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Colonialism Once Again a Bad Idea, Helps
Inspire Terrorism: Conflict in South Asia
By Maia Brown-Jackson
Modern Terrorism and Counterterrorism
Professor James Forest
1
INTRODUCTION
The end of colonialism and subsequent subdivision of land and peoples in South Asia has
served to exacerbate the political, cultural, religious, and ethnic divides in the region. The 1947
partition of India and Pakistan alone sprouted continuing violence that has led to a multitude of
security threats that stem from ethnic and religious conflicts, as well as larger social factors
including poverty and under-development. Two terrorist groups, ostensibly born out of anger,
frustration, and fear created by the partition, have had distinct paths as each fights for its goals. One,
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), frames itself as a religious organization ultimately aiming at global jihad,
but beginning with reclaiming Kashmir from India for Pakistan. Its Islamist ideology has aided it in
getting support from another terrorist group, al Qaeda. The other organization, the United
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), is a secular movement fighting for independence of the state of
Assam, with very few connections or goals outside its immediate territory. While LeT’s ability to
rebrand itself as a new, non-terrorist group and maintain a positive relationship with the Pakistani
state has enabled it to continue, ULFA’s attempts to change with the times have created dissent
within its ranks. Ultimately the more inclusive narrative of cross border Muslim solidarity has
allowed LeT to flourish while the smaller, increasingly divided support base for ULFA has caused
ULFA to stagnate in terms of its original goal of independence.
1
LASHKAR-E-TAIBA
The division of the principalities into the states of India and Pakistan is one factor that led to
unceasing tension between the two nations. Before Britain gave independence to the newly created
states, the area which was to become Pakistan was predominately Muslim, and the area to become
1
While ULFA is in discussions with India, it has split into the pro- and anti-negotiation factions, and the pro-negotiation
faction is aiming for a cease fire currently, not independence, its initial stated goal.
2
India was predominately Hindu. The division into two nations caused tension in each, between the
new majority and new minority groups as they grappled with changes in the balance of power.
i
The territory of Kashmir, in particular, has become a battleground for proxy fighting. One
group fighting in that region against what they consider to be a global issue of Muslim oppression is
Lashkar-e-Taiba, or LeT. LeT was founded in 1987 by Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, Zaki-ur-Rehman
Lakhvi, and Abdul Rehman Makki as a militant branch of a larger group Markaz Dawat-ul-Irshad
(MDI) that sought a universal Islamic state.
ii
Beginning by fighting apostates in Afghanistan, LeT
soon after joined an insurgency begun in Kashmir through protests and violence as early as 1988,
continuing in full insurrection-based violence through the first half of the 1990s.
iii
This was
intended to be a first step to removing Indian power throughout the region and establishing an
Islamic caliphate, but a step they have not yet achieved.
iv
Evidence of their global ambition,
however, can be seen in several attempted and achieved attacks, including the attempted shoe
bomber and the creation of a jihadist group in Virginia.
v
The shift to attacking the US, a step
towards global jihad, rather than solely focusing on Indian territory, illustrates that LeT’s goals are
greater than gaining control of Kashmir.
The group is currently led by founder Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and has been officially
(though not effectively) banned in Pakistan since 2002. It is a hierarchical organization, with
different commanders focused on various regional theaters, but all of whom report to the supreme
commander (Saeed) and his deputy supreme commander. Saeed’s family was one of thousands to
lose family members during the partition.
vi
During university, he was inspired by Saudi Sheikhs he
met to actively support the mujahedeen in Afghanistan.
vii
Those connections helped LeT gain
support from al Qaeda. LeT also receives important support from the Pakistani intelligence service,
the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
viii
Providing funds, training, and weapons—some of these the
stashes left behind when the US withdrew support from the mujahedeen in Afghanistan— the ISI in
3
turn uses LeT to fight against India in Kashmir.
ix
In return, LeT leaders within Pakistan, even when
ostensibly under house arrest, are given enough freedom to allow them to continue to organize, plan
attacks, and work with other terrorist groups.
x
Further, LeT is able to integrate both their jihadist
goals of a Muslim state in South Asia with their role as a proxy army for Pakistan in India (as
opposed to an official government army), as they can frame the latter as a fight against Hindu
oppression of Muslims.
xi
To avoid detection when LeT intelligence operatives were primarily Pashtun and Punjabi,
LeT began creating small local outfits and sleeper cells throughout all of India, aided by the rise of
the Internet.
xii
Indoctrinating groups throughout India, they redirected the focus of the Indian
government away from solely Kashmir.
xiii
Thus far, despite LeT’s global rhetoric, their direct
activities have maintained a focus on India. Saeed has stated: “LeT intends to ‘plant the flag of
Islam in Washington, Tel Aviv and New Delhi.’”
