ArticlePDF Available

Explaining the paradox of conspiracy theories and system‐justifying beliefs from an intergroup perspective

August 2023
Political Psychology 45(2)

DOI:10.1111/pops.12924

License
CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Authors:

Jiayan Mao

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Zhaoxie Zeng

Nanjing Normal University

Shen-Long Yang

Xi'an Jiaotong University

Show all 5 authorsHide

By distinguishing between ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories, this research seeks to explain a paradox in conspiracy theory research, namely, that conspiracy beliefs are associated with both derogation and justification of the social system. Study 1 ( N = 1,481) was a survey in the context of the COVID‐19 pandemic in China, and the results revealed a negative correlation between belief in ingroup conspiracy theories and system‐justifying beliefs. In Study 2 ( N = 195), exposure to outgroup conspiracy theories positively predicted system‐justifying beliefs, a finding that was serially mediated by external attributions and collective narcissism. In Study 3 ( N = 256), exposure to ingroup conspiracy theories negatively predicted system‐justifying beliefs, a result that was serially mediated by internal attributions and anomie. In Study 4 ( N = 616), exposure to a conspiracy theory about the US government increased system‐justifying beliefs among Chinese participants and decreased them among US participants. The distinction between ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories hence implies two different processes through which conspiracy theories affect system‐justifying beliefs.

Content uploaded by Zhaoxie Zeng

Content may be subject to copyright.

Political Psychology. 2023;00:1–20.

wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pops

DOI: 10.1111/pops.12924

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Explaining the paradox of conspiracy theories

and system- justifying beliefs from an intergroup

perspective

Jia- YanMao 1 | Zhao- XieZeng2 | Shen- LongYang3 |

Yong- YuGuo2 | Jan- Willemvan Prooijen 1, 4,5

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which

permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the us e is non-commercial and no

modifications or adaptations are made.

Psychology.

Jia- Yan Mao and Zhao- Xie Zeng contribute d equally to the article.

1Department of Experimental and Applied

Psychology, VU Amsterdam, Amsterdam,

the Netherlands

2School of Psycholog y, Nanjing Nor mal

University, Nanjing, China

3Institute of Social Psychology, School

of Human ities and Social Science, Xi'an

Jiaotong University, Xi'an, China

4The Netherlands Institute for the Study

of Crime and Law Enforcement (NSCR),

Amsterdam, the Netherlands

5Maastricht University, Maastricht, the

Netherlands

Correspondence

Jia- Yan Mao, Department of Experimental

and Applied Psychology, VU A msterdam,

Van der Boechorststraat 7, 1081BT

Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

Email: j.mao@vu.nl

Funding information

China Scholarship Council, Grant/Award

Number: 202006860004; National Natural

Science Foundation of China, Grant/Award

Number: 71971120 and 72001171

Abstract

By distinguishing between ingroup versus outgroup con-

spiracy theories, this research seeks to explain a paradox

in conspiracy theory research, namely, that conspiracy be-

liefs are associated with both derogation and justification

of the social system. Study 1 (N = 1,481) was a survey in

the context of the COVID- 19 pandemic in China, and the

results revealed a negative correlation between belief in

ingroup conspiracy theories and system- justifying beliefs.

In Study 2 (N = 195), exposure to outgroup conspiracy the-

ories positively predicted system- justifying beliefs, a find-

ing that was serially mediated by external attributions and

collective narcissism. In Study 3 (N = 256), exposure to

ingroup conspiracy theories negatively predicted system-

justifying beliefs, a result that was serially mediated by

internal attributions and anomie. In Study 4 (N = 616) , ex -

posure to a conspiracy theory about the US government

increased system- justifying beliefs among Chinese partic-

ipants and decreased them among US participants. The

distinction between ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy

theories hence implies two different processes through

which conspiracy theories affect system- justifying beliefs.

KEYWOR DS

anomie, attribution, belief in conspiracy theories, collective

narcissism, system- justifying belief

MAO et al.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, conspiracy theories have been rampant following major societal crises

such as wars, natural disasters, and terrorist attacks (van Prooijen & Douglas,2017). During

the COVID- 19 pandemic, many citizens endorsed conspiracy theories such as that the novel

coronavirus came from China's “biological warfare plan” or that the virus was a “biological

weapon” that leaked out of a Wuhan laboratory (Dehghani & Masoumi,2020; Douglas,2020;

Nie,2020). At the same time, large numbers of Chinese citizens believed the conspiracy the-

ory that the United States created the virus (Mao et al.,2021; Mu,2020; Su et al.,2021). Such

conspiracy theories surge particularly in societal crisis situations, which is consistent with the

notion that feelings of existential threat trigger the sensemaking processes underlying people's

belief in conspiracy theories (Van Prooijen,2020; Van Prooijen & Douglas,2 017).

A common assumption is that conspiracy theories have negative, and even subversive, soci-

etal implications. As the World Health Organization (WHO) has articulated in response to the

COVID- 19 pandemic, “We're not just fighting an epidemic; we're fighting an infodemic. Fake

news spreads faster and more easily than this virus, and is just as dangerous” (see also Oleksy,

Wnuk, Maison, & Łyś,2021; Pennycook et al.,2020; Van Bavel et al.,2020; WHO, 2020). For

example, belief in the conspiracy theory that electromagnetic waves transmitted by 5G tech-

nology could cause COVID- 19 has prompted people to damage telecommunication masts in

arson attacks and to verbally or physically abuse their engineers (Jolley & Paterson, 2020;

Waterson & Hern,2020). Also, Casara et al.(2022) have found that belief in conspiracy theo-

ries can motivate collective action against the perceived threat of economic inequality (see also

Sternisko et al.,2021). More generally, belief in conspiracy theories is associated with dissatis-

faction with the current social system (Abalakina- Paap et al.,1999; Goertzel,1994), suggesting

that conspiracy theories predict a tendency to derogate or challenge the social system.

System threat also can inspire people to defend the social system they live in, however (Kay

& Friesen,2011). Previous studies have found that conspiracy theories therefore can increase

system justification (Jolley et al.,2018; Mao et al.,2021), defined as the belief that the social

system and the status quo are legitimate (Kay & Jost,2003, 2014). Jolley et al.(2018) found that

exposure to conspiracy theories increases participants' satisfaction with the British social sys-

tem. Moreover, the relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and satisfaction with the

status quo was mediated by a tendency to attribute social problems to individuals and small

groups rather than systemic causes. Likewise, Mao et al.(2021) found that the system threat

posed by the COVID- 19 pandemic led Chinese participants to believe stronger conspiracy the-

ories about outgroups (mainly the United States), which in turn predicted increased system-

justifying belief. This illustrates that conspiracy theories can increase people's support for the

government and the social system that they live in.

Taken together, these findings suggest a paradox: Whereas conspiracy theories often are

associated with negative feelings and attitudes toward one's own society and government

(Goertzel,1994; Imhoff & Bruder,2014), they are also associated with a tendency to justify

the social system that citizens live in (Jolley et al.,2018; Mao et al.,2021). In the present re-

search, we try to resolve this paradox by examining the role of the social identity of the alleged

conspirators. Beliefs in conspiracy theories are rooted in perceived intergroup conflict (van

Prooijen,2020; van Prooijen & van Vugt,2018), and, indeed, people often believe conspiracy

theories about competing outgroups (Cichocka et al.,2016; Mashuri & Zaduqisti,2015; van

Prooijen & Song,2021). People may also often believe conspiracy theories from within their

own ingroup, however, such as the belief that one's own government is involved in malevolent

conspiracies (van Prooijen & van Lange,2014). Such ingroup conspiracies may be difficult to

dissociate from the social system that people live in. We therefore propose that this distinc-

tion between ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories is of paramount importance in the

relationship between system- justifying beliefs. For the present purposes, we operationalize

14679221, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.12924 by Cochrane Netherlands, Wiley Online Library on [31/08/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION

the distinction between ingroup and outgroup at the national level in our studies, given that

different countries represent different social systems.

Hofstadter(1966) has pointed out that conspiracy theories help people understand incom-

prehensible events by attributing significant events to powerful, hostile groups. Our overarch-

ing theoretical proposition is that these attributions differ between ingroup versus outgroup

conspiracy theories: Ingroup conspiracy theories are likely associated with internal attribu-

tions blaming the social system, whereas outgroup conspiracy theories are likely associated

with external attributions blaming factors outside the social system. For instance, when peo-

ple attribute COVID- 19 to a conspiracy of their own government, it reduces trust in their

government; however, this is not the case when people attribute COVID- 19 to a conspiracy of

foreign groups (Bertin et al.,2022; McCarthy et al.,2022; Oleksy, Wnuk, Gambin, & Łyś,2021).

Ingroup and outgroup conspiracy theories thus stimulate different attributions— assuming

that societal problems were caused within or outside the social system— which in turn are

associated with different appraisals of the social system. We therefore hypothesize that belief

in ingroup conspiracy theories is negatively correlated with system- justifying belief, whereas

belief in outgroup conspiracy theories is positively correlated with system- justifying belief

(Hypothesis 1). In what follows, we highlight the more specific underlying processes for out-

group versus ingroup conspiracy theories separately.

Belief in outgroup conspiracy theories and system- justifying belief

Why would outgroup conspiracy theories predict increased system justification? We propose that

as outgroup conspiracy theories trigger attributions to hostile, immoral forces external to the so-

cial system, they also underscore the inherent greatness of their own social system. Conspiracy

theories about outgroups often are associated with two complementary psychological processes:

strong feelings of cohesion within one's own group (e.g., ingroup favoritism) and derogation of dif-

ferent groups as reflected in prejudice, hostility, and feelings of intergroup threat (e.g., Chayinska &

Minescu,2018; Tajfel & Turner,1979; Van Bavel & Pereira,2018; van Prooijen & van Vugt,2018).

Correspondingly, the cohesion within one's group— as associated with outgroup conspiracy be-

liefs— is often reflected in collective narcissism, that is, the feeling that one's own group is superior

to other groups and has special entitlements (Cichocka et al.,2016; Robertson et al.,2022).

