Colombian Economic Foreign Policy towards Brazil: Limited Cooperation and Competition for Regional Leadership.

Abstract

This bilateral case study provides important clues to understand how the interplay between variations in relative capabilities and changes in the national role conception of secondary powers, added to a low expectation of follow-on or alignment with the regional power, can lead to situations of competition – though not necessarily confrontation – between the two for influence and leadership in the region, even amid significant power asymmetries. The objective of this chapter is to analyze how national material capabilities, national role conceptions, and the perceptions of Colombian decision-makers and elites regarding Brazil influenced the development of their bilateral economic relations in the period 2010–2022.

Full text

Asymmetric Neighbors and
International Relations
With a range of case studies from every continent, the contributors to this book
analyze the challenges that arise for states living with much larger neighbors,
and the policies they develop to account for this asymmetry.
Bringing together the perspectives of bilateral relations and the study of small
states, this book analyzes a range of scenarios where one or more smaller coun-
tries must manage relations with a much larger neighbor or neighbors, from
the perspective of the smaller countries. Each case presents different priorities,
depending on the relationship between the states concerned, while highlighting
the commonalities across the various scenarios. The range of cases and con-
tributors is wide and diverse, with examples including Togo’s relationship with
Ghana, Mongolia’s with China, and Colombia’s with Brazil – as well as more
widely known examples such as Canada and the United States, or Australia and
New Zealand.
A valuable resource for scholars and students of international relations, and
public policy of small- and medium-sized states.
Ian Roberge is an Associate Professor in the School of Public Policy and Admin-
istration at York University in Toronto, Canada.
Nara Park is an Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Management at Yonsei
University, Seoul, South Korea.
Thomas R. Klassen is a Professor in the School of Public Policy and Adminis-
tration at York University, Toronto, Canada.

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To our students – I. R., N. P. and T. R. K.
To my beloved mother, Heejung Kim – N. P.

Contents
List of Figures xi
List of Tables xiii
List of Contributors xv
Preface xxi
Acknowledgements xxv
1 New Perspectives on Asymmetrical Relations 1
THOMAS R. KL ASSEN, NAR A PARK A ND I AN ROBERGE
PART I
Asymmetrical Relations in a Bilateral Context 11
2 Canada and the United States: A Symbiotic Relationship
or Complex Entanglement? 13
CHAR LES CONTEH
3 Dealing with Russia: Georgia’s Endeavor to Escape
Trampling 29
SALOME MINESASHV ILI, FR ÉDÉR IC LABA RRE A ND
PIER R E JOLICOEUR
4 Endless Integration of Russia and Its “Difficult Ally”
Belarus 41
LEONID KAR A BESH KIN, FRÉDÉRIC L ABAR R E AN D
PIER R E JOLICOEUR
5 Legacies of a Trans-Tasman Relationship: The Evolution
of Asymmetry between New Zealand and Australia 54
JENNIFER CURTI N AN D DOMINIC O’SULLIVAN

viii Contents
6 Living in the Shadow of Elephants: The Case
of Timor-Leste 70
NICHOLAS MORRIS
7 Living Peacefully or in the Shadow? Elucidating the
Relationship between Ghana and Togo 86
FR ANK L.K . OHEMENG A ND EMM ANUEL K. SA KYI
PART II
Asymmetrical Relations in a Regional Context 105
8 The Middle Power Diplomacy of South Korea: Four
Strategic Choices vis-à-vis Japan and China 107
NARA PARK
9 Mongolia’s Balancing Act: Sandwiched between a Bear
and a Dragon 120
UNDRAA AGVAANLUVSAN
10 Balancing the Elephant and the Dragon: Nepal’s
Struggle for Political In(ter)dependence 133
JAWAD HUSSAIN QUR ESH I
11 The Little Red Dot That Roared: Singapore
between Giants 147
YOHANES SULAIMAN
12 A Tripartite Dilemma: Turkey, Armenia, and
Azerbaijan Relations at the Intersection of Identity and
National Interest 159
MERVE ÖZDEMIRKIRAN-EMBEL
13 Stepping Out of the Shade: Qatari-Saudi Relations
Amid the Rise of Cosmopolitan Qatar 175
GERTJAN HOETJES

Contents ix
14 Colombian Economic Foreign Policy toward Brazil:
Limited Cooperation and Competition for Regional
Leadership 189
EDUAR DO PASTR ANA BUELVAS AND DIEGO F. VERA PIÑEROS
Conclusion 209
15 The Mouse Fights Back: The Maneuvering Room of
Smaller States with Respect to Their Larger Neighbor(s) 211
IAN ROBERGE
Index 225

DOI: 10.4324/9781003296249-16
14 Colombian Economic
Foreign Policy toward Brazil
Limited Cooperation and
Competition for Regional Leadership
Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas and Diego F. Vera
Piñeros
Introduction
Colombia is a secondary power in terms of its material structural position in
South America, having limited resources but also cognitive references that
drive it to adopt an ambitious foreign policy more characteristic of regional
powers. That is to say, Colombia has shown a strategically imbalanced for-
eign policy. Brazil has a considerable advantage in terms of material capabili-
ties that project it as a regional power. However, it has not been able to fully
translate this potential into consistent leadership projections, due to factors
such as the regional involvement of the United States, domestic challenges,
and contestation by secondary regional powers. Although Brazil and Colom-
bia have maintained relative economic cooperation since the beginning of the
twenty- first century, their geopolitical interests are different, and sometimes
even incompatible.
The relative increase in the material capabilities of Colombia in recent years,
compared to other secondary powers in the region such as Argentina, Chile,
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, motivated Colombian presidents Juan Manuel
Santos (2010–2018) and Iván Duque (2018–2022) to expand the country’s for-
eign policy agenda, seeking international and regional recognition and leader-
ship, but in conditions of non-alignment and competition with Brazil. The two
countries’ foreign agendas differed partially because of the different role concep-
tions projected by Colombia in the international system, as well as its perceptions
of the regional role of Brazil. Despite these differences, bilateral relations have
included increased economic and investment exchanges with Brazil, without
making it a main partner, and increased cooperation in security and defense,
without adopting Brazil as a strategic partner or provider of regional security
and stability.
The argument that Colombia’s historical relationship of subordination to the
United States in the economic and security/defense fields has prevented it from
getting “too close” to Brazil as an emerging power is poor. Similarly, the sim-
ple increase in a country’s material capabilities does not by itself explain the
expansion of a foreign policy agenda, the search for leadership and international

190 Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas and Diego F. Vera Piñeros
recognition, or competition between a secondary power and a regional one.
Moreover, systemic changes in, for example, global or regional polarity, and geo-
political pressures, are insufficient to explain why a secondary power attempts to
project global or regional leadership. Therefore, this bilateral case study provides
important clues to understand how the interplay between variations in relative
capabilities and changes in the national role conception of secondary powers,
added to a low expectation of follow-on or alignment with the regional power,
can lead to situations of competition – though not necessarily confrontation –
between the two for influence and leadership in the region, even amid significant
power asymmetries.
The objective of this chapter is to analyze how national material capabilities,
national role conceptions, and the perceptions of Colombian decision-makers
and elites regarding Brazil influenced the development of their bilateral eco-
nomic relations in the period 2010–2022.
Interpretative Framework
Neoclassical realism argues that systemic factors and relative state capacities
have an indirect influence on foreign policy, due to the factors that intervene in
domestic decision-making processes, including the preferences, perceptions, and
interests of decision-makers (Rose 1998, 146). When considering regional polar-
ity, it supposes that the more unequal the power distribution and the higher the
percentage of power concentrated in the regional power, the lower the likeli-
hood of an interstate conflict in the region, due to deterrence (Lemke 2010, 32).
Secondary regional powers respond, through foreign policy, to the restrictions,
opportunities, or threats that this asymmetry of capabilities represents for them,
according to perceptions of the conduct of these actors.
In a predominantly peaceful regional environment, regional powers tend to
play roles of stabilization, mediation, and provision of regional public goods
and values, both bilaterally and through intergovernmental structures. Regional
powers are characterized by a large population, high comparative gross domestic
product, strong conventional armed forces, and sometimes, nuclear weapons.
Unlike great powers, regional powers have lower military projection capacity,
concentrating instead on their region. And unlike middle powers, regional pow-
ers acquire responsibilities for maintaining regional security and order (Flemes
2012, 31). Several of these conditions apply to Brazil.
Secondary regional powers are defined as states that occupy a secondary posi-
tion in the regional power hierarchy when their material and/or ideational capa-
bilities are compared to the regional power, allowing them to partially compete
with regional powers in one or more policy areas (Flemes 2012, 33). Secondary
powers try to maintain their own room to maneuver through use of their own
resources, extra-regional allies, and soft-balancing strategies against the lead-
ership claims of the regional power (Flemes and Wehner 2012). Some of these
strategies include: (a) buffering: capacity-strengthening and symmetrical coop-
eration between secondary units; (b) collective questioning of the legitimacy or

Colombian Economic Foreign Policy toward Brazil 191
efficiency of the regional power; (c) entangling diplomacy: using regional and
multilateral rules, procedures, and structures to stop unilateral actions by the
regional power; (d) binding: seeking direct agreements with the regional power
to restrict the arbitrary use of its power; and (e) omni-enmeshment: collectively
engaging the regional power in multilevel governance agreements and struc-
tures so that it responds positively to their needs (Flemes and Wehner 2012). A
secondary regional power tends to expand its agenda when its decision-makers
perceive an improvement in its relative capabilities, becoming even more inde-
pendent from the regional power (Rose 1998).
Neoclassical realism, focused on the capabilities of the powers but balanced
with the strategic or dogmatic role of the ideas of decision-makers (Kitchen
2010), can be complemented with the concept of national role conception. This
is a contribution from role theory to explain foreign policy behavior from a cog-
nitive or cultural point of view.
Role theory assumes that states are actors which try to behave consist-
ently in terms of specific roles with which they identify (Chafetz, Abramson,
and Grillot 1996, 732). Rosenau, in his text “Turbulence in World Politics”
from1990, understood role as the result of the attitudinal and behavioral expec-
tations of others, and the expectations that its occupant has of itself (220,
cited in Chafetz, Abramson, and Grillot 1996, 732). Roles are derived from a
combination of the actor’s own understanding of what their behavior should
be, the demands of society and external actors, and the particular contextual
conditions within which the role is performed (Chafetz, Abramson, and Grillot
1996, 733).
Therefore, national role conception is understood as the perceptions held by
decision-makers of the position that their state occupies in the international sys-
tem. Such perceptions offer policymakers a set of procedures, rules, and guiding
ideas for action in the international arena to achieve their proposed objectives
(Bailin 1980, 533). Role expectations express the interaction between alter and
ego. This implies that the ego, when acting, must behave in the appropriate way
expected of him or her by the alter (Thies 2009, 9–10). In this sense, role has
a systemic character because its existence and acceptance depend on the recog-
nition of that specific role by other states, as Doran argues in the text “Con-
fronting the Principles of the Power Cycle” in the Handbook of War Studies II of
2000 (338–339, cited in Lahneman 2003, 99). Finally, there is role performance,
which defines and expresses the way in which the ego acts in the social world.
In foreign policy, this means the way in which states perform their national role
conception through the implementation of their strategies on the international
stage (Thies 2009).
As national role conception is based primarily on a government’s own idea
of its international position and its functions or responsibilities, it can either be
attuned to or collide with, the role prescriptions and expectations of others (Hol-
sti 1970, 239). The role infers that the agent has certain material and ideational
power capabilities, with which it has a certain responsibility and enjoys certain
privileges according to its position in a given power hierarchy. Additionally, the

