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FALLING FOR FLATTERY
Too Naïve to Lead: When Leaders Fall for Flattery
BENJAMIN A. ROGERS*
Carroll School of Management
Boston College
OVUL SEZER
Cornell University
SC Johnson College of Business
NADAV KLEIN
INSEAD
In-Press, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Pre-Publication Copy
© 2023, American Psychological Association. This paper is not the copy of record and may not
exactly replicate the final, authoritative version of the article. Please do not copy or cite without
authors' permission. The final article will be available, upon publication, via its DOI:
10.1037/pspi0000433
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to the editor and reviewers for their valuable feedback,
which greatly improved this work. We also thank Tracy Barbera, as well as members of the UNC
Behavioral Lab and the INSEAD-Sorbonne Université Behavioural Lab for their assistance with
data collection and coding. In particular, we appreciate Mitch Bloch, Germain Dépetasse, Ritika
Khosla, Hazel Lim, Hoai Huong Ngo, Luke Nguyen, Alexa Sterling, and Anagha Velliyatt, for
their efforts.
Competing Interests: Authors declare no competing interests.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY
Abstract
Flattery is one of the oldest and most commonly used impression-management tactics in
everyday life. Though it often brings benefits to the flatterer, less is known about how it affects
the target. In the present research, we explore when and why being flattered can be costly for
leaders—common targets of flattery—depending on how they respond to it. We suggest that
leaders who are observed rewarding flatterers risk appearing naïve to others. Across seven
studies and six supplementary studies (N = 4,612), we find evidence that leaders who grant
favors to flatterers are often perceived to have naively “fallen for flattery,” which shapes
observers’ impressions of the leaders and the organizations they represent. A first set of studies
(Studies 1-4) detail the variety of factors that lead observers to conclude their leader has fallen
for flattery and the resulting impacts to the leaders’ reputation and their organization (e.g.,
competence, warmth, commitment to the leader, organizational fairness). The second set of
studies look at the contextual factors that impact what costs leaders pay for being perceived to
have fallen for flattery, including the type of flattery (Study 5), who is harmed by the favor
(Study 6), and the leader’s apparent awareness of the motives underlying flattery (Study 7).
Whereas previous research highlights positive consequences of flattery for the flatterer, we find
that flattery comes with costs for leaders and their organizations. We discuss theoretical and
practical implications for leaders who are frequently flattered.
Keywords: flattery; naiveté; impression management; commitment; fairness
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 1
Too Naïve to Lead: When Leaders Fall for Flattery
The Crow, anxious to prove to him that she did possess a voice, began to
caw vigorously, of course dropping the cheese. The Fox pounced upon it
and carried it off, remarking as he went away, “My good friend Crow, you
have every good quality: now try to get some common sense.”
—Aesop’s Fables (trans. 1883, p. 3)
Flattery is one of the oldest and most commonly used impression-management tactics in
everyday life. Cultural, historical and literary texts are filled with examples of its uses. In
Aesop’s fable “The Fox and the Crow,” a sly fox heaps praise upon a naïve crow until she lets
down her guard and accidentally drops her dinner into the fox’s waiting paws. Similarly, prior
research provides evidence that people struggle to maintain skepticism in the face of flattery.
Flattery recipients evaluate their flatterers positively due to their desire to believe the good things
they hear about themselves (Gordon, 1996; Vonk, 2002). Various studies have shown that
flattery, defined as the use of compliments and praise (whether accurate or not) designed to
evoke interpersonal liking for personal gain (e.g., Wortman & Linsenmeier, 1977), yields
material and social rewards flatterers, such as positive evaluations from others, favorable
treatment, and increased upward mobility (Gordon, 1996; Higgins et al., 2003; Jones, 1964;
Kumar & Beyerlein, 1991; Stern & Westphal, 2010; Vonk, 2002; Westphal & Stern, 2006). In
sum, flattery, even when it is insincere, works (Chan & Sengupta, 2010).
However, compared to those being flattered, flattery’s appeal differs dramatically for
those observing it from a distance. From the recipients’ perspective, flattery is egocentrically
validating (Bless et al., 1992; Chan & Sengupta, 2010; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Vonk, 2002).
By comparison, observers tend to focus on the perceived instrumental motives underlying
flattery, seeing such behavior as strategic and used only to curry favor (Crant, 1996; Turnley &
Bolino, 2001). Insults such as “sucking up to the boss” or “boot-licker” reveal the perceived
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 2
strategic nature of flattery attempts. As such insults suggest, people in high-ranking positions are
among flattery’s most frequent targets (Westphal & Shani, 2016), although flattery can be used
across hierarchical levels. Lacking formal control over organizational resources (e.g., Salancik &
Pfeffer, 1974), non-leaders must use informal means to influence powerful stakeholders and
secure favorable positions. Thus, followers often attempt to shape how leaders see them with
flattery – offering compliments and praise aimed at pleasing the leader – along with other
ingratiatory behaviors such as performing favors and opinion conformity to strengthen the
leader-follower relationship and seek resources for themselves (Gordon, 1996; Higgins et al.,
2003, Westphal & Stern, 2006; also see Bolino et al., 2016, for a review)
Flattery’s persuasiveness presents a unique challenge to leaders. They are expected to be
fair when making decisions that affect followers (Offermann & Coats, 2018), but it can be
difficult to remain objective when receiving flattery due to the validation it provides (Fogg &
Nass, 1997). Because people tend to assume that others share their attitudes and feelings
(Krueger & Clement, 1994; Ross et al., 1977), observers likely believe that a savvy leader shares
their skepticism about ingratiators’ motives and “knows better” than to reward flattery (Crant,
1996; Turnley & Bolino, 2001). As a result, if observers witness leaders when they treat
flatterers favorably, they may come to believe that the leader has “fallen for flattery,” specifically
that the leader must be naïve, lacking the sophistication (Heidhues & Köszegi, 2010) and real-
world knowledge (Thompson, 1990) needed to notice flatterers’ self-interested motives. The
present research suggests that how leaders navigate this challenge – whether to reward flattery
with favorable treatment or not – is pivotal in shaping not only their followers’ perceptions of
them but also followers’ view of and commitment to the organizations to which they belong.
We argue that when leaders are perceived to have “fallen for flattery,” they risk
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 3
damaging their own and their organizations’ reputation. Across seven studies and six
supplementary studies (N = 4,612), we find that observers view leaders who reward flattery less
favorably, seeing them as naïve about the potential untoward motives of flatterers. Observers
extend this distaste to other impressions they have of the leader, as well as their feelings towards
the broader organization. We explore the underlying mechanism – perceived naiveté of the
flattery recipient – and various boundaries of this effect. We also examine when observers might
look somewhat favorably on leaders who reward flattery and conclude that, unlike established
leaders, unfamiliar leaders can benefit in terms of warmth perceptions due to the surface-level
generosity that accompanies favor-granting (e.g., Foulk & Long, 2016; Klein & Epley, 2014).
Overall, our results show consistent negative consequences of being perceived to have fallen for
flattery for leaders and organizations, with mixed perceptions of leader warmth.
These findings make important contributions to our understanding of ingratiation, social
influence, and impression management. First, by focusing on observer perceptions of flattery
recipients – typically leaders – rather than flatterers, we broaden the ingratiation literature and
highlight the potential cascading consequences of flattery in organizations. Prior work has
mainly made the flatterer the “focal actor,” but has yet to explore how people react to targets of
flattery who usually wield power in organizations (Zellars & Kacmar, 1999). In the present
research, we examine how observers make inferences about leaders’ responses to flattery and
when these inferences lead to a loss of faith in the leader and the organization as a whole.
We also contribute to work on social influence in organizations by looking beyond the
impact of a leader’s receptivity to persuasion for the flatterer (e.g., Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004).
We instead focus on how the leader’s receptivity to flattery – as revealed by the granting or
refusing of favors – becomes social information for others in the organization. Inferences of
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 4
naiveté that accompany favor granting have consequences for organizations and for leaders in
particular and this work provides an empirical investigation of the role of naiveté in the judgment
of leadership effectiveness and discretion (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Grusky, 1963).
Finally, we extend research on impression management by disentangling how the specific
components of impressions are affected when leaders are perceived as falling for flattery.
Whereas we find that being seen as rewarding flattery consistently harms competence
perceptions of leaders, we find that the impact of rewarding flattery on warmth perceptions
varies based on an observer’s prior relationship with the leader. Our research shows that leaders’
interactions with followers cannot be fully understood without the careful consideration of the
conflict between warmth perceptions (appearing likeable) and competence perceptions
(appearing capable). Building on prior research by Foulk and Long (2016), our work provides
clarity about when rewarding flattery may carry some benefits – such as when a leader is
observed by newcomers – and when it is likely to broadly harm a leader’s reputation.
Why Flattery Recipients Reward Flatterers
While the act of complimenting another person can be purely prosocial (Zhao & Epley,
2021), flattery, as a type of ingratiation tactic, represents the intentional use of kind words to
elicit liking and favorable treatment (Bolino et al., 2016). As a tactic, flattery is often successful.
Flatterers are conferred more credibility (Vonk, 2002), are more likely to be hired (Zhao &
Liden, 2011), receive higher performance ratings (Gordon, 1996; Higgins et al., 2003), and are
more likely to receive board appointments (Westphal & Stern, 2006). Flattery is successful
because it is pleasant to hear (Jones, 1964; Wayne & Ferris, 1990) and increases a recipient’s
self-esteem and social status (Foulk & Long, 2016; Park et al., 2011). Due to norms of
reciprocity, people find it difficult not to like those who think highly of them (Jones, 1964).
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 5
Flattery also triggers feelings of psychological indebtedness, whereby recipients seek to “repay”
compliments via favorable treatment (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Gray et al., 2014).
Additionally, flattery recipients see ingratiation as aligned with their usually positive self-image
(Taylor & Brown, 1988) and thus often fail to scrutinize flatterers’ motives.
Flattery also succeeds because leaders find it difficult to refuse the explicit or implicit
requests for favorable treatment that can often follow. Refusing direct requests for help feels
uncomfortable (Flynn & Lake, 2008), triggers a desire to avoid being viewed as uncaring (Klein
& Epley, 2016), and high-status leaders might feel pressured to compensate for the stereotype of
being perceived as cold (Swencionis & Fiske, 2016) and grant favors in response to flattery to
appear sociable. Moreover, as compared to the indirect and uncertain costs of granting requests
(such as potential criticism from observers), the benefits of granting favors—positive evaluations
from flatterers—are immediately salient (Abele & Bruckmuller, 2011; Willis & Todorov, 2006).
When Leaders are Perceived to Have “Fallen for Flattery”
In contrast to flattery recipients, third-party observers are less likely to view flattery
positively. Observers tend to be suspicious of ingratiators (Fein, 1996; Keeves et al., 2017;
Vonk, 1998) and view them cynically (Carrier et al., 2019; Critcher & Dunning, 2011; Miller &
Ratner, 1998). As flattery in organizations is often targeted at leaders, it is frequently viewed as a
tactic to improve social exchange relationships with people who control access to valued
resources (Pfeffer, 1981). Therefore, observers may scrutinize interactions involving their
superiors for cues of improper influence.
Since observers do not experience the psychological benefits of flattery, they are more
likely than recipients to attribute cynical motives to flatterers (Vonk, 2002). Moreover, observers
are likely to judge the situation from their own more skeptical perspective (Epley et al., 2004).
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 6
As such, they are likely to see the flatterer as insincere and the flattery attempt as unpersuasive.
Thus, when a leader accommodates the flatterer’s request, theories of social influence (e.g.,
Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004) suggest that an observer will likely conclude that the leader was
unduly receptive to persuasion; otherwise, the leader, too, would have seen through the
unpersuasive flattery and rejected the favor request. In other words, to a skeptical observer,
favorable treatment towards flatterers indicates a leader who must not fully grasp the self-serving
motives behind flattery, regardless of whether the leader is actually unaware or not.
We argue that the leader’s apparent lack of skepticism to flattery and the motives behind
it will manifest as perceptions that they are naïve – defined as lacking knowledge, experience,
and sophistication, in this case about the potential motives or strategic considerations of others
(e.g., Barasch et al., 2016; Thompson, 1990). Naïve individuals are thought to be easily
exploited, too quick to trust, and likely to fail to appropriately consider others’ self-serving
motives (Forgas & East, 2008; Teunisse et al., 2020; Tsay et al., 2011). While it is possible that
the leader is aware of the flatterer’s motives and may be granting a favor nonetheless, in the eyes
of a cynical observer, acceding to flattery may indicate that a leader has fallen for flattery by
failing to see the transparent instrumentality of an ingratiator’s efforts. Importantly, this
attribution of naiveté has potentially broader consequences for organizations and especially for
leaders, given the central role they play in distributing valuable resources.