Previous studies have found a significant positive correlation between collective narcissism and be-

lief in outgroup conspiracy theories (Cichocka et al.,2015, 2016; Golec de Zavala & Federico,2018;

Robertson et al., 2022; Sternisko et al., 2021). For example, collective narcissism among Polish

participants is correlated with conspiratorial stereotypes of Jewish attempts at world domination

(Golec de Zavala & Cichocka,2012). Americans' collective narcissism is positively correlated with

support for conspiracy theories involving foreign governments (Cichocka et al.,2016). Collective

narcissism is closely coupled with people's desire to defend, protect, and recognize their ingroup,

which supports system- justifying beliefs. We therefore hypothesize a serial mediation model, such

that belief in outgroup conspiracy theories positively predicts system- justifying belief through col-

lective narcissism and attributions external to the social system (Hypothesis 2).

Belief in ingroup conspiracy theories and system- justifying belief

Although outgroup conspiracy theories may trigger external attributions that downplay flaws

in the system, making internal attributions that accuse important actors from within one's own

community of malpractice is likely to highlight flaws in the system. We therefore propose that

the attributional process associated with ingroup conspiracy theories is likely to promote ano-

mie, defined as the shared perception that society is collapsing (Teymoori et al.,2017). Anomie

MAO et al.

often occurs in times of social crisis (Casara et al.,2022; Teymoori et al.,2016, 2017), such

as war, terrorism (Jamieson, 1998), extensive political, ideological, and institutional change

(Ådnanes,2007; Genov,1998; Huschka & Mau,2006), and high levels of social inequality and

crime (Casara et al.,2022; Merton,1938, 1968; Messner & Rosenfeld,2001).

How people interpret and communicate perceptions of objective events shapes the develop-

ment of anomie (Teymoori et al.,2017). As ingroup conspiracy theories ascribe crisis events to

internal systems, belief in ingroup conspiracy theories is likely to stimulate feelings of anomie.

Previous research indeed has observed a positive correlation between belief in conspiracy theo-

ries about the government and anomie (Goertzel,1994), which in turn is likely to be associated

with feelings of alienation and dissatisfaction with the social system. Anomie is negatively cor-

related with belief in a just world (Teymoori et al.,2016), predicts withdrawal from the super-

ordinate group (Hornsey & Hogg,2000; Teymoori et al.,2017), reduces perceived cohesion in

society (Durkheim,1897/1987; Orru,1983; Zhao & Cao,2010), and lowers national identifica-

tion (Blank,2003; Scheepers et al.,1992; Srole,1956). We therefore hypothesize that the negative

relationship between ingroup conspiracy beliefs and system- justifying belief is serially mediated

by internal attributions and anomie (Hypothesis 3).

Current research overview

In the current research, we report a correlational study (Study 1) and three experimental studies

(Studies 2, 3, and 4) that delve into the complex relationship between belief in (ingroup vs. out-

group) conspiracy theories and system- justifying beliefs. Study 1 tested Hypothesis 1 in a correla-

tional study that took place in the context of the COVID- 19 pandemic. Study 2 tested Hypothesis

2 through an experimental manipulation of exposure to outgroup conspiracy theories. Study 3

tested Hypothesis 3 through a manipulation of exposure to ingroup conspiracy theories. Study

4 further tested our line of reasoning by manipulating exposure to a conspiracy theory involving

the US government in a Chinese sample (outgroup conspiracy theory) and a US sample (ingroup

conspiracy theory). All studies were conducted with Chinese samples, except for Study 4.

ST U DY 1

Study 1 was a survey study with a large sample conducted in China in August 2021, when

the delta variant of the coronavirus started spreading into the Chinese mainland. Our pur-

pose was to explore the relationship between belief in ingroup and outgroup conspiracy theo-

ries and system- justifying belief in the context of the COVID- 19 pandemic. All participants

completed measures including ingroup conspiracy beliefs, outgroup conspiracy beliefs, and

system- justifying belief. Following Hypothesis 1, we expected a negative correlation between

system- justifying belief and belief in ingroup conspiracy theories, and a positive correlation

with belief in outgroup conspiracy theories.

Method

Participants and design

We sent out a battery of questionnaires through Credamo, a Chinese crowdsourcing site

similar to Amazon's Mechanical Turk. A total of 1,497 adult participants in mainland

China provided written informed consent and completed the questionnaires. Three partici-

pants were removed because they were under 18 years old, and 13 participants were removed

CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION

because their time required to complete the questions was extremely short. The final sam-

ple for data analysis consisted of 1,481 participants (680 males, 729 females, 72 partici-

pants without gender information), ranging in age from 18 to 68 years, with a mean age of

29.28 years (SD = 6. 81).

Materials and procedure

Using a self- compiled scale based on the Conspiracy Mentality Scale developed by Imhoff and

Bruder(2014), we measured participants' belief in ingroup conspiracy theories. There were three

statements (e.g., “The government has covered up the truth about the recent pandemic”; 1 = strongly

disagree, 7 = strongly agree, Cronbach's α = .76).1 Belief in outgroup conspiracy theories was meas-

ured by selecting three items from the scale of outgroup conspiracy beliefs in the context of the

pandemic compiled by Mao et al.(2021), combined with one self- compiled item. Participants rated

the four items (e.g., “The novel coronavirus variant ‘Delta strain’ that has suddenly emerged in

China recently was maliciously transmitted into China by foreign reactionary forces”; 1 = strongly

disagree, 7 = strongly agree, Cronbach's α = .87). The ingroup and outgroup conspiracy belief items

loaded on separate factors in a factor analysis (see the Online Supplementary Materials). System-

justifying beliefs were measured with three items (e.g., “The majority of the Chinese government

policy is conducive to the interests of most people”; 1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree,

Cronbach's α = .87) adapted from the System Justification Scale (Kay & Jost,2003). The measures

were part of a larger questionnaire used for multiple different research projects.2 After completing

all the measurements, participants were paid a small amount of money.

Results

The correlations are displayed in Table1, showing that while ingroup conspiracy beliefs were

negatively related to system- justifying beliefs, outgroup conspiracy beliefs were unrelated to

system- justifying beliefs. These results support Hypothesis 1 for ingroup conspiracy theories,

but not for outgroup conspiracy theories.

Discussion

Although the negative correlation between belief in ingroup conspiracy theories and system-

justifying belief observed was consistent with our expectations, Study 1 did not replicate the

1We have emphasized in the preamble that these three items are about the Chines e govern ment.

2The questionnaire also included other variables, such as psychological distance, risk perception, perceived uncertainty,

responsibility attribution, and panic mental ity (see the online supplemental materials for a complete list of all measured variable s).

These variables were included in the survey by other researchers for other research purposes.

TABLE 1 Descriptive analysis and correlations.

MSD 1 2 3

1. Belief in ingroup conspiracy theories 2.20 1.11 1

2. Belief in outgroup conspiracy theories 4.22 1.39 .11*** 1

3. System- justifying belief 7.69 1.15 −.41*** .03 1

***p < .001.

MAO et al.

positive correlation between belief in outgroup conspiracy theories and system- justifying be-

lief in a Chinese context (Mao et al.,2021).

One possible explanation is the difference between the time when we conducted the current

survey (August 2021) versus the time when Mao et al. (2021) carried out their experiments

(September and October 2020). In September and October 2020, the origin of the novel corona-

virus was still hotly debated in China, as many Chinese people believed in conspiracy theories

that it originated in the United States. In August 2021, however, when the delta strain was first

introduced to the Chinese mainland, people's support for the conspiracy theories that the virus

originated abroad dropped, whereas criticism of their own government's lack of responsibility

increased (Zheng,2022).

Study 1 illustrates that ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy beliefs have different implica-

tions for how people justify the social system that they live in. In addition, our findings are

consistent with a theoretical model that ingroup conspiracy theories may predict decreased

system justification, although the positive link between outgroup conspiracy theories and sys-

tem justification did not emerge in Study 1. There may hence be two different processes in the

relationship between belief in (ingroup vs. outgroup) conspiracy theories and system- justifying

belief. In the following, we report three experiments that investigated the effects of exposure

to outgroup (Studies 2 and 4) and ingroup (Studies 3 and 4) conspiracy theories on system-

justifying belief.

ST U DY 2

In Study 2, participants were exposed (vs. not exposed) to outgroup conspiracy theories

by reading text materials. The text materials focused on the conspiracy theory that Fort

Detrick in the United States leaked the coronavirus (a common theory in China). After

the reading task, participants were asked to rate their external attributions, collective

narcissism, and system- justifying beliefs. Based on our line of reasoning in the introduc-

tion, we expect a positive effect of exposure to outgroup conspiracy theories on system-

justifying beliefs, with external attribution and collective narcissism as serial mediators

of this effect.

Method

Participants and design

The study was a two- level between- group design (exposure to outgroup conspiracy theories:

exposure vs. control). An effect size (d) of .5 in an independent samples t- test requires a

sample size of approximately 102 participants for 80% power of detecting the effect. We re-

cruited 216 adult participants in mainland China through Credamo. A Monte Carlo power

analysis for indirect effects (Schoemann et al.,2 017) revealed that the current sample size

yielded 99% power to detect the serial mediation effect in our data. Two participants were

excluded because their time required to complete the questions was very short, and 14 par-

ticipants were excluded because their answers showed significant regularity (e.g., all the

results of the scale containing reverse- scoring questions were the same value and not the

middle value of the scale). In addition, five participants in the experimental group failed

the manipulation test and were deleted from data analyses. The final sample for data analy-

ses consisted of 195 participants (100 in the control group, 95 in the experimental group; 81

male, 114 female; Mage = 29 .17, SD = 6.34).

CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION

Materials and procedure

Inspired by the manipulation of Douglas and Sutton(2008), we asked participants in the out-

group conspiracy theory condition to read and understand as carefully as possible an article

about a conspiracy theory that Fort Detrick in the United States leaked the novel coronavirus.

