Testing the Asymmetry Hypothesis of Tolerance: Thinking About Socially Disruptive Protest Actions

Abstract

Under the asymmetry hypothesis, political tolerance and intolerance differ in their underlying psychology, making it easier to persuade the tolerant to become less tolerant than to convince the intolerant to become more tolerant. Using a representative sample of the Dutch population (N = 546), we examined this hypothesis for people’s tolerance or intolerance of socially disruptive protest actions of their least-liked group. Focusing on the relevant contrasting values of freedom of speech and public order, we found empirical evidence for the asymmetry of political tolerance: it was easier to persuade the tolerant to become less tolerant than to convince the intolerant to become more tolerant. In fact, we found a backlash effect among the intolerant participants with them showing higher intolerance as a result. These findings support the notion that tolerance is more fragile than intolerance because of the required self-restraint that involves psychological discomfort and uneasiness. However, tolerance is indispensable for our increasingly polarized liberal democratic societies making further research on the social psychology of tolerance and intolerance topical and urgent.

Full text

Original Research Reports
Testing the Asymmetry Hypothesis of Tolerance: Thinking About Socially
Disruptive Protest Actions
Maykel Verkuyten1, Kumar Yogeeswaran2, Levi Adelman1
[1]ERCOMER, Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands. [2]School of
Psychology, Speech and Hearing, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.
Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 2023, Vol. 11(1), 397–407, https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.11269
Received: 2023-02-02 •Accepted: 2023-06-14 •Published (VoR): 2023-08-01
Handling Editor: Klaus Michael Reininger, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg, Germany
Corresponding Author: Maykel Verkuyten, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science, ERCOMER, Utrecht
University, Padualaan 14, 3584 CH Utrecht, Postal address: P.O. Box 80.140 3508 TC Utrecht, Netherlands. E-mail: m.verkuyten@uu.nl
Supplementary Materials: Data, Preregistration [see Index of Supplementary Materials]
Abstract
Under the asymmetry hypothesis, political tolerance and intolerance differ in their underlying psychology, making it easier to
persuade the tolerant to become less tolerant than to convince the intolerant to become more tolerant. Using a representative sample
of the Dutch population (N = 546), we examined this hypothesis for people’s tolerance or intolerance of socially disruptive protest
actions of their least-liked group. Focusing on the relevant contrasting values of freedom of speech and public order, we found
empirical evidence for the asymmetry of political tolerance: it was easier to persuade the tolerant to become less tolerant than to
convince the intolerant to become more tolerant. In fact, we found a backlash effect among the intolerant participants with them
showing higher intolerance as a result. These indings support the notion that tolerance is more fragile than intolerance because of
the required self-restraint that involves psychological discomfort and uneasiness. However, tolerance is indispensable for our
increasingly polarized liberal democratic societies making further research on the social psychology of tolerance and intolerance
topical and urgent.
Keywords
political tolerance, intolerance, asymmetry, protest actions
“Because the conventional view is that intolerance and tolerance are merely polar opposites on an
unidimensional continuum, researchers have not paid enough attention to the hypothesis of asymmetry”
(Gibson, 2006, p. 29).
For decades, social and political scientists have speculated on the fragility of tolerance relative to intolerance. Specii
cally, it is hypothesized that it would be easier to convince a tolerant person to be intolerant than it would be to
convince an intolerant person to be tolerant (Gibson, 2006; Pefley et al., 2001). The reason for this asymmetry is that the
psychology of tolerance and intolerance differs (Verkuyten et al., 2022). While intolerance involves congruity between
one’s negative attitude toward a dissenting belief or practice alongside rejection of those beliefs or practices (i.e., you
reject what you object to), tolerance implies self-restraint in putting up with beliefs or practices that you object to (i.e.,
you endure what you object to). Tolerance involves “the suppression of the tendency to suppress” (Schuyt, 1997, p. 169),
and the required self-restraint has been described as ‘painful’ and ‘suffering’ (Tønder, 2013; Williams, 1996) because
it elicits psychological conlict by requiring people to balance their objections against reasons to nevertheless endure
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License, CC BY 4.0, which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction, provided the original work is properly cited.

(Verkuyten et al., 2022). The psychological discomfort and uneasiness of cognitive dissonance that is involved would
make tolerance more fragile than intolerance (Festinger, 1962; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999).
In social psychology two main models have been proposed for understanding tolerance. Simon and colleagues have
developed and empirically tested their disapproval-respect model, which argues that tolerance involves disapproval
based on ingroup-outgroup categorization that is restrained by respect based on shared superordinate categorization
(Simon, 2020; Zitzmann et al., 2022).
The forbearance model of tolerance goes beyond categorization processes in considering tolerance as an ideological
dilemma (Billig et al., 1988) that involves thinking about relevant reasons for disapproval in relation to reasons for en
durance (Verkuyten et al., 2022). This model identiies a general thinking process that results in tolerance or intolerance
depending on the content and prioritizing of speciic considerations and values relevant to the situation and case at
hand. People’s belief systems tend to contain competing values (Pefley et al., 2001) and the prioritization involved in
weighing competing considerations can lead to higher tolerance or rather intolerance. The reasons for rejecting what
one objects to can trump the reasons for being tolerant and thus decrease the psychological discomfort and the required
self-restraint of toleration. For example, a commitment to freedom of speech can be overridden by values of public order
and safety leading to lower tolerance of socially disruptive protest actions of adversaries (Adelman et al., 2021; Kuklinski
et al., 1991).
