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International Conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION
Vol. XXIX No 1 2023
FUNCTIONAL MODELS OF THE SPONSOR-AGENT RELATIONSHIP IN PROXY
WARFARE
Alin CÎRDEI, Paul TUDORACHE, Lucian ISPAS
“Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy, Sibiu, Romania
cirdei.alin@armyacademy.ro, p_tudorache@yahoo.com, ispaslucian04@yahoo.com
Abstract: Proxy wars are a form of confrontation whose origins are lost in the mists of history. In the
20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century, this type of war experienced a sharp
development due to the changes that took place on the international scene. Due to the fact that the
great powers avoided direct confrontation during the Cold War, for fear that this confrontation would
degenerate into a new conventional or even nuclear world war, they chose to use proxy warfare as a
pressure relief valve, a way to put the opponent in difficulty, to gain influence or even economic,
political or other benefits. Proxy wars can take place both between states and between groups within a
state, or between a terrorist group, paramilitary organisation, etc. and a state, and the common
element is given by the fact that one or both of the parties benefit from external support, especially in
the form of armaments, ammunitions, intelligence, expertise, advice from a sponsor of which it
becomes an agent. In exchange for the sponsor's support, the agent offers him a series of advantages,
influence, etc. The sponsor obtains strategic advantages without direct involvement, without exposing
himself and without settling national and international image costs, while the agent is actively
involved in combat operations, it is he who must ensure the achievement of objectives to satisfy both
his own expectations and those of the sponsor.
Keywords: proxy war, sponsor, agent, indirect confrontation
1. Introduction
Proxy warfare is a particular form of
confrontation, which can be associated with
a conflict of lower intensity, with less
geographical spread than a direct conflict
between states of the same caliber. This
type of war has always been seen as a way
to gain advantages, to achieve political and
military objectives without direct military
intervention, by using an armed force
willing to do anything to satisfy the needs
and interests of the power that supports and
directs the intervention, which cannot be
held accountable most of the time because
it does not represent a state entity. The
support from the powerful state can be
direct and visible or indirect, invisible,
difficult or impossible to attribute to
someone and therefore it can be a preferred
form of intervention to promote some
interests, some objectives, to reduce the
influence of a potential adversary, to cause
damage etc. Proxy warfare is not something
new on the international scene, it has been
used since ancient times, but it returned to
the attention of researchers during the Cold
War [1], when the great powers, faced with
the risk of a total, nuclear war, sought new
forms of confrontation, repressing tensions,
promoting ideologies, obtaining or
maintaining spheres of influence, etc. Thus
proxy war became the main form of
confrontation on the international stage,
with great powers choosing to support
DOI: 10.2478/kbo-2023-0005
© 2023 Alin Cîrdei et al. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives
3.0 License.
27
smaller states or even armed groups that
were involved in regional, local conflicts or
civil wars. After the end of the cold war, the
war through intermediaries did not
disappear from the international scene, but
acquired new forms of manifestation, being
associated most of the time with a way of
materializing the hybrid conflict.
2. Fundamental aspects of the proxy
warfare
The proxy war is a form of confrontation that
is not new and that in the 21st century
acquired new forms of manifestation, the
conflict evolving rapidly and becoming a
form of manifestation of hybrid war. In
general terms, proxy war can be defined as an
international conflict, between state or non-
state actors, fought on the territory of a third
party, which hides under the guise of an
internal or regional conflict and which uses
the human resources and territory of the
smaller states to fulfill the objectives of the
stronger state. The concept of “proxy war”
refers to wars in which a stronger state
provides a smaller state or entity with support
that could be useful in the course of a
conflict, such as “funding, arms, equipment,
advising, training, intelligence, and/or troops,
for the purposes of accomplishing some
strategic objective” [2].
Proxy wars are based on how power
relations are constructed, on the respect and
appreciation enjoyed by the conflicting
parties, and also consider the consequences
of direct displays of support between the
parties involved. When the cooperation
between the parties is based on certain
agreements, on the direct assumption of
certain responsibilities, rights and
obligations between the parties, we can
speak of the existence of an alliance or
coalition, formed by entities with
appropriate or identical objectives, but with
different capabilities. In the situation where
we are talking about the lack of open
relations, the need for the relationship
between the parties to remain clandestine,
the existence of strong asymmetries, then
we can bring up the proxy conflict, in
which one party supports, provides
resources, information, etc. [3], and one
side is supported in exchange for promoting
the interests of the stronger side, but which
wishes to remain in the shadows. The
supporting party is also known as the
sponsor, and the supported party is called
an intermediary or agent, a power tool used
by the powerful in order to achieve their
own goals. In the proxy conflict everything
revolves around interests and power
relations, as both the sponsor and the
intermediary want to obtain maximum
benefits with minimum effort and exposure.
