Feminism and Populism with No Guarantee

Abstract

From different latitudes across the globe, the study of the link between feminism and populism has been entangled in approaches that not only mistrust the possibility of the relationship itself, but also constantly reveal incompatibilities in their findings that shadow the reflection on their productive coexistence. Against this background, Paula Biglieri and Luciana Cadahia's book, Seven essays on populism, represents a breath of fresh air. The joint work of these Latin American political theorists opens up a line of research which proposes a new form of theorizing populism alongside feminism. In the following sections we focus on this dismantling process that underpins Biglieri and Cadahia's effort to open up and imagine a possible articulation between these phenomena, but alongside this analysis, we will also polemicize with their ideas, by bringing out the temptation of closure that eventually lurks in their analytical endeavours.

Full text

249
Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
, XXV, 2023, 2, pp. 249-267
ISSN: 1825-5167
FEMINISM AND POPULISM WITH NO
GUARANTEE
MERCEDES BARROS
Instituto de Investigaciones en
Diversidad Cultural y Procesos de Cambio
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas
y Técnicas
Universidad Nacional de Río Negro (Argentina)
barros.mercedes@conicet.gov.ar
NATALIA MARTÍNEZ PRADO
Instituto de Humanidades
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas
y Técnicas
Centro de Investigaciones "María Saleme de
Burnichón" de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (Argentina)
natalia.martinez@unc.edu.ar

ABSTRACT
From different latitudes across the globe, the study of the link between feminism and populism
has been entangled in approaches that not only mistrust the possibility of the relationship itself,
but also constantly reveal incompatibilities in their findings that shadow the reflection on their
productive coexistence. Against this background, Paula Biglieri and Luciana Cadahia's book,
Seven essays on populism
, represents a breath of fresh air. The joint work of these Latin Amer-
ican political theorists opens up a line of research which proposes a new form of theorizing pop-
ulism alongside feminism. In the following sections we focus on this dismantling process that
underpins Biglieri and Cadahia's effort to open up and imagine a possible articulation between
these phenomena, but alongside this analysis, we will also polemicize with their ideas, by bringing
out the temptation of closure that eventually lurks in their analytical endeavours.
KEYWORDS
Populism, feminism, care, militancy
INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the relationship between populism and feminism has rarely been
the subject of academic reflection. However, this situation has been changing rap-
idly, not only because of the unexpected relevance of feminisms today, but also as

250 MERCEDES BARROS & NATALIA MARTÍNEZ PRADO
a result of the rise of the ‘populist moment’ which, according to different readings,
we are currently experiencing in various parts of the world (Mouffe, 2018; Bru-
baker, 2017; Villacañas, 2015).
The truth is that, while acknowledging the possibility of this crossover, several of
these approaches' initial assumptions, as well as the conclusions they reach, tend to
underestimate or even dismiss the implications and importance of the reflection on
this linkage. To begin with, there seems to be an almost inevitable need to reflect
on both contemporary and growing phenomena, but at the same time, there is also
a sense that this reflection is somewhat odd, or at best, improper (Kroes, 2018). In
fact, several of these readings suggest that the populist understanding of ‘the people’
leads to an eventual indistinguishability of gender. As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser
point out, populism falls short of having ‘a specific relationship to gender; indeed,
[they argue] gender differences, like all other differences within the ‘people’, are
considered secondary, if not irrelevant, to populist politics’ (Mudde and Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2015: 16). From other points of view, the thinking of the populism and
feminism’s link is directly considered to be inadequate because the two constitute
opposite poles on the political spectrum (Roth, 2020; Kroes, 2018). As it is often
pointed out, the most recent versions of right-wing populism are notoriously misog-
ynist and sexist, opposing same-sex marriage, abortion and even gender studies
(Gwiazda, 2021; Korolczuk, Graff, 2018; Askola, 2017). But in addition, even in
left-wing populisms there would prevail aspects that place them in opposition to the
feminist tradition: mainly their homogenising and anti-pluralist tendency and their
confrontational and antagonistic rhetoric between two blocs – the elites and the un-
derprivileged. As argued, while feminisms also tend to refer to male domination in
antagonistic terms, the populist way of politics would obstruct last wave feminisms’
intersectional political practices (Roth, 2020; Emejulu, 2011). Likewise, the central-
ity of the charismatic and paternalistic male leader in populisms is another aspect
that would definitively separate it from feminism. As it is well known, feminist po-
litical practices insist on horizontality and question hierarchical and representative
politics, since these aspects characterise precisely the male hegemony of politics
(Kantola and Lombardo, 2020).
From different latitudes across the globe then, the study of the link between fem-
inism and populism has been entangled in approaches that not only mistrust the
possibility of the relationship itself, but also constantly reveal incompatibilities in
their findings – to a greater extent regarding right-wing populisms – that shadow the
reflection on their productive coexistence. Against this background, Paula Biglieri
and Luciana Cadahia's book represents a breath of fresh air. The joint work of these
Latin American political theorists,
Seven essays on populism
, opens up a line of
research which, while seeking to overcome the advance of the right and the paralys-
ing perplexity of the left, proposes a new form of theorising populism alongside