In contrast, trying to convince the intolerant to become more tolerant by allowing that which they disapprove of
is far more challenging because it is asking people to increase their feelings of psychological discomfort. The principle
of cognitive consistency implies that people are motivated to hold their attitudes and actions in harmony and avoid
dissonance (Festinger, 1962; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). Thus, higher tolerance of disruptive protest actions by being
asked to consider freedom of speech is less likely to be effective for those who are intolerant of these actions to begin
with.
In fact, there is the real possibility of an “opinion backlash” (Bishin et al., 2016) in which trying to change the intoler
ant in the direction of higher tolerance results in the opposite effect (e.g., Bratton, 2002; Preuhs, 2007). For example, calls
for tolerance towards immigrants can lead to more positive attitudes among the already tolerant, but simultaneously to
more negative attitudes among the intolerant (Djupe et al., 2015). Further, permissive policy approaches can decrease
conservative peoples’ support of Muslim minority members holding public rallies and demonstrations for a better
recognition of their interests (Traunmüller & Helbling, 2017). Thus an emphasis on reasons for tolerance might backire
and have unanticipated consequences, similar to reactive effects in trying to reduce prejudice with invoking external
social norms rather than autonomous choice (e.g., Brehm & Brehm, 2013; Legault et al., 2011).
Testing the Asymmetry Hypothesis
Using a representative sample of the Dutch population, we examined the hypothesis of asymmetry for people’s political
tolerance or intolerance of socially disruptive protest actions of their least-liked ideological group. Tolerance signiies an
approach towards opinions, beliefs, and related practices that one disagrees with or objects to (Cohen, 2004; Verkuyten
et al., 2022). However, social groups become the proper focus of tolerance if accompanied by a deining set of group
values and beliefs, such as opinion-based groups (being pro or anti an issue) or ideological adversaries. Research on
political tolerance is concerned with accepting the equal civic rights of ideological groups that one is negative about,
and the common term – and related measure – for this is ‘the least-liked group’. The well-known least liked group
technique examines political tolerance by irst asking people to indicate which ideological group they like the least and
subsequently whether they are willing to grant people of that group the full rights of citizenship, such as giving public
speeches, seeking public ofice, and holding demonstrations and protest actions (Sullivan et al., 1979). Political tolerance
presupposes that the perceiver dislikes the ideological target group (Gibson, 2006) and although the content-controlled
least-liked group technique has its limitations, it allows for the examination of political tolerance of ideological groups
that people themselves object to (Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002).
We further tested the asymmetry hypothesis by focusing on socially disruptive protest actions and considering the
relevant contrasting values of freedom of speech and public order. First, political tolerance is commonly examined in
terms of practices and actions that must be allowed for all citizens to express and seek support for their point-of-view,
Asymmetry of Tolerance 398
Journal of Social and Political Psychology
2023, Vol. 11(1), 397–407
https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.11269

including protest actions of groups with contrasting ideological beliefs and practices. Protest actions are typically
perceived in relation to a constellation of dimensions and various distinctions are proposed for different types of
protest actions, such as normative and non-normative, violent and non-violent, moral and immoral, and disruptive and
constructive (e.g., Feinberg et al., 2020; Piven & Cloward, 1991; Tausch et al., 2011). Protest actions that are deemed as
violating a moral standard or transgressing a moral boundary (e.g., “stopping other people from speaking in public”,
“occupying buildings”) are generally not tolerated by the public because these actions are considered unreasonable,
threatening, and emotionally harmful means to reach a goal (Boch, 2020; Chong & Levy, 2018; Feinberg et al., 2020;
Simpson et al., 2018; Verkuyten et al., 2023). Therefore, such actions are ill-suited for testing the asymmetry hypothesis
as they would be expected to be intolerable to most. Here we instead focus on conventional protest actions (e.g. demon
strations on public roads, rallies in one’s neighborhood) that can be considered socially inconvenient and disruptive of
everyday life and thereby the functioning of society (Shuman et al., 2021).
Second, we considered the well-known oppositional values of “freedom of speech and demonstration” vs. “public
order and safety” which are relevant for evaluating socially disruptive protest actions (e.g., Adelman et al., 2021; Nelson
et al., 1997; Pefley et al., 2001; Zilli Ramirez & Verkuyten, 2011). For some people, tolerance of these actions may
follow from liberal freedoms of speech and expression, whereas for others, the rejection of these actions stems from
concerns about public safety and order. Thus, tolerance of disruptive protest actions can be weighed, on the one hand,
by the value placed on individual liberties and civic freedom that are supported by overwhelming proportions of citizens
in western democracies (Wike & Simmons, 2015), and, on the other hand, by whether such practices undermine the
safety, order, and wellbeing of others which are also deemed important by most citizens (Silver, 2018). These two values
can conlict with each other making it important to consider the relative trade-off that people make between them
for understanding their tolerance (i.e., freedom trumps order) or intolerance (i.e., order trumps freedom) of protest
actions. Following cognitive dissonance theory and the asymmetry hypothesis, we expected that asking tolerant people
to consider the importance of public safety and order will make them less tolerant, whereas intolerant people will not
become more tolerant when asked to consider the importance of freedom of speech, and might even become more
intolerant (i.e., a backlash or reactance effect).