However, the proxy must bear the greatest
risks and the strongest consequences arising
from the materialization of power relations
and the way the conflict is completed.
Proxy conflict is sought by powerful states,
because this way they can pursue their
strategic goals and at the same time avoid
direct engagement, involvement in a costly,
bloody and uncertain conflict. From these
considerations, we can state that the proxy
war is a hybrid war, which uses
conventional and non-conventional means,
in physical, informational and virtual
dimensions, to achieve with minimal efforts
and with reduced exposure some objectives
of strategic importance, proxy wars being
the “product of a relationship between a
benefactor, who is a state or non-state actor
external to the dynamic of an existing
conflict, and the chosen proxies who are the
conduit for the benefactor’s weapons,
training and funding” [4].
The emergence, evolution and completion
of proxy war can be influenced by complex
factors such as geopolitical, economic,
political, ideological, cultural and last but
not least military interests [5]. A state's
appetite for proxy war can be understood by
identifying the main reasons behind the
desire to support other states or non-state
actors through the use of military and
economic instruments, such as: the
possibility of changing or balancing the
balance of power, weakening adversaries,
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economic gains, obtaining political
influence, promoting currents of opinion
internally, the possibility of providing
humanitarian support. Likewise, a sponsor's
decision to engage in a proxy war may be
influenced by tactical and operational
factors such as the length of supply lines,
the complexity of logistical support,
domestic and international exposure,
limitations and vulnerabilities of
conventional forces, political constraints
etc., elements that can make “prolonged
military confrontation unattractive to many
decision makers” [6], because the costs of
this direct confrontation are far too great in
relation to the benefits it brings and
therefore it will prefer to wage a war
through intermediaries.
For proxy warfare to materialize there
needs to be a strong asymmetry in the
relationship between the parties in favor of
the sponsor, and the agent must be willing
or coerced to accept protection and support
from the sponsor in exchange for promoting
interests and concentrating efforts to satisfy
demands of a sponsor who may have
visible, clearly expressed or even hidden
interests. The power relationship between
sponsor and agent is clearly in favor of the
sponsor, who will seek by any means to
keep the agent under control, to prevent him
from amassing too much power and
desiring emancipation or even rebellion.
The protector-protégé relationship is effective
and sustainable as long as both parties have
something to gain, as long as they see each
other as partners in a symbiotic relationship
and not in a parasitic relationship. When the
sponsor disregards the agent, the latter's
desire to get out of this relationship, to free
himself from constraints and follow his own
path will appear, and when the agent refuses
to follow the path imposed or desired by the
sponsor , tries to make its own decisions that
may even be in conflict with the sponsor's
interests, the sponsor will resort to coercive
tools to bring the agent back under its own
control, limit or withdraw its support, or even
try to find another agent to compete or fight
with the original agent, who got out of
control. From this perspective, even if the
relationship between sponsor and agent in
proxy war is a relationship based on common
interests, on the possibility of easy
satisfaction of political, economic or military
needs, this does not mean that the situation
cannot get out of control and that the mutual
benefits offered by proxy war cannot turn into
disadvantages. The lack of border control and
the geographical positioning between the
sponsor and the agent can facilitate proxy
wars by enabling access to resources or
providing the ability to retreat to external safe
havens [7].
In proxy warfare the relations between the
sponsor - the supporting party and the agent
- the supported party are not formalized by
a written understanding, agreement or
treaty, but are based on informal, unofficial
understandings, without established
cooperation or coordination relationships
and without existing command-control
relationships between the sponsor and the
agent. The relationship between the sponsor
and the agent is complex and involves the
sponsor delegating some responsibilities to
a local actor that it does not fully control,
making often important investments in
equipping and supporting the intermediary's
armed forces participating in the
confrontations, maintaining out of the
attention of the international community as
long as its own interests demand it.
3. Main models of the agent–sponsor
relationship in modern proxy warfare
The relationship between sponsor and agent
is very complex, each war having its own
peculiarities and forms of manifestation.
However, studies conducted by specialists
in the field have highlighted five main
models of proxy conflicts from the
perspective of power, influence and
responsibility relationships that are
established between the parties involved
[8]: the exploitative model, the transactional
model, the coercive model, the contractual
model and the cultural model (figure no. 1).
