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Indigenous Military Reforms from the Outside: The Paradox of the UAE Armed Forces Modernisation
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Proponents claim that US military training diffuses norms of democracy and civilian control into foreign militaries. I argue that foreign trainees are likely to absorb the United States’ entire pattern of civil-military relations, including the more political trends that have emerged in recent decades, such as military personnel identifying with and voting for political parties, and serving in senior positions in government upon retirement. Through interviews and two surveys of Tunisian military personnel, I show that US trainees are more supportive than French trainees of active-duty personnel voting and of retired officers serving as president and defense minister. The diffusion of these more political attitudes to foreign trainees may help explain why US military training does not uniformly correlate with apolitical behavior.
Security Force Assistance (SFA) – the training and equipping of a foreign security force – represent a common form of intervention into fragile states. This introduction assesses the state of the field of SFA research and focuses on dynamics specific to recipient states with fragmented security sectors. Based on insights from the contributions to the special issue we propose a framework for research which covers conceptualisation, implementation and impact of SFA programmes. The cases studied here emphasise that the logic of governance in many of these states relies upon manipulating security sector fragmentation, often producing outcomes directly opposed to SFA providers' intent.
This study assesses the military effectiveness of the UAE's armed forces. It discusses the ways in which the Emirati armed forces have demonstrated greater capabilities in combat than other Arab armed forces, as well as their lingering limitations. It explains how Emirati force generation practices have produced a small, but quite capable elite and are striving to improve the overall quality of the entire force by employing a range of "workarounds" to the problems that have bedeviled Arab armed forces throughout the modern era. It concludes with a wider discussion of both the limits to this approach, and the efforts of the UAE's political leadership to effect a broader societal transformation that could--among other benefits--produce far greater military power.
When it comes to states arming themselves, it has become axiomatic among scholars of comparative defence industries that go-it-alone production is no longer an option for most. The processes associated with defence-industrial globalization combined with the ever-rising costs of producing leading-edge weapons systems present huge disincentives for autarky in armaments. Against these strong headwinds, however, India has recently launched, as part of a broader, multi-sector initiative called Make in India, a renewed effort to achieve greater self-reliance in armaments production. This article first places India’s recent defence indigenization efforts within wider discussions about states’ armament strategies and trends in global arms production. Secondly, it contextualizes the drivers behind New Delhi’s latest attempts to transform itself from leading arms importer to major producer (and significant exporter) against the backdrop of past efforts which have yielded little but disappointment. Third, it explicates the main facets of the current strategy for defence-industrial indigenization and gauges its chances for success. To preview the main findings, we argue that self-reliance in armaments via indigenous production will almost certainly continue to allude India because of systemic, structural and technological constraints.
The Gulf countries have become an increasingly lucrative market for international arms trade, especially since the shrinking of Western defence budgets added fuel to the global export race in their direction. Amidst the profuse literature on security relations of the Gulf with outside powers, however, few publications aimed at explaining the incentives driving this trade beyond security motives on the part of clients, and economic determinism on the part of suppliers. This paper, which focuses on evolving trends of arms trade in Qatar and the UAE, aims at filling this gap by offering an overview of their multifaceted internal and international drivers and the way it has impacted the rules of the regional and global security game. Qatari and Emirati defence procurement used to be a means to an end that had little to do with addressing threats they faced on their own, let alone gaining more power on the international stage. Because they were small – and young – states unable to overcome their own security dilemma, their military acquisition served other main purposes. The author hence begins by focusing on the famous “glitter factor” implied in their arms acquisitions. She starts by giving an overview of the reactions that this importance of – sparkly – appearances in Gulf countries’ arms purchases stirs before trying and analysing the internal and international motivations behind this reality. Then, the essay turns to all indirect ways through which arms trade in Qatar and the UAE guarantee the security and stability of the state and, above all, the regime. Pointing to multiple international and domestic political, social and strategic determinants playing out in this area, the author argues that it perfectly illustrates their multifaceted survival strategy as “Small Princes-States”. Finally, the study turns to new dynamics of arms trade in Qatar and the UAE as a consequence of new external incentives – chief among which was the global economic context combined with the regional turmoil and its associated vacuum of power – meeting with new internal priorities. The author points to the two countries’ recent assertiveness, analyses the impact this has on the Client State – Supplying State – Industrial company triangle, and questions whether or not this can lead to new rules of the regional and global security game.
Oil and dynastic rule have led to an idiosyncratic pattern of state formation in the Gulf, and in few parts of the state are the idiosyncrasies more pronounced than in the security sector. Oil income has allowed the ruling families of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to engineer a relatively soft, rent- and patronage-based authoritarianism characterized by multiple centers of power and huge institutional redundancies. Having constructed their police and military forces along these lines, their monarchical rule has become more resilient, but their armed forces also more hapless.