Method
Participants
Potential respondents were selected by a survey company (Kantar) which maintains a representative panel for ieldwork
in the Netherlands. From this online panel, a national sample of the native Dutch population aged 18 years and older
was compiled via a random stratiication procedure based on the characteristics gender, age, education, household size,
and region. The response rate was 54%, which is common in the Netherlands (Stoop et al., 2010). A sample of 544 Dutch
respondents participated with consent in an online survey and answered the questions of interest.1 The sample closely
matches the general Dutch population in terms of demographic characteristics, but with a slight overrepresentation
of older people and higher educated (Statistics Netherlands, 2019). The sample was relatively evenly divided in terms
of gender (51.1% female), and age ranged from 18 to 89 years (M = 49.18, SD = 18.24). Education was measured on a
7-point ordinal scale, ranging from “no education/only lower education/integration course/Dutch language course” (1)
to “Doctoral or master’s degree or postgraduate education” (7). Based on the classiication of low, moderate, and high
education levels by Statistics Netherlands (2019), 13.2% of the sample were classiied as having low levels of education,
48% as moderately educated, and 38.8% as highly educated. Participants were relatively evenly distributed in their
political orientation (self-placement from 1 (‘extreme left’) to 7 (‘extreme right’), M = 4.71, SD = 1.87; 24.8% center, 26.6%
left-leaning, 34.4% right-leaning, 14.3% non-response or indicating they did not know). With weights applied to correct
1) As is common in large-scale data collections, a team was involved which resulted in various topics being examined in different randomized versions of the
questionnaire, such as attitudes towards immigrants, self-conirmation, and prejudice. Here we focus on the questions that we were able to include in four of
the ten versions of the questionnaire to empirically test the asymmetry hypothesis.
Verkuyten, Yogeeswaran, & Adelman 399
Journal of Social and Political Psychology
2023, Vol. 11(1), 397–407
https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.11269

for any deviations from the targeted quotas the indings are representative for the Dutch population in terms of gender,
age, education, and political orientation. Data collection was approved by the relevant ethical board and adhered to the
national legal requirements. The study was pre-registered and the data was made publicly available (see Supplementary
Materials).
Procedure and Materials
Participants were asked to select from a list of pre-selected ideological groups their least-liked group. We used a list of
pre-selected groups because this does not lead people to focus on extreme or extremist groups (e.g. terrorists, neo-nazis)
that are beyond toleration by most. Based on previous research in the Netherlands (Verkuyten et al., 2023), participants
were presented with a list of 15 mainstream ideological groups of different types and across the political spectrum
which provides “everyone an opportunity to express his or her intolerance” (Gibson, 1992, p. 574; see Appendix).2
Then, participants were asked to indicate to what extent it should be tolerated that this group engages in four
types of socially disruptive protest actions: “holding protest actions in your neighborhood or city”, “holding a large
demonstration on the public road”, “distribute pamphlets and lealets at the entrance of public buildings”, and “organiz
ing meetings in busy shopping areas”. Seven-point scales were used with the anchor ‘never tolerated’ (1) and ‘always
tolerated’ (7) and the four items formed a reliable scale (α = .92).
Based on the sum score on these four questions, individual participants were then automatically (computerized)
divided into two groups: intolerant (if sum < 16) and tolerant (if sum ≥ 16). Next the contrasting values of freedom
of speech and public order were presented to the two groups. Previous research demonstrates that the Dutch public
considers both values equally important in relation to speciic dissenting practices (Adelman et al., 2021) and also as
equally persuasive arguments for policies.3 Speciically, the intolerant group was presented with the following text:
“Safety and public order are of course very important values, but there are also other values that are important, such
as freedom of speech and the right to demonstrate”. By contrast, the tolerant group was told: “Freedom of speech and
the right to demonstrate are of course very important values, but there are also other values that are important, such as
security and public order”. Subsequently, both groups of participants were asked to take some time to carefully consider
and weigh up the different values in light of their answers: “Now we ask you to consider and weigh up the different
values carefully. So please really take a moment to think about the importance of the different values in the light of
your answers”. This persuasibility intervention sought to guarantee that both the costs and the beneits of tolerance or
intolerance were fully considered which allows us to test the asymmetry hypothesis. After relecting on the different
values, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they were inclined to change their view (“to what extent
are you then inclined to …”) using three bipolar questions with the end-point anchors, “be less tolerant vs be more
tolerant”, “be more negative toward the least-liked group vs be more positive towards the least-liked group”, and “listen
less to arguments of the least-liked group vs listen-more to arguments of the least-liked group”. Seven-point scales were
used and it was explained that a score of 4 (scale midpoint) indicates that they do not change their views (“if your
answer remains the same, choose the middle box of 4”) and that the degree of change in one or the other direction could
be indicated (α = .67).
Intervention and Assignment Check
To check whether participants followed the instruction to “really take a moment to think about the importance of the
different values in the light of your answers”, we used a covert timestamp that was inserted after participants read the
instructions and again after they had answered the three questions about whether they were intended to change their
2) We did not consider the participants (N = 37) who did not choose one of the pre-given groups. The least-liked group of these participants is not known and
therefore these participants could not be asked questions about their intentions to change their views towards this group.