192 Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas and Diego F. Vera Piñeros
role incorporates objectives and condenses the essence of state conduct in foreign
policy (Lahneman 2003, 98–99).
Holsti identifies 17 roles that can be inferred from the discourse. This chap-
ter references only those relevant for Colombia: (1) regional leader: composed
of the duties or responsibilities a government defines for itself in its perceived
region; (2) active independent: based on governmental declarations that support
non-alignment and autonomous foreign policy; (3) doctrine defender: imply-
ing commitments to defend the values of the system to which it considers itself
belonging; (4) mediator-integrator: a conciliatory figure capable of managing
conflict resolution in other states; and (5) regional subsystem collaborator:
expressing cooperative efforts with the regional leader (Holsti 1970, 260–270).
Due to its internal weaknesses and dependence on external help, Colombia has
historically been a state that uses foreign policy to solve its domestic problems,
complementing this with roles as an active independent, and regional subsys-
tem collaborator. However, in recent governments, there has been a perceived
attempt to assume roles as a regional leader, doctrine defender, and mediator-
integrator, which are usually attributed more to regional powers than to second-
ary ones.
Evolution of the Material Capabilities of Colombia and
Brazil, and their Positions in South America
Colombia occupies the second structural position in South America, although
vastly inferior to Brazil. Here, the perspective of Lemke (2010, 47) is partially
adopted to estimate the concentration of material capabilities by Colombia and
Brazil within the region.
Nine indicators of material power are taken into account for each of the
12 South American states per year, and weighted without coefficients against
the regional total: (1) percentage of gross domestic product; (2) percentage
of monetary reserves in dollars, including gold; (3) percentage of taxes col-
lected in dollars, minus subsidies; (4) percentage of military spending in dol-
lars; (5) percentage of the value of arms imported in dollars; (6) percentage
of the population; (7) percentage of military personnel; (8) percentage of scien-
tific articles published; and (9) percentage of the territory in square kilometers.
These nine indicators are added together and then divided by nine. Table 14.1
presents the national material power index for South America between 2009
and 2020.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the data. First, the asymmetry in favor
of Brazil positioning it as the only South American regional power has been
stable, despite contractions in 2015, 2016, and 2020, amid its economic and
political crises. Second, Colombia remained in second place as the main sec-
ondary power, although it temporarily lost this position by a narrow margin to
Argentina in 2016 and 2019. Third, for both Colombian presidents Santos and
Duque, in the years before and of their presidential inauguration(s), Colombia
had favorable material indicators compared to other South American states.

Colombian Economic Foreign Policy toward Brazil 193
Table 14.1 National Material Power Index in South America
National Power 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2 016 2017 2 018 2019 2020
Argentina 9.70 9.49 9.48 9.37 9.29 9.14 10.4 2 10.36 11.74 10.15 10.90 9.09
Bolivia 1.99 1.91 2.12 2.10 2.07 2.54 2.02 2.44 2.10 1.93 3.27 2.33
Brazil 49.17 51.52 51.90 50.82 49.36 49.78 47. 8 7 47.49 48.48 51.67 52.52 4 7.2 0
Chile 7. 80 8.55 7.45 5.60 5.52 6.71 6.93 6.31 6.85 7.31 5.66 10.49
Colombia 11.38 11.05 9.98 11.01 10.91 11.58 11.81 10.03 12.39 10.17 10.57 11.38
Ecuador 2.50 2.36 2.16 2.43 1.89 2.38 2.25 2.54 2.53 2.20 2.24 2.58
Guyana 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.31 0.23
Peru 5.25 5.31 5.33 5.34 5.59 6.90 7. 77 9.40 7. 06 7. 3 7 5.55 5.99
Paraguay 0.85 0.86 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.99 1.08 1.04
Suriname 0.60 0.52 0.50 0.49 0.54 0.51 0.62 0.60 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.57
Uruguay 1.27 1.14 1.03 1.09 1.21 1.33 1.33 1.24 1.24 1.51 1.29 1.71
Venezuela 9.27 7. 0 9 8.93 10.63 12.53 7.9 9 7. 81 8.42 5.89 5.94 6.03 7. 3 9
Source: Based on data from the World Bank (2022a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2022). Table by the authors.

194 Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas and Diego F. Vera Piñeros
National Role Conception of Colombia and Perceptions
of the Regional Role of Brazil
This section examines the national role conception projected by Colombia in
terms of international leadership during the Santos and Duque governments.
Additionally, it tracks Colombian perceptions regarding Brazil, to determine if it
was perceived as a strategic or priority ally, a regional leader, or simply a neighbor
of interest in cooperation.
During his first term from 2010 to 2014, Colombian President Juan Manuel
Santos repeatedly emphasized that Colombia would play a relevant role in new
global spaces and assume the international leadership “that corresponds to it”
(Presidencia 2010). In his second term from 2014 to 2018, Santos frequently
expressed that Colombia had regained a “preeminent role in the world,” high-
lighting the creation of the Pacific Alliance trade bloc with Chile, Mexico, and
Peru in 2011 and showed his willingness to contribute to regional integra-
tion, coordination, and cooperation (Presidencia 2014). Therefore, he sought
to expand Colombian participation in the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR), the Andean Community (CAN), the Mesoamerica Integration
and Development Project, the Pacific Alliance, and the Community of Latin
American and Caribbean States.
Mercosur was not considered, and the only allusion to Brazil was as a bench-
mark of economic, political, and diplomatic interest as part – but not leader – of
BRICS (the five major emerging economies Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa). Instead, the United States, Europe, and Canada were mentioned
as key economic partners, and Chile, Mexico, and Peru were named as key allies
in the Pacific Alliance, to strengthen the country’s capabilities and open mar-
kets, including greater interaction with Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). No expec-
tations about Brazil’s roles as a regional power were identified. Thus, Colombia
sought to display shared leadership with Chile, Mexico, and Peru through the
Pacific Alliance, to compete – indirectly – with Brazil and Mercosur, identifying
Central America and the Caribbean as subregions in which to project its own
leadership on specific topics of commercial and security cooperation.
In the Iván Duque government (2018–2022) and its national role conception,
Colombia’s role as a “global and regional collaborator” was maintained in the
existing legal regimes, although it sought greater support from the United States
(Duque, August 7, 2018). Moreover, diplomacy and multilateralism were rein-
terpreted in terms of an ideological construction with similar states, and a differ-
entiation or exclusion of those with different political regimes. Thus, Colombia
adopted a dogmatic version of the regional defense of representative democracy
and the rejection of neighboring governments (Nicaragua, Cuba, Venezuela, and
Bolivia). The Colombian government opted for the role of “doctrine defender,”
and possibly, functions more associated with a leading regional or global power
as a rule-maker and sanctioner of unwanted conduct. This weakened its roles
as mediator-integrator and regional bridge that had been attempted by Santos.

Colombian Economic Foreign Policy toward Brazil 195
The Colombian government also made no mention of Brazil, withdrew from the
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), led the Forum for the Progress
and Integration of South America (PROSUR) as a substitute, and did not con-
sider Mercosur.
Santos communicated the following balance of Colombian-Brazilian relations
at the end of his presidency, in a speech to then-President of Brazil, Michel
Temer: (1) Colombia and Brazil are sister nations, united by history, ethnic diver-
sity, and cultural and environmental wealth; (2) they are the most biodiverse and
populated countries in the region; (3) broadening and deepening the bilateral
agenda was a priority; (4) the issues of bilateral support for Venezuelan migrants
and cooperation to restore democracy in Venezuela were added; and (5) Brazil-
ian support for peace-building in Colombia was highlighted, via its backing for
the peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
guerrilla group and the provision of technical assistance for humanitarian dem-
ining and rural development (Santos 2018). Although Santos recognized Brazil
as a “natural leader,” he did so in the context of its role as a promoter of sustain-
able development and the United Nations 2030 Agenda, not its role as a South
American regional power.
Regarding Duque’s perception, there is no complete picture of Brazil,
only fragments. Brazil continued to be perceived as a protagonist in sustain-
able development, environmental conservation, and the fight against climate
change, but judgments of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s economic policies
in the Amazon – as made by several international actors due to extreme
deforestation – were avoided (Deutsche Welle 2021). Duque considered Brazil
an important partner in commercial matters, the fight against drugs, and dip-
lomatic pressure on the Venezuelan government, but not a strategic partner or
the regional leader.
The most powerful Colombian labor unions have considerable influence on
the direction of bilateral economic relations. Their perceptions of Brazil vary,
but they also reflect a duality between the aspiration for greater trade and invest-
ment and a latent mistrust of Brazil’s role as a regional integration leader, prefer-
ring to maintain strategic relations with the United States and deeper ones with
other secondary powers.
The National Business Association of Colombia has supported the diversifi-
cation of commercial partners including Brazil, technology transfer, and Bra-
zil’s participation in the modernization of Colombia’s national infrastructure
(Flemes 2012, 34), at least before the regional corruption scandal involving Bra-
zilian construction conglomerate Odebrecht. The association has considered it
necessary to deepen trade cooperation between the Andean Community and
Mercosur and to stimulate more reciprocal investment, but it has also signaled
the inconsistency between Brazil’s intended regional leadership and the real –
low – costs it has assumed to integrate South America economically, physically,
and politically (Pastrana and Vera 2012, 632). It has also negatively perceived
the resistance of Brazil and Mercosur to negotiate a free trade agreement with
the United States.