xiv
LeT had a presence in 21 countries as of 2012.
xv
These fighters use a variety of weapons, from AK-47s to rocket-propelled grenades, as well as
highly effective IEDs.
xvi
While the group is jihadist, it doesn’t believe in attacking Muslims. That is part of the
rationale for LeT not carrying out terrorist actions in Pakistan, and fear of the revocation or change
in this attitude prevents the Pakistani government from withdrawing financial support (even when
that support is often publicly denied
2
).
xvii
LeT doesn’t believe in the full legitimacy of the Pakistani
government, but says that in Pakistan, there “is not a struggle between Islam and disbelief.”
xviii
This
relationship between the Pakistani government and LeT also helps support the ISI goal of using the
makeup of LeT—many members share close ties to the Rajouri and Poonch districts (along the Line
of Control between Indian and Pakistan) in Kashmir—to expand the fight and target an increasing
2
Pakistan outlawed the LeT in 2002, but there is continued evidence of financial support and training from the ISI. (”Lashkar-
e-Taiba,” Mapping Militant Organizations, Jan 30 2016, [http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-
bin/groups/view/79].)
4
number of Hindu civilians.
xix
This newer wave of attacks (post-2006) includes “serial bombings,
marketplace attacks, hostage holding and train bombings,” and is increasingly indiscriminate.
xx
The
operatives primarily attack in groups of two to four.
xxi
They do not, however, employ suicide
bombing tactics as a primary method, though they are willing to die if it will increase the death toll
and, thus, further their goals.
xxii
The attacks on civilians are part ethnic cleansing and part an
attempt to foil moderates supporting peace negotiations.
xxiii
While maintaining connections to the Pakistani ISI, LeT is not completely dependent on
them. The organization collects contributions from individuals throughout Pakistan.
xxiv
It also
operates legitimate businesses including farming and participates in illegal money-making
activities, including counterfeiting and extortion.
xxv
The increase in the diversity of funding has
made LeT less dependent on the ISI financially, though it still relies on the safe haven and political
protection of Pakistan.
xxvi
LeT’s framing of its fight as a war of Muslim liberation has been effective for recruitment.
The LeT recruits are largely young men, with a mean age of approximately seventeen. These young
men typically survive in the organization for five years before death.
xxvii
These recruits typically
have more years of secular education than is average for the region, and the majority are recruited
from Punjab before being sent for training in Muzaffarabad or Afghanistan.
xxviii
The educated
fighting base may be linked, in part, to the ideology supported by the LeT. LeT believes that
fighting and preaching are equally important, and its recruits often join due to a religious
conviction.
xxix
Multiple militant groups in Pakistan employ the notion of azadi, which suggests that
the fight is for freedom and self-determination—a concept that was used during British colonialism
to support Indian self-rule.
xxx
Increasingly, LeT recruits are attracted by the language in LeT’s
manifesto: “Is there any place in this world today where Muslims are not suffering? Are there not
cries for help from the downtrodden Muslim men, women and children in Indian Kashmir, the
5
Philippines, Chechnya, China, Russia, Bosnia among other places, all pleading to be saved from
their torments?”
xxxi
LeT’s appealing ideology is bolstered by its support of necessary social and medical services
throughout underserved regions of Pakistan. LeT provides services under the name of its charitable
branch, Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD).
xxxii
While JuD claims to condemn terrorism, it has long been linked
to LeT.
xxxiii
It operates schools, ambulances, mobile clinics, and seminaries throughout the country,
including in under-served rural areas.
xxxiv
Its quick response to provide aid after an earthquake in
2005 also became a platform for increased recruitment.
xxxv
These activities not only produce
additional local support (and financial contributions), but also tie it into the fabric of life throughout
Pakistan, so that it is not simply a military group but embedded in communities. These efforts have
been effective. The supervisor of one LeT camp reported, “The other day a child of six years came
to register for jihad. We respected his enthusiasm, but refused to enlist him.”
xxxvi
LeT’s popularity has remained steady, though it has gone through a series of cosmetic
changes. After 2002, when LeT was “officially” banned in Pakistan, JuD remained active. When
JuD was also banned following ties to the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the group registered as the Mlli
Muslim League Pakistan, and the previous head of JuD controls programs throughout Pakistan
while under house arrest.
xxxvii
Pakistan is not responding to the increasing jihadist activity
throughout the state—not only that of LeT.
xxxviii
Terrorist groups based in Afghanistan, including
the Taliban, have also been granted safe haven in Pakistan in part to help the country maintain good
relations with Afghanistan.
xxxix
India’s response to LeT—as the country bearing the brunt of the attacks—has been flawed.
