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Global Pandemics are Extinction- level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management

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Abstract and Figures

Emergency Management, whether conceived as a management system or an operational unit of government, should not be in the ‘business’ of managing global pandemics. While pandemics are certainly biological incidents - and smaller pandemics are included as part of Emergency Management’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) plans and protocols - the aspects of a global pandemic extend beyond the capabilities of both the field of Emergency Management and its practice as a whole. Government’s command decisions to act during a global pandemic, may start out aligned with the standard Emergency Management/ Disaster Phase Cycle mission actions of Preparedness/Protection/Prevention, Response, Recovery, and Mitigation, but as the pandemic progresses, those command decisions quickly become reprioritized away from the doctrinal standards and practices of emergency management.
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Global Pandemics are Extinction-
level Events and Should not be
Coordinated Solely through
National or Jurisdictional
Emergency Management
By Michael Prasad
HSAJ | Pracademic Aairs
HSAJ Pracademic Aairs | Volume 3 – Article 2 - August 2023 | WW W.HSAJ.ORG
2 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
Abstract
Emergency Management, whether conceived as a management system or an operational
unit of government, should not be in the ‘business’ of managing global pandemics.
While pandemics are certainly biological incidents - and smaller pandemics are included
as part of Emergency Management’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and
Explosive (CBRNE) plans and protocols - the aspects of a global pandemic extend beyond
the capabilities of both the field of Emergency Management and its practice as a whole.
Government’s command decisions to act during a global pandemic, may start out aligned
with the standard Emergency Management/ Disaster Phase Cycle mission actions of
Preparedness/Protection/Prevention, Response, Recovery, and Mitigation, but as the
pandemic progesses, those command decisions quickly become reprioritized away from
the doctrinal standards and practices of emergency management.
Suggested Citation
Prasad, Michael. “Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be
Coordinated Solely through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management. Homeland
Security Affairs: Pracademic Affairs 3, Article 2 (Aug, 2023). www.hsaj.org/articles/22285.
Introduction
This arcle will make the case that global pandemics should not be in the planning,
organizaon, equipping, training, and exercising responsibilies solely for emergency
management enes – they need to be managed through a whole-of-government/whole-
community approach using other management techniques. Some of the lessons learned from
COVID-19 should include a strategic paradigm shi away from the “tyranny of precedent”1
which dictates that all disasters must be resolved through emergency management pracces
and principles. This arcle’s premises include the following.
Emergency management pracce is jurisdiconally bound and generally follows a ‘boom-
up’ approach, with resources for unmet needs coming from a higher level.
The size and scope of the management system for any disaster response and recovery
eorts are limited. At some point, the response eorts must become a whole-of-
government approach, and therefore change management systems, because whole
governments operate under a polical management system instead of the ad-hoc
temporary structure of an emergency management system.
Emergency management applies a straight-line approach to disasters, in a cyclical paern. Even
if there is an overlap between adjacent disaster cycle phases, they generally occur in order.
Emergency management follows a unity of eort model; everyone in the response and
recovery Incident Command System (ICS) is working towards the same goals and the same
end-state.
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3 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
Emergency management - through any ICS in any country - is organized dierently than
steady-state polical-oriented governmental day-to-day operaons. COVID-19, like any
worldwide impacng incident, turned those systems upside-down. The ICS organizaonal
branches of Command, Intelligence, Finance/Administraon, Logiscs, Operaons, and
Planning for every level of government were signicantly impeded during COVID-19.