The Consequences of Falling for Flattery
We suggest that there are two types of downstream consequences from being perceived
to have fallen for flattery. First, there are impression-management consequences, defined as
observers’ impression of the flattered leader’s character (i.e., perceptions of competence,
warmth). Second, there are organizational consequences, or impact on observers’ relationship to
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 7
the broader organization (i.e., commitment to the leader, perceptions of organizational fairness).
If an observer views a leader who rewards flattery as acting naïvely, their perceptions of
the leader’s other characteristics may fundamentally change. Because naiveté is not a valorized
trait among leaders, accommodating flattery may result in reduced perceptions of a leader’s
competence. To be effective in their roles, leaders are expected to be adept at handling
interpersonal interactions (Toegel et al., 2013), making good decisions (Offermann & Coats,
2018), and resisting persuasion (Cialdini & Mirels, 1976). As naïve individuals are viewed as
gullible and overly trusting (Rotter, 1980; Forgas & East, 2008), being seen rewarding flattery
will likely undercut leaders’ perceived competence.
1
We also explore how witnessing a leader reward flattery affects warmth perceptions.
Here we did not expect clear-cut results. Specifically, appearing to naively reward flattery is
likely to elicit two contrasting inferences related to the friendliness and sincerity that typically
underly perceptions of warmth (Fiske et al., 2007). On the one hand, granting a favor is a
prosocial act aimed at helping the flatterer. Despite their skepticism, observers may view a
positive social interaction between leader and flatterer as indicative of sociability or generosity
(Foulk & Long, 2016; Klein & Epley, 2014), particularly since naïve individuals are perceived as
happy and friendly (Barasch et al., 2016). On the other hand, warmth encompasses how well one
treats others (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002; Abele & Wojciszke, 2014); thus, accommodating flattery
can be considered as uncaring to those who have not flattered the leader (Wojciszke et al.,
1993)—the observers themselves being the most salient members of this group.
Given that perceiving a leader to have fallen for flattery has contrasting implications for
1
Naiveté, which represents a general lack of awareness about the real world, is conceptually and empirically distinct
from competence (Barasch et al., 2016), which reflects efficacy within a domain; for example, consider the
stereotype of an intelligent and prolific academic who is unaware of happenings beyond their domain of expertise.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 8
warmth perceptions (unlike our straightforward prediction for perceived competence), we
anticipate that the surrounding context will shape whether a leader who rewards flattery is seen
as more friendly (and increase perceived warmth) or more unfair (and not increase perceived
warmth). In particular, we examine leader familiarity. Building on recent work suggesting that
positive surface-level social cues are more important to newcomers to organizations (Foulk &
Long, 2016), we hypothesize that observers’ warmth perceptions of unfamiliar favor-granting
leaders would increase, but favor-granting by established leaders is likely to be assessed within a
richer context that raises the salience of the favor’s harm, mitigating any warmth benefit.
Aside from the special circumstance of unfamiliar leaders, we predict largely negative
consequences for observers’ impressions of leaders seen as falling for flattery. We further
suggest that this has important organizational implications. As the linchpin that connects
individuals to the organization (Sparrowe & Liden, 2005), a leader’s relationship with followers
is a proxy for the followers’ connection to the organization itself (Ashforth & Rogers, 2012). We
first focus on commitment to the leader, which represents the attachment and desire to remain in
an exchange relationship with the leader (Meyer & Allen, 1991; Flint et al., 2013). Strong
attachments between followers and leaders are important both for follower well-being and for
organizational functioning (Meyer et al., 2002). When leaders grant favors for unmeritocratic
reasons, observers may see such actions—and, by extension, their relationship with the leader—
as obstructing their own future success in the organization, making it unworthy of continuation
or additional investment. Further, by attributing favor-granting in response to flattery to a
leader’s naiveté, individuals may conclude that their leader will be exploited by ingratiation in
the future. This perception may undercut observers’ beliefs that they are engaged in a stable,
high-quality exchange relationship with the leader.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 9
Finally, we suggest that negative perceptions of leaders can spill over into broader
concerns about the organization’s fairness. Observers can be expected to focus on the unfairness
of favor-granting in response to flattery, particularly the extent to which benefits are distributed
meritocratically (distributive fairness) and result from fair processes (procedural fairness;
Colquitt, 2001). Individuals see leaders as stewards of organizational intent (Levinson, 1965;
Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002), particularly in their allocation of valued resources (Liden &
Mitchell, 1988; Shoss et al., 2013). Flattery-based favors, and the resulting attributions of leader
naiveté, are particularly likely to reduce observers’ faith in the overall organization’s ability to
operate in a just manner. In this way, individuals who witness leaders rewarding flattery with
favors are likely to conclude that the organization itself is, and will continue to be, unfair.
Overview of Present Research
Across seven studies and six supplementary studies (N = 4,612), we examine the
consequences of being seen as falling for flattery across a range of domains and using a variety
of methodological approaches. In doing so, we provide a comprehensive analysis of flattery and
favor-granting situations in organizations. After a pilot study that establishes the commonness of
observers witnessing flattery and favor-granting in organizational life, we present a series of
studies to test observers’ reactions to leaders who are seen granting favors to flatterers. Our
empirical exploration consists of two primary sections. In the first section, four studies assess the
factors that lead an observer to perceive their leader has naïvely fallen for flattery, as well as the
downstream consequences of this attribution for leaders. In the second section, consisting of
three studies, we document the contextual factors that either magnify or reduce the downstream
consequences of observers’ beliefs that their leader has fallen for flattery.
Across all studies, we chose our sample size in advance, and we report all of the variables
and conditions we collected either in the main manuscript or supplemental materials. For our
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 10
first study, we chose a sample of 75 per condition which would allow us sufficient power (i.e.,
>= .80) to detect a small to medium effect size of at least .4 for our target alpha level (α = .05).
The first study yielded main effect sizes ranging from d = .42 to d = 1.47. Thus, we continued to
target a sample size of 75-100 participants per cell in our main studies to account for potential
exclusions due to poor data quality or attrition. Power analyses conducted in G*Power on our
achieved sample sizes revealed that we had sufficient power (i.e., >= .80) in all studies to detect
a main effect size of at least .42. All data, syntax, and materials are available through the Open
Science Framework: https://osf.io/wuc5k/?view_only=5839d24dea4b425186253b9f28dc2e8d
Pilot Study
Method
Participants and Procedure
We recruited 105 individuals from a sample of working professionals in Singapore (Mage
= 33.18 years, SDage = 8.48; 49.52% female) to complete a brief survey about their observations
of interactions between their leader and coworkers. Participants’ occupations included auditors,
architects, IT consultants, and film producers. The average work experience of the sample was
9.16 years (SD = 7.74); participants had worked with their leader an average of 3.35 years (SD =
3.68). All participants were asked if they had ever witnessed their supervisor receive
compliments, praise, or flattery. If so, participants were also asked about specific types of flattery
they may have seen using an adapted measure from Stern and Westphal (2010). Specifically,
participants were asked if they had seen coworkers compliment leaders’ personal characteristics,
appearance, clothing or personal belongings, insight on a strategic issues, success, and
contributions to the company.
Participants then reported whether flattery ever resulted in favors to the flatterer
(dichotomous choice: yes or no), and if so, to describe it. Additionally, using an adapted measure
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 11
by Hinkin and Schriesheim (1989), we asked what type of favors participants were granted: a
pay raise or bonus, special benefits, and promotions (dichotomous choices: yes or no). Finally,
we also inquired about whether participants’ leader seemed aware that flattery might be done to
secure professional favors (dichotomous choice: yes or no) and the extent to which their leader
generally rewarded flattery with preferential treatment. (1 = not at all, 7 = to a great extent).
Results
Observing Flattery
Witnessing flattery of leaders was quite common. 72 out of 105 participants (69%)
recalled witnessing their leader receive flattery from a coworker. The flattery took a variety of
forms, both professional and personal: The highest percentage of workers witnessed their
coworkers flatter the leader by complimenting their personal characteristics or strategic insights
(48% for each), followed by their professional judgment (42%), organizational contributions
(39%), personal appearance or professional success (38% each), and clothing or personal
belongings (24%). Importantly, 39% of the workers who witnessed flattery felt their leader was
unaware that the compliments were aimed at securing favorable treatment.
Frequency of Rewards to Flatterers
Many leaders seemed to reward the flattery they received. Of the participants who saw
flattery, a substantial portion (39%) reported seeing their leader grants favors to the flatterer.
Favors took a variety of forms and often included multiple aspects: 61% included pay raises or
bonuses, 68% included assistance securing a promotion, and 61% included other special benefits.
Section 1: Outlining the Predictors and Consequences of Falling for Flattery
The results of the pilot study showed that witnessing leaders receive flattery and respond
with a range of professional favors is common, with many observers believing their leaders had
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 12
“fallen for flattery” by being naively unaware about their flatterer’s motives. In this section, we
look at the variety of factors that lead observers to shape this belief – whether the leader grants
(or refuses to grant) a favor after being flattered (Studies 1-2), whether the flattery is isolated or
recurring (Study 3), and whether the favor occurs in response to flattery or for other reasons
(Study 4) – and the various costs to leaders that result when observers conclude they have fallen
for flattery. Importantly, we look at how the attribution of falling for flattery affects unfamiliar
leaders (Studies 1-2) and established leaders (Studies 3-4) and find that both types of leaders
suffer the same general costs in terms of reduced perceived competence and commitment from
observers but that established leaders, unlike unfamiliar leaders, do not receive any reputational
silver lining in the form of increased warmth perceptions.
Study 1: Falling for Flattery in a Networking Context
Study 1 tests how people react to different responses to flattery. We conducted this study
at an academic conference, an appropriate setting as candidates for faculty positions often use
conferences to develop social ties and find professional opportunities, and senior faculty are seen
as occupational leaders (Welch, 1980; Forret & Dougherty, 2004). We asked academics how
they would react if they saw a job applicant flatter a senior faculty member and then witnessed
the faculty member either granting or refusing to grant a professional favor.
Method
Participants
Prior to data collection, we targeted recruitment of at least 150 individuals (75 per
condition). We recruited 209 individuals (Mage = 32.40 years, SDage = 8.22; 46.89% female) for
this experiment: 172 participants from a conference for decision-making and behavioral-science
scholars (110 from the conference itself and 62 from an email follow-up via a listserv associated
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 13
with the conference), and 37 participants from Twitter.
2
,
3
We excluded 28 individuals (21 from
the conference sample, 6 from the listserv, and 1 from Twitter) who did not hold academic
positions as faculty or Ph.D. students due to their lack of familiarity with the Ph.D. student job
market, resulting in a final sample size of 181.
Design and Procedure
Participants read a hypothetical scenario about a conference similar to the one they were
attending or had attended recently (for online participants). In the scenario, a Ph.D. student on
the job market pointedly flatters a senior faculty member and asks whether the faculty member
would be willing to review their research statement and put in a good word to their hiring
committee. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the Grant
Favor condition, participants read that the senior faculty agreed to do the favor for the Ph.D.
student. In the Refuse Favor condition, participants read that the senior faculty member refused.
Dependent Measures
Perceived Naiveté. After reading one of the two scenarios, participants evaluated the
senior faculty member’s naiveté (four items: naive, gullible, ignorant, unaware, α = .91; 1 = not
at all, 7 = extremely; Barasch et al., 2016).
Impression-Management Consequences. Next, participants assessed how their
evaluations of the senior faculty member would change (-3 = become much more negative, +3 =
become much more positive) in terms of competence (three items: smart, competent, intelligent,
α = .88); and warmth (two items: caring, nice; α = .93).
Organizational Consequences. As the faculty member in our scenario was unassociated
2
We recruited Twitter participants using an invitation to the second author’s Twitter followers, who were employed
in academia, to participate in a survey about the academic job market.
3
To assess whether the different data source impacted our results in any meaningful way, we ran the analyses,
including data source as a covariate, which did not change the pattern and significance of our effects.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 14
with the participant, we did not assess commitment in this study, but instead focused on the
downstream impacts to academia. Participants assessed academia overall with three items (1 =
not at all, 7 = extremely): “How fair do you think academia is?” “How meritocracy-based do you
think academia is?” and “Do you think academia is where the best scholars are the ones who
receive job offers?” (α = .85).
Results
Table 1 provides means for all dependent measures by condition. Results for ancillary
variables are reported in supplemental analyses for Study 1 in the Supplemental Materials.
Perceived Naiveté
Supporting our prediction, we found a significant effect of favor-granting on perceived
naiveté, t(178) = 2.75, p = .007, d = .42. Participants viewed faculty who granted a favor as
more naïve (M = 2.44, SD = 1.44) than the faculty who refused (M = 1.91, SD = 1.09).