Primarily, these flaws stem from a reactionary rather than pro active response and a lack of an
integrated homeland security policy.
xl
Historically, Indian armed forces have trained for
conventional conflict but “the Indian Army found itself extensively committed to internal security
6
operations in diverse environments that ranged from the dense jungles of Mizoram to the mountains
of J&K.”
xli
Though ostensibly focused on outside threats, the Indian army was thus deployed
increasingly to address internal threats. Further, the intelligence capabilities are not adequately
interconnected.
xlii
Information is not synthesized and is under utilized. This will be discussed further
in the counterterrorism section.
UNITED LIBERATION FRONT OF ASSAM
The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) was created in 1979, as a reaction to tension
caused by the partition of India and Pakistan. Their goal is independence from India—not secession,
as the group does not accept that Assam has ever been a part of India, but instead believes it has
been continually occupied.
xliii
In the initial plans for the partition, Assam was to be Pakistani.
xliv
But
an Assamese committee protested this decision, and Assam was split so that a district along East
Bengal would go to Pakistan and the rest to India.
xlv
This meant that the Bengali-Muslim population
was primarily in Pakistan, and the Assamese-speaking population became the majority within the
state of Assam in India.
xlvi
However, the partition and violence in Bengal led to refugee migration
into Assam. After the partition became formalized, many of these refugees were considered
foreigners in Assam (Hindus were seen as refugees, Muslims as illegal immigrants).
xlvii
Fear of
foreigners creating independence movements that would infringe upon already limited land led to
both the Assam Movement (a nationalist movement) and ULFA. ULFA was started in 1979 by a
group of seven young Assamese men worried about the future of their country, including Arabinda
Rajkhowa (present Chairman) and Paresh Barush (present Commander in Chief).
xlviii
During the process of British colonialism and the shift to India’s independence, this area of
India was largely ignored, creating a group of secluded, autonomous tribes.
xlix
The ethno-nationalist
groups who evolved during the years immediately following partition feared the threat of any
7
different group, making lasting alliances difficult. The fundamental injustice of that era has stayed a
key part of the justification and anger that bolstered the nationalist groups.
l
ULFA was born in 1979 from the merging of a group of movements in Assam rejecting
India.
li
The Assam People’s Liberation Army (APLA) had the same goals and began as a more
popular movement than ULFA.
lii
Yet from the beginning ULFA had a geographic advantage, with
many of its members from Nagaland (a state in India in a similar situation to Assam) who came to
ULFA with connections to insurgent groups in Nagaland.
liii
As the APLA and the third critical
armed group in the area, the Brachin National Union, both dissolved, their members who were
unsatisfied with a peaceful resolution joined ULFA.
liv
The Assam Accord of 1985 was one attempt to end hostilities, and was acceptable to many
dissidents in Assam. It gave citizenship to those who immigrated before 1961, deported those who
immigrated after 1971, and delayed voting rights for those who immigrated in the interim.
lv
Most
members of APLA surrendered after the Assam Accord and it dissolved.
lvi
The majority of people
were no longer interested in a fight, but rather in returning to their lives.
lvii
The disconnect between
ULFA’s violent tactics and the attitude of the populace greatly diminished ULFA’s initial
popularity. Some dissidents remained unsatisfied, however, and were inspired to join ULFA to
demand secession.
lviii
ULFA evolved from one unit into two after the 1985 Assam Accord, one for
political matters and one for military.
lix
Specially tasked units, including one “suicide squad,” have
also been created and dissolved over time depending on need.
lx
There have not been many women
involved in the group, and they primarily serve administrative and medical functions.
lxi
This
movement is not solely about independence from India, but also includes a distrust of foreigners
(non indigenous Assamese) in an increasingly heterogeneous area.
ULFA initially rose to prominence in part through its creation of development projects in
rural areas underserved by the state.
lxviii
In the 1980s, ULFA organized co-op farming to
8
supplement the lack of government assistance and focused on keeping profits within the state to aid
Assamese development.
lxix
It also carried out violent, public actions, such as attacks against election
officials in 1983, calling the election illegal.
lxx
The continuing discontent of various groups
throughout Assam and the brutal response of the government dramatically aided ULFA’s
popularity.
lxxi
As author Sanjib Baruah has said, “ULFA’s roots are in… extraordinary street
mobilization protesting the entry and enfranchisement of ‘foreigners’… which the campaigners said
was illegal and threatened to turn the state’s ‘indigenous’ population into a minority.”
lxxii
In 1986,
due to its anti-India sentiment, the group gained support from Pakistan and the ISI.
lxxiii
Other shifts have been made as well. Once ULFA was banned as a terrorist group in India in
1990, its members withdrew from public view and it became increasingly secretive and
disconnected.
lxxvii
Despite its staunch initial anti-foreigner stance, in the early 1990s ULFA adopted
a welcoming attitude to Bengali people.
lxxviii
This shift helped to create a better relationship with
Bangladesh, and is likely one factor in Bangladesh providing sanctuary for ULFA members moving
forward as well as storage for ULFA arms.
lxxix
The change in its view towards immigrants began at
this time, as ULFA was losing support in Assam and was being struck by Indian military operations
and needed to broaden its support base.
lxxx
In addition, at different points ULFA has focused on
indigenous Assamese and on a wider group including Bengalis.
lxxxi
Inconsistency on these issues led
to increasing dissent within the organization.