Unlike some other staples of security studies that do not even register the issue, Buzan & Hansen’s (2009) The Evolution of International Security Studies unambiguously identifies ‘Western-centrism’ as a problem. This article seeks to make the point, however, that treating heretofore-understudied insecurities (such as those experienced in the non-West) as a ‘blind spot’ of the discipline may prevent us from fully recognizing the ways in which such ‘historical absences’ have been constitutive of security both in theory and in practice. Put differently, the discipline’s ‘Western-centric’ character is no mere challenge for students of security studies. The ‘historical absence’ from security studies of non-Western insecurities and approaches has been a ‘constitutive practice’ that has shaped (and continues to shape) both the discipline and subjects and objects of security in different parts of the world.
This article proposes the notion of a security imaginary as a heuristic tool for exploring military isomorphism (the phenomenon that weapons and military strategies begin to look the same across the world) at a time when the US model of defence transformation is being adopted by an increasing number of countries. Built on a critical constructivist foundation, the security-imaginary approach is contrasted with rationalist and neo-institutionalist ways of explaining military diffusion and emulation. Merging cultural and constructivist themes, the article offers a `strong cultural' argument to explain why a country would emulate a foreign military model and how this model is constituted in and comes to constitute a society's security imaginary.
From 1964 to 1975 a small group of British officers, advisors, and trainers guided the forces of the Sultanate of Oman to victory in their conflict with the Marxist insurgents of the People's Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). This campaign provides a clear example of how to effectively support an ally's counterinsurgency efforts with a minimal commitment of men and material. In particular, the critical assistance provided by the British consisted of experienced leadership and skilled technical support personnel as well as a viable strategy for victory. However, more important for the ultimate success of the counterinsurgency campaign was the emergence of new progressive leadership with the accession of Sultan Qaboos. The most important lesson from this study is that while security assistance can reinforce positive political efforts, it is not enough on its own to bring about a victory in an unfavourable political environment.
Though the Arab Spring has reverberated through the Middle East, largely leaving a path of destruction, the relative calm in the United Arab Emirates has offered a regional roadmap for stability. Domestic changes since 2000 have significantly altered the country's dynamics, firmly cementing power within Abu Dhabi. While Khalifa bin Zayed succeeded his father as emir of Abu Dhabi and UAE president in 2004, the Emirates' evolution has largely been accredited to Abu Dhabi's crown prince, Mohammed bin Zayed. His reign has been characterized by the rise of the security apparatus and a micromanaged approach to governance. Mohammed bin Zayed's strategy of fortification has focused on pre-empting threats from the UAE's native population, rather than from expatriates or foreign actors. As a result, he has consolidated power, distributing its administration among his tribal and kinship allies. In essence, Mohammed bin Zayed has driven modernization in order to strengthen his grasp on power. This book explores Mohammed bin Zayed's regime security strategy, illustrating the network of alliances that seek to support his reign and that of his family. In an ever-turbulent region, the UAE remains critical to understanding the evolution of Middle Eastern authoritarian control.
The United States regularly seeks to promote the liberal norms of respect for human rights and deference to civilian authority in the militaries that it trains. Yet norm-abiding behavior often does not follow from liberal foreign military training. Existing explanations ascribe norm violations either to insufficient socialization or to interest misalignment between providers and recipients. One reason violations occur is because liberal training imparts conflicting norms. How do militaries respond when they confront the dilemma of conflict between the liberal norms of respect for human rights and civilian control of the military? The U.S. policy expectation is that trained militaries will prioritize human rights over obedience to civilian authorities. But when liberal norms clash, soldiers fall back on a third norm of cohesion, which refers to the bonds that enable military forces to operate in a unified, group- and missionoriented way. Cohesion functions as both a military norm (particularly at the individual level) and an interest (particularly at the institutional level). If a military prioritizes cohesion, then it will choose the path that best serves its organization, which may entail violating human rights, civilian control, or both. An exploration of the effects of norm conflict on military attitudes among the Armed Forces of Liberia uses an experiment embedded in a survey to probe the theory. Results provide preliminary evidence that norm conflict weakens support for human rights and democracy. Results are strongest among soldiers with more U.S. training.
Many conceptualizations of homeland security posit a rigid division between national security, which focuses on global threats and challenges at the systemic level, and homeland or domestic security, which focuses on internal threats and challenges inside a state. Thus, in the United States, Iran is a national security threat, while human trafficking or natural disasters are homeland security threats and challenges. The American conceptualization has come to dominate much of the academic literature and curriculum on homeland security. Analysis of courses in domestic and homeland security in the Middle East shows that an American model of homeland security is a frequent export of American-style education. However, this artificial division is not relevant for small states, even aspiring regional powers, because their security priorities overlap the domestic and international. A case study of the United Arab Emirates demonstrates that its key security priorities are shaped by both domestic and global inputs, and require solutions at both levels. However, many courses on domestic and homeland security in the Emirates do not reflect this reality. In studying and teaching security in non-superpowers, the homeland security concept should be updated to properly fit the strategic context of a small state in theory and practice.
