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Hydro-Hegemony, Counter-Hegemony and Neoclassical Realism on the Nile Basin: An Analysis of Egypt’s Response to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)
Abstract
The Framework of Hydro-Hegemony (FHH) has been applied several times to transboundary water disputes. Since it defines Egypt as a hegemon and Ethiopia as a counter-hegemon, many studies have focused on the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic activities in the Nile Basin. However, this article argues that Egypt has also deployed counter-hegemonic tactics to deal with the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) from Neoclassical Realist perspective. In this context, it questions why and how Egypt has deployed hegemonic and counter-hegemonic tactics to respond to the GERD through process-tracing and utilising primary and secondary sources such as official statements, books, articles and journals.
... Accordingly, Egypt signed several economic and military agreements with them, and the president visited all these countries amidst the crisis regarding the dam fillings. In this context, Egypt also demanded support for dealing with the GERD (İlkbahar & Mercan, 2023). In this period, the intersection of international, regional, and domestic developments mainly directed Egypt's foreign policy to deal with the GERD, as outlined in the Table 1. ...
Egypt has been one of the most significant countries in the Nile Basin in terms of the hydropolitics of the Nile River. Since Egypt is downstream and Ethiopia is an upstream country having main sources of the Nile waters in the basin, Egyptian water utilization has been highly dependent on the water resources that come from the Ethiopian highlands. Since Ethiopia lacked the financial and economic capacity to effectively utilize the Nile River, Egypt has been the leading exploiting country of the Nile waters. However, the Ethiopians’ infrastructural projects, such as the construction of hydroelectric dams, have been considered a national security threat by the Egyptian foreign policy decision�makers. Therefore, the developments in the Nile River and Egyptian water security have been chief foreign policy concerns for Egypt. In this context, this study mainly addresses the role of the Nile River in Egyptian foreign policy based on international, regional, and domestic factors. Deploying the descriptive qualitative method, it analyses how the dam constructions and developments regarding water sharing and distribution in the Nile
Basin have shaped Egypt’s foreign policy throughout the historical process. It utilizes
primary and secondary resources such as the original texts of the historical agreements,
official statements, memoirs, and related books and articles in the literature.
Keywords: Egypt, Ethiopia, Nile River, Egyptian Foreign Policy.
... Accordingly, Egypt signed several economic and military agreements with them, and the president visited all these countries amidst the crisis regarding the dam fillings. In this context, Egypt also demanded support for dealing with the GERD (İlkbahar & Mercan, 2023). In this period, the intersection of international, regional, and domestic developments mainly directed Egypt's foreign policy to deal with the GERD, as outlined in the Table 1. ...
Egypt has been one of the most significant countries in the Nile Basin in terms of the hydropolitics of the Nile River. Since Egypt is downstream and Ethiopia is an upstream country having main sources of the Nile waters in the basin, Egyptian water utilization has been highly dependent on the water resources that come from the Ethiopian highlands. Since Ethiopia lacked the financial and economic capacity to effectively utilize the Nile River, Egypt has been the leading exploiting country of the Nile waters. However, the Ethiopians’ infrastructural projects, such as the construction of hydroelectric dams, have been considered a national security threat by the Egyptian foreign policy decision-makers. Therefore, the developments in the Nile River and Egyptian water security have been chief foreign policy concerns for Egypt. In this context, this study mainly addresses the role of the Nile River in Egyptian foreign policy based on international, regional, and domestic factors. Deploying the descriptive qualitative method, it analyses how the dam constructions and developments regarding water sharing and distribution in the Nile Basin have shaped Egypt’s foreign policy throughout the historical process. It utilizes primary and secondary resources such as the original texts of the historical agreements, official statements, memoirs, and related books and articles in the literature.
... As an international relations theory, Neoclassical Realism signifies the influence of the ruling class (i.e., those who rule or govern a state, e.g., the riparian states) in reshaping the hydro-politics of a shared watercourse. Using the case study of GERD, for instance, İlkbahar and Mercan (2023) articulated the stance or the foreign policy of the downstream Egypt with regards to the development and the operationalization of the GERD in the upstream Ethiopia. Similar to the case of Harirud River where downstream Iran serves as the hydro-hegemon of the basin due to the presence of a politically and socio-economically fragile government under the Taliban's administration in the upstream (see Loodin and Warner 2022), İlkbahar and Mercan notice that the downstream Egypt, which was once the hydrohegemon of the Nile River exerting control over a large portion of the flow of the river, perceives upstream's water infrastructures as threat to its national security. ...