While it began as a movement for “the people,” one which embraced discussion and public
involvement, after it was banned it eschewed public exchange and criticism.
lxxxii
In fact, “ULFA
stretched the point a step further to argue that those who raise questions about its representative
character must be treated as ‘outsiders’ and therefore have no place in Assam.”
lxxxiii
They no longer
accurately represented the communities for which they claimed to fight. ULFA’s primary tactics
became bombings and explosions, aimed at police and private citizens.
9
The deaths of numerous Assamese in ULFA’s attacks lost them further support.
lxxxiv
This
shift in popular support stemmed, in part, from the discovery of mass graves created by ULFA in
the Saraipung jungles in the 1990s.
lxxxv
In 2004 there was sustained public outcry against the
bombings conducted by ULFA.
lxxxvi
In turn, other organizations began to resonate more with the
people in Assam, and popularity shifted from ULFA.
lxxxvii
With the decrease in community support,
ULFA’s financing mainly came through extortion and drug trafficking.
lxxxviii
A failure of India’s approach to counterterrorism in Assam has been its focus on eliminating
specific terrorist threats without addressing the underlying causes of the groups’ successes and
popularity. The environment in Assam is still one that is conducive to illegal organizations. Due to
India’s lack of bureaucratic structure in the area, the terrorist organizations in northern India are
often the ones providing necessary social services.
lxxxix
Additionally, India hasn’t consistently
enforced any policies to make surrendering individuals or small groups return their arms. Those
people and guns are still available and vulnerable to being used by terrorist groups.
xc
India has, however, been able to use the chaos in the region and lack of transparency within
ULFA to the advantage of the government.
xci
Indian security forces blame any regional violence on
ULFA, which ULFA denies, meaning that the public is left not knowing who to trust.
xcii
Another powerful tactic India has used since the early 2000s with some success is killing
family members connected to those in ULFA. India has killed family connected to all levels of
ULFA members as retaliation if members do not surrender.
xciii
Within the organization, it is
accepted, to a degree, that only young men will be recruits, and that they have a limited time during
which they will fight. The previous foreign secretary for ULFA, Sashadhar Choudhury, said, “When
a person is young and energetic, he thinks of sacrificing for two causes: 1) for his offspring, and 2)
for his motherland. And when they become old, they forget about the motherland. They will only
remain engaged for money… You cannot do anything once you get older.”
xciv
The militants in
10
ULFA, unlike in some other groups, cannot maintain relationships with anyone outside the group. If
they do, those people may be targeted for violence or death.
xcv
India counterterrorism’s focus on
destroying the only people with whom ULFA terrorists have bonds has had some success in
persuading some ULFA members to surrender.
4
In the later 1990s, the Indian army, state police, and paramilitary forces were joined into one
group to combat insurgent groups in Assam.
xcvi
The unification of forces and sharing of
information had a marked impact on the government’s ability to combat ULFA. This effort was
aided by another specific tactic: hiring surrendered ULFA members to work for state security
forces.
xcvii
This strategy of hiring former terrorists allowed India to better anticipate and understand
the workings of the group.
LET VS ULFA: A COMPARISON
There is no one metric by which to compare the success of two different terrorist groups. I
will therefore address several parameters of each: achievement of clearly stated goals, long term
sustainability, and popularity within their territory.
ULFA’s first primary goal was independence for Assam, whereas LeT’s goals are to
incorporate Kashmir into Pakistan, and more broadly, global jihad. ULFA’s objective of an
independent state of Assam is unlikely. The group has split into those willing to negotiate and those
unwilling. Those who have participated in talks have made concessions over time during ongoing
peace talks, withdrawing their largest demands. If ULFA could shift its primary goal from
independence to protection for indigenous Assamese people, they might yet see success. The
indigenous tribes in Assam are being considered for tribal status by India, which would protect the
4
In the same interview, Choudhury said that the relationships within the organization are not friendships, as “Emotion will
not work.” Rajeev Bhattacharyya and Nikhil Ramond Puri, “An Annotated Interview with Sashadhar Choudhury, Foreign
Secretary, United Liberation Front of Asom [Assam] Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol 7 No 2, 91.