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Figure 1: Models of proxy warfare (apud Fox, Amos C. “Strategic Relationships, Risk, and Proxy
War.” Journal of Strategic Security 14, no. 2 (2021), pp. 1-24).
The exploitative model is based on a parasitic
relationship, where the intermediary is
completely dependent on the sponsor for its
own survival. This dependence gives rise to
very strong bonds between the sponsor and
the agent, and the sponsor has almost
unlimited power over the agent, who feels
obliged to satisfy all the demands of the
sponsor on whose support his own survival
depends. After the sponsor meets its goals,
the agent is no longer important and support
may be reduced or even discontinued if the
relationship is no longer profitable for the
sponsor. In this relationship the agent is
nothing more than a tool for the sponsor, who
does not necessarily have any special affinity
for the latter. A representative example of this
model can be the relationship between the
Russian Federation and the separatist
republics from Eastern Ukraine, for the
period 2014 - 2022.
The coercive model is based on a
contingent relationship, between two parties
that have nothing in common. In this
relationship the sponsor forces the agent to
promote his interests, the agent not being
very willing to take risks, and the sponsor
must constantly make his presence and
importance felt in order to keep the agent
under control and focused on the fulfilment
of the imposed objectives. This relationship
is one of conjuncture, not based on respect
or common ideals, and is characterized by
an acute lack of trust, each of the parties
involved having to expect changes in
orientation of the other party and even
attacks from its side, so as was the case
with the relationship between international
coalition forces and Afghan security forces.
The coercive model works because the
sponsor possesses significant military and
economic power and has the means to
influence the course of a conflict, and the
agent is forced to accept support for lack of
viable alternatives.
The cultural model is perhaps the most
effective type of proxy relationship
because, in addition to the political, military
and economic interests that bring the
sponsor and the agent closer together, there
is also a cultural affinity between them that
allows them to collaborate more effectively
and that justifies the closeness between the
two sides. Within this type of relationship,
religious, ethnic, linguistic, cultural aspects
are taken into account, which are not
limited to borders or geographical
neighbourhoods, the relationship can also
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be created between entities located at a
distance from each other. Among the most
important advantages of this model we can
list the willingness of the parties to take
risks due to these affinities, their desire to
help an entity that is related and with which
they partially identify, but also the high
level of trust on which this is based
relationship because related entities, sharing
the same language, the same religion, the
same traditions, come together much more
easily and coalesce against a completely
different entity, which shows hostility not
to the agent directly, but to what it
represents (religion, language, ethnicity,
culture). An example of this can be the
support given by Iran to various Shia
militias and groups in conflict with Sunni
groups in Yemen, Palestine or Syria.
The contractual model represents a new
form of manifestation of the conflict
through an intermediary specific to the
modern era and the hybrid conflict, but
essentially it represents one of the oldest
relational models between the agent and the
sponsor. In this model, it is about hiring
mercenaries to fulfil some objectives,
without the relationship between employer
and employee being very clearly
highlighted. The basis of this model is
represented by the possibility of some states
or entities to hire a private security
company to serve as an instrument of force
in a certain area. The use of mercenaries or
private security companies can be a
favorable way to solve certain problems
because it can be more efficient in terms of
costs and benefits, with the sponsor or
employer choosing the most convenient
course of action without directly exposing
themselves and without having legal
responsibilities related to the way of action
of the Security companies, being able at
most to be considered morally responsible.
Examples of this model can be private
security companies used by the US or
Russia, such as Blackwater, Dyncorps or
Wagner.
Another common model is the transactional
one, where each of the actors, both the
sponsor and the agent have something to
gain from the relationship, they have to
give something to get something else in
return. As a rule, the sponsor participates in
this conflict by providing support,
protection, information, advice, and the
agent provides the military force fighting
for the defeat of the common adversary,
assuming human, material and image losses
in exchange for the support received.
Unlike other models, this type of
relationship gives the intermediary greater
bargaining power, as he is the one who
requests support and the one who can shape
how it is provided. In the transactional
model, which can be assimilated to a
commercial contract, usually without a
signed document to this effect, the
relationship between the two parties has a
limited duration and ends when the
objectives are met and when the
intermediary wants to return to the previous
situation, no strings attached. In the
transactional relationship, the intermediary
possesses a military force that allows him to
act, but believes that the involvement of a
sponsor increases his chances of success.
