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Global Pandemics are Extinction-
level Events and Should not be
Coordinated Solely through
National or Jurisdictional
Emergency Management
By Michael Prasad
HSAJ | Pracademic Aairs
HSAJ Pracademic Aairs | Volume 3 – Article 2 - August 2023 | WW W.HSAJ.ORG
2 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
Abstract
Emergency Management, whether conceived as a management system or an operational
unit of government, should not be in the ‘business’ of managing global pandemics.
While pandemics are certainly biological incidents - and smaller pandemics are included
as part of Emergency Management’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and
Explosive (CBRNE) plans and protocols - the aspects of a global pandemic extend beyond
the capabilities of both the field of Emergency Management and its practice as a whole.
Government’s command decisions to act during a global pandemic, may start out aligned
with the standard Emergency Management/ Disaster Phase Cycle mission actions of
Preparedness/Protection/Prevention, Response, Recovery, and Mitigation, but as the
pandemic progesses, those command decisions quickly become reprioritized away from
the doctrinal standards and practices of emergency management.
Suggested Citation
Prasad, Michael. “Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be
Coordinated Solely through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management.” Homeland
Security Affairs: Pracademic Affairs 3, Article 2 (Aug, 2023). www.hsaj.org/articles/22285.
Introduction
This arcle will make the case that global pandemics should not be in the planning,
organizaon, equipping, training, and exercising responsibilies solely for emergency
management enes – they need to be managed through a whole-of-government/whole-
community approach using other management techniques. Some of the lessons learned from
COVID-19 should include a strategic paradigm shi away from the “tyranny of precedent”1
which dictates that all disasters must be resolved through emergency management pracces
and principles. This arcle’s premises include the following.
• Emergency management pracce is jurisdiconally bound and generally follows a ‘boom-
up’ approach, with resources for unmet needs coming from a higher level.
• The size and scope of the management system for any disaster response and recovery
eorts are limited. At some point, the response eorts must become a whole-of-
government approach, and therefore change management systems, because whole
governments operate under a polical management system instead of the ad-hoc
temporary structure of an emergency management system.
• Emergency management applies a straight-line approach to disasters, in a cyclical paern. Even
if there is an overlap between adjacent disaster cycle phases, they generally occur in order.
• Emergency management follows a unity of eort model; everyone in the response and
recovery Incident Command System (ICS) is working towards the same goals and the same
end-state.
HSAJ Pracademic Aairs | Volume 3 – Article 2 - August 2023 | WW W.HSAJ.ORG
3 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
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• Emergency management - through any ICS in any country - is organized dierently than
steady-state polical-oriented governmental day-to-day operaons. COVID-19, like any
worldwide impacng incident, turned those systems upside-down. The ICS organizaonal
branches of Command, Intelligence, Finance/Administraon, Logiscs, Operaons, and
Planning for every level of government were signicantly impeded during COVID-19.
Global Pandemics are Bigger
than Anyone’s Breadbox
These exponenal “super-spreading events”2 should not be considered a ‘normal’ escalaon
from an endemic biological incident within a single country (i.e., ratcheted upward from a
lesser level CBRNE incident), nor one where a pandemic expands beyond a single naon’s
borders. One of the main constructs of emergency management is that it is designed to be
jurisdiconally limited within a single naon. Emergency management is defensive and supports
the homeland . While aid and advice can be provided from one naon to another, the incident
is sll managed within a single country or component subjurisdicons. Governmental missions
which are predominately oensive, such as intervenons, interdicons, interrupons, and
isolaons, are single-enty missions generally to be delegated to law enforcement enes
(including Public Health Ocers) domescally and the naon’s military and naonal defense
agencies, internaonally. In many countries, including the United States, military and naonal
defense agencies were ulized domescally as part of these oensive missions.3
In the United States, the denion of what is an emergency, or a disaster, is very uid. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has an incident typing system, where ve is
the lowest in terms of resources required and one is the highest, as shown in Figure 1:
Figure 1 – FEMA Incident Types
Credit: FEMA - hps://emilms.fema.gov/IS2200/groups/162.html
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Emergency management has as one of its standards to “ratchet up and down” the resource
support needed, based on the incident type. For example, when a Type 4 incident is sll
scaling up – meaning not yet under control or expanding – addional resources should be
requested as if the incident could grow to a Type 3. While COVID-19 may have started in the
United States as a small outbreak in Washington state on January 20, 2020, it expanded
exponenally across the enre country in a maer of weeks. And at the same me, the virus