This article consists of nine short paragraphs with multiple pieces of evidence to support the

idea that the COVID- 19 pandemic originated in the United States. The term conspiracy theory

does not appear in the article (for full text, see the Online Supplementary Materials). Consistent

with Jolley et al.(2018), participants in the control group did not participate in this reading

comprehension task or read any other written material, but directly responded to the media-

tors and dependent variables. After the manipulation, participants completed a multiple-

choice question to check comprehension of the manipulation.3

All participants then completed measurements of the remaining variables. Synthesizing

previous studies (Arlikatti et al.,2007; Brown & White, 2010; Cheng et al., 2017; McAuley

et al.,1992), we used a seven- item scale to measure participants' tendency to make external

attributions for the pandemic (e.g., “I hold the US government responsible for this outbreak

of COVID- 19”; 1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree, Cronbach's α = .93). Following Golec

de Zavala and Federico(2018), we used four items to measure participants' collective narcis-

sism (e.g., “If China had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place”;

1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree, Cronbach's α = .69). In addition, consistent with pre-

vious studies (Mashuri & Zaduqisti,2014; Pehrson et al.,2009), we used four items to mea-

sure participants' national identification (e.g., “I feel close to China”; 1 = strongly disagree,

7 = strongly agree, Cronbach's α = .71). Finally, system- justifying belief was measured with

the eight- item System Justification Scale developed by Kay and Jost(2003; e.g., “China's po-

litical system operates in a fair and legitimate way”; 1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree,

Cronbach's α = .89). We also collected basic demographic information of participants. At the

end of the study, all participants received a small monetary reward.

Results

First, we conducted a series of independent samples t- tests on participants' external attribution,

collective narcissism, national identification, and system- justifying beliefs. Participants displayed

stronger external attribution, collective narcissism, national identification, and system- justifying

beliefs in the conspiracy exposure condition than in the control condition (see Table2). This

suggests that our experimental manipulation significantly influences all the dependent variables

in the expected manner. Descriptive statistics and correlational analyses showed that all the de-

pendent variables are positively correlated (see Tabl e2).

The PROCESS macro for IBM SPSS 25.0 (Model 6; Hayes,2013) was then used to test the serial

mediating effect of exposure to outgroup conspiracy theories on system- justifying belief, through

external attribution and collective narcissism. Regression analysis results (see Figure1) showed that,

after controlling for the mediators, the direct effect of exposure to outgroup conspiracy theories on

system- justifying belief was reduced to nonsignificant, B = .10, p = .12, CI95% [− .03, .23]. Although

exposure to outgroup conspiracy theories did not have a significant effect on collective narcissism in

this model, B = .05, p = .44, CI95% [− .08, .19], it did significantly predict external attribution, B = .50,

p < .001, CI95% [.37, .62], which in turn significantly predicted collective narcissism, B = .51, p < .001,

CI95% [.37, .65]. Both external attribution, B = .39, p < .001, CI95% [.25, .53], and collective narcissism,

B = .28, p < .001, CI95% [.15, .41], had significant effects on system- justifying belief.

3For complete multiple- choice questions in the three studies (Studies 2, 3, and 4), please refer to the Online Supplementar y

Materials. If all data are included in the statistical analyses, the results are similar.

MAO et al.

TABLE 2 Independent samples t- tests, descriptive analysis, and correlations.

Experimental

group (N = 95)

Control group

(N = 100)

Cohen's

d M SD 1 2 3 4 5MSD MSD

1. Exposure to outgroup conspiracy theories .49 .50 1

2. External attribution 8.01 .69 6.77 1.36 7.96*** 1.15 7.37 1.25 .50*** 1

3. Collective narcissism 6.24 .56 5.83 .72 4.50*.64 6.03 .68 .31*** .54*** 1

4. National identification 6.66 .35 6.33 .51 5.24** .75 6.49 .47 .35*** .36*** .63*** 1

5. System- justifying belief 7.97 .64 7.29 1.0 0 5.68** .81 7.62 .91 .38*** .59*** .52*** .48*** 1

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION

The serial mediation analysis showed that external attribution and collective narcissism fully

mediated the effect of exposure to outgroup conspiracy theories on system- justifying belief, with a

mediating effect size of .28, accounting for 73.83% of the total effect (.38) of exposure to outgroup

conspiracy theories on system- justifying belief. The indirect effect generated by exposure to out-

group conspiracy theories → external attribution → collective narcissism → system- justifying be-

lief was significant, B = .07, CI95% [.03, .14], accounting for 18.94% of the total effect.4

Discussion

The results of Study 2 support and extend the findings of Mao et al.(2021) that exposure to

outgroup conspiracy theories increases system- justifying belief. In addition, external attribu-

tion and collective narcissism serially mediate this effect, which supports Hypothesis 2.

ST U DY 3

Study 3 expanded on Study 2 by testing the idea that exposure to an ingroup conspiracy theory

reduces system justification. The ingroup conspiracy theory used was based on a “pregnant

miscarriage” incident that received widespread media attention in China. Specifically, one

month before Study 3 was carried out (February 2022), an eight- months pregnant woman in

Xi'an, China, had a miscarriage after waiting for two hours at the hospital gate because she

could not provide proof of a negative COVID- 19 test. After the reading task, participants were

asked to rate participants' attributions of this event as internal to the system, anomie, and

system- justifying belief. It was expected that exposure to ingroup conspiracy theories would

decrease system- justifying belief. Following Hypothesis 3, we also investigate the serial medi-

ating role of internal attribution and anomie in this effect.

Method

Participants and design

The study had a two- level between- group design (exposure to ingroup conspiracy theories: ex-

posure vs. control). Based on the same power analysis as in Study 2, 290 adult participants in

4The serial mediation model still holds when we include national identification along with individual and parental educational

levels as covariates i n the model.

FIGUR E 1 Study 2: Serial mediation model. Path values are the path coefficients with standard errors.

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. All variables were standardized.

Exposure to Out-group Conspiracy Theories System-justifying Belief

External AttributionCollective Narcissism

.51(.07) ***

.50(.06) ***

.28(.07) ***

.10(.06)

.39(.07) ***

.05(.07)

MAO et al.

mainland China were recruited through Credamo. A Monte Carlo power analysis for indirect

effects (Schoemann et al.,2017) revealed that the current sample size yielded more than 99%

power to detect the serial mediation effect in our data. Two participants were excluded because

they failed our attention test, five participants were excluded because their time required to com-

plete the questions was very short, and 16 participants were excluded because their answers

showed significant regularity (for the same reasons as in Study 2). In addition, 11 participants

in the experimental group failed the manipulation test and were deleted from data analyses. The

final sample for data analysis consisted of 256 participants (130 in the control group, 126 in the

experimental group; 93 male, 163 female, Mage = 30.88, SD = 6.32).

Materials and procedure

Using the same manipulation method used in Study 2, participants in the ingroup conspiracy the-

ory exposure group first completed a reading comprehension task in which they were asked to read

and memorize an article about the “pregnant miscarriage” incident in Xi'an. This article consists of

four short paragraphs. The term conspiracy theory does not appear in the article (for full text, see the

Online Supplementary Materials), but it conveys a theme that many government policies and ac-

tions conceal unknown purposes, which is consistent with the characteristics of conspiracy theories

as summarized by previous researchers (Brotherton et al.,2013; van Prooijen & van Vugt,2018). As

in Study 2, participants in the control group did not read any materials but responded to the medi-

ating and dependent variables directly. After the experimental manipulation, participants com-

pleted a multiple- choice question to check comprehension of the manipulation.5

After this, all participants completed measurements of the remaining variables. We adapted

the measurement of attribution by Jolley et al.(2018) and presented participants with nine

major social issues (i.e., huge gap of wealth, serious environmental pollution, grim employment

landscape, imbalance of educational resources, excessively high price of housing, serious work

involution, sharp drop in new population, and entertainment prevails and corruption) in to-

day's Chinese society. Participants were asked to rate on a 9- point scale the extent to which they

thought a range of social issues are caused by the actions of individuals, small groups in society

(or foreign governments), or fundamental flaws inherent in Chinese society (1 = the actions of in-

dividuals, small groups in society or foreign governments, 9 = fundamental flaws inherent in Chinese

society, Cronbach's α = .84). The issues included flawed laws, values, social norms, institutions,

and China's political and economic systems.

We also assessed the Anomie Scale developed by Teymoori et al. (2016). Participants re-

sponded to 12 items (e.g., “People think that there are no clear moral standards to follow”;

1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree, Cronbach's α = .91) on the scale. System- justifying be-

lief was again measured with the eight items (Cronbach's α = .91) using the System Justification

Scale developed by Kay and Jost(2003). In addition, participants' national identification was

measured using the same four items (Cronbach's α = .81), as in Study 2. Finally, participants'

basic demographic information was collected, and they received a small monetary reward.

Results

A series of independent samples t- tests were conducted on participants' internal attribution,

anomie, system- justifying belief, and national identification. The results showed that partici-

pants had higher levels of internal attribution and anomie, but lower levels of system- justifying

belief and national identification in the experimental group than in the control group (see

5If all data are included in the statistical analyses, the results are simi lar.

CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION

Table3). This indicates that our manipulation influenced our measured variables in the ex-

pected manner. Descriptive statistics and correlational analyses showed that all the dependent

variables were significantly correlated (see Table3).

The PROCESS macro for IBM SPSS 25.0 (Model 6) developed by Hayes(2013) was again

used to test the serial mediating effect of exposure to ingroup conspiracy theories on system-

justifying belief through internal attribution and anomie. The results (see Figure2) revealed

that, after controlling for the mediators, the direct effect of exposure to ingroup conspiracy

theories on system- justifying belief was reduced to nonsignificant, B = −.0 7, p = .08, CI95%

[−.16, .01]. Exposure to ingroup conspiracy theories had significant effects on internal attri-

bution, B = .34, p < .0 01, CI 95% [.22, .45], and anomie, B = .21, p < .001, C I95% [.09, .33]; internal

attribution significantly predicted anomie, B = .26, p < .001, C I95% [.14, .39], but did not pre-

dict system- justifying belief, B = −.0 4, p = .37, C I95% [−.12, .05]; anomie significantly predicted

system- justifying belief, B = −.75, p < .001, CI95% [−.83, −.67].

The results of the serial mediation analysis showed that internal attribution and anomie fully

mediated the effect of exposure to ingroup conspiracy theories on system- justifying belief, with

a mediating effect size of −.24, accounting for 76.43% of the total effect (−.31) of exposure to

ingroup conspiracy theories on system- justifying belief. Specifically, the indirect effect generated

by exposure to ingroup conspiracy theories → internal attribution → anomie → system- justifying

belief was significant, B = − .07, CI95% [−.13, −.03], accounting for 21.58% of the total effect.6

Discussion

Study 3 demonstrated that exposure to ingroup conspiracy theories decreases system- justifying

belief, serially mediated by internal attributions and anomie. This supports Hypothesis 3.