3) With a different national representative sample (N = 912) and using 7-point scales, we found that ‘freedom of speech’ (M = 4.95, SD = 1.35) and ‘public peace
and order’ (M = 4.91, SD = 1.30) were considered equally convincing policy arguments (“How convincing do you ind [speciic value] as a decisive argument
for policy?”).
Asymmetry of Tolerance 400
Journal of Social and Political Psychology
2023, Vol. 11(1), 397–407
https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.11269

views. On average, completion time was 60.40 seconds (SD = 70.11; median = 48; mode = 44; range 7 – 946) which
indicates that in general participants deliberated during the task.
To validate the assignment of the participants to the tolerant or the intolerant group, we checked whether the
tolerant group generally valued ‘freedom of speech’ more than ‘public order’ and the intolerant group indeed prioritized
‘public order’. Participants were asked at the end of the questionnaire to evaluate both values. Four iller items with oth
er values were used (e.g., ‘equal opportunities’, ‘personal responsibility’) and the values were introduced and presented
together so that participants could evaluate them in relation to each other. For each value, three questions with 7-point
scales were presented: “How important is this value for you in comparison to other values?”, “How strongly is this value
for you a moral principle?”, and “How important do you ind this value for making policy decisions”. The three items for
freedom of speech formed a reliable scale (α = .80; M = 5.22, SD = 1.00) and this was also the case for the three items for
public order (α = .85; M = 5.05, SD = 1.04). Following our theoretical reasoning and previous research, we examined the
process of value prioritization by using a difference measure in which an individual’s value for social order is subtracted
from the importance attached to freedom of speech (Adelman et al., 2021; Gibson et al., 2020; Pefley et al., 2001). Thus, a
higher or more positive score means that in general participants consider the value of freedom of speech relatively more
important as a basis for policy than public order, and vice versa for the lower or more negative score. Overall, there was
a somewhat stronger emphasis on freedom of speech over social order (M = .18, SD = 1.12). Importantly and in support
of the computerized assignment of the participants, the tolerant group considered freedom of speech relatively more
important than public order (M = .52, SD = 1.07), compared to the intolerant group (M = -.05, SD = 1.09). The difference
between the two groups is signiicant and substantial, t(545) = 6.14, p < .001, d = .54. Moreover, the tolerant group valued
freedom of speech more than the intolerant group, t(545) = 3.44, p < .001, d = .30; M = 5.41, SD = .95, and M = 5.11,
SD = 1.01, respectively, and valued social order less, t(545) = -3.15, p = .002, d = .28; M = 4.88, SD = 1.07, and M = 5.16,
SD = 1.00. Yet, on average, both groups considered freedom of speech and public order to be important values with the
average scores signiicantly above the midpoint of the scales, ps < .001. This suggests that appeals to both values can
resonate in both groups, making it meaningful to ask participants in the two groups to seriously consider these values
in deciding whether to tolerate the protest actions of their least-liked group (Nelson & Garst, 2005; Pefley & Hurwitz,
2007).
Results
Tolerance
We irst examined how tolerant the national sample of participants was of the socially disruptive actions of their
least-liked group. Following previous research on tolerance (Adelman et al., 2021; Gibson et al., 2020), and the labelling
of the scale endpoints together with the subsequent automatic (computerized) division of the participants into two
groups, we found that a majority of participants were generally more intolerant (61.1%; score < 16) than tolerant (38.9%,
score ≥ 16), which supports the notion that the protest actions were considered socially disruptive (Verkuyten et al.,
2023). The average tolerance score for the four protest actions was 3.34 (SD = 1.57) which is signiicantly below the
midpoint, t(545) = -9.82, p < .001. Compared to tolerant participants, the intolerant participants were more strongly
right-wing oriented politically, t(467) = 3.18, p = .002 (M = 3.91, SD = 1.32, and M = 4.33, SD = 1.45, respectively) and had
a lower formal educated, t(545) = 4.76, p < .001, but the two groups did not differ signiicantly in gender and age.
Change of Views
After the tolerant group was asked to carefully consider the importance of public order and safety and the intolerant
group the importance of freedom of speech and the right to demonstrate, both groups were asked whether they were
inclined to change their views on accepting the protest actions. On average, there were no signiicant differences in the
amount of time both groups of participants took to relect on the importance of the additional value and to respond to
the three items, t(545) = .48, p = .64, suggesting that both tolerant and intolerant people engaged in deliberative thinking
to a similar extent.
Verkuyten, Yogeeswaran, & Adelman 401
Journal of Social and Political Psychology
2023, Vol. 11(1), 397–407
https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.11269

Participants were instructed to choose the midpoint (4) of the bipolar scales if they were not inclined to change
their views. As expected, compared to this midpoint, the tolerant group became signiicantly less accepting of their
least-liked group, t(212) = 3.31, p = 001, d = .23; M = 3.80, SD = .85. Thus, in line with the asymmetry hypothesis,
carefully considering the importance of public order and safety made tolerant people somewhat less accepting. However,
the intolerant group also became less accepting towards their least-liked group after being asked to consider a value to
accept their least-liked group indicating a contrast effect, t(333) = 11.39, p < .001, d = .62; M = 3.44, SD = .90. Thus, in line
with the asymmetry hypothesis, being asked to carefully consider the importance of freedom of speech and the right to
demonstrate did not make the intolerant participants more tolerant. Rather, a contrast effect emerged and they became
even more intolerant, and more strongly so compared to the tolerant group: the difference in average change between
both groups was signiicant, t(545) = 4.81, p < .001, d = .42.