251
Feminism and Populism with no Guarantee
feminism1. By mapping a new emancipatory horizon for our time, Biglieri and Ca-
dahia's intervention brings to the fore a necessary interpretative challenge that ena-
bles discussions that had not been truly opened before and which raises a thought-
provoking question: how can we be feminist and populist without having to apolo-
gise for it?
Biglieri and Cadahia’s argumentative path begins by clearly stating a political po-
sition: they recognise themselves, first and foremost, as women/theorists/
militants
of the global South. This positioning implies situating themselves in the Latin Amer-
ican context, and from there, theorising about another global social order’s possi-
bilities as well as new strategic alliances to achieve it. In this sense, they aim to re-
cover political experiences
from
and
about
the global South, but not from a privi-
leged epistemic perspective, nor from subalternity, but rather as an intervention
which situates itself in the proximity of what is widely known to them. In effect, their
intervention attempts to disrupt the usual preconception that undervalues theory
from the South, or that directly uses the South only as a case study for a theory from
the North. Their commitment is to capture what is universalisable in the region’s
experiences, convinced that understanding local problems requires a global per-
spective as well as a questioning of the usual hierarchy of nation-state borders. In-
deed, with this intrepid book they claim that transformative ideas can only emerge
within the construction of egalitarian academic spaces of debate framed in our con-
dition as political subjects of knowledge.
Now, from this specific position, they propose a risky and provocative approach
that rejects the apparent inadequacy of populism and feminism’s link. As post-
Marxist theorists and activists who are aware of the articulations and antagonisms of
our time, and above all, of exceptional dislocating events, they believe that it is cru-
cial to theorise, imagine and promote the articulation of these two political tradi-
tions. That is why their book ends with a clear wager: if it is the feminist struggles of
the South that today shake everything up, revealing the limits of the social and re-
structuring the symbolic register of the popular camp, why should we doubt that an
emancipatory populist politics can go in that direction? That said, their approach
neither simply assumes feminist nor populist affiliations, but rather it attempts to
dismantle and displace the positions generally taken as given within each of these
traditions. Because, as argued, ‘the basis of the missed encounter [between popu-
lism and feminism] can be found in feminist claims that block antagonism (and
negativity), and populist proposals that deny the role of care and the feminisation of
politics’ (Biglieri and Cadahia, 2021: 119).

1 Much of this proposal can be found in the last essay of the book, entitled: ‘We Populists
are Feminists’, which is why throughout this text we will particularly focus on this chapter, although
we will not neglect the general proposal of the book in the rest of the chapters.

252 MERCEDES BARROS & NATALIA MARTÍNEZ PRADO
In the following sections we will focus mainly on this dismantling process that
underpins Biglieri and Cadahia's effort to open up and imagine a possible articula-
tion between these phenomena. But alongside this analysis, we will also polemicise
with their ideas, by bringing out the temptation of closure that eventually lurks in
their analytical endeavours. In their persistent attempt to forge communication
channels between feminism and populism, the authors run the risk of
making
a
narrative that ends up preventing the oddness of populist politics and, above all,
undermining the frontiers’ contingency, arbitrariness and power which politics itself
brings into being and that populism
par excellence
foregrounds. But let us first look
at the operation of openness which is at the heart of Biglieri and Cadahia work and
which makes it extremely interesting and conducive.
1. FEMINISATION OF POLITICS? CAREFUL WITH CARE POLITICS
One of the authors’ first and boldest steps to imagine the link between feminism
and populism is to take up a discussion on the possibility of distinguishing and de-
fining feminist praxis on the basis of a notion of ‘care’ linked to the ‘feminisation of
politics’2. They embark on this path not with the intention of recovering
women
's
politics – in a cis-heterosexist sense – but as an interpretative wager that seeks to
conjugate the popular configuration that populism brings, as an always ‘failed image
of the people’, to the social problems that feminisms address today (127). By these
means, the authors privilege the notion of
care
as a signifier that ties together histor-
ical feminist approaches – socialist, Marxist and post-Marxist feminisms – as well as
a political practice of
sorority
that would make this ‘feminisation of politics’ possible
under the broad principle of
caring for each other
.
Now, in taking up this debate and these categories, Biglieri and Cadahia also seek
to dissociate themselves from the ‘autonomist current’ that, according to them, has
prevailed in certain traditions of thought and militancy, particularly in the Latin
American context. These have been related to communitarian feminisms and to
left feminist perspectives, close to the immanentist thought. Questioning this auton-
omous current throughout the book, but particularly with regard to feminist politics,
the authors insist that these approaches risk transforming the horizon of the femi-
nisation of politics into a non-conflicting and reconciling ‘ethic of care’ that eventu-
ally obscures the inherent antagonistic dimension in all politics. The risk is due to
the way in which, from these approaches, the political dynamic becomes entangled
in ‘an unconfessed gender dichotomy’ (121). Such division ends up constituting two
separate and totalised camps: on the one hand, the masculine position, as the

2 Cadahia and Biglieri focus on the idea of ‘the crisis of care’ proposed by Nancy Fraser,
Cinzia Arruzza and Tithi Bhattacharya in their Manifesto:
Feminism for the 99 Percent
(Fraser, Ar-
ruzza and Bhattacharya, 2019).