Studies 2 and 3 jointly are consistent with our conjecture that the type of conspiracy theories

(ingroup vs. outgroup) elicits different attributions, thus explaining the complex relationships

between belief in conspiracy theories and system justification.

ST U DY 4

While Studies 2 and 3 separately tested the effects of outgroup versus ingroup conspiracy

theories on system justification beliefs, in Study 4, we tried to find experimental evidence for

both processes in a single study. Specifically, Study 4 exposed participants to a conspiracy

theory about the role of the US government and pharmaceutical companies in the COVID- 19

pandemic (vs. a control group), but it recruited participants in China and the United States.

The reading material hence exposed Chinese participants to an outgroup conspiracy theory

but American participants to an ingroup conspiracy theory.

Method

Participants and design

The study used a 2 (sample: US vs. China) × 2 (exposure to conspiracy theories: exposure vs.

control) between- subject design. In China, 330 Chinese adult participants were recruited

through wenju an.com, a platform similar to Credamo. In the United States, 330 American adult

6The serial mediation model still holds when we include national identification along with individual and parental educational

levels as covariates i n the model.

MAO et al.

TABLE 3 Independent samples t- tests, descriptive analysis, and correlations.

Experimental

group (N = 126)

Control group

(N = 130)

Cohen's

d M SD 12345MSD MSD

1. Exposure to ingroup

conspiracy theories

.49 .50 1

2. Internal attribution 6.08 1.21 5.09 1.52 5.73*** .72 5.58 1.46 .34*** 1

3. Anomie 2.98 .99 2.40 .87 5.01*** .62 2.68 .97 .30*** .34*** 1

4. System- justifying

belief

7.0 0 1.37 7.73 .80 −5.22*** −.65 7.37 1.17 −.31*** −.32*** −.79*** 1

5. National

identification

6.01 .88 6.33 .50 −3.55*** −.45 6.17 .73 −.22*** −.19 ** −.56*** .73*** 1

**p < .01; ***p < .001.

CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION

participants were recruited through Prolific. Following our preregistration, 21 participants were

excluded because their answers showed significant regularity (for the same reasons as in Study 2;

11 Chinese and 10 American). In addition, 23 participants in the experimental group failed the

manipulation test (10 Chinese and 13 American) and were deleted from data analyses.

The final Chinese sample consisted of 309 participants (153 in the control group, 156 in the

experimental group; 98 male, 209 female, 2 other; Mage = 32.03 , SD = 6.77). The final American

sample consisted of 307 participants (153 in the control group, 154 in the experimental group;

182 male, 119 female, 6 other; Mage = 37.73, SD = 14.12 ).

Materials and procedure

Participants in the conspiracy theory exposure groups were asked to read an excerpt from a blog

about a suspected conspiracy of the US government having a secret deal with pharmaceutical

companies such as Pfizer during the COVID- 19 pandemic (for full text, see the Online

Supplementary Materials). After reading the text, participants were asked to briefly summarize

the main content in one or two sentences and then completed a multiple- choice comprehension

check.7 Participants in the control condition responded directly to the dependent variables.

After this, all participants completed the measurement of the dependent variables. Similar to

Studies 2 and 3, we used the System Justification Scale developed by Kay and Jost(2003) to mea-

sure system- justifying belief with eight items (Cronbach's α = .91). Chinese participants were asked to

provide system- justifying beliefs about Chinese society, whereas American participants were asked to

provide these for American society. In addition, we used four self- compiled items (e.g., “I believe there

were secret and illegal deals between the US government and pharmaceutical companies during the

course of the COVID- 19 pandemic”; 1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree, Cronbach's α = .92) to

measure participants’ specific belief in conspiracy theories about the US government. Finally, partic-

ipants' basic demographic information was collected, and they all received a small monetary reward.

Results

Conspiracy beliefs

A 2 (sample) × 2 (conspiracy exposure) ANOVA revealed that the main effect of conspiracy

exposure was significant, F(1,612) = 6. 67, p = . 010, η2 = .011. The main effect of the sample also

7If the data of par ticipants who made an error on the multiple- choice question (22 participants) are i ncluded in the analyses, the

results are similar.

FIGUR E 2 Study 3: Serial mediation model. Path values are the path coefficients with standard errors.

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. All variables were standardized.

Exposure to In-group Conspiracy Theories System-justifying Belief

Internal Attribution Anomie

–.07(.04)

.26(.06) ***

.34(.06) ***

–.75(.04)***

–.04(.04)

.21(.06) ***

MAO et al.

was significant, F(1,612) = 181.11, p < .001, η2 = .228. The interaction between conspiracy expo-

sure and sample was not significant, F(1,612) = .15, p = .70 2, η2 = .000. These findings indicate

that our manipulation of conspiracy exposure successfully influenced participants' conspiracy

beliefs.

System- justifying beliefs

A 2 (sample) × 2 (conspiracy exposure) ANOVA revealed that the main effect of conspiracy

exposure was not significant, F(1,612) = .03, p = .866, η2 = .000. The main effect of the sample

was significant, F(1,612) = 620.92 , p < .0 01, η2 = .504. Importantly, the interaction effect between

conspiracy exposure and sample was significant, F(1,612) = 11.32 , p = .0 01, η2 = .018. Figure3

displays the interaction effect.

Among US participants, the simple main effect of conspiracy exposure on system-

justifying belief was significant, F(1,612) = 5.0 9, p = .024, η2 = .008. System- justifying beliefs

of American participants exposed to the conspiracy theory (M = 3 .76, SD = .11) were signifi-

cantly lower than those of the American control group (M = 4.10 , SD = .11). Among Chinese

participants, the simple main effect of conspiracy exposure on system- justifying belief was

also significant, F(1,612) = 6.2 7, p = .013, η2 = .010. System- justifying beliefs of Chinese par-

ticipants exposed to the conspiracy theory (M = 6.75 , SD = .11) were significantly higher

than those of the Chinese control group (M = 6.38 , SD = .11). These findings further support

our line of reasoning.8

Discussion

Study 4 sought to test the effects of ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories by pre-

senting a conspiracy involving the US government, and then recruiting Chinese and US

participants. The results supported our hypothesis: Exposure to an ingroup conspiracy

theory (i.e., US participants exposed to a conspiracy theory about the US government) de-

creased system justification, but exposure to an outgroup conspiracy theory (i.e., Chinese

participants exposed to a conspiracy theory about the US government) increased system

justification.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

There seems to be a paradox in previous research results on the relationship between con-

spiracy theory and system- justifying belief. On the one hand, conspiracy beliefs are associ-

ated with the public's dissatisfaction with, and derogation of, the social system that they live

in (Abalakina- Paap et al.,1999; Casara et al.,2022; Goertzel,1994; Imhoff & Bruder,2014).

On the other hand, however, conspiracy theories can stimulate people to defend the social

system they live in and perceive it as fair and legitimate (Jolley et al.,2018; Mao et al.,2021).

The current research sought to resolve this paradox by classifying conspiracy theories accord-

ing to whether the suspected conspirators come from perceivers' ingroup or outgroup. Study

1 revealed a negative correlation between belief in ingroup conspiracy theories and system-

justifying beliefs. Results further indicated that exposure to an outgroup conspiracy theory

increased system- justifying beliefs in Study 2, while exposure to an ingroup conspiracy theory

8If gender and age are controlled for, the results are similar.

CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION

reduced system- justifying beliefs in Study 3. Through serial mediation analyses, the current

research also supports two different processes underlying the relationship between belief in

conspiracy theories and system- justifying belief. Furthermore, Study 4 indicated different ef-

fects on ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories on system justification within the same

study by recruiting participants from the United States and China.

Although overall the results were quite consistent, Study 1 did not replicate the positive

correlation between belief in outgroup conspiracy theories and system- justifying belief found

by Mao et al.(2021). We suspect this is the case because the social situation in China at the

time of our survey had changed significantly from that of Mao et al.(2021). This also under-

scores the necessity of subsequent experimental manipulation of conspiracy theory exposure.

Furthermore, various conspiracy theories about the same event may point to different conspir-

ators and different plots, and supporting these different conspiracy theories may have different

social consequences (Imhoff & Lamberty,2020; Oleksy, Wnuk, Maison, & Łyś,2021). The

present research adds to these issues by illuminating that whether people categorize conspir-

acy theories as internal or external to their society matters for how they feel about that society.

One of the main contributions of the current research is that it illuminates how ingroup

versus outgroup conspiracy theories have different downstream implications, notably for how

people evaluate their social and political systems. This distinction also resonates with social

identity theory (Tajfel & Turner,1979), which stipulates that people's positive social identity is

enhanced upon realizing that their ingroup is superior to an outgroup. However, when their in-

group is in a relatively weak position— as is the case when people feel threatened by a powerful

outgroup— they may endorse beliefs to restore their ingroup status, such as that the powerful

outgroup is part of an immoral conspiracy (Casara et al.,2022; Einstein & Glick,2015). When

the hostile group is an inseparable part of one's own ingroup (e.g., one's own government),

however, it decreases the value that people attribute to their group. This distinction between

threats coming from within or outside a perceiver's' own group has different psychological

aftereffects and social consequences.

A core aspect of our line of reasoning is people's tendency to attribute perceived malprac-

tice as internal or external to the system. Jolley et al.(2018) found that conspiracy theories can

justify social systems by attributing social problems to individuals and small groups instead

of systemic causes, thus allowing more satisfaction with the status quo. The serial mediation

analysis of Study 2 provides further support for this process, and it illuminates that people

can legitimize their system by attributing its problems to causes outside the system. Moreover,

Study 3 underscores that a different attributional process explains the link between ingroup

FIGUR E 3 Study 4: Mean system- justifying beliefs as a function of sample (Chinese vs. American

participants) and exposure to a conspiracy theory involving the US government (exposure vs. control).

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

8.00

9.00

Chinese participants American participants

System-justifying beliefs

Conspiracy exposure

Control group

MAO et al.

conspiracy theories and system- justifying beliefs: Ingroup conspiracy theories make people

attribute societal problems as inherent to the system, decreasing its legitimacy. Together, this

suggests that conspiracy theories instigate an attributional process that shapes their evalua-

tions of society.