spread worldwide.4 The size and scope moved the incident typing o the scale5; there were
no addional resources available anywhere, nor was there proper planning in place for this
level of incident. There are hazards and threats for which emergency management cannot
plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise because they are too complex. One way to quanfy
them is to describe them as Type 0 – Exncon Level Events.6
When the phrase ‘Exncon-Level Event’7 is menoned, thoughts turn towards world-
changing events – such as asteroid strikes, nuclear war, and even climate change/global
warming. None of those tragedies have their response and recovery missions coordinated
through their naonal emergency management process. There is a cap to the maximum
of maximums of the capabilies and capacies for naonal and jurisdiconal emergency
management agencies and departments – as well as the concepts of the Incident Command
System within the eld of emergency management itself. When a disaster expands8 beyond
the capability of the internal sub-jurisdicons within a naon, that jurisdicon usually
requests assistance upward, all the way to the naonal level for support. When the naon
itself needs support beyond its own capabilies, it can choose to reach out to partner naons,
intergovernmental organizaons, or non-governmental organizaons for addional support
(i.e., NATO, the United Naons, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Naonal Sociees across the
globe, etc.). When all the naons are impacted at the same me by the same incident - and
there is no one unimpacted le to help – that constutes a worldwide catastrophe. Can any
such incident be managed within a single naon’s borders? Maybe, but not by or through
emergency management, since the decisions about all aspects of the disaster phase cycle
missions of Preparedness/Prevenon/Protecon, Response, Recovery, and Migaon are a
maer of naonal security and economic development.9
Disasters are usually straightforward
and straight-lined
Another emergency management construct is that disaster phase cycles usually need to occur
linearly, and successively, even if they overlap. Most large-scale incidents look something like
this, as shown in Figure 2:
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5 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
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Figure 2 - FEMA’s Naonal Disaster Response and Recovery Frameworks
Credit: FEMA - hps://www.fema.gov/sites/default/les/2020-06/naonal_disaster_recovery_framework_2nd.pdf
Emergency management can comprehend and work in this model, allocating staff and
resources into distinct roles (phases), and collaborating with whole-community partners
along the way. This same structure works for the smallest and most localized incidents
through the vast majority of the largest domestic disasters possible – even for complex
coordinated attacks and concurrent disasters such as civil unrest after a hurricane, or
during a contested national election. As long as there are additional resources that can be
allocated and assigned to response and recovery missions,and there is a common set of
strategic and operational objective priorities of life safety, incident stabilization, and then
asset/property protection, emergency management’s use of unified command and control
can work effectively.
Emergency managers can also understand that their steady-state work may be applied
to any part or multiple parts of the disaster phase cycle. This is the concept of Disaster
Readiness or Disaster Resiliency. See Figure 2 for a graphic representation of Disaster
Readiness or Resiliency. While they are preparing for a hurricane, emergency management
can apply mitigation efforts to help in economic recovery. These are funding sources and
results from a single action or steady-state project. This works in ‘blue sky’10 mode. On
the other hand, in ‘gray sky’11 mode, emergency managers revert to the linear model.
Politicians focus on other priorities. While the continuity of national primary mission
essential functions12 is a general strategic priority, a nation’s security and economic
growth have always overridden the doctrinal standards and practices for which emergency
management is designed to follow and almost always found in this order: life safety,
incident stabilization, and then asset/property protection. Goals of national security and/
or economic growth do not always follow those doctrinal standards. More to the point,
when the political management system overtakes the emergency management system
of operations, disasters become more negatively impactful to those who are socially
vulnerable and disenfranchised.13
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Figure 3 - Phases of Incidents, Emergencies, and Disasters
Credit: Barton Dunant – www. BartonDunant.com. Used with permission.
When protecve measures for life safety are not implemented consistently and clearly,
or there are objecons by the public or governmental/polical leaders to priorize asset/
property protecon above incident stabilizaon and life safety, emergency management
can no longer be the doctrinal model to use. When there is not a common unied incident
command system where branches and secons (local and state/tribal/territorial governments
through home rule or autonomous sovereignty) do not follow and adhere to the “Planning P”
process, emergency management will fail. When situaonal awareness and intelligence are
not shared collaboravely between groups, when economic pressures supersede life safety
concerns, and when logiscs supply-chain systems are unsupported for a naonal disaster or
warme eorts, emergency management will fail.