253
Feminism and Populism with no Guarantee
disintegrating element through the perpetuation of antagonism, power and the hi-
erarchy of the social, which is materialised in the state, representative politics, polit-
ical parties, male leaders and antagonism, thus embodying patriarchy and its univer-
salising politics. On the other hand, the feminine side stands out as the locus of the
possibility of communal living through care, or through the affective and expansive
gathering of bodies, where corporeality and affects arise as the opposite of power.
All of which translates into the horizontal, collective and assembly organisational
form of feminisms. It is at this clear-cut dichotomy where Biglieri and Cadahia, ra-
ther than finding the sources of feminist potentiality, find its limits: basically, on the
failure to recognise how political articulations for feminist struggle are produced –
as any other political struggle, which always involves conflict and is intertwined with
power relations – and on the risks that this type of position has when it comes to
generating links of solidarity and political imagination towards other instances of
political struggle.
In contrast to these approaches, the authors boldly argue that the feminisation of
politics and the politics of care should not be divorced from their antagonistic di-
mension and, drawing on two valuable theoretical contributions with a psychoana-
lytical imprint, they take seriously the possibility of reconnecting the two. The first
of these inputs is the notion of
perseverance
, as developed by Joan Copjec in her
book
Imagine There’s No Woman
(2002). There, Copjec explores the distinction
between the fixation drive and the perseverance drive through her analysis of Soph-
ocles' Greek tragedy
Antigone
. As Biglieri and Cadahia argue, this distinction proves
to be very enriching when it comes to conceiving social antagonism. For, unlike an
antagonist action guided by a drive of fixation – that is nourished by the belief that
there is a good to follow which is built on an idea of the law (Creon's masculine
behaviour) – the perseverance drive allows to conceive a mode of antagonism con-
structed on the need for a loving bond – coming from desire – which preserves the
irreducible in all idealisation and in all law (Antigona's action). That is to say, the
drive to perseverance antagonises the law, the state and institutions by denouncing
what cannot be replaced by them and preserving the irreducible, making possible a
way of constructing the common through that which is irreplaceable3. For the au-
thors, then, it is this way of thinking about antagonism that opens the door to con-
ceiving the feminisation of politics as linked to the construction of an antagonism

3 It is interesting here to mention Judith Butler's reading of Sophocles' play Antigone (Butler,
2002). According to her, Antigone's action is “partially” outside the law, as her disobedience of
Creon’s rule involves both rejection and assimilation of the authority of the law. In this sense, Anti-
gone does not act in language by placing herself outside of the law which Creon invokes; on the
contrary, she anchors her language in that same law and by appropriating it, she appropriates the
authority wielded by Creon. What is interesting about this other reading is that it underlines how the
antagonistic action also implies a moment of appropriation/identification with the law it opposes, and
that it is precisely from there that its subversive effects take place.

254 MERCEDES BARROS & NATALIA MARTÍNEZ PRADO
through a de-totalising loving bond. And it is at this point in the argument that a
second theoretical figure is invoked: the ethics of the not-all of Lacanian psychoa-
nalysis, as a way of thinking about the possibility of imagining feminism as a rupture
with the masculine logic of totality. A totality that – in Luce Irigaray's terms – has
characterised, not flesh and blood males, but the male phallogocentric position of
the All and the One (Irigaray, 1985). Precisely, by embracing the indeterminacy of
reality, this logic assumes the non-existence of previously constituted identities, con-
tradicting the gender binarisms that seem to reappear in the feminisation of auton-
omist-rooted politics and thus paving the way to radical heterogeneity.
In our view, this critical displacement of the autonomist framework from which
the feminisation of politics and the politics of care are usually approached – and
whose implications are barely noticed – is crucial to address the problematic and
confrontational development of feminist articulations today. However, it seems to
us that the authors do not fully grasp the radical implications of these shifts in their
own argumentation. To start with, what we have our doubts about regarding Biglieri
and Cadahia’ strategy, are the reasons and criteria by which the centrality of the
category of ‘care’ should be kept as defining feminist politics. In effect, we recognise
that the politisation of care has been central to articulate various feminist demands
linked to the recognition and valorisation of unpaid domestic and care work mainly
carried out by cis women4. And we also see that, as fundamental for the reproduc-
tion of the labour force, it has been the category that best synthesises the political
strategy of socialist and Marxist feminism today, opening for this political tradition
the greatest possibilities for the articulation of feminisms with the popular camp:
with class, racial, indigenous, postcolonial, and environmental struggles.
But it is because of the aforementioned that we consider that Biglieri and Ca-
dahia's effort does not fully undermine the restrictive and structural approach that
still privileges the emancipatory character of relative positioning within the labour
force. In other words, by what criteria can care be understood as a common ground
between feminisms and as a starting point for their radicalisation? Raising this ques-
tion does not mean that care has not been an overarching demand at a certain point
in time, or in some specific circumstances, but can we establish in advance that this
category has a crucial (inherent) political role? Why holding on to this category and
giving it the political role of bringing together the feminist struggles?5. Or even, is
this the category that can be universalised from the South and then be the main
attribute from which to radicalise populism? According to Nancy Fraser, and her

4 The category has been broadened by feminist economics and activisms to include not only
domestic work and care for dependents but also care for all people, for interdependent relationships
and also, in its broadest version, care for nature.
5 Regarding this point, the
Ni Una Menos
movement in Argentina, unlike articulating and
popularising its struggles around care or abortion right – as other interpretations usually dismiss –
expanded through the demand against women´s violence. See Martínez Prado, 2018.

