Identity, Conflict, and Social Movement Activism in Bangladesh's Nation-Building Politics

Abstract

In the last half a century, the search for a Bangladeshi national identity has been driven and contested by different forces and political imageries. This paper looks at the interrelations between nation-building policies and social-movement activism. Since its independence in 1971, the country has been caught up in debates surrounding Bengali, Bangladeshi, and Muslim identities and activism in its nation-building process, leading to multiple exclusions along ethnic, religious, gender, and class lines. Identity formation in postcolonial society has mainly relied on constructing majority populations with shared commonalities, such as religion, language, heritage, or social traditions. We show how state initiatives in crafting a so-called natural identity and homogeneity in the name of nation-building have turned into counterproductive and politically profit-oriented projects, masking inequalities and persecution. We propose that achieving a sophisticated understanding of the nation-building process requires paying attention to the causes, outcomes, and influences of social and political movements. We also posit that nation-building is a protracted process of political integration that often remains unfinished, even decades after a nation has gained its independence.

Full text

ASIEN 164/165 (Juli/Oktober 2022), S. 48–69
Refereed article
Identity, Conflict, and Social Movement Activism
in Bangladesh’s Nation-Building Politics
Hosna J. Shewly and Eva Gerharz
Abstract
In the last half a century, the search for a Bangladeshi national identity has been
driven and contested by different forces and political imageries. This paper looks at
the interrelations between nation-building policies and social-movement activism.
Since its independence in 1971, the country has been caught up in debates
surrounding Bengali, Bangladeshi, and Muslim identities and activism in its nation-
building process, leading to multiple exclusions along ethnic, religious, gender, and
class lines. Identity formation in postcolonial society has mainly relied on constructing
majority populations with shared commonalities, such as religion, language, heritage,
or social traditions. We show how state initiatives in crafting a so-called natural
identity and homogeneity in the name of nation-building have turned into
counterproductive and politically profit-oriented projects, masking inequalities and
persecution. We propose that achieving a sophisticated understanding of the nation-
building process requires paying attention to the causes, outcomes, and influences
of social and political movements. We also posit that nation-building is a protracted
process of political integration that often remains unfinished, even decades after a
nation has gained its independence.
Keywords: intersectional movement, postcolonial state, nation-building, indigenous
activism, secularism, conflict
Hosna J. Shewly is a Senior Researcher in Social and Cultural Studies, Fulda
University of Applied Sciences. She works on intersectional inequality and activism,
urban public space and mobility justice, irregular migration, and environmental
governance.
hosna.shewly@sk.hs-fulda.de; ORCID: 0000-0002-2686-8268
Eva Gerharz is a Professor of Sociology and Globalization at the same institution.
Her work focuses on youth movements, indigenous activism and mobility in South
Asia.
eva.gerharz@sk.hs-fulda.de; ORCID: 0000-0002-8615-0813

Identity, Conflict, and Social Movement Activism in Bangladesh … 49
Introduction
“Nation-building” may be defined as the process through which the boundaries of
the modern state and those of the national community become congruent (Mylonas
2012). It is often thought that nation-building constitutes a challenge wherever
modernity has brought previously smaller, self-contained social units into closer
contact with one another. In this context, political integration and national
identification form two sides of the same coin: nation-building (Talentino 2004). To
achieve political integration and national identity, states forge ties between citizens
and the state that serve to integrate ethnic both minorities and majorities into an
inclusive power arrangement. As part of this process, cultural pluralities are viewed
anew in numerical terms and, as such, perceived as “minorities” and “majorities.”
Consequently, they are required to be pacified, contained, held, subjugated, or
“transformed” through the symbolism of the majoritarian culture, which the state
itself often articulates through its social and cultural policies (Sheth 1992). Yet
nation” and “national identity” remain contentious topics and unattainable visions in
many postcolonial countries, mainly ones where society is deeply divided along
sociocultural lines.
Bangladesh has a long history of contestation related to national belonging, and the
subject of nationhood continues to be part of struggles and negotiations in the
postcolonial nation-state. Since independence in 1971, the advancement of Bengali,
Bangladeshi, and Muslim nationalisms has led to various exclusions along ethnic,
religious, gender, and class lines. While the dominant nationalist model promoted
by the more secular faction with East Bengal’s political leadership reinforced the
unity of Bengalis based on language, culture, and heritage, those protagonists
embracing more religious ideals have sought to highlight a national unity based on
Islamism. Rather more invisible, however, have been forms of activism denouncing
intersectional inequalities, such as the exclusion of religious and indigenous 1
minorities or of diverse gendere identities.
Against this background, this paper investigates the intersection between nation-
building policies and social-movement activism.2 It shows, first, how the crafting of
a threat to national security has been employed as a political strategy to mask the
exclusions enshrined in nation-building. Second, nation-building seen as a
continuous process can be strongly linked to both violent and nonviolent social
movements, ones that relate to the state as the primary but not the only force behind
particular nation-bui lding projects (Sheth 1992). Political and social movements al so
seek to contribute to nation-building by pursuing processes of social transformation.
1 The term “indigenous” refers to the population covered by the definition “indigenous people” coined
by the United Nations.
2 This write-up is part of a research project funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG, Project
Number 395804440) on “Youth movements and changes in political cultures in Bangladesh and
Senegal.”