What motivates states to provide others with military assistance? Traditional explanations naturally focus on the security interests of the sender state. But could domestic considerations – intra-party politics, for example – also be a factor in some cases? This analysis, which examines the British decision to send a Military Advisory Team [MAT] to the newly federated United Arab Emirates [UAE] in 1971, answers in the affirmative. It demonstrates that the MAT was primarily, albeit not exclusively, a means by which the British government of Prime Minister Edward Heath could stave off sharp criticism from fellow Conservative politicians that under his leadership that Britain was cutting and running from its overseas responsibilities. Furthermore, because the MAT was in inception a political tool, its military utility in assisting the UAE, or the influence Britain derived from its presence, was minimal at best and counterproductive at worst.
It has long been observed that the development of professional security institutions is a key stage in modern state formation. Leaders of many proto-states embarking on programs of rapid development – such as many of the rulers of the Arab Gulf States in the 1960s – have brought in foreign professional expertise to assist in building up fledgling state institutions, including militaries, police forces and intelligence services. We know little, however, about the relationship between ruler and these key expatriates performing these functions. To help fill this lacuna, this article examines the first three expatriate professional heads of Abu Dhabi Police over the period 1959-68 and their relationship with their paymasters – first Shaikh Shakhbut bin Sultan Al Nahyan, then his brother, Shaikh Zayed. It details the difficulties these professional expatriates faced in operating within this ruler-dominated political-administration system. We believe observations made in this study have relevance to the contemporary Gulf, where governments continue to employ highly skilled expatriates in their security institutions and much else besides.
The British Empire employed a diverse range of strategies to establish and then maintain control over its overseas territories in the Middle East. This new interpretation of how Britain maintained order, protected its interests and carried out its defence obligations in the Gulf in the decades before its withdrawal from the region in 1971 looks at how the British government increasingly sought to achieve security with great economy of force by building up local militaries instead of deploying costly military forces from the home country. Benefitting from the extensive use of recently declassified British Government archival documents and India Office records, this highly original narrative weighs the successes and failures of Britain's use of 'indirect rule' among the small states of Eastern Arabia, including Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the seven Trucial States and Oman. Drawing important lessons for scholars and policymakers about the limitations of trying to outsource security to local partners, Security in the Gulf is a remarkable study of the deployment of British colonial policy in the Middle East before 1971.
The literature examining national militaries in the Arab world paints a near-universally bleak picture of their capabilities. Some argue issues rooted in “Arab culture”—so-called essentialist rationales—fatally undermine military effectiveness. Others assert that regime security concerns encourage leaders to actively politicize, coup-proof, and consequently weaken their military. This article challenges these literatures by demonstrating that United Arab Emirates (UAE) forces have repeatedly exemplified unusual levels of military effectiveness and sophistication in hostile campaigns. Using approaches from public policy studies (the Advocacy Coalition Framework), this paper investigates how the UAE military bucked the trend. The 1990 invasion of Kuwait was a “focusing event” that prompted a rethink of existing approaches. Catalyzed, a key “policy entrepreneur,” Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, changed approaches to training, unified federal militaries, and tested forces in challenging operations. Such findings undercut lingering essentialist critiques of Arab militaries, provide a potential pathway for other states to emulate, demonstrate that secure and motivated leaders can overcome coup-proofing concerns, and showcase the fruitful pollination of methodologies from public policy to security studies.
The failure of two costly military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan to establish sustainable levels of security has led some commentators to announce the “death of the nation-building project.” This has led to a Western emphasis on increasing Security Force Assistance (SFA) as a way of supporting host-nation security forces who are now shouldering the bulk of the front-line fighting against insurgents and terrorist organisations.
The authors of this article have been studying international efforts to provide Security Force Assistance (SFA) to host-nation partners throughout Africa and the Middle East for over a decade. We have found that there are many practical reasons why SFA efforts fail. However, we contend there is a greater problem: failure of vision.
This article uses the example of international humanitarian law (IHL) courses to show that technical training will not fix political problems. Instead, for SFA to succeed in fragile environments, it must be approached as part of political peacebuilding between different security actors, civilian leaders, and societal elites. This means focussing on civil-military relations (CMR), which in turn requires local ownership of the process, timelines and objectives.