While a substantial body of literature perceives rationality as the only path for negotiations over the use of the transboundary shared watercourse, recent scholarship has unveiled the role of emotion in decision-making processes over the use of the shared water. This research aims to challenge the conventional approach—rationality—by exploring affective dynamics of the riparian nations of the Helmand River (shared between upstream Afghanistan and downstream Iran) and how decisions over the use of the shared Helmand River are ingrained in the emotional dispositions of the riparian nations. Taking an integrated approach combining emotional political ecology and neoclassical realism, this research unravels the intricate emotional dynamics of the riparian nations to the flow of the Helmand River. The staggering increase in water withdrawal—both surface and groundwater resources— coupled with the population growth, and adverse effects of climate changes has stimulated the negative emotional dispositions of the borderland communities— the sufferings of farming communities due to lack of access to water—resulting in water conflict escalation in the Helmand River Basin. Finally, it is asserted that negotiations over the use of Helmand River are considered to be ill-equipped unless emotionality and rationality—a pluralistic approach— are equally weighed or gauged in water allocation and utilization by the co-riparian nations.
For centuries and emboldened by colonial treaties, Egypt has enjoyed overwhelming hydro-hegemony in the (NBR) Nile Basin River region. However, Egyptian dominance over the NBR has been challenged by Ethiopia following her unilateral construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Using A qualitative, deductive approach based on multiple sources of evidence, this paper analyses the historical imbalance in the Nile colonial treaties that gave Egypt monopoly over the waters of the NBR. The article also describes various human security threats in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, where the dam project is located and the geopolitical implications of this development against the backdrop of climate change and the coming of new actors and donors such as China, including the leasing of land to corporations and countries such as India, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. We recommend collaborative and holistic management instead of the dominant state-centric water development approach in this international waterway. The development of sustainable cooperation over this shared waterway will help meet climate change challenges and mitigate the contemporary conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt, including other countries within the region.
The longstanding hydro-political history of the Nile River had been characterized by the domination of a single riparian country, Egypt, through its claim of historical and natural right discourse which is essentially not acceptable in modern international water laws. Nevertheless, the Nile upper riparian countries have been experiencing several political and economic changes that could a major reason to promote shifts the status quo. The aim of this paper is to give exploratory and theoretical analysis up on changing the wrong historical claiming of hydro-hegemony in the Nile river basin. Methodologically, the paper is employed general qualitative and theoretical approach as well as exploratory research design. After their independence (except Ethiopia), upstream riparian countries of the Nile River basin have begun to look at the utilization of the shared water resource to meet their respective national development needs. This, in fact, has its own reasons. Among others, most of the riparian countries are currently more politically and economically stable than the past several years. Secondly, the emergence of modern international water laws have contributed a lot in giving an awareness of the rights of riparian countries on shared water resources through its icon principle of equitable and reasonable utilization on trans-boundary water resources. This paper is, therefore, trying to show the invalidity of the historical notion of hydro-hegemony which is basically void in any contemporary international water laws.
There are increasing challenges to Egypt’s security approach to the River Nile. The river is under immense pressure. This paper examines the significance of the Nile for Egypt and the factors and problems of diminishing its waters. It reviews Egypt’s long-time policy on the Nile and concludes that this policy is difficult to maintain in the face of the present and future challenges. It recommends a non-security multilateral solution for the benefit of all parties.
For a long time, Egypt has been the principal hegemon state in the Nile basin. “Through a myriad of mechanisms and tactics Egypt has been capable of maintaining its role as the regional hydro-hegemon and effectively hindering any competition over its water supply.” Recently, however, the upstream states, especially Ethiopia, are challenging the Egyptian hydro hegemony and undertaking various measures to change the status quo. The launching of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), the adoption of Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and the signing of Declaration of Principles (DoPs) are examples of those measures.
This paper attempts to analyze the implications of those measures on the hydro-hegemonic configuration of the Nile basin. In so doing, it follows a multi-disciplinary approach- drawing upon politics, hydro-hegemony and law. The paper argues that, although the measures are steps forward for challenging the Egyptian hegemony, the two important legal instruments, the CFA and DoPs, are not sufficient to change the anachronistic status quo. In addition, the paper indicates how the lower riparian states could use these documents to perpetuate the status quo. It proposes a change in the status quo through a new basin wide multilateral treaty that harms none and benefits all.
Part II presents the Egyptian hydro hegemony in the Nile basin and indicates how it was developed. Part III analyzes the status of the Egyptian hydro-hegemony in light of international law. Part IV presents the actions taken by upstream states to challenge the Egyptian hydro-hegemony and analyzes their legal and non-legal implications on the status quo. Part V proposes alternatives for changing the status quo. The last part provides concluding remarks.
The principle of fairness operates alongside lofty principles of international law, such as equity and justice. However, these concepts often face criticism for being too vague to shed any meaningful light on the practical interpretation and implementation of international law within specific fields. By analysing the cooperation between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan on the Blue Nile, this paper seeks to address such criticism. It suggests that the concept of fairness does have value as a framework for analysing both commitment and compliance in international law; and that exploring specific contexts, such as legal developments related to the Blue Nile, helps give it further meaning.