Additional Analyses
To examine the robustness of the indings, we conducted two additional analyses. First, we considered completion time
for examining whether outliers impacted on the indings. Participants (N = 28) who took less time than one-third of the
median were considered speeders (Miller et al., 2020). Excluding them from the analysis did not change the indings:
there was again a similar signiicant difference in the intention to change one’s views between the tolerant (M = 3.77,
SD = .86) and intolerant group (M = 3.40, SD = .88), t(517) = 4.57, p < .001, d = .42. Additionally, we excluded participants
who were slower than one-third of the median and this also did not change the pattern of results.
Second, using the general linear model (GLM) univariate procedure, we compared the difference in average change
intention of the tolerant and intolerant groups while controlling statistically for age, gender, level of education4, and
political orientation (as covariates). The general linear model is a lexible generalization of analysis of variance and
regression analysis and yields similar results (Rutherford, 2001). This analysis showed a similar signiicant difference
between the tolerant group and the intolerant group in the inclination to change views, F(1, 492) = 18.66, p < .001,
ηp
2 = .04, and there were no signiicant main effects for any of the four demographic variables (ps > .18). Additionally,
there were no signiicant interaction effects between any of these variables and the two groups (ps > .24). Thus, the
asymmetry hypothesis was supported regardless of whether we considered the age, gender, education level, or political
orientation of the participants, and was similar for older and younger participants, females and males, higher and lower
educated, and right-wing and left-wing oriented people.
Discussion
Using a national representative sample, we found empirical evidence for the asymmetry of political tolerance: it was
easier to persuade the tolerant to become less tolerant than to convince the intolerant to become more tolerant
(e.g., Gibson, 2006; Pefley et al., 2001). In fact, we found among the intolerant participants a backlash effect where
consideration of alternate reasons to tolerate their least-liked ideological group resulted in higher intolerance, as found
in other studies (e.g., Djupe et al., 2015; Traunmüller & Helbling, 2017). This supports the notion that tolerance is more
fragile than intolerance because of the psychological discomfort and uneasiness of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962;
Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999) that is involved (Verkuyten et al., 2022). The empirical role of psychological discomfort as
the underlying mechanism might be studied in future research. For example, recent research using brain activity (EEG)
has indeed found higher cognitive conlict following an outgroup toleration task than a control task (Yogeeswaran et al.,
2022). Such brain imaging techniques can help shed light on the underlying mechanisms involved.
Theoretically, the asymmetry of tolerance and the related psychological processes further suggests that tolerance
and intolerance are indeed not “merely polar opposites on an unidimensional continuum” (see quote above, Gibson,
4) Education was measured on a 7-point ordinal scale, but similar to other research in the Netherlands (e.g. De Graaf et al., 2000; Van de Werhorst & Van
Tubergen, 2007), it was treated as a continuous variable in the analysis. An additional analysis with the categories of ‘low, middle, and high’ level of education
in which ‘low education’ was the refence category, yielded similar results.
Asymmetry of Tolerance 402
Journal of Social and Political Psychology
2023, Vol. 11(1), 397–407
https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.11269

2006, p. 29). This is also indicated in research using person-centred approaches such as latent class and proile analysis.
For example, in a US study on political tolerance, the best model for the data in a latent class analysis required four
categories of individuals rather than a continuum of tolerance-intolerance (McCutcheon, 1985). These four categories
could not be readily placed on a unidimensional positive–negative continuum because there was no monotonic change
across the four groups of individuals. Rather, they formed four latent classes of political tolerance. Similarly, in
examining tolerance among a nationwide sample in the US and also in the Netherlands, four qualitative different latent
proiles were found including subgroups of individuals that were generally intolerant or generally tolerant (Adelman &
Verkuyten, 2020; Mather & Tranby, 2014).
The practical importance of the indings is that it is easier to create intolerance out of tolerance, than vice versa.
This suggests, for example, that populist appeals to intolerance towards the full rights of citizenship of political
adversaries or minority groups might be more persuasive to the public than appeals to tolerance. Furthermore, the
psychological consistency of intolerance (you reject what you object to) makes it more likely that people negatively act
on their negative attitude: intolerance tends to have stronger behavioural consequences than does tolerance with its
psychological dissonance and self-restraint (Gibson, 2006). These possible implications make it important to more fully
examine the psychological differences between tolerance and intolerance and when and why intolerance increases, or
rather how tolerance can be stimulated.
Limitations and Future Research
In evaluating our indings, some limitations should be considered that provide directions for future research. First, we
focused on political tolerance and it is unclear whether the asymmetry also exists in social domains in which people
have to deal with questions of whether to endure certain beliefs and practices that they object to, such as cultural and
religious differences as well as views and behaviors of friends, disagreements at work, or trouble in the neighborhood.