50 Hosna J. Shewly and Eva Gerharz
Methodologically, this article is based on extensive empirical research undertaken
in various phases in Dhaka and the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). The first author
conducted ethnographic research, including participant observation in multiple
protests and political meetings, group discussions, and interviews over six months
in Dhaka between 2018 and 2020. Interviews were conducted with four key figures
of the Shahbag movement, persons who were particularly visible in the movement’s
slogans, statements, speeches, media interviews, or talk shows, plus with 31
movement participants as well as 13 “supporters.”3 She also conducted three group
discussions (six to a group) and four in-depth interviews with indigenous activists in
Dhaka who participated in the Shahbag movement. Although access to leaders or
activists from Hefazat-e-Islam (HEI) proved difficult, interviews were conducted
with two leaders of HEI, six Long-March participants, as well as 13 supporters.
Beyond the movement’s participation circle, five group discussions (six to a group)
were further conducted with current university students on the topics of national
identity and social movements.
The second author has conducted ethnographic fieldwork in the CHT since the late
1990s in various phases, with a focus on ethnicity and nationalism, indigeneity,
social-movement activism, and development. She has also worked with activists
from indigenous communities both in academia and more practical fields. This has
occurred in various on-site fieldwork missions and collaborative projects with local
organizations, as well as part of engagement in transnational ac tivism for human and
particularly indigenous people’s rights.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin by exploring academic discourses on
nation-building and their connection to social movements, then examine nation-
building agendas and strategies in Bangladesh. We focus thereafter on the
indigenous movement in rural southeastern CHT and its connectivities to activist
spaces in urban areas. We subsequently draw on our findings concerning the
different positionalities of national identity and their connections to Shahbag and its
countermovement led by HEI. Next, we establish parallels between the indigenous
and the Shahbag movements by showing how intersecting social categories structure
the multiple inequalities enshrined in opposing ideas of national belonging and
exclusion. The final section sums up the paper’s findings and briefly discusses its
broader implications.
Nation-building and social movement activism
How have scholars engaged with the concept of nation-building? How are social-
movement activism and nation-building processes interlinked? We address these
questions on the basis of two key arguments: first, that nation-building is a
3 These are individuals who support the cause but did not directly participate in related activities, or
did so but only on one or two occasions.

Identity, Conflict, and Social Movement Activism in Bangladesh … 51
continuous process and, second, that nation-building and social movements are
mutually constitutive.
Nation-building combines two objectives: state-building, which involves creating
and developing formal political institutions, and identity-building, which refers to
creating an overarching communal identit y (Talentino 2004; Fukuyama 2007; Allen
2010; Barr 2012). National-identity formation or contestation are considered central
to a nation-state’s ability to realize these objectives. National identity, however, is
constituted from particularistic ethnic cores, myths, memories, religious beliefs,
language(s), territorial connections, and political values (Smith 1991). Thus, an
essential feature of nation-building lies in its attempts to create loyalty to that
communal identity. And it is considered one of the key sources for solidarity (Moran
2011) as well as for achieving the goals of resolution and rehabilitation, particularly
in post-conflict contexts (Talentino 2004; Pfaff-Czarnecka 2005). In this way, the
nation-building process is a form of integration that involves shifting sovereignties
from kinship or ethnic allegiances to fealty to the nation-state (Sutherland 2009).
Importantly, national identity is not about individuals per se but refers to a personal
identity arising from membership in a national political community, and an identity
vis-à-vis said political community that renders it distinct from those of other nations
(Parekh 2008, 56). At the same time, structure and political process are the core
elements of nation-building. Thus, state-building and identity formation are not
separate spheres; instead, they influence each other (as demonstrated later
empirically).
Existing theories do not specify who pursues nation-building policies and in what
fashion (Mylonas 2016). There is a need to examine policy outputs, the process of
selecting policies, as well as specific ones regarding assimilation, accommodation,
or exclusion (Mylonas 2016). Nation-building is the interaction between various
groups within a state, wherein foreign policy and international actors/interests are
also involved. Quite often, nation-building is the contingent outcome of a strategic
response by politicians to the modern conditions of geopolitical competition or of
power plays within the state. The formation of national identity in the postcolonial
era has primarily relied on the construction of majority populations sharing
commonalities such as religion, language, heritage, or social traditions. These
common denominators encompass decisive factors for the perceived unity and
solidarity needed to construct a national community. How these majorities are
established is what tends to exclude those perceived as minorities (Talentino 2002;
Mylonas 2012;). For nationalists, populations threatening the purity of the national
community constitute a potential danger. This fuels tensions in heterogeneous
societies where high degrees of ethnic, linguistic, or other forms of diversity are
present. Scholars often tend to analyze nation-building discrepancies through an
inclusion/exclusion binary (Wimmer 2010). In contrast, we adhere to Mylonas’s
(2012) argument that nation-building policies must be viewed as more than
dichotomous conceptualizations such as “inclusion/exclusion” or “violent/non-
violent.”

52 Hosna J. Shewly and Eva Gerharz
For nation builders, the acceptance of state-building processes is essential for the
creation of the desired overarching identity. This acceptance includes a belief in the
state’s legitimacy and an internal sense of ownership of its policies. Legitimacy,
thus, is linked to identity — as the process of identity-building aims to bind citizens
to the state through the nation (Talentino 2004). Struggles over participation in
decision-making procedures, equal access to social institutions, or the recognition of
cultural differences can perpetuate social movement activism. As will be seen in the
subsequent analysis, social movements representing the claims of minorities
challenge the hegemony of the state by positioning themselves in opposition to it.
While understanding nation-building according to the above framework is practical,
it also offers only a fragmented picture of the nation-building process. We propose
that to obtain a sophisticated temporal understanding of the assimilation,
accommodation, and exclusion enshrined in nation-building requires close attention
being paid to the causes, outcomes, and influences of social and political movements
in that nation-building process. Assimila tion, accommodation, and exclusion are not
static but rather require an awareness of how various groups react to and shape that
process, and how they interact and negotiate with other state- and non-state actors
— both nationally as well as internationally.
The existing scholarship on nation-building and social movements has largely been
carried out in isolation, although many overlapping notions do exist. As discussed
above, nation-building engages in a variety of different processes to unite people and
ensure (social) justic e through a consensual state apparatus. On the other hand, social
movements strongly influence states in manifold ways: they might contribute to
overthrowing dictatorships and monarchies, to establishing democracies, to
triggering local policy transformations, or to instigating changes in people’s views
on particular social and political realms (Shewly and Gerharz 2023). Although a
popular uprising may not always successfully overthrow a regime, it can still alter
media discourses, public opinion, or scientific and intellectual communities, thereby
creating a pathway for future achievements in this regard (Jenkins and Form 2013).
The so-called Arab Spring, the revolutionary movement in Sudan, or contemporary
anti-monarchy or anti-military-rule movements in Southe ast Asia constitute cases of
social-movement activism par excellence that later shook or shaped particular forms
of nation-building. In South Asia, social movements have broader both political and
social implications. As Amenta (2006) rightfully argues, political contexts matter,
as they shape social movements’ scope for action.
Social movements typically prefer to promote a unified and homogenous collective
identity to minimize internal division and avoid related factions (Lichterman 1999;
Armstrong 2002; Pulido 2006; Ward 2008). In doing so, social movements often fail
to respond to the fact that their participants possess individual identities that might
structure the types of challenges or opportunities they encounter in their lives.
Moreover, identity-based moveme nts tend to devote limite d attention to the interests
of subgroups marginalized in multiple ways (Cohen 1999; Strolovitch 2007).