4
Impression-Management Consequences
We found a significant effect of favor-granting on perceptions of competence, t(174) = -
3.23, p = .001, d = -.49, such that participants viewed faculty who granted a favor to be less
competent (M = 0.07, SD = 0.71) than those who refused (M = 0.41, SD = 0.69). Bootstrap
mediation analysis revealed that granting favors decreased perceptions of competence through its
effect on perceived naiveté (indirect effect = -.07, SE = .03, 95%CI[-0.15, -0.02]; 5,000 samples),
suggesting a significant indirect effect (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Preacher & Kelley, 2011).
5
We found a significant effect of favor-granting on warmth perceptions, t(176) = 9.85, p <
4
As the means for both conditions were below the scale midpoint (4), we wanted to validate that favor-granting
leaders were being perceived as naïve rather than simply more naïve compared to non-favor-grantors. We present
Supplementary Study 1 in the Supplemental Materials, which shows that leaders are implicitly perceived to be
generally low in naiveté (M = 2.36, SD = 1.05) and significantly less naïve than both non-leaders (diff = 1.13, p <
.001) and the average person (diff = 1.46, p < .001). This suggests that results in this study (and our other studies)
show that favor-granting leaders are seen as naïve within the more-restricted range people use for judging leaders.
5
Note: all subsequent mediation analyses in the manuscript used the same bootstrapped analytical approach.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 15
.001, d = 1.47, as favor-granting increased perceptions of warmth (M = 1.02, SD = 1.00) as
compared to refusing (M = -0.49, SD = 1.05). Additionally, we explored whether perceived
naiveté mediated the relationship between favor-granting and perceptions of warmth. We did not
find that the increased perceptions of warmth were mediated by naiveté (indirect effect = -.05, SE
= .05, 95%CI [-0.18, 0.01]).
Organizational Consequences
Following our predictions, participants perceived academia as less fair when the faculty
member granted a favor (M = 3.17, SD = 1.11) than when the faculty member refused (M = 3.89,
SD = 1.12), t(176) = -4.36, p < .001, d = -.65, an effect mediated by perceived naiveté (indirect
effect = -.14, SE = .06, 95%CI [-0.28, -0.04]).
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for All Measures in Study 1
Variable
Grant Favor
Refuse Favor
t
p
d
df
Perceived naiveté
Perceived Naiveté
2.44 [2.14, 2.74]
1.91 [1.68, 2.14]
2.75
.007
.42
178
Impression-management consequences
Perceived Competence
0.07 [-0.08, 0.21]
0.41 [0.26, 0.56]
-3.23
.001
.49
174
Perceived Warmth
1.02 [0.81, 1.23]
-0.49 [-0.72, -0.27]
9.85
<.001
1.47
176
Organizational consequences
Organizational Fairness
3.17 [2.93, 3.40]
3.89 [3.66, 4.13]
-4.36
<.001
.65
176
Note. The values in square brackets are 95% confidence intervals.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 show that being seen rewarding flattery is risky for faculty leaders,
whom academics expect to be not easily swayed by compliments. In contrast, non-leaders do not
carry the same implicit expectations of being able to resist influence (as suggested by
Supplementary Study 1, see Footnote 4). We conducted Supplementary Study 2 to test whether
this leads observers to penalize favor-granting non-leaders less. As presented in the
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 16
Supplemental Materials, results showed that leaders and non-leaders alike appeared more naïve
when granting favors to flatterers (ts > 2.77, ps < .006, ds > 2.01). However, participants rated
leaders who rewarded flattery as less competent than those who refused (t(184) = -4.13, p =
<.001, d = .49), but did not penalize non-leaders for the same behavior (t(177) = -.42, p = .674, d
= .23). Thus, while all flattery recipients who reward flattery appeared more naïve to observers,
being a leader was associated with additional reputational costs from rewarding flattery.
Study 2: Falling for Flattery in the Lab
We next explore whether our predictions extend to real-time observations of flattery and
favor-granting. Study 2 engages lab participants in a competitive task in which they see their
competitor flatter and seek favorable treatment from the experimenter, the authority figure in the
lab. We investigate whether participants – working on a real task, with outcomes determined by
the experimenter – react negatively to favorable responses to flattery and whether they will
decrease their commitment to the experimenter (i.e., the leader in this context) as a result.
Method
Participants
We recruited 170 adults
6
(Mage = 23.89 years, SDage = 7.01; 56.14% female) and paid
them $15 to participate in an hour-long lab session at a large Southeastern university. We
removed five participants who expressed awareness that their simulated competitor (see next
section for more details) was fake
7
as well as one participant who completed the experiment
twice, resulting in a usable sample of 164.
Design and Procedure
Participants were tasked with preparing a one-minute video presentation on the business
6
Covid-19 facility closures prevented us from collecting our full target sample of 200 participants.
7
We also ran the analysis with suspicious participants and saw no change in the pattern or significance of results.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 17
topic of first offers in negotiations. To help them do so, we provided them with a set of slides
containing relevant materials. Participants were told they would be competing against another
participant for a chance to earn a $10 bonus and that they would be judged based on their
presentation performance. During their preparation, participants could communicate with the lab
experimenter via instant messaging to ask clarification questions.
Before delivering their presentations, participants were randomly assigned to one of two
conditions. In both conditions, under the premise of ensuring equal task knowledge prior to
presenting, participants were shown presentation materials purported to be from their competitor.
The competitor’s materials included an instant-messaging transcript between them and the lab
experimenter. In the transcript, the competitor flattered the lab experimenter (e.g., “I have never
had an experimenter explain things so clearly. You must be really smart!”; for full text, see
Supplemental Materials) and then asked for specific tips on how to make it to the next round. In
the Grant Favor condition, participants read that the experimenter agreed to grant the favor and
provided some suggestions to the competitor. In the Refuse Favor condition, participants read the
same materials but with the experimenter instead refusing to provide tips. Participants also saw
their competitor’s speaking notes, which reinforced the manipulation with a comment that
included more flattery for the experimenter and a note either thanking the experimenter for their
helpful tips or expressing understanding about why the experimenter refused to help.
Dependent Measures
Perceived Naiveté. After reading the materials from their competitor and prior to
delivering their presentation, participants used the same measures as Study 1 to evaluate the lab
experimenter’s naiveté (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely; α = .97; Barasch et al., 2016)
Impression-Management Consequences. We collected the measures of competence and
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 18
warmth from Study 1 (αcompetence = .95; αwarmth = .92) adapted to an absolute scale (1 = not at all,
7 = extremely), rather than a change scale (-3 = become much more negative, +3 = become much
more positive), as participants were likely unfamiliar with the experimenter and the lab context
and thus did not have meaningful prior perceptions of the experimenter’s competence or warmth.
Organizational Consequences.
Organizational Fairness. We collected the same measures of organizational fairness as
in Study 1. For example, we asked participants if they thought the lab was “fair” or
“meritocracy-based” (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely; α = .81).
Commitment To the Leader. In line with conceptualizations of commitment as a
willingness to continue in an exchange relationship (Flint et al., 2013; Meyer et al., 2002), we
assessed commitment by asking participants how willing they would be to sign up for another
study run by the same lab experimenter (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely; single item).
Leader Fairness. In addition to the measures collected above as part of our core
theoretical model, we also collected a measure of experimenter fairness to support secondary
mediation analyses. We asked participants to rate their perceptions of the experimenter’s fairness
using a single item: “how fair s/he is” (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely).
Results
Table 2 provides means for all focal measures by condition. Results for ancillary
variables are described in supplemental analyses for Study 2 in the Supplemental Materials.
Manipulation Check
As a manipulation check, we asked, “How helpful was the Lab Evaluator towards your
competitor?” (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). As expected, participants in the Grant Favor
condition rated the experimenter as more helpful to their competitor (M = 6.03, SD = 1.08) than
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 19
did Refuse Favor condition participants (M = 4.62, SD = 1.43), t(162) = 7.08, p < .001, d = 1.11.
Perceived Naiveté
Supporting our predictions, participants viewed an experimenter who granted the favor as
more naïve (M = 2.69, SD = 1.67) than an experimenter who refused (M = 1.89, SD = 1.19),
t(162) = 3.55, p < .001, d = .56.
Impression-Management Consequences
As Table 2 shows, in this study, we did not find the predicted effect of favor-granting on
perceived competence, t(162) = -0.32, p = .749, d = .05, but we did find support for the indirect
effect of granting favors on competence via the perceived naiveté mechanism (indirect effect = -
.34, SE = .11, 95% CI [-0.59, -0.14]), suggesting that naiveté had the predicted negative effect on
competence. We speculate that the lack of a negative main effect of favor-granting on perceived
competence stemmed from a countervailing effect of the favor-granting in our lab context, which
may have made the lab experimenter appear more decisive (autonomously choosing to provide
inside information) and knowledgeable (detailing suggestions) and thus bolstered how competent
they seemed (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2011) compared to the favor-refusing experimenter, who simply
stated they were unable to provide assistance.
In terms of perceived warmth, results were consistent with Study 1 and Supplementary
Study 2, as the unfamiliar lab experimenters who granted favors received higher warmth ratings
(M = 5.11, SD = 1.05) than those who refused to grant a favor (M = 4.58, SD = 1.38), t(162) =
2.75, p = .007, d = .43. We again did not find that the effect of favor-granting on perceived
warmth was mediated by perceived naiveté (indirect effect = -.07, SE = .05, 95%CI[-0.20, 0.01]).
Organizational Consequences
In this study, we assessed both types of organizational consequences from our theoretical
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 20
model: commitment to the leader and perceptions of organizational fairness. Participants who
witnessed the lab experimenter grant a favor after flattery were less committed to the
experimenter, as shown by a decreased willingness to do another study with the experimenter (M
= 4.98, SD = 1.83), as compared to those who witnessed the experimenter refusing to grant a
favor (M = 5.83, SD= 1.44), t(162) = -3.35, p = .001, d = 0.52). Additionally, participants
perceived the lab to be less fair when the experimenter granted a favor (M = 4.10, SD = 1.42)
than when the experimenter refused (M = 5.17, SD = 1.13), t(162) = -5.35, p < .001, d = .84.
We next assessed whether naiveté mediated these effects. We found that the relationship
between favor-granting and participants’ willingness to do another study with the experimenter
was mediated by perceived naiveté (indirect effect = -.38, SE = .13, 95%CI [-0.68, -0.15], as was
the relationship between experimenter favor-granting and organizational fairness (indirect effect
= -.22, SE = .09, 95% CI [-0.45, -0.08]). These results replicated our findings from previous
studies and offer further evidence that our mechanism – perceived naiveté – drives these effects.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for All Measures in Study 2
Variable
Grant Favor
Refuse Favor
t
p
d
Perceived naiveté
Perceived Naiveté
2.69 [2.32, 3.07]
1.89 [1.64, 2.15]
3.55
<.001
0.56
Impression-management consequences
Perceived Competence
4.80 [4.49, 5.11]
4.87 [4.61, 5.12]
-0.32
.749
0.05
Perceived Warmth
5.11 [4.88, 5.35]
4.58 [4.28, 4.89]
2.75
.007
0.43
Organizational consequences
Organizational Fairness
4.10 [3.78, 4.42]
5.17 [4.93, 5.41]
-5.35
<.001
0.84
Willing to do another study
4.98 [4.57, 5.38]
5.83 [5.52, 6.15]
-3.35
.001
0.52
df = 162; Note. The values in square brackets are 95% confidence intervals.
Secondary Mediation Analyses
To provide further support for our conceptual model, we tested an additional mediation
model, including an alternative mechanism. Specifically, one alternative explanation for our
downstream effects may be that they are driven solely by perceptions of leader unfairness rather
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 21
than by perceived naiveté. To test this possibility, we conducted secondary mediation analyses,
including both perceived naiveté and perceptions of leader fairness as simultaneous mediators
from favor-granting to our downstream outcomes. We present the full table of indirect effects in
supplemental analyses for Study 2 in the Supplemental Materials. In brief, we found that when
leader fairness was included as a simultaneous mediator, the results continued to show
significant indirect effects via perceived naiveté for both competence (indirect effect = -.14, SE =
.08, 95% CI [-0.34, -0.02]) and willingness to complete additional studies (i.e., commitment to
the leader) (indirect effect = -.19, SE = .10, 95% CI [-0.45, -0.04]), although there was not a
significant indirect effect for organizational fairness (indirect effect = -.03, SE = .06, 95% CI [-
0.17, 0.07]). Overall, these results suggest that viewing the experimenter as naïve explains
variance above and beyond simply viewing the experimenter as unfair.
Discussion
Beyond providing support for our theoretical model using an in-person task, this
laboratory experiment adds two key insights. First, we find that the negative consequences of
rewarding flattery are not limited to perceptions of leaders or their organizations, but extend to
observers’ willingness to work with such leaders in the future. Second, it shows the unique role
of perceptions of naiveté when observers witness leaders reward flattery, above and beyond
negative evaluations of leader fairness.
