A Kantian response to the Gamer’s Dilemma

Abstract

The Gamer’s Dilemma consists of three intuitively plausible but conflicting assertions: (i) Virtual murder is morally permissible. (ii) Virtual child molestation is morally forbidden. (iii) There is no relevant moral difference between virtual murder and virtual child molestation in computer games. Numerous attempts to resolve (or dissolve) the Gamer’s Dilemma line the field of computer game ethics. Mostly, the phenomenon is approached using expressivist argumentation: Reprehensible virtual actions express something immoral in their performance but are not immoral by themselves. Consequentialists, on the other hand, claim that the immorality of virtual actions arises from their harmful consequences. I argue that both approaches have serious difficulties meeting the moral challenge posed by the Gamer’s Dilemma. They tend to confuse the morality of in-game actions either with the morality of their real-world counterparts or with the morality of games as objects. Following this critical analysis, I will develop a Kantian argument and defend it against two objections. So far, deontological responses to the Gamer’s Dilemma have been sought in vain. Yet, with Kant, its moral challenge can be met by looking at the gamer’s reasons. From this perspective, the Gamer’s Dilemma is based on a false assumption: the moral status of gaming acts does not derive from a normative equation with their real-world counterparts but only from their justifications.

Full text

Vol.:(0123456789)
1 3
Ethics and Information Technology (2023) 25:39
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-023-09710-0
ORIGINAL PAPER
A Kantian response totheGamer’s Dilemma
SamuelUlbricht1
Accepted: 22 June 2023 / Published online: 9 July 2023
© The Author(s) 2023
Abstract
The Gamer’s Dilemma consists of three intuitively plausible but conflicting assertions: (i) Virtual murder is morally permis-
sible. (ii) Virtual child molestation is morally forbidden. (iii) There is no relevant moral difference between virtual murder
and virtual child molestation in computer games. Numerous attempts to resolve (or dissolve) the Gamer’s Dilemma line
the field of computer game ethics. Mostly, the phenomenon is approached using expressivist argumentation: Reprehensible
virtual actions express something immoral in their performance but are not immoral by themselves. Consequentialists, on the
other hand, claim that the immorality of virtual actions arises from their harmful consequences. I argue that both approaches
have serious difficulties meeting the moral challenge posed by the Gamer’s Dilemma. They tend to confuse the morality of
in-game actions either with the morality of their real-world counterparts or with the morality of games as objects. Following
this critical analysis, I will develop a Kantian argument and defend it against two objections. So far, deontological responses
to the Gamer’s Dilemma have been sought in vain. Yet, with Kant, its moral challenge can be met by looking at the gamer’s
reasons. From this perspective, the Gamer’s Dilemma is based on a false assumption: the moral status of gaming acts does
not derive from anormative equation with their real-world counterparts but only from their justifications.
Keywords Gamer’s Dilemma· Kant· Deontology· Computer games· Video games· Ethics
* Samuel Ulbricht
saulbric@uni-mainz.de
1 Department ofPhilosophy, University ofMainz, Mainz,
Germany
1 I use the terms ‘virtual action’, ‘in-game action’ and ‘gaming
action’ interchangeably to describe actions we perform while playing
computer games. Actually, I prefer a more sophisticated usage that
distinguishes between virtual and fictional actions (Chalmers 2017;
Ulbricht 2022, 9–45), but this differentiation is not (currently) com-
mon in the debate. With the terms ‘real’, ‘real-world’, ‘ordinary’ and
‘game-external’ I refer to actions we perform outside of the game.
With this, I do not mean to suggest that virtual actions are not real
ontologically. On the contrary, virtual actions are (ontologically) real
just like any other action (Chalmers 2017; Börchers 2018; Ulbricht
2022, 20–43). Instead, my distinction between virtual acts and real
acts is based on normative differences: a virtual murder is simply not
a real murder (even though it is a real act).
Introduction
The Gamer’s Dilemma was introduced into the philosophical
debate by MorganLuck (2009) and consists of three intui-
tively plausible but conflicting assertions (Luck, 2018, 157):
i. Virtual murder1 is morally permissible.
ii. Virtual child molestation is morally forbidden.
iii. There is no relevant moral difference between virtual
murder and virtual child molestation in computer
games.