Identity, Conflict, and Social Movement Activism in Bangladesh … 53
Individual activists, however, are sometimes quite conscious of how their own
identities affect their experiences and may draw on more than one identity to spur
their activism (Greenwood 2008; Blackwell 2011; Clay 2012; Milkman and
Terriquez 2012). They may also attempt to build bridges between the various
communities they are a part of (Mische 2008). Looking specifically at what they call
“movement intersectionality,” Roberts and Jesudason conclude that “attention to
intersecting identities has the potential to create solidarity and cohesion [across
identity categories]” (2013, 313). Thus, intersectionality can foster alliances and act
as a means for movements to embrace diversity (Crenshaw 1991). Such
understanding can encourage the development of connections within social
movements and thus make them more inclusive (Terriquez, Brenes, and Lopez
2018).
We argue that adopting an intersectional lens can help us to better grasp a social
movement’s construction of exclusionary social and cultural policies in nation-
building, as they operate within the social spaces available to them. This does not
imply that we claim to perform a systematic intersectional analysis of the field. Our
aim is more humble, intimating the need to look beyond dominant identity categories
and therefore reveal how coalitions are being formed and identity politics
configured. Social movements and the state often do not work together. On the
contrary, through the political and social mobilization of certain sections of the
population, often on rights-related issues, movements seek to compel the state to
adopt policies and enact legislation that it would otherwise not be inclined to pursue
(Sheth 1992). However, we also posit that social-movement activists’ influence on
state-making is no less problematic or hegemonic.
A general limitation of the nation-building literature is that it emphasizes more the
struggles that have constituted a nation rather than looking at changes in nation-
building from a temporal perspective. Here, rather, we take the view that nation-
building is a protracted and ongoing process of political integration that requires
continuous negotiation between state and society. Consequently, the evolvement of
a political consciousness that helps contain internal conflicts does not result from a
unilineal process but is rather a disjointed series of reverses and delays, and
ultimately remains elusive. In the following, we illustrate this with the case of the
Bangladeshi nation.
Nation-building in Bangladesh: Changes, contestations, and
exclusions
Bangladesh is relatively homogeneous in cultural, linguistic, and ethnic terms. It has
a small (slightly over 10 percent) but declining and politically weak Hindu minority,
as well as a modest indigenous population. Together with a form of economically

54 Hosna J. Shewly and Eva Gerharz
driven colonialism from West Pakistan, Bengali ethnonationalism4 was at the core
of East Pakistan’s independence movement and the subsequent birth of
“Bangladesh” (Jahan 1973; Riaz 2020).
The newly crafted Bangladeshi Constitution adopted nationalism, socialism,
democracy, and secularism as its fundamental nation-building principles.
Secularism5 in Bangladesh was largely conceived of as an instrument to prevent
communal forces from capitalizing on Islam for political benefit. Scholars consider
this a result of the experiences of rancorous religious nationalism during the Pakistan
era (O’Connell 1976; Guhathakurta 2012). As part of its secularism, the Constitution
declared religion a personal choice, banned religious-based political parties, chose a
national anthem composed by Rabindranath Tagore, and designed a national flag
devoid of Islamic symbolism (Kabeer 1991). This echoes Talentino’s (2004)
reflection on the aftermath of war being a time to reinforce the fledgling spirit of
community and commitment to a shared vision of unity. In subsequent years,
however, the practice of secularism remained vague, with an array of religious
activities taking place in public spaces — including religious broadcasts on state-
controlled media or allowing the madrasahs (Islamic seminaries), particularly those
of a Deobandi persuasion, to impart Islamic instruction despite the nationalization
of the education system (Riaz 2020).
To establish unity on the basis of language and culture, the Constitution declared
Bangladeshi citizens “Bengalis.” This, however, eventually led to ethnolinguistic
fragmentation by alienating the non-Bengali populations, the largest of which lives
in the CHT located on Bangladesh’s southeastern border. 6 In response, the local
4 Although formed on the basis of religious commonality, Muslim identity did not unite the two
demographic segments of Pakistan for long. The connection between religion and politics in the
region has a long history. Although the partition of Bengal in 1947 was not the result of a long
political mobilization or of a shared national ideology regarding the creation of a homeland for the
Muslims of Bengal, Punjab, and other areas (Khan 2010, 5), the idea of a Muslim nation was indeed
present at the time — as was Muslim religious nationalism. Three major historical movements — the
Faraizi Movement, the Tariqah-i-Muhammadiya Movement, and the pan-Islamic Khilafat Movement
— were indicative of the rise of political Islam in colonial Bengal. However, there was no one
particular movement that campaigned for an Islamic territorial nationalism in colonial India. In 1933,
Rahmat Ali, a University of Cambridge student, coined the name “Pakistan” and first proposed a
Muslim state separate from India. The notion of Pakistan appeared in the Muslim League’s political
agenda in 1937. According to the 3rd June Plan, the Bengal Legislative Assembly divided itself into
two parts, where representatives of both the Hindu and the Muslim majority districts conducted
separate votes to determine whether a majority wished to divide the province. The representatives of
the Hindu majority districts voted in favor of religious segregation, while representatives of the
Muslim majority districts voted against it. For more details, (see: Moore 1983; Chatterji 1999;
Shewly 2008, 2013).
5 It is important to mention here that the context, meaning, and appeal of secularism in Bangladesh are
different than in its Western manifestation. In Bengali, the term dharmanirapekṣatābād is used for
“secularism.” It translates as “neu trality in religio n,” or, to use O’Connell’s (1976) term, “tolerance.”
6 Historically, the CHT was a distinct geopolitical entity with its own social and political system and
remained outside the sphere of colonial administration. In the 1935 Government of India Act, the
CHT was declared a “totally excluded area.” When the postcolonial states of Pakistan and