This article analyzes the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam both as an outcome of shifts in the regional hydropolitical dynamics in the past decade and as a catalyst of future cooperation developments in the Nile Basin region. First, it analyzes the GERD in the context of changing power relations, including a critical discussion of the role of multilateral cooperation process and norms. Second, it examines the GERD as a shaper of future hydropolitical dynamics, and how the complex trilateral cooperative process around the GERD (2011–2015) can represent a constructive step towards wider institutional transboundary cooperation and regional economic integration in the Nile Basin.
This paper serves international water conflict resolution efforts by examining the ways that states contest hegemonic transboundary water arrangements. The conceptual framework of dynamic transboundary water interaction that it presents integrates theories about change and counter-hegemony to ascertain coercive, leverage, and liberating mechanisms through which contest and transformation of an arrangement occur. While the mechanisms can be active through sociopolitical processes either of compliance or of contest of the arrangement, most transboundary water interaction is found to contain elements of both. The role of power asymmetry is interpreted through classification of intervention strategies that seek to either influence or challenge the arrangements. Coexisting contest and compliance serve to explain in part the stasis on the Jordan and Ganges rivers (where the non-hegemons have in effect consented to the arrangement), as well as the changes on the Tigris and Mekong rivers, and even more rapid changes on the Amu Darya and Nile rivers (where the non-hegemons have confronted power asymmetry through influence and challenge). The framework also stresses how transboundary water events that may appear isolated are more accurately read within the many sociopolitical processes and arrangements they are shaped by. By clarifying the typically murky dynamics of interstate relations over transboundary waters, furthermore, the framework exposes a new suite of entry points for hydro-diplomatic initiatives.
Egypt was nothing but an African state, and its relations with south of the Nile valley
and CentralAfrica have continued ever since.
It is possible to view the geopolitical regional relations between Egypt and the
states of the African Horn and the Nile basin in such a way that they could be
considered conducive to cooperation in peacetime, but a point of pressure that might
threaten the Egyptian entity in case of war or the threat of it.
The first aspect of this relationship resulted when the Red Sea became an important
international waterway and centre of interest of the international powers, hence the
necessity for Egyptian, Arab and African cooperation by virtue of the long African
andWestern shorelines on this very Sea.
The second aspect was imposed by the water sources of the Nile, as Egypt relies
entirely on the Nile River to supply her need for fresh waters. Ethiopia claims a
monopoly of supply by consuming more than 80 percent of these sources. This is a
fact that has set a permanent goal for the Egyptian leadership to ensure the present
flow of waters of the Nile.
The third aspect relates to the Nile River as an international river crossing the
borders of ten states of the Nile basin. Such international nature of the river presents
a grave challenge necessitating cooperation between all riparian states for the
management of sources of the river to achieve the best utilization.
The fourth aspect is reflected in the nature of protracted conflicts in the African
Horn of Africa, and East Africa, particularly in Sudan, Somalia, northern Uganda,
and the Great Lakes region.
Added to the preceding dimensions are the possibilities of future wars over water in the
area after the end of the ColdWar. As a number of studies indicate, a future war in the
Middle East andAfrica could well be based on conflict over water sources (Starr 1991).
No doubt that this dimension has exerted new pressure on the Egyptian leadership as a
national security issue, because not only does it threaten the entity of the state but also
its social fabric as well.
This article aims to define the place of this dimension in Egyptian foreign policy
vis-à-vis the states of the Nile Basin, with a special focus the Nile River water. The
authors argue that Egyptian foreign policy behaviour as well as her desire to ensure a
smooth and uninterrupted flow of the Nile River waters have historically been and will
continue to be intertwined.
Hydropolitics in the Nile River Basin have been dominated by Egypt,
which has developed its water-related infrastructure unilaterally. As a
result of Egypt's policies, relations with both Ethiopia and Sudan have
deteriorated over time, increasing the potential for contentious issues
to escalate into conflict. Recent population and agricultural trends
have only further exacerbated already tense relations. The challenge
lies in cooperation. Basinwide initiatives have been attempted, but,
until recently, have largely failed. The most recent Nile Basin Initiative
holds the strongest potential for establishing a basinwide framework for
cooperation. Nevertheless, a subbasin model would be more appropriate
and effective because it would diffuse existing tensions first without
jeopardizing basinwide cooperation prematurely.