The third premise results from the observation that com-
mon arguments regarding themorality of gaming typically
either excuse or condemn both in-game murder and in-game
child molestation. The position of the ‘Ludic amoralist’ who
insists that ‘It’s just a game!’ (Ostritsch, 2017; Patridge,
2011) excuses all virtual crimes. In contrast, arguments that
place virtual crimes in close moral relation to their real-
world counterparts ultimately condemn all of them. As a
consequence, gamers have to choose: “Either they acknowl-
edge that acts of virtual murder and virtual paedophilia are
morally prohibited, or they acknowledge that both are mor-
ally permissible” (Luck, 2009, 35).
Numerous attempts to resolve or dissolve the Gamer’s
Dilemma line the field of computer game ethics, but a decid-
edly deontological response is sought in vain. I will develop
the latter in this paper and show its advantages over other
approaches. In the first part, I will reformulate the philo-
sophical challenge of the Gamer’s Dilemma and argue that
Footnote 1 (continued)
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

S.Ulbricht
1 3
39 Page 2 of 11
consequentialist and expressivist approaches have serious
difficulties meeting it. In the second part, I will develop a
deontological response that is based on Kantian ethics and
meets the philosophical challenge of the Gamer’s Dilemma.
In the last part, I will address two objections that arise in
view of the Kantian response.
The moral challenge oftheGamer’s
Dilemma2
Before a response to the Gamer’s Dilemmacan be elabo-
rated, the philosophical challenge it poses must be com-
pletely clear. The first two premises draw a moral distinction
between two virtual crimes that is intuitively accepted by
the majority of gamers and non-gamers. The third prem-
ise denies a moral-theoretical foundation for this distinc-
tion by claiming that there is no moral difference between
virtual murder and virtual child molestation. Although this
is not a moral statement, it refers to a moral differentiation
that has practical implications (if there is no moral differ-
ence between virtual murder and virtual child molestation,
gamers face the Gamer’s Dilemma). The philosophical
challenge of the Gamer’s Dilemma is therefore inherently
a moral challenge. It asks about the morality of certain vir-
tual actions in computer games and, closely related, about
themoral differences among these virtual actions.3 In what
follows, I will discuss two lines of argumentation that cur-
rently dominate the debate: the consequentialist and the
expressivist approach. The systematic compilation neither
claims to be exhaustive nor to represent the full potential
of individual approaches but rather focuses onthe general
difficulties they tend to face in adequately meeting the moral
challenge of the Gamer’s Dilemma.4
The consequentialist approach
The consequentialist states that consequences of virtual
child molestation are more harmful than consequences of
virtual murder. In its more convincing version, the argu-
ment emphasizes the role of habituation effects that could
result in the brutalization of gamers (McCormick, 2001;
Waddington, 2007), rather than claiming that virtual crimes
encourage the commission of real crimes and turn players
into murderers or abusers. This line of thought has recently
been reinforced by C. Thi Nguyen’s considerations on the
phenomenon of “value capture” (2000, 200). According to
Nguyen, the general danger of games is posed by offering
pleasantly simplified modes of agency that players might
adopt for reality (Nguyen, 2020, 202–203):
In value capture […] the simplified value takes over as
the primary guide in my practical reasoning. […] The
worry here is not that I can be incentivized in coun-
terproductive directions, but that my values are trans-
formed by the seductive clarity of simplified values.
[…] The pleasures of games can give us a motivation
to simplify our values in potentially problematic ways.
This danger could be considered higher for virtual child
molestation than for virtual murder because, in compari-
son, it represents a clearer (reprehensible) value logic, for
example by its autotelic structure (Kjeldgaard-Christiansen,
2020), by discriminating against a certain social group—
women (Bartel, 2012) or children (Patridge, 2013) –, or
by endorsing a specific “morally problematic worldview”
(Ostritsch, 2017, 117). All this does not apply to typi-
cal cases of virtual murder (of course, exceptions can be
constructed).
Although the consequentialist approach is discussed in
research (Luck, 2009; Montefiore & Formosa, 2022), it
receives comparatively little attention and is usually dis-
missed quickly. Mostly, this is justified by the lack of empiri-
cal data. Studies comparingthe effects of virtual murder
with theeffects of virtual child molestation do not exist.