When a global pandemic - or any disaster that consumes an enre naon by itself - is framed
along the disaster phase cycles, it is not dened as two-dimensionally linear, but rather as
three-dimensionally spiral, as shown in Figure 4.
HSAJ Pracademic Aairs | Volume 3 – Article 2 - August 2023 | WW W.HSAJ.ORG
7 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
Figure 4 – Fakhruddin, et al. – graphic from ‘Are we there yet?
The transion from response to recovery for the COVID-19 pandemic’
Note: hps://doi.org/hps://doi.org/10.1016/j.pdisas.2020.100102 Creave Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0
Fakhruddin et al. correctly idened that in a pandemic both local, state, and naonal
jurisdicons can be in response, recovery, migaon, and preparedness/prevenon/
protecon at the same me. A municipality may be recovering from one variant, while at the
same me responding to the next one. U.S. states saw policy changes – including reversals
of social distancing rules, PPE usage, etc. – based on new variants14, which came at a faster
pace than the normal linear process emergency management expects for the disaster phase
cycle. COVID-19 was like experiencing back-to-back-to-back tornadoes in the same town.
Without a complete paradigm shi to a dierent model of resource management – including
governmental operaons stang – to aid the public through concurrent waves of divergent
acvies, a community cannot survive a pandemic by using its tradional emergency
management model of support.
All for one, and one for all
Finally, emergency management has as a foundaonal principle, the use of an incident
management system in a “unity of eort” approach. Whether it is a single command, unied
command, or even area command on larger geographic incidents, the structure remains
the same. Whether it is the ICS from the Naonal Incident Management System (NIMS), the
standardized emergency management system used in California, or any other system, the
aspects of coordinaon, cooperaon, collaboraon, and communicaon are hallmarks of
being properly executed. Another foundaonal principle is the ability to connuously source
and supply a sustained incident Response and Recovery – without interference from any
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governmental or non-governmental levels or enes. It is impossible to achieve both of these
principles in a naonal-level pandemic.
An abbreviated high-level analysis of the emergency management-inspired Response and
Recovery federal missions for COVID-19 in the United States further validates the premise that
global pandemics should not be conducted by naonal or jurisdiconal emergency management
enes. Below, I will detail the disconnects during this worldwide pandemic via any incident
management system’s major branches of command, intelligence15, nance/administraon,
logiscs, operaons, and planning.
Command
Federal-level emergency management enes were never in the posion to lead and
coordinate all external incident command system branches, especially across every state and
territory at the same me. Their role has always been to provide federal resources in support16
of states and territories. The governors of states (and leaders of sovereign tribal naons, as
well as leaders of U.S. territories) are the designated commanders-in-chief for their respecve
jurisdicons. During a naonal disaster, this model does not t with a tradional unied
command structure found in emergency management. There is no domesc disaster equivalent
of the U.S. military’s Pentagon, nor a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta.17 Since the U.S.
poron of a global pandemic is predominately a public health response, the newly elevated
Administraon for Strategic Preparedness Response or the presidenally appointed U.S.
Surgeon General18 - as the naon’s chief medical ocer and leader of the naonwide uniformed
public health ocers - might be someone to be considered to lead a unied command
structure for a global pandemic public health response. The challenge though, is that both of
those enes and funconalies are currently not a naonal command one, only an advisory
one. Like FEMA, the U.S. Public Health Service commissioned ocers can only support the
states’ eorts. The United States has never been a naon that orders its constuents to give up
their freedom of choice when it comes to individual healthcare. These ethical and legal conicts
belong to the highest levels of government – and should not be delegated to be aconed and/or
solved by and through emergency management.
Intelligence
There was a constant need for Emergency Management Intelligence (EMINT)19, both from
external and internal threats and hazards to any naon. External threats included new variants
of COVID-19, a dierent pandemic virus spread, the possibility of add-on aacks from foreign
actors who viewed a country’s defense capabilies as weakened, severe weather incidents,
etc. Internal threats included pandemic Response and Recovery mission resource shoralls,
concurrent domesc violent extremism, annual elecon results integrity concerns, overall
economic pressures, etc. When many U.S. states were allowed to limit the informaon – and
intelligence – they shared upward to the federal government as to the demographics and
locaons of COVID-19 posives mortality and morbidity, this signicantly hindered one of the
naonal-level concepts of planning (situaonal awareness and disaster assessment). When
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9 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
any naon does not adequately consider socially vulnerable populaons – including those of
impacted people within the Sovereign Tribal Naons within the United States and cizens of
other countries – it does not follow one of the newer (and historically missing or decient)
elements of: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion. Knowing where and how COVID-19 was impacng
all of our divergent populaons, is key to resource management and metrics analysis.