For most of the 20th century, the Nile River has been the source of political tensions and low-intensity conflicts among three of its major riparian countries (Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt). However, since the late 1990s, the Nile basin countries—with the encouragement and support of the international community—have made some attempts to establish basin-wide cooperative institutions. This process of engagement and collaboration is presently under severe stress due to increasing demand and decreasing supply of water resources in the basin. This situation may be complicated further by the global climate change, which is anticipated to result in long-term changes in the volume and pattern of runoff in the Nile River system. Moreover, the emergence of China as a major player in the power politics of the Nile basin has facilitated a number of unilateral initiatives for large-scale water development projects. In this context, this paper critically examines the survival and sustainability of water cooperation endeavours in the Nile basin as the river faces challenges from the global climate change and shifting regional geo-politics.Citation Swain, A. (2011) Challenges for water sharing in the Nile basin: changing geo-politics and changing climate. Hydrol. Sci. J.56(4), 687–702.
THE Nile flows for 6,700 kilometres through ten countries
in
north-eastern Africa – Rwanda, Burundi, Zaïre/Congo,
Tanzania, Kenya,
Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt – before reaching
the Mediterranean, and is the longest international river system in the
world – see Map 1. Its two main tributaries converge at Khartoum:
the White Nile, which originates from Burundi and flows through the
Equatorial Lakes, provides a small but steady flow that is fed by the
eternal snows of the Ruwenzori (the ‘rain giver’) mountains,
while the
Blue Nile, which suffers from high seasonal fluctuations, descends from
the lofty Ethiopian ‘water tower’ highlands. They provide
86 per cent
of the waters of the Nile – Blue Nile 59 per cent, Baro-Akobo (Sobat)
14 per cent, Tekesse (Atbara) 13 per cent – while the contribution
from the Equatorial Lakes region is only 14 per cent.
This paper introduces the basic concepts of hydro-hegemony which are employed in the analysis of the contributors of this special issue. It emphasises the roles of hegemony, power and political –economy processes in shaping international transboundary water relations. Central to the analysis is Lukes' concept of the three dimensions of power and Gramscian notions of hegemony (see S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2005). Hegemony depends on the skilful use of hard and soft forms of power, between formally equal parties such as nation states. Hydro-hegemony is hegemony active in international transboundary water settings, the analytical framework for which is laid out in detail by Zeitoun and Warner in Water Policy vol 8 (2006, 435– 460). The challenges of conceptualising the complex nexus of international water relations are also addressed. A recurring theme is that both power and political economy processes are especially effective when they operate invisibly. The approach furthermore sets the frame for exploration of improvement of the options of hegemon riparians and non-hegemon riparians alike for more principled transboundary water governance.
In its present emergent form, International Water Law (IWL) is concerned with enabling States to demonstrate an end result of equitable and reasonable sharing of transboundary waters, and thus does not directly address the cause of behaviour which may prevent this goal from being realised. In addition, this consent-based system is insufficiently developed to redress issues arising from the use of covert ideational power by one state to achieve control over water resources shared with other states. By offering a means to describe, analyse and demonstrate how the use of power by a State is a major determinant of its behaviour regarding sharing water resources, the approach of hydro-hegemony may help address such shortcomings, and thus be of some use to IWL. This paper presents a straightforward introduction to the area overlapped by International Water Law and the Framework of Hydro-Hegemony. We further explore how the Framework could make a direct and practical contribution to the knowledge of legal norms for state behaviour regarding the use of power and water sharing. The Framework of Hydro-hegemony shows that the covert use of power by a State can be used to perpetuate water sharing arrangements that can be inequitable and unreasonable, yet tolerated and even 'stable', in that they are not readily challenged. At present, hegemony and IWL coexist as parallel tracks, with the law being effectively blind to what is actually happening. We suggest that international water law must become aware of these covert hegemonic practices and incorporate them into the determination of compliant State practice if the principles of equitable and reasonable use are to be properly operationalised.
In this paper we seek to identify historical indicators of international freshwater conflict and cooperation and to create a framework to identify and evaluate international river basins at potential risk for future conflict. We derived biophysical, socioeco-nomic, and geopolitical variables at multiple spatial and temporal scales from GIS datasets of international basins and associated countries, and we tested these variables against a database of historical incidents of international water related cooperation and conflict from 1948 to 1999. International relations over freshwater resources were overwhelmingly cooperative and covered a wide range of issues, including water quantity, water quality, joint management, and hydropower. Conflictive relations tended to center on quantity and infrastructure. No single indicator—including climate, water stress, government type, and dependence on water for agriculture or energy—explained conflict/cooperation over water. Even indicators showing a significant correlation with water conflict, such as high population density, low per capita GDP, and overall unfriendly international relations, explained only a small percentage of data variability. The most promising sets of indicators for water conflict were those associated with rapid or extreme physical or institutional change within a basin (e.g., large dams or internationalization of a basin) and the key role of institutional mechanisms, such as freshwater treaties, in mitigating such conflict.