CITATION: Emily Knowles and Jahara Matisek, "Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States," The RUSI Journal, vol. 164, no. 3, (2019): 10-21, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2019.1643258
Do experts rationalize and legitimize authoritarian governance? Although research on expert actors in contexts of democracy and international governance is now extensive, scholarly work on their role in authoritarian settings remains limited. This article helps open the black box of authoritarian decision-making by investigating expert advisers in the Arab Gulf monarchies, where ruling elites have enlisted them from top global universities and consulting firms. Qualitative fieldwork combined with three experiments cast doubt on both the rationalization and legitimacy hypotheses and also generated new insights surrounding unintended consequences. On rationalization, the evidence suggests that experts contribute to perverse cycles of overconfidence among authoritarian ruling elites, thereby enabling a belief in state-building shortcuts. On legitimacy, the experiments demonstrate a backfire effect, with experts reducing public support for reform. The article makes theoretical contributions by suggesting important and heretofore unrecognized conflicts and trade-offs across experts’ potential for rationalizing vis-à-vis legitimizing.
After 15 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, many now see ‘small-footprint’ security force assistance (SFA) – training, advising and equipping allied militaries – as an alternative to large US ground-force commitments. Yet, its actual military efficacy has been little studied. This paper seeks to fill this gap. We find important limitations on SFA’s military utility, stemming from agency problems arising from systematic interest misalignment between the US and its typical partners. SFA’s achievable upper bound is modest and attainable only if US policy is intrusive and conditional, which it rarely is. For SFA, small footprints will usually mean small payoffs.
There has been a Western expatriate presence in ruler-controlled military forces of the Trucial States and, later, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) since the 1960s. Their numbers and roles have varied enormously during this time, and can be grouped into three distinct periods. The first, from 1964 to 1980, begins with the engagement of the first expatriate in the Abu Dhabi Defence Force, which was controlled by the Ruler of Abu Dhabi. Expatriate numbers grew rapidly to around 150 in the early 1970s, before declining to around twenty by 1980. During the second period of the 1980s, there were rarely more than a dozen expatriates employed, while the third period starting in 1990 has seen the ongoing engagement of increasingly large numbers of expatriates.
To discover why the number of Western expatriates embedded in the Emirati military between 1964 and 1980 rose, then fell to just a few, and why the numbers from 1990 to the present day have persistently risen, this paper argues that the engagement of expatriates is related to the type of force that the rulers wished to create.
This updated edition analyses the challenges, both internal and external, facing Saudi Arabia in the twenty-first century. Two new chapters discuss the political, economic and social developments in the aftermath of 9/11, painting a vivid picture of a country shocked by terrorism and condemned by the international community. Madawi Al-Rasheed reveals that fragmentation of royal politics, a failing economy and fermenting Islamist dissent posed serious threats to state and society in 2001. She assesses the consequent state reforms introduced under pressure of terrorism, international scrutiny and a social mobilisation of men, women and minorities struggling to shape their future against a background of repression and authoritarian rule. While Saudi Arabia is still far from establishing a fourth state, there are signs that the people are ready for a serious change that will lead them to a state of institutions rather than princes.
This is a book on how to think - strategically - about foreign policy. Focusing on the American experience, it defines the national interest as a concept in strategic logic and describes how to select objectives that will take advantage of opportunities to promote interests, while protecting them against threats. It also discusses national power and influence, as well as the political, informational, economic, and military instruments of state power. Based on a graphic framework that models strategic interrelationships, the book is illustrated with numerous examples from recent American statecraft. It ends with an extended critique of current American foreign policy and a detailed outline of an alternative strategy better suited to the problems of the 21st century.
This article examines cross-national variation in the diffusion and adoption of military technologies and ideas. The history of warfare has been marked by periods of innovation in which the institutions and practices of war-making adapted in response to technological opportunities, and social and political developments. As information about new practices spreads, through the demonstration effects of innovating states or transnational social networks, military innovations have diffused throughout the international system. Diffusion can restructure power relations as states leverage new capabilities to increase their military power and enhance their international influence.
World culture shapes the way states generate military power: norms of conventional warfare provide the template for military organization, and norms of humanitarian law define what is morally acceptable in military operations. Sometimes, however, local strategic circumstances can challenge these worldwide technical scripts and moral codes for military action. Accordingly, this article advances an approach - cultural adaptation theory - that accounts for the role of power and politics in the worldwide normative structuring of military action. This theory explains how actors may modify their military practices in response to rising threats, in ways that avoid norm violation. Two case studies explore this theory: Irish military organization in the lead up to the Second World War, and NATO air operations in the Kosovo war. Some tentative conclusions are reached regarding suboptimal organization by weak states and operational restraint by powerful states. Overall, the article advances the case for dialogue between constructivist and rationalist approaches to security studies.
In the UAE the United States Has a Quiet Potent Ally Nicknamed ‘Little Sparta
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