There is currently no established standing role for EMINT in emergency management, only
the possibility that Intelligence/Invesgaon20 – more terrorism and law enforcement-centric
– can be applied to the Incident Command System, as warranted. While FEMA is a unit of
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), it appears to not have its own Intelligence
funconality21, and rather curates the eorts of other units for terrorism/homeland security
domesc incidents, when requested. The U.S. Coast Guard, another unit of DHS, has a clearer
understanding of the role of Intelligence22 in the Incident Command System, but a future
naonal pandemic would probably not be managed by them. The U.S. Federal Government
already has a robust collecon of intelligence gathering, analysis, and disseminaon groups
known as the Intelligence Community, managed through the presidenally appointed Director
of Naonal Intelligence.23 A new organizaonal construct24 – outside of emergency management
– to manage the U.S. poron of a global pandemic must include a direct report to the unied
command for emergency management intelligence.
Finance/Administration
One posive aspect of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States has been the almost
unanimous endorsement of U.S. Federal Government nancial support to the states for
pandemic-related acvies. Following the model of presidenally declared disasters, the
government routed federal resources – and funding – through the Staord Act. While FEMA
is certainly the naon’s expert on disaster funding and administraon, the global aspect of
this pandemic quickly expanded beyond the capabilies established through the Staord Act.
New Congressional legislaon was required for new funding streams, and new administrave
protocols and procedures for the states were established. For example, disaster unemployment
insurance is a standard tool in the toolbox of FEMA and the U.S. Department of Labor for
helping the states during declared disasters. COVID-19 required an exponenal upgrade to
this on a naonal scale, to include addional funding to COVID-19 impacted individuals, which
was well beyond the capabilies of FEMA to administer. State-level Labor Departments quickly
became overwhelmed25, and the incident became economically destabilized throughout
2020 and 2021. The White House – in both administraons - created and managed pandemic
Response and Recovery missions for economic health26, which may have conicted with public
health. Again, depriorizing life safety can be a naon’s goal, but it is not aligned with the
doctrine and pracces of emergency management.
Logistics
At the start of the pandemic in the U.S., there were immediate shortages of crical supplies
and equipment, both for the public and for responders. The development and distribuon of
vaccines was a whole-community mission – even triggering the Naonal Defense Producon Act
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– and involved private corporaons in both the pharmaceucal industry, as well as the supply-
chain management industry. Automove manufacturers switched producon27 to venlators.
Federal agencies not normally associated with disasters, such as the U.S. Post Oce28, were
ulized for the logiscal distribuon of supplies and informaon. In many U.S. states – especially
in the rst few months of the COVID-19 pandemic – there were logiscs supply and stang
shortages, and some were compeng with each other29 for resources. There are no current U.S.
legal constructs to manage the deconicon of these resource requests at a single command
point, which is something that the Logiscs branch within emergency management’s ICS
typically performs on large-scale incidents.
Stang is a key part of logiscs. The long duraon of a naonal pandemic, along with an
inability to refresh sta (i.e., having enough qualied sta to demobilize, decompress, and
then remobilize) are both more war-like than disaster-like. While there are aspects of declared
disasters that extend beyond short-term Recovery into longer-term Recovery and Migaon30 -
such as Public Assistance work – they tend to devolve away from emergency management into
roune day-to-day work. The signicant concern about Post-Traumac Stress Disorder amongst
healthcare professionals, caused by COVID-19 work31 is a workforce safety issue akin to what
the U.S. Veterans Aairs department sees in returning military forces. FEMA has engaged the
U.S. Department of Jusce’s assistance in establishing post-traumac stress disorder counseling
programs, starng with the Oklahoma Bombing in 1995. The current programs32 from the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administraon provide counseling for as long
as needed by disaster vicms, but they have also become overwhelmed by simultaneous
requests from all the states and territories. Emergency management is sll not fully engaged in
comprehensive care for the mental health and wellness of its workforce especially as needed by
responders, including healthcare workers in health disasters.33
Operations
Varying levels of collaboraon and adherence to public health and other direcves occurred
within the United States, as well as in other countries. This was true for both response/recovery
enes themselves, and the public. In the U.S., aempts at applying a homogeneous set of
Response missions to all the states and territories were met with the same resistance to other
Federalism aspects34, protected by the 10th Amendment. Acceptance of non-pharmaceucal
intervenons (NPIs) and then pharmaceucal intervenons were contenous at best and
life-threatening at worst. Governmental response organizaons at the state and local levels
were not prepared for the connuity of government needed to support a long-term sustained
response eort. If this were a mul-state wildland re, instead of a pandemic, there probably
would not be resistance by any governmental enty for any aspect of federal operaonal
support, and the mutual-aid aspects35 from state to state would prevail, as the resources
available from non-impacted states are already consistently trained, typed, and credenaled.