255
Feminism and Populism with no Guarantee
collective proposal of a
Feminism for the 99%
, there is indeed a structural connec-
tion between social reproduction and gender asymmetry. But do Biglieri and Ca-
dahia also assume this? Sometimes it seems that the authors are not particularly
concerned with releasing this category from its structural economistic roots, for if
this were the case,
care
would no longer have to be privileged as a category of eman-
cipation and political analysis. In other words, their remarkable effort to link the
feminisation of politics with antagonism, understood no longer as an oppositional
relationship guided by an ideal – which would generate the illusion that at some
point such antagonism could disappear – but as an opposition faithful to irreduci-
bility, would not seem to open the way to an uncertain scenario of indeterminate
and unknown political categories, demands and struggles.
In addition, we find it polemical, but at the same time extremely interesting, to
think of the feminisation of the political as a disruption of the logic of totality and as
an introduction of radical indeterminacy, which is nothing other than the manifes-
tation of the logic of the not-all in psychoanalytical terms. Indeed, for Biglieri and
Cadahia, the feminine position performs ‘a double operation: from the ontic per-
spective, it is the materially existing force that allows us to short-circuit from within
the master’s totalizing discourse embodied in the figure of the dominant, white, het-
erosexual man. But, from the ontological perspective, it is a catacretic figure used
to think when names fail’ (127). From our perspective, this theoretical approach
could certainly be very productive in addressing and understanding the different
ways in which feminisms act and situate themselves in the social domain, and the
forms in which the singular and the multiple – as opposed to the One and the other
– prevail in feminist politics, confirming its constitutive heterogeneity. In this re-
spect, there is no feminism that can represent successfully the whole of them: just
as ‘woman does not exist’, ‘feminism does not exist’. Nonetheless, as soon as the
feminisation of politics is posed in these terms, a main question arises: how is it
possible to conceive even the gesture of unifying a politics that is in itself multiple
and heterogeneous? This first issue opens up a couple of others that may be useful
to address.
Firstly, if the logic of the not-all points to the de-totalising gesture of feminist pol-
itics, showing its ‘always open character and its hospitality to otherness, enabling a
singular-plural that brings no One together, how would this politics marked by its
perseverance towards the heterogeneous coexist with the inevitable drawing of clo-
sures, frontiers and fixations of populism? That is to say, it seems to us that it is very
productive to think of feminisms as a political tradition that
par excellence
has
brought heterogeneity into the field of the political, and that this attachment to in-
determinacy definitely functions as an antidote to the essentialisms and binarisms
that easily find their way into politics. But it is not clear in the authors' argument
how this de-totalising gesture aligns with populist interventions, in particular with the
specific populist way
of doing
with antagonism (Biglieri, 2020). In other words, we

256 MERCEDES BARROS & NATALIA MARTÍNEZ PRADO
wonder how the political praxis that the authors link to the notion of perseverance,
as that which opposes the One in the name of the irreducible, finds its communion
with a form of antagonistic politics that, while making visible the irreducible tension
between the part and the whole of the community,
still
involves a moment of full-
ness and closure, a moment when the
plebs
claims to be the only legitimate
populus
.
Because, at a certain point, this particular understanding of feminist antagonistic
politics, which, in the words of Biglieri and Cadahia, ‘points beyond our fixations
and preserves, from within the storage chest of our desires that which cannot be
substituted – but only sublimated’ (124) seems closer to that ethics from which they
aimed to differentiate themselves, or even more to queer politics6, than to a populist
logic of articulation. A logic that – as the authors well know, following Laclau’s the-
oretical developments – always oscillates between openness
and closure
through
precarious and partial fixations around multiple names of the people – social justice,
equality, Peronism, human rights – establishing a dividing boundary that has the
fundamental role of avoiding, rather than embracing or caring for, (all) others.
Secondly, directly linked to the above, and bringing a problem that has always
been a pressing issue for feminisms, we also wonder how a feminist politics which
is faithful to heterogeneity can accommodate hegemonic politics
tout court
. And
here we are thinking not only on the equivalential moment of politics to which
Biglieri and Cadahia anchor populism’s inclusive and egalitarian impulse – and
which we can understand as close to feminist horizontality – but on the moment of
the equivalential chain’s representation to which they barely refer to: namely the
hegemonic dimension itself and the very possibility of universality in feminist poli-
tics. In specific terms, how is the moment of representation inscribed in the hori-
zontality and openness assumed in the consensual and anonymous form of deci-
sion-making of most feminist assemblies? In our opinion, the authors do not seem
to be willing to discuss these questions in the field of feminisms, nor to address their
analytical implications, which would require a discussion of the categories of lead-
ership, identification, hegemony. In fact, when analysing the experience of feminist
mobilisations in Argentina around the demand of
Ni Una Menos
[Not One Less]
as a way of exemplifying a de-totalising feminist politics, the universal function of
this demand is already assumed, taken for granted, with no traces of its political
becoming. That is, they are not dealing with how NUM managed to obtain that
function, if it still has it, or how it has been transformed since its emergence. And
these are key questions when it comes to thinking about new ways of connecting
feminist and populist politics. Actually, the current
Ni Una Menos
assemblies are
having enormous difficulties in articulating collective actions, beyond agreeing on

6 As Miquel Bassols (2021:19) has pointed out: “Can there be a queer politics? It would be
a politics that would not be defined by opposition with respect to another term, but by something
incomparable, something that does not have an identity of its own, ontological, but is always so singu-
lar that it is removed from any binary definition”.