Moreover, significant long-term effects on the gamer’s char-
acter from specific in-game actions are unlikely (Ferguson,
2 I thank two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments,
from which this chapter in particular has benefited substantially.
3 Despite a variety of recent attempts to narrow the dilemma down
(Luck 2022; Montefiore & Formosa 2022) or to split it up (Ali 2022;
Kjeldgaard-Christiansen 2020), I turn to the Gamer’s Dilemma in its
original form, which has lost none of its provocative power. Narrow-
ing it down to particularly explosive cases is not necessary, since a
full response to the Gamer’s Dilemma should not only explain clear-
cut cases but rather resolve the moral conundrum for all conceivable
cases. After all, clear-cut cases pose no dilemma. At the same time, it
is important to note that the Gamer’s Dilemma by itself already pro-
vides a very narrow context: It is about virtual actions within com-
puter games that do not affect other people. Thus, the focus is neither
on non-gaming virtual spaces nor on multiplayer games. Accord-
ingly, while different normative aspects may play a role in it, the
Gamer’s Dilemma is one dilemma that can be met with one response.
Recently, Ali (2022) has questioned this, turning one dilemma into
three, depending on whether we are talking about virtual or gaming
actions, but he himself admits in footnote 10: “It may be that there
is a more general resolution that addresses both types of acts, for
instance, focusing on acts that are ‘not real’” (Ali 2022). This is what
I am aiming for. Essentially, the Gamer’s Dilemma is about murders
and child molestations that are, in a sense, not real murders and child
molestations (see also Davnall 2021, 225).
4 Accordingly, it is not about an exegesis of the debate so far, but
about a problem-oriented presentation of general difficulties asso-
ciated with the mentioned lines of argumentation and their basic
assumptions. Of the specific texts and authors referred to, some cope
well, others less well, with the highlighted challenges. Unfortunately,
the limited scope of this paper does not allow for extensive discussion
of the specific strengths and weaknesses of individual approaches.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

A Kantian response totheGamer’s Dilemma
1 3
Page 3 of 11 39
2015; Reinecke & Klein, 2015). Of course, pathological
gaming (e.g., due to gaming addiction) may cause signifi-
cant long-term damage to those affected, and somevirtual
actions may increase aggressiveness in the short term. But
the Gamer’s Dilemma is not about harms of pathological
behavior or short-term mood swings but about specific and
weighty moral dangers of certain in-game actions. These
are neither empirically proven nor very likely. With these
findings, no difference can be found between virtual murder
and virtual child molestation. Actually, those findings seem
to imply that both virtual crimes are equally morally unprob-
lematic because any in-game crime does not appear to result
in weighty harmful consequences. This is the position of the
‘Ludic Amoralist’ (Ostritsch, 2017), who rejects premise (ii)
of the Gamer’s Dilemma and thus seems to provide a valid
answer to its moral challenge. But this answer is incom-
plete. It cannot explain our different intuitions underlying
the Gamer’s Dilemma, but rather denies that there is any
difference. However, empirical research suggests that there
are different intuitions (Formosa etal., 2023), which leads
to a reversal of the burden of proof: Apparently, the Gamer’s
Dilemma poses a major challenge to the Ludic Amoralist,
not the other way around.
There is another, more serious difficulty for consequen-
tialist argumentation: The assumption of thebrutalization of
gamers presupposes that habituation effects extend beyond
gaming situations. As stated by Sicart (2009), Schulzke
(2010), and in part by Nguyen (2020, 189–215), gamers
might acquire certain character traits while performing in-
game actions, which then could become practical effective
in comparable real-world situations. However, this argu-
ment overestimates the normative analogy between in-game
and game-external situations. Carrying out virtual murder
or virtual child molestation requires completely different
competences, knowledge, desires, and circumstances than
carrying out their real-world counterparts. The conditions
for agency are different in gaming than in reality: neither
the same values nor the same actions are at stake (Ulbricht,
2022, 62–68). A consequentialist argument would have to
go a long way explaining why (and which) in-game values
and situations can be applied to game-external contexts (and
how they differ in cases of virtual murder and virtual child
molestation).
The expressivist approach
The philosophical debate about the Gamer’s Dilemma is
dominated by another approach: expressivist argumentation.