That is not the case with any pandemic: All the states are not parcipang in healthcare mutual
aid compacts36 and the nature of a naonal (or global) pandemic means there are no resources
available from non-impacted jurisdicons. These disconnects require a dierent naonal
management system, other than the current model of emergency management.
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Planning
While there were exisng U.S. naonal pandemic plans established before the COVID-19
pandemic, in most parts of the country they were not followed.37 So many acvies of
government (NPIs, vaccinaons, boosters, mask usage, social distancing, business shutdowns,
travel restricons, etc.) seemed to be unplanned and haphazard in their implementaon. The
governmental instrucons – and reacon to a lack of suciently distributed supply – for mask/
respirator usage38 by both healthcare workers and the public is a prime example. A mely
release of supplies from the strategic naonal stockpile and use of the Defense Producon Act39
must be reviewed and revised, ulizing a war-faring model – as they were designed for – and
not an emergency management one.
What was heard me and again from governmental polical leadership was that COVID-19
decisions were made “out of an abundance of cauon” as if restricons and countermeasures
were not planned as part of any pandemic threat.40 Those decisions usually signal that
governments are either not following their exisng emergency management plans or they have
no plans to execute. The quote usually aributed to Benjamin Franklin41 of ‘If you are failing to
plan, you are planning to fail’ is always appropriate to emergency management in any scenario
(please recall Franklin founded the rst re department in the United States). Emergency
management – when performed successfully - strictly follows a planning process.
Conclusion
In emergency management, post-mortem analysis and review of acons taken during the incident
response and recovery phases are incorporated into Aer-Acon Reporng/Improvement
Planning (AAR/IP) processes. Usually, this occurs in the migaon phase, once the response
phase is concluded and the interim and short-term recovery phase elements are concluded as
well. This arcle took an AAR/IP approach to object specically to any future singular use of
emergency management systems, doctrine, and pracce for global pandemics. Instead, global
pandemics – like any other exncon-level events - should be managed through a whole-of-
government/whole-community approach using other management techniques. As previously
noted, AAR/IPs are usually conducted once the incident is ‘declared’ concluded. While the World
Health Organizaon inially sounded the alarm for a public health emergency of internaonal
concern in January 2020, they have not said the COVID-19 pandemic is over, as of September
2022.42 COVID-19 will most likely never go away completely, but rather become endemic.43 As all
emergency managers know, disasters do not occur in a vacuum. As noted previously, hurricanes
occurred, civil unrest incidents transpired, and other disasters all happened while the naons of
the world were experiencing this pandemic. In 2022 in the United States and elsewhere, measles
reemerged as a CBRNE threat: especially as a hazard to children.44
Compare the inial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic (early 2020) to the U.S. Opioid Crisis
at this same meframe. Several federal agencies, including FEMA, as well as many states45
have taken on a Preparedness/Prevenon/Protecon role, in passing along community
preparedness/prevenon material46 regarding opioids from the Drug Enforcement Agency
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(DEA). The opioid crisis, while not a pandemic, could be considered endemic, as the U.S.
White House, many U.S. states, and other naons are now considering COVID-19. Like the
Opioid Crisis, COVID-19 is now an unfortunate part of everyone’s daily lives in some way or
another: our ‘New Normal’.
While an aempt to provide whole-of-government soluons to a naonwide crisis, the tools
and techniques – the tradecra - of FEMA and state/territorial emergency management
enes, may not be the best for endemic, steady-state, or ‘blue sky’ incidents. COVID-19
will soon follow this same path as the Opioid Crisis – as well as the seasonal u47 – the future
impacts will not be considered catastrophic disasters by the public. There is no longer an
outrage factor48 associated with COVID-19 or any other pandemic occurring today. Can any
naon ‘defeat’ an ‘enemy’ such as addicon or a pandemic? These terms sound more like war
than they do emergency management.