Examples of the materialization of this
model are: the support given by the US to
Iraq for the defeat of ISIS, the support
provided by Russia to Syria in the
framework of the civil war, etc.
Regardless of the model in which proxy
warfare fits, it will remain a preferred form
of conducting conflicts, repositioning
spheres of influence or releasing tensions
on the international stage and will remain
“a core feature of the contemporary and
future strategic and security environment”
[9], because, in theory, proxy war is a
simple solution to a complex problem. In
practice, however, it has been found that
proxy war is actually a simple solution only
in the short term, because the evolution of
events is unpredictable and most of the time
the consequences and effects are not
anticipated and are very difficult to manage.
Proxy warfare gives the sponsor some
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flexibility and freedom of action because he
is not in the foreground and can always
deny or hide involvement in the conflict
and “provides the principal actors a degree
of standoff and limited liability” [10], both
in front of domestic and international public
opinion, as well as in front of international
organisations, which cannot hold the
sponsor responsible for the actions of the
intermediary and thus the impact on the
former is much reduced.
4. Conclusions
Proxy warfare is a cheap, simple, non-
committal way of enabling a stronger state
to achieve its strategic, military, political or
economic objectives in the short and
medium term. In the long term, however,
they can create problems and fissures in the
relationship between the sponsor and the
agent, and the agent to escape from the
control and influence of the sponsor,
creating for him a series of problems that
are difficult to solve, from the creation and
maintenance of instability, the emergence
of the need to intervene later to stabilize the
situation, image costs, etc. Another
consequence of the use of intermediaries in
the promotion of different interests is
related to the observance of the rules of
international humanitarian law by the
intermediary who, in many cases, not being
bound by conventions and being difficult to
hold accountable, indulges in reprehensible
or even illegal acts, facts that can be
imputed to the sponsor, who thus becomes
morally guilty. “Proxy warfare in the form
of state support to non-state armed groups
is a recurrent feature of armed conflicts.
While states have long recognized the
strategic advantages of this form of indirect
conflict intervention, several studies have
linked proxy warfare to a protraction of
conflicts and an increased probability of
violations of international humanitarian
law” [11]. In this situation, the short-term
advantages obtained by the sponsoring state
are cancelled out by the legal and moral
consequences of the intermediary's actions.
However, their transformative effects and
consequences on conflict dynamics more
broadly–conflict elongation and
termination, civilian abuse, victimization,
fatalities–demand a careful calibration of
short and long term gains, as well as costs
and benefits [12].
The relationship between the sponsor and
the agent is a complex relationship,
characteristic of hybrid type confrontations,
in which the armed arm is represented by
the intermediary, the one who assumes
most of the risks and bears most of the
consequences, and the spring, the catalyst is
represented by the sponsor, the one who
provides resources, motivates, sets goals
and limits. The relationship between the
two parties is based on power relations, and
the durability of this relationship is closely
related to the model on which it is built.
The more artificial, more conjunctural the
relationship, the more fragile it is. Because
the relations of power and influence
between the sponsor and the agent are not
regulated and formalized, a state of
uncertainty arises, which, depending on the
evolution of the conflict, can turn into a
state of tension between the two main
actors. It is possible that the sponsor wants
to control the intermediary's actions as
much as possible, considering himself
entitled to the financial, material and
informational support provided, and the
intermediary feeling entitled to benefit from
greater freedom of action, greater
recognition due to the direct effort that he
submits. Moreover, if the intermediary's
actions are successful, it is possible to
witness a desire for emancipation, to get out
of the sponsor's tutelage, to obtain a better
status, which can lead to additional tensions
between the two parties.
Proxy war is and will remain in the future
the preferred form of conflict between
global and regional powers [13], which, in a
multipolar and unpredictable world, where
power relations are complex and where
economic interdependencies make direct
confrontation less likely. The war between
32
Russia and Ukraine, even if it does not fit
into the definition of proxy war, highlights
the vulnerability of a state that has a major
military power against a smaller state, but
which is indirectly supported by other states
and which, avoiding military involvement
directly in the conflict, they can influence
its evolution by imposing sanctions and
limiting economic and commercial relations
with the aggressor state. This lesson can
represent an x-ray of the current Security
environment and an element to increase the
potential importance of proxy warfare in
advancing interests and maintaining or
expanding spheres of influence.
Acknowledgements
This paper was created in the framework of
the Interdisciplinary Education and
Training on Hybrid Warfare (Project ID:
2021-1-HU01-KA220-HED-000032179)
project supported by the European Union
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