The basic line is simple: Some virtual crimes express some-
thing reprehensible, others do not. Variants of this thought
differ in what the ‘expressed thing’ exactly is. Roughly, four
arguments can be distinguished (mixed forms also occur):
The reprehensible thing that is expressed when committing
a (reprehensible) virtual crime consists in…
a. …the reprehensible character of the player.
b. …the reprehensible game.
c. …its reprehensible real-world counterpart.
d. …a reprehensible statement.
With regard to the Gamer’s Dilemma, the expressivist
states that virtual child molestation expresses something
reprehensible more often (Ali, 2015; Ramirez, 2020) or
exclusively (Bartel, 2012; Patridge, 2013) compared to
virtual murder. Thus, in contrast to virtual murder, (a) a
vicious desire of the player shows up (more often) when
performing virtual acts of child molestation, (b) games that
include child molestation are (more often) reprehensible in
contrast to games that include (solely) murder, (c) virtual
child molestation (usually) adopts significantly more (im)
moral properties of its real-world counterpart than virtual
murder, or (d) virtual child molestation (usually) sends a
reprehensible message, unlike virtual murder.
Expressivist theories are initially convincing. By locating
morality outside of play, expressivists satisfy the intuition
that play is intrinsically amoral. Nevertheless, they face sig-
nificant argumentative hurdles, which are not always taken
seriously enough. One fundamental difficulty for any expres-
sivist approach is to go beyond adescriptive explanation
of moral intuitions and provide normative justification (in
a strong, moral sense) for why certain virtual crimes are
reprehensible. As said, the expressivist strategy is to show
that certain in-game acts express reprehensible things: Play
is amoral but may stand as asymbol for another thing that
is immoral. However, this seems to imply that only the thing
expressed is reprehensible—not play itself as mere expres-
sion. Expressivists thus face the challenge of establishing
arobust moral dependency between expressive actions
and expressed reprehensibility that goes beyond intuitional
connection.
In addition, each version of the expressivist theory strug-
gles with its own more specific challenges. Regarding the
focus on the gamer’s character (a), it is unclear why gam-
ers should express attitudes towards ordinary crimes while
performing in-game crimes. After all, gamers are primarily
dealing with virtual actions, not with their real-world coun-
terparts. Why should my desire to murder virtually reveal
anything about my disposition toward real murder? Some
authors state that the reprehensible attitude of the player
is (only) expressed when playing reprehensible games
(Ostritsch, 2017; Patridge, 2011). However, this argument
tends to confuse the morality of gaming with the moral-
ity of games: player or game may be immoral here, but not
the virtual crime as such (which is the core of the Gamer’s
Dilemma).
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

S.Ulbricht
1 3
39 Page 4 of 11
If one focuses on games as moral objects (b), one faces
a similar difficulty in showing that a normative connection
exists between the morality of games or in-game contexts
(Ali, 2015; Nader, 2020) and the morality of virtual actions
in those games. A direct moral connection seems hard to jus-
tify since we can easily imagine morally acceptable actions
in immoral games (say, for research purposes) and, vice
versa, morally problematic actions in morally acceptable
games (say, humiliating other players). In determining the
morality of virtual actions, the gamer’s motivations seem
to play a much more decisive role than the morality of the
game, in contrast to what Rami Ali states (2015, 269–270):
[I]f virtual acts depend wholly on the gamer’s context,
then any in-game act will turn out impermissible or
permissible depending on the gamer’s intention in the
performance. The morality of virtual acts will turn on
whether the gamer engages with these acts in a morally
perverse manner or not, and not on the type of act per-
formed (whether virtual murder or virtual pedophilia).
In this sense, depending wholly on the gamer’s context
trivializes the dilemma.
Prima facie, it is the other way around: Not relying on the
‘gamer’s context’ (i.e., her motivations) means not speaking
about the morality of actions and thus not addressing the
moral challenge of the Gamer’s Dilemma. Of course, one
couldthen inquire if immoral gaming is (in)appropriate for
games and their in-game contexts—but this is a different
question that is not posed by the Gamer’s Dilemma.