Study 3: Falling for Flattery in the Field
The prior studies feature one-off instances of flattery and favor-granting with leaders who
are either somewhat unfamiliar to the observer (Study 1 and Supplementary Study 2) or are
completely new (Study 2). To broaden beyond this context,
8
we next assess real-world
8
Another aspect of our experimental paradigm that may vary in the real world is whether a favor is observed to be
explicitly requested by the flatterer. We explored this in Supplementary Study 3, presented in the Supplemental
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 22
experiences of flattery and favor-granting by asking MBA students to describe their existing
leader and evaluate the leader’s response to flattery via a recollection task.
By doing so, we generalize our model beyond initial impressions of leaders to established
leader-follower relationships. This is an important step, as we have posited that whether or not
the observer has an existing relationship with the leader may mitigate the positive effect of
flattery-based favor-granting on warmth, since witnessing a leader act favorably towards a
flatterer has contrasting implications for the leaders’ friendliness and fairness which underly
warmth perceptions. In particular, while prior work indicates that newcomers may—absent other
relevant knowledge—perceive leaders who grant favors as friendly and warm (Foulk & Long,
2016), observers with established relationships with such leaders may assess the behavior
beyond its surface-level appearance and thus be more critical. We preregistered our study at
https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=9pp3ng.
9
Method
Participants
A cohort of 148 students from an MBA program in Western Europe took part in this
study. Of the 148, 21 students reported not having witnessed flattery, and three provided open-
ended responses irrelevant to the context; they were thus excluded, leaving a final sample of 124
(Mage = 29.00 years, SDage = 2.12; 38 female, 80 male, six did not self-identify). The average
work experience of the sample was 5.87 years (SD = 1.79). Importantly, the average length of the
Materials, and found that whether or not the favor was explicitly requested had relatively little impact, with the
exception that leaders who grant favors without an explicitly requested favor are perceived to be less warm.
9
For conciseness, we report the results for one preregistered variable, overall impression of the leader, in the
Supplemental Materials as supplemental analyses for this and the other studies in this manuscript. We
conceptualized this variable as an alternate leadership outcome representing the holistic perception a subordinate has
of their leader. We note that, as expected, results followed predictions, showing a significant negative effect of being
seen rewarding flattery on overall impression, mediated by naiveté. The results of studies 4-7 also followed our
predictions and were consistent with the results pattern for the other organizational consequences variables.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 23
relationship with their leader was 3.32 years (SD = 1.80).
Design and Procedure
We first asked participants to think of their current or most recent supervisor and report
the length and quality of their relationship with them.
10
Next, we informed participants that we
were interested in instances when they may have witnessed the leader receive flattery from
followers or peers that appeared aimed at currying favor. Participants were asked to describe the
event(s) in a few sentences before completing the measures.
Measures
Rewarding Flattery. We asked to what extent participants’ leaders “generally rewarded
flattery with some sort of preferential treatment or favors” (1 = not at all, 7 = to a great extent).
Perceived Naiveté and Impression-Management Consequences. Due to time
constraints, we collected single item versions of the naiveté and impression-management
measures as our prior studies.
11
Organizational Consequences. As with the impression-management measures, we used
shortened versions of scales in this study. For commitment to the leader, we adapted an item
from Grant and colleagues’ (2008) measure of affective commitment. Participants indicated
whether they would be happy to spend the rest of their career working with the supervisor (1 =
not at all, 7 = to a great extent). Finally, we assessed how rewarding flattery with favors impacts
views of organizational fairness on two important dimensions related to the allocation of
10
We used the two relationship variables in supplemental analyses to Study 3 presented in the Supplemental
Materials. Results showed that the variables did not significantly interact with favor-granting in predicting our
outcomes and that controlling for them did not impact the pattern or significance of results. Thus, while results from
this study suggest that the impact of rewarding flattery on warmth differs for established leader-follower
relationships (compared to unfamiliar leaders), the characteristics of the relationship appear less impactful.
11
Given this limitation, we conducted Supplementary Study 4, an identical version of this study on Amazon MTurk
using multi-item validated measures of all dependent variables (N = 135) as a robustness check. As presented in the
Supplemental Materials, focal results and conclusions were consistent with the results of Study 3.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 24
rewards: procedural fairness and distributive fairness. Using items adapted from Colquitt (2001),
we had participants rate how the leader’s response affected their views of how fair their
organization was in using bias-free procedures (procedural fairness) and rewarding individuals
appropriately for their work (distributive fairness) (1 = not at all, 7 = to a great extent). We
averaged the two items to create a measure of organizational fairness (α= .80).
Results
Perceived Naiveté
As predicted, leaders who were recalled as more strongly rewarding flattery were seen by
participants as more naïve (b = 0.44, SE = .09, t(120) = 4.96, p < .001).
Impression-Management Consequences
Supporting our predictions, we found that the more leaders were perceived as rewarding
flattery, the less competent they seemed (b = -.47, SE = .07, t(120) = -6.52, p < .001). As with
our prior studies, we found that perceived naiveté mediated the effect of leaders’ rewarding
flattery on perceived competence (indirect effect = -.09, SE = .05, 95% CIBC [ -0.21, -0.02]).
As predicted and in contrast to the prior studies, where unfamiliar leaders were seen as
warmer after rewarding flattery, established leaders did not gain a warmth benefit from the same
behavior. The relationship between rewarding flattery and warmth for established leaders was
nonsignificant and was directionally negative (b = -.14, SE = .08, t(120) = -1.85, p = .067).
Organizational Consequences
As predicted, recollections of leaders rewarding flattery were negatively associated with
commitment to the leader (b = -.49, SE = .09, t(120) = -5.33, p < .001) and perceptions of
organizational fairness (b = -.35, SE = .07, t(120) = -4.91, p < .001). We also assessed whether
naiveté perceptions mediated the effect of leaders’ rewarding flattery on organizational
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 25
outcomes. In partial support of our predictions, perceived naiveté mediated the effect of
rewarding flattery on commitment (indirect effect = -.09, SE = .05, 95% CIBC [ -0.20, -0.02]), but
not organizational fairness (indirect effect = -.04, SE = .04, 95% CIBC [ -0.12, 0.03]).
Secondary Analyses
By testing our model with established leader-follower relationships, we can also
generalize our findings beyond one-off instances of flattery and favor-granting. As presented in
supplemental analyses for Study 3 in the Supplemental Materials, two coders who were blind to
hypotheses rated participants’ descriptions of leaders’ response to flattery and identified 80
instances of recurring flattery and 36 instances of one-off flattery (8 responses were unclear). We
tested flattery frequency as a moderator variable (0 = one-off, 1 = recurring) to see if flattery
frequency impacted the relationship between favor-granting and our outcomes. Analyses
revealed no significant interactions between favor-granting and flattery frequency, nor was
flattery frequency a significant predictor for any outcome. These results suggest that reactions to
leaders falling for flattery are similar whether the observed flattery is isolated or recurring.
Discussion
Using participant recollections of their own leaders rewarding flattery, we find that the
negative consequences of observing a leader reward flattery also occur in established leader-
follower relationships, but that appearing warm—the one possible benefit of rewarding flattery—
appears to be limited to unknown or new leaders as shown in our prior studies. To directly test
this result, we also conducted Supplementary Study 5, in which we assessed the effects of favor-
granting while varying whether the leader was newly introduced or was the participant’s existing
leader. As presented in the Supplemental Materials, the results were supportive of an effect of
leader familiarity on warmth (but not on any other outcomes), with favor-granting increasing
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 26
warmth for new leaders (b = .38, SE = .18, p = .034), but not for established leaders (b = .00, SE
= .13, p = .991). The combined results of Study 3 and Supplementary Study 5 provide a clear
picture of the risk that established leaders take when they reward flattery: In the eyes of others,
this behavior likely leads to negative consequences without the benefit of appearing warmer.
Study 4: The Unique Effect of Flattery
There are many potential reasons for leaders to grant favors to followers. Are flattery-
based favors different from other types of unfair favors? Study 4 tests the unique role of flattery
comparing it to another context in which followers can perceive leaders as granting favors
unfairly: nepotism (Burhan et al., 2020). In the case of flattery, followers believe leaders are
naïve because they are unaware of flatterers’ self-serving motives. In contrast, observers of
nepotism are unlikely to attribute naiveté to leaders who are clearly aware that they are granting
favors to family members (Bellow, 2003). Thus, while both flattery and nepotism involve the
unfair allocation of resources, naiveté should be unique to the former.
We also sought to contrast flattery with a context in which observers might view favor-
granting as fair. Meritocracy is often a socially acceptable justification for unequal outcomes
(e.g., Hook & Cook, 1979), and people generally favor granting bonuses to those who have
earned them (Shaw et al., 2018). By systematically testing contexts in which leaders’ favors are
fair or unfair, we gain a more precise understanding of the processes unique to flattery.
Method
Participants
We recruited 803 participants from Amazon MTurk who were employed at an
organization other than MTurk. One participant was excluded for failing both attention checks,
leaving a final sample of 802 participants (Mage = 37.31 years, SDage = 10.11; 345 female, 450
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 27
male, three non-binary/third gender; four did not self-identify).
Design and Procedure
We first asked participants to recall a leader in their organization and to report the length
and quality of their relationship with that leader.
12
All participants were then asked to imagine
they observed another individual (the “approacher”) approach the leader at an office social event
and ask for a major professional favor. To enhance realism (and to continue testing our model
with actual leaders, following Study 3), we programmed the survey to insert the name or initials
of the participants’ leader into the scenarios. We used a 4(request context: flattery vs. nepotism
vs. meritocracy vs. control) 2(leader response: grant favor vs. refuse favor) between-subjects
design (see Supplemental Materials for scenario text).
In the Flattery condition, participants read that the approacher began by flattering the
leader before asking for an introduction to the hiring manager of a desirable position and a
recommendation for the promotion. In the Nepotism condition, participants read that the
approacher was the leader’s nephew and that the two discussed a recent family gathering before
the approacher asked for the same favor. In the Meritocracy condition, participants read that the
approacher accurately detailed their strong qualifications before asking for the favor. Finally, in
the Control condition, participants read that the approacher simply asked for the favor.
After the requests, participants in the Grant Favor condition read that the leader granted
the favor, introducing the approacher to the hiring manager and recommending them for the
position. In the Refuse Favor condition, participants read that the leader did not grant the favor.
Dependent Measures
Perceived Naiveté. We collected the same naiveté measure as previous studies (α = .96).
12
Following Study 3, we present supplemental analyses for this study in the Supplemental Materials controlling for
these relationship variables which show that the pattern and significance of our focal results were unchanged.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 28
Impression-Management Consequences. Participants assessed how their impression of
the leader’s competence and warmth would be affected by what they read using four items each
(αcompetence = .92, αwarmth = .92; -3 = become much more negative, 3 = become much more
positive) from Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick (2008; competent, skillful, confident, able; warm, nice,
friendly, sincere).
Organizational Consequences.
Commitment to the Leader. Participants indicated how committed they would feel to
their leader if the scenario were to happen using a five-item adapted version of the affective
commitment measure in Grant, Dutton, and Rosso (2008; e.g., “I would be very happy to spend
the rest of my career working with (my leader)”; α = .93).
Organizational Fairness. Participants assessed their perceptions of their organization’s
fairness with the full six-item version of the Colquitt (2001) scale used in Study 3 (α = .96)
Results
We conducted an ANOVA on all our dependent variables, using request context: (flattery
vs. nepotism vs. meritocracy vs. control) and leader response: (grant favor vs. refuse favor) as
between-subjects factors. Means by condition are presented in Table 3 and Figures 1 and 2A-D.
Manipulation Checks
As manipulation checks, participants were asked to what extent the approacher flattered
the leader, to what extent the two were biologically related, to what extent the approacher
provided details about their qualifications, and to what extent the leader performed a favor (1 =
not at all, 7 = very much). As expected, participants in the grant-favor conditions observed favor
granting to a greater extent (M = 5.91, SD = 1.23) than did participants in the refuse-favor
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 29
conditions, (M = 1.98, SD = 1.75), F(1, 794) = 1365.53, p < .001.
13
The results for the request
context (i.e., flattery, nepotism, meritocracy, or control) manipulation checks, reported in the
supplemental analyses for Study 4 in the Supplemental Materials, confirmed that participants
correctly observed the request context to which they were assigned by condition.
Perceived Naiveté
An ANOVA testing the effects of request context and favor-granting on perceived
naiveté indicated a significant effect of favor-granting, F(1, 794) = 35.55, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .043,
and a significant interaction, F(3, 794) = 9.65, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .035. There was no significant
effect of request condition, F(3, 794) = 2.45, p = .063, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .009. As shown in Table 3 and
Figure 1, granting a favor in response to flattery led to increased perceptions of naiveté as
compared to refusing, t(200) = 6.76, p <.001, d = .95. In contrast, favor granting had no effect in
either the nepotism or meritocracy conditions (ts < 1.61, ps > .110, ds < .23). While favor-
granting in the control condition also followed the same pattern as flattery (t(197) = 3.65, p <
.001, d = .52), planned contrasts showed that observers viewed leaders who granted favors as
more naïve in the flattery condition than favor-granting leaders in the nepotism (t(395) = 4.35, p
< .001), meritocracy (t(395) = 4.45, p < .001), and control conditions (t(395) = 2.87, p = .004).
Naiveté was an attribution unique to flattery and did not emerge to the same extent in other
unfair favor-granting contexts, such as nepotism.
13
This effect was qualified by a significant interaction between favor granting and request context, F(3, 794) = 4.91,
p = .002. Post-hoc tests showed a significant effect of favor-granting in all request contexts (ts > 13.99, ps < .001).
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 30
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for All Measures in Study 4
Flattery
Nepotism
Meritocracy
Control
Variable
Grant Favor
Refuse
Favor
ta
Grant
Favor
Refuse
Favor
tb
Grant
Favor
Refuse
Favor
tc
Grant
Favor
Refuse
Favor
td
Perceived naiveté
Perceived
Naiveté
M = 3.33
[2.97,2.68]
M = 1.80
[1.52,2.08]
6.76
(p <.001)
M = 2.31
[2.01,2.62]
M = 1.96
[1.65,2.27]
1.61
(p =.110)
M = 2.33
[2.06,2.60]
M = 2.40
[2.07,2.73]
-0.34
(p =.733)
M = 2.66
[2.31,3.01]
M = 1.85
[1.58,2.12]
3.65
(p <.001)
Impression-management consequences
Perceived
Competence
M = 0.17
[-0.07,0.42]
M = 1.31
[1.12,1.49]
-7.45
(p <.001)
M = 0.42
[0.21,0.63]
M = 1.41
[1.21,1.61]
-6.76
(p <.001)
M = 1.06
[0.87,1.25]
M = 0.78
[0.56,0.99]
1.95
(p =.053)
M = 0.79
[0.57,1.01]
M = 0.86
[0.66,1.05
-0.46
(p =.646)
Perceived
Warmth
M = 0.41
[0.17,0.65]
M = 0.57
[0.38,0.76]
-1.05
(p =.297)
M = 0.42
[0.18,0.66]
M = 0.80
[0.59,1.01]
-2.37
(p =.019)
M = 1.25
[1.04,1.45]
M = 0.11
[-.16,0.39]
6.60
(p <.001)
M = 1.03
[0.82,1.24]
M = 0.26
[0.03,0.50]
4.79
(p <.001)
Organizational consequences
Commitment
to Leader
M = 3.95
[3.59,4.30]
M = 4.54
[4.26,4.81]
-2.63
(p =.009)
M = 4.13
[3.82,4.43]
M = 4.87
[4.60,5.13]
-3.60
(p <.001)
M = 4.33
[4.05,4.60]
M = 4.24
[3.94,4.54]
0.41
(p =.683)
M = 4.54
[4.26,4.83]
M = 4.20
[3.90,4.50]
1.65
(p =.101)
Organization
al Fairness
M = 3.65
[3.31,4.00]
M = 5.49
[5.26,5.72]
-9.06
(p <.001)
M = 3.66
[3.35,3.96]
M = 5.66
[5.45,5.87]
-10.66
(p <.001)
M = 4.86
[4.62,5.10]
M = 4.80
[4.50,5.10]
0.32
(p =.746)
M = 4.11
[3.81,4.41]
M = 5.20
[4.96,5.44]
-5.66
(p <.001)
a df = 200; b df = 201; c df = 196; d df = 197 Note. The values in square brackets are 95% confidence intervals.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 31
Figure 1
Study 4: Perceived leader naiveté as a function of request context (flattery vs. nepotism vs.
meritocracy vs. control) and favor conditions (grant favor vs. refuse favor)
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Impression-Management Consequences
Perceived Competence. An ANOVA on perceived competence indicated a significant
main effect of favor granting, F(1, 794) = 42.64, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .051, and a significant
interaction, F(3, 794) = 21.87, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 076. There was no significant effect of request
context, F(3, 794) = 1.13, p = .336, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .004. As presented in Table 3 and Figure 2A, favor-
granting diminished perceptions of competence in the flattery and nepotism conditions as
compared to refusing (ts < -6.76, ps < .001, ds > .95). In contrast, there was no significant effect
of favor-granting on competence in either the meritocracy or control conditions (ts < 1.95, ps >
.053, ds < .28). Planned contrasts showed that favor-granting led to lower perceived competence
in the flattery condition than in the meritocracy (t(395) = -5.73, p < .001) or control conditions
(t(395) = -3.94, p < .001), while not differing from the nepotism condition (t(395) = -1.59, p =
.113). Thus, while the flattery and nepotism contexts differed in terms of their effect on naiveté
attributions, they both led to the same negative distal outcome. By highlighting the attributional
process of reactions to unfairness, we highlight important differences in observers’ reactions that
otherwise would appear similar based solely on downstream outcomes.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 32
Perceived Warmth. Consistent with our previous results, an ANOVA on perceived
warmth indicated a significant main effect of favor granting, F(1, 794) = 17.11, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =
.021, and a significant interaction, F(3, 794) = 20.23, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .071, but no significant
effect of request context, F(3, 794) = 0.93, p = .424, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .004. The results in Table 3 and Figure
2B showed that favor-granting did not impact warmth perceptions in the flattery condition
(t(200) = -1.05, p = .297, d = -.15), which is consistent with Study 3 and Supplementary Study 5
in showing that observers do not perceive established leaders as warmer when they reward
flattery. In the nepotism condition, favor-granting reduced warmth perceptions as compared to
refusing (t(201) = -2.37, p = .019, d = -.33). In contrast, granting a favor led to higher
perceptions of warmth in the meritocracy and control conditions as compared to refusing (ts >
4.79, ps < .001, ds > .68). These results support our contention that favor-granting boosts warmth
perceptions when it does not appear to unjustly disadvantage others.
Organizational Consequences
Commitment to the Leader. Similar to prior results, an ANOVA on commitment
indicated a significant main effect of favor granting, F(1, 794) = 4.69, p = .031, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .006, and a
significant interaction, F(3, 794) = 6.11, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .023, but no significant effect of request
context, F(3, 794) = 1.01, p = .389, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .004. The results in Table 3 and Figure 2C demonstrate
that observers in the flattery and nepotism conditions were less committed after witnessing
favor-granting (ts < -2.63, ps < .010, ds > .37), but there was no impact in the meritocracy or
control conditions (ts < 1.65, ps > .101, ds < .23). As with the impression-management
consequences, these results indicate that granting favors for unjust reasons harms observers’
relationship with their leader in contrast to favors granted due to merit.
Organizational fairness. Finally, an ANOVA on organizational fairness followed the
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 33
same pattern and indicated a significant main effect of favor granting, F(1, 794) = 160.73, p <
.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .170, and a significant interaction, F(3, 794) = 23.40, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .082, but no
significant effect of request context, F(3, 794) = 1.24, p = .294, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .005. The results in Table 3
and Figure 2D show that participants rated their organization as less fair when observing favor-
granting as compared to refusing in the flattery, nepotism, and control conditions (ts < -5.66, ps
< .001, ds > .80), but favor-granting did not affect fairness perceptions in the meritocracy
condition (t(192) = 0.32, p = .746, d = .05). Planned contrasts indicated that favor-granting by
leaders led participants to perceive the organization as less fair in the flattery condition than
participants in the control (t(389) = -2.13, p = .034) or meritocracy conditions (t(389) = -5.63, p
< .001), while not differing from the nepotism condition (t(389) = -0.02, p = .988). As with
commitment, flattery and nepotism exacerbate the negative impact of favor-granting on
observers’ views of the organization as compared to the meritocracy and control conditions.
Figures 2A-2D
Study 4: Impression-management consequences (competence and warmth) and organizational
consequences (commitment to leader and organizational fairness) as a function of request
context (flattery vs. nepotism vs. meritocracy vs. control) and favor conditions (grant favor vs.
refuse favor)
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 34
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Secondary Mediation Analyses
The results for naiveté highlight it a mechanism that is unique to the flattery context.
Supporting this conclusion, supplemental mediation analyses for this study presented in the
Supplemental Materials showed that naiveté did not mediate the effect of favor-granting for the
nepotism, meritocracy, and control conditions on any outcome. In contrast, naiveté mediated the
effect in the flattery condition for competence (indirect effect = - .17, SE = .09, 95% CI [-0.365, -
0.027]) and organizational fairness (indirect effect = -.30, SE = .11, 95% CI [ -0.543, -0.115]),
although it did not mediate the effect on commitment (indirect effect = -.10, SE = .09, 95% CI [-
0.302, 0.051]). In sum, although favors granted due to nepotism led to many of the same
outcomes, inferences of naiveté appear specific to the flattery-based attributional process.
Discussion
Results from Study 4 illustrate the role that context – flattery, nepotism, or meritocracy –
plays in shaping observer reactions when leaders grant favor. Additionally, the results from the
Meritocracy condition suggested that an approacher’s deservingness may allow favors to be seen
less negatively. We conducted Supplementary Study 6 to test if observers’ negative reactions to
leaders rewarding flattery would be magnified if the flatterer was incompetent because not only
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 35
did the favor result from disingenuous flattery, but it aided the career of an undeserving person.
14
Results presented in the Supplemental Materials supported our prediction. When a flatterer was
incompetent, observers viewed favor-granting leaders as even more naïve, less competent and
warm, and the organization as even less fair. These results confirm that observers consider both
the flattery and the approacher’s deservingness when witnessing a leader reward flattery.
Section 2: Contextual Factors that Shape Downstream Impacts of Falling for Flattery
In Studies 5-7, we look at the contextual factors that magnify or reduce what costs leaders
pay for being perceived to have fallen for flattery. Specifically, we examine the type of flattery
used (Study 5), the extent to which the favor directly harms the observer (Study 6), and whether
the leader indicates awareness that the flattery they receive is not genuine (Study 7).
Study 5: The Various Forms of Flattery
Flattery can take numerous forms (Stern & Westphal, 2010), varying in terms of its
excessiveness as well as its referent domain (e.g., work-related or personal). While our model
would suggest that all types of flattery are likely to lead observers to make attributions of falling
for flattery, the nature of the flattery should shape observers’ subsequent reactions. In particular,
excessive flattery should create a more negative context within which favor-granting would be
assessed and incur higher costs, while rewarding more benign or seemingly genuine flattery may
lead to benefits, such as observers seeing leaders as warmer. Moreover, we also tested how these
forms of flattery compare with neutral platitudes (i.e., “have a nice day”) in a control condition.
We also used this study to further unpack the attribution that a favor-granting leader is
naïvely falling for flattery by measuring observers’ belief that the leader sees the flattery as
14
We also explored in Supplementary Study 6 whether observers’ reactions to favor-granting after flattery would
vary based on observers’ prior perceptions of the leader’s general competence. As shown in secondary analyses for
the study, the leader’s general competence seemed to have little impact on reactions to favor-granting after flattery.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 36
genuine (versus instrumental). Our theory suggests that observers’ perceptions that a leader
believes flattery is genuine will mediate the effect of favor-granting on perceptions of naiveté.
We preregistered our study and analysis plan at https://aspredicted.org/GQD_N97.
Method
Participants
We recruited 604 participants from Amazon MTurk who were employed at an
organization. Fourteen participants were excluded based on our preregistered exclusion criteria
(i.e., either answered both attention checks incorrectly or provided a nonsensical response to
what they do for work), leaving a final sample of 590 participants (Mage = 39.76 years, SDage =
11.14; 256 female, 325 male, one non-binary/third gender; eight did not self-identify).
Participants had worked with their leader for an average of 7.30 years (SD = 7.77).
Design and Procedure
Using a design similar to Study 4, we first asked participants to recall a leader in their
organization and report the length of their relationship. Participants were then asked to imagine
that they observed another individual (the “approacher”) approach the leader at an office social
event and flatter the leader. The scenario differed slightly from Study 4 by stating that the
observer did not see the approacher ask for a favor (e.g., a personal introduction and
recommendation to a hiring manager for a new promotion) until a week later rather than
immediately. We made this change to test whether the time interval between flattery and favor
requests mattered. We used a 4(flattery type: excessive work-related vs. merited work-related vs.
excessive personal characteristics-related vs. control) 2(leader response: grant favor vs. refuse
favor) between-subjects design (see Supplemental Materials for scenario text).
In the Excessive Work-Related condition, participants read the same scenario from Study
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 37
4, in which the approacher excessively flattered the leader for their work (“act in an extremely
fawning way…complimenting them on their work, buttering them up, and repeatedly mentioning
how they admire [the leader’s] work”). In the Merited Work-Related condition, participants read
that the approacher complimented the leader on a recent organizational initiative but noted that
the observer was aware this initiative was indeed a big success and due to the leader’s efforts. In
the Excessive Personal Characteristics-Related condition, participants read that the approacher
excessively flattered the leader on their appearance (“act in an extremely fawning
way…complimenting them on their outfit and repeatedly mentioning how they liked [the
leader’s] new haircut”). Finally, in the Control condition, participants read that the approacher
simply asked the leader about their week and said, “I hope you had a great day.”
After the requests, participants read that the leader either granted the approacher’s favor
(Grant Favor condition) or refused to do so (Refuse Favor condition). As with the modification
to the scenario for the timing of the approacher’s request described above, we also had the
approacher eventually find out about the favor-granting or refusal, rather than witnessing it
immediately, again to test whether the time interval mattered.
Dependent Measures
Perceived Belief that Flattery was Genuine. Prior to rating their leader’s naiveté,
participants indicated the extent to which the leader seemed to believe the approacher’s
compliments were genuine with a single item (1 = not at all, 7 = to a great extent).
Perceived Naiveté and Downstream Consequences. We collected the same measures
as in Study 4 of naiveté (α = .96), competence (α = .93), warmth (α = .90), commitment (α =
.91), and organizational fairness (α = .97).
Results
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 38
Providing support for our overall predictions, the results demonstrated significant
interactions of flattery type and favor-granting for the majority of focal outcomes. Results by
outcome are presented in Table 4 and Figures 3 and 4A-D, and discussed further below.
Manipulation Check
Participants were asked to what extent the leader performed a favor for the approacher (1
= not at all; 7 = very much). Participants in the grant-favor condition witnessed favor-granting to
a stronger extent (M = 6.03, SD = 1.07) than did participants in the refuse-favor condition (M =
1.74, SD = 1.36; t(588) = 42.64, p < .001).
Perceived Naiveté
An ANOVA testing the effects of flattery type and favor-granting on naiveté revealed a
significant effect of granting favors, F(1, 582) = 140.73, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .195, and a significant
effect of flattery type, F(1, 582) = 2.62, p = .050, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .013, but did not show a significant
interaction as predicted, F(1, 582) = 1.38, p = .247, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .007. As shown in Table 4 and Figure 3,
favor granting increased perceptions of naiveté regardless of the type of flattery and, while there
was not a significant interaction, planned contrasts suggested that perceptions of naiveté were
most strongly related to favor-granting in response to excessive flattery (whether related to work
or personal characteristics). Rewarding flattery for excessive work-related flattery led to
significantly higher perceived naiveté than in the merited work-related flattery condition (t(582)
= 2.19, p = .029) and marginally higher than in the control condition (t(582) = 1.79, p = .074).
Similarly, rewarding flattery in the excessive personal characteristics condition led to higher
perceived naiveté than in the merited work-related flattery (t(582) = 2.73, p = .007) and control
conditions (t(582) = 2.33, p = .020). These results show that flattery of all types, as well as
normal pleasantries, leads to perceived naiveté when leaders grant favors but that the apparent
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 39
excessiveness of the flattery is an important factor in observers’ attributions of leader naiveté.
Our theorizing suggests that observers’ attributions of naiveté stem from the inference
that the leader must believe the flattery to be genuine and not manipulative. This should
particularly be the case when the observer views the flattery as excessive and thus obviously
disingenuous in their eyes. To test this, we conducted secondary mediation analyses to assess if
observers’ perceptions that the leader believed the flattery to be genuine mediates the effect of
favor-granting on naiveté across our conditions. We expected that the belief would mediate the
effect of favor-granting in the excessive flattery conditions. In contrast, we did not expect the
belief to mediate the effect in the merited work-related and control conditions, where the
approacher’s comments to the leader were less fawning and likely to spark the inference that a
favor-granting leader must have naively believed the flattery to be genuine to choose to reward it
with a favor. Results followed our expectations as the perceived leader’s belief that the flattery
was genuine mediated the effect of favor-granting on naiveté for the excessive work-related
(indirect effect = .40, SE = .41, 95%CI [0.10, 0.83]) and personal characteristics-related
conditions (indirect effect = .75, SE = .18, 95%CI [0.41, 1.13]), but did not for the merited work-
related (indirect effect = -.09, SE = .15, 95%CI [-0.38, 0.20]) or the control conditions (indirect
effect = .16, SE = .18, 95%CI [-0.17, 0.56]). In line with our theory, perceived naiveté stems
from observers’ inferences that a favor-granting leader must unwittingly believe the flattery is
genuine, otherwise they would have not rewarded manipulative behavior.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 40
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for All Measures in Study 5
Excessive Work-Related
Merited Work-Related
Personal Characteristics-Related
Control
Variable
Grant
Favor
Refuse
Favor
ta
Grant
Favor
Refuse
Favor
tb
Grant
Favor
Refuse
Favor
tc
Grant
Favor
Refuse
Favor
td
Perceived naiveté
Perceived
Naiveté
M = 3.42
[3.01,3.82]
M = 1.83
[1.51,2.15]
5.90
(p <.001)
M = 2.88
[2.49,3.27]
M = 1.58
[1.37,1.78]
6.24
(p <.001)
M = 3.56
[3.13,3.98]
M = 1.73
[1.46,2.01]
-6.82
(p <.001)
M = 2.97
[2.54,3.40]
M = 1.80
[1.54,2.07]
4.85
(p <.001)
Impression-management consequences
Perceived
Competence
M = -0.10
[-.35,0.15]
M = 1.23
[0.97,1.49]
-7.33
(p <.001)
M = 0.55
[0.23,0.86]
M = 1.24
[1.03,1.46]
-3.76
(p <.001)
M = 0.10
[-.15,0.35]
M = 1.45
[1.22,1.68]
-7.74
(p <.001)
M = 0.63
[0.37,0.90]
M = 0.74
[0.50,0.98]
-0.60
(p =.549)
Perceived
Warmth
M = 0.21
[-.02,0.45]
M = 0.31
[0.05,0.58]
-0.55
(p =.581)
M = 0.97
[0.68,1.26]
M = 0.15
[-.08,0.39]
4.41
(p <.001)
M = 0.52
[0.29,0.75]
M = 0.34
[0.11,0.57]
1.06
(p =0.29)
M = 1.00
[0.75,1.25]
M = -0.11
[-.34,0.13]
6.45
(p <.001)
Organizational consequences
Commitment
to Leader
M = 3.23
[2.92,3.53]
M = 3.99
[3.72,4.26]
-3.63
(p <.001)
M = 4.21
[3.87,4.56]
M = 3.83
[3.51,4.14]
1.64
(p =.103)
M = 3.53
[3.19,3.86]
M = 4.23
[3.93,4.53]
-3.07
(p =.003)
M = 4.19
[3.84,4.55]
M = 3.69
[3.38,3.99]
2.19
(p =.030)
Organizational
Fairness
M = 3.24
[2.91,3.57]
M = 5.20
[4.89,5.50]
-8.54
(p <.001)
M = 3.97
[3.57,4.38]
M = 5.28
[5.02,5.55]
-5.59
(p <.001)
M = 3.42
[3.07,3.77]
M = 5.55
[5.26,5.84]
-9.02
(p <.001)
M = 3.90
[3.52,4.28]
M = 4.94
[4.66,5.22]
-4.53
(p <.001)
a df = 200; b df = 201; c df = 196; d df = 197 Note. The values in square brackets are 95% confidence intervals.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 41
Figure 3
Study 5: Perceived leader naiveté as a function of flattery type (excessive work-related vs.
merited work-related vs. personal characteristics-related vs. control) and favor conditions (grant
favor vs. refuse favor)
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Impression-Management Consequences
Beginning with perceived competence, ANOVA results indicated a significant effect of
favor-granting, F(1, 582) = 93.65, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .276, a significant effect of flattery type, F(1,
582) = 2.79, p = .040, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .014, and a significant interaction, F(1, 582) = 10.73, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =
.052. As shown in Table 4 and Figure 4A, favor-granting led to reduced perceptions of
competence for all types of flattery but not in the control condition. Additionally, following our
predictions, planned contrasts showed that competence perceptions were lowest for the excessive
work and personal characteristics-related flattery conditions compared to the merited work and
control conditions (ts >2 .50, ps ≤ .013), although competence perceptions did not differ between
the two excessive flattery conditions themselves, as had been expected (t(582) = 1.16, p = .245).
Thus, as with naiveté, flattery excessiveness magnifies the negative reaction that observers have
of favor-granting leaders’ competence.
An ANOVA on perceptions of warmth revealed a significant effect of favor-granting,
F(1, 582) = 31.87, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .052, and a significant interaction, F(1, 582) = 10.04, p <
.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .049, but no significant effect of flattery type, F(1, 582) = 2.19, p = .089, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .011.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 42
As Table 4 and Figure 4B show, favor-granting had no impact on warmth when done in response
to excessive work-related flattery – in line with our prior studies with established leaders – or
personal characteristics-related flattery, but increased warmth for merited work-related flattery
and in the control condition. While warmth perceptions in response to favor-granting did not
significantly differ between excessive work and excessive personal characteristics-related
flattery (t(582) = 1.82, p = .070), warmth results otherwise followed predictions, with favor-
granting in both conditions leading to lower perceived warmth than the merited work-related
flattery and control conditions (ts ≥2.57, ps ≤ .011). These results suggest that, while rewarding
excessive flattery does not benefit perceived warmth, rewarding merited flattery or neutral
platitudes can increase how warm a leader seems.
Organizational Consequences
An ANOVA on commitment to the leader showed a significant interaction of flattery
type and favor-granting, F(1, 582) = 9.11, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .045, but no significant effect of favor-
granting, F(1, 582) = 1.63, p = .202, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .003, or flattery type, F(1, 582) = 2.60, p = .051, 𝜂𝑝
2 =
.013. As Table 4 and Figure 4C illustrate, favor-granting had no impact on commitment for the
merited work-related and control conditions but decreased commitment when done for excessive
work-related or personal characteristics-related flattery. Following the results for perceived
competence and in line with our predictions, granting a favor decreased commitment in the
excessive work-related and personal characteristics-related flattery conditions as compared to the
merited work-related flattery (ts ≥ 3.04, ps ≤ .0024) and the control conditions (ts ≥ 2.91, ps ≤
.004), although commitment did not differ between excessive work and personal characteristics-
related conditions (t(582) = 1.40, p = .163).
Finally, results for an ANOVA on organizational fairness showed a significant interaction
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 43
of flattery type and favor-granting, F(1, 582) = 4.91, p = .002, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .025, and a significant effect
of favor-granting, F(1, 582) = 191.80, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .248, but no effect of flattery type, F(1,
582) = 2.26, p = .081, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .012. As Table 4 and Figure 4D show, favor-granting led to lower
perceptions of fairness regardless of flattery type, with planned contrasts showing that, as with
our other negative downstream consequences, rewarding excessive work-related or personal
characteristics-related flattery harmed perceptions of fairness more than doing so for merited
work-related flattery (ts ≥ 2.05, ps ≤. 041) or in the control condition (ts ≥ 2.39, ps ≤ .017). In
sum, we see that the negative organizational consequences of observers witnessing leaders
reward excessive flattery are greater compared to merited compliments.
Figures 4A-4D
Study 5: Impression-management consequences (competence and warmth) and organizational
consequences (commitment to leader and organizational fairness) as a function of flattery type
(excessive work-related vs. merited work-related vs. personal characteristics-related vs. control)
and favor conditions (grant favor vs. refuse favor)
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 44
Discussion
This study reveals that the type of flattery can matter. In particular, flattery viewed as
excessive (whether work-related or personal) exacerbates the tension in observers’ minds
between the obviousness of the flattery and their leader seeming to have bought into it, leading to
heightened perceptions of naiveté
15
and worse downstream consequences compared to merited
and normal workplace pleasantries (e.g., “have a nice day.”)
Study 6: When Falling for Flattery Hurts the Observer
Witnessing a leader reward flattery can be particularly poignant when the favor granted
to the flatterer negatively affects observers themselves. Study 6 manipulates whether or not a
leader’s favor in response to flattery harms participants’ own standing. In line with work on
outcome dependency (see Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), we predict that the negative consequences
(e.g., naiveté, competence, decreased commitment) will be exacerbated when participants’ own
outcomes are worsened as a result of a leader rewarding flattery. In contrast, as warmth reflects
“other-profitability” (Peeters, 1992), favor-granting that directly harms the observer should be
seen as less “profitable” to them – and thus less warm. We also again investigate the behavioral
consequences of such treatment by asking participants to commit to additional work with the
leader and by text-analyzing their evaluations of the leader. We preregistered our study and
analysis plan prior to data collection at https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=2fv9j3.
Method
Participants
15
In addition to the study’s primary focus, we wanted to provide further evidence as to the central role that naiveté
plays in mediating the effect of favor-granting on outcomes. In supplemental analyses presented in the Supplemental
Materials for this study, we assessed whether naiveté would remain a significant mediator when including two
alternate mechanisms: perceptions of the leaders’ self-absorption and cynicality in the excessive work-flattery
condition. The pattern and significance of results largely did not change with the inclusion of the other mechanisms,
the only exception being leader commitment, where the indirect effect associated with naiveté became
nonsignificant. These results underscore naiveté as a key mechanism by which falling for flattery harms reputations.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 45
We recruited 504 participants from MTurk to participate in a two-part experiment with
the surveys separated by one day. We excluded 36 participants who did not complete both parts
of the study and removed four participants who expressed suspicion that the simulated evaluator
was fake,
16
leaving a final sample of 464 participants (Mage = 40.29 years, SDage = 12.55; 247
female, 214 male, one non-binary/third gender; two did not self-identify).
Design and Procedure
This was a 2 (impact of favor: favor-harm vs. no harm) x 2 (leader response: grant favor
vs. refuse favor) between-subjects design. The study was composed of two parts, completed
sequentially. In the first part of the study, we instructed participants to complete the “Finding E’s
task” (Ariely et al., 2008), which involves quickly finding the letter “e” within a series of ten 10
x 10 grids that contain other letters. Participants were told that another experienced MTurker (the
“evaluator”) would assess their work and could – at the evaluator’s discretion – nominate them
for a promotion to be an evaluator on future studies, a position that would earn them a higher pay
rate. After completing the grids, participants were given an optional comment box in which to
communicate anything they wanted to their evaluator regarding their performance before
completing demographic measures.
In the second part of the study, participants were told that prior to seeing their results,
they would be reviewing the evaluation of another participant for comparison so that they could
provide feedback on the study evaluators. In the Favor-Harm condition, participants read that
they would be reviewing another participant’s evaluation from the same evaluator who assessed
their own performance and that the evaluator’s decision would have strongly impacted their own
16
As we did not preregister an exclusion for suspicion, we also ran the analyses including the participants and did
not see any substantive change in the pattern or significance of results, with the exception of a marginally significant
interaction for perceived competence (F(1,464) = 3.74, p = .054, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01). Given that the goal of this study was to
demonstrate behavioral outcomes in a realistic context, we present the results excluding suspicious participants.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 46
potential nomination, as evaluators could only nominate one participant per study. In the No
Harm condition, participants read that they would be reviewing an evaluation from a different
evaluator and that the evaluator’s decision thus had no impact on them.
Participants were shown materials purported to be about another participant (see
Supplemental Materials for full text). Participants saw that the other participant was an
objectively average performer and had left a comment to their evaluator containing flattery (e.g.,
“i'm super impressed that you did well enough on this task to become an evaluator”) and asking
to be nominated for the advanced role (e.g., “if you’d be willing to suggest me, thatd be
amazing.” [sic]) In the Grant Favor condition, participants read that the evaluator decided to
nominate the participant for the promotion, while in the Refuse Favor condition, the evaluator
did not. Participants then completed measures about their perceptions of the evaluator, as well as
two behavioral measures of commitment (signing up for additional studies with the evaluator and
an open-ended response about how committed they felt to the evaluator) before being debriefed.
These behavioral measures improve on our prior lab study (Study 3) by directly assessing
ongoing commitment to the evaluator rather than simply a willingness to work with them again.
Dependent Measures
Perceived Naiveté and Impression-Management Consequences. We collected the
same scales as Studies 4 and 5 of naiveté (α = .94), competence (α = .94), and warmth (α = .93).
Organizational Consequences – Commitment to The Leader.
17
Participants indicated
their commitment to the evaluator with two behavioral measures. First, participants were invited
to register for up to ten additional studies with the evaluator. Second, as an exploratory measure,
we asked participants to provide an open-ended review of the evaluator – particularly, how
17
For this study, we did not assess perceptions of organizational fairness due to the nature of the MTurk setting,
where participants frequently complete studies from a variety of different institutions.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 47
happy they would be to participate in future studies and how connected they felt to the evaluator
(key aspects of commitment). We text-analyzed their responses using the Linguistic Inquiry and
Word Count application (Pennebaker et al., 2015). Specifically, we focused on the Emotional
Tone variable wherein a high number reflects a positive and upbeat response.
Results
Providing support for our predictions, the results demonstrated significant interactions of
favor-harm and favor-granting for all focal outcomes, with the exception of perceived naiveté.
Results by outcome are presented in Table 5 and Figures 5 and 6A-D.
Manipulation Checks
As manipulation checks, participants were asked to what extent the evaluator performed a
favor for another participant and to what extent their nomination was impacted (1 = not at all; 7
= very much). Participants in the favor-harm condition perceived the favor to more strongly
impact their nomination (M = 4.46, SD = 1.95) as compared to those in the no-harm condition (M
= 3.03, SD = 2.12; t(462) = 7.59, p < .001). Participants in the grant-favor condition witnessed
favor-granting to a stronger extent (M = 5.42, SD = 1.60) than did participants in the refuse-favor
condition (M = 2.09, SD = 1.49; t(462) = 23.26, p < .001).
Perceived Naiveté
Beginning with perceived naiveté, an ANOVA testing the effects of favor impact and
favor-granting revealed a significant effect of granting favors, F(1, 460) = 93.03, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =
.17, but did not show a significant effect of favor impact nor an interaction (Fs < 1.59, ps >
.208, 𝜂𝑝
2s < .001). As shown in Table 5 and Figure 5, participants perceived leaders who granted
a favor in response to flattery as more naïve than leaders who refused, regardless of whether the
favor harmed them. These results are in line with findings across our studies demonstrating
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 48
consistent attributions of naiveté for favor-grantors, independent of contextual factors.
Figure 5
Study 6: Perceived leader naiveté as a function of impact (favor-harm vs. no harm) and favor
conditions (grant favor vs. refuse favor)
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for All Measures in Study 6
Favor-Harm
No Harm
Variable
Grant Favor
Refuse Favor
ta
p
Grant Favor
Refuse Favor
tb
p
Perceived naiveté
Perceived
Naiveté
3.21
[2.91, 3.51]
1.86
[1.63, 2.10]
7.10
<.001
2.99
[2.70, 3.28]
1.75
[1.51, 1.98]
6.54
<.001
Impression-management consequences
Perceived
Competence
0.66
[0.43, 0.91]
1.80
[1.64, 1.97]
-7.79
<.001
0.94
[0.69, 1.19]
1.63
[1.41, 1.86]
-4.06
<.001
Perceived
Warmth
1.38
[1.18, 1.59]
0.70
[0.49, 0.91]
4.60
<.001
1.83
[1.67, 2.00]
0.50
[0.25, 0.76]
8.71
<.001
Organizational consequences- Commitment to leader
Study
Sign-ups
6.93
[6.25, 7.61]
8.45
[7.99, 8.91]
-3.70
<.001
7.80
[7.18, 8.42]
7.93
[7.34, 8.52]
-0.31
.759
Emotional
Tone
78.91
[73.49, 84.32]
88.08
[84.18, 91.98]
-2.75
.006
87.61
[83.43, 91.79]
88.15
[83.95, 92.35]
-0.18
.857
a df = 231; b df = 229; Note. The values in square brackets are 95% confidence intervals.
Impression-Management Consequences
Consistent with our predictions, the ANOVA revealed significant interactions of favor
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 49
impact and favor-granting for both impression-management outcomes (Fs > 3.87, ps < .050, 𝜂𝑝
2s
> .008). Beginning with perceived competence, the ANOVA results indicated a significant effect
of favor-granting, F(1, 460) = 66.61, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .126, and a significant interaction, F(1, 460)
= 3.87, p = .050, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .008. There was no significant effect of favor impact, F(1, 460) = 0.19, p =
.665, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .000. As shown in Table 5 and Figure 6A, while the effect of favor-granting on
perceived competence was negative regardless of favor impact, participants who were directly
harmed by the favor reacted more negatively to favor granting versus refusing (t(231) = -7.79, p
< .001, d = -1.02) than did those who were not harmed (t(229) = -4.06, p < .001, d = -.53).
An ANOVA on perceptions of warmth revealed a significant effect of favor-granting,
F(1, 460) = 89.14, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .162, and a significant interaction, F(1, 460) = 9.29, p =
.002, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .020, but no significant effect of favor impact, F(1, 460) = 1.34, p = .247, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .003.
As Table 5 and Figure 6B shows, while favor-granting increased warmth perceptions as
compared to refusing favors across impact conditions, planned contrasts showed that granting a
favor that harmed participants led to lower warmth perceptions as compared to granting a favor
that did not impact participants (t(229) = -3.36, p < .001). In sum, negative reactions to favor-
granting, in terms of perceived competence, were magnified when participants were directly
harmed, while positive reactions in the form of warmth perceptions were dulled.
Organizational Consequences
As with our impression-management outcomes, an ANOVA on the number of study sign-
ups demonstrated a significant effect of favor-granting, F(1, 460) = 7.73, p = .006, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .017, and
an interaction, F(1, 460) = 5.41, p = .020, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .012. There was no significant effect of favor
impact, F(1, 460) = 0.33, p = .568, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .001. As Table 5 and Figure 6C show, participants
harmed by the favor signed up for fewer studies after witnessing favor-granting than did those
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 50
who witnessed the evaluator refuse (t(231) = -3.70, p < .001, d = -.48). In contrast, participants
unharmed by the favor did not differ in study sign-ups when the evaluator granted or refused,
t(229) = -0.31, p = .759, d = -.04.
Our exploratory measure—the emotional tone of open-ended commitment responses—
also provided support for our predictions. An ANOVA on emotional tone showed a significant
effect of favor-granting, F(1, 460) = 4.73. p = .030, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01. However, the results did not
demonstrate an effect of favor impact, F(1, 460) = 3.79, p = .052, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, nor a significant
interaction, F(1, 460) = 3.71, p = .055, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, although both effects approached significance.
Despite the nonsignificant interaction, results in Table 5 and Figure 6D, as well as post-hoc tests,
illustrate a similar pattern of results as our other behavioral measure of commitment. Participants
harmed by the favor reviewed favor-granting evaluators less favorably than did participants who
saw the evaluator refuse, t(231) = -2.75, p = .006, d = -.36. On the other hand, participants who
were not impacted by the favor did not differ in the emotional tone of their reviews when they
evaluator granted or refused, t(229) = -0.18, p = .857, d = -.02.
Figures 6A-6D
Study 6: Impression-management consequences (competence and warmth) and behavioral
measures of commitment to the leader (study sign-ups and emotional tone) as a function of
impact (favor-harm vs. no harm) and favor conditions (grant favor vs. refuse favor)
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 51
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Bar chart format used for Study Sign-Ups measure
as measurement represents cumulative total of studies selected.
Discussion
This study provides insight about how observers’ reactions to witnessing their leaders
reward flattery change if they are directly harmed by the favor. Results illustrated when the
leader’s decision to reward flattery directly harms observers, this magnifies their negative
reactions while minimizing reputational benefits.
Study 7: The Impact of Leader’s Awareness They are Being Flattered
Can leaders mitigate the reputational risk of falling for flattery? Study 7 tests whether
leaders can use demonstrated awareness of flattery motives to benefit their reputations in
conjunction with refusing to reward the flattery with favors.
Method
Participants
We recruited 389 participants from MTurk who were employed at an organization other
than MTurk. Following the exclusion criteria used in our other studies, we excluded 72
participants who either failed our attention check or provided a nonsensical answer to an open-
ended response question, leaving a final sample of 317 (Mage = 35.15 years, SDage = 10.22; 194
women, 182 men, 1 did not self-identify)
Design and Procedure
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 52
This study employs a 2(leader’s demonstrated awareness: aware vs. unaware) 2(leader
response: grant favor vs. refuse favor) between-subjects design (see Supplemental Materials for
scenario text). Following a design similar to many of our studies, participants recalled a leader in
their own organization and then were asked to imagine they observed someone approach this
leader, excessively flatter the leader, and request a favor, which the leader either granted (Grant
Favor condition) or refused to grant (Refuse Favor condition). After the flattery but prior to the
favor being granted or refused, participants were asked to imagine that the leader made a remark
to the observer that either signaled awareness that the approacher was flattering them because of
their position or suggested a lack of awareness. In the Aware condition, the leader commented,
“Wow, that person never gave me the time of day before I was promoted to manager.” In the
Unaware condition, the leader stated, “Wow, that person seemed really interested in my work!”
Measures
Perceived Naiveté. We collected the same measures of naiveté as prior studies (α = .93).
Impression-Management and Organizational Consequences. Using the same
measures as Study 1, participants rated the leader’s competence (α = .94) and warmth (α = .85),
as well as the organization’s fairness (α = .82).
Results
As predicted, results demonstrate that favor-granting and leader’s demonstrated
awareness of the motives underlying flattery are both important in shaping reactions to leaders
falling for flattery. Results by outcome are presented in Table 6 and Figures 7 and 8A-C.
Manipulation Checks
Participants were asked to what extent the leader believed the approacher treated them
kindly solely because of their position in the organization (1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 53
Participants in the Aware condition rated the leader as more strongly believing the flattery was
due to their organizational position (M = 5.54, SD = 1.28) compared to participants in the
Unaware condition (M = 4.73, SD = 1.67; t(315) = 4.81, p < .001).
Perceived Naiveté
Beginning with perceived naiveté, an ANOVA testing the effects of leader’s
demonstrated awareness and favor-granting revealed a significant effect of granting favors, F(1,
313) = 60.67, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .158, a significant effect of demonstrated awareness, F(1, 313) =
7.05, p = .008, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .022, and a significant interaction, F(1, 313) = 3.91, p = .049, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .12. As
shown in Table 6 and Figure 7, observers perceived leaders who granted favors as more naïve
regardless of their demonstrated awareness. However, planned contrasts showed that aware
leaders who refused to grant a favor appeared less naïve than unaware leaders who also refused,
t(313) = 3.28, p = .001. Thus, we see that both the favor-granting and the leader’s demonstrated
awareness contribute to naiveté perceptions, such that leaders can appear the least naïve if they
refuse to grant favors and demonstrate awareness of the motives behind flattery.
Figure 7
Study 7: Perceived leader naiveté as a function of leader’s demonstrated awareness (aware vs.
unaware) and favor conditions (grant favor vs. refuse favor)
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for All Measures in Study 7
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 54
Aware Leader
Unaware Leader
Variable
Grant Favor
Refuse Favor
ta
p
Grant Favor
Refuse Favor
tb
p
Perceived naiveté
Perceived
Naiveté
4.01
[3.68, 4.34]
2.37
[2.05, 2.69]
7.02
<.001
4.12
[3.80, 4.44]
3.14
[2.79, 3.49]
4.10
<.001
Impression-management consequences
Perceived
Competence
0.26
[-0.02, 0.54]
1.37
[1.14, 1.60]
6.13
<.001
-0.05
[-0.33,0.22]
0.91
[0.64, 1.18]
4.93
<.001
Perceived
Warmth
0.73
[0.49, 0.98]
0.75
[0.52, 0.97]
0.10
.924
0.53
[0.28, 0.77]
0.47
[0.24, 0.70]
0.33
.743
Organizational consequences
Organizational
Fairness
3.91
[3.61, 4.21]
4.89
[4.66, 5.11]
5.22
<.001
3.81
[3.54, 4.07]
4.58
[4.30, 4.86]
4.02
<.001
a df = 153; b df = 160; Note. The values in square brackets are 95% confidence intervals.
Impression-Management Consequences
For perceived competence, ANOVA results indicated a significant effect of favor-
granting, F(1, 313) = 60,22, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .161, a significant effect of demonstrated awareness,
F(1, 313) = 8.33, p = .004, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .026. There was not a significant interaction, F(1, 313) = 0.31, p
= .578, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .001. As shown in Table 6 and Figure 8A, despite the lack of interaction, these
results parallel the naiveté results by showing the role of both favor-granting and demonstrated
awareness in shaping competence perceptions, and particularly that aware leaders who refuse to
grant a favor appear more competent than unaware leaders who similarly refused to grant the
favor, t(313) = 2.44, p = .015.
An ANOVA on perceived warmth did not reveal a significant effect of favor-granting,
F(1, 313) = 0.03, p = .864, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .000, which is aligned with our prior established leader studies,
but did show a significant effect of demonstrated awareness, F(1, 313) = 4.10, p = .044, 𝜂𝑝
2 =
.013. There was not a significant interaction, F(1, 313) = 0.09, p = .765, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .000. The results in
Table 6 and Figure 8B suggest that while favor-granting does not impact warmth perceptions,
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 55
leaders can appear warmer by indicating their awareness of the motives underlying flattery.
Organizational Consequences
Finally, ANOVA results for organizational fairness, show a significant effect of favor-
granting, F(1, 313) = 42.18, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .119, but no significant effect of demonstrated
awareness, F(1, 313) = 0.87, p = .353, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .002, nor a significant interaction, F(1, 313) = 5.05, p
= .025, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .010. In contrast to the results related to leader perceptions, the results presented in
Table 6 and Figure 8C suggest that a leader’s demonstrated awareness of flattery motives does
not impact evaluations of the overall organization’s fairness and that only whether the leader
grants a favor or not matters for observers.
Figures 8A-8C
Study 7: Impression-management consequences (competence and warmth) and organizational
fairness as a function of leader’s demonstrated awareness (aware vs. unaware) and favor
conditions (grant favor vs. refuse favor)
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 56
Post-Hoc Exploratory Analyses: Observer’s Belief that the Leader is Aware of Motives
The preceding results indicate a limited effect of leaders’ stated awareness of flattery’s
motives on observers’ impressions when they reward flattery, but it is possible that observers’
personal beliefs about the leader’s awareness matter more. Post-hoc exploratory analyses testing
the effect of observers’ beliefs about the leader’s awareness, as captured by our manipulation
check, predicted perceptions of the leader according to our theory (e.g., lower naiveté, higher
competence). Mirroring secondary results of Study 5, leader who were believed to be aware of
flattery’s motives appeared less naïve (b = -0.24, SE = .06, p < .001) and more competent (b =
.26, SE = .05, p < .001), although there was no significant effect of these beliefs on warmth (b =
.07, SE = .04, p = .082). These results show that, while leaders’ stated awareness of motives may
have a limited impact on observers’ reactions to rewarding flattery, the observers’ own beliefs
about the leaders’ awareness underly the inference of naiveté seen in our prior studies.
Discussion
The results of Study 7 provide several insights. First, both the favor-granting behavior
and a leader’s stated awareness of the flatterer’s true motives shape observer attributions that a
leader is falling for flattery and the downstream consequences for the leader. Second, while
refusing to reward flattery is seemingly the more powerful tool leaders have to avoid negative
reactions to witnessed flattery, demonstrating awareness of flatterers’ ulterior motives can help.
Finally, rather than trust the leader’s stated beliefs, observers appear to rely on the behavior of
the leader and their own inferences when forming their impression of the leader. Thus, leaders
cannot rely simply on saying the right thing (i.e., that they are aware of flattery’s motives) to
save their reputation when their behavior contradicts their statements (i.e., by rewarding flattery).
General Discussion
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 57
Across seven studies and six supplementary studies, we document the impression-
management and organizational consequences of being perceived to have “fallen for flattery”
using a variety of paradigms, across a range of stimuli, and across both attitudinal and behavioral
measures. In a first set of experiments conducted at an academic conference and in the lab
(Studies 1-2), we show that rewarding flattery caused leaders to appear more naïve which
harmed their followers’ impressions of their competence, their commitment to the leader, and
their view of the organization, although favor-granting did make the leader seem warmer. A
recollection study exploring people’s own experiences witnessing their leaders reward flattery
(Study 3) showed similar costs of falling for flattery as the first two studies with unfamiliar
leaders, but also revealed that established leaders do not receive the same warmth benefit as their
actions are judged within a richer relationship context. Next, in Study 4, we examined observer
reactions to favor-granting in other contexts (nepotism, meritocracy, control) to show that our
focal mechanism – perceived leader naiveté - is unique to flattery as compared to other contexts.
In the final set of studies, we found that the consequences of falling for flattery were
exacerbated by contextual factors such as the flattery’s excessiveness (Study 5) and the favor’s
harm to the observer (Study 6), although leaders could reduce reputational costs if they signaled
awareness of flatterers’ motives while refusing to grant a favor (Study 7).
Theoretical Contributions and Practical Implications
Our work has important theoretical contributions. First, we contribute to work on how
reputations are shaped by responses to influence attempts (Cialdini & Mirels, 1976) by
documenting the inherently cynical perspective with which observers view influence attempts
such as flattery, and easily come to the attribution that leaders have naively “fallen” for it. This
latter point extends research on behavioral attributions (Eastman, 1994; Halbesleben et al., 2010,
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 58
Johnson et al., 2002) by finding that attributions of naiveté are specific to flattery and not found
in other persuasion contexts. Second, our work extends our understanding of ingratiation by
finding that observers’ distaste for ingratiation applies not only to ingratiators (Vonk, 2002) but
also to recipients of flattery and the organizations they represent (when flattery is rewarded.)
Third, we extend prior work on the costs of appearing naïve for low-power individuals
(Berry & McArthur, 1985; Zebrowitz et al., 1991) by providing a comprehensive view of the
reputational and organizational costs of being perceived as naively “falling for flattery” for high-
power and high-status individuals, who are often formal leaders (e.g., Westphal et al., 2012), but
may also be those with situational power (e.g., Goodwin et al., 1998). Fourth, we add nuance to
work on newcomer perceptions of ingratiation (Foulk & Long, 2016) by showing that established
leaders fail to reap any benefit from rewarding flattery in the form of warmth perceptions. Fifth,
we contribute to research on impression management which has mainly focused on positive
outcomes of flattery for flatterers (e.g., Pfeffer, 1981; Westphal, 1998). Focusing on targets of
flattery in organizations, we link impression management with the expectation that those who
hold organizational authority or power should detect ulterior motives (e.g., Offermann & Coats,
2018; Toegel et al., 2013).
Finally, our work highlights the importance of studying naiveté in group contexts.
Naiveté does not reflect general inability (Thompson, 1990) or unintelligence (Fox & Spector,
2000), but rather vulnerability to exploitation (Forgas & East, 2008) and a lack of tacit
knowledge (Sternberg, 1998). Given leaders’ positions of power, they are more likely to be
targets of influence tactics, and their perceived naiveté would make them even more vulnerable
to deception. Understanding perceived (and actual) naiveté in groups is therefore important.
Our work also has practical implications in helping leaders make informed decisions in
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 59
their treatment of followers. Our findings complement recent work on the contextual nature of
ingratiation (Kim et al., 2022) and underscore the need for leaders to consider how flattery
creates a climate that may cast rewards and benefits in a negative light. Rather than conducting
the classic ethicality test of considering what would happen if their actions were published on the
front page of a newspaper (Kidder, 1995), leaders could reflect on how their actions would be
evaluated if simply observed by another follower. Moreover, rather than simply suffering the
reputational costs of acceding to flattery, leaders or people with situational power can shape their
reputations by refusing to grant favors to flatterers without appropriate justification.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
As with any research, our studies include several limitations that allow for fruitful future
directions. First, while our experimental approach enables strong claims of causality, our study
designs do not allow us to assess how durable such effects may be after the initial negative
reaction fades (Brans & Verduyn, 2014). Longitudinal or experience-sampling methodologies
can help demonstrate the consequences of falling for flattery over time and avoid limitations of
common-method bias or concerns of reverse causality that our single time-point studies are
unable to address (e.g., Podsakoff et al., 2003). One particularly interesting avenue to pursue is
whether perceiving a leader as naïve leads to greater competition among followers for personal
advancement through additional flattery (e.g., Kim et al., 2022). Thus, naïve leaders might
ironically increase the amount of (instrumentally-minded) compliments they receive.
Next, while we uncover several contextual factors that shape the effect of rewarding
flattery on warmth, particularly whether the leader is unfamiliar, our studies point to a complex
relationship between naiveté and warmth. Building on Carrier and colleagues’ (2019) work on
the impact of goal relevancy on interpersonal perceptions, further research is needed to explore
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 60
the processes by which naiveté does or does not lead to warmth perceptions.
Finally, our studies primarily looked at situational factors that impacted the costs and
attributions of falling for flattery, but a variety of individual differences are likely to be important
as well. One example is the experience level of the observer—if the observers themselves are
leaders who face similar flattery attempts, this might help reduce the “empathy gap” between
observer and recipient (Ruttan et al., 2015), Similarly, while non-leaders may assume a favorable
response to flattery is genuine (Keeves et al., 2017), other leaders may view such a reaction as
simply an impression-management tactic used to navigate an uncomfortable social situation
(Yukl et al., 1995) and thus judge the manager less harshly, although other work might suggest
this might actually magnify harsh judgements (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2008). Beyond leadership
experience, observer reactions may depend on observers’ values or beliefs, such as their belief in
a just world where people get the treatment they deserve (Lerner, 1980; Rubin & Peplau, 1975).
Observers who score high on this belief may be more comfortable when their leaders receive
flattery and may be less likely to scrutinize these leaders’ responses.
Conclusion
Leaders who receive flattery experience strong pressure to grant ingratiators’ requests for
favors. Our work shows that it pays to know who else is watching. Observers might well
conclude that a leader has naively “fallen for flattery” and put the leader and organization’s
reputation at risk. We suggest that leaders can view ingratiation attempts as opportunities to
solidify their reputations by refusing to provide unmeritocratic rewards to flattery. To observers,
such an action will be the litmus test that affirms faith in their leadership and organization.
FALLING FOR FLATTERY 61
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