Global Pandemics are Bigger
than Anyone’s Breadbox
These exponenal “super-spreading events”2 should not be considered a ‘normal’ escalaon
from an endemic biological incident within a single country (i.e., ratcheted upward from a
lesser level CBRNE incident), nor one where a pandemic expands beyond a single naon’s
borders. One of the main constructs of emergency management is that it is designed to be
jurisdiconally limited within a single naon. Emergency management is defensive and supports
the homeland . While aid and advice can be provided from one naon to another, the incident
is sll managed within a single country or component subjurisdicons. Governmental missions
which are predominately oensive, such as intervenons, interdicons, interrupons, and
isolaons, are single-enty missions generally to be delegated to law enforcement enes
(including Public Health Ocers) domescally and the naon’s military and naonal defense
agencies, internaonally. In many countries, including the United States, military and naonal
defense agencies were ulized domescally as part of these oensive missions.3
In the United States, the denion of what is an emergency, or a disaster, is very uid. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has an incident typing system, where ve is
the lowest in terms of resources required and one is the highest, as shown in Figure 1:
Figure 1 – FEMA Incident Types
Credit: FEMA - hps://emilms.fema.gov/IS2200/groups/162.html
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4 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
Emergency management has as one of its standards to “ratchet up and down” the resource
support needed, based on the incident type. For example, when a Type 4 incident is sll
scaling up – meaning not yet under control or expanding – addional resources should be
requested as if the incident could grow to a Type 3. While COVID-19 may have started in the
United States as a small outbreak in Washington state on January 20, 2020, it expanded
exponenally across the enre country in a maer of weeks. And at the same me, the virus
spread worldwide.4 The size and scope moved the incident typing o the scale5; there were
no addional resources available anywhere, nor was there proper planning in place for this
level of incident. There are hazards and threats for which emergency management cannot
plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise because they are too complex. One way to quanfy
them is to describe them as Type 0 – Exncon Level Events.6
When the phrase ‘Exncon-Level Event’7 is menoned, thoughts turn towards world-
changing events – such as asteroid strikes, nuclear war, and even climate change/global
warming. None of those tragedies have their response and recovery missions coordinated
through their naonal emergency management process. There is a cap to the maximum
of maximums of the capabilies and capacies for naonal and jurisdiconal emergency
management agencies and departments – as well as the concepts of the Incident Command
System within the eld of emergency management itself. When a disaster expands8 beyond
the capability of the internal sub-jurisdicons within a naon, that jurisdicon usually
requests assistance upward, all the way to the naonal level for support. When the naon
itself needs support beyond its own capabilies, it can choose to reach out to partner naons,
intergovernmental organizaons, or non-governmental organizaons for addional support
(i.e., NATO, the United Naons, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Naonal Sociees across the
globe, etc.). When all the naons are impacted at the same me by the same incident - and
there is no one unimpacted le to help – that constutes a worldwide catastrophe. Can any
such incident be managed within a single naon’s borders? Maybe, but not by or through
emergency management, since the decisions about all aspects of the disaster phase cycle
missions of Preparedness/Prevenon/Protecon, Response, Recovery, and Migaon are a
maer of naonal security and economic development.9
Disasters are usually straightforward
and straight-lined
Another emergency management construct is that disaster phase cycles usually need to occur
linearly, and successively, even if they overlap. Most large-scale incidents look something like
this, as shown in Figure 2:
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5 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
Figure 2 - FEMA’s Naonal Disaster Response and Recovery Frameworks
Credit: FEMA - hps://www.fema.gov/sites/default/les/2020-06/naonal_disaster_recovery_framework_2nd.pdf
Emergency management can comprehend and work in this model, allocating staff and
resources into distinct roles (phases), and collaborating with whole-community partners
along the way. This same structure works for the smallest and most localized incidents
through the vast majority of the largest domestic disasters possible – even for complex
coordinated attacks and concurrent disasters such as civil unrest after a hurricane, or
during a contested national election. As long as there are additional resources that can be
allocated and assigned to response and recovery missions,and there is a common set of
strategic and operational objective priorities of life safety, incident stabilization, and then
asset/property protection, emergency management’s use of unified command and control
can work effectively.
Emergency managers can also understand that their steady-state work may be applied
to any part or multiple parts of the disaster phase cycle. This is the concept of Disaster
Readiness or Disaster Resiliency. See Figure 2 for a graphic representation of Disaster
Readiness or Resiliency. While they are preparing for a hurricane, emergency management
can apply mitigation efforts to help in economic recovery. These are funding sources and
results from a single action or steady-state project. This works in ‘blue sky’10 mode. On
the other hand, in ‘gray sky’11 mode, emergency managers revert to the linear model.
Politicians focus on other priorities. While the continuity of national primary mission
essential functions12 is a general strategic priority, a nation’s security and economic
growth have always overridden the doctrinal standards and practices for which emergency
management is designed to follow and almost always found in this order: life safety,
incident stabilization, and then asset/property protection. Goals of national security and/
or economic growth do not always follow those doctrinal standards. More to the point,
when the political management system overtakes the emergency management system
of operations, disasters become more negatively impactful to those who are socially
vulnerable and disenfranchised.13
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Figure 3 - Phases of Incidents, Emergencies, and Disasters
Credit: Barton Dunant – www. BartonDunant.com. Used with permission.
When protecve measures for life safety are not implemented consistently and clearly,
or there are objecons by the public or governmental/polical leaders to priorize asset/
property protecon above incident stabilizaon and life safety, emergency management
can no longer be the doctrinal model to use. When there is not a common unied incident
command system where branches and secons (local and state/tribal/territorial governments
through home rule or autonomous sovereignty) do not follow and adhere to the “Planning P”
process, emergency management will fail. When situaonal awareness and intelligence are
not shared collaboravely between groups, when economic pressures supersede life safety
concerns, and when logiscs supply-chain systems are unsupported for a naonal disaster or
warme eorts, emergency management will fail.