This paper seeks to broaden the analysis of transboundary water interaction, by examining and interpreting the influence of
‘soft’ power therein. The ‘soft’ power of persuasion is understood to be exercised through discursive and to a lesser extent
ideational means, and is interpreted in terms of compliance related to distributive (conflictual) or integrative (consensual)
ends (after Scott (1994)). The focus is on inter-state water conflicts in hegemonic political contexts, where, it is found, the ‘first among equals’
has a greater ability to exploit ‘soft’ power and to determine the outcome. ‘Soft’ power is also seen to influence the choices
states make or avoid in their transboundary water interaction, which explains in part how treaties intending to manage conflict
may in fact delay or perpetuate it. For example, ‘soft’ power can be used by the basin hegemon to frame inequitable forms
of cooperation in a cooperative light, such that unfair and ultimately unsustainable transboundary arrangements are replicated
by the international donor community. Non-hegemonic riparian states also employ their capacity of ‘soft’ power, though may
find themselves with little choice other than to comply with the arrangement established by the basin hegemon. The findings
stress the importance of analysts questioning claims of interaction promoted as ‘cooperative’, and of examining the ‘soft’
power plays that underlie all transboundary water arrangements. Exemplification is provided through transboundary river basins
and aquifers around the globe.
KeywordsWater conflict–Water cooperation–Hydro-hegemony–Hydropolitics–Power–Soft power–Nile Basin Initiative
Whether the inter-state and sub-national tensions over transboundary waters will lead to greater conflict or increased cooperation
remains a hotly debated issue. Most work on the subject situates transboundary water conflict and transboundary water cooperation
at opposing ends of a continuum. The examination of either conflict or cooperation, we argue, refutes the reality of the vast majority of contexts where cooperation and conflict actually co-exist,
and perpetuates the paradigm that any conflict is ‘bad’, and that all forms of cooperation are ‘good’. The efforts of the
international water academic and practitioner communities may be better served through a combined reading of conflict and
cooperation as transboundary water interaction. Mirumachi’s Transboundary Waters Interaction NexuS is offered as a robust method demonstrating that simultaneous consideration
of conflict and cooperation is both insightful and possible. Transboundary water interaction is shown to be an inherently
political process determined by the broader political context. We examine evidence suggesting that uncritical acceptance of
traditional forms of ‘cooperative’ arrangements may in fact sustain the conflict it was intended to transform. Several other
less well-known faces of ‘cooperation’ are discussed in detail, with examples of narrow, token and coercive cooperation derived
from inter-state relations on the Jordan, Nile and Ganges rivers. With a view to paving the way for improved transboundary
water sharing and governance, subjectively negative, neutral and positive forms of interaction are defined, and linked with
a first approximation of their potential driving forces.
The increasing structural and physical scarcity of water across the globe calls for a deeper understanding of trans-boundary water conflicts. Conventional analysis tends to downplay the role that power asymmetry plays in creating and maintaining situations of water conflict that fall short of the violent form of war and to treat as unproblematic situations of cooperation occurring in an asymmetrical context. The conceptual Framework of Hydro-Hegemony presented herein attempts to give these two features – power and varying intensities of conflict – their respective place in the perennial and deeply political question: who gets how much water, how and why?
Hydro-hegemony is hegemony at the river basin level, achieved through water resource control strategies such as resource capture, integration and containment. The strategies are executed through an array of tactics (e.g. coercion-pressure, treaties, knowledge construction, etc.) that are enabled by the exploitation of existing power asymmetries within a weak international institutional context. Political processes outside the water sector configure basin-wide hydro-political relations in a form ranging from the benefits derived from cooperation under hegemonic leadership to the inequitable aspects of domination. The outcome of the competition in terms of control over the resource is determined through the form of hydro-hegemony established, typically in favour of the most powerful actor.
The Framework of Hydro-hegemony is applied to the Nile, Jordan and Tigris and Euphrates river basins, where it is found that current hydro-hegemonic configurations tend towards the dominative form.. There is evidence in each case of power asymmetries influencing an inequitable outcome – at the expense of lingering, low-intensity conflicts. It is proposed that the framework provides an analytical paradigm useful for examining the options of such powerful or hegemonized riparians and how they might move away from domination towards cooperation.
We trace the development of a theory and analytical frames within international political economy that originated from Tony Allan’s mainstreaming of power as a determining factor in the control of transboundary flows. These include the Framework of Hydro-Hegemony, coexisting conflict and cooperation and Transboundary Water Interaction Analysis, counter-hegemony and virtual water rivers. These contributions are exemplified briefly through cases from around the globe and in particular the Nile. To ensure that this aspect of Tony’s legacy lives on, we propose a research agenda that includes the analysis of power interactions at substate levels between central governments and non-state actors.