Identity, Conflict, and Social Movement Activism in Bangladesh … 55
political leadership, seeking to represent the interests of the Pahari population,7 took
a strong stand against the assimilationist politics pursued by the first Bangladeshi
government. This led to the formation of the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati
(PCJSS) in 1972, a political organization that advocates for the recognition of
cultural differences and strongly opposes exclusion and discrimination. The situation
in the CHT worsened from 1975, as the Bangladeshi military seized power in a
bloody coup and reversed the nation’s trajectory in its attempt to define national
identity anew. The PCJSS’s demands for the recognition of cultural differences and
regional autonomy were suppressed by increasingly violent means. Heavy
militarization resulted in an open and violent conflict between the Banglade shi army
and the PCJSS’s armed wing.
The military-dominated governments of General Ziaur (Zia) Rahman (1975–1981)
and General Hossain Muhammad Ershad (1982–1990) not only shaped political
developments in the CHT but had far-reaching consequences for Bangladesh in
general. Both promoted Islamization as part of seeking to earn a veneer of legitimacy
(Hakim 1998). Secularism was replaced with the phrase “Absolute trust and faith in
Almighty Allah,” while a new clause was included in the Constitution: “The state
shall endeavor to consolidate, preserve, and strengthen friendly relations among
Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity” (Kabeer 1991; Jahan 2003; Riaz
2013).8
President Zia legitimized the return of religiously-based political parties such as
Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI), and declared the slogan “Joy Bangla” (Bengali: jaẏ bāṃlā;
i.e. “Victory to Bengal”) as un-Islamic, to be replaced with “Bangladesh zindabad”
(Bengali: bāṃlālādeś jindābād; i.e. “Long live Bangladesh!”). Attempts to blur the
lines between state and religion continued unabashed during the regime of President
Ershad: Islam became the state religion in 1988, and un-Islamic practices and
expressions were discouraged. What could be remembered in public spaces was
strictly regulated by the then government (D’Costa 2013). Although a signatory to
the World Plan of Action for the UN Decade for Women, the Bangladesh
government refused to ratify a number of clauses (related to inheritance, marriage,
subsequently Bangladesh attempted military, bureaucratic, political, and economic encroachment
into the CHT’s indigenous territories strong counterreactions ensued.
7 “Pahari” (Bengali: pāhāṙi) literally means “hill people.” The term is commonly used to denote the
CHT’s indigenous population.
8 In the area of foreign policy, Bangladesh initially opted for nonalignment, negotiating mainly with
India and socialist countries on aid and assistance, which negatively affected the building of relations
with the United States. After the 1975 coup, President Zia set the country firmly on its still-present
pro-Islamic and pro-US course, where aid from the developed capitalist countries became much more
important, as did that from OPEC states — particularly Saudi Arabia. For example, during the
devastating famine of 1974, the US decided to withhold food shipments (due to Bangladesh’s trade
relations with Cuba) at a time when the population was suffering from one of the country’s worst
disasters to date. It should also be noted that Saudi Arabia refused to recognize the new state of
Bangladesh until the assassination of Prime Minister Sheikh Mujib and the subsequent appointment
of President Zia. For detail see (Sobhan 1982).

56 Hosna J. Shewly and Eva Gerharz
child custody, and divorce) listed in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, on the grounds that they conflicted with Sharia
law (Kabeer 1991). Despite the strict control of information and banning of any
commemorative rituals other than those sanctioned by the authoritarian state, public
resentment grew (Hossain 2015). In January 1983, President Ershad reneged on his
plan to turn Bangladesh into an Islamic state after massive protests.9 Such ongoing
resistance has helped moderate the extent to which official Islamization has a direct
effect on women’s rights in Bangladesh. Military rule ended with a popular
democratic uprising in 1990.
The period of parliamentary democracy from 1991 to 2013 was marked by the fierce
rivalry between the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party
(BNP). This resulted in a polarized politica l landscape vis-à-vis national identi ty and
nation-building: the AL continues to embrace Bengali nationalism, the BNP
supports a Bangladeshi-Muslim form thereof, while JEI promotes an overtly
political Islam. In the preceding years, Islamist groups in general and JEI in
particular had not only gained recognition as legitimate political actors but also
emerged as kingmakers, both electorally as well as ideologically, having formed a
coalition with the BNP (Riaz 2004, 7).
This notwithstanding, during the new era of democracy the victims of the 1971 war
organized and led the Gono Adalot movement, which, on January 19, 1992, formed
the 101-member Ekattorer Ghatak Dalal Nirmul Committee (EGDNC) (“Committee
for Eradicating the Killers and Collaborators of [19]71”). This nonviolent
movement, as well as the leadership of JEI, appealed to all segments of society (De
2015; Mookherjee 2009). The Committee’s demands developed into a slogan taken
up by urban youth. The AL enjoyed a landslide election victory in 2008 with the
mandate of establishing an “International Crime Tribunal” to punish the war
criminals. In 2011, it also passed a National Women’s Development Policy that was
fiercely opposed by Islamists in reinstating secularism to the Constitution. During
this period, the AL overtly supported the Shahbag movem ent and instructed the state
security apparatus to be extremely heavy-handed in its response to the
countermovement organized by HEI.
After 2014, however, the AL would reverse its position on secularism. It has since
pursued an increasing Islamization of Bangladesh’s political culture in official
speeches,10 has passed blasphemy laws, and has overseen the revision of school
9 Twenty-three opposition leaders also issued a statement warning that the declaration of an Islamic
state would lead to civil war and communal strife. Various women’s groups led this opposition, with
a popular newspaper headline reading: “This time the women have taken the lead” (Kabeer 1991,
55).
10 On March 23, 2014, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina declared that the country would be governed as
per the Medina Charter, a 622 CE document that lays out the principles of Islamic governance —
representing a significant shift as part of Bangladesh’s journey from its promise to banish religion
from the public sphere to bringing religion into the heart of state ideology (Riaz 2020).