For the path of outgroup conspiracy theories increasing system- justifying belief, we also

have investigated collective narcissism as a mediator on the basis of previous research findings.

Expandi ng previous studie s showing positive correlations between collective narcissism and be-

lief in outgroup conspiracy theories (Cichocka et al.,2016; Golec de Zavala & Cichocka,2012),

Study 2 demonstrates that exposure to an outgroup conspiracy theory causally increases peo-

ple's collective narcissism. Apparently, conspiracy theories help to bolster people's social self-

perception (Biddlestone et al.,2021). More importantly for the present purposes, our results

suggest that through collective narcissism, outgroup conspiracy theories incite a psychological

process leading them to justify their societal system.

For the path of ingroup conspiracy theories decreasing system- justifying belief, we have

introduced anomie as a mediating variable. Anomie is primarily a sociological concept, orig-

inally used to describe a state in which a social system is collapsing (Durkheim, 1897/1987;

Merton, 1938, 1968; Messner & Rosenfeld, 2001; Teymoori et al., 2 017). This social state is

closely related to social crisis situations (Casara et al.,2022; Teymoori et al.,2016, 2017 ) and

provides fertile soil for conspiracy theories. Our research suggests that ingroup conspiracy

theories increase feelings of anomie, decreasing the extent to which they perceive the societal

system as legitimate and just.

The present findings may inspire future research designed to examine differential effects

of ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories. This also hints at possible practical impli-

cations of this research. When public opinion blames outgroups for crisis situations and,

accordingly, outgroup conspiracy theories proliferate, citizens may display increased levels

of nationalism and collective narcissism. In such situations, public officials need to be pre-

pared for possible hostility toward outgroups. When ingroup conspiracy theories prevail,

however, such hostility is more likely directed at one's own public institutions, increasing

the need for governmental authorities to build institutional trust among citizens. Indeed,

governmental interventions to build trust can counteract the impact of COVID- 19 conspir-

acy theories (Murphy et al.,2021).

Limitations

It is important to point out that the current research has some limitations. First, although rely-

ing on Chinese samples may increase knowledge of how conspiracy beliefs emerge in Eastern

cultures, an almost exclusive focus on China (with the exception of Study 4) may also limit the

generalizability of our research findings. China is a country with a collectivistic culture, and

this cultural dimension is related to people's susceptibility to conspiracy theories and other

unfounded beliefs (Adam- Troïan et al.,2021; Lin et al.,2021; Van Prooijen & Song,2021). The

extent to which our conclusions generalize to countries with a Western cultural background

hence needs to be addressed more thoroughly in future studies.

Second, there were various methodological limitations associated with our studies. Notably,

although the conclusions of Studies 2 and 3 are based on serial mediation analyses, it is impos-

sible to prove causal relationships in cross- sectional designs. In addition, the experimental de-

sign of Studies 2, 3, and 4 compared the experimental condition to a baseline condition where

no information was provided. It is therefore difficult to establish whether the observed effects

are due to the conspiracist nature of the vignette or merely to providing critical information

about an ingroup or an outgroup. These limitations may be resolved in future research using

different research designs.

CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION

Finally, we should note that there may be additional important factors (e.g., national iden-

tification in Studies 2 and 3) explaining the links between ingroup and outgroup conspiracy

theories and system- justifying belief. This is important, as accumulating evidence indicates

that ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories are associated with different psychological

processes and outcomes (Wang & Van Prooijen,2023). Relatedly, we have operationalized in-

groups and outgroups based on national identity, as these include different social systems. This

limits the extent to which the present findings generalize to different ingroups and outgroups,

for example, within the same country (e.g., competing political parties, different racial groups).

This needs to be explored in future research. Nonetheless, our current research model can be

used as a theoretical framework to study how belief in ingroup and outgroup conspiracy theo-

ries produces different psychological and social effects. The present studies hence represent a

first step to acknowledge the important differences between ingroup versus outgroup conspir-

acy theories, and they clarify that this distinction deserves more attention in future research.

Concluding remarks

The occurrence of social crisis situations stimulates conspiracy theories (Van Prooijen &

Douglas, 2017 ). However, embracing conspiracy theories can have different, even contra-

dictory, social effects, especially in political attitudes, which can lead to both derogating

(Abalakina- Paap et al.,1999; Casara et al.,2022; Goertzel,1994; Imhoff & Bruder,2014) and

justifying social systems (Jolley et al.,2018; Mao et al.,2021). This research used an intergroup

perspective to explain this paradox, by clarifying the effects of whether the suspected con-

spirators come from the ingroup or a competing outgroup. The results are consistent with the

notions that outgroup conspiracy theories predict increased system- justifying beliefs, whereas

ingroup conspiracy theories predict decreased system- justifying beliefs. These findings sug-

gest that when examining the social and political impact of belief in conspiracy theories, one

needs to take the social categorization of the suspected conspirators into account.

ACKNO WLE DGE MENTS

This work was funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Project No.

71971120, Project No. 72001171) and the China Scholarship Council (Grant/Award Number:

202006860004).

DATA AVAILA BI LIT Y STATE MEN T

All data and materials of the studies reported here are publicly available on the Open Science

Framework (https://osf.io/g37vz/). For all the studies, we report all the conditions and meas-

ures (either in the Method sections or the Supplementary Materials); data exclusions (if any)

are reported in the Method sections of the respective studies. All the studies reported here have

formal ethical approval, and Study 4 was preregistered (https://osf.io/m5hqn ?revis ionId =63491

9ecd1 964c1 02748 2996).

ORCI D

Jia- Yan Mao https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7598-0870

Jan- Willem van Prooijen https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6236-0819

REFERENCES

Abalak ina- Paap, M., Ste phan, W. G., Craig, T., & Gregory, W. L. (1999). Beliefs in con spiracie s. Political Psychology,

20(3), 637– 647.

Adam- Troïan, J., Wagner- Egger, P., Motyl, M., Arciszewski, T., Imhoff, R., Zimmer, F., Klein, O., Babinska, M.,

Bangerter, A., Bilewicz, M., Blanuša, N., Bovan, K., Bužarovska, R., Cichocka, A., Çelebi, E., Delouvée, S.,

MAO et al.

Douglas, K. M., Dyrendal, A., Gjoneska, B., … van Prooijen, J.- W. (2021). Investigating the links between

cultural variables and belief in conspiracy theories: The key roles of collectivism and masculinity. Political

Psychology, 42(4), 597– 618.

Ådnanes, M. (2007). Social transitions and anomie among post- communist Bulgarian youth. Yo ung , 15(1), 49– 69.

Arlikatti, S., Lindell, M. K., & Prater, C. S. (2007). Perceived stakeholder role relationships and adoption of seismic

hazard adjustments. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 25(3), 218– 256.

Bertin, P., Marinthe, G., Biddlestone, M., & Delouvée, S. (2022). Investigating the identification- prejudice link

through the lens of national narcissism: The role of defensive group beliefs. Journal of Experimental Social

Psychology, 98, 104252.

Biddlestone, M., Green, R., Cichocka, A., Sutton, R., & Douglas, K. (2021). Conspiracy beliefs and the individual,

relational, and collective selves. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 15 (10), e12639.

Blank, T. (2003). Determinants of National Identity in east and West Germany: An empirical comparison of

theories on the significance of authoritarianism, anomie, and general self- esteem. Political Psychology,

24(2), 259– 288.

Brotherton, R., French, C. C., & Pickering, A. D. (2013). Measuring belief in conspiracy theories: The generic con-

spiracist beliefs scale. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 279.

Brown, K. A., & White, C. L. (2010). Organization– public relationships and crisis response strategies: Impact on

attribution of responsibility. Journal of Public Relations R esearch, 23(1), 75 – 92.

Casara, B. G. S., Suitner, C., & Jetten, J. (2022). The impact of economic inequality on conspiracy beliefs. Journal of

Experimental Social Psychology, 98, 104245.

Chayinska, M., & Mi nescu, A. (2018). “They've conspire d against us”: Understanding the role of socia l identification

and conspiracy beliefs in justification of ingroup collective behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology,

48(7), 990– 998.

Cheng, P., Wei, J., & Ge, Y. (2017). Who should be blamed? The attribution of responsibility for a city smog event in

China. Natural Hazards, 85(2), 669– 689.

Cichocka, A., Golec de Zavala, A., Marchlewska, M., & Olechowski, M. (2015). Grandiose delusions: Collective

narcissism, secure in-group identification and belief in conspiracies. In M. Bilewicz, A. Cichocka, & W. Soral

(E ds.), The psychology of conspiracy (pp. 60– 79). Routledge.

Cichocka, A., Marchlewska, M., Golec de Zavala, A., & Olechowski, M. (2016). “They will not control us”: In- group

positivity and belief in intergroup conspiracies. British Journal of Psychology, 1 07, 556– 576.

Dehghani, A., & Masoumi, G. (2020). Could SARS- CoV- 2 or COVID- 19 Be a biological weapon? Iranian Journal of

Public Health, 49, 143– 144.

Douglas, K. M. (2020). Covid- 19 conspiracy theories. G roup Processes & Intergroup Relations, 24(2), 270– 275.

Dougla s, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (2008). The hidden impact of conspiracy theories: Perceived and actual i nfluence of

theories surrounding the death of Princess Diana. Journal of Social Psychology, 148, 210– 221.

Durkheim, E. (1897/1987). Suicide (J. A. Spaulding & G. Simpson, Trans.). Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Einstein, K. L., & Glick, D. M. (2015). Do I think BLS data are BS? The consequences of conspiracy theories.

Political Behavior, 37(3), 679– 701.

Genov, N. (1998). Transformation and anomie: Problems of quality of life in Bulgaria. Social Indicators Research ,

43, 197– 209.

Goertzel, T. (1994). Belief in conspiracy theories. Political Psychology, 15(4), 731– 742.

Golec de Zavala, A., & Cichocka, A. (2012). Collective narcissism and anti- Semitism in Poland. Group Processes &

Intergroup Relations, 15(2), 213– 229.

Golec de Zavala, A., & Federico, C. M. (2018). Collective narcissism and the growth of conspiracy thinking over

the course of the 2016 United States presidential election: A longitudinal analysis. E uropea n Journal of Social

Psychology, 48, 1011– 1018.

Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression based ap-

proach. The Guilford Press.

Hofstadter, R. (1966). The paranoid style in Amer ican politics. In R. Hofst adter (Ed.), The para noid style in American

politics a nd other essays (pp. 3– 40). Knopf.

Hornsey, M. J., & Hogg, M. A. (2000). Assimilation and diversity: An integrative model of subgroup relations.

Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 143 – 156.

Huschka, D., & Mau, S. (2006). Social anomie and racial segregation in South Africa. Social Indicators Research,

76, 467– 498.

Imhoff, R., & Bruder, M. (2014). Speaking (un- )truth to power: Conspiracy mentality as a generalised political atti-

tude. Europea n Journal of Personality, 28(1), 25 – 43.

Imhoff, R., & Lamberty, P. (2020). A bioweapon or a hoax? The link between distinct conspiracy beliefs about

the coronavirus disease (COVID- 19) outbreak and pandemic behavior. Soci al Psychological and Personality

Science, 11(8), 1110– 1118 .

Jamieson, R. (1998). Towards a criminology of war in Europe. In V. Ruggiero, N. South, & I. Taylor (Eds.), The new

European criminology: Crime and social order in Europe (pp. 480– 506). Routledge.

CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION

Jolley, D., Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (2018). Blaming a few bad apples to save a threatened barrel: The system-

justifying function of conspiracy theories. Political Psychology, 39(2), 465– 478.

Jolley, D., & Paterson, J. L. (2020). Pylons ablaze: Examining the role of 5G COVID- 19 conspiracy beliefs and sup-

port for violence. British Journal of Social Psychology, 59(3), 628– 6 40.

Kay, A. C., & Friesen, J. (2011). On social stability and social change: Understanding when system justification does

and does not occur. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20(6), 360– 364.

Kay, A. C., & Jost, J. T. (2003). Complementary justice: Effects of “poor but happy” and “poor but honest” stereo-

type exemplars on system justification and implicit activation of the justice motive. Journal of Personality and

Social Psychology, 85(5), 823– 837.

Kay, A. C., & Jost, J. T. (2014). Theoretical integration in motivational science: System justification as one of many

“autonomous motivational structures”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37(2), 146 – 147.

Lin, Y., Zhang, Y. C., & Oyserman, D. (2021). Seeing meaning even when none may exist: Collectivism increases

belief in empty claims. Journal of Personality a nd Social Psychology, 122(3), 351– 366.

Mao, J. Y., van Prooijen, J. W., Yang, S. L., & Guo, Y. Y. (2021). System threat during a pandemic: How conspiracy

theories help to justify the system. Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology, 15, 1– 11.

Mashuri, A., & Zaduqisti, E. (2014). The role of social identification, intergroup threat, and out- group derogation in

explaining belief in conspiracy theory about terrorism in Indonesia. International Journal of Research Studies

in Psychology, 3(1), 35– 50.

Mashuri, A., & Zaduqisti, E. (2015). The effect of intergroup threat and social identity salience on the belief in

conspiracy theories over terrorism in Indonesia: Collective angst as a mediator. International Journal of

Psychological Research, 8, 24 – 35.

McAuley, E., Duncan, T. E., & Russell, D. W. (1992). Measuring causal attributions: The revised causal dimension

scale (CDSII). Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18(5), 566– 573.

McCarthy, M., Murphy, K., Sargeant, E., & Williamson, H. (2022). Examining the relationship between conspiracy

theories and COVID- 19 vaccine hesitancy: A mediating role for perceived health threats, trust, and anomie?

Analyses of Social Issues a nd Public Policy, 22(1), 106– 129.

Merton, R. (1938). Social structure and anomie. American Sociological Review, 3, 672– 682.

Merton, R. (1968). Social theory and social structure. Free Press.

Messner, S. F., & Rosenfeld, R. (2001). Crime and the American dream (3rd ed.). Wadsworth.

Mu, M. (2020). The prevalence and antecedents of nationalism conspiracy theories during Covid- 19 in China. 2020

4th international seminar on education, management and social sciences (ISEMSS 2020), 466, 334– 341.

Murphy, J., Vallières, F., Bentall, R. P., Shevlin, M., McBride, O., Hartman, T. K., McKay, R., Bennett, K.,

Mason, L., Gibson- Miller, J., Levita, L., Martinez, A. P., Stocks, T. V. A., Karatzias, T., & Hyland, P. (2021).

Psychological characteristics associated with COVID- 19 vaccine hesitancy and resistance in Ireland and the

United Kingdom. Nature Communications, 12(1), 1– 15.

Nie, J. B. (2020). In the shadow of biological warfare: Conspiracy theories on the origins of COVID- 19 and enhanc-

ing global governance of biosafety as a matter of urgency. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, 17(4), 567– 574.

Oleksy, T., Wnuk, A., Gambin, M., & Łyś, A. (2021). Dynamic relationships between different types of conspir-

acy theories about COVID- 19 and protective behaviour: A four- wave panel study in Poland. S ocial Science &

Medicine, 280, 114028.

Oleksy, T., Wnuk, A., Maison, D., & Łyś, A. (2021). Content matters. Dif ferent predictors and social consequences of

general and government- related conspiracy theories on covid- 19. Personality and Individual Differences, 168(3),

110289.

Orru, M. (1983). The ethics of anomie: Jean Marie Guyau and Emile Durkheim. British Journal of Sociology, 34(4),

499– 518.

Pehrson, S., Vignoles, V. L., & Brown, R. (2009). National identification and anti- immigrant prejudice: Individual

and contextual effects of national definitions. Social Psychology Quarterly, 72(1), 24 – 38.

Pennycook, G., Mcphetres, J., Zhang, Y., Lu, J. G., & Rand, D. G. (2020). Fighting covid- 19 misinformation on

social media: Experimental evidence for a scalable accuracy- nudge intervention. Psychological Science, 31(7),

770– 780.

Robertson, C. E., Pretus, C., Rathje, S., Harris, E. A., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2022). How social identity shapes conspira-

torial belief. Current Opinion in Psychology, 4 7, 101423. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101423

Scheepers, P. L. H., Felling, A., & Peters, J. (1992). Anomie, authoritarianism and eth nocentrism: Update of a classic

theme and an empirical test. Politics & the Individual, 2, 43 – 59.

Schoemann, A. M., Boulton, A. J., & Short, S. D. (2017). Deter mining power and sample size for simple and complex

mediation models. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 8(4), 379– 386.

Srole, L. (1956). Social integration and certain corollaries: An exploratory study. American Sociological Review,

21(6), 709 – 716 .

Sternisko, A., Cichocka, A., Cislak, A., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2021). National Narcissism predicts the belief in and the

dissemination of conspiracy theories during the COVID- 19 pandemic: Evidence from 56 countries. Personality

and Social Psychology Bulletin, 49, 48– 65. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461 67221 1054947

MAO et al.

Su, Y., Lee, D. K. L., Xiao, X., Li, W., & Shu, W. (2021). Who endorses conspiracy theories? A moderated mediation

model of Chinese and international social media use, media skepticism, need for cognition, and COVID- 19

conspiracy theory endorsement in China. Computers in Human Behavior, 12 0, 106760.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.),

The social psychology of intergroup relations. Brooks- Cole.

Teymoori, A., Ba stian, B., & Jetten, J. (2017). Towards a ps ychological analysis of anomi e. Political Psychology, 38(6),

1009– 1023.

Teymoori, A., Jetten, J., Bastian, B., Ar iyanto, A., Autin, F., Ayub, N., Badea, C., Besta, T., Butera, F., Costa- Lopes,

R., Cui, L., Fantini, C., Finchilescu, G., Gaertner, L., Gollwitzer, M., Gómez, Á., González, R., Hong, Y. Y.,

Jensen, D. H., … Wohl, M. (2016). Revisiting the measurement of anomie. PL oS One, 11(7), e0158370.

Van Bavel, J., Baicker, K., Boggio, P. S., Capraro, V., Cichocka, A., Cikara, M., Cro ckett, M. J., Crum, A. J., Douglas,

K. M., Druckman, J. N., Drury, N., Dube, O., Ellemers, N., Finkel, E. J., Fowler, J. H., Gelfand, M., Han, S.,

Haslam, S. A., Jetten, J., … Willer, R. (2020). Using social and behavioural science to support COVID- 19 pan-

demic response. Nature Human Behaviour, 4, 460 – 471.

Van Bavel, J. J., & Pereira, A. (2018). The partisan brain: An identity- based model of political belief. Trends in

Cognitive Sciences, 22(3), 213– 224.

Van Prooijen, J. W. (2020). An existential threat model of conspiracy theories. European Psychologist, 25(1), 16– 25.

Van Prooijen, J. W., & Douglas, K. M. (2017). Conspiracy theories as part of history: The role of societal crisis situ-

ations. Memory Studies, 10(3), 323– 333.

Van Prooijen, J. W., & Song, M. (2021). The cultural dimension of intergroup conspiracy theories. British Journal of

Psychology, 112(2), 455 – 473.

Van Prooijen, J. W., & Van Lange, P. A. (2014). Power, politics, and paranoia: Why people are suspicious of their lea d-

ers. Cambridge University Press.

Van Prooijen, J. W., & Van Vugt, M. (2018). Conspiracy theories: Evolved functions and psychological mechanisms.

Perspectives on Psychological Science, 13(6), 770– 788.

Wang, H., & van Prooijen, J. W. (2023). Stolen elections: How conspiracy beliefs during the 2020 American presiden-

tial elections changed over time. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 37(2), 277– 289.

Waterson, J., & Hern, A. (2020). How false claims about 5G health risks spread into the mainstream. The Guardian.

https://www.thegu ardian.com/techn ology/ 2020/apr/07/how- false - claim s- about - 5g- healt h- risks - sprea d- into-

the- mains tream

WHO. (2020). Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) situation report – 86. WHO.

Zhao, R., & Cao, L. (2010). Social change and anomie: A cross- national study. Social Forces, 88(3), 1209– 1229.

Zheng, S . Z. (2022). Feng Jun, form er party s ecretar y and chair man of the ea stern ai rport grou p, and others have b een

held accountable for lax epidemic prevention and control. Xinhuanet. http://www.news.cn/2022- 01/29/c_11283

15060.htm

SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section

at the end of this article.