Second, we focused on socially disruptive but conventional protest actions and it is likely that there is no asymmetry
in (in)tolerance for protest actions that violate moral standards and therefore are generally considered unreasonable,
threatening, and emotionally harmful (e.g., Feinberg et al., 2020; Simpson et al., 2018; Verkuyten et al., 2023). Further
more, we focused on people’s tolerance of disruptive protest actions of mainstream ideological groups that are typically
democratic and differ from radical extremist groups (e.g. terrorists, neo-nazis). However, average levels of tolerance
can vary across mainstream disliked groups (Gibson et al., 2020) and this might matter for the pliability of tolerance
and intolerance. For example, some of these groups might be perceived as less democratic making it easier to persuade
people to limit the civil liberties of these groups (Petersen et al., 2011). Hence, future research should examine the
asymmetry hypothesis of tolerance in relation to the nature of protest actions and the nature of the least-liked
ideological group.
Third, in examining the asymmetry hypothesis, we considered the contrasting values of liberty and order. These
two values are found to be central in people’s thinking about disruptive protest actions and dissenting practices. For
example, the Dutch public considers both values as equally decisive arguments for policies (Footnote 2) and equally
important in relation to speciic dissenting minority practices (Adelman et al., 2021). Furthermore, valuing freedom of
speech over public order (or vice versa) distinguished tolerant and intolerant participants in the current research, and
has been found to exert strong effects on political tolerance (e.g., Gibson et al., 2020; Nelson et al., 1997; Pefley et al.,
2001). However, future research could investigate the pliability of tolerance and intolerance by focusing on additional
values (e.g., responsibility, equality, reciprocity) and the ways in which people weigh and balance these in deciding to
tolerate or not to tolerate disruptive protest actions (Verkuyten et al., 2023).
In addition to the type of values and considerations it is possible to examine the effectiveness of different ways
in which persuasive messages and counter arguments are presented. We asked people to relect on the contrasting
values and the completion times suggest that they did engage in relective thinking. However, it could also be examined
whether, for example, a custom animated video or a writing task is more effective in stimulating tolerance of disliked
groups and create less reactance.
And inally, we measured change by explicitly asking participants to what degree they were inclined to change
their views after being asked to carefully consider an alternative value. However, change could also be measured more
Verkuyten, Yogeeswaran, & Adelman 403
Journal of Social and Political Psychology
2023, Vol. 11(1), 397–407
https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.11269

indirectly or implicitly which would go beyond self-reported change and rule out the possibility that participants report
an inclination to change because of potential response tendencies such as social desirable responding. Additionally,
for measuring tolerance and the inclination to change views, we used familiar bipolar scales with end-point anchors.
However, these anchors were not explained to the participants and therefore we do not know which understanding of
tolerance the participants had. Yet, research using open-ended questions in a survey on national sample of Dutch adults
showed that the large majority understood tolerance as having to do with endurance and putting up with something
one objects to (Verkuyten & Kollar, 2021).
Despite these limitations and venues for future work, the present indings demonstrate that tolerance is more pliable
than intolerance. Tolerance is more fragile because it involves “the suppression of the tendency to suppress” (Schuyt,
1997, p. 169) and the required self-restraint implies dissonance and that has been described as ‘painful’ and ‘to suffer’
(Tønder, 2013; Williams, 1996). Yet, tolerance is indispensable for our increasingly polarized liberal democratic societies
making further research on the social psychology of tolerance and intolerance topical and urgent.
Funding: This manuscript was supported by a European Research Council (ERC) Advanced Grant under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and
innovation programme (grant agreement No 740788).
Acknowledgments: The authors have no additional (i.e., non-inancial) support to report.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
Ethics Statement: The research was ethically approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Utrecht University. File
number: 21-0151.
Data Availability: All the data for this study is publicly available (see Verkuyten, Yogeeswaran, & Adelman, 2023). They are also stored at the special storage
facility of Utrecht University and are openly accessible at the Data Archive and Networking Services of the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences.
Supplementary Materials
The Supplementary Materials contain the following items (for access see Index of Supplementary Materials below):
• The pre-registration protocol for the study
• All research data to replicate the indings
Index of Supplementary Materials
Verkuyten, M., Yogeeswaran, K., & Adelman, L. (2021). Tolerance/intolerance persuasion [Pre-registration protocol]. OSF.
https://osf.io/h7jgr
Verkuyten, M., Yogeeswaran, K., & Adelman, L. (2023). Tolerance/intolerance persuasion [Research data]. OSF. https://osf.io/z6q5d
References
Adelman, L., & Verkuyten, M. (2020). Prejudice and the acceptance of Muslim minority practices: A person-centered approach. Social
Psychology, 51(1), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000380
Adelman, L., Verkuyten, M., & Yogeeswaran, K. (2021). Moralization and moral trade-offs explain (in)tolerance of Muslim minority
behaviours. European Journal of Social Psychology, 51(6), 924–935. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2792
Billig, M., Condor, S., Edwards, D., Gane, M., Middleton, D., & Radley, A. (1988). Ideological dilemmas: A social psychology of everyday
thinking. SAGE.