196 Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas and Diego F. Vera Piñeros
Colombia’s National Association of Financial Institutions had viewed Brazil
positively. However, since 2014 it has considered Brazil to have a poor perfor-
mance due to left-wing populist management under Presidents Luíz Inácio Lula
da Silva (2003–2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016), elevated corruption and
public debt, and the lack of competition and transparency in its credit markets,
hoping that Jair Bolsonaro would be more prudent macroeconomically (Clavijo
et al. 2019). This weakness clearly favors the Colombian banking sector in its
aspirations for internationalization.
Colombian agricultural unions have perceived both opportunities and threats
in Colombia’s approaches to Brazil. The Colombian Farmers Society and the
National Federation of Livestock Farmers are interested in learning from the
Brazilian model of the technification of food production and livestock farming
(Pastrana and Vera 2012, 632). At the same time, they fear the effect of greater
trade liberalization with Brazil due to its superior competitiveness and Colom-
bia’s rural vulnerability (Flemes 2012, 34).
Role Performance and Bilateral Relations in the
Economic Field
Foreign policy – from diplomacy to armed attack – constitutes all the ways in
which states translate their available power into policies to achieve positive out-
comes for their territorial security, economic vitality, and political independ-
ence (Duncan, Jancar-Webster, and Switky 2009, 160). This section addresses
only the economic dimension of Colombia’s foreign policy in relation to Brazil,
emphasizing the evolution of trade and investment diplomacy and indicators
between the two countries as evidence of Colombia’s role performance in rela-
tion to the regional power. Growing economic cooperation with Brazil can be
evidenced, but not in strategic or priority terms. Other partners outside and
within the region are prioritized, and Colombia indirectly contests some of
Brazil’s interests and projects as regional leader.
As shown in Figure 14.1, exports from Colombia to Brazil have grown gradu-
ally over the period studied, with some oscillations, indicating that the Brazilian
market has gained importance for Colombia.
Figure 14.2 shows that Colombia’s imports from Brazil have remained stable
at around US$2.5 billion annually, except for a sharp drop in 2019–2021.
Figure 14.3 indicates that Colombia maintains a trade deficit with Brazil,
although this reduced in 2019–2021. This reflects the general industrial asym-
metry between Brazil and Colombia in favor of Brazil.
However, despite this asymmetry in trade between Colombia and Brazil,
explained by the higher added value of Brazil’s sales and industrial capacity, the
regional power has not achieved hegemony by concentrating trade with Colom-
bia and the Andean countries, as tends to happen in Mercosur. Brazil repre-
sented only 2.62 percent of total Colombian exports in 2010, and 5.83 percent
of its total imports. In 2014, the two figures were 2.96 and 3.85 percent, respec-
tively. In 2018, in the last year of Colombian President Santos’ second term, they

Colombian Economic Foreign Policy toward Brazil 197
were 3.73 and 5.52 percent. And in 2021, three years into Colombian President
Duque’s term, they were 4.96 and 5.7 percent for the portion of the year for
which data was available (ALADI 2022c).
For Colombia, Brazil oscillates in importance between positions eight (2010),
nine (2014), seven (2018), and three (2021) as a buyer, and positions four (2010,
2018, 2021) and five (2014) as a seller (ALADI 2022c). Brazil has gained impor-
tance as a trading partner, but without priority or dependency. The possibilities
of increasing Colombian-Brazilian trade are limited by the differences between
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Exports from Colombia to Brazil
Figure 14.1 Colombian Exports to Brazil (Thousands of US Dollars).
Source: Latin American Integration Association (ALADI 2022a). Graphic by the authors.
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
3000000
3500000
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 20182019 2020 2021
Imports to Colombia from Brazil
Figure 14.2 Colombian Imports from Brazil (Thousands of US Dollars).
Source: Latin American Integration Association (ALADI 2022b). Graphic by the authors.
-1800000
-1600000
-1400000
-1200000
-1000000
-800000
-600000
-400000
-200000
0
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Trade balance of Colombia with Brazil
Figure 14.3 Trade Balance of Colombia with Brazil (Thousands of US Dollars).
Source: Latin American Integration Association (ALADI 2022a, b). Graphic by the authors.

198 Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas and Diego F. Vera Piñeros
the community norms and open conception of the Andean Community (which
made the individual free trade negotiations of Colombia and Peru with the
United States and European Union possible), compared to Mercosur’s rules
(e.g., its common external tariff and collective bargaining policy with third par-
ties), which makes a possible free trade agreement between Colombia and Brazil
difficult. There is little probability of Colombia binding with Brazil in the com-
mercial field to attenuate industrial, legal, and technological asymmetries. Addi-
tionally, it is difficult to imagine that Brazil can achieve commercial hegemony
in South America outside Mercosur, or without expanding Mercosur, while the
other secondary and Andean powers prioritize the United States and/or China.
Colombia has signed trade agreements with Brazil in the framework of collec-
tive or plurilateral regulations. Three Partial Scope Agreements are in force: the
Latin American Integration Association or ALADI (1980), the Global System of
Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (1988), and the 1999 updating
of the ALADI agreement for the accession of Cuba (Ministry of Commerce,
Industry and Tourism, December 24, 2021). Colombia, like the other members
of the Andean Community, did not originally join Mercosur but agreed to the
status of Associated State, signing an Andean Community-Mercosur Economic
Cooperation Agreement, ACE 59, in 2004, which was updated in 2017 as ACE
72, giving them some tariff preferences but with a very limited scope. This shows
that the Andean Community-Mercosur agreements are not only used as a mech-
anism to increase trade with Brazil and its priority partners, but also as an appli-
cation of entangling diplomacy to mitigate the highly negative discriminatory
treatment of Brazil and Mercosur to economies outside their bloc.
Colombia is not interested in joining Mercosur because its bilateral agree-
ments with the United States (2006), the European Union (2012), Mexico
(2009), Chile (2006), and the Pacific Alliance (2011–2012) are its commercial
pillars, together with its traditional membership of the Andean Community. In
fact, Santos’ governments opted to search for multiple free trade agreements,
with bilateralism prevailing as a strategy for international economic insertion
over community agreements in the Andean Community. Unfortunately, this has
weakened the Andean Community as a buffering platform, not only to negotiate
collectively and less asymmetrically with the United States and the European
Union, but also to achieve better trading terms with Brazil and Mercosur. This
performance of intense bilateralism increases Colombia’s international presence
but weakens its role as a regional “mediator-integrator,” losing its position as the
historical leader of the Andean Community.
At the bilateral level, seeking new impetus for relations with Brazil, Colombia
signed eight cooperation agreements in 2010 in areas such as: economic devel-
opment and social exchange on the Leticia-Tabatinga border, police coopera-
tion, scientific research, agricultural modernization, education, environmental
development, biofuel production, and joint defense industry projects (Pastrana
and Vera 2013, 638–639). None related to trade or investment. During Brazil-
ian President Rousseff’s 2015 visit to Colombia, with the re-elected Santos, the
two countries tried to increase their interdependence by signing agreements on

Colombian Economic Foreign Policy toward Brazil 199
indigenous affairs, research studies between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs,
family farming, investment, trade, information technology, and productive inte-
gration between Leticia and Tabatinga (Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
October 9, 2015). In particular, the trade agreement sought to promote the
development of the automotive industry and associated sectors, and to increase
the volume of vehicle trade between the two countries, with an additional pro-
tocol to the ACE 59 Andean Community-Mercosur Economic Cooperation
Agreement. The investment agreement sought to facilitate the mutual flow of
productive capital. Of these initiatives, only the investment agreement became
a treaty, but it is no longer in force (Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
n.d.-a).
By contrast, Colombian President Duque chose not to sign new free trade
agreements. He did not have a defined foreign trade strategy, nor did he reverse
existing trends or show significant interest in Brazil or Mercosur. Faced with
the importance given to the United States market and capital, Colombia’s role
performance reflects the fact that Brazil was perceived more as a rival economy
than a complementary one, and that there was no expectation of a role for Brazil
as the center of gravity of the South American economy. Although paradoxical,
this performance demonstrates that Colombian elites felt the country’s role as an
“independent asset” was less threatened by links with the United States than by
increasing interdependence with Brazil.
For Santos and Duque, the Pacific Alliance was the main mechanism for
regional economic interaction. The Pacific Alliance competes with Brazil and
Mercosur because it has a more symmetrical conception between secondary
powers and is more open and without supranational restrictions, allowing the
members to link with key partners outside South America, position themselves
with less disadvantage against the regional power, and attract markets and
investment without having to negotiate collectively or accommodate Brazilian
geopolitical interests (Flemes and Castro 2016, 79), as is the case for Brazil’s
partners in Mercosur. For this reason, the Pacific Alliance is understood as an
essential buffering mechanism against Brazil and Mercosur in at least three ways:
(a) it distances itself from the post-hegemonic regionalism which seeks to weaken
the regional influence of the United States; (b) it has tried to attract Paraguay
and Uruguay, Brazil’s Mercosur partners, although their full membership is dif-
ficult without free trade agreements with the United States; and (c) it allows its
members to collectively increase their pressure on Brazil and reduce its asym-
metric influence, either by excluding Brazil or attracting it toward the Pacific
Alliance’s flexible terms of trade and decision-making in the future (Flemes and
Castro 2016, 84–85).
Although Colombia’s role performance shows interest in links between
the Pacific Alliance and Mercosur to identify complementarities and mitigate
frictions, this has not yet materialized and could become an arrangement of
omni-enmeshment between blocs in the future, to attract – not repel – the eco-
nomic interests of Brazil, but on terms more favorable to the secondary powers.
In other words, Colombia has projected the role of the “regional leader” of

200 Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas and Diego F. Vera Piñeros
the Pacific Alliance and tried to promote the role of “mediator-integrator” to
link it with Mercosur, although without much success. However, under Duque,
Colombia’s role in the Pacific Alliance weakened, and he opted instead for the
Forum for the Progress and Integration of South America (PROSUR) as an
antagonistic economic-ideological articulation against the Union of South
American Nations (UNASUR).
In Santos’ first term (2010–2014), 16 agreements with Brazil were officially
adopted, of which 15 remain in force, but only 5 refer to cooperation in produc-
tive projects (Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.-b). In Santos’ second
term (2014–2018), only the investment agreement was formalized. Under the
Duque government (2018–2022), six instruments were adopted, of which five
are in force. The only one referring to economic issues focuses on air services and
was not in force at the time of writing. In summary, this diplomatic indicator
warns that economic cooperation dynamics were more intense in the first term
of Santos, weaker in his second term, and increased slightly during the second
half of the Duque government, although at the beginning of 2022, they were
not ratified agreements.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is another factor that can reveal the relative
importance and dependencies between regional and secondary powers.
As illustrated in Figure 14.4, the growth of Brazilian FDI to Colombia stands
out, especially in 2019, and to a lesser extent in 2011, 2012, and 2013. Although
it tends to rise positively, it is highly irregular. As for FDI from Colombia to
Brazil, its growth between 2012 and 2021 is very similar, except for the strong
contraction in 2019. Thus, from 2012 to the third quarter of 2021, Colombia
reported a permanent, total FDI in Brazil of approximately US$1.12 billion, well
below the Brazilian FDI in Colombia of around US$2.6 billion (Central Bank
of Colombia 2022). This could be due to the greater investment power of Bra-
zilian corporations, and partially to the better investment conditions Colombia
has presented in recent years compared to Brazil, which has exhibited difficulties
since 2014.
-1500.0
-1000.0
-500.0
0.0
500.0
1000.0
1500.0
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
FDI between Colombia and Brasil
FDI BRA TO COL FDI COL TO BRA
Figure 14.4 Foreign Direct Investment Flow between Colombia and Brazil (Millions of
US Dollars).
Source: Central Bank of Colombia (2022). Graphic by the authors.