11
communities, and provide a tribal majority in the state assembly.
xcviii
ULFA’s support has fallen
both within Assam and without. This is in part due to the growing divide between the public’s
desires and the group’s stated goals. Additionally, the public is not supportive, generally, of
ULFA’s violent tactics. Popular sentiment in both Bangladesh and Bhutan is overall less supportive
to terrorist groups than it was in the past.
xcix
The lack of internal support has reduced the number of
civilians willing to pay “taxes” to ULFA, decreasing their funding.
c
On the other hand, ULFA is one group out of several in the area who have been brought to
peace talks with India multiple times as representatives of the dissatisfied population. The part of
the group willing to negotiate, having now backed down from their goal of full independence, they
may be able to get tribal status for the indigenous people of the area, providing recognition and
protection. While ULFA is still not a formally recognized group in the manner the PLO or FLN
have been in such conflicts, their goals are nonetheless being represented.
Similarly, LeT has not achieved its initial goal of Kashmir being incorporated into Pakistan.
It could be argued, however, that LeT’s acts of terrorism have contributed to the continued
destabilization of Kashmir, and that instability and conflict has contributed to Pakistan’s ability to
occupy parts of Kashmir.
ci
The continued international attention to the conflict could lead to
pressure for peace talks and potentially redistributing Kashmir. Additionally, unlike ULFA, the
indiscriminate use of violence is seen as a positive factor by LeT’s supporters.
As for LeT’s more expansive hopes of widespread jihad, they have not established a
caliphate. While certainly LeT has continued to produce acts of terror both focused on Indian
Kashmir and more generally on non-Muslims, they have remained less far-reaching than other
groups. The attempted shoe-bombing and the creation of a jihad network in Virginia remain the
only attacks in the West in which LeT played any part, unlike the many attacks claimed by al
Qaeda, for instance.
cii
LeT has created a media presence that is undeniable, and spread their
12
message far. Their religious justification and connection to multiple ethnic groups as well as
complementary terrorist groups through the message of global jihad has promoted them more
widely. Yet they do not believe that the Pakistani government reflects their beliefs, and thus for
them to take further reaching steps they would need to become independent from the ISI. So long as
Kashmir is the focus, and LeT is reliant on funding and protection from Pakistan, there is a limit to
how global they can be. Both groups have made some progress, but LeT has been consistent with its
goals and ULFA was forced to narrow its goal in order to potentially gain some success.
The next metric is long term group survival. In this, LeT clearly has the superior platform.
ULFA began with incorporating motives from the people they hoped would join them (such as the
inclusion and a later shift in its policy on “foreigners” and the definition of a foreigner). Yet as they
became increasingly withdrawn from the community they were fighting for, they also grew
disconnected from the objectives sought by the populace. Additionally, India’s unified and focused
counterterrorism forces in Assam had marked impact. The reorganization and cohesion of the
counter insurgency projects had a measurable effect on Assam.
ciii
LeT’s ties to the ISI and Pakistani government have provided it with considerable
protection. Other than simply providing space for training camps and the like, Pakistan’s lax
attitude for high ranking LeT members as prisoners has allowed captured members to continue
operating. Additionally, the connection between the somewhat more tolerated JuD and the official
government allows increased access and transfer between the LeT and the state. Further, the full
extent of the LeT’s connection to the government beyond the ISI is not clear. They could potentially
have clout, leverage, and sympathy.
Connections to al Qaeda also increase the likely longevity of LeT; they are part of a broader,
further reaching, and better funded network. Moreover, the global Islamist scope of their goals
allows for a wider audience to become involved. Not only do they represent Pakistan’s claim to
13
Kashmir, they represent a Muslim claim to earlier homelands. Unlike ULFA, which has a very
limited base from which to draw recruits, LeT has a broader pool of potential members due to its
shift to broader goals.
ULFA attempted to gain popularity by changing its message of Assamese-only to include
people from Bangladesh, but in doing so it contradicted its initial purpose. Further, its use of
violence against the Assamese has lost it support in its base, which cannot be fully recouped
through additional support in Bangladesh. Its primary goal and focus has always been narrow and
specific: independence for Assam. Thus it does not have a wide external audience outside its region
with whom its message might deeply resonate. Once it began losing popularity in mainstream
Assamese opinion, it was likely the beginning of the end for the initial lofty goals. The group has
now essentially split into those who are willing to negotiate with the Indian government, for whom
independence is off the table, and those who are not.
civ
I would surmise that the pro-negotiation
faction may continue a cease-fire and create an agreement with the Indian government, leaving the
anti-negotiation faction even smaller and less supported. Its attacks have stagnated, and it is not a
well-known name.