Bishin, B. G., Hayes, T. J., Incantalupo, M. B., & Smith, C. A. (2016). Opinion backlash and public attitudes: Are political advances in
gay rights counterproductive? American Journal of Political Science, 60(3), 625–648. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12181
Asymmetry of Tolerance 404
Journal of Social and Political Psychology
2023, Vol. 11(1), 397–407
https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.11269

Boch, A. (2020). Increasing American political tolerance: A framework excluding hate speech. Socius: Sociological Research for a
Dynamic World, 6, 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1177/2378023120903959
Bratton, K. A. (2002). The effect of legislative diversity on agenda setting: Evidence from six state legislatures. American Politics
Research, 30(2), 115–142. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X02030002001
Brehm, S. S., & Brehm, J. W. (2013). Psychological reactance: A theory of freedom and control. Academic Press.
Chong, D., & Levy, M. (2018). Competing norms of free expression and political tolerance. Social Research, 85(1), 197–227.
https://doi.org/10.1353/sor.2018.0010
Cohen, A. J. (2004). What toleration is. Ethics, 115(1), 68–95. https://doi.org/10.1086/421982
De Graaf, N. D., De Graaf, P. M., & Kraaykamp, G. (2000). Parental cultural capital and educational attainment in the Netherlands: A
reinement of the cultural capital perspective. Sociology of Education, 73(2), 92–111. https://doi.org/10.2307/2673239
Djupe, P. A., Neiheisel, J. R., & Olson, L. R. (2015). Carriers of the creed? The effects of urging tolerance on persuasion. In P. A. Djupe
(Ed.), Religion and political tolerance in America: Advances and state of the art (pp. 183-199). Temple University Press.
Feinberg, M., Willer, R., & Kovacheff, C. (2020). The activist’s dilemma: Extreme protest actions reduce popular support for social
movements. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 119(5), 1086–1111. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000230
Festinger, L. (1962). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press.
Gibson, J. L. (1992). Alternative measures of political tolerance: Must tolerance be ‘least-liked’? American Journal of Political Science,
36(2), 560–577. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111491
Gibson, J. L. (2006). Enigmas of intolerance: Fifty years after Stouffer’s Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties. Perspectives on
Politics, 4(1), 21–34. https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759270606004X
Gibson, J., Claassen, C., & Barceló, J. (2020). Putting groups back into the study of political intolerance. In E. Borgida, C. M. Federico,
& J. M. Miller (Eds.), At the forefront of political psychology (pp. 55-78). Routledge.
Harmon-Jones, E., & Mills, J. (Eds.). (1999). Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology. American
Psychological Association.
Hurwitz, J., & Mondak, J. J. (2002). Democratic principles, discrimination and political intolerance. British Journal of Political Science,
32(1), 93–118. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123402000042
Kuklinski, J. H., Riggle, E., Ottati, V., Schwarz, N., & Wyer, R. S. (1991). The cognitive and affective bases of political tolerance
judgments. American Journal of Political Science, 35(1), 1–27. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111436
Legault, L., Gutsell, J. N., & Inzlicht, M. (2011). Ironic effects of antiprejudice messages: How motivational interventions can reduce
(but also increase) prejudice. Psychological Science, 22(12), 1472–1477. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611427918
Mather, D. M., & Tranby, E. (2014). New dimensions of tolerance: A case for a broader, categorical approach. Sociological Science, 1,
512–531. https://doi.org/10.15195/v1.a28
McCutcheon, A. L. (1985). A latent class analysis of tolerance for nonconformity in the American public. Public Opinion Quarterly,
49(4), 474–488. https://doi.org/10.1086/268945
Miller, C. A., Guidry, J. P. D., Dahman, B., & Thomson, M. D. (2020). A tale of two diverse ualtrics samples: Information for online
survey researchers. Cancer Epidemiology, Biomarkers & Prevention, 29(4), 731–735. https://doi.org/10.1158/1055-9965.EPI-19-0846
Nelson, T. E., Clawson, R. A., & Oxley, Z. M. (1997). Media framing of a civil liberties conlict and its effect on tolerance. The American
Political Science Review, 91(3), 567–583. https://doi.org/10.2307/2952075
Nelson, T. E., & Garst, J. (2005). Values-based political messages and persuasion: Relationships among speaker, recipient, and evoked
values. Political Psychology, 26(4), 489–516. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2005.00428.x
Pefley, M., & Hurwitz, J. (2007). Persuasion and resistance: Race and the death penalty in America. American Journal of Political
Science, 51(4), 996–1012. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00293.x
Pefley, M., Knigge, P., & Hurwitz, J. (2001). A multiple values model of political tolerance. Political Research Quarterly, 54(2), 379–406.
https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290105400207
Petersen, M., Slothuus, R., Stubager, R., & Togebey, L. (2011). Freedom for all? The strength and limits of political tolerance. British
Journal of Political Science, 41(3), 581–597. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123410000451
Piven, F. F., & Cloward, R. A. (1991). Collective protest: A critique of resource-mobilization. In S. M. Lyman (Ed.), Social movements:
Main trends of the modern world (pp. 137-167). Palgrave Macmillan.
Preuhs, R. R. (2007). Descriptive representation as a mechanism to mitigate policy backlash: Latino incorporation and welfare policy
in the American states. Political Research Quarterly, 60(2), 277–292. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907301981
Verkuyten, Yogeeswaran, & Adelman 405
Journal of Social and Political Psychology
2023, Vol. 11(1), 397–407
https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.11269

Rutherford, A. (2001). Introducing ANOVA and ANCOVA, a GLM approach. SAGE.
Schuyt, K. (1997). Continuïteit en verandering in de idee van tolerantie [Continuity and change in the idea of toleration]. In N.