How to cite this article: Mao, J.-Y., Zeng, Z.-X., Yang, S.-L., Guo, Y.-Y., & van Prooijen,

J.-W. (2023). Explaining the paradox of conspiracy theories and system- justifying beliefs

from an intergroup perspective. Political Psychology, 00, 1–20. https://d oi.or g /10.1111/

pops.12924

Cross-Cultural Investigation of the Relationship Between Social Identity, Trusting the System, COVID-19 Vaccine Adherence, and Conspiratorial Beliefs

Article

Full-text available

May 2025
ASIAN J PSYCHOL

Understanding how individual beliefs and societal values influence support for measures to prevent COVID-19 transmission and risk is vital to developing and implementing effective prevention policies. Surges in COVID-19 infections continue to be prevalent worldwide and strategies to address the increase in vaccine hesitancy and related conspiracy theories are being enacted globally. Using the lenses of the social identity approach and system justification theory, we examined how individual-level conceptualizations of identity, system legitimacy, conspiracy beliefs, and trust in science, government, and healthcare influence an uptick in COVID-19 vaccine adherence. Data from an international survey of adults from China, the Philippines, and the United States (N=358; Study 1) and a six-country two-wave stratified online sample (N=6,138; Study 2) allowed the present research to investigate how cultural values and governmental policies intersect with COVID-19 risk perception and vaccine hesitancy. The most robust findings were: (1) identifying with a superordinate global identity was associated with greater vaccine adherence; (2) having a stronger subordinate national identity was associated with greater vaccine hesitancy; and (3) the association between having a strong national identity and the endorsement of COVID-19 conspiracy theories was mediated by system justification. The results presented are used to discuss strategies for increasing vaccine uptake globally for future pandemics.

Conspiracy Beliefs and the Perception of Intergroup Inequalities

Article

Full-text available

Sep 2024
Pers Soc Psychol Bull

Conspiracy beliefs are prevalent among members of disadvantaged groups. Adopting a social identity perspective, we hypothesized that these beliefs would reduce the endorsement of internal attributions for inequalities that could negatively affect the image of disadvantaged ingroups. In Study 1 ( n = 1,104), conspiracy mentality was negatively associated with meritocracy beliefs, which attribute success and failure to internal factors. In Studies 2 to 5 ( ns = 179, 251, 221, 248), taking the perspective of a person exhibiting a high (vs. low) conspiracy mentality in a fictitious context reduced participants’ meritocracy beliefs, internal attributions for a privileged outgroup’s situation, and fostered negative attitudes toward the outgroup. However, it did not reduce internal attributions for the situation of a disadvantaged ingroup, nor did it improve attitudes toward the ingroup. Regarding intergroup comparison, conspiracy mentality seems to primarily deteriorate the perception of privileged outgroups rather than improve the perception of disadvantaged ingroups.

Panacea or Pandora’s box: diverse governance strategies for conspiracy theories and their consequences in China

Article

Full-text available

May 2025

This study examines the Chinese government’s strategies for managing conspiracy theories (CTs) on social media. While previous research has primarily considered how authoritarian regimes disseminate CTs for political purposes and has often viewed the public as fully receptive to propaganda and easily manipulated, our research explores a broader spectrum of state strategies including propagation, tolerance, and partial rebuttal. Based on social network analysis, topic modeling, and qualitative analysis of 46,387 Weibo posts from 3 cases, we argue that the Chinese government’s manipulation of CTs is multifaceted and carries significant audience costs. Our findings indicate that state-led CTs can indeed mobilize public opinion, but they also risk expanding beyond state control, which can lead to unintended consequences that may undermine state interests and limit policy flexibility. This research contributes to our understanding of the tactical and operational complexities authoritarian regimes face when leveraging CTs, while highlighting the intricate balance between state control and public agency.

The Ghost Story of Kuyang: Establishing Social Construction of Belief System on Identity in Kalimantan

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2024

This research described the social construction of the belief system on the identity of the ghost Kuyang in Kalimantan. This research argues that ghost stories have constructed the ghost's identity of gender and place. The gender always represents the ghost as a woman while the place represents the Kuyang ghost as a Dayak or Malay tribe in Kalimantan. This research formulates how the Kuyang ghost story can establish a social construction of the belief system on identity in Kalimantan. This research uses a descriptive qualitative method by collecting data through storytelling in the community and on YouTube social media. The results of this study show that: 1) female ghost stories represent a patriarchal system for women; 2) the development of a belief system in local communities; 3) community responses through tradition and religion; and 4) social construction shapes the identity of Ghost Kuyang in Kalimantan. The development of the social construction of the belief system in the ghost of Kuyang can bring a new discourse on identity following ethnic, religious, and culture in Kalimantan.

The Appraisal Model of Conspiracy Theories (AMCT): Applying Appraisal Theories to Understand Emotional and Behavioral Reactions to Conspiracy Theories

Article

Full-text available

Mar 2025
PSYCHOL INQ

Beliefs in conspiracy theories are related to a diverse set of emotional and behavioral consequences. At the same time, a theoretical model detailing when a conspiracy theory is more likely to elicit confrontation compared to withdrawal, indirect aggression or community-building is missing. We argue that appraisals provide the missing link between conspiracy beliefs and their consequences, proposing the Appraisal Model of Conspiracy Theories (AMCT). Based on appraisal theories of emotions, we outline how the focus on different features that vary between conspiracy theories and the situations in which they are embedded (i.e., focus on secrecy vs. gained knowledge; powerlessness vs. option of confrontation; harm to oneself vs. others) facilitate specific appraisals, resulting in different behavioral outcomes. We also outline how the AMCT helps to reconcile inconsistent research on conspiracy beliefs by providing better predictions about their emotional and behavioral consequences.

Beyond the Battlefield: Nationalism, Geopolitics, and the Perception of Russo-Ukrainian War Conspiracies in Chinese Social Media Discourse

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2024
SOCIETY

Yiwen Zhang

This study investigates conspiracy theories on China’s Weibo regarding the Russo-Ukrainian War, with a specific focus on the roles and impacts of different types of accounts (official verified accounts, individual verified accounts, and ordinary personal accounts) in these discussions. Employing structural topic modeling (STM) and qualitative text analysis, the study comprehensively analyzes Weibo posts from March 1, 2022, to October 21, 2023, aiming to unveil the thematic characteristics, construction motives, and their manifestations in the social media context of conspiracy theories. The findings reveal that the content of conspiracy theories primarily revolves around three aspects: conspiracies directly related to the war itself, nationalist narratives, and geopolitical discourse. These themes not only reflect the public’s primary narratives of conspiracy theories about the Russo-Ukrainian War but also unveil the motives for constructing and disseminating these theories. Notably, different types of social media accounts display distinct understandings and focal points regarding the nature and themes of conspiracy theories. This study offers a new perspective on the dissemination of conspiracy theories in regulated media environments, with particular attention to the Global South. In these contexts, state-led communication strategies and social media governance contribute to the formation of public discourse.

The Appraisal Model of Conspiracy Theories (AMCT): Applying Appraisal Theories to Understand Emotional and Behavioral Reactions to Conspiracy Theories

Preprint

Full-text available

Nov 2024

2024) The appraisal model of conspiracy theories (AMCT): Applying appraisal theories to understand emotional and behavioral reactions to conspiracy theories. Psychological Inquiry. ISSN 1047-840X. (In press) Kent Academic Repository Downloaded from https://kar.

Conspiracy Theories: Groups, Ideology, and Status as Three Distinct Bases for Expressions in Society

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2024

Conspiracy theories have been treated mostly as a homogeneous phenomenon in empirical research. However, to fully understand their causes and consequences, a multifaceted approach to conspiracy theories would be useful. Here, we propose an organizational framework with three facets (groups, ideology, and status) to conceptualize conspiracy theories. Based on a review of recent research, the current contribution highlights the psychological differences between (a) perceived conspiracies within or outside of one’s valued community; (b) ideological versus nonideological conspiracy beliefs, based on whether conspiracy beliefs are directly relevant for people’s core values; and (c) upward versus downward conspiracy beliefs, that is, whether the perceived conspiracy involves a relatively high- or low-status group. Finally, we discuss some distinct consequences of these facets in affecting societally consequential behaviors, such as collective action, protest, hostility, or polarization.

On the Subjectivity of Conspiracy Theory Appraisals

Article

Mar 2025
PSYCHOL INQ

Jan Willem van Prooijen

The social psychology of conspiracy theories: Key insights and future challenges

Chapter

Jan 2025

Conspiracy theories are a common feature of social and political debate, and of growing concern for governments and policymakers. Awareness of the importance of conspiracy theories has been facilitated by a rapid expansion of empirical research in the past 20 years, and the bulk of this research comes from social psychology. In the current chapter, we review this significant research progress, focusing on the antecedents of conspiracy beliefs and their consequences. As we review this literature, we refer to examples from our ongoing research programme. We then articulate what we perceive to be the main limitations of the research to date focusing on measurement, sampling and theoretical focus, and propose avenues for future research. Finally, we briefly discuss interventions to address the effects of conspiracy theories.

Stolen elections: How conspiracy beliefs during the 2020 American presidential elections changed over time

Article

Full-text available

Sep 2022
APPL COGNITIVE PSYCH

Conspiracy beliefs have been studied mostly through cross‐sectional designs. We conducted a five‐wave longitudinal study (N = 376; two waves before and three waves after the 2020 American presidential elections) to examine if the election results influenced specific conspiracy beliefs and conspiracy mentality, and whether effects differ between election winners (i.e., Biden voters) versus losers (i.e., Trump voters) at the individual level. Results revealed that conspiracy mentality kept unchanged over 2 months, providing first evidence that this indeed is a relatively stable trait. Specific conspiracy beliefs (outgroup and ingroup conspiracy beliefs) did change over time, however. In terms of group‐level change, outgroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time for Biden voters but increased for Trump voters. Ingroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time across all voters, although those of Trump voters decreased faster. These findings illuminate how specific conspiracy beliefs are, and conspiracy mentality is not, influenced by an election event.