257
Feminism and Populism with no Guarantee
an annual collective manifesto. Although most interpretations of the potential of the
NUM's feminist assembly politics focus on its first massive outburst or on the way
in which these assemblies moved towards the already existing political fronts of Ar-
gentine feminisms, little is said about the process of opening up and metonymic
displacement by which the NUM came to successfully
represent
other demands.
For it was precisely in this process of emptying and de-particularisation of this sin-
gular demand that the possibility of closure and representation of the chain of soli-
darities between different feminist claims was achieved. A political closure which,
for some sectors within the assemblies was nonetheless the possibility of expanding
feminist politics beyond national borders, while for others it was the beginning of its
end7. That is to say, the
Ni Una Menos
demand, which originally emerged as a
particular claim against femicides and violence against (cis) women, began to lose
its particular content while gaining its universal function through a language and po-
litical tradition that managed to impose itself over other present discourses. Against
this background, even if some of the NUM assemblies across the country may still
continue to be heterogeneous, we must not fail to pay attention to what and whom
these assemblies actually represent at any given time and what discourses inscribe
and overdetermine their demands8. But as we said before, this requires bringing into
discussion different views and categories on how the process of representation ac-
tually takes place within feminist politics.
In this sense, if Biglieri and Cadahia's proposal, by assuming the de-totalising
gesture of the logic of the not-all, harbours an understanding of the way in which
feminisms assume the particular in its irrevocable singular multiplicity – its unrep-
resentability –, it does not seem so clear that their approach problematise the tense
unfolding of that ubiquitous – but always relative – universal that marks all political
practice, even the feminist one. That
wandering All
which, after the critique of the
metaphysics of the emancipatory subject, some feminist critique came to under-
stand, as Linda Zerilli (1998) did once long ago, as that ‘universalism which is not
One’.

7 Let us recall that in order to achieve the openness to new demands that became a hallmark
of NUM, their first
Manifesto
explicitly excluded the historical demand of Argentine feminism, the
right to abortion. This claim’s later inclusion is what for some sectors represented the beginning of
the NUM’s politicisation and the end of its potential for social articulation.
8 In this sense, we share Biglieri and Cadahia’s mistrust of an apparent immanent feminist
power of assemblies resultant of the ‘political performativity of bodies’, and we are also definitely wary
of the idea that the ‘proximity and displacement by conflict’ is produced by a supposedly gathered
‘collective intelligence’ (Gago, 2020: 175-6).

258 MERCEDES BARROS & NATALIA MARTÍNEZ PRADO
2. WHO RADICALISES WHOM? POPULIST MILITANCY AND ITS AB-
SENCE OF GUARANTEES
As we have already mentioned, the other authors’ crucial turn in their attempt to
bridge the gap between feminism and populism is to problematise existing populist
conceptualisations and proposals. Drawing on the theoretical developments of Ern-
esto Laclau, the authors raise two crucial points for understanding this phenome-
non. Firstly, and put it in very simple terms, they argue that populism must be un-
derstood in its ontological dimension and not as ‘a political moment nor a merely
conjunctural political strategy’ (Biglieri and Cadahia, 2021: 13). In effect, pursuing
Laclau fundamental steps ‘to make politics thinkable again’ (Laclau, 2008: 12), they
not only grant populism the status of a political category, but they also conceive it as
‘a singular way of theorizing the being of the social’ (Biglieri and Cadahia 2021: 18).
Secondly, and in close relation to this first point, they further assert that populism’s
insurrectional character and emancipatory potential do not allow it to be linked to
just any kind of content or politics. For them, populism only occurs when equality,
among those at the bottom (against those on top), is achieved by privileging the logic
of equivalence which allows for the articulation of heterogeneity, i.e. the radical in-
clusion of differences, rather than their erasure or suppression. Populism can there-
fore be conceived as synonymous with the politics of equality and inclusion, hence
as the authors suggest, ‘it can only be emancipatory’ (35). From these premises, they
introduce a watershed in the current intellectual and political debate: populism is
either left-wing or it is not. Moreover, while the notion of fascism is still at play, it is
possible to dispense with the left-right, inclusive-exclusive qualifiers, and speak –
without apologies – only of populism as opposed to fascism.
Once again, we find Biglieri and Cadahia's approach highly suggestive. Indeed,
their approach brings to the understanding of the link between populism and fem-
inism a fruitful debate and a renewed perspective that breaks with the empirical
interpretations of ‘really existing’ populisms – mostly right-wing of the global North
– which tend to attribute a pejorative character to this form of politics. Moreover, it
also invites us to reflect on the controversial distinction between left-wing and right-
wing populism which has been the object of debate in recent years within populist
studies and, in particular, in the field of post-structuralist discursive approaches to
populism (Stavrakakis, 2017; Panizza, 2005, Mouffe, 2018; Devenney, 2020; Gly-
nos and Mondon, 2016). In this respect, let us first say that we share their suspicion
on the extent to which this left-right distinction, as well as the inclusionary- exclu-
sionary differentiation (Mouffe, 2018; Marchart, 2018; Stravakakis, 2017), may ac-
tually contribute to understanding populism as such, or whether it rather does not
bring more confusion to the political discursive approach to the matter. By pointing
out that populism is one form of political articulation among others, with its own
internal logic of functioning, Biglieri and Cadahia raise an entirely valid question:
‘How could it be both ontologically and strategically correct to conflate fascism with