Starting the inception of the 2010s, Ethiopia’s relations with Egypt have been experiencing one of the deepest crises in the relationship of the two countries’ history. Ethiopia, one of the upper riparian states of the Nile River not only theoretically challenged the exclusive veto power of Egypt over the Nile River but also practically start constructing one of Africa’s largest hydropower dams on the Blue Nile since 2011. The challenging behavior of Ethiopia over the Nile River worried the long-standing regional hegemon, Egypt. Against this background, this paper aims to forward a new insight into how and why Ethiopia challenged the long-standing superior-subordinate Egypt-led order over the Nile River. Moreover, in its discussion, the paper tries to address key drives, challenges, and prospects of Ethiopia-Egypt water diplomacy. The paper also illustrates how and why the Ethio-Egypt water diplomacy strain becomes a cross-cut on the two nation’s foreign policy matters. The paper has also attempted to understand how the superior-subordinate power duality approach works over the Nile River against the new balancer. Keywords: Ethiopia, Egypt, Relation, Nile River, Challenges, Prospects
In Northeast Africa, great power interests have often impeded local capabilities for effective statecraft in anarchy. However, construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile presents a revealing case study of evolving domestic constraints on foreign policy. Three realist perspectives may be drawn upon to analyze Nile Politics and the GERD through the prism of statecraft and statebuilding in contemporary Ethiopia. In the neoclassical realism analysis, Nile policymaking emerges as a murky outcome of elite preferences and threat constructions. In the subaltern realism analysis, Ethiopia’s construction of the GERD, in defiance of Egypt, is the culmination of a decade-long statebuilding project resulting in improved capabilities for statecraft. In the constructivist realism analysis, Nile politics reveal Ethiopia’s evolving interests and ideational constraints informing variations in preferences for assertive foreign policy orientation. Notably, and in contrast to the association of mainstream constructivist approaches with optimistic outcomes in international politics, analysis of the Nile conflict through constructivist realism reveals the most pessimistic outlook on peaceful resolution, compared to other approaches. Subaltern realism reveals the most optimistic outlook on the outcome of this conflict, due to greater incentives for cooperation introduced by statebuilding constraints in Ethiopia’s increasingly unstable contemporary polity.
This article analyzes the role of Sudan in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute settlement process. The role of the Nile and water resources in the domestic policy of Sudan in connection with its foreign policy is researched mindfully. In different historical periods, political elites have formed a water discourse to expand their power and obtain resources, while using the rhetoric of modernization and consolidation of the nation. In order to track the change in discourse of the GERD project in connection with the political regime change in 2019, an analysis of the statements of officials was carried out using materials from the Sudanese media. The analysis revealed a gradual change in position from more pragmatic to more confrontational in relation to Ethiopia. Despite this, Sudan is closest to a pragmatic approach in the negotiation process on the Nile waters and can help to reach a compromise.
Water-related conflict chronology can be grouped around two broad sets of ideas: On the one hand is material-related conflict such as water stress and under-development; while on the other is management-related conflict including state-failure and lack of governance. In line with the latter form of conflict, this paper gives a specific consideration to the three types of causal factors looming with the potential for conflict over the Nile basin: Political tensions among stakeholders, lack of all-inclusive agreement on management of the Nile water, and states' unilateral actions. By identifying these causal factors, this study limits itself to focus on the initial phase of conflict resolutions, that is diagnosing sources to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in the methodological context. Based on Johan Galtung's theoretical approaches on conflict dynamics, the paper explores two areas that are lacking in current literature. It accounts for the sources of conflict over the Nile basin hinging on three variables, while mapping the nature of the ongoing negotiation process around Ethiopia's "Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam" construction. This process is distributive in form and offers a collaborative (win-win) form of negotiations to cement the latter and to redress current predicaments.
Written from the perspective of an insider of the most prominent events in the Middle East over the last fifty years, this book examines Egypt’s diplomacy in transformative times of war, peace and transition. The author offers unique insights, first-hand information, singular documents, critical and candid analysis, as well as case studies, richly sharing his experiences as the country’s Foreign Minister and ambassador. This project covers a wide range of issues including the Arab-Israeli peace process, the liberation of Kuwait, the invasion of Iraq, nuclear weapons proliferation in the region, relations with the United States, Russia and other major international and regional players. Most importantly, it offers a series of potential trajectories on the future of Egypt and its relations within the region and the world. This is an essential work for a number of audiences, including scholars, graduate students, researchers, as well as policy makers, and is strongly appealing for anyone who is interested in international relations and Middle Eastern politics.
Nabil Fahmy is Former Foreign Affairs Minister of Egypt and Dean of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at The American University in Cairo, Egypt.