While ULFA’s popularity has decreased over time, LeT’s (under its various monikers) has
remained steady. Unlike ULFA, LeT has been able to successfully transform itself when it comes
up against resistance. When banned as a terrorist organization, it created a charitable front that acted
as a political party. When this group was banned, a new one was created. Further, LeT has made the
issue for which it is fighting one that is critical to a wider group of people. They are not fighting for
the independence of Kashmir, but its “return” to Pakistan. Thus people throughout the country are
willing to support this as it affects their country and their wider, cultural family. People outside the
region are willing to offer support as well, as LeT is connected to al Qaeda, and also fighting for
Muslims worldwide.
14
This difference in popularity is also reflected in the differences in funding. While both
participate in illegal activities, ULFA must secure practically all of their funds from extortions and
kidnapping, while LeT is able to rely on ISI and Saudi backers.
To summarize, though these two organizations operate in the same neighborhood and with
hierarchical structures led by men personally impacted by the partition, they have gone in different
directions. ULFA from the start has had a narrower focus. While this has hindered the group in
some ways, as they have a less widespread support base and fewer sources of revenue, they may
still see some success. The pro-negotiation part of the group, while it will not see independence for
Assam, may make measurable strides for some of the tribes in the area. Meanwhile LeT is more
widely known due to its jihadist sentiments and connections with al Qaeda. A wide support base
and connections to the ISI have allowed them to continue creating conflict in Kashmir and sowing
terror elsewhere in India such that the state of India cannot ignore them. India’s inability to unify
their task force to combat LeT has allowed it to grow. However, Kashmir remains legally in the
Indian state, with parts occupied by Pakistan, and the idea of a global caliphate remains unrealized.
COUNTERTERRORISM LESSONS
There are several lessons we can take from the way India has addressed both LeT and
ULFA. The first is the impact of the media. With LeT, Indian officials didn’t sufficiently regulate
the images coming from conflicts with LeT.
cv
This allowed LeT to spread their own sympathetic
narrative. LeT has better control over propaganda, branding themselves differently in different
situations (freedom fighters; jihadists with al Qaeda; provider of social services). The government
needs to employ the same social media tactics to counter the ones used by the groups. The opposite
can be seen with ULFA. When images of their mass graves came out, they lost popular support.
15
While LeT remained connected to the populace and aware of their needs, ULFA became
disconnected.
This brings up the issue of serving rural areas: when the only way for people to get essential
goods and services is through a non-governmental organization, they are far more likely to distrust
the government and put their faith in this outside organization. Thus another way to counter terror
groups is to ensure all necessary governmental functions are being employed throughout the
country, even in more difficult to reach areas. Such actions would also allow for closer watch to be
kept over less governable areas, to notice potential insurgencies at their inception. It has been noted
that many LeT members were recruited from madrasas.
cvi
So regulating and paying attention to any
potential sources of radicalization could help. In turn, promoting sufi Islam as the primary branch
would increase the practitioners of peaceful strands of Islam in predominately Muslim areas.
cvii
Thirdly, there remains the question of negotiation and peaceful solution. India’s continued
fight against ULFA has created a much smaller force with which to reckon, allowing moderates the
ability to argue for tribal status rather than full independence. At the same time, it is critical to
recognize when a group is truly willing to negotiate for peace (which, like with ULFA, can come
from continually battering their forces) or when one is truly negotiating with terrorist groups. The
allowance of groups associated with LeT in Pakistan provides them increased legitimacy. If India
could push for further international condemnation, LeT would have less legitimacy. More broadly
speaking, getting strong allies to condemn terrorist groups provides international strength.
Lastly there is the importance of constant and effective communication. When dealing with
ULFA, different branches of Indian armed forces synthesized their information. When dealing with
LeT, this was not the case, and it has negatively impacted their counterterrorism approach.
Then there are more direct approaches. Indian counterterrorism’s technique of threatening
(and following through on threats) to kill family members of ULFA members has been an effective
16
tactic to prompt surrenders. Their additional steps of recruiting some of these surrendered members
is also strategically effective. More generally, being able to work with previous member of a
terrorist group, or speak with someone who has been deradicalized, can provide insight into the
group that might not have otherwise been possible.
To help fight these terrorist agencies, the US should support India’s building of
counterterrorism programs and reformist democratic movements in Pakistan. Pakistan’s primary
threat is India, and it is possible that changing the power dynamic between the two countries is what
could force Pakistan to change its stance on terrorist groups. While in the past the US has tried to
combat terrorism by decreasing funding to the region, it could instead focus on the causes of
terrorism rather than just the symptoms. Encouraging democracy and education throughout the
country may be a better long term strategy to undercut LeT and other terrorist groups.