Colombian Economic Foreign Policy toward Brazil 201
As of 2020, there were 102 Brazilian companies based in Colombia, having
increased between 2017 and 2020. Although mining and oil have been key areas
of investment, Brazilian FDI in Colombia grew by 50 percent in 2021 in other
sectors, including agribusiness, finance, cosmetics, infrastructure, steel, and
information and communication technologies (Government of Brazil, August
25, 2021). In parallel, Colombian investments in Brazil have also increased in
the areas of oil exploration, electric power transmission, and industries related to
plastics and resins (Embassy of Brazil 2018).
Compared to other countries, Brazilian FDI in Colombia is positive and
tended to grow over the period studied, but it was not a priority. In 2020, Bra-
zilian FDI in Colombia ranked sixteenth in importance, accounting for just
0.71 percent of FDI received, with US$63.1 million, while United States FDI
ranked first, accounting for 20.9 percent with US$1.85 billion (Central Bank
of Colombia 2022). In 2019, the best year of the period analyzed for Brazilian
FDI in Colombia, Brazil climbed to fourth place as an investor (7.7 percent)
but remained far behind the US (17.65 percent) and Spain (18.13 percent). In
other words, the interdependencies in Colombian capital flow were stronger with
extra-regional powers – the US dominated – and even with other neighbors such
as Panama, Chile, and Peru than with Brazil. This role performance shows that
Colombia perceived attracting US capital as a mechanism to compete with Brazil
and other emerging economies, although this fosters dependency on the United
States. Colombia has tried to become a regional “economic leader,” but without
self-sufficiency, weakening its role as an “independent asset” and tying it to the
interests of the United States.
Table 14.2 summarizes the five roles that Colombian national role concep-
tion tried to project during the governments of Santos and Duque, and the
actions – although some were only intentions – related to the performance of
economic foreign policy in this period, including some aspects not yet men-
tioned but which have also been part of this economic diplomacy.
In short, Colombia’s economic diplomacy, and its trade and investment actions
and indicators with Brazil, reflect aspects of the country’s role performance as a
secondary regional power seeking its own space for regional leadership. Colom-
bia cooperates, but without aligning itself with Brazil or losing its main partner,
the United States, and with some acts of soft balancing against Brazil and its
projects. Some of the inconsistencies between the roles attributed by Colombian
national role conception and the performance of its economic policy relate to
variables such as the effort and capacities invested in performing those roles
(insufficient), the time invested (short-term or intermittent), its range and scope
(all of Latin America or only South America?), and the receptivity (low) of those
who should play the complementary role (followers, allies, partners, etc.) (Thies
20 0 9, 6 –9).
Emerging powers or those experiencing temporary improvements in their
capabilities in relation to others – such as Colombia – tend more to define
ascribed roles than to achieve them, until they manage to satisfy the aforemen-
tioned variables (Thies 2009, 8). The same happens with Brazil. That is, its

202 Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas and Diego F. Vera Piñeros
Table 14.2 Relationship between the Typology of Colombia’s National Role Conception
and the Role Performance of Its Economic Diplomacy
Colombian Ascribed
Roles
Economic Role Performance Actions
Regional leader • Increasing the competitiveness and image of the Pacific
Alliance in relation to Mercosur
• Attracting Mercosur members to join the Pacific Alliance
• Joining the OECD and emulating its economic institutions
to position itself regionally
• Launching economic projects in PROSUR as substitutes for
those of UNASUR
• Relaunching the Andean Community
• Making Colombia the “Silicon Valley” of South America
• Becoming the main South American economic partner of
Central America and the Caribbean
• Leading triangular cooperation in productive projects for
Central America and the Caribbean
Active independent • Avoiding commercial and financial dependency on Brazil
• Recovering the trade deficit with Brazil by exporting more
• Increasing bilateral cooperation in productive projects with
Brazil without alignment or conditions
• Maintaining the flexibility and openness of regional norms
and bodies to be able to negotiate free trade agreements
• Competing against Brazil for foreign direct investment from
the US and other financial powers
Doctrine defender • Preserving regional ideals such as representative democracy,
free markets, and human rights
• Confronting anti-market and anti-capitalist discourses and
alliances
• Isolating and economically sanctioning Venezuela to induce
regime change and (liberal) economic reconstruction
Mediator-integrator • Seeking Andean Community-Mercosur economic
cooperation agreements
• Promoting summits between the Pacific Alliance and
Mercosur
• Becoming a “bridge” country to attract countries from
Latin America and East Asia to its market and the Pacific
Alliance
• Linking the markets and interests of South American
countries with those of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (Canada, the US, and Mexico)
Regional subsystem
collaborator • Participating in hemispheric and regional economic
structures and alliances led by the US
• Participating in Brazil’s regional integration and
cooperation initiatives without excluding cooperation with
the US
• Promoting good regional relations with the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, and Inter-American
Development Bank
• Participating in and promoting economic initiatives for the
region derived from the Summits of the Americas
Source: Based in part on Holsti (1970) and Thies (2009).

Colombian Economic Foreign Policy toward Brazil 203
national role ambitions do not tend to coincide with its performance results,
eventually forcing it to adjust those role conceptions or increase its relative capa-
bilities to perform them. Although Colombia has experienced positive and pro-
gressive improvements in its material power indicators in the period analyzed,
partially influencing the ambitions found in policymakers’ national role concep-
tion, the gap between Colombia and Brazil remains considerable, and internal
development and security problems remain a significant obstacle to fully playing
the roles of regional leader, doctrine defender, and mediator-integrator, which
are more typical of regional powers than secondary ones.
Conclusion
During the period 2010–2022, under Colombian presidents Santos and Duque,
Colombia and Brazil increased trade, investment, and bilateral economic coop-
eration, but without alignment. Colombian policymakers incorporated leader-
ship expectations, some related to regional power roles, which have distanced it
from the Brazilian regional agenda, taking advantage of its own rising material
capabilities and the relative vacuum of regional leadership during the Brazilian
governments of Dilma Rousseff, Michel Temer, and Jair Bolsonaro.
Colombia has tried to detach itself from some Brazilian roles by projecting
leadership in specific areas, approaching Brazil comparatively but trying to avoid
the effects of its asymmetry to limit dependence or alignment. Its ego leader-
ship expectations stand out, and there is no expectation of following Brazil or
recognizing its role as regional hegemon. Colombia has sought to show shared
leadership with Chile, Mexico, and Peru through the Pacific Alliance as part of
a soft-balancing strategy to compete with, but not directly rival, Brazil and Mer-
cosur, identifying Central America and the Caribbean as subregions in which to
project leadership.
The national role conceptions of Colombian presidents Santos and Duque
identify Latin America as the region, not South America as in Brazilian ideas,
and without excluding partners such as Mexico and the United States. San-
tos sought collective regional leadership, symmetrical and without hegemony,
but with a central or articulating role, leading without becoming a hegemon,
cooperating with the region without following hegemons. Duque reinterpreted
diplomacy and multilateralism as an ideological construction with similar states
and the differentiation or exclusion of those with different regimes.
Examining Colombia’s economic cooperation with Brazil as a means of ver-
ifying Colombia’s performance of its roles indicates growing but not strategic
cooperation, with priority given to other partners outside and within the region.
Brazil has gained importance as a trade and investment partner for Colombia,
but without priority or dependency, despite the industrial and financial capital
asymmetry favorable to the regional power.
The actions and intentions of the economic role performance of Colombia
reflect its contrasting plurality of roles, between those that correspond more
to a secondary unit (e.g., regional collaborator), a secondary but independent

204 Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas and Diego F. Vera Piñeros
or non-aligned unit, or a unit that wants to act as a regional power. This could
be explained in part by the ideological orientations of the decision-makers ana-
lyzed, and by the fact that Colombia is a state in transition and an intermediate
power in both development and security, with growing positive indicators but
persistent internal and external deficits. Brazil is perceived as a regional power in
political and economic decline since the Rousseff presidency, which prompted
the Colombian governments of Santos and Duque to try to partially fill that
regional power vacuum, although without much success.
Neoclassical realism and national role conception are useful and complemen-
tary perspectives for developing causal arguments to understand the behavior
of powers and the nature of the interactions between them at different levels
of the hierarchy. Neoclassical realism, with its emphasis on variations in relative
capacities and on regional polarity, can help explain the potential expansion or
contraction of the foreign policy agendas of geographically close states, but it
does not provide a strictly arithmetical relationship. National role conception
and role theory, with their interpretative analysis focused on the cognitive ref-
erents of decision-makers about the roles they want to play in the international
system, and their perceptions and expectations of the roles of other countries,
help us understand the intentions and ambitions that guide foreign policy, but
do not clarify how capacities influence the effective expansion or transformation
of those roles.
In other words, theories focused on material and structural aspects, and those
focused on ideational and interagency factors, can combine to provide a more
complete picture of the foreign policy decision-making process. This combina-
tion, and the case study addressed, also make it possible to partially suggest,
in the context of interactions between powers in a region, that: (1) asymmetry
favoring regional powers does not guarantee the adhesion of its neighbors; (2)
a secondary power’s internal problems and material disadvantages do not imply
that its elites will give up their own regional leadership projection, indeed, they
sometimes compete directly with regional powers; (3) inconsistencies between
effective capabilities and role conceptions can generate a strategically unbalanced
foreign policy, hindering the materialization and performance of regional leader-
ship roles, including leadership, integration-mediation, and doctrine building/
defending, for both regional powers and secondary ones; and, finally (4) the
expectations and perceptions of the other, especially the recipients of the role, do
not necessarily fully engage to accept that leadership, in light of the reputation,
superiority, or incentives offered by the aspiring regional leader, forcing theorists
to examine other factors.
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Conclusion