System Threat during a Pandemic: How Conspiracy Theories Help to Justify the System

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2021
J PAC RIM PSYCHOL

During the COVID-19 pandemic, many people have endorsed conspiracy theories about foreign governments yet shown increased trust and support for their own government. Whether there is a potential correlation between these social phenomena and the psychological mechanisms behind them is still unclear. Integrating insights from the existential threat model of conspiracy theories and system justification theory, two experimental studies were conducted to investigate whether belief in out-group conspiracy theories can play a mediating role in the effects of system threat on people's system justification beliefs against the background of the pandemic. The results show that system threat positively predicts individuals’ system-justifying belief, and belief in out-group conspiracy theories mediated this relationship.

Investigating the identification-prejudice link through the lens of national narcissism: The role of defensive group beliefs

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2022
J EXP SOC PSYCHOL

The identification-prejudice link describes the defensive stance toward immigrants held by strong national identifiers. Recent research refined this relationship by suggesting that defensive national identification (operationalized through national narcissism), but not secure national identification, was associated with prejudice. While previous research found intergroup threat and conspiracy beliefs to mediate the identification-prejudice link, the need to comprehensively and experimentally test the role of these defensive group beliefs remains in the context of the narcissistic identification-prejudice link. Furthermore, following the group-based control model, we proposed that these defensive group beliefs might be more pronounced among national narcissists compensating for a low personal control. In Study 1 (N = 1104, nationally representative sample), national narcissism, but not secure national identification, was related to prejudice against immigrants, and a serial model composed of perceived intergroup threat and conspiracy beliefs mediated this relationship. These relationships held when controlling for conspiracy mentality, supporting the notion that these conspiracy beliefs were motivated at the intergroup level. In Study 2 (N = 474, pre-registered), we experimentally induced intergroup threat and exposure to conspiracy theories about immigrants. Induced threat increased conspiracy beliefs, and both increased prejudice, corroborating their causal relationship. In Study 3 (N = 350, pre-registered), we induced low personal control and made national narcissism salient to test the group-based control hypothesis. The relationship between measured (but not manipulated) national narcissism and conspiracy beliefs was more pronounced under low personal control. We discuss the role of defensive group beliefs on group-based control and prejudice against immigrants.

Conspiracy beliefs and the individual, relational, and collective selves

Article

Full-text available

Sep 2021

Recent empirical and theoretical developments suggest that endorsement of conspiracy theories can arise from the frustration of social motives. Taking this further, the current review integrates theorising on processes relating to three selves—the individual, relational, and collective self and outlines their associations with conspiracy beliefs. In doing so, we argue that motives pertaining to the individual self (e.g., narcissism, need for uniqueness) are linked to belief in conspiracy theories to deflect blame from personal shortcomings and protect the self‐image. Motives responding to threats to the relational self (e.g., social exclusion) increase endorsement of conspiracy theories to regain a sense of social support through exchanging shared concerns. Finally, collective self motives (e.g., collective narcissism, perceived ingroup victimhood) foster conspiracy beliefs to defend the group image by blaming outgroups for ingroup misfortunes and placing one's group in a morally superior victim role. Taken together, endorsement of conspiracy theories appears to be borne out of attempts to manage these three selves. Potential consequences for each of the selves, future directions, and theoretical implications are discussed.

SEEING MEANING WHERE NONE MAY EXIST 1 Seeing Meaning Even When None May Exist: Collectivism Increases Belief in Empty Claims

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2021

People often find truth and meaning in claims that have no regard for truth or empirical evidence. We propose that one reason is that people value connecting and fitting in with others, motivating them to seek the common ground of communication and generate explanations for how claims might make sense. This increases the likelihood that people experience empty claims as truthful, meaningful, or even profound. Seven studies (N > 16,000 from the U.S. and China) support our prediction. People who score higher in collectivism (valuing connection and fitting in) are more likely to find fake news meaningful and believe in pseudoscience (Studies 1 to 3). China-U.S. cross-national comparisons show parallel effects. Relative to people from the U.S., Chinese participants are more likely to see meaning in randomly generated vague claims (Study 4). People higher in collectivism are more likely to engage in meaning-making, generating explanations when faced with an empty claim, and having done so, are more likely to find meaning (Study 5). People who momentarily experience themselves as more collectivistic are more likely to see empty claims as meaningful (Study 6). People higher in collectivism are more likely to engage in meaning-making unless there is no common ground to seek (Study 7). We interpret our results as suggesting that conditions that trigger collectivism create fertile territory for the spread of empty claims, including fake news and misinformation.

How Social Identity Shapes Conspiratorial Belief

Article

Jul 2022

While conspiracy theories may offer benefits to those who believe in them, they can also foster intergroup conflict, threaten democracy, and undercut public health. We argue that the motivations behind conspiracy theory belief are often related to social identity. Conspiracy theories are well-positioned to fulfill social identity needs such as belongingness goals, the need to think highly of one’s in-group, and the need to feel secure in one’s group status. Understanding the social motives that attract people to conspiracy theories should be a focus of future research, and may be key to creating more successful interventions to reduce socially harmful conspiracy theories.

Examining the relationship between conspiracy theories and COVID‐19 vaccine hesitancy: A mediating role for perceived health threats, trust, and anomie?

Article

Dec 2021

The COVID‐19 pandemic has led to an upswing in conspiracy theory beliefs, which creates challenges for effectively countering the pandemic, with higher rates of COVID‐19 vaccine hesitancy found among conspiracy theorists. Research suggests health risk perceptions, trust in government and anomie may mediate the relationship between COVID‐19 conspiracy theory beliefs and vaccine hesitancy. However, the mediating role of trust in government and anomie on vaccine hesitancy have not been empirically examined in the context of COVID‐19, and it is not clear whether different conspiracy theories have distinct mediational pathways to vaccine hesitancy. The current study examines the extent to which perceptions of the health threat posed by COVID‐19, trust in government and anomie can explain the relationship between distinct COVID‐19 conspiracy theories and COVID‐19 vaccine hesitancy. Drawing on data from a national online survey of 779 Australian adults, a series of path analyses examining the influence of three distinct conspiracy theories on vaccination hesitancy revealed two key mediational pathways, which varied across conspiracy theory types. Anomie and perceptions of the health threat posed by COVID‐19 were the most common mediators of this relationship. Implications for COVID‐19 vaccine hesitancy and for conspiracy theory research are discussed.

National Narcissism predicts the Belief in and the Dissemination of Conspiracy Theories During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Evidence From 56 Countries

Article

Dec 2021

Conspiracy theories related to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) have propagated around the globe, leading the World Health Organization to declare the spread of misinformation an “Infodemic.” We tested the hypothesis that national narcissism—a belief in the greatness of one’s nation that requires external recognition—is associated with the spread of conspiracy theories during the COVID-19 pandemic. In two large-scale national surveys ( N Total = 950) conducted in the United States and the United Kingdom, and secondary analysis of data from 56 countries ( N = 50,757), we found a robust, positive relationship between national narcissism and proneness to believe and disseminate conspiracy theories related to COVID-19. Furthermore, belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories was related to less engagement in health behaviors and less support for public-health policies to combat COVID-19. Our findings illustrate the importance of social identity factors in the spread of conspiracy theories and provide insights into the psychological processes underlying the COVID-19 pandemic.

The impact of economic inequality on conspiracy beliefs

Article

Jan 2022
J EXP SOC PSYCHOL

Previous literature highlights the crucial role of economic inequality in triggering a range of negative societal outcomes. However, the relationship between economic inequality and the proliferation of conspiracy beliefs remains unexplored. Here, we explore the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs as an outcome of objective country-level (Study 1a, 1b, 1c), perceived (Study 2), and manipulated economic inequality (Studies 3a, 3b, 4a, 4b). In the correlational studies, both objective and perceived economic inequality were associated with greater conspiracy beliefs. In the experiments, participants in the high (compared to the low) inequality condition were more likely to endorse conspiratorial narratives. This effect was fully mediated by anomie (Studies 3a, 3b) suggesting that inequality enhances the perception that society is breaking down (anomie), which in turn increases conspiratorial thinking, possibly in an attempt to regain some sense of order and control. Furthermore, the link between economic inequality and conspiracy beliefs was stronger when participants endorsed a conspiracy worldview (Studies 4a, 4b). Moreover, conspiracy beliefs mediated the effect of the economic inequality manipulation on willingness to engage in collective action aimed at addressing economic inequality. The results show that economic inequality and conspiracy beliefs go hand in hand: economic inequality can cause conspiratorial thinking and conspiracy beliefs can motivate collective action against economic inequality.

Dynamic relationships between different types of conspiracy theories about COVID-19 and protective behaviour: A four-wave panel study in Poland

Article

May 2021

Rationale: Conspiracy theories about COVID-19 pose a serious threat to public health by providing false information and undermining official health recommendations. However, existing studies rarely employed longitudinal designs, precluding the determination of the directionality between endorsement of conspiracy theories and its societal consequences. Also, relatively little research examined whether the association between protective health behaviour and the endorsement of conspiracy theories is affected by the content of a given theory. Methods: A four-wave longitudinal panel survey on the association between belief in a wide range of conspiracy theories about COVID-19 and protective behaviour was carried out on a representative sample of Polish citizens (T1 = 1130, T2 = 971, T3 = 818, T4 = 688). Analyses were performed using Random Intercept Cross-Lagged Panel Models. Results: The results showed a reciprocal, bidirectional association between conspiracy mentality and protective behaviour. The same effect was also observed between protective behaviour and threat of authoritarianism. We did not find evidence that specific COVID-19 related conspiracy theories directly (and differently) predict within-person changes in protective behaviour over time. Conclusions: Our results showed that the association between various conspiracy-related variables and anti-pandemic COVID-19 variables differs at within- and between-person levels. Changes in the adherence to pro-health measures were negatively predicted by conspiracy mentality and a feeling of threat that the solutions introduced by the government may limit civil rights. Specific conspiracy beliefs were significantly related to protective behaviour only at the between-person level.

Explaining the paradox of conspiracy theories and system‐justifying beliefs from an intergroup perspective

Abstract

Recommended publications

Last Chance to Apply! 18 Assistant & Associate Professor positions at VU Amsterdam

See our 18 open Asst/Assoc. Professor positions at the science faculty of VU Amsterdam

System Threat during a Pandemic: How Conspiracy Theories Help to Justify the System

The cultural dimension of intergroup conspiracy theories

How does economic inequality shape conspiracy theories? Empirical evidence from China

A vicious circle? Longitudinal relationships between different modes of in-group identity and COVID-...