The third approach (c) is often mixed with other lines of
argumentation. Descriptions of moral dangers or shortcom-
ings of virtual crimes regularly focus not on virtual actions
as such but on their real-world counterparts. However, it is
unclear why and how moral properties of ordinary actions
should be transferred to their virtual equivalents. One pro-
posal is given by Ramirez (2020, 145):
A player commits an act of virtual murder in those
cases where she directs her character to kill another
and in which her decision affects her psychologically,
physiologically, and behaviorally in the same way that
a real decision to commit murder would. […] Insofar
as virtual murders are to be defined in terms of their
connection to actual murder, PBVM [Psychological
and Behavioral Virtual Murder, S.U.] aims to capture
the features of a virtual murder that include these psy-
chological and behavioral elements of murder (real or
virtual) about which we might worry.
There are two problems with this argument. First, Ram-
irez’ definition is too exclusive. It is empirically question-
able wether such cases of virtual murder actually occur. Typ-
ically, virtual murder is ‘physiologically and behaviorally’
quite different from real murder; just look at the different
body movements (you normally do not murder by pushing
buttons on gaming controllers). Comparable psychological
states among gamers and murderers seem even rarer. Sec-
ond, it is not clear why virtual murder should be treated mor-
ally similar to real murder if it is a normatively incomplete
copy. Prima facie, the essential moral issue of murder is the
intentional taking of a life without consent,not the psychol-
ogy or movement of the murderer. Why should there be a
relevant moral analogy between virtual and real murder if
the former lacks this central moral property?
In many cases, moral analogy is implicitly assumed. For
example, Luck states that “child molestation is grave enough
that, by engaging with it[s] representation in a carefree or
light-hearted manner, we treat it too lightly—whilst the same
is not true of murder” (Luck, 2022, 1306). If we assume that
there is indeed a difference of ‘graveness’ between murder
and child molestation (which could be doubted), this might
have moral implications for our handling of such crimes but
not for our handling of virtual crimes. Luck’s considerations
may concern game developers or games that potentially aim
at representing (real) crimes, but not gamers, who typically
are not dealing with murder and child molestation but with
virtual murder and virtual child molestation.
While it is likely that virtual actions share some aspects
with their real-world counterparts (otherwise, it would be a
mystery why we use designations of real actions to describe
virtual actions), a separate argument must be made for moral
dependency, which cannot be presumed when talking about
the morality of gaming. It has to become clear why a moral
derivation relation should exist despite the high number of
normatively relevant differences (in body movement, con-
text, intention, people affected, etc.).
The last approach (d) ascribes a representational role to
virtual crimes, such that by performing them, factual state-
ments are made that may be reprehensible—for example,
because these statements discriminate against women (Bar-
tel, 2012) or children (Patridge, 2013). However, it is unclear
how virtual crimes should make such statements. Making
a statement is an action. Who performs this action? The
virtual action itself can hardly be the agent. Instead, play-
ers, game developers, or games come into question. If one
assumes that players send immoral messages by performing
certain virtual crimes, one encounters the challenges related
to the first approach (a) discussed earlier. Furthermore, the
gameplay as such does not seem to be a sufficient indicator
to derive statements from the player. Considering the sec-
ond option, the connection between performed action and
game developers is very unclear: How can one person (the
developer) make a statement through the actions of another
person (the player)? How do we even determine the develop-
ers’ intention? The first source for this is the game itself. So,
is it simply a statement of the game that is expressed when
playing it? With this reasoning, we run into the difficulties
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

A Kantian response totheGamer’s Dilemma
1 3
Page 5 of 11 39
of approach (b): It is hard to justify why a player’s action
should necessarily express a game’s statement.
For the sake of the argument, let us assume that virtual
actions can make statements for themselves. What could
such a statement be about? Prima facie, its subject is the
performed action. But why should an affirmative statement
about a virtual crime be reprehensible? The answer can-
not be “Because virtual crimes are reprehensible!” because
then what is to be shown is presupposed. If the answer is
“Because an affirmative statement about real crimes is
expressed when performing virtual crimes!”, then we end
up with the challenges of approach (c).