This book introduces an analytic framework constructed upon the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma game to model and analyze transboundary water interactions along the Nile River. It presents a thorough and in-depth analysis of the historical path through which conflict and cooperation have been generated among the Nile riparians over large-scale developmental schemes. This is done through modeling water interactions in the basin as an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma game and employing process-tracing method to compare four distinguishable rounds of the game: the colonial round, the Cold War round, the post-Cold War round, and the post-2011 round. The book examines the influences of the changing political contexts at the domestic, regional, and global levels on the game outcomes.
This framework is initially applied on several cases of international rivers worldwide, while the rest of the book is devoted to the Nile case. The book's central argument is that the riparians' interests, capabilities, and beliefs are heterogeneous in varying degrees and that the changing multilevel political contexts influence the level of such heterogeneities among the riparians, which ultimately drive the equilibrium dynamics in the Nile game to generate different conflictive and cooperative outcomes over time. Although the book's main conclusion indicates that the absence of economic interdependence and regional integration will transfer the game into tug-of-war, which will impose harsh punishment on the basin communities and ecosystems on the long term, the final chapter lists a group of recommendations addressed to the riparian states and international donors, exploring the way for boosting cooperation and preventing conflicts in the basin. Presenting clear theoretical, methodological, and policy implications, this book is appropriate for students and scholars of international relations, hydrology, and development studies.
A new hydro-political order is emerging in the Nile Basin. Upstream riparian states have improved their bargaining power vis-à-vis downstream countries by adopting a common position in the negotiations over a new framework agreement to govern the utilisation of the Nile waters. Some upstream riparians have unilaterally constructed hydraulic projects that threaten Egypt’s hegemonic position in the basin, the most notable of which is the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Whether these developments will lead to a more equitable utilisation of water resources and a more cooperative order will depend on the policies of the riparian states, especially in the Eastern Nile. Respect of the Declaration of Principles on the GERD signed between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan could help build trust between the three countries after years of tensions around the project. Beyond that, a basin-wide plan for the utilisation of water resources would not only maximise the benefits from the river and address the common challenges facing the basin, but also reduce the political costs of tensions on future projects.
Home to more than 160 million people, the Nile River Basin has become one of the hotspots of the global quest for food, water and energy security. Moving closer to its completion, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) highlights the interplay between the food, water, and energy sectors and their implications on geopolitical power relations in the region. Despite Ethiopia having the highest volumetric contribution to the Nile river flow, Egypt has maintained hydro-hegemony over the basin for several decades on the basis of historical claims and colonial agreements. Egypt has stated that its volumetric share of the Nile’s water is not sufficient to sustain its growing population, declaring water availability a matter of national security. However, for Ethiopia, the GERD represents a crucial moment in its development agenda, acting as both a counterhegemonic power play, as well as a means to improving the hydropower capacity of the country, and ensuring future food security. This paper explores the various hegemonic and counter-hegemonic strategies employed by Egypt and Ethiopia respectively, highlighting the various ways in which food, water, and energy concerns are intrinsic components of the asymmetric power configurations of the Nile River Basin. By navigating the debate surrounding the GERD, this paper highlights the necessity of incorporating the food, water, and energy nexus into studies of hydro-hegemony and counter-hegemony. This allows the future policy direction for nexus management and governance in the Nile River Basin to move beyond benefit sharing, instead steering towards power sharing.
Negotiations over the GERD have not transformed the debate in the Eastern Nile from sharing water to sharing benefits. Nationalistic discourse used by the three governments, the political sensitivity of the Nile issue, cautious Egyptian approach towards Eastern Nile cooperation beyond the project, divisions within policy circles in Egypt on dealing with the project and with the NBI as a framework of cooperation, the failure of Egypt to adapt its water policies to expected changes in the post-GERD era, and the new power asymmetries in the Eastern Nile have affected, and will continue to affect, positions in ongoing negotiations, making it more difficult to reach a benefit-sharing deal.
The paper questions the argument of the hydro-hegemony framework that counter-hegemonic mechanisms used by non-hegemons in transboundary rivers lead to a more equitable order of water and benefit-sharing, using the case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). It agrees with hydro-hegemony scholars that the GERD is a 'game changer' that challenges Egypt's hegemonic position, and an important step in the transition towards a new order in the Nile Basin. However, it scrutinises how Ethiopia and Egypt manage this transition through their policies to implement or contest the dam, and the conditions under which the GERD could lead to a more equitable order in the basin, and create incentives for cooperation beyond the project. It argues that Ethiopia's planning and implementation of the project, and Egypt's inconsistent response to it, have increased uncertainties about the benefits of the project to downstream countries, and even to Ethiopia, and fuelled the historical mistrust between the two countries. It suggests steps to build trust and translate the recent Declaration of Principles between the three Eastern Nile riparians into a benefit-sharing deal.