Identity, Conflict, and Social Movement Activism in Bangladesh … 57
texts.11 An increasingly authoritarian style of rule has seen the AL make greater
concessions to HEI. Lorch (2019) interprets these developments as part of a top-
down process of state-led Islamization and a strategy to contain the rise of Islamic
social movements, fierce political competition, and to legitimize semi-authoritarian
rule.
“Cultural engineering” — that is, the attempt to create a sense of national identity in
cultural terms — occurs particularly in the areas of education and communication
(Breuilly 1985). Since independence, there have been vast changes in Bangladesh’s
political culture, social practices, and most importantly in its national identity and
integration. Public culture in Bangladesh has seen a transition in terms of the
acceptance of Islam, due to state patronization. This reflects Gellner’s (1983)
argument that national identity is supported by national institutions and reinforced
through the education system in line with the narratives promoted by state elites.
Nation-building policies in Bangladesh — whether upheld via language criteria, the
promotion of national history, or school textbooks — are all devoted to
implementing elites’ preferred nation-sta te project. While Bengal i identity advocates
excluded ethnic minorities, the promoters of a Bangladeshi-Muslim identity have
additionally excluded not only ethnic but also religious minorities. In the years since
independence, national-identity formation and nation-building measures have seen
periods of secularism and religiosity, with associated resistance emerging through
various forms of activism. As a result, in Bangladesh today two ideologically divided
camps exist, while politics, culture, and grassroots activism continue to shape
constitutional, institutional, and educational perspectives in the country (as well as
their various contestations).
Forced assimilation, conflict, and indigenous movements
In the 1970s, as the country’s military rulers discontinued negotiations and instead
violently repressed demands for regional autonomy, insurgents in the CHT began to
fight back for their right to self-determination. The military attacked local villages,
taking part in massacres, acts of torture, and disappearances — which contributed to
massive internal and international displacement (to India) during the 1980s and
1990s (Chakma and D’Costa 2013). Quite often, the vacated lands were taken over
by Bengalis, who were relocated under a scheme named the “Settlement of landless
non-tribal families in the CHT” between 1979 and 1985 (Adnan and Dastidar 2011,
42). 12
11 The government launched new editions of schoolbooks in 2017, which featured more references to
religious symbols and from which 17 poems that Islamic conservatives had condemned as “atheist”
were removed (Lorch 2019).
12 Officially, approximately 400,000 Bengalis (mostly Muslims) took part in this program, but it is
estimated that the number settled in the hills is actually much higher. Before agreeing to settle in the
CHT, each migrant family was promised 5 acres of hilly land, 4 acres of “mixed” land, and 2.5 acres
of paddy land in addition to access to bank loans. The government organized the logistics of their

58 Hosna J. Shewly and Eva Gerharz
This scheme also involved the forcible eviction of indigenous people from their
homes and their regrouping in “cluster villages.” Because of the traditional system
of collective land ownership in the CHT, where oftentimes no officially accepted
land titles exist, allegedly ownerless land was distributed to Bengali settlers — thus
depriving the previous occupants access to the lands they had recently lived on and
farmed. The scheme was ultimately designed to suppress the armed resistance of the
PCJSS rebels (Dewan 1990, 243; Adnan and Dastidar 2011, 42). It has also been
argued that the government’s real motive behind the relocation program was to
“colonize” the CHT by bringing about a demographic shift (Mohsin 2003). The
initiatives, taken in the name of development, ultimately marginalized Paharis and
alienated them from their lands – a process that Levene (1999) defines as a case of
“creeping genocide. ” Since independence, all regimes and governments have denied
the demands for self-determination or regional autonomy by the CHT and
legitimized the exclusion of minorities there and violence toward them. This was
achieved by labeling them a serious threat to the security and territorial integrity of
Bangladesh (Mohsin 1997, 2003; Guhathakurta 2002; Gardner and Gerharz 2016;
Bal and Siraj 2017; Gerharz and Pfaff-Czarnecka 2017). As various scholars have
pointed out, defining the minority as a danger to the greater community constitutes
an essential strategy in the building of national unity — one rooted in colonial,
administrative, and political measures (Appadurai 2006; Riaz 2020).
In 1997 a Peace Accord was signed in the CHT, following negotiations between the
AL government and the PCJSS’s leadership. From the point of view of activism, the
peace process implied a transition from a militant to a civil social movement. The
peace process was accompanied by the institutionalization of an indigenous-rights
regime — a comprehensive transition that fostered the reinterpretation of questions
of identity and brought to the fore indigeneity as a new unifying category of
identification (Gerharz 2015). In the re alm of social-movement activism in the CHT,
the post-Accord period has seen a split into various factions amid party politics,
military interference, diverse economic interests, and intragroup animosities.
Beyond these internal divisions, contemporary activism in the CHT occurs on two
fronts: namely regarding indigenous issues and participation in general movements
respectively. An ongoing clampdown by state forces starting around 2017 has forced
many indigenous political activists to flee, with many of them still on the run
(Chakma and Chakma 2021). Research participants mentioned in interviews that
activists located in the CHT need to be extremely cautious, and that there is always
the risk they will be deemed insurgents by the security forces. In response to these
increasingly repressive government strategies, the members of respective social
transportation to the CHT with different reception points along the way. The state also provided
incentives like cash allowances, military protection in their new locations, and food rations. The
transmigration program officially ended in 1985, but research shows that settlement continued “albeit
in disguise” into the second decade of the twenty-first century (Chakma 2010, 42).