Two adequacy conditions tomeet themoral
challenge oftheGamer’s Dilemma
The difficulties presented in completely and adequately
meeting the moral challenge of the Gamer’s Dilemma can
be summarized by two adequacy conditions. First, the
response should provide a moral-theoretical argument and
not remain in the realm of Descriptive Ethics. The Gamer’s
Dilemma poses a moral-theoretical puzzle that has to be
solved by moral-theoretical reasoning. A complete response
both explains the source of our moral intuitions and justifies
why these intuitions are (not)morally reasonable.5 Second,
an adequate response to the Gamer’s Dilemma should do
justice to the subject matter: virtual crimes. Accordingly, one
has to deal with actions (play) rather than objects (games),
and with virtual crimes rather than real crimes. While it is
true that game and gaming, as well as virtual crimes and
real crimes, may be normatively related, this tells us nothing
about the moral status of in-game actions as such. Moreover,
as we have seen, neither play and game nor virtual crimes and
real crimes seem to share a very close moral bond. First, one
can perform morally acceptable acts in reprehensible games
and reprehensible acts in morally acceptable games. Second,
virtual crimes and real crimes differ so much in terms of
context and execution that the morality of one can hardly tell
us anything about the morality of the other. What makes real
murder immoral is not what makes in-game murder (poten-
tially) immoral—no one’s life is taken violently and willingly.
In sum, the adequacy conditions for a complete and adequate
response to the Gamer’s Dilemma call for the following:
1. To deliver a complete analysis, that is…
a. …to provide a descriptive explanation of our intui-
tions and…
b. …to provide a moral-theoretical reflection of their
basis.
2. To do justice to the subject matter, that is…
a. …not to confuse in-game actions with games as
objects and…
b. …not to confuse in-game actions with ordinary
actions.
A Kantian response
Consequentialist and expressivist considerations are not flawed
as such. Understood descriptively, they provide promising
explanations for our intuitions and thus easily fulfill adequacy
condition (1a). They also point to some relevant normative
characteristics of the Gamer’s Dilemma, and I do not categori-
cally rule out the possibility that consequentialists or expres-
sivists could, with careful reasoning, satisfy all adequacy
conditions. Nevertheless, grasping the moral core of what
might be reprehensible about virtual crimes as such remains a
fundamental challenge for both approaches. In light of this, it
is surprising that a genuine deontological approach has hardly
been pursued so far.6 Such an approach is attractive because
it does not need to make empirical assumptions (e.g., about
brutalization) while still focusing decidedly on the moral status
of actions. Thus, adequacy conditions (1b) and (2a) are satis-
fied from the outset. However, conditions (1a) and (2b) remain
challenging: to explain our different intuitions regarding virtual
crimes and to do justice to the specificity of play.
Are virtual crimes morally forbidden?
Imagine the following: Anton plays a computer game. He
enters a store (in-game), murders the shopkeeper, and then
abuses his child.
5 This condition does not apply to approaches that decidedly com-
mit to a descriptive explanation, such as the excellent paper by Jens
Kjeldgaard-Christiansen (2020), which provides illuminating insights
into the moral psychological background of the Gamer’s Dilemma, or
the proposal by Thomas Montefiore and Paul Formosa (2022), who
suggest “that the robustness of the intuitive difference may indeed
have a normative basis, but that basis may lie in aesthetic and con-
ventional norms”. These papers are enlightening in their own sense
but are not suited to solve the moral-theoretical puzzle posed by the
Gamer’s Dilemma. I also include Garry Young’s approach (2016) in
this line of argument. He describes socially constructed norms that
ground our moral intuitions regarding the Gamer’s Dilemma. There-
fore, Young’s remarks remain in the realm of Descriptive Ethics:
Young’s ‘Constructive Ecumenical Expressivism’ may explain social
conventions and moral intuitions, but it cannot justify moral norms in
a strong sense (Ostritsch & Ulbricht 2021). There are important nor-
mative differences between social and moral norms (Bicchieri 2006).
6 Recent exceptions are papers by HelenRyland (2019), TobiasFlat-
tery (2021), and Ulbricht’s Ethics of Computer Gaming (2022,
68–97).