Egypt maintained a policy of antagonism at arm’s length toward Ethiopia throughout Husni Mubarak’s presidency. This pattern changed immediately following Mubarak’s ouster. The burst of rapprochement and diplomatic activism that took shape in the spring of 2011 signaled a fundamental shift in the content and form of Egyptian policy vis-à-vis Ethiopia, which was reflected in President Muhammad Mursi’s reluctance to respond belligerently to Ethiopian initiatives 2 years later that threatened to diminish the northward flow of the Nile. Cairo’s evident restraint during the Mursi era cannot be explained by a change in the strategic circumstances that confronted Egyptian policy-makers. A more promising explanation can be found in a reformulation of desecuritization theory, which highlights the internal dynamics whereby potentially dangerous aspects of a country’s external environment get transformed into matters of routine political contestation.
This paper addresses hydro-hegemony from the perspective of International Water Law, by examining the role of law in upstream/downstream negotiations. It is built on the understanding that International Water Law constitutes an element of power relations, asserting that it is a source of structural and bargaining power. The first section of the paper discusses main principles that have emerged, and their establishment as terms of reference for water cooperation. In the second part, competing claims are analysed to see how co-riparians in the Euphrates and Tigris basins have provided deliberately conflicting interpretations over "International rivers", "equitable and reasonable utilization", "no harm", "prior notification" and "consultation" to derive negotiating positions and influence from International Water Law. Conclusions point to the understanding of water law as a structural variable, impacting on the actors' constraints and options and enhancing the structural power of the non-hegemonic riparians. International Water Law appears to operate as well as process-related variable which influences the process and outcome of water negotiations. As a source of bargaining power, legal principles increase the legitimacy of downstream riparians and enhances their bargaining position in the negotiation process.
The Framework of Hydro-Hegemony (described by Zeitoun & Warner, in Water Policy8, pp 435–460, 2006) challenges mainstream analyses of hydro-political relations in transboundary river basins and highlights the role of power. The approach asserts that asymmetric power relations represent the cornerstone of the analysis of hydro-political relations. Varying hegemonic configurations and the unequal control of water resources among riparian states are characteristic of these relations. The hegemonic riparian in a given international transboundary water setting deploys several strategies to attain and maintain control, sometimes unilaterally, over the shared water resources. But is the control always as deep and entrenched as it sometimes seems to be?
The starting point of this paper is that hydro-hegemony is not incontestable. An established hegemonic order may often be challenged and resisted through a variety of counter-hegemonic strategies. Through examination of Ethiopian contest and consent of Egyptian hydro-hegemony, this study attempts to provide insights into the condition of counter hydro-hegemony and to provide a framework for further analysis in the field of transboundary water relations. The approach explores the options available for non-hegemonic riparians to challenge a particular hydro-hegemony and finds that these come from unexpected or unacknowledged sources. An assessment of these strategies shows how non-hegemonic riparians might challenge unequal hydro-political configurations and eventually contribute towards a more sustainable and equitable water and benefit-sharing regime.
This paper seeks to re-evaluate Sudan's position, power and policy in light of the hydro-hegemony theory. Sudan's unique transboundary hydrology, particularly in the south, and recent important developments in Sudanese affairs are of particular interest. The possibility of Sudan disintegrating into two sovereign states as per Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Sudan's emergence as an oil-exporting country have provided new political events that serve as important factors to be used to analyse Sudan's position and power under the hydro-hegemony theory. Furthermore, Sudan's historical hydro-political objective, the 'midstream doctrine' which strives to reconcile the competing demands of downstream and upstream Nile riparians shall be brought to the fore. The methodology utilised in this paper to evaluate hydro-hegemony shall be based on Viotti and Kauppi's definition of Hegemony, Yoffe's Water Event Intensity Scale and Naff and Matson's Power Ratio.
The premise of this article is that basin-wide accords, integrated basin development, and formulae for optimal use of water in international river basins will prove elusive, and the costs of searching for them will be excessive. This holds especially for basins with several riparian states. The article suggests some measures that can be taken within riparian states that simultaneously make good sense in purely domestic terms and that will help prepare the riparians for bi-lateral or multi-lateral negotiating with other riparians.
Although international relations theory has been dominated for two
decades by debates over theories of international politics, recently
there has been a surge of interest in theories of foreign policy.
These seek to explain, not the pattern of outcomes of state
interactions, but rather the behavior of individual states. The author
surveys three prominent theories of foreign policy and shows how
the works under review set out a compelling alternative, one that
updates and systematizes insights drawn from classical realist
thought. Neoclassical realism argues that the scope and ambition
of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by the
country's relative material power. Yet it contends that the impact of
power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex,
because systemic pressures must be translated through
intervening unit-level variables such as decision-makers'
perceptions and state structure. Understanding the links between
power and policy thus requires close examination of both the
international and the domestic contexts within which foreign policy
is formulated and implemented.
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