Identity, Conflict, and Social Movement Activism in Bangladesh … 59
movements have been forced to either quit, go underground, or take refuge in other
countries; those who choose to stay and remain active are subject to extensive
surveillance.
Thus, regional activism can be classified as extremely risky and relatively
unsuccessful vis-à-vis attracting media attention to its cause. Interlocutors shared
their frustrations over mainstream media: “Our news only appears (though partially)
in the newspaper if an incident goes viral on social media.” All research participants
unanimously argued that the CHT sees a much higher prevalence of human rights
violations because it is de facto ruled by the military. Although the Peace Accord
included a clause on demilitarization and specifically the withdrawal of all army
camps from the region, currently there still exist over 400 military or paramilitary
camps (Hill Voice 2021) in major strategic locations. The government employs a
variety of means to conceal the deteriorating human rights situation: denying access
to human rights observers, restricting the movement of foreigners, or openly
threatening human rights activists. Despite a number of attempts to make human
rights violations in the CHT public, the military has never been held accountable for
the violence perpetrated there, and such news is seldom heard in the mainstream
media.
One of the few opportunities for activists to reach a wider audience is coordinated
activism via social media. Indigenous youth activism in this space lobbies against
military oppression, land grabs in the name of development, tensions with Bengali
settlers, and gender-based violence. Tourism, commercial plantations, resource
extraction, and external — as well as, to a limited extent, internal — corporate actors
have caused further l oss of lands, of livelihoods, not to mention forced displace ments
(Adnan and Dastidar 2011; Ahmed 2017). Commercially driven land grabs have
become the central issue afflicting the CHT. Alongside a commitment to upholding
human rights, devolving power to regional bodies, and demilitarizing the region, the
Peace Accord also includes provisions for speeding up “development,” the
settlement of land disputes, and for the rehabilitation of indigenous refugees and
internally displaced persons. However, the non-implementation of most of the
Accord’s provisions continues to be a source of stark disappointment and contention.
Due to the massive ongoing migration of Bengalis from the country’s plains to the
CHT, the indigenous population has become a minority in demographic terms.
Moreover, the domination of Bengalis in virtually every social, political, and
economic space in the region, observed by scholars during the early post-Accord
years (e.g. Gerharz 2002; Adnan 2008), continues to the present day. Despite the
Accord, the years of terror imposed on the local population (Uddin and Gerharz
2017) have instilled acute feelings of alienation from successive ruling Bengali
regimes (Mohsin 2003).
In addition to online activism, CHT youth have strengthened their networks and
participation vis-à-vis various nationwide social movements to bring the injustices
experienced locally onto other organizations’ agendas. One example is the women’s

60 Hosna J. Shewly and Eva Gerharz
movement, which has actively supported activist initiatives against gender-based
violence in the CHT (D’Costa 2014; Gerharz 2014). To change the enduring stigmas
resulting from racist prejudices against the indigenous population in the national
mainstream media, activists often visualize that which might help break social and
political stereotypes.
Such initiatives reveal that contrary to established forms of nationalist exclusion,
ethnicity is being juxtaposed with other categories such as age and gender. Such
activism, located in as well as strategically addressing intersecting categories of
identification, can inspire commitment in multiple subordinate groups (Frederick
2010), and serves the call for a more holistic form of social justice and social change
(Pastrana 2006, 2010). In October 2020, for example, Bengali and indigenous
activists formed a coalition in which they marched and occupied city spaces together
in a week-long protest against rape and the culture of impunity around it in
Bangladesh. Their slogan “In hills and plains, the battle will persist uniformly” is an
essential step toward the bringing together of diverse voices speaking out against
violence against women (Shewly and Gerharz 2021). Such intersectional activism
reflects the importance of overlapping memberships in social-movement spillover
(Meyer and Whittier 1994) and demonstrates the ultimate permeability of the
nationalist imaginary.
Besides being represented as a security threat, indigenous people are also
constructed — particularly by the media but also in some textbooks — as an “exotic”
other (CHT Commission 1991, 91; Gerharz 2015). The popularity of such images of
the backward, primitive, yet beautiful and interesting “tribals” is embedded in
colonial and postcolonial notions of civilization and development (Schendel 1992,
103). Since independence, Bangladesh’s indigenous peoples have challenged the
degrading imagination of “tribals” as “backward” and “primitive” and sought
recognition as equal citizens. Reflecting on such representations, our research
participants highlighted how different dimensions of discrimination and power
relations impacted their lives. In line with such viewpoints, indigenous activists
across the country use social media to publicly counter the twin stigma associated
with their intersectional marginalities and identities (Zimmerman et al. 2012)
through visual art and storytelling — both individually and collectively.
State-making policies and practices in the CHT are, therefore, not only
discriminatory but also instruments of internal colonization. While local activists try
to resist acts of land grabbing and forced displacement, their concerns rarely occupy
a place in policy discourses or make headlines in popular or state media. However,
their involvement in national collectives such as the women’s movement
demonstrates progress is being made regarding the interconnection of identity
processes on multiple levels.