Lastly, it is critical to remember that terrorists are still human beings. These groups do not
run like flawless machines, but rather, because they are composed of people with all their strengths
and weaknesses, will always be full of disagreements and dissension. We saw that dissension over
the goals and tactics of ULFA eroded its support. Finding the weak points, where factions could
split apart, where members have irreconcilable differences over goals and methods and then
exploiting those would be an effective counterterrorism strategy. Dividing the group makes each
part less powerful, and should one such part be defeated, they may hold little enough loyalty to the
others to share critical information. Lastly, in a similar vein to India’s killing of family members,
one could imagine a situation in which the US, while not ostensibly threatening innocent lives,
threatened deportation or similar actions to force a hostile to surrender. Such tactics could prove
effective.
17
i
Yasmin Khan, “Why Pakistan and India remain in denial 70 years on from partition,” The
Observer, Aug 5 2017.
ii
Ashley J. Tellis testimony, “Bad Company—Lashkar E-Tayyiba and the Growing Ambition of
Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,” United States House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, March 11, 2010.
iii
Ibid.
iv
”Lashkar-e-Taiba,” Mapping Militant Organizations, Jan 30 2016,
[http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/79].
v
“FACTBOX: Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba,” Reuters, Nov 7 2010,
[https://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-52728420101107].
vi
”Who is Hafiz Saeed?”, The Times of India, Apr 4 2012
[https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Who-is-Hafiz-
Saeed/articleshow/12529918.cms].
vii
Ibid.
viii
Sebastian Rotella, “A Terror Group That Recruits from Pakistan’s ‘Best and Brightest,’” The
Atlantic, Apr 4 2013.
ix
Arjun Subramaniam, “Challenges of Protecting India from Terrorism,” Terrorism and
Political Violence, 2012, 398.
x
Ashley J. Tellis, “The Menace That Is Lashkar-e-Taiba,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace: Policy Outlook, March 2012, 10.
xi
Stephen Tankel, “Lashakr-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects,” National Security
Studies Program Paper, New America Foundation, 2.
xii
Subramaniam, 402.
xiii
Ibid, 402.
xiv
“The Menace That Is Lashkar-e-Taiba,” 4.
xv
Ibid, 5.
xvi
Geoffrey Kambere, Puay Hock Goh, Pranav Kumar, and Fulgence Msafir, “The Financing of
Lashkar-e-Taiba,” Countering Terrorism Exchange, [https://globalecco.org/ctx-v1n1/lashkar-
e-taiba].
xvii
Tankel, 2.
xviii
Ibid, 3.
xix
Ibid, 4.
xx
”Lashkar-e-Taiba,” Mapping Militant Organizations.
xxi
“The Menace That Is Lashkar-e-Taiba,” 14.
xxii
Ibid, 14.
xxiii
Tankel, 12.
xxiv
“The Menace That Is Lashkar-e-Taiba,” 12.
xxv
Kambere.
xxvi
“The Menace That Is Lashkar-e-Taiba,” 12.
xxvii
Rassler 4.
xxviii
Rassler 4-5.
xxix
”Lashkar-e-Taiba,” Mapping Militant Organizations.
xxx
C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Democratic Values and Support for
Militant Politics: Evidence from a National Survey of Pakistan,” Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol 58, 2014, 745, 748.
xxxi
Ibid, 747.
18
xxxii
Steve Coll, “Lashkar-e-Taiba,” The New Yorker, Dec 1 2008.
[https://www.newyorker.com/news/steve-coll/lashkar-e-taiba].
xxxiii
Joshua Partlow and Kamran Khan, “Charity Funds Said to Provide Clues to Alleged
Terrorist Plot,” The Washington Post, Aug 15 2006, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/14/AR2006081401196_2.html].
xxxiv
“The Menace That Is Lashkar-e-Taiba,” 12.
xxxv
Praveen Swami, “Quake Came as a Boon for Lashkar Leadership,” The Hindu, Nov 17 2005,
[http://www.thehindu.com/2005/11/17/stories/2005111705951200.htm].
xxxvi
Sushant Sareen, The Jihad Factory: Pakistan's Islamic Revolution in the Making, Har-Anand
Publications, 2005, 249.
xxxvii
Umair Jamal, “What is Behind the Political ‘Mainstreaming’ of Jamaat-ud-Dawa in
Pakistan?”, The Diplomat, Aug 8 2017, [https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/what-is-behind-
the-political-mainstreaming-of-jamaat-ud-dawa-in-pakistan/].
xxxviii
Ibid.