DOI: 10.4324/9781003296249-18
15 The Mouse Fights Back
The Maneuvering Room of
Smaller States with Respect to
Their Larger Neighbor(s)
Ian Roberge
Introduction
This volume has presented 13 diverse and detailed case studies of asymmetrical
bilateral relationships between neighboring states from the perspective of the
smaller partner. Drawn from every continent, the cases cover different regions,
diverse peoples, and varied practices. The collection brings together comparative
and foreign policy analyses of these relationships. How do smaller states manage
their relations with their larger neighbor(s)? What do these cases tell us about the
perspectives and experiences of smaller states? What practical recommendations for
smaller states emanate from this study? In this concluding chapter, we consider the
autonomy of smaller states vis-à-vis their larger neighbor(s). We argue that smaller
states have options and room to maneuver, yet these are highly dependent on the
particulars of their situation. While broad generalizations are difficult, we suggest
that many of the smaller states in our study remain in delicate situations requiring
thoughtful, yet active approaches to dealing with their larger neighbor(s).
Before proceeding to the analysis, three important reminders are neces-
sary. First, this edited collection has focused on smaller states, not small ones.
Although some definitions of small states could possibly have fit our purpose
(Baldacchino and Wivel 2020), there are too many challenges to each definition
to meet the needs of this research. The object of this study was not to address
the role and place of small and microstates in international relations. Rather, the
matters of power and size are seen as relative and relational, and the focus is on
asymmetrical relations. As Long (2017) has noted, it is not the size that matters,
but the relationship and the nature of the asymmetry. This research includes
cases where it is known or perceived that one of the neighbors is more powerful
or bigger than the other. Canada is not small, and its land mass is larger than
that of the United States, though it is by virtue of many other indicators, such
as population size, the smaller and less powerful of the two neighbors. In their
chapter on Colombia and Brazil, Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas and Diego F. Vera
define and use indicators of material capabilities as well as role conception to
demonstrate the power differential among states.
Second, this research volume is interested in how smaller states approach
their relationship with their larger neighbor(s). There are many ways in which

212 Ian Roberge
autonomy or dependence can be conceptualized and operationalized. This book
contains cases where the influence of the larger neighbor on the smaller state is
direct, and where it participates in its affairs. India and China, for example, are
directly involved in Nepal. There are also cases where the smaller state is clearly
dependent on the larger neighbor, especially from an economic perspective.
Timor-Leste, despite its recently obtained statehood, clearly remains dependent
on Indonesia and other countries in the region for its economic development.
The collection contains further cases, however, where the smaller state enjoys
greater relative autonomy like New Zealand or where the exercise of power and
influence by the larger neighbor on the smaller state is more subtle. Indeed,
smaller states think of autonomy or dependence differently depending on the
circumstances.
Lastly, the cases in this book all center on bilateral relations, although rela-
tionships are rarely if ever only one-on-one. The book’s second section contains
cases of smaller states sandwiched between larger neighbors, such as Mongolia
between Russia and China. Smaller states often bring other partners into the
relationship, whether from the same region or outside, for support vis-à-vis their
larger adjacent neighbor. For example, South Korea must balance Chinese and
Japanese influences, and often works with the United States to help meet its
objectives. The regional environment clearly affects the nature of the bilateral
relationship.
This concluding chapter is divided into three main sections. Following the
inductive research approach adopted for this project, the first section analyzes
the major lessons to be drawn from our case studies. The second section consid-
ers possible strategies for how smaller states are approaching, or might approach,
their relationships with their larger neighbor(s). The third section proposes ave-
nues for further research.
Lessons from the Cases
Five major lessons can be drawn from the case studies in this collection. These
are: (1) Smaller states are still focused on their existence, and national secu-
rity and survival remain high-level priorities; (2) Identity matters a great deal
and is heavily shaped by history, geography, peoples, and cultures; (3) Relation-
ships change over time and improve or worsen depending on circumstances; (4)
Power and size are relational, and being beside a superpower or major power vs. a
regional power or simply a larger state affects the nature of the relationship; and
(5) Smaller states that appear more successful in managing their relationships are
more proactive in their foreign policy and diplomatic approach.
Security
The international relations literature tells us that small states are “structurally
irrelevant” (Maass 2016) and that their existence is always under threat. Small
states have proliferated in the twentieth century, but their perennity in the

The Mouse Fights Back 213
hierarchical world order is not assured. While this volume is not focused on small
states per se, there remains some veracity, if nuanced, to this statement. Smaller
states continue to be concerned about their security situation. The Belarus-
Russia case makes explicit the possibility of integration and the larger state swal-
lowing up the smaller country. As Salome Minesashvili, Frédéric Labarre, and
Pierre Jolicoeur argue, Georgian identity was fashioned in response to threats
from the Ottoman Empire and then today in response to Russia. Smaller states,
such as Armenia and Azerbaijan, have been involved in armed conflicts. Timor-
Leste was born out of a long struggle for independence and is highly depend-
ent on external support. Qatar has taken greater liberty in its relationship with
Saudi Arabia, although the patience of this larger neighbor has clear limits. And
South Korea and Singapore both have important security considerations related
to Asian geopolitics. Nonetheless, security considerations do not apply in as
forthright a manner to all cases, as is demonstrated by the relationships between
Canada and the United States, Colombia and Brazil, and New Zealand and
Australia. A possible difference to note is that while these states are smaller, they
are not small, which likely gives them the perception of greater security.
Identity Matters
Many of the chapters in this collection highlight the importance of a distinct
identity for the smaller of the two states, particularly in terms of how it perceives
and interacts with its larger neighbor. The role of history, geography, peoples,
and cultures in the relationship is made explicit in a number of the analyses. The
Togo-Ghana relationship is heavily influenced by the two countries’ colonial past
and the arbitrary division of borders. In this chapter, Frank L.K. Ohemeng and
Emmanuel K. Sakyi write openly about sociocultural interdependence and the
significance of shared kinship, ethnicity, and cultural practices. The question of
identity is also extremely important in understanding the relationship between
Georgia and Russia. Georgia first turned to Russia as a form of defense against
the Ottoman Empire; Georgians now prefer to identify as Europeans rather
than Russians. Gertjan Hoetjes views the Qatari-Saudi relationship through the
lens of Qatar’s quest for a cosmopolitan identity. Much of Canadian identity is
shaped by what it is not – the United States. The historical overview of the New
Zealand-Australia relationship also demonstrates important differences in iden-
tity during the period of state formation, which help to explain New Zealand’s
preference for sovereignty despite their special relationship, and the country’s
independent approach to key public policies.
More narrowly, the cases in this volume all reference the significance of history
and geography in shaping the relationship between smaller states and their larger
neighbor(s). For instance, the history among Korea, Japan, and China is critical
to understanding the relationships in the region. The creation of Singapore is
important for grasping the way it relates to its two larger neighbors. As Jawad
Hussain Qureshi notes in his chapter, the history of Nepal is intertwined with
that of India and Tibet. Furthermore, the relationship between Nepal and China

214 Ian Roberge
is partly defined by their physical separation by the Himalayan mountain range.
Geography is also important in assessing the relationship between Colombia
and Brazil where the border separating the two countries is in the Amazon. As
Undraa Agvaanluvsan remarks, Mongolia’s geography is an important consider-
ation in its relationships with Russia and China, as well as its particular security
considerations. In fact, part of the challenge of drawing major lessons that apply
to all cases in this study is that the relationships are heavily influenced by pro-
cesses of identity formation, historical dependencies, geographic considerations,
peoples, and cultures.
Relationships Evolve
These case studies also emphasize that relationships between countries sharing a
border change over time and are not linear. Since the end of the Cold War, the
relationship between Belarus and Russia has had many iterations, as explained
by Leonid Karabeshkin, Frédéric Labarre, and Pierre Jolicoeur, with the two
countries appearing now as very close allies because of the Russian invasion of
Ukraine. In her detailed analysis, Merve Özdemirkiran-Embel observes serious
efforts to mend Armenia’s relationship with Turkey throughout recent history,
though these efforts have often hit a wall because of the Armenian diaspora.
Aclose reading of Gertjan Hoetjes’ chapter suggests that Saudi Arabia has toler-
ated Qatar’s dalliances, although it is clearly frustrated at times and has sought
to bring Qatar back to the fold. Indonesia’s military actions to suppress the
Timor-Leste independence movement were brutal. Today, Indonesia is much
more supportive of the development of its smaller neighbor. Thus, these rela-
tionships do not remain static but evolve over time, often oscillating between
positive and more challenging.
The Role of Major Powers
The relationship between a smaller state and its neighbor(s) is also affected by
whether that neighbor is a superpower or major power, as opposed to a regional
power or simply a larger state. Smaller states and their neighbor(s) may have
shared objectives, although in some circumstances they may be quite different.
And, as Musgrave (2019) points out, larger states do not always get their way.
That being noted, there is evidence that being beside a superpower often, though
not always, entails major security concerns and forces the smaller state to align
their policies somewhat more closely to those of their larger neighbor(s). South
Korea, as a middle power, tries to foster a path in between China, Japan, and
the United States, while the North Korean threat remains ever-present. Charles
Conteh, in the chapter on the Canada-US relationship, suggests that Canada
remains heavily dependent on its much more powerful neighbor to the south.
The international relations literature often assumes that larger states will be
somewhat more dismissive of their smaller partners, whereas the evidence in
this book does not completely support this claim. Russia clearly attempts to