When a global pandemic - or any disaster that consumes an enre naon by itself - is framed
along the disaster phase cycles, it is not dened as two-dimensionally linear, but rather as
three-dimensionally spiral, as shown in Figure 4.
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7 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
Figure 4 – Fakhruddin, et al. – graphic from ‘Are we there yet?
The transion from response to recovery for the COVID-19 pandemic’
Note: hps://doi.org/hps://doi.org/10.1016/j.pdisas.2020.100102 Creave Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0
Fakhruddin et al. correctly idened that in a pandemic both local, state, and naonal
jurisdicons can be in response, recovery, migaon, and preparedness/prevenon/
protecon at the same me. A municipality may be recovering from one variant, while at the
same me responding to the next one. U.S. states saw policy changes – including reversals
of social distancing rules, PPE usage, etc. – based on new variants14, which came at a faster
pace than the normal linear process emergency management expects for the disaster phase
cycle. COVID-19 was like experiencing back-to-back-to-back tornadoes in the same town.
Without a complete paradigm shi to a dierent model of resource management – including
governmental operaons stang – to aid the public through concurrent waves of divergent
acvies, a community cannot survive a pandemic by using its tradional emergency
management model of support.
All for one, and one for all
Finally, emergency management has as a foundaonal principle, the use of an incident
management system in a “unity of eort” approach. Whether it is a single command, unied
command, or even area command on larger geographic incidents, the structure remains
the same. Whether it is the ICS from the Naonal Incident Management System (NIMS), the
standardized emergency management system used in California, or any other system, the
aspects of coordinaon, cooperaon, collaboraon, and communicaon are hallmarks of
being properly executed. Another foundaonal principle is the ability to connuously source
and supply a sustained incident Response and Recovery – without interference from any
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8 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
governmental or non-governmental levels or enes. It is impossible to achieve both of these
principles in a naonal-level pandemic.
An abbreviated high-level analysis of the emergency management-inspired Response and
Recovery federal missions for COVID-19 in the United States further validates the premise that
global pandemics should not be conducted by naonal or jurisdiconal emergency management
enes. Below, I will detail the disconnects during this worldwide pandemic via any incident
management system’s major branches of command, intelligence15, nance/administraon,
logiscs, operaons, and planning.
Command
Federal-level emergency management enes were never in the posion to lead and
coordinate all external incident command system branches, especially across every state and
territory at the same me. Their role has always been to provide federal resources in support16
of states and territories. The governors of states (and leaders of sovereign tribal naons, as
well as leaders of U.S. territories) are the designated commanders-in-chief for their respecve
jurisdicons. During a naonal disaster, this model does not t with a tradional unied
command structure found in emergency management. There is no domesc disaster equivalent
of the U.S. military’s Pentagon, nor a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta.17 Since the U.S.
poron of a global pandemic is predominately a public health response, the newly elevated
Administraon for Strategic Preparedness Response or the presidenally appointed U.S.
Surgeon General18 - as the naon’s chief medical ocer and leader of the naonwide uniformed
public health ocers - might be someone to be considered to lead a unied command
structure for a global pandemic public health response. The challenge though, is that both of
those enes and funconalies are currently not a naonal command one, only an advisory
one. Like FEMA, the U.S. Public Health Service commissioned ocers can only support the
states’ eorts. The United States has never been a naon that orders its constuents to give up
their freedom of choice when it comes to individual healthcare. These ethical and legal conicts
belong to the highest levels of government – and should not be delegated to be aconed and/or
solved by and through emergency management.
Intelligence
There was a constant need for Emergency Management Intelligence (EMINT)19, both from
external and internal threats and hazards to any naon. External threats included new variants
of COVID-19, a dierent pandemic virus spread, the possibility of add-on aacks from foreign
actors who viewed a country’s defense capabilies as weakened, severe weather incidents,
etc. Internal threats included pandemic Response and Recovery mission resource shoralls,
concurrent domesc violent extremism, annual elecon results integrity concerns, overall
economic pressures, etc. When many U.S. states were allowed to limit the informaon – and
intelligence – they shared upward to the federal government as to the demographics and
locaons of COVID-19 posives mortality and morbidity, this signicantly hindered one of the
naonal-level concepts of planning (situaonal awareness and disaster assessment). When
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9 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
any naon does not adequately consider socially vulnerable populaons – including those of
impacted people within the Sovereign Tribal Naons within the United States and cizens of
other countries – it does not follow one of the newer (and historically missing or decient)
elements of: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion. Knowing where and how COVID-19 was impacng
all of our divergent populaons, is key to resource management and metrics analysis.
There is currently no established standing role for EMINT in emergency management, only
the possibility that Intelligence/Invesgaon20 – more terrorism and law enforcement-centric
– can be applied to the Incident Command System, as warranted. While FEMA is a unit of
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), it appears to not have its own Intelligence
funconality21, and rather curates the eorts of other units for terrorism/homeland security
domesc incidents, when requested. The U.S. Coast Guard, another unit of DHS, has a clearer
understanding of the role of Intelligence22 in the Incident Command System, but a future
naonal pandemic would probably not be managed by them. The U.S. Federal Government
already has a robust collecon of intelligence gathering, analysis, and disseminaon groups
known as the Intelligence Community, managed through the presidenally appointed Director
of Naonal Intelligence.23 A new organizaonal construct24 – outside of emergency management
– to manage the U.S. poron of a global pandemic must include a direct report to the unied
command for emergency management intelligence.
Finance/Administration
One posive aspect of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States has been the almost
unanimous endorsement of U.S. Federal Government nancial support to the states for
pandemic-related acvies. Following the model of presidenally declared disasters, the
government routed federal resources – and funding – through the Staord Act. While FEMA
is certainly the naon’s expert on disaster funding and administraon, the global aspect of
this pandemic quickly expanded beyond the capabilies established through the Staord Act.
New Congressional legislaon was required for new funding streams, and new administrave
protocols and procedures for the states were established. For example, disaster unemployment
insurance is a standard tool in the toolbox of FEMA and the U.S. Department of Labor for
helping the states during declared disasters. COVID-19 required an exponenal upgrade to
this on a naonal scale, to include addional funding to COVID-19 impacted individuals, which
was well beyond the capabilies of FEMA to administer. State-level Labor Departments quickly
became overwhelmed25, and the incident became economically destabilized throughout
2020 and 2021. The White House – in both administraons - created and managed pandemic
Response and Recovery missions for economic health26, which may have conicted with public
health. Again, depriorizing life safety can be a naon’s goal, but it is not aligned with the
doctrine and pracces of emergency management.
Logistics
At the start of the pandemic in the U.S., there were immediate shortages of crical supplies
and equipment, both for the public and for responders. The development and distribuon of
vaccines was a whole-community mission – even triggering the Naonal Defense Producon Act
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10 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
– and involved private corporaons in both the pharmaceucal industry, as well as the supply-
chain management industry. Automove manufacturers switched producon27 to venlators.
Federal agencies not normally associated with disasters, such as the U.S. Post Oce28, were
ulized for the logiscal distribuon of supplies and informaon. In many U.S. states – especially
in the rst few months of the COVID-19 pandemic – there were logiscs supply and stang
shortages, and some were compeng with each other29 for resources. There are no current U.S.
legal constructs to manage the deconicon of these resource requests at a single command
point, which is something that the Logiscs branch within emergency management’s ICS
typically performs on large-scale incidents.
Stang is a key part of logiscs. The long duraon of a naonal pandemic, along with an
inability to refresh sta (i.e., having enough qualied sta to demobilize, decompress, and
then remobilize) are both more war-like than disaster-like. While there are aspects of declared
disasters that extend beyond short-term Recovery into longer-term Recovery and Migaon30 -
such as Public Assistance work – they tend to devolve away from emergency management into
roune day-to-day work. The signicant concern about Post-Traumac Stress Disorder amongst
healthcare professionals, caused by COVID-19 work31 is a workforce safety issue akin to what
the U.S. Veterans Aairs department sees in returning military forces. FEMA has engaged the
U.S. Department of Jusce’s assistance in establishing post-traumac stress disorder counseling
programs, starng with the Oklahoma Bombing in 1995. The current programs32 from the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administraon provide counseling for as long
as needed by disaster vicms, but they have also become overwhelmed by simultaneous
requests from all the states and territories. Emergency management is sll not fully engaged in
comprehensive care for the mental health and wellness of its workforce especially as needed by
responders, including healthcare workers in health disasters.33
Operations
Varying levels of collaboraon and adherence to public health and other direcves occurred
within the United States, as well as in other countries. This was true for both response/recovery
enes themselves, and the public. In the U.S., aempts at applying a homogeneous set of
Response missions to all the states and territories were met with the same resistance to other
Federalism aspects34, protected by the 10th Amendment. Acceptance of non-pharmaceucal
intervenons (NPIs) and then pharmaceucal intervenons were contenous at best and
life-threatening at worst. Governmental response organizaons at the state and local levels
were not prepared for the connuity of government needed to support a long-term sustained
response eort. If this were a mul-state wildland re, instead of a pandemic, there probably
would not be resistance by any governmental enty for any aspect of federal operaonal
support, and the mutual-aid aspects35 from state to state would prevail, as the resources
available from non-impacted states are already consistently trained, typed, and credenaled.
That is not the case with any pandemic: All the states are not parcipang in healthcare mutual
aid compacts36 and the nature of a naonal (or global) pandemic means there are no resources
available from non-impacted jurisdicons. These disconnects require a dierent naonal
management system, other than the current model of emergency management.
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11 Global Pandemics a re Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
Planning
While there were exisng U.S. naonal pandemic plans established before the COVID-19
pandemic, in most parts of the country they were not followed.37 So many acvies of
government (NPIs, vaccinaons, boosters, mask usage, social distancing, business shutdowns,
travel restricons, etc.) seemed to be unplanned and haphazard in their implementaon. The
governmental instrucons – and reacon to a lack of suciently distributed supply – for mask/
respirator usage38 by both healthcare workers and the public is a prime example. A mely
release of supplies from the strategic naonal stockpile and use of the Defense Producon Act39
must be reviewed and revised, ulizing a war-faring model – as they were designed for – and
not an emergency management one.
What was heard me and again from governmental polical leadership was that COVID-19
decisions were made “out of an abundance of cauon” as if restricons and countermeasures
were not planned as part of any pandemic threat.40 Those decisions usually signal that
governments are either not following their exisng emergency management plans or they have
no plans to execute. The quote usually aributed to Benjamin Franklin41 of ‘If you are failing to
plan, you are planning to fail’ is always appropriate to emergency management in any scenario
(please recall Franklin founded the rst re department in the United States). Emergency
management – when performed successfully - strictly follows a planning process.
Conclusion
In emergency management, post-mortem analysis and review of acons taken during the incident
response and recovery phases are incorporated into Aer-Acon Reporng/Improvement
Planning (AAR/IP) processes. Usually, this occurs in the migaon phase, once the response
phase is concluded and the interim and short-term recovery phase elements are concluded as
well. This arcle took an AAR/IP approach to object specically to any future singular use of
emergency management systems, doctrine, and pracce for global pandemics. Instead, global
pandemics – like any other exncon-level events - should be managed through a whole-of-
government/whole-community approach using other management techniques. As previously
noted, AAR/IPs are usually conducted once the incident is ‘declared’ concluded. While the World
Health Organizaon inially sounded the alarm for a public health emergency of internaonal
concern in January 2020, they have not said the COVID-19 pandemic is over, as of September
2022.42 COVID-19 will most likely never go away completely, but rather become endemic.43 As all
emergency managers know, disasters do not occur in a vacuum. As noted previously, hurricanes
occurred, civil unrest incidents transpired, and other disasters all happened while the naons of
the world were experiencing this pandemic. In 2022 in the United States and elsewhere, measles
reemerged as a CBRNE threat: especially as a hazard to children.44
Compare the inial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic (early 2020) to the U.S. Opioid Crisis
at this same meframe. Several federal agencies, including FEMA, as well as many states45
have taken on a Preparedness/Prevenon/Protecon role, in passing along community
preparedness/prevenon material46 regarding opioids from the Drug Enforcement Agency
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12 Global Pandemics a re Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
(DEA). The opioid crisis, while not a pandemic, could be considered endemic, as the U.S.
White House, many U.S. states, and other naons are now considering COVID-19. Like the
Opioid Crisis, COVID-19 is now an unfortunate part of everyone’s daily lives in some way or
another: our ‘New Normal’.
While an aempt to provide whole-of-government soluons to a naonwide crisis, the tools
and techniques – the tradecra - of FEMA and state/territorial emergency management
enes, may not be the best for endemic, steady-state, or ‘blue sky’ incidents. COVID-19
will soon follow this same path as the Opioid Crisis – as well as the seasonal u47the future
impacts will not be considered catastrophic disasters by the public. There is no longer an
outrage factor48 associated with COVID-19 or any other pandemic occurring today. Can any
naon ‘defeat’ an ‘enemy’ such as addicon or a pandemic? These terms sound more like war
than they do emergency management.
One recommendaon for a replacement to the needed federal-level whole-of-government
operaonal management grouping is to ulize the exisng U.S. Federal Execuve Boards49,
which are organized through the White House’s Oce of Personnel Management. This group,
formed by a 1961 U.S. Presidenal Direcve50 from the Kennedy Administraon, could be
the federal government equivalent of the Naonal Voluntary Organizaons Acve in Disaster
(NVOAD)51 and provide beer communicaon, collaboraon, coordinaon, and cooperaon
amongst U.S. federal enes:
Federal Execuve Boards (FEBs) perform highly valuable funcons. Specically, they provide:
a forum for the exchange of informaon between Washington and the eld about
programs, management strategies, and administrave challenges;
a point of coordinaon for the development and operaon of Federal programs having
common characteriscs;
a means of communicaon through which Washington can strengthen the eld
understanding and support of management iniaves and concerns; and
Federal representaon and involvement within their communies.
The FEBs implement these funcons, under the direcon of the Oce of Personnel
Management. Examples of their acvies are:
the disseminaon of informaon on Administraon iniaves,
the sharing of technical knowledge and resources in procurement, human resources
management, and informaon technology,
implementaon of the local Combined Federal Campaign,
the pooling of resources to provide, as eciently as possible, and at the least possible
cost to the taxpayers, common services such as training courses, and alternave dispute
resoluon consorums,
encouragement of employee iniaves and beer performance through special
recognion and other incenve programs, and
emergency operaons, such as under hazardous weather condions and natural and man-
made disasters; responding to blood donaon needs; and communicang related leave
policies. (Federal Execuve Boards, p. 1).52
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13 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
Another recommendaon has already commenced. Viewing naonal and global pandemics as
a naonal concern requires a whole-of-government unied command and control, one made
through a war-powers lens, which is a beer approach than that of an emergency management
view. Recently, the non-governmental Biparsan Commission on Biodefense produced a report53
on how the U.S. could put an end to pandemics within ten years. Their Athena Agenda54 focuses
more on Prevenon and Protecon, and while it had recommendaons to idenfy beer ways
to support federal-level connuity of government during pandemics, it did not address the
whole community leadership needed to support the needs of the public itself.
Finally, a more comprehensive AAR/IP document should be wrien and published, showing how
to beer respond and recover from the next global pandemic: one which involves both whole-
community partnerships and whole-of-government collaboraon, communicaon, coordinaon,
and cooperaon, rather than applying emergency management doctrine and pracces.
About the Author
Michael Prasad is a Cered Emergency Manager® from the Internaonal Associaon of
Emergency Managers – USA (IAEM-USA) and is a senior research analyst for Barton Dunant –
Emergency Management Training and Consulng (www.bartondunant.com). Mr. Prasad is an
emergency management praconer-scholar and the former assistant director of the Oce
of Emergency Management for the New Jersey State Department of Children and Families and
a former director of disaster funcons for the American Red Cross – New Jersey Region. He
is the vice president for the IAEM-USA Region 2 group and the new chair of the IAEM-USA’s
naonal Children and Disaster Caucus. He holds a master’s degree in Emergency and Disaster
Management from American Public University and also writes Emergency Management
Intelligence analysis for their Naonal Security Policy and Analysis Organizaon (hps://www.
nspao-apus.org/). Views expressed are solely his and may not reect the ocial posion of any
of these organizaons or groups. He may be reached at info@bartondunant.com .
Notes
1. William E. Barton, The Life of Clara Barton Founder of the American Red Cross, 1922, 359, (as cited in Brew ton,
2015, https://suebrewton.com/2015/12/31/no-clara-barton-did-not-write-that/).
2. Marek Kochańczyk, et al., “Super-Spreading Events Initiated the Exponential Growth Phase of COVID-19
with ℛ 0 Higher Than Initially Estimated,” Royal Society Open Science 7, no. 9 (2020): 200786–. https://doi.
org/10.1098/rsos.200786.
3. Fawzia Gibson-Fall, “Militar y ℛesponses to COVID-19, Emerging Trends in Global Civil-Military
Engagements,” Review of International Studies 47, no. 2 (2021): 155–70. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0260210521000048.
4. Savannah Bergquist, et al., “COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States,” Health Policy and Technology 9, no. 4
(2020): 623–38. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hlpt.2020.08.007.
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14 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
5. Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System Incident Complexity
Guide Preparedness, Planning and Training, June 2021, 3, https://ww w.fema.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/nims-incident-complexity-guide.pdf.
6. Dale Dominey-Howes, “Hazards and Disasters in the Anthropocene: Some Critical ℛeflections for the
Future,” Geoscience Letters 5, no. 1 (2018): 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40562-018-0107-x.
7. Jason G. Matheny, “ℛeducing the ℛisk of Human Extinction,” Risk Analysis 27, no. 5 (2007): 1335– 44. https://
doi .org/10.1111/ j .15 3 9 - 6 924. 2 0 0 7.00960.x .
8. Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System Incident Complexity
Guide Preparedness, Planning, and Training, 18.
9. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, Februar y 2022, 23, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-
Unclassified-ℛeport.pdf.
10. Suwan Shen, et al., “Challenges to Maintaining Disaster ℛelief Supply Chains in Island Communities:
Disaster Preparedness and ℛesponse in Honolulu, Hawai’I,” Natural Hazards (Dordrecht) 114, no. 2 (2022):
1829–55. ht tps://doi.or g/10.1007/s11069 -022-05 449 -x.
11. Ibid.
12. U.S. Department of Homeland Securit y, “List of Validated Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs)
by Department,” n.d., https://www.dhs.gov/publication/primary-mission-essential-functions-pmefs-
department#:~:text=Primary%20Mission%20Essential%20Functions%20(PMEFs)%20are%20those%20
functions%20that%20need,(FEMA)%20National%20Community%20Coordinator.
13. Christine Crudo Blackburn and Sayali Shelke, “The Lingering Impact of Hurricane Katrina: Examining the
Physical Health, Mental Health, and ℛacial Equity Impacts of Disaster ℛesponse,” Journal of Emergency
Management (Weston, Mass.) 20, no. 1 (2021): 9–15. https://doi.org/10.5055/jem.0629.
14. S. Islam, et al., “New Coronavirus Variants are Creating More Challenges to Global Healthcare System: A
Brief ℛeport on the Current Knowledge,”Clinical Pathology, 2022;15. doi:10.1177/2632010X 22107558 4 .
15. Michael Prasad, “Formalizing the ℛole of Intelligence & Investigation, April 2021, https://www.
domesticpreparedness.com/preparedness/formalizing-the-role-of-intelligence-investigation/.
16. Federal Emergency Management Agency (@FEMA), “Disaster Efforts Work Best When They’re Locally
Executed, State Managed & Federally Supported: The ℛesponse to Delta Along With Other ℛecent Storms
On The Gulf,” Twitter, October 11, 2020, 2:00 p.m. https://twitter.com/fema/status/1315351701906509824 .
17. U.S Department of Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Chiefs of Staff,” n.d., https://www.jcs.mil/.
18. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, “Office of the Surgeon General (OSG), n.d., https://www.
hhs.gov/surgeongeneral/index.html .
19. The Center for Emergency Management Intelligence ℛesearch, https://cemir.org.
20. Michael Prasad, “Formalizing the ℛole of Intelligence & Investigation.”
21. U.S. Depar tment of Homeland Security, “FEMA Approved Intelligence Analyst Training Courses,” n.d.,
https://www.dhs.gov/fema-approved-intelligence-analyst-training-courses.
22. U.S. Department of Homeland Security United States Coast Guard, “United States Coast Guard
Intelligence,” n.d., https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Intelligence-CG-2/ .
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15 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
23. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Office of the Director of National Intelligence,” n.d., https://
www.dni.gov/index.php .
24. Asha M. George and John T. O’Brien, “Bipartisan Commission Says Nation Unprepared for Biological
Events,” March 2022, https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/commentary/bipartisan-commission-says-
nation-unprepared-for-biological-events/.
25. Paul ℛ Shafer, “Expanded Unemployment Benefits and Their Implications for Health During the COVID 19
Pandemic,” Health Services Research 57, no. 1 (2021): 12–14. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.13881.
26. Thomas ℛ. Sadler, Pandemic Economics, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon. ℛoutledge, 2021.
27. William P. King, et al., “Emergency ventilator for COVID-19,” December 2020, https://doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pone.0244963.
28. Michael Pignone, “America’s Unrecognized Health Workforce: Postal Workers,” July 2020, https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11606-020-06080-x.
29. Jennifer Cohen and Yana van der Muelen ℛodgers, “Contributing Factors to Personal Protective
Equipment Shortages During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” December 2020, https://dx.doi.org/10.1016%2Fj.
ypmed.2020.106263.
30. Elizabeth Fussell, “The Long-Term ℛecovery of New Orleans’ Population After Hurricane Katrina,” American
Behavioral Scientist, 59(10), 1231-1245. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764215591181.
31. Valeria Saladino, et al., “Healthcare Professionals, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, and COVID-19: A ℛeview
of the Literature,” January 2022, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2021.795221.
32. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services Substance Abuse and Mental Health Ser vices
Administration, “Coronavirus (COVID-19),” n.d., https://www.samhsa.gov/coronavirus.
33. B. Kleim and M. Westphal, “Mental Health in First ℛesponders: A ℛeview and ℛecommendation
for Prevention and Inter vention Strategies,” Traumatology, 17(4), 17-24. https://doi.
org /10.1177/15347 656114 2 9 079.
34. Beverly A Cigler, “Fighting COVID-19 in the United States with Federalism and Other Constitutional and
Statutory Authority,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 51, no. 4 (2021): 673-92. https://doi.org/10.1093/
publius/pjab021.
35. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, “The All Hazards National Mutual Aid System,” n.d., https://
www.emacweb.org/.
36. The U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, “ The Emergency System for Advance ℛegistration of
Volunteer Health Professionals,” n.d., https://www.phe.gov/esarvhp/pages/about.aspx.
37. Alejando E. Camacho and ℛobert L. Glicksman, “Structured to Fail: Lessons from the Trump
Administration’s Faulty Pandemic Planning and ℛesponse,” 2021.
38. Jeremy Howard, et al., “An Evidence ℛeview of Face Masks Against COVID-19”, January 2021, https://doi.
org/10.107 3/pnas.2014564118.
39. Daniel M. Gerstein, “The Strategic National Stockpile and COVID-19 ℛethinking the Stockpile,” Santa
Monica, C A: ℛAND Corporation, 2020. https://ww w.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/C TA530-1.html.
40. ℛebecca Wallace, et al., “Out of an Abundance of Caution: COVID-19 and Health ℛisk Frames in Canadian
News Media,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 54 (2), (2021): 449–62. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0008423921000214.
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16 Global Pandemics are Extinction-level Events and Should not be Coordinated Solely
through National or Jurisdictional Emergency Management | By Michael Prasad
41. Quote Investigator, “If You Fail To Prepare You Are Preparing To Fail,” n.d., https://quoteinvestigator.
com/2018/07/08/plan/.
42. Cecelia Smith-Schoewalder, “WHO Says COVID-19 Pandemic Isn’t Over After Biden’s Controversial
ℛemarks,” U.S. News & World Report, September 2022, https://www.usnews.com/news/health-news/
articles/2022-09-22/who-says-covid-19-pandemic-isnt-over-after-bidens-controversial-remarks.
43. Christopher KC Lai, et al., “COVID-19 Pandemic Af ter Omicron,”Hong Kong Medical Journal28, no. 3 (06,
2022): 196. https://doi.org/10.12809/hkmj215130.
44. David N. Durrheim, et al., “A Dangerous Measles Future Looms Beyond the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Nature
Medicine 27, no. 3 (2021): 360–61. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-021-01237-5.
45. Nebraska Preparedness Partnership, “Emergencies Happen!” n.d., https://www.neprep.org/ .
46. U.S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration, “One Pill Can Kill,” n.d., https://www.dea.
gov/onepill.
47. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, “Flu Season,” n.d., https://ww w.cdc.gov/flu/season/index.
html.
48. Peter M. Sandman, “ℛisk = Hazard + Outrage,” n.d., https://www.psandman.com/index-OM.
htm#:~:text=In%20the%20mid%2D1980s%20I,%E2%80%9Cthe%20outrage%20factors%E2%80%9D)%20
are.
49. The White House Office of Personnel Management, “Federal Executive Boards,” n.d., https://www.feb.gov.
50. The White House Office of Personnel Management, “Presidential Directive,” November 1961, https://www.
feb.gov/about/presidential-directive/ .
51. National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, “We are National VOAD,” n.d., https://w ww.nvoad.org.
52. The White House Off ice of Personnel Management, “About,” n.d https://www.feb.gov/about/ .
53. The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, “ The U.S. Can End Pandemics Within A Decade,” April 2022,
https://biodefensecommission.org/the-u-s-can-end-pandemics-within-a-decade/ .
54. The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, The Athena Agenda Advancing the Apollo Program for
Biodefense, April 2022, https://biodefensecommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Athena-ℛeport_
v6_web.pdf .
Copyright
Copyright © 2023 by the author(s). Homeland Security Aairs is an academic journal available
free of charge to individuals and instuons. Because the purpose of this publicaon is the
widest possible disseminaon of knowledge, copies of this journal and the arcles contained
herein may be printed or downloaded and redistributed for personal, research or educaonal
purposes free of charge and without permission. Any commercial use of Homeland Security
Aairs or the arcles published herein is expressly prohibited without the wrien consent of
the copyright holder. The copyright of all arcles published in Homeland Security Aairs rests
with the author(s) of the arcle. Homeland Security Aairs is the online journal of the Naval
Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS).
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Purpose: The purpose of the research discussed in this paper is to better understand the negative health outcomes resulting from Hurricane Katrina and the disaster response that followed. This understanding can inform future disaster response. Design: We conducted 10 in-depth interviews with individuals who lived in New Orleans at the time of Hurricane Katrina. We conducted thematic analysis on the interview content and identified patterns across all 10 interviews. Findings: Four primary patterns emerged across all interviews. These were: (1) FEMA's response to the crisis created greater physical and mental health hazards for interviewees; (2) Hurricane Katrina led to long-term mental health issues for interviewees, even those who evacuated before the storm; (3) displacement from homes following the storm typically resulted in overcrowded living conditions, which increased interviewees' risk of infectious disease; and (4) the discrimination faced by interviewees in the months and years following Hurricane Katrina had a profound and lasting impact on their well-being. Originality: Numerous studies have been conducted to understand the mental health impacts of disaster and a limited number have looked at the physical health impacts or the threat of infectious disease. This study is unique because it incorporates both mental and physical health impacts, but also examines how disaster response itself plays a role in health outcomes for survivors. Additionally, this paper also incorporates the role of racial inequities in disaster response and how those inequities impact survivor health.