One recommendaon for a replacement to the needed federal-level whole-of-government
operaonal management grouping is to ulize the exisng U.S. Federal Execuve Boards49,
which are organized through the White House’s Oce of Personnel Management. This group,
formed by a 1961 U.S. Presidenal Direcve50 from the Kennedy Administraon, could be
the federal government equivalent of the Naonal Voluntary Organizaons Acve in Disaster
(NVOAD)51 and provide beer communicaon, collaboraon, coordinaon, and cooperaon
amongst U.S. federal enes:
Federal Execuve Boards (FEBs) perform highly valuable funcons. Specically, they provide:
• a forum for the exchange of informaon between Washington and the eld about
programs, management strategies, and administrave challenges;
• a point of coordinaon for the development and operaon of Federal programs having
common characteriscs;
• a means of communicaon through which Washington can strengthen the eld
understanding and support of management iniaves and concerns; and
• Federal representaon and involvement within their communies.
The FEBs implement these funcons, under the direcon of the Oce of Personnel
Management. Examples of their acvies are:
• the disseminaon of informaon on Administraon iniaves,
• the sharing of technical knowledge and resources in procurement, human resources
management, and informaon technology,
• implementaon of the local Combined Federal Campaign,
• the pooling of resources to provide, as eciently as possible, and at the least possible
cost to the taxpayers, common services such as training courses, and alternave dispute
resoluon consorums,
• encouragement of employee iniaves and beer performance through special
recognion and other incenve programs, and
• emergency operaons, such as under hazardous weather condions and natural and man-
made disasters; responding to blood donaon needs; and communicang related leave
policies. (Federal Execuve Boards, p. 1).52
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Another recommendaon has already commenced. Viewing naonal and global pandemics as
a naonal concern requires a whole-of-government unied command and control, one made
through a war-powers lens, which is a beer approach than that of an emergency management
view. Recently, the non-governmental Biparsan Commission on Biodefense produced a report53
on how the U.S. could put an end to pandemics within ten years. Their Athena Agenda54 focuses
more on Prevenon and Protecon, and while it had recommendaons to idenfy beer ways
to support federal-level connuity of government during pandemics, it did not address the
whole community leadership needed to support the needs of the public itself.
Finally, a more comprehensive AAR/IP document should be wrien and published, showing how
to beer respond and recover from the next global pandemic: one which involves both whole-
community partnerships and whole-of-government collaboraon, communicaon, coordinaon,
and cooperaon, rather than applying emergency management doctrine and pracces.
About the Author
Michael Prasad is a Cered Emergency Manager® from the Internaonal Associaon of
Emergency Managers – USA (IAEM-USA) and is a senior research analyst for Barton Dunant –
Emergency Management Training and Consulng (www.bartondunant.com). Mr. Prasad is an
emergency management praconer-scholar and the former assistant director of the Oce
of Emergency Management for the New Jersey State Department of Children and Families and
a former director of disaster funcons for the American Red Cross – New Jersey Region. He
is the vice president for the IAEM-USA Region 2 group and the new chair of the IAEM-USA’s
naonal Children and Disaster Caucus. He holds a master’s degree in Emergency and Disaster
Management from American Public University and also writes Emergency Management
Intelligence analysis for their Naonal Security Policy and Analysis Organizaon (hps://www.
nspao-apus.org/). Views expressed are solely his and may not reect the ocial posion of any
of these organizaons or groups. He may be reached at info@bartondunant.com .
Notes
1. William E. Barton, The Life of Clara Barton Founder of the American Red Cross, 1922, 359, (as cited in Brew ton,
2015, https://suebrewton.com/2015/12/31/no-clara-barton-did-not-write-that/).
2. Marek Kochańczyk, et al., “Super-Spreading Events Initiated the Exponential Growth Phase of COVID-19
with ℛ 0 Higher Than Initially Estimated,” Royal Society Open Science 7, no. 9 (2020): 200786–. https://doi.
org/10.1098/rsos.200786.
3. Fawzia Gibson-Fall, “Militar y ℛesponses to COVID-19, Emerging Trends in Global Civil-Military
Engagements,” Review of International Studies 47, no. 2 (2021): 155–70. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0260210521000048.
4. Savannah Bergquist, et al., “COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States,” Health Policy and Technology 9, no. 4
(2020): 623–38. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hlpt.2020.08.007.
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14 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
5. Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System Incident Complexity
Guide Preparedness, Planning and Training, June 2021, 3, https://ww w.fema.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/nims-incident-complexity-guide.pdf.
6. Dale Dominey-Howes, “Hazards and Disasters in the Anthropocene: Some Critical ℛeflections for the
Future,” Geoscience Letters 5, no. 1 (2018): 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40562-018-0107-x.
7. Jason G. Matheny, “ℛeducing the ℛisk of Human Extinction,” Risk Analysis 27, no. 5 (2007): 1335– 44. https://
doi .org/10.1111/ j .15 3 9 - 6 924. 2 0 0 7.00960.x .
8. Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System Incident Complexity
Guide Preparedness, Planning, and Training, 18.
9. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, Februar y 2022, 23, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-
Unclassified-ℛeport.pdf.
10. Suwan Shen, et al., “Challenges to Maintaining Disaster ℛelief Supply Chains in Island Communities:
Disaster Preparedness and ℛesponse in Honolulu, Hawai’I,” Natural Hazards (Dordrecht) 114, no. 2 (2022):
1829–55. ht tps://doi.or g/10.1007/s11069 -022-05 449 -x.
11. Ibid.
12. U.S. Department of Homeland Securit y, “List of Validated Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs)
by Department,” n.d., https://www.dhs.gov/publication/primary-mission-essential-functions-pmefs-
department#:~:text=Primary%20Mission%20Essential%20Functions%20(PMEFs)%20are%20those%20
functions%20that%20need,(FEMA)%20National%20Community%20Coordinator.
13. Christine Crudo Blackburn and Sayali Shelke, “The Lingering Impact of Hurricane Katrina: Examining the
Physical Health, Mental Health, and ℛacial Equity Impacts of Disaster ℛesponse,” Journal of Emergency
Management (Weston, Mass.) 20, no. 1 (2021): 9–15. https://doi.org/10.5055/jem.0629.
14. S. Islam, et al., “New Coronavirus Variants are Creating More Challenges to Global Healthcare System: A
Brief ℛeport on the Current Knowledge,”Clinical Pathology, 2022;15. doi:10.1177/2632010X 22107558 4 .
15. Michael Prasad, “Formalizing the ℛole of Intelligence & Investigation, April 2021, https://www.
domesticpreparedness.com/preparedness/formalizing-the-role-of-intelligence-investigation/.
16. Federal Emergency Management Agency (@FEMA), “Disaster Efforts Work Best When They’re Locally
Executed, State Managed & Federally Supported: The ℛesponse to Delta Along With Other ℛecent Storms
On The Gulf,” Twitter, October 11, 2020, 2:00 p.m. https://twitter.com/fema/status/1315351701906509824 .
17. U.S Department of Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Chiefs of Staff,” n.d., https://www.jcs.mil/.
18. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, “Office of the Surgeon General (OSG), n.d., https://www.
hhs.gov/surgeongeneral/index.html .
19. The Center for Emergency Management Intelligence ℛesearch, https://cemir.org.
20. Michael Prasad, “Formalizing the ℛole of Intelligence & Investigation.”
21. U.S. Depar tment of Homeland Security, “FEMA Approved Intelligence Analyst Training Courses,” n.d.,
https://www.dhs.gov/fema-approved-intelligence-analyst-training-courses.
22. U.S. Department of Homeland Security United States Coast Guard, “United States Coast Guard
Intelligence,” n.d., https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Intelligence-CG-2/ .
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15 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
23. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Office of the Director of National Intelligence,” n.d., https://
www.dni.gov/index.php .
24. Asha M. George and John T. O’Brien, “Bipartisan Commission Says Nation Unprepared for Biological
Events,” March 2022, https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/commentary/bipartisan-commission-says-
nation-unprepared-for-biological-events/.
25. Paul ℛ Shafer, “Expanded Unemployment Benefits and Their Implications for Health During the COVID 19
Pandemic,” Health Services Research 57, no. 1 (2021): 12–14. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.13881.
26. Thomas ℛ. Sadler, Pandemic Economics, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon. ℛoutledge, 2021.
27. William P. King, et al., “Emergency ventilator for COVID-19,” December 2020, https://doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pone.0244963.
28. Michael Pignone, “America’s Unrecognized Health Workforce: Postal Workers,” July 2020, https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11606-020-06080-x.
29. Jennifer Cohen and Yana van der Muelen ℛodgers, “Contributing Factors to Personal Protective
Equipment Shortages During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” December 2020, https://dx.doi.org/10.1016%2Fj.
ypmed.2020.106263.
30. Elizabeth Fussell, “The Long-Term ℛecovery of New Orleans’ Population After Hurricane Katrina,” American
Behavioral Scientist, 59(10), 1231-1245. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764215591181.
31. Valeria Saladino, et al., “Healthcare Professionals, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, and COVID-19: A ℛeview
of the Literature,” January 2022, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2021.795221.
32. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services Substance Abuse and Mental Health Ser vices
Administration, “Coronavirus (COVID-19),” n.d., https://www.samhsa.gov/coronavirus.
33. B. Kleim and M. Westphal, “Mental Health in First ℛesponders: A ℛeview and ℛecommendation
for Prevention and Inter vention Strategies,” Traumatology, 17(4), 17-24. https://doi.
org /10.1177/15347 656114 2 9 079.
34. Beverly A Cigler, “Fighting COVID-19 in the United States with Federalism and Other Constitutional and
Statutory Authority,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 51, no. 4 (2021): 673-92. https://doi.org/10.1093/
publius/pjab021.
35. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, “The All Hazards National Mutual Aid System,” n.d., https://
www.emacweb.org/.
36. The U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, “ The Emergency System for Advance ℛegistration of
Volunteer Health Professionals,” n.d., https://www.phe.gov/esarvhp/pages/about.aspx.
37. Alejando E. Camacho and ℛobert L. Glicksman, “Structured to Fail: Lessons from the Trump
Administration’s Faulty Pandemic Planning and ℛesponse,” 2021.
38. Jeremy Howard, et al., “An Evidence ℛeview of Face Masks Against COVID-19”, January 2021, https://doi.
org/10.107 3/pnas.2014564118.
39. Daniel M. Gerstein, “The Strategic National Stockpile and COVID-19 ℛethinking the Stockpile,” Santa
Monica, C A: ℛAND Corporation, 2020. https://ww w.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/C TA530-1.html.
40. ℛebecca Wallace, et al., “Out of an Abundance of Caution: COVID-19 and Health ℛisk Frames in Canadian
News Media,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 54 (2), (2021): 449–62. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0008423921000214.
HSAJ Pracademic Aairs | Volume 3 – Article 2 - August 2023 | WW W.HSAJ.ORG
16 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
41. Quote Investigator, “If You Fail To Prepare You Are Preparing To Fail,” n.d., https://quoteinvestigator.
com/2018/07/08/plan/.
42. Cecelia Smith-Schoewalder, “WHO Says COVID-19 Pandemic Isn’t Over After Biden’s Controversial
ℛemarks,” U.S. News & World Report, September 2022, https://www.usnews.com/news/health-news/
articles/2022-09-22/who-says-covid-19-pandemic-isnt-over-after-bidens-controversial-remarks.
43. Christopher KC Lai, et al., “COVID-19 Pandemic Af ter Omicron,”Hong Kong Medical Journal28, no. 3 (06,
2022): 196. https://doi.org/10.12809/hkmj215130.
44. David N. Durrheim, et al., “A Dangerous Measles Future Looms Beyond the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Nature
Medicine 27, no. 3 (2021): 360–61. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-021-01237-5.
45. Nebraska Preparedness Partnership, “Emergencies Happen!” n.d., https://www.neprep.org/ .
46. U.S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration, “One Pill Can Kill,” n.d., https://www.dea.
gov/onepill.
47. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, “Flu Season,” n.d., https://ww w.cdc.gov/flu/season/index.
html.
48. Peter M. Sandman, “ℛisk = Hazard + Outrage,” n.d., https://www.psandman.com/index-OM.
htm#:~:text=In%20the%20mid%2D1980s%20I,%E2%80%9Cthe%20outrage%20factors%E2%80%9D)%20
are.
49. The White House Office of Personnel Management, “Federal Executive Boards,” n.d., https://www.feb.gov.
50. The White House Office of Personnel Management, “Presidential Directive,” November 1961, https://www.
feb.gov/about/presidential-directive/ .
51. National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, “We are National VOAD,” n.d., https://w ww.nvoad.org.
52. The White House Off ice of Personnel Management, “About,” n.d https://www.feb.gov/about/ .
53. The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, “ The U.S. Can End Pandemics Within A Decade,” April 2022,
https://biodefensecommission.org/the-u-s-can-end-pandemics-within-a-decade/ .
54. The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, The Athena Agenda Advancing the Apollo Program for
Biodefense, April 2022, https://biodefensecommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Athena-ℛeport_
v6_web.pdf .
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