Identity, Conflict, and Social Movement Activism in Bangladesh … 61
Shahbag and its counter-movement: A redux of competing
identities
The Shahbag movement emerging in 2013 was first sparked by the verdict delivered
in one of Bangladesh’s war-criminal trials. 13 Research participants consistently
stressed that the movement was galvanized not merely because of Kader Mullah’s
V sign after being sentenced to life imprisonment for being a collaborator during the
war of independence, but also because of increasing suspicions and frustrations over
the decades-old political culture of “hidden negotiations” between the government
and opposition politicians (see also, The Daily Star 2013). Initially it was young
people and students who engaged in online activism, so-called bloggers who helped
drive the ultimate engagement of the masses (De 2015). As articulated by one of its
leading organizers during the field research: “We called the event and thought only
a few would turn up […] but people were making it bigger every minute.”
This unpre cedented participation of ordinary people is a sign both of popular support
and public acceptance, essential aspects of a social movement’s potential for
genuinely transforming state and society. Shahbag activists and supporters shared
how in its early days the movement reflected the desire to undo three decades of
nation-building policies wherein war criminals had played a significant role. The
new collective reinvigorated the latent emotions and memories of the independence
movement and 1971 war through their various symbolic and peaceful performative
acts.
Which exact issues motivated people to participate in Shahbag events (Tarrow
1998)? Several key aspects appeared in their answers to our related questions, such
as reforming the justice system to prevent corruption in politics, emotions and
memories surrounding the war, participating in a peaceful movement beyond
otherwise contentious political-party mandates, or bringing closure to the sad
chapter of the “collaboration” by some locals in Pakistan’s repressive actions pre-
independence. Like in many other countries, particularly those in the Global South,
a large number of younger Bangladeshis distrust political parties completely
(Shewly and Gerharz 2021).
Indigenous research participants recalled their motivations in joining the movement:
namely inclusivity, and the hope that the fulfillment of the promises made during the
declaration of independence14 might bring some changes to their less-than-citizen
status. Jointly, they amended one of the 1971 slogans ‘tumi ke? āmi ke? bāṅāli,
13 Individual online activists used blogging platforms to showcase their particular agendas and
ideological motivations. Young, urban bloggers had been active since around 2005, demanding that
war criminals face trial, bringing to the fore various historical facts, and offering narratives of
genocide and JEI’s involvement with Pakistan that had either been forgotten or buried by those in
power.
14 The elected political leadership formed a provisional government and issued the proclamation of the
independence of Bangladesh on April 10, 1971. The government pledged to establish “equality,
human dignity, and social justice” as fundamental guiding principles.

62 Hosna J. Shewly and Eva Gerharz
bāṅāli’, by changing it to ‘tumi ke? āmi ke? bāṅāli, pāhāṙī’ (“Who are you? Who
am I? Bengali, Pahari”). In questions of identity, thus, the slogan reflects a
recognition of ethnocultural plurality.
Shahbag leaders initially followed a strategy of not aligning themselves with any
politicians. Although this helped it become a people’s movement, this impression
was not sustained (Roy 2018). Many research participants, both those who actively
took part in the protests as well as supporters, noted that they lost interest in Shahbag
once “the people’s movement had been hijacked by the ruling party.” One of the
participants shared that the “AL is not only capable of organizing successful
movements, but [also] of negating a popular movement.” The movement suffered its
biggest blow when a self-proclaimed atheist blogger and Shahbag activist, Rajib,
was stabbed to death for his antireligious writings in Bengali. On top of this, his
blogposts were published in a right-wing newspaper, which branded Shahbag a
nāstik (“atheist”) movement (Chowdhury 2019). Worth mentioning here is that the
print media was also highly polarized and active in discursive “Othering” (Parvez
2022). Secularist positions were subsequently denounced by the countermovement
as atheist, the government distanced itself from Shahbag, and the participation of
ordinary people fell markedly (Sajjad and Härdig 2016). More importantly,
however, the accusation of promoting atheism provoked a discussion at a general
level about the role of Islam in Bangladesh and raised questions of how far the faith
belonged to “national culture.”
A few weeks after the instigation of the Shahbag movement, a strongly religious
orthodox group, HEI,15 emerged in campaigning against these activists (Chowdhury
2019). The organization served notice to the governing AL by gathering over half a
million supporters in Dhaka on April 6, 2013, for a protest where the main slogan
was: “Hang the atheist bloggers” (Mustafa 2013). HEI put forward a total of 13
demands, criticizing the government for not taking action against what it called
“atheist bloggers.” Among these was the call for a new blasphemy law, with the
death penalty for those who insulted Islam and the Prophet Muhammad. On May 5,
HEI arranged another rally (“long march”) in Dhaka to again demand the acceptance
of their 13 conditions. During a violent encounter between HEI supporters and
police, 27 people (incl uding two policem en) were killed and many more injured and
arrested (BBC 2013).16
15 HEI has traditionally not sought power through electoral processes, but instead has looked to use its
“street muscle” to change Bangladesh’s secular culture and politics through the enforcement of what
it believes are proper Islamic ways. The organizations belonging to the HEI coalition are based in
more than 25,000 madrasahs across Bangladesh.
16 HEI supporters reportedly vandalized and torched 50 vehicles, a number of buildings and political
offices, as well as assaulted journalists during their rally. In the early hours of May 6, security forces
— drawn from the police, the elite Rapid Action Battalion, and from the paramilitary Border Guard
Bangladesh — jointly launched an operation and used stun grenades and rubber bullets to disperse
protesters and end their sit-in. The government has filed charges against 12 of HEI’s top leaders for
murder, vandalism, arson, the destruction of property, and other crimes (BBC 2013).