The Mouse Fights Back 215
keep the smaller states surrounding it within its sphere of influence. Ghana is
quite involved in the affairs of Togo. And while this is a primarily peaceful rela-
tionship, Ghana’s intervention is not always welcomed. Both India and China
are directly involved in Nepali affairs. The relationship between Colombia and
Brazil is interesting in that both countries stand side by side, each with a clear
and distinct role. Brazil is demonstrably the regional power, while Colombia
assumes its role as the region’s secondary power. The Colombian-Brazilian case
suggests that what may be at issue are defined, agreed-upon roles within the
relationship, not just the size differential, and whether there is a shared under-
standing, if not outright common interests, binding the parties together.
Proactive Diplomacy
For smaller states, there is no definitive meaning of success in the ways they
manage their relationship with their larger neighbor(s). However, there are
countries that appear more active and agile in handling that relationship. There
are situations, as well, where smaller countries can tangibly influence the larger
state(s) next door. In her chapter on South Korea, Nara Park highlights the
country’s foreign policy attempts to balance the interests of its larger neigh-
bors through slightly different strategies tweaked with each new government.
Yohanes Sulaiman’s chapter shows that Singapore, situated between Indonesia
and Malaysia, has succeeded in forging an independent path for itself. Despite
the pressures from Saudi Arabia, even Qatar has been able to promote its own
self-interest through various means. The balancing game that smaller states
play with their larger neighbors, and/or other third parties, is nonetheless a
challenging one, and smaller countries are not always successful in applying it.
Jawad Hussain Qureshi observes that Nepal’s overtures to China do not give
it the leverage it seeks. Georgians are interested in a rapprochement with the
European Union, though the EU is careful in its response. In between Turkey
and Azerbaijan, Armenia came up on the losing side of the Second Nagorno-
Karabakh War.
Strategies for the Smaller States
Based on these observations, what are the strategies and opportunities for smaller
states in managing their relationships with their larger neighbor(s)? There are
various efforts in the international relations literature to account for asymmet-
rical relations within a hierarchical international system (McConaughey, Mus-
grave, and Nexon 2018). Yet, many of these theories are presented without
necessarily being tested, or concrete case studies, and often seem removed from
international relations practices. As such, we refer only to a select few.
Womack (2016) has developed a theoretical framework which suggests that
depending on the convergence or divergence of their interests, states can be stra-
tegic partners, client patrons, strategic rivals, or the relationship may be one of
domination. Although the framework and its underpinnings are elaborate, this

216 Ian Roberge
breakdown does not appear to fit our cases, except perhaps for the client-patron
situation which could be said to apply to the Belarussian-Russian relationship.
Shelter theory has become important in international relations for understand-
ing the behavior of small states (Thorhallsson 2019), although it is somewhat less
useful in providing strategic guidance to manage bilateral relations. Schoeller
and Falkner (2022) have developed a theoretical framework to account for the
approaches used by smaller states within the confines of the European Union.
Depending on the power differential, smaller states have different options that
range from bargaining to exercising influence, including foot-dragging, fence-
sitting, co-shaping, and pacesetting. While useful, the framework has limitations
for smaller states outside the EU where no such regional infrastructure exists,
the relationships are largely bilateral, and there is not always the opportunity to
work with other like-minded actors for leverage.
The most useful review, considering the findings of this collection, comes
from Efremova (2019), who studied the role of smaller states as a buffer between
great powers, and considers the various strategies open to them: balancing,
bandwagoning, leaning to a third power, staying neutral, or hedging risks. Many
of the smaller states in our research have used, or are using, these or similar
approaches. As such, we have adapted these strategies for our analysis, noting
that they do not form a framework or model per se, yet still provide guidance
for smaller states on how to approach asymmetrical bilateral relations with their
larger neighbor(s).
Tilting
The strategy referred to as tilting could be understood as the “bend but do not
break approach.” These states are under heavy pressure from their larger neigh-
bor(s), have serious security considerations, and look for ways to resist without
overtly offending their neighbor(s). These countries have limited autonomy, and
the autonomy they do possess must be exercised very carefully. Admittedly, states
do not choose tilting as their strategy, but are forced to use it by their situation.
In our study, Georgia is a good example of a country needing to use this
approach. Georgia looks to the West for its identity, yet its economy remains
dependent on Russia. Georgia has security concerns that have been accentuated
with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Georgian policymakers have few options,
and their capacity to exert influence vis-à-vis external actors, whether Russian or
European, is limited.
Nepal is also in this category. It is under heavy pressure from India and China
and has tried with limited success to play them against each other. In his chapter,
Qureshi makes clear that Nepal would benefit from aligning itself more closely
with India whose influence is more positive. This is not to say that Georgia and
Nepal ought to tilt in the same way – there are particularities to both cases. But
states needing to use the tilting strategy are in more precarious positions, and
this description applies to both Georgia and Nepal.

The Mouse Fights Back 217
Building Bridges/Bandwagoning
The strategies of building bridges and bandwagoning represent variants of the
efforts by smaller states to bring about a rapprochement with their larger neigh-
bor(s). Building bridges refers to attempts by the smaller states to strengthen
relations. Bandwagoning, on the other end, is a more defensive approach in
which the smaller partner follows the lead of the larger country. These strategies
are neither positive nor negative in themselves. Rather, the smaller state in both
cases believes that it is in its interest, whether for purposes of preservation or to
grow, to ally more closely with its larger neighbor.
In their chapter, Karabeshkin, Labarre, and Jolicoeur suggest that Belarussian
policymakers have decided to align their country with Russia. The Belarussian
choice can be interpreted as a form of bandwagoning. From a political, secu-
rity, economic, and social perspective, Belarus at this moment is dependent on
Russian support. Armenia, on the other hand, has in the past tried and must
again seek to build bridges with Turkey, especially after the Second Nagorno-
Karabakh War. As previously observed, what makes the Armenian government’s
position so difficult in pursuing this strategy is the pressure exercised by its dias-
pora community in opposition to Turkey. Yet, Armenia’s interest lies in devel-
oping better relationships with its neighbors. The building bridges approach is
indicative of the fact that relationships evolve over time.
Satisficing/Remaining Neutral
The satisficing strategy can be used when there is stability, and while both sides
may not fully accept their role, there is at least a defined pattern to the rela-
tionship. Smaller states have some autonomy, though within existing bounds.
Smaller states to whom this approach is available may also be able to remain neu-
tral when their larger neighbor is involved in other conflicts that do not directly
affect them. This strategy is open, and in some cases preferred, for many of the
cases in this book.
Canada, without defining it in this way, employs this approach. There is a
pattern to the Canada-US relationship with which both states appear relatively
content. Over the years, there has been much talk in Canada about diversifying
its economy away from the United States, in part to break its dependence. Yet
this has only been minimally achieved. Canada enjoys, however, some latitude,
as was shown when it refused to join the US-led coalition for the Iraq War.
Colombia also adopts this strategy with Brazil. The relationship between the
two countries is relatively stable and is usually contained within the confines of
regional organizations. Colombia and Brazil compete on diverse fronts, but in a
rather healthy manner.
Likewise, Qatar applies this strategy in its relationship with Saudi Ara-
bia, though the circumstances are different than in the other two cases just
mentioned. As Hoetjes’ chapter demonstrates, Qatar had to be proactive,

218 Ian Roberge
define its role, and find its place in the region. And it did so to the disap-
proval of Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, Qatar appears to have been successful in
forging a place within the Arabian Peninsula. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia remains
the dominant state, and so there are limits to how far Qatar can push ahead
independently.
Togo’s approach to its relationship with Ghana provides another variant of
the satisficing approach. Both countries have a defined role, and Togo needs the
support of Ghana. There is friction as per any relationship, although Ohemeng
and Sakyi appear to describe it as that of a “big sibling with a smaller sibling.”
The two states, especially in the Volta Region, have much in common which
facilitates their relations.
Finally, New Zealand’s approach to managing relations with Australia also
fits within the satisficing category. New Zealand is not obsessed with its rela-
tionship with Australia, and though closely linked, both states appear to coexist
somewhat autonomously. This type of strategy appears to be available when the
smaller state has a defined status (Duque 2018), or at the very least when the
relationship has reached a high level of maturity.
Balancing/Edging/Leaning to a Third Power
The strategies of balancing, edging, or leaning to a third power are most often
open to states in between two larger neighbors, usually superpowers or major
powers. These approaches could be open to a state seeking leverage outside the
region, although their regular use in that situation might be hard to sustain. The
strategies all entail attempts to balance the interests of larger neighboring states,
whether via sheltering, the building of alliances, or outright playing neighbors
against each other.
In our research, Mongolia, Korea, and Singapore all appear to attempt the use
of these strategies to varying degrees over time. In her chapter, Agvaanluvsan
does not indicate that Mongolia, landlocked between Russia and China, seeks
to play them off against each other. And with the rapprochement between the
two major powers, there is no evidence that such an approach would be success-
ful. Mongolia, nevertheless, appears to serve as a relatively stable buffer state
between its two bigger neighbors.
These strategies are most evident in South Korean foreign policy. South
Korea’s very existence and its economic success require a balance between quite
varied interests. South Korea is economically dependent on China, at least in
part, and would not benefit if this elephant were to be too weakened. At the
same time, South Korea requires American support, especially when it comes to
the issue of North Korea. In her chapter, Park also makes clear that the interests
of South Korea and Japan do not always coalesce. South Korea is described as a
middle power, yet what defines South Korean foreign policy more than its status
is the extent to which it must pursue very proactive diplomacy.
As Sulaiman demonstrates, this approach is also used by Singapore in its rela-
tionship with Indonesia and Malaysia. Singapore has been adept at utilizing this

The Mouse Fights Back 219
strategy to position itself within the region. However, Singapore’s future con-
cerns may have less to do with its neighbors than broader geopolitical realign-
ment in the region. With the possible organizational decline of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and China and the United States both
becoming more aggressive across Asia, Singapore’s foreign policy will be heavily
tested in years to come. This strategy carries much risk, particularly as balance is
not a permanent situation.
We note again that Nepal is keen to use this approach as it seeks to engage
China more directly for funding and infrastructure support as a counter to
India. However, Nepal has been much less successful in its execution of this
strategy, nor is it necessarily a wise option. Nepalese leaders may feel they have
no choice, or their country would be subjugated by its dominant neighbor. Yet,
because Nepal has not shown it can successfully attain that balance, it is left with
the tilting strategy, and trying to withstand the pressures coming from outside
its borders.
Some Observations
When and how are these strategies to be employed by smaller states in manag-
ing their relationship with their larger neighbor(s)? We provide a preliminary
response that reflects which states predominantly use which approach. There are
three criteria that explain when a strategy is available.
The first is the perceived level of security of the state. The less secure the
smaller country is, the more likely it will tilt to try to survive, or that it will use
the bandwagoning strategy to align itself with a larger neighbor. Smaller states
where security is less at play have the luxury of adopting a satisficing approach,
or of trying when and if appropriate to balance broader external interests. The
cases listed as using, or needing to use, the tilting and bandwagoning strategies
must manage serious security considerations. Belarus appears the most secure of
these states. Yet, the reality is that if it had not chosen to pursue greater integra-
tion, Belarus’ situation would likely not be that different from that of the Baltic
states, Ukraine, and other countries within Russia’s present or former sphere of
influence.
The second major consideration is whether there is stability in the relationship.
Satisficing and balancing are only available as strategies when the relationship
is sufficiently predictable. Canada and New Zealand, among other cases, enjoy
mature relations with their larger neighbor. The same is largely true of Togo and
Ghana, though not quite in the same way when accounting for Togo’s political
instability. Smaller states for which there are more definite ebbs and flows in the
relationship do not have the option of pursuing a satisficing approach and may
face greater challenges in trying to execute the balancing strategy.
The third major condition, on which admittedly our chapters do not elab-
orate, is the capacity of the smaller states to make use of a particular strategy.
The literature on small states traditionally poses capacity as an issue of concern
(Thorhallsson 2018). States such as South Korea and Singapore have very high