259
Feminism and Populism with no Guarantee
a populist form of popular construction?’ (2021: 39). In effect, from our view, this
kind of typology that aims at capturing and accounting for different types or degrees
of populist discourses (Stravakakis, 2017), does little to actually sharpen the focus
on populism and to allow for its distinction from other political practices and dis-
cursive interventions, such as democratic-authoritarian-totalitarian ones (Panizza,
2014; Barros, 2013). In contrast, it frequently contributes to homogenising them by
bringing together very distinct ways of constructing the people and dealing with the
tension between the
part
and the
whole
in the structuration of the community's or-
der. As has already been pointed out, what clarifying distinction can we speak of
when such dissimilar forms of politics, as the political experiences of Trump,
Orbán, Lula, Bolsonaro, Perón, Kirchner, Chávez or Morales converge under the
same political category?
Yet, it is precisely because of this need to separate the
wheat from the chaff
that
we have some reservations about the rapid assimilation that the authors establish
between populism and the emancipatory project of the left. We think that by iden-
tifying the traits of the left, as if they were specific and proper to populism, this logic
becomes too close to the notions of equality and inclusion which, in any case, are
also found in other forms of political articulation, such as the democratic one. This
consequently leaves populism's own features still in the shadows. In our view, once
we put populism back on the left-right axis – as Biglieri and Cadahia acknowledge
Laclau himself tried to avoid –, we again run the risk of losing sight of its specificity,
that is, of the internal logics through which populism functions, the types of popular
identification it involves, and how it actually tends to perpetuate the (always conflic-
tive) tension between the legitimate
demos
and the set of popular identifications in
which it operates (Aboy Carlés 2005; Barros, 2013). Since the publication of
On
populist Reason
(Laclau, 2005), if not before, the task of further characterising pop-
ulism has given rise to very interesting theoretical crossovers, many of which have
been carried out by Biglieri and Cadahia themselves (Biglieri and Perelló, 2019;
Biglieri, 2020; Coronel and Cadahia, 2018), among other scholars within the post-
structuralist field of study across the globe (Critchley and Marchart, 2004; Glynos
and Howarth, 2007; Stravakakis and Katsambekis, 2014; Aboy Carlés, 2005; Bar-
ros, 2006; Panizza, 2013). Therefore, we wonder whether a return to this mode of
characterisation might not be somewhat counterproductive to the developments
that have taken place with the decisive passage from
normative
to
formal
and
dis-
cursive
approaches. Moreover, we ask ourselves if this synonymy would not end up
giving back to populism a series of distinctive ontic contents – as Wendy Brown
(2021) suggested in the book's foreword –, which would certainly go against the au-
thors’ attempt to understand its ontological specificity.
Now, it is precisely from this problematisation of populism, and by putting for-
ward their own understanding of this concept, that Biglieri and Cadahia can begin
to draw a possible way of conceiving populism alongside feminism. As we

260 MERCEDES BARROS & NATALIA MARTÍNEZ PRADO
mentioned before, for them populism differs from other logics of political articula-
tion in its specific way of dealing with differences
vis-à-vis
equivalences. While pop-
ulism supports constitutive heterogeneity of differences in the construction of the
people, right-wing politics, which they identify as fascism, organises them through
homogeneity. Contrary to general views that only see in populism the homogenising
effects of an antagonistic politics that divides the social field into two opposing parts,
the egalitarian and inclusive populist logic makes this type of politics hospitable to-
wards the heterogeneity of differences. In this way, this hospitable aspect opens up
a productive link with the heterogeneity and inclusion present in current feminisms
and to the care politics that this implies. That is, this aspect also allows the approach
of a dimension of care that apparently has gone unnoticed in populism9, because,
as the authors argue, for populist logic to embrace the heterogeneity of differences,
first of all, it needs to take care of them. As we can see, once the authors disentangle
populism from right-wing politics and link it to left-wing egalitarian and inclusive
politics, the path to feminist politics is fairly straightforward. It is only then that they
can begin to think on how these two phenomena can mutually potentiate each
other, how feminism can radicalise and expand populism across national borders,
and how populism can politicise feminism, giving it back its antagonistic politics.
Now, from this point of departure, the authors – as
militants
– dare to imagine a
populist-feminist emancipatory project by appealing to two ‘current images’ of our
latitudes. In these images, they find some glimpses of this popular construction
crossed by a feminist tint or, we could risk, a
populist feminism
in the making: the
Ni Una Menos
(NUM) [Not One Less] movement, to which we have referred be-
fore, and the political appeal of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, former President
of Argentina and the current leader of the Peronist movement:
La Patria es el Otro
[The Homeland is the Other]. We are interested in the analysis of both figures
because from this analysis some questions arise about the way in which the authors
pose the communion between feminisms and populisms.
Biglieri and Cadahia envision in the NUM feminist mobilisation an unprece-
dented restructuring of the popular camp. For them, this movement has managed
to weaken the antagonisms that have marked Argentina's political history, drawing
new frontiers within the social field and taking feminist demands beyond nation-
state borders. In this process of internationalisation of feminist demands on a global
scale lies the effective possibility of imagining a
feminist people
. In their words: ‘A
massive, global and historical image of resistance and living struggles against patriar-
chy’ (Biglieri and Cadahia, 2021: 128).

9 We say ‘apparently’ bearing in mind the enormous attention that care policies have received
in Latin American populism and their effects on women's lives – to name just one case, the one we
know best, let us remember the role of the Evita Foundation. In this sense it is hard to appreciate this
supposed lack of attention.