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

S.Ulbricht
1 3
39 Page 6 of 11
Two questions arise: Are Anton’s actions morally rep-
rehensible? And are Anton’s virtual crimes—virtual mur-
der and virtual child molestation—morally equivalent? To
exclude simple cases (i.e., to take the moral challenge of
the Gamer’s Dilemma seriously), let us assume that Anton
plays alone, that he knows perfectly well that he (only) plays,
and that he does not use the game instrumentally for game-
external purposes (e.g., to prepare a real crime): Are his
actions (still) morally reprehensible?7
According to Kant, an action is immoral only when the
agent’s maxim (as afirst-personally complete and appro-
priate justification of action) contradicts the categorical
imperative. The categorical imperative reads in its classic
form: “[A]ct only in accordance with that maxim through
which you can at the same time will that it become a univer-
sal law” (Kant, 1998, 4:421/31). Regarding Anton, we must
ask whether the maxim to virtually murder and abuse chil-
dren can be willed as universal law without contradiction.
Taking adequacy condition (2b) into account, the answer
seems clear: Yes, murdering and abusing children in-game
cantypically be willed as universal law. After all, Anton
does not violate any rights while playing; no moral duty
seems to apply, as many theorists have already stated (Huiz-
inga, 1980, 6; Ostritsch, 2017). Let us take a closer look at
this argument by first considering a criminal’s maxim:
A. Criminal’s Maxim: “I want to murder the shopkeeper
and abuse his child!”.
Let this be an (incomplete)8 description of a maxim that
results in real-world crime. This action is clearly reprehen-
sible with Kant;it is not willable that its maxim becomes
universal law. Now what distinguishes (A) from typical in-
game actions?
B. Gamer’s Maxim: “I want to quasi-murder the shop-
keeper and quasi-abuse his child!”.
How should we understand description (B) and its quasi-
operators? Anton’s play is appropriately described not as
murder and child abuse but as in-game murder and in-game
child abuse. One is therefore mistaken if one claims that
Anton murders and abuses while playing. He does not do
that, and he is aware of it. In terms of action theory, he has
the practical knowledge that he does not carry out the acts in
the real world but only in the game world.9 He knows that he
must perform a different “primitive action” (Davidson, 2002,
49) while playing thanis needed to perform the real-world
counterpart. Using Kendall Walton’s framework (Walton,
1978, 10–12), Anton only acts as if doing these things. He
is performing quasi-actions, and he is aware of it.10 Other-
wise, it would not be possible to solve the fiction-theoretical
puzzle that all in-game actions like Anton’s action (B) pose:
How is Anton,as aphysical person,able to commit crimes
in the fictive game world? After all, an ontologically robust
“barrier against physical interactions between fictional
worlds and the real world” (Walton, 1978, 5) is commonly
assumed. The puzzle’s solution is that Anton does not really
commit crimes, but makes himself believe that he does so.
7 The following arguments are heavily inspired by Ulbricht’s consid-
erations (2022, esp. chapters2.2.2 and 3.2).
8 A Kantian maxim integrates the full normative dimension of an
action that the agent attributes to it. In the following examples (A, B,
and C), I concentrate on the normative core of the agent’s justifica-
tion and will not fully represent her maxim with all of its possible
side aspects. This reduced but focused perspective is sufficient for my
argumentative purposes.
9 Elizabeth Anscombe established the notion of ‘practical knowl-
edge’ to point out that agents always know what they are doing and
how they are doing it (Anscombe 1963, §45). An essential part of the
practical knowledge of a gamer is that he is in fact playing a game
(Ulbricht 2022, 20–42). This is not taken seriously enough by Flat-
tery’s Kantian account. He writes about a gamer named Reed who
“represented his act and circumstances in a way that is indistinguish-
able from how he might represent his act and circumstances in an
analogous but nonvirtual situation. Thus, it’s plausible that Reed’s
maxim, while in his state of immersion, was something like this:
when I’m in the presence of someone who’s defenseless and cornered,
shoot them for the thrill of it” (Flattery 2021, 760). In my view, if we
imagine Reed asa gamer, we must imagine him as fully aware of his
situation: that he is actually not ‘in the presence of someone who’s
defenseless and cornered’. Obviously, Reed adequately perceives his
surroundings, which is why he presses buttons on a controller and
does not do something else. Understanding the gaming situation dif-
ferently does not happen incidentally but is only possible with an
imaginative transformative act (Ulbricht 2022, 79–95): a specific
form of make-believe that Flattery does not address.
10 I do not claim that every verbal formulation of a gamer’s inten-
tion necessarily contains a quasi-operator, as in (B). On the contrary,
when I am asked what I am doing while playing, I usually do not
answer “I quasi-explore the cave”, but simply “I explore the cave”.
