thousands of Russian troops to
advance into South Ossetia and Georgia, with Rus-
sian airstrikes hitting Georgian targets (Deibert
etal., 2012). Ultimately, Russia and Georgia signed
a cease-fire which saw Abkhazia and South Ossetia
gain de facto independence.
In the weeks before the ground invasion, Geor-
gian Internet infrastructure was attacked by exter-
nal agents, assumed to be Russian (Hollis, 2011). In
July 2008, Russian hacker forums, blogs, and online
communities contained many posts about methods
and tactics for attacking Georgian targets, emphasiz-
ing the DDoS and website defacements used against
Estonia. Arbor Networks, a prominent global security
firm, noticed a heightened amount of ‘noise’ in July
2008 coming from Russia’s hacker and cybercriminal
underground, indicating a high level of premeditation
and strategic oversight behind the attacks (Markoff,
2008).
The first wave of attacks occurred hours after the
ground invasion and consisted of DDoS against over
50 websites, government servers, and national com-
munications infrastructure (Bumgarner & Borg,
2009; Hollis, 2011). The attacks came from botnets
whose IP addresses were affiliated with Russian
organized crime and the unofficially state-sanctioned
‘Russian Business Network’ which was connected to
the attacks against Estonia in 2007 (Korns & Kasten-
berg, 2008; Markoff, 2008; Stapleton-Gray & Wood-
cock, 2011) (Fig.5).
A second wave of attacks utilized participatory
DDoS by providing an easy-to-use tool for Russian
citizens to attack Georgian websites. This wave tar-
geted financial institutions, business associations,
and educational websites (Bumgarner & Borg, 2009).
The attacks disrupted the ability of Georgia to make
financial transactions as the Internet was essential for
commerce and trade. The attacks were so successful
that the National Bank of Georgia severed all Internet
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connections for ten days, leaving it unable to operate
(Bumgarner & Borg, 2009).
Despite the low-level of Internet penetration in
Georgia, Russian hackers modified their attack plans
to deprive the Georgian government of the ability
to communicate or disseminate information. These
attacks rendered the majority of governmental web-
sites inoperative, forcing the Georgian government
to relocate its official business to Google’s Blogspot
service in the United States and to other U.S. based
hosts (Kastenberg, 2009; Korns & Kastenberg, 2008).
The Georgian IT community also reached out to Esto-
nian officials who connected them to EU and NATO
experts to bolster Georgia’s defenses by altering the
European Internet infrastructure upon which Georgia
relied (Bumgarner & Borg, 2009) (Fig.6).
What distinguishes these attacks is the linkage
between online attacks and offline military action.
Once Russian commanders had established a foothold
in Georgian territory, cyberattacks were intensified
and designed to sow confusion amongst the general
populace, government functionaries, and financial
and political elites (Bumgarner & Borg, 2009; Hollis,
2011). This was demonstrated by directing cyberat-
tacks towards local news and government communi-
cations services in the city of Gori at the same time as
the Russian ground and air offensive against the city.
The attacks were specific enough that intelligence
analysts were able to use DDoS attacks to anticipate
where Russian ground attacks were focused or immi-
nent (Hollis, 2011).
The United States and Iran: 2010–2016
The third case examines a series of attacks between
the United States and Iran from 2010 through 2013,
with emphasis on the well-known Stuxnet case.
Although it is argued this cyberwar is still ongoing,
this paper will focus on the most well-known and
foundational attacks (Greenberg, 2019; Nakashima,
2019; Perlroth & Krauss, 2018).
The US/Iran cyberwar begins with Stuxnet, mali-
cious software designed to destroy industrial com-
ponents in Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities, erase
evidence of its presence, and deceive computer
administrators into believing that systems were
Fig. 5 Defaced Georgian parliament website (Markoff, 2008)
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normal (Gross, 2011; Markoff, 2011). The discovery
of Stuxnet sent ripples through cybersecurity commu-
nities because it was the first ‘cyberweapon’ designed
to destroy physical infrastructure and was sophisti-
cated enough to have accomplished its objective vir-
tually undetected (Gross, 2011; Sanger, 2019).
Stuxnet was designed to alter speeds on nuclear
centrifuges to cause them to malfunction and explode
(Gross, 2011; Zetter, 2014). It did this by targeting
software developed by the German company Siemens
used to power centrifuges, specifically model S7-300
(Falliere et al., 2011; Gross, 2011; Zetter, 2014). If
the Siemens software was not found, Stuxnet would
delete itself from the computer. It would, however,
spread to other computers and continue scanning for
S7-300 (Falliere etal., 2011).
If the Siemens software was found, Stuxnet would
scan the system for disk drives used on the S7-300
system from two vendors: Vacon from Finland and
Fararo Paya from Iran. The existence of these drives
would confirm to Stuxnet that this system was a valid
target, and Stuxnet would examine the centrifuges for
those spinning at certain frequencies (Falliere et al.,
2011; Shakarian, 2011). If these elements were pre-
sent, Stuxnet would cause the centrifuges to rapidly
increase and decrease in rotational speed, stressing
the centrifuge and forcing it into collision with its
housing, destroying it (Stark, 2011). While these cen-
trifuges were spinning, Stuxnet would feed informa-
tion to centrifuge operators indicating that systems
were normal (Gross, 2011; Markoff, 2011) (Fig.7).
Stuxnet faced a significant problem reaching
Natanz because the facility was air-gapped (discon-
nected from the Internet) as a security precaution. To
address this, Stuxnet developers ensured that it could
spread through infected USB drives. Stuxnet’s devel-
opers also targeted the internal systems of five com-
panies that intelligence sources believed were work-
ing with Iran’s nuclear program (Zetter, 2014). The
hope was that someone from these companies would
unwittingly take an infected drive into Natanz and
allow the malware to infect the facility (Sanger, 2019;
Zetter, 2014, 2015). This was successful, as employ-
ees of those companies posted questions to anti-virus
forums asking for help with unusual problems associ-
ated with Siemens software (Zetter, 2014). According
to Zetter (2014):
But by August that year, only 4,592 centri-
fuges were enriching at the plant, a decrease
of 328 centrifuges since June. By November,
that number had dropped even further to 3,936,
Fig. 6 Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Google Blogspot (Screenshot by author)
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a difference of 984 in five months. What’s
more, although new machines were still being
installed, none of them were being fed gas.
(Zetter, 2014)
Stuxnet was discovered in July 2010 by Belarusian
security firm VirusBlokAda (Gross, 2011). Secu-
rity analysis pointed towards state sponsorship of its
development by the United States and Israel (Sanger,
2012), as the sophistication of the code indicated
access to resources beyond those available to non-
state actors.
The discovery and dissection of Stuxnet did not
slow the cyberwar against Iran. Shortly after discov-
ering Stuxnet, security researchers discovered another
malware, codenamed Duqu in two countries: Sudan
and Iran. Duqu exfiltrated information on industrial
command and control systems by recording key-
strokes and screenshots and sending them back to
servers located in ‘Vietnam, India, Germany, Sin-
gapore, Switzerland, the UK, the Netherlands, Bel-
gium, South Korea’ (Kamluk, 2011). The malicious
intent of the software and geographic specificity led
researchers to conclude that Duqu was a follow-up
to Stuxnet designed to survey the post-Stuxnet land-
scape in preparation for future attacks (Symantec
Security Response, 2011). Other attacks included
‘Mahdi’ designed to exfiltrate industrial control infor-
mation out of Iran and ‘Gauss’ exfiltrating data from
Iran’s proxies in Lebanon (Gross, 2013).
The scale of U.S. activities against Iran, dubbed
‘Operation Olympic Games’ and the unambigu-
ous source and targets did not go unnoticed by the
Iranian government (Sanger, 2012). Iran declared
Fig. 7 Map of Stuxnet infections (Finin, 2010)
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that it would be increasing its cyberwar potential
and expanding its cyber-army to identify threats and
project power abroad (Gross, 2013). In March 2012
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
established the High Council of Cyberspace with $1
billion in funding (Berman, 2012).
After Stuxnet, Iran counterattacked U.S. interests.
The first attack, in July 2011, targeted DigiNotar, a
Dutch firm which issues encryption certificates used
to encrypt communications for banking, social media,
or email (Galperin et al., 2011; Gross, 2013). Iran
was able to issue compromised certificates and inter-
cept the emails of over 300,000 Gmail users while the
breach threatened global encrypted communications
(Arnbak & Van Eijk, 2012; Galperin et al., 2011;
Gross, 2013).
Iran’s success with DigiNotar prompted the
world’s Internet browsers to immediately stop accept-
ing their certificates, an unprecedented move which
demonstrated Iran’s technical sophistication in cyber-
war (Zetter, 2011b). The security risk was significant
enough for the Dutch government to take ownership
of the firm, prompting a major restructuring of Dutch
encryption certificate-issuing authorities (Arnbak
& Van Eijk, 2012; van der Meulen, 2013; Zetter,
2011b).
Iran’s next target was Saudi Aramco. At the time,
it was the largest cyberattack against a corpora-
tion and the first whose purpose was destruction of
data rather than exfiltration or surveillance (Gross,
2013). Codenamed Shamoon, it occurred on August
15, 2012, infecting and erasing data on over 30,000
computers and replacing screens with an image of a
burning American flag (Gross, 2013). Saudi Aramco
was forced to replace these compromised drives, tem-
porarily driving up global prices on computer disk
drives (Rashid, 2015). Digital forensics indicated
that an insider with physical access to the machines
used an infected USB drive to plant the virus. The
malware then automatically replicated and spread
through 75% of Saudi Aramco’s communications net-
work. It erased essential data related to refining and
exploration, eventually infecting company computers
around the world, including in the Netherlands and
the United States (Bronk & Tikk-Ringas, 2013).
Iran’s retaliation continued after Shamoon. In
September 2012, U.S. banks and financial firms
encountered the most sophisticated DDoS attacks
ever detected. The attacks came from global datacent-
ers and targeted ‘Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells
Fargo, U.S. Bancorp, PNC, Capital One, Fifth Third
Bank, BB&T and HSBC’ (Perlroth & Hardy, 2013;
Peterson, 2013). The attack’s traffic was significantly
larger than the total of traffic used in the Russian
cyberwar against Estonia, with researchers claiming
that the attacks were more than 10 times larger than
any known DDoS attack (Gross, 2013; Perlroth &
Hardy, 2013) (Fig.8).
In the previous case studies, states leveraged
globally dispersed networks of malware infec-
tions controlled by centralized ‘command and con-
trol’ servers. These Iranian DDoS attacks, dubbed
Operation Ababil, eschewed that cyber-geographic
orthodoxy and infected concentrated cloud stor-
age servers in datacenters with a malware known as
‘itsoknoproblembro’.
Fig. 8 Spike in traffic
during an Operation Ababil
attack (Goh, 2013)
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This malware evaded detection and spread rapidly
through thousands of servers. Security researchers
stated that the attacks exceeded 70 gigabits (Perlroth
& Hardy, 2013). By comparison, at that time, mid-
size businesses routinely had less than 1 gigabit of
traffic and a large international bank would barely
reach 40 gigabits of traffic during peak usage (Perl-
roth & Hardy, 2013). The banks incurred large costs,
with some paying more than $10 million for emer-
gency DDoS defense (Gross, 2013).
The spatiality ofcyberwar: discussion ofthecase
studies
The complexities of space and power in these case
studies highlight the need for thinking beyond terri-
tory. The spatiality of power model offers one poten-
tial avenue of moving beyond territory in cyberwar.
Ensemble of worlds
In the ensemble of worlds, power is articulated
through separation of human groupings, with limited
connectivity, and power concentrated and directed
internally rather than externally. The spatial focus is
on separation.
While the idea of separation may be at odds with
connectivity in a digital age, it remains relevant in the
modern state’s co-production of space and secrecy
(Paglen, 2010). The secretive Dimona labs where
Stuxnet was developed and Iran’s Natanz facility
are located in remote deserts, which are air-gapped
with multiple levels of security and military defense
(Broad etal., 2011; Zero Days, 2016; Zetter, 2011a).
The disconnection of these secretive spaces made
them more powerful—requiring substantial more
effort and work to infiltrate and attack (Sanger, 2019).
Indeed, efforts to infect Natanz relied upon cross-
ing the air-gap, utilizing both undercover physical
infiltration, targeted infections, and global malware
spread to increase the odds of crossing the air-gap
(Zero Days, 2016).
Beyond physical separation, firewalls and anti-
virus software create digital spaces of separation.
Computers located behind secured networks are
connected to the broader Internet but disconnected
from the world of malware infection. However, ‘zero
days’ which are exploits with no defense, were used
by Stuxnet and can overcome these defenses to infil-
trate separated spaces (Huskaj & Wilson, 2020).
Due to this ability, zero day exploits are expensive
and difficult to procure, with RAND estimating that
one exploit costs an average of US $30,000, making
them mostly used by states (Ablon & Bogart, 2017).
The lack of separation through effective anti-virus
software creates spaces of vulnerability from con-
nectivity, forming the backbone of the global DDoS
networks which utilize thousands of poorly-defended
computers to orchestrate DDoS attacks.
Disconnection also becomes power with the abil-
ity to disconnect from the Internet forcibly or defen-
sively. The DDoS attacks in the cases of Russia and
Estonia/Georgia were efforts to separate these states
from the global Internet. Given the disparity of avail-
able resources between Russia and Estonia/Georgia,
a powerful state is one which can resist separation or
can easily separate others. At the same time, Estonia
disconnected itself from the Internet to retain domes-
tic communicative power. Thus, space and power in
cyberwar can manifest simultaneously with and in
separation.
Field of forces
The field of forces model sees power within ter-
ritorial states where the state has total control over
its territory and where border expansion comes at
the expense of others. The focus in this model is on
power within boundaries.
The DDoS-focused case studies demonstrated how
power can be distributed globally by infecting mil-
lions of computers and using them to attack a territo-
rial state. In the face of overwhelming attacks directed
towards its national cyberspace, Estonia leveraged
territorialized power by disconnecting from the Inter-
net. In this way Estonia maintained some domes-
tic connectivity to allow critical national services to
continue to operate and simultaneously stopped the
attack. While Russian DDoS power was globally dis-
persed and not bound by its territory, Estonia’s power
manifested in its territorial power to disconnect.
Territorial boundaries in cyberwar also manifested
in the case of Georgia. The Russian attacks focused
on targets within Georgia’s territory in coordination
with a kinetic ground invasion. In response, rather
than disconnect, Georgia relocated key government
services to the territory of the United States. Georgia
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used TSHost and Google’s US-based infrastructure
which offered robust protections and were located in
a neutral country (Kastenberg, 2009).
By determining the structure of Iran’s Natanz facil-
ity through traditional intelligence work, Stuxnet’s
developers crafted a cyberweapon targeting a specific
industrial control system. They did so by embedding
the details of Iran’s technical systems within the mal-
ware itself. This was to deliberately limit the potential
for outside discovery, minimize damage or disruption
to non-targeted systems, and to ensure that the cor-
rect targets were destroyed. Indeed, while much of the
Internet operates on similar hardware and software
worldwide, how these systems are used and deployed
varies by geography and is influenced by the state’s
technical and social structures (Golumbia, 2009;
Takhteyev, 2012). Here, territory in cyberwar mani-
fests in the development and deployment of cyber-
weapons which embed territorial particularities in
code.
Hierarchical network
The hierarchical network emphasizes cores, semi-
peripheries, peripheries as nodes in a global network
of flows. The focus is on networks connecting global
hierarchies of nodes.
Global computing power is arranged in a core/
periphery model centered around datacenters. These
datacenters are host to tens of thousands of computers
and power most of the Internet (Jaeger etal., 2009).
Indeed, 1/3 of all websites are powered by Amazon’s
AWS datacenters (Desjardins, 2019). The central-
ity of datacenters to the Internet landscape contin-
ues apace, with Cisco Systems estimating datacenter
Internet traffic will reach 19.4 zettabytes in 2021
(Cisco Systems, 2018). A zettabyte is one billion tera-
bytes, with one terabyte being the common size for
an entire PC hard drive. In contrast, the computers of
individual users form a dispersed periphery of global
computing power.
These spatial disparities are malleable in cyberwar.
As demonstrated in both the Estonian and Georgian
cases, by infecting tens of thousands of ‘periphery’
computers, a state can form them into a core of com-
puting powerful enough to disconnect states from
the Internet. The ‘topography’ of global computing
power, therefore, is shaped by geographies of mal-
ware vulnerability. The distinction between core and
periphery is less rigid and more flexible, with periph-
ery becoming core through the scale of hijacked com-
puters. This is the logic behind DDoS attacks which
emphasize hierarchical networks by negating ter-
ritorial boundaries and gathering computing power
through infected nodes.
The fluidity in the hierarchical network does not
only benefit the attacker. In the case of Georgia,
the state’s collapsing computing defenses demon-
strated that it was on the periphery of global defen-
sive resources. Recognizing this, Georgia relocated
its online services to a core: Google’s servers in the
United States. The assumption was that Google’s
scale and resources could withstand the DDoS attacks
(Kastenberg, 2009). While novel at the time, relocat-
ing key assets to DDoS-defensible nodes has become
a norm, with industry leader Cloudflare defending
27 million websites from attack in 2020 (Cloudflare,
2020; Zuckerman etal., 2010).
The core/periphery model of datacenters was a
critical factor in Iran’s retaliatory DDoS attacks.
Instead of hijacking computers on the global comput-
ing periphery, Iran infected computers at core data-
centers, marking the start of a new era in datacenter-
focused attacks. Due to their relative homogeneity,
datacenters became nodes of heightened risk, filled
with tens of thousands of identical computers with
similar vulnerabilities which were easily infected by
the ‘itsoknoproblembro’ malware (Gilder, 2006; Jae-
ger etal., 2009). Datacenters are growing as attrac-
tive, centralized target for states, with malware
which exploits their vulnerabilities (Cimpanu, 2019;
Korolov, 2017, 2020).
Power and space in hierarchical networks is fluid,
aggregating and disaggregating peripheries and
cores. With global DDoS attacks estimated to reach
15.4 million in 2023 and global malware detections
exceeding 750 million, hierarchical networks will
continue to play a prominent role in both cyber-attack
and defense (Cisco MalwareBytes, 2019; Systems,
2020).
World society
The world society model postulates synchronous
interconnectedness of real and virtual spaces, the
emergence of a global public opinion and awareness,
‘flat’ unhierarchical networks, as well as reciprocal
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time and space in global human affairs (Agnew,
2003).
Early geographic literature about the Internet artic-
ulated a distinct ‘online/offline’ dichotomy (Brunn,
1998). While such a distinction may have existed with
dialup modems and desktop computers, the contem-
porary reality of near-ubiquitous mobile computing
and connectivity has made the dichotomy a false one.
This interconnectedness of the real and the virtual
has resulted in cyberwar becoming a security prior-
ity for states, as industrial control systems in national
electricity grids, dams, water treatment plants, rail-
roads, and other key infrastructure become connected
to the global Internet (Baram & Lim, 2020; Clarke
& Knake, 2012; Sanger, 2019; Zetter, 2016). World
militaries have organized around this, notably the
U.S. budgeting $610 million for Cyber Command to
integrate cyberwar offense and defense into kinetic
conflict (Williams, 2019).
The Estonian case study demonstrated the reci-
procity between online and offline protest movements.
The effort to relocate the Bronze Soldier resulted
in riots and simultaneous online calls for digital
action. The resulting online attacks interrupted bank
transfers, telephone calls, and more (Thilek, 2009).
The attacks themselves were launched from a glob-
ally infected DDoS network which ignored national
boundaries and operated across multiple time zones
simultaneously with the protests.
The Georgian case likewise demonstrates this con-
fluence: globally controlled DDoS networks attacking
specific targets in conjunction with kinetic ground
assaults. While forensics research has concluded that
Russia was responsible for the attacks, the global dis-
tribution of attack sources meant there was no single
state responsible (Blank, 2008; Grant, 2007). Rus-
sia could claim that even if it shut down or restricted
access within its own borders, it was powerless to
stop attackers in other jurisdictions—which is pre-
cisely what it did (Clarke & Knake, 2012).
Of the case studies, the future of synchronous
online and offline interconnectedness was most
clearly demonstrated in Stuxnet. The malware was
developed to exploit the reality that even air-gapped
spaces cannot be disconnected. The Natanz facility,
although disconnected from the Internet, required
regular software patches provided by vendors whose
computers would be connected to the Internet. This
allowed Stuxnet to be updated and destroy additional
centrifuges by unwitting vendors bringing Sutxnet-
infected USB drives to (Zero Days, 2016). Even dis-
connected spaces can be connected in the world soci-
ety model (Table1).
The confluence of online and offline means that the
spatiality of power in cyberspace is not restricted to
cyberspace, but manifests in the interconnectedness
between the digital and the physical. Power is spatial-
ized globally to the extent the Internet is spatialized
globally. This is evidenced in the dramatic increase of
‘Internet of Things’ devices like Internet-connected
thermostats, copy machines, and webcameras. Their
widespread usage, with over 34 billion devices, has
resulted in an enormous new geography of cyber
insecurity (Burhan etal., 2018). The result is further
blurring of the cyber-battlefront and the boundaries
between civilians and combatants. Indeed, one of the
largest DDoS attacks occurred in 2016 from nearly
50,000 webcameras in 164 countries infected by the
Mirai malware (Herzberg etal., 2016).
Conclusion
Despite nearly 8 million DDoS attacks annually, a
U.S. budget of $17 billion for cyberwar, and broad
public awareness, geographers have rarely engaged
with the spatiality of cyberwar. The purpose of this
paper was to address this gap by offering a prelimi-
nary theoretical geographical lens on space and
power in cyberwar.