xxxix
Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Why Pakistan Supports Terrorist Groups, and Why the US Finds it
so Hard to Induce Change,” Brookings, Jan 5 2018, [https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-
from-chaos/2018/01/05/why-pakistan-supports-terrorist-groups-and-why-the-us-finds-it-
so-hard-to-induce-change/].
xl
Subramaniam, 404.
xli
Ibid, 405.
xlii
Ibid, 406.
xliii
Nani Gopal Mahanta, Confronting the State: ULFA’s Quest for Sovereignty, Sage Publications:
2015, 61.
xliv
Makiko Kimura, “The Emergence of Ethnic Movement in Assam: Issue of Language,
Migration and Identity,” Dissertation, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Feb 14 2014,
[http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/15845/9/09_chapter%203.pdf] 77.
xlv
Ibid, 77.
xlvi
Ibid, 78.
xlvii
Ibid, 79.
xlviii
Brig Sushi Kumar Sharma, “Future Prospects of Peace Talk with United Liberation Front of
Assam (ULFA) Genesis, Issues and Recommendations,” Vivekananda International Foundation,
July 2016 [http://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/future-prospects-of-peace-talk-with-
united-liberation-front-of-assam-genesis-issues-and-recommendations_0.pdf], 8-9.
xlix
Upadhyay, Archana. 2006. “Terrorism in the North-East: Linkages and Implications”,
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 41, No. 48, 4993.
l
Ibid, 4994.
li
Mahanta, 52.
lii
Ibid, 54.
liii
Ibid, 55.
liv
Ibid, 57.
lv
“Assam Accord 1985,” IAS Parliament, Apr 29 2017,
[http://www.iasparliament.com/current-affairs/mains/assam-accord-1985].
lvi
Mahanta, 54.
lvii
Ibid, 55.
19
lviii
Rajeev Bhattacharyya and Nikhil Ramond Puri, “An Annotated Interview with Sashadhar
Choudhury, Foreign Secretary, United Liberation Front of Asom [Assam],” Perspectives on
Terrorism, Vol 7 No 2, 82.
lix
Mahanta, 63.
lx
Ibid, 66.
lxi
Ibid, 66.
lxviii
Sharma, 9.
lxix
Mahanta, 80-81.
lxx
Ibid, 74.
lxxi
Ibid, 74.
lxxii
Rajat Ganguly, Autonomy and Ethnic Conflict in South and South-East Asia, Routledge: 2013,
30.
lxxiii
Sharma, 10.
lxxvii
Samir Kumar Das, “Where are the ‘People’? A Study of Peace Processes in India’s
Northeast,” Journal of the National Human Rights Commission, Volume 14, 2015, 260.
lxxviii
Mahanta, 68.
lxxix
Ibid, 67, 70.
lxxx
Ibid, 70, 72.
lxxxi
Sanjib Baruah, “Separatist Militants and Contentious Politics in Assam, India: The Limits of
Counterinsurgency,” Asian Survey, Vol 159 No 6, Dec 2009, 963.
lxxxii
Das, 261.
lxxxiii
Ibid, 261.
lxxxiv
“Global Terrorism Database: United Liberation Front of Assam, Attack Type,” June 2017
[http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=attack&search=u
nited%20liberation%20front%20of%20assam].
lxxxv
Sharma, 12.
lxxxvi
Das, 263.
lxxxvii
Ibid, 263.
lxxxviii
“Military: Unitled Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA),” Global Security, February 2018,
[https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ulfa.htm].
lxxxix
Upadhyay, 4997.
xc
Ibid, 4997.
xci
Baruah, 953.
xcii
Ibid, 953.
xciii
Bhattacharyya, 87.
xciv
Ibid, 87.
xcv
Ibid, 88.
xcvi
Sharma, 22.
xcvii
“Military: Unitled Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA).”
xcviii
Sharma, 17.
xcix
Ibid, 11.
c
Ibid, 14.
ci
”57 days, 400 truce violations: Pakistan leaves Kashmir reeling,” The Times of India, Feb 27
2018, [https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/jk-over-400-ceasefire-violations-so-far-in-
2018/articleshow/63087069.cms].
20
cii
“FACTBOX: Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba.”
ciii
Sharma, 22.
civ
Samudra Gupta Kashyap, “No talks without ‘independence of Assam’ on agenda, says ULFA
leader Paresh Barua,” The Indian Express, Sep 8 2017,
[http://indianexpress.com/article/india/no-talks-without-independence-of-assam-on-
agenda-says-ulfa-i-leader-paresh-barua-4834508/].
cv
Subramaniam, 408.
cvi
Ibid, 410.
cvii
Abdul Basit, “The Urban and Educated Jihadists of South Asia,” RSIS Commentary, Vol 11, Jan
12 2017, 3.
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21
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22
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