220 Ian Roberge
policy capacity; they have the knowledge, competencies, and skills to attain for-
eign policy objectives. Developing countries, especially, are less likely to have
that capacity. Nepal and Timor-Leste are the two cases in this book that most
clearly highlight this reality. Armenia is an interesting case in that it may have
the capacity but is somewhat restricted in what it can legitimately attempt due to
pressures from external and domestic sources.
Which strategy to use is not predetermined, though it does involve a certain
constancy. South Korea’s balancing efforts are long-standing. The foundation
of the Canada-US relationship has not changed in many decades. The approach
may evolve as circumstances evolve. Might Belarus, now that political leaders
have chosen their camp, move to more of a satisficing strategy, ensuring that they
retain some autonomy from Russia? That is a possibility, though it would also
entail Russia recognizing mutual roles. In another example, the more Timor-
Leste develops, the more autonomy it might gain, which could change how it
views its relationships with its neighbors. Questions of security, the stability of
the relationship, and the capacity to execute all appear to be important consider-
ations in terms of which strategy to adopt.
Future Research
The inductive approach used in this collection provides a wonderful opportunity
as the basis for the development of a research program. From the case studies
and the reflections in this conclusion, there are many avenues for future research.
Some of these ideas are presented here.
First, this field and related research would benefit from a sounder theoretical
underpinning. Contributors to this volume were given free rein to address what
mattered most in the relationship from the perspective of the smaller neighbor.
Many of the chapters are more descriptive, and some are more traditional in
their approach, such as the Colombia-Brazil chapter which provides a ranking
based on the properties of states. The case studies led to the identification of four
possible strategies for smaller states. Work is required to capture these strategies
more fully and to determine when they are more effective. There would be sig-
nificant value in developing a full framework that could categorize better rela-
tionships and guide smaller states in their relations with their larger neighbor(s).
Although a theory or framework would not be able to cover all possibilities and
developments, and while the behavior of states can be unpredictable, it would
still be of great benefit, if only to provide much greater clarity on the nature of
asymmetrical bilateral relations.
This research project began well before the February 2022 Russian invasion
of Ukraine. The editorial team knew the project was prescient but had not fore-
seen just how important asymmetrical bilateral relations between neighboring
states would become as a topic in the months to follow. This book is now being
finalized at a time that suggests a possible major geopolitical realignment. Such
a realignment, if confirmed, is bound to have major effects on smaller states that
border superpowers or major powers.

The Mouse Fights Back 221
The repercussions could, obviously, be significant worldwide. For example,
what might it mean for Canada if the United States is further destabilized? As
Anderson (2019) notes, there is a need to recast assumptions about this relation-
ship that accounts for the dynamics of asymmetrical power, considering political
developments in the United States. What are the legitimate options for smaller
states bordering Russia now that it has shown it does not believe it is bound
by international law and conventions? What does a more direct confrontation
between the United States and China mean for smaller states in Asia such as
South Korea and Singapore? A new Cold War with possible hot spots at the mar-
gins is sure to have repercussions in the Middle East, and across Africa. Might a
state such as Nepal benefit from greater competition between its two neighbors
who could seek to outdo each other for a foothold in the country? The Nepalese
government would have to be particularly adept in handling this extra attention.
Geopolitical realignment would likely mean even more pressure by the larger
partner on the smaller state. The elephant could have even less patience for the
autonomous actions of its smaller neighbor. Given this, what are the implications
of the decline of a rules-based international order and of international organi-
zations for asymmetrical bilateral relations, for the smaller of the two countries?
Small and middle-power states are said to be able to exercise more influence
through multilateral means by bringing like-minded states together and using
international organizations for shelter. A global geopolitical realignment seri-
ously puts into question the capacity or opportunity for small and middle-power
states to act in such a way.
Beyond the possible geopolitical realignment, we should add that this edited
collection has only referenced, but not fully considered, other major global
developments, such as the return of populism and nativism across the Amer-
icas, Europe, and many parts of the world; the remnants of the COVID-19
pandemic; and global economic uncertainties. Each of these phenomena on its
own has the potential to upend global affairs, including asymmetrical bilateral
relations between neighboring states. There is, thus, a need to continue to con-
duct research in this field which could experience substantive upheaval in years
to come.
Third, this multi-author volume has used a case-study approach to provide
concrete examples of asymmetrical bilateral relations between neighboring
states. These cases were varied and provide a solid glimpse into these relation-
ships. But they are also circumstantial. The use of other cases might have led to
different conclusions. For instance, there would be much value in North Amer-
ica in studying the Mexico-United States relationship, and South America could
include a case such as Paraguay and Argentina. There is no western European
case in this collection. The redefined relationship between the United Kingdom
and the European Union would be particularly interesting to consider. We have
barely scratched the surface of the African experience from which many more
cases ought to be drawn. And while we had different cases involving Russia
and China, we had a single case of a smaller neighbor to India. There is much
research that could focus on South Asia.

222 Ian Roberge
The findings from this book are the results of the selected cases and the con-
tributors’ expertise. We believe there are some elements from which it is possible
to generalize, though our cases are clearly not representative of all such rela-
tionships. Expanding the number of cases is bound to generate new results and
deeper insights. Here, as well, there is much work to be done.
In Closing
This volume has demonstrated the interest in studying asymmetrical bilateral
relations among neighboring states and provided rich detailed case studies of
these relationships. Focusing on foreign and security policy, as well as economic
policy and questions of identity, the cases have revealed much about dependence
and interdependence, the autonomy of smaller states, and options for managing
these relationships. We have shown that smaller states have options in how they
approach their larger neighbor(s) and are not simply subject to the whims of the
bigger partner. At the same time, the smaller countries face real and significant
constraints. For practitioners, there is no clear roadmap to follow. Nevertheless,
the strategies proposed in this conclusion open the door to thinking in concrete
terms about options available to smaller states for successfully managing these
relationships.
When the elephant moves, there is no doubt it can crush the mouse. The
mouse, however, is not without savvy. There are more mice than elephants in the
world, and surely, they can learn from each other. More to the point, the smart
and agile mouse can not only avoid being crushed but also find a way to thrive
in the shadow of the elephant.
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bridge University Press.

Index
44-Day War 168–170
1950 India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and
Friendship 134–135, 137–138, 142
Abe Shinzō 114, 116
Abkhazia 31–32, 34, 36, 43
Agotime Traditional Area 88, 91
Akatsi-Akanu road reconstruction
project95
Albanese, Anthony 61, 63, 65
Al Jazeera 181–183, 185
Andean Community 194–195,
198–199, 202
Anglo-Qatari Treaty of 1916 178
Arab uprisings 182–183
Ardern, Jacinda 60–63, 65
Argentina 189, 192, 221
Armenian diaspora 7, 159–161, 163, 170,
214, 217
artificial borders 89–90
Asian Development Bank 80
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) 7, 81, 147–148, 152–155,
194, 219
Bahrain 8, 175, 178–180, 182–183
Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline
164–165
balancing/edging/leaning to a third
power 8, 218
Baltic region 159
Baltic States 42–43, 219
bandwagoning 8, 216–217, 219
Bangladesh 129, 141, 143
Belarusian elite 41–42, 44–46, 51
Biden, Joe 110; administration
19, 22, 184
binding 191, 198
Bolsonaro, Jair 195–196, 203
border security 23, 94
British Togoland 87–88, 97
buffering 190, 198–199
buffer state 218
building bridges 8, 217
building bridges/bandwagoning 8, 217
Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement
(CUSMA) 1, 16, 21
China National Space Administration
129–130
China’s Belt and Road Initiative 139,
141–143
China’s Northeast Project 115
citizenship 55, 58, 62–63
climate change 21–22, 61, 116, 120–121,
195
Closer Economic Relations Trade
Agreement 56, 59
Cold War 2, 108–109, 112, 124, 214; new
221
comfort women 5, 71, 81, 113
Commission for Reception, Truth and
Reconciliation in East Timor 73–76
Commonwealth of Independent States 31,
33, 41, 46, 164
constructivist approach 175–176
COVID-19 pandemic 3, 63, 79, 87, 221
Davutoǧlu, Ahmet 162, 170
decolonization 87
deportation 62–63
diplomacy: active 7, 113, 148, 181, 185;
economic 201–202; entangling 191,
198; middle power 114; Pragmatic 112;
proactive 215, 218; second track 169;
soccer 160, 163, 169–170