261
Feminism and Populism with no Guarantee
While we may agree with Biglieri and Cadahia on the restructuring effect of
NUM, we still have reservations on whether it is possible to find in this form of
transnational feminist politics a form of populist articulation. That is to say, can this
internationalist feminism, which today carries the claim of ‘Ni Una Menos’ onto a
global scale, be approached under the rubric of populism? For we must not ignore
the fact that the internationalist reading that permeates feminisms today is condi-
tioned by a discourse that bears the universalising imprint of socialist-Marxist ideol-
ogy. And even if we can agree that under the Marxist tradition there are innumera-
ble and more or less equidistant political languages – whose closeness allows for the
formation of alliances and common fronts – as political analysts and theorists we
cannot ignore the tensions and differences between one another10. In other words,
would there not be differences between the transnational politics of Marxists and
populists?11.
For the authors, this does not seem to be an entirely valid or pertinent question,
since, as we explained above, they begin this discussion by assuming the proximity
of populism to the left. Yet, from our position, this form of politics of internation-
alist feminisms is not exactly, nor necessarily populist, since the presence of an an-
tagonistic division of the social field between feminists and patriarchy does not en-
sure the emergence of populism. For the time being, we consider that the left poli-
tics that has dominated transnational feminist mobilisations has not yet proved to
have populist traits. Its predominant mode of articulating differences, though grad-
ually widening, does not cease to antagonise the ‘dual system of oppression’ – as
Marxist feminisms recognise the combined oppression of patriarchy and capitalism
– under the assumption of a resolution of the tension over the boundaries of the
legitimate
populus
. This implies, at the same time, the continuous hierarchisation
of the ‘structural’ differences which, on both sides of the frontier, prevail over the
rest, according to an order (of oppression, or of emancipation) which is presented
as unfailingly, and not so secretly12, overdetermining its horizon. In contrast to this

10 We cannot ignore the debate that Laclau and Žižek had on the subject (Butler, Laclau and
Žižek, 2000; Žižek, 2006; Laclau, 2006). Among feminisms, although Fraser has recently approached
the Laclauian framework and populism as a political alternative for the emancipation of the left
(2017), Gago's reading rejects it out of hand (Gago, 2020: 202-6).
11 For De Cleen et. al. (2020) a
transnational
populism is distinguished from an
international
one because rather than an allusion to a ‘cooperation between national populisms’, the transnational
one requires ‘the construction of a ‘people’ that goes across national borders’ (2020: 153). For Ca-
dahia and Biglieri, this distinction is problematic because it implies ignoring that ‘(national) particula-
rities are ineradicable in the conformation of a transnational people’ (2021:94). We believe that De
Cleen et al. would agree with them on that point as well. What is overlapping in both analyses, in our
view, are the differential ways of constructing that people that prevail in progressive sectors, which
make some populist and others not.
12 To paraphrase Žižek who pointed out that ‘in the series of struggles (economic, political,
feminist, ecological, ethnic, etc.) there is always one which, being part of the chain, secretly overde-
termines its very horizon’ (Butler, Laclau and Žižek, 2000: 320).

262 MERCEDES BARROS & NATALIA MARTÍNEZ PRADO
way of articulation, populist discourses exacerbate that tension over the borders and
give visibility to the ultimate arbitrariness of social division. This is because, in a
populist articulation, the popular subject is presented both as the victim of a harm
that demands reparation (
plebs
) and as the embodiment of the communal ‘whole’
(
populus
). In its pendular movement, this tension between being
part
and being
whole
is exacerbated and does not find a definitive resolution (Barros, 2013). In
fact, it is in this failed attempt to represent the
whole
that the popular subject dis-
tances herself from her particular condition, which allows her to generate unprece-
dented links with other popular identifications. Thus, unlike political discourses that
are articulated through other logics, in populist interventions there is no privilege of
differences, and any social claim or struggle can be part of either side of the frontier.
Someone who is considered an enemy at first sight, someone who is ‘at the top’ or
who is part of the ‘establishment’, i.e. ‘the elites’ (such as the national bourgeoisie,
rural producers, groups represented by the light blue anti-abortion scarves13) can, at
a given moment, be identified as ‘those from below’, as ‘members of the people’.
This more porous, contaminated and ambivalent politics is what gives populism its
disruptive and radical potency and what differentiates it from political struggles cir-
cumscribed to pre-ordained enemies, prefigured by universal systems of oppres-
sion.
In this light, we are not so optimistic about the second image either – the Kirch-
nerist appeal: ‘The Homeland is the Other’ – which the authors refer to as a ‘distinct
form of populist work that (...) is not articulated through the domination of the other
but embraces the other of the self as that polemicist who must be cared for in order
for things to flourish’ (Biglieri and Cadahia, 2021: 131). For Biglieri and Cadahia,
this signifier would in fact reveal the emancipatory structure of the logic of articula-
tion of populism which, according to them, ‘asserts itself through the care of the self
as the other of the self’ (130). That is to say, in the syntagm coined by the Kichnerist
political discourse, the other would be that irreducible element that constitutes us,
so, as they say, ‘far from something to be eliminated’ (130), we should take care of
it. From their point of view, this populist gesture would already contain an effective
dimension of care that has gone unnoticed, or rather, devalued by feminist politics
with an autonomist slant. In effect, in this form of identity configuration there would
be a space for sheltering and promoting the care of the other, and its
sororal
drifts,
without neglecting the oppositional and articulatory dimension constitutive of pop-
ulist formations. Recovering this dimension, therefore, would be crucial for imagin-
ing one of the ways of radicalising feminist politics through populist politics.

13 The sectors that oppose the legalisation of abortion in Argentina use light blue headscarves
as a symbol of their struggle and as a way of differentiating themselves from the green headscarves of
feminist activists. In this regard, in a controversial speech, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner called for
the formation of a social and political front that includes both headscarves, generating great contro-
versy among her supporters, most of whom were in favour of abortion.