Wilterdink, J. Heilbron, & A. de Swaan (Eds.), Alles verandert [Everything changes] (pp. 167-178). Meulenhoff.
Shuman, E., Saguy, T., Van Zomeren, M., & Halperin, E. (2021). Disrupting the system constructively: Testing the effectiveness of
nonnormative nonviolent collective action. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 121(4), 819–841.
https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000333
Silver, L. (2018, October 22). Immigration concerns fall in Western Europe, but most see need for newcomers to integrate into society.
Pew Research Center.
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/22/immigration-concerns-fall-in-western-europe-but-most-see-need-for-
newcomers-to-integrate-into-society/
Simon, B. (2020). A new perspective on intergroup conlict: The social psychology of politicized struggles for recognition. Theory &
Psychology, 30(2), 147–163. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354319887227
Simpson, B., Willer, R., & Feinberg, M. (2018). Does violent protest backire? Testing a theory of public reactions to activist violence.
Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World, 4, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1177/2378023118803189
Statistics Netherlands. (2019). Bevolking: Kerncijfers [Population: Key characteristics]. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek.
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/cijfers/detail/37296ned
Stoop, I., Billiet, J., Koch, A., & Fitzgerald, R. (2010). Backgrounds of nonresponse. In I. Stoop, J. Billiet, A. Koch, & R. Fitzgerald (Eds.),
Improving survey response: Lessons learned from the European Social Survey (pp. 1-8). Wiley.
Sullivan, J. L., Piereson, J., & Marcus, G. E. (1979). An alternative conceptualization of political tolerance: Illusory increases
1950s-1970s. The American Political Science Review, 73(3), 781–794. https://doi.org/10.2307/1955404
Tausch, N., Becker, J. C., Spears, R., Christ, O., Saab, R., Singh, P., & Siddiqui, R. N. (2011). Explaining radical group behavior:
Developing emotion and eficacy routes to normative and nonnormative collective action. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 101(1), 129–148. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022728
Tønder, L. (2013). Tolerance: A sensorial orientation to politics. Oxford University Press.
Traunmüller, R., & Helbling, M. (2017). Backlash to policy decisions: How citizens react to immigrants’ rights to demonstrate. SSRN.
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2906365
Van de Werhorst, H. G., & Van Tubergen, F. (2007). Ethnicity, schooling and merit in the Netherlands. Ethnicities, 7(3), 416–444.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796807080236
Verkuyten, M., Adelman, L., & Yogeeswaran, K. (2023). Intolerance of transgressive protest actions: The differential roles of
deontological and utilitarian morality. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 49(8), 1184–1196.
https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672221099709
Verkuyten, M., & Kollar, R. (2021). Tolerance and intolerance: Cultural meanings and discursive usage. Culture and Psychology, 27(1),
172–186. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X20984356
Verkuyten, M., Adelman, L., & Yogeeswaran, K. (2022). Tolerance as forbearance: Overcoming intuitive versus deliberative objection
to cultural, religious and ideological differences. Psychological Review, 129(2), 368–387. https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000228
Wike, R., & Simmons, K. (2015, November 18). Global support for principle of free expression, but opposition to some forms of speech.
Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2015/11/18/global-support-for-principle-of-free-expression-but-
opposition-to-some-forms-of-speech/
Williams, B. (1996). Tolerations: An impossible virtue? In D. Heyd (Ed.), Toleration: An elusive virtue (pp. 19-27). Princeton University
Press.
Yogeeswaran, K., Nash, K., Jia, H., Adelman, L., & Verkuyten, M. (2022). Intolerant of being tolerant? Examining the impact of
intergroup toleration on relative left frontal activity and outgroup attitudes. Current Psychology, 41(10), 7228–7239.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-020-01290-2
Zilli Ramirez, C., & Verkuyten, M. (2011). Values, media framing, and political tolerance for extremist groups. Journal of Applied Social
Psychology, 41(7), 1583–1602. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2011.00775.x
Zitzmann, S., Loreth, L., Reininger, K. M., & Simon, B. (2022). Does respect foster tolerance? (Re)analyzing and synthesizing data from
a large research project using meta-analytic techniques. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 48(6), 823–843.
https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672211024422
Asymmetry of Tolerance 406
Journal of Social and Political Psychology
2023, Vol. 11(1), 397–407
https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.11269

Appendix
Table A.1
Frequency of Identification of Groups as Least-Liked (N = 546)
Group Percentage
Pro-Black Pete 1.5%
Anti-Black Pete 34.2%
Right-wing activists 12.9%
Left-wing activists 5.5%
Anti-Islam 3.3%
Pro-Islam 7.0%
Animal rights activists 2.0%
Environmental activists 0.9%
Anti-racists 2.8%
Gay rights activists 5.8%
Nationalists 4.2%
Vegetarians 0.4%
Feminist 1.3%
Climate change deniers 16.2%
Climate activists 2.8%
Note. Black Pete is a character linked to the traditional St Nicolaus fest in the Netherlands and is portrayed as a
black assistant to St Nicolaus. As part of the festivities and for playing their role, people dress up as Black Pete,
including blackening their faces.
Verkuyten, Yogeeswaran, & Adelman 407
Journal of Social and Political Psychology
2023, Vol. 11(1), 397–407
https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.11269