226 Index
displacement, Timor-Leste 76; forced
displacement 73; internally displaced
persons 74
doctrine defender 192, 194, 202–203
Duque, Iván 189, 192, 194–195, 197,
199–201, 203–204
Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) 87, 89–90, 92,
98–99
Egypt 8, 175, 181–184
electricity: Belarus and Russia 5, 50;
Colombia and Brazil 201; Ghana and
Togo 87–88, 90, 93–95, 98–99; Nepal,
China, and India 141–142
Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 163, 169
EU Association Agreement 33
EU Eastern Partnership initiative 33, 44
Eurasian Economic Union 33, 49
Euro-Atlantic integration 31–34, 36
European belonging, Georgia 30, 33, 36
European Neighbourhood Policy 32
Evangelical Presbyterian Church in Ghana
and Togo 96
Ewe people 88, 90–91, 96
Export Processing Zones 95
extreme poverty 90
famine 73
farmers/farming: Colombia and Brazil
196, 199; Ghana and Togo 86–87, 90,
93; New Zealand and Australia 56–57
Faure Gnassingbé 92–93
Federation of Malaysia 7, 148–149
festivals, Ghana and Togo 86, 88,
91–92, 99
first Gulf War 179
First Nagorno-Karabakh War 168
Five Eyes 58, 60, 116
food security 91, 142
Forum for the Progress and Integration of
South America (PROSUR) 200, 202
French Togoland 87–88
Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for an
Independent East Timor) 72–75,
78, 81
Gazprom 47
genocide 60, 70, 72, 80–81, 161–163
geopolitical realignment 24, 219–221
Georgian Dream 33, 35
Georgian Orthodox Church 30, 35
Georgia’s Europeanness 30–32, 34
German Togoland 96
Gnassingbé Eyadéma 97
gold 90, 120, 192
Gold Coast 87–88, 90, 96
Greater Sunrise project 78–79
great powers 117, 154–155, 190, 216;
great power politics 148; great power
status 46
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 179,
182–184
Hawar Islands 179–180
hedging 6, 111–113, 115, 216
human rights: Georgia 35; Qatar 180
human rights promotion: Canada 23;
Colombia 202; Mongolia 121, 124;
New Zealand and Australia 5; South
Korea 116; United Nations 23, 75
human rights violations: China 59–61;
Timor-Leste 5, 75, 77, 81–82
hydrocarbon reserves, Azerbaijan 159–
161, 164, 170
hydroelectric power, Nepal 137–138,
141–143
immigration 5, 21, 23, 55, 90
India-China War (1962) 134, 139
Indigenous peoples 15, 54–56,
63–64, 71
Indo-Sino rivalry/tensions 138, 140
integration roadmaps, Belarus and
Russia 49–50
international law 155–156, 221
International Monetary Fund 14, 79,
111, 202
international peacekeeping operations,
Mongolia participation 6, 121,
123–125, 131
international space blocs 130
International Think Tank for Landlocked
Developing Countries 125
international treaties, outer space 130
Iran 129, 164, 175, 179–180, 182,
184–185
Iraq 32, 124, 179
Iraq War 18, 217
Jana Andolan 135, 137
Jana Andolan II 135, 137
Japanese pop culture 109, 111–112
Kalapani border dispute 136–138, 142
Keystone XL pipeline 19
Kim Dae-jung 109–112, 117
Kim Young-sam 110–112

Index 227
Kocharyan, Robert 161–162
Konfrontasi 150, 154
Kuwait 179, 182
landlocked countries: Armenia 163, 168;
Armenia and Azerbaijan 159, 170;
Azerbaijan 164; Mongolia 6, 121,
130–131, 218; Nepal 6, 133–134, 140
land powers 6, 107–108, 115–117
Lee Kuan Yew 148–150, 152–153
Lee Myung-bak 110–114
Line of Actual Control 138, 140
Lukashenka, Alexander 42–46, 48–50
Lula da Silva, Luíz Inácio 196
Mackinder, Halford 107
Madheshis 136, 142
Mahuta, Nanaia 60
major powers 8, 111–112, 116, 155, 212,
214, 218, 220
Māori 55, 63–65
maritime boundaries, Timor-Leste and
Australia 78, 81
material capabilities 189–190, 192,
203, 211
material power indicators 192, 203
mediator-integrator 192, 194, 198, 200,
202–203
Meng Wanzhou 20
Mercosur 194–196, 198–200, 202–203
Mexico 1–2, 194, 198, 202–203, 221
middle powers 190, 221; Canada 13–14,
18, 23; South Korea 108, 110, 115,
214, 218; Turkey 160
military spending, Singapore 148
monarchies: Arab 182; dynastic 179; Gulf
179, 181
Mongolia, telecommunications sector 6,
122, 125–128, 131
Moon Jae-in 110–111, 113–116
Morrison, Scott 61–63
Morsi, Mohammed 183
multiculturalism 15, 21, 23
multi-vector foreign policy, Belarus
41–43, 45
Muslim Brotherhood 181–183
Nagorno-Karabakh 159, 161, 163–164,
166–169
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 160, 162–163,
166–168
national interests: Australia and New
Zealand 55, 57–58, 61; Canada 19, 23;
South Korea 112–113, 116; Turkey,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan 159–160, 166,
169–170
nationalism: Armenian 160–161, 163;
Armenian diaspora 160–161, 163;
Belarusian 42; Georgian 30, 35; Nepali
134, 136–137, 139; New Zealand and
Australia 54–56; rise of 2–3, 20
national role conception 190–191, 194,
201–204
national security 3, 8, 212; Ghana and
Togo 6, 99; Mongolia 121–122, 124,
131; Russia 5
national security integration, Russia 34
nativism 3, 221; Canada 20–21; United
States 20–21
nativist groups, Georgia 34–36
neoclassical realism 190–191, 204
Nepal 2015 earthquake 135–136, 139
Nepal’s interdependence approach
141–143
New Zealand Australia Free Trade
Agreement 56
Niagara-Buffalo cross-border corridor 17
Niagara region, Canada 17, 19, 21
North American Free Trade Agreement
1, 202
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) 14, 32, 44, 46, 124, 168;
membership aspirations, Georgia 32–34;
Partnership for Peace program 31,
44, 164
nuclear-weapon-free zone status, Mongolia
6, 121–123, 131
Obama administration 19, 162
Oli, K.P. Sharma 136
omni-enmeshment 191, 199
Ottoman Empire 213
Pacific Alliance 194, 198–200, 202–203
Pacific Island countries 61
Panchayat system 134–135
Paraguay 199, 221
Park Geun-hye 110–111, 113–114
Pashinyan, Nikol 169
policies, environmental 18–19, 21–22, 61,
121; environmental conservation 195
policy capacity 220
populism 3, 20, 221; anti-ethnic Chinese
rhetoric 150; anti-Western party 35;
far-right movements 20; initiatives 19;
left-wing populist management 196;
right-wing 21
post-Soviet countries 163–164

228 Index
post-Soviet space 37, 41, 46
Prachanda 135
Protasevich, Roman 49
pro-Western orientation, Georgia 31–36
Putin, Vladimir 43, 46–49
Qatari dissidents 182
Qatar’s state identity 7, 175, 181–182
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 116, 154
Ramos-Horta, José 74, 78
Rana regime 133–134
refugees: Armenia and Azerbaijan 167;
East Timorese 74; Ghana and Togo 6,
91, 93, 98; Tibetan 139–140
regional integration 89, 99, 152, 159,
194–195, 202
regional order 7, 116, 148, 153, 156,
186–188, 190
regional powers 153, 160, 189–192,
203–204; Brazil 8, 192, 194–196,
199, 203–204, 215; British East India
Company 134; implications of being
beside 4, 8, 212, 214; Indonesia and
Australia 77; recognition by 177; Saudi
Arabia and Egypt 181; Saudi Arabia and
Iran 175; Turkey and Iran 185; Turkey
and Russia 159
regional security 14, 63, 140, 152, 179,
189–190
regional stability 46, 61, 151, 154
Roh Moo-hyun 110–111, 114, 117
role conceptions 189, 203–204, 211
role theory 191, 204
Rose Revolution (Georgia) 30–32, 34
Rousseff, Dilma 196, 203
rule of law 60, 116, 152
rules-based order 155–156, 221
Russian elite 46–47, 50
Russian Empire 30, 166
Russian hegemony 29–31
Russian sphere of influence 4, 31, 34, 37,
49, 215, 219
Saakashvili, Mikheil 32–35
sanctions: against Belarus 45, 49–51;
against China’s human rights violations
60; against Russia 44, 51; against
Venezuela by Colombia 202; US climate
22
Santos, Juan Manuel 189, 192, 194–196,
198–201, 203–204
Sapega, Sofia 49
Sargsyan, Serzh 162–163
satisficing 217–220
satisficing/remaining neutral 8, 217
sea powers 6, 107–109, 115–117
secondary regional powers 8, 189–192,
195, 199–201, 204, 215
Second Nagorno-Karabakh War 1, 7, 168,
215, 217
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (Sheikh
Hamad) 7–8, 175, 179–183, 185
Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani
(Sheikh Tamim) 183
shelter theory 216
Shevardnadze, Eduard 31
smuggling: Ghana and Togo 90, 97–98;
Nepal and India 142
social security 62
soft-balancing strategies 190, 201, 203
South Caucasus 159–160, 169–170
South Ossetia 31–34, 37, 43, 163
status quo approach 6, 111–112, 116
superpowers 116, 147, 153; in decline 24;
neighboring 8, 14, 212, 214, 218, 220;
recognition by 177; superpower
status 178
Temer, Michel 195, 203
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) 110, 113–116
Ter-Petrosyan, Levon 161
Third Neighbor policy, Mongolia
121–122, 131
Tibet 134, 138–142, 213
Tibetan diaspora 143
tilting 6, 8, 111, 216, 219
Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund 78–79
tourism: Canada and the United States
17, 19; Georgia and Russia 34; Ghana
and Togo 87–88, 91; Nepal and India,
religious 143; space 128; Timor-Leste
and Indonesia 80
traditional authorities 88, 91
Treaty of Waitangi 64–165
tribalism 178–179
tripolar contestation, United States,
Russia, and China 19, 24
Trudeau, Pierre 2
Trump, Donald 1, 18, 114, 117;
administration 19–22
Tunku Abdul Rahman 149–150, 154
turath (cultural heritage) 179
Turkey-Armenia bilateral cooperation
protocols 160, 163, 169

Index 229
UAE (United Arab Emirates) 8, 90, 175,
179–180, 182–183, 188
Ukraine 41–45, 47, 219; events in 2014 5,
44, 49; Russia’s 2022 invasion 1–2, 5,
45, 51, 116, 214, 216, 220
Al-Ula agreement 184
Unification Church 116
Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR) 194–195, 200, 202
Union Parliament, Russia and Belarus
48–49
Union State, Russia and Belarus 48–49
United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP) 64
United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor 74, 80
United States, trade protectionism 19
United States and China: competition 7,
113, 115, 148, 154; confrontation 109,
221; growing tension 7, 19, 24, 154
uranium 120, 123
Volta Region 93, 95–96, 218
Wagner Group 44–45
Wahhabism 178
welfare state: Canada 23; Qatar 178
white supremacy 20
Windsor-Detroit trade corridor 17
World Bank 2, 5, 14, 82, 202
world powers 6, 114, 131
World Trade Organization 2, 20, 60, 114
Yeltsin, Boris 34, 46
Yoon Seok-yeol 110, 115–116