How does applying this theoretical framework
advance cyberwar in geography? Given the case stud-
ies and discussion of the multiple spatialities in these
conflicts, spatializing power in cyberspace through a
strictly territorial lens is insufficient. The spatiality
of power model offered is one lens through which the
paper sought to demonstrate how space and power can
exist in cyberwar apart from the Westphalian model.
And although there is broad agreement that the West-
phalian system is challenged by various supranational
forces, without engagement by geographers, cyberwar
scholarship is likely to remain in the territorial trap
which recent research has demonstrated (Hughes &
Colarik, 2017).
What the case studies and analysis also demon-
strate is that there are multiple spatialities at play in
cyberwar: disconnection, hierarchy, spatiotemporal
connectedness, and more. And as this paper’s analysis
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Table 1 Case studies and the spatiality of power
Explanation Russia/Estonia Russia/Georgia U.S./lran Differences Similarities
Ensemble of Worlds Power is articulated
through structural
separation
N/A N/A Stuxnet developed in
and deployed against
separate air-gapped
spaces
DDoS—based cyber-
war relies upon con-
nectivity rather than
isolation
Utilizing the digital to
penetrate separate
spaces to achieve
political goals
Field of Forces Power located in ter-
ritorial entities
Russia: N/A Estonia:
Leveraged inter-
national technical
alliances to stop
cyberattacks
Russia: Attacks
explicitly territorial
Georgian cyberpower
Georgia: International
technical alliances to
stop attacks; relocates
cyber-assets to other
territorial states based
on alliances
Olympic Games
malware (including
StuxNet) deliberately
targets Iran’s terri-
tory; Iran’s power
conceived of in ter-
ritorial terms
Attacks must be territo-
rially defined; defense
seeks to leverage
the state monopoly
over international
geographical con-
nectivity
Cyberpower’s structure
is on territorial lines:
alliances, targets, and
infrastructure. Cyber-
power must be located
somewhere. Territory
as "framing principle"
for attack and defense
Hierarchical Network Emphasis on cities,
nodes of power, and
hinterlands
Russia: Embraces
model, seeks out
nodes with high con-
nectivity to power
botnet used in attacks
Estonia: N/A
Russia: Envisioned
cyberpower as hier-
archical nodes within
Georgia. Georgia:
Relocated cyber-
assets to other territo-
rial states located near
nodes associated with
state cyberpower
Iran’s counterattacks
targeted hierarchi-
cal nodes of oil
and finance using
hierarchical nodes
of computing power
(data centers)
Physical nodes of
power harder to
relocate than nodes
associated with
cyberpower
Nodes of power become
nodes of vulnerability
for both attack (via
botnets) and defense
World Society Power in social group-
ings, confluence
of real and virtual
spaces, global public
opinion, as well as
spontaneous and
reciprocal time and
space
Synchronized protests
and cyberattacks;
global attacks oper-
ated at a global spa-
tiotemporality rather
than a local Estonian
spatiotemporality;
equal and unhierarchi-
cal global actors
Physical/virtual spaces
conflated due to
simultaneous cyber
and kinetic attack on
specific locations;
using global botnets
to attack specific
cities prior to kinetic
ground offensives;
Georgian state relo-
cates vital state cyber-
assets to other states
and nodes globally
Iran’s DigiNotar coun-
terattack targeted and
compromised global
Internet security
and connectivity;
conceived of and pro-
jected power globally
through networks
Purely digital and
hybrid conceive of
global battlespace to
different ends: one
for disruption/attack,
the other as pool of
potential resources
Envisioning global
cyberspace as pool of
resources or vulnerabil-
ity -a global battles-
pace; understanding
that connectivity is
vulnerability; leverag-
ing physical and virtual
convergence
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was not exhaustive, there are undoubtedly more layers
of analysis which could be applied. However, given
the dearth of geographical engagement, these valua-
ble analyses are lacking. Geography has much to offer
this field both theoretically and empirically, and it is
hoped that this paper can contribute to the beginnings
of that conversation on space and power in cyberwar.
Funding Open access funding provided by Central European
University Private University. The author did not receive sup-
port from any organization for the submitted work.
Declarations
Conflict of interest The author has no relevant financial or
non-financial interests to disclose.
Human participants or animals This research did not
involve human participants or animals.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Com-
mons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits
use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any
medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Crea-
tive Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The
images or other third party material in this article are included
in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated
otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your
intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly
from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
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