Identity, Conflict, and Social Movement Activism in Bangladesh … 63
While the polarization between two movements exemplifies the contestation over
the significance of religion versus secularism in the Bangladeshi nationalist
imaginary, it a lso reveals other significa nt facets in play here such as class dynamics,
the switching of public support from one movement to another, the influence of the
education system, and similar. The Shahbag movement, for example, is generally
considered to be spearheaded by predominantly secularist middl e-class urban youth,
and the HEI countermovement by a younger generation of an opposing mold:
namely rural, lower class, predominantly male madrasah students. Some research
participants expressed similar frustrations with the perceived divisions along class
rather than ideological lines. One interviewee complained that: “Rich people’s sons
(Shahbag activists) were allowed to stay on the street for weeks, but the government
was brutal with our sons (HEI supporters) when they occupied the streets only for a
day.”
Our own field research reveals a more complex picture beyond mere differences of
class, however. Although it could be said that Qawmi madrasah students come from
a middle-class background, and many participated in both movements, religious
identity nevertheless played a big role in people’s alignment choices. As one activist
shared: “I joined Shahbag because I wanted punishment for the war criminals, but I
care about my religion too.” Another felt that: “It was a question of your belief part
of my education in the madrasah — later I joined the long march to Dhaka. Ordinary
people on the way to Shapla Square offered us food, water, and showed solidarity!
It was not Qawmi madrasah – only movement.” Some participants expressed their
disappointment over HEI’s political strategy to try and remove the government: “We
all marched on their call to save Islam, but it was shocking to find out their political
wishes — they were discussing who will take over the president’s and the prime
minister’s positions.” Internal divisions within the network of Qawmi madrasahs
also deterred many members of other madrasahs from joining the long march.
A decade on from the original Shahbag protests, the topic of Bengali and Muslim
identity continues to consume Bangladesh’s social and political spheres to such an
extent that many of the ongoing injustices and structural inequalities in the country
are not strongly contested for fear of taking sides. University students involved in
our research, irrespective of their religious or ethnic identities, expressed their
frustrations over the fugitive politics surrounding national identity. In group
discussions, they shared that they do not have the luxury of thinking about a national
identity in the current situation where their employment prospects are bleak, daily
living expenses rising, student accommodation is politically explosive and unsafe,
and the streets are dangerous for girls and women. Others remarked that they do not
belong to either of these groups. As a student in a public university noted: “I want to
solve my everyday problems, for example, corruption or oppression by the ruling
party’s student wing but there is no way to form a crowd. The coalition breaks apart
mostly on identity lines.” People coming together en masse is vital to popular politics
because doing so provides a highly visible, physically present, and embodied form
of contestation (Chowdhury 2019).

64 Hosna J. Shewly and Eva Gerharz
A diverse paradoxical assortment of factions currently paralyzes Bangladeshi
politics, with competing nationalisms, grievances, and m ovements all falling into the
trap of binary politics. These movements — parallel, conte ntious, and continuous —
have not only instrumentalized many of the institutional and public policy changes
seen in recent decades but also revealed deep-seated divisions within Bangladeshi
society. One example is the split among the younger generation and people in
general over national identity, the result of contested nation-building strategi es since
independence. Significantly, however, a rising trend among students of placing more
importance on everyday practicalities than on visions of an overarching national
identity might suggest a new driving force being at work in the near future.
Conclusion
The paper showed how political discourses and ruling elite s’ nation-building policies
have taken capricious paths since Bangladesh’s birth in 1971. We were also able to
draw on our research findings in illuminating the different positionalities as well as
the significant role that religion and language play in Bangladeshi political culture.
Despite cultural and linguistic diversity, there has been a “systematic reluctance” to
recognize the “plural and heterogeneous nature” of the country’s ethnic minorities
within the legal framework of modern Bangladesh’s Constitution (Adnan 2008, 27).
Similarly, the analysis revealed that the construction of a Bengali versus Bangladeshi
nationalism is so powerful that it supersedes (visions of) everyday reality.
Meanwhile, the increased visibility of religion in political and public life does not
mean the death of secularization; instead, it highlights that secularization is a
complex, multifaceted process that encompasses a number of different dimensions
of individual and collective life (Riaz 2020, 10). Bangladesh’s social movements are
at a crossroads in terms of their coordinated responses to state hegemony because of
these divisions along identity lines. While social-movement actors struggle to
overcome these binary nationalisms, many ordinary students are striving to find new
ways to position themselves beyond such divides in Bangladesh. These contested
identity politics and subsequent movements overshadow the general aspiration of
nation-building: namely community formation.
We made three important theoretical contributions to the discussion of nation-
building policies and politics in the Bangladeshi context. First, nation-building is a
contentious, complex, and continuous process that necessitates a temporal approach
being taken to fully fathom its multifaceted nature. Second, the goal of developing a
so-called natural homogeneity under the guise of nation-building is a political
project, one that masks intersectional inequalities, enforces majoritarianism, and,
ultimately, thus remains ineffective. The goal of nation-building should not be to
develop a single nation in the sense of shared ethos but to build a common
commitment to a single state (Talentino 2004). It is about consultation, negotiation,
and compromise.

Identity, Conflict, and Social Movement Activism in Bangladesh … 65
Third and finally, nation-building is not linear, but an occurrence regarding which
we need to take into account the complex interaction of various resistances (social
movements) that alter, pause, complicate, or shape that (top-down) process. At the
same time, social movements are in perpetual motion, they have their ups and downs,
they exist as mobilizations and uprisings but also in latent states — at once shaping
and at the same time being shaped by political culture. We, thus, brought together
two literature strands that normally work in isolation, therewith calling also for more
empirically informed work on the intersection between social movements and
nation-building policies as well as practices.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank German Research Foundation (Project Number 395804440)
for funding this research, Carmen Brandt for her kind editorial support, Abantee
Harun, Papreen Nahar, and Shahaduz Zaman for their tremendous support during
field research as well as two anonymous reviewers for their constructive criticism.
We are grateful to our research participants for generously sharing their time,
experiences, and thoughts with us.
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