263
Feminism and Populism with no Guarantee
Now, even if we can appreciate the possibilities that this political gesture opens
up for the articulation of feminist and populist political practices – and which the
authors rightly point out – we nevertheless also believe it is fundamental to highlight
the limits and challenges that populism still represents for feminist politics. For if
the appeal ‘the Homeland is the Other’ sums up the logic of openness and inclusion
of otherness in similar terms to a ‘populist normativity’, it is far from defining its
political practice: oriented towards the construction of hegemony through antago-
nist politics. That is, first and foremost, in the back-and-forth between the
whole
and the
part
proper to populist hegemonic politics, the notion of caring for differ-
ences loses its effect. For it is not a criterion of care that will safeguard those differ-
ences from the shifting of populist boundaries. Hegemonic investiture has unpre-
dictable effects, including the underestimation or discarding of some of the differ-
ences that were present in the first place. Secondly, the logic of populist inclusion is
not infinite, nor indistinct, and, above all, it is not defined
ad hoc
by a criterion of
indiscriminate openness to otherness, as many feminisms and left-wing activisms
seem to assume when they conduct their political praxis by a supposed political
correctness of accumulation of social differences by definition14.
For all these reasons, and unlike some feminisms that are now questioned for
their moralistic practices of ‘nullification’ or ‘aggravation’, populist praxis leaves
open the way in which political differences are settled, involving then conjunctural
and singular judgements that will have the agreement of some and the opposition
of others. Populist inclusion is thus radically unpredictable, so that sometimes those
who were previously on the opposite side of the fence join its forces; and at other
times strategic alliances are forged with sectors even of the opposition – with the
right, with the light blue scarves – to represent the elusive whole. This is why popu-
lism is the logic of political articulation
par excellence
, as Biglieri and Cadahia have
affirmed on countless occasions. And therefore, not all feminisms would be willing
to go along with it. Therefore, we should also ask ourselves what it would mean for
feminisms to allow themselves to be radicalised by populism. As we have tried to
show, accepting the ineradicable nature of the antagonism does not seem to be
enough. It is also necessary not to elude the always unsuccessful displacement of
political borders present in the failed attempts at closure and plenitude that populist
hegemonic process implies. Only in this way can heterogeneity be thought beyond
the acceptance of differences and acquire its radical character.

14 In other words, intersectionality does not always translate into the politicisation of differen-
ces; on the contrary, the mere aggregation of differences is often a means of depoliticising them.

264 MERCEDES BARROS & NATALIA MARTÍNEZ PRADO
OPEN CONCLUDING REMARKS: ‘A NEBULOUS NO-(WO)MAN'S-
LAND’15
To conclude our intervention, we would like to invoke once again the spirit of
openness that Biglieri and Cadahia bring through their intervention to the apparent
and sedimented antinomy between populism and feminism. As we have shown, the
authors make a remarkable effort to work on the traces of a possible encounter
between these two historically distant, but currently fascinating political phenomena.
As they point out, their aim is to translate certain practices and experiences located
in the South – equating or contrasting them with those prevailing in the Global
North – with the expectation of tracing contact points which are often overlooked
or dismissed out of hand.
But in doing so, as we have also tried to show in our intervention, the authors
have not discussed nor acknowledged two assumptions underlying their own mili-
tant and analytical approach: on the one hand, their translation exercise was carried
out on the basis of assuming an internationalist framework intimately linked to the
tradition of the Marxist left which, as we pointed out above, is far from making
possible the radicality of the contingency of political borders – and their overdeter-
mined and singular inscriptions – which, whether we like it or not, populism pre-
supposes. On the other hand, they remained distant from the discussion on how
the heterogeneity inherent to feminisms can deal with the hegemonic dimension of
populism. That is, even if we admit, along with them, that the logic of the not-all
definitively recognises this gesture of radical assumption of singularities as some-
thing exceptional and distinctive of feminist politics – an absolute apprehension of
the heterogeneous – it remains to be analysed how the moment of closure and rep-
resentation, inherent to populisms, can be assumed therefrom. Following that path,
it may be productive to recall Butler's reading of Antigone (2002) to which we re-
ferred earlier on, especially her insistence that heterogeneity is not without the law,
which is why Antigone's action is only partially outside Creon's Law.
Now, if for Cadahia and Biglieri populism and feminism can radicalise each
other from antagonism and care, for us it is instead from the tension between open-
ness and closure, between social heterogeneity and hegemonic articulation that we
can glimpse the greatest challenge to their coexistence. That is why we consider that
it is still necessary to proceed with caution, but with no less enthusiasm, in thinking
about their communion. This may require also an analytical register guided by a
logic that operates on a case-by-case basis, and that unfolds in a singular and situated
manner, which can be attentive to the specific and distinctive moments in which

15 Alluding to the words that Ernesto Laclau once wrote: ‘(...) between left-wing and right-wing
populism, there is a nebulous no-man's-land which can be crossed — and has been crossed — in many
directions’ (Laclau, 2005: 87).

265
Feminism and Populism with no Guarantee
populist glimpses permeate feminist politics16. For that, this analytical path must be
faithful to the indeterminacy of the social and always aware of the contingent and
arbitrary locations of social struggles. Many times, this may go against the militant
spirit which always tries to make history happen.
So, let us provisionally close the opening of this dialogue, then, by recalling, with
reference to Hannah Arendt's reading, that one of the main limits of Marxist polit-
ical philosophy, apart from the privileging of a Subject that makes history, was pre-
cisely that politics ended up deriving from history as a
making
. And as she herself
also said, only Marx understood that a conception of ‘making history’ implied ac-
cepting that, as every craft of making implies a certain end (a made, fabricated prod-
uct), ‘history will have an end’ (Arendt, 2018: 127). And we, as feminists and popu-
lists, know that, although we are moving in a nebulous land, our story has only just
begun.
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