And this seems perfectly fine. So, we need to differentiate. In the
performance of quasi-actions, or ‘fictional actions’ (Ulbricht 2022,
28–36), typically no quasi-operator is immediately present, because
while playing in this sense, we do not use a normatively adequate
terminology to describe our actions (which would include a quasi-
operator), but rather a fictional terminology: We immerse ourselves in
the fictive world. At the same time, we are fully aware of the norma-
tive dimension of our doing, which calls for the ‘quasi-operator’ in
the maxim of our actions (we do not forget that all things are done
only in play—which is why we make ourselves believe that they are
not). This double-layered perspective of gamers has been described
many times. By Johan Huizinga as “the consciousness, however
latent, of ‘only pretending’” (Huizinga 1980, 22) and more recently
by Nguyen, who distinguishes the “outer layer” from the “inner layer”
of gaming agency (Nguyen 2020, 56), which are both present while
play: “At least to some degree, we must have the psychological capac-
ity to maintain these layers simultaneously—to run the outer layer in
the background” (Ngyuen 2020, 58).
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

A Kantian response totheGamer’s Dilemma
1 3
Page 7 of 11 39
And this, in turn, can be willed as universally carried out
way of acting in a Kantian sense. It is impossible to make
oneself an exception if one merely plays. Therefore, gaming
acts are typically not reprehensible. But this does not mean
morally forbidden gaming acts do not exist at all. Consider
the following maxim:
C. Gamer’s Maxim: “I want to kill the shopkeeper and
abuse his child!”.
What distinguishes (C) from (B)? In (C), we have gaming
action but no quasi-operators. Thus, the maxim is subjec-
tively indistinguishable from the maxim (A) of ordinary
action. Since the Kantian view aims at maxims alone, it fol-
lows that acts (A) and (C) are equally reprehensible. But
how exactly is gaming to be understood under (C)? Are such
actions even possible? Consider this alternative display:
C*. Gamer’s Maxim: “I want to quasi-kill the shopkeeper
and quasi-abuse his child!”.
The representation of action (C*) resembles (B) in every
respect except that the quasi-operators are crossed out. And
actually, this is exactly what Anton does when he performs
virtual crimes with maxim (C): He mentally deletes quasi-
operators (which would be normatively adequate for describ-
ing play, as Anton knows). He summons all his imaginative
powers to (mis)understand the gaming context as possibil-
ity of performing real-world crimes. Thus, Anton does not
accept the fiction of play but imaginatively transforms his in-
game crime into areal crime. He tries (without anychance
of success) to really carry out murder and molestation while
playing. This makes Anton’s action not only paradoxical but
irrational. This is crucial: While every play inherently has
the tendency to be paradoxical (when pretending, one does
things that one does not really do), Anton’s action in (C)
is, moreover, irrational: He does not really commit crimes,
is aware of this fact (Anton does not forget that he is play-
ing), and yet tries to commit them. Why is he doing so?
Because he imagines that he is actually committing crimes
while playing: Subjectively, he is de facto realizing his rep-
rehensible maxim, even though from an objective observer’s
perspective, he is not. Anton is aware of both perspectives.
Using Nguyen’s terminology, this phenomenon can be
explained as follows: Anton “submerge[s]” himself “in the
temporary agency of the game” (Nguyen, 2020, 10), while
simultaneously caring about non-temporary ends that extend
beyond the game. By placing his gaming under real ends,
Anton himself subjects it to the moral law. He acts under
the idea that his virtual actions are no longer mere play but
moral seriousness. His virtual actions, then, are actually
morally forbidden because they realize reprehensible max-
ims that contradict the categorical imperative.11
This answers this section’s first question: Anton’s vir-
tual actions are morally forbidden only if he performs them
with a maxim that contradicts the categorical imperative.
It should be noted, however, that such a way of gaming is
exceptional. Usually, players accept the fiction of the game
and do not try to transform it. To interpret one’s own play in
such an alienating way as in (C) is rather exotic.
Is there any moral difference betweenvirtual
crimes?
By answering the first question, the answer to the second one,
and thus the Kantian response to the Gamer’s Dilemma, is
quickly formulated. From a Kantian perspective, the categori-
cal moