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Emociones y sesgos implícitos en el derecho. ¿Fenómenos similares?
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El propósito de este trabajo es hacer disponible a los actores jurídicos y a la sociedad el conocimiento sobre los procesos psicológicos imbuidos en la toma de decisiones del actor judicial, en razón de que este no únicamente está guiado por la ley y por el derecho, sino también por ideas preconcebidas y valores en los que se fundamenta su concepción del mundo. De ahí que valga cuestionarse cuánta es la convicción personal del juzgador acerca de la ocurrencia de los hechos, qué motiva su decisión o en qué medida sus propias proyecciones, aversiones o la opinión pública inciden en la decisión judicial. Con esta intención se analiza el rol que desempeña el juez en el proceso penal acusatorio, distinguiendo el rol del juzgador con sistemas de corte inquisitivo, y específicamente se hace referencia al modelo de justicia en México. También se hace una crítica a las categorizaciones que se han hecho del funcionario judicial y se exponen asimismo los estímulos y circunstancias que influyen en el juez, aspectos que son estudiados por la psicología. Finalmente, se hace una clasificación de los mencionados sesgos, concluyendo que tomar conciencia de ello ayudará al funcionario judicial a asumir mayor imparcialidad en sus sentencias.
This paper discusses three prerequisites for ascription of responsibility for our emotions. According to the first prerequisite, assignment of responsibility for our emotions requires them being subject to evaluation as rational or irrational; the second prerequisite is that some degree of control over our emotions is a necessary condition of reproach; the third assumption is their ability to motivate action. The paper argues that emotions meet indeed these three requirements and attempts to show that the Criminal Law of our legal systems does consider as a factor that modulates ones own responsibility for his/her actions their being motivated by the appropriate or inappropriate emotions (i. e. it makes us to some extent responsible for our emotions).
Recent legal scholarship challenges the default psychological assumption in antidiscrimination law that discrimination is a function of psychological processes under the conscious control of the discriminator, and replaces it with the assumption that discrimination is the result of unconscious, or implicit, psychological processes that operate automatically, beyond conscious control. However, this challenge is only as persuasive as the research on which it is predicated, and we document that this research fails to satisfy key scientific tests of validity. We conclude that implicit prejudice research should be accepted as neither legislative authority nor litigation evidence until there is more: (1) rigorous investigation of the error rates of the new implicit measures of prejudice (and of how investigators balance Type I errors of false accusations against Type II errors of failing to identify prejudice); (2) thorough analysis of how well implicit measures of prejudice predict discriminatory behavior under realistic workplace conditions; (3) open debate about the societal consequences of setting thresholds of proof for calling people prejudiced so low that the vast majority of the population qualifies as prejudiced.
Most academics agree that emotions and moods are related but distinct phenomena. The present study assessed emotion-mood distinctions among a non-academic population and compared these views with distinctions proposed in the literature. Content analysis of responses from 106 participants identified 16 themes, with cause (65% of respondents), duration (40%), control (25%), experience (15%) and consequences (14%) the most frequently cited distinctions. Among 65 contributions to the academic literature, eight themes were proposed, with duration (62% of authors), intentionality (41%), cause (31%), consequences (31%) and function (18%) the most frequently cited. When the eight themes cited by both academics and non-academics were rank ordered, approximately 60% overlap in opinion was evident. A data-derived summary of emotion-mood distinctions is provided. These data should prove useful to investigators interested in developing a clearer scientific distinction between emotion and mood than is currently available.
Cognitive biases are systematic tendencies of thought which undermine accurate or fair reasoning. An allied concept is that of ‘implicit bias’, which are biases directed at members of particular social identities which may manifest without individual’s endorsement or awareness. This article reviews the literature on cognitive bias, broadly conceived, and makes proposals for how judges might usefully think about avoiding bias in their decision making. Contra some portrayals of cognitive bias as ‘unconscious’ or unknowable, we contend that things can be known about our psychological biases, and steps taken to address them. We argue for the benefits of a unified treatment of cognitive and implicit biases and propose a “3 by 3” framework which can be used by individuals and institutions to review their practice with respect to addressing bias. We emphasise that addressing bias requires an ongoing commitment to monitoring, evaluation and review rather than one-off interventions.
La política cultural de las emociones. C. Olivares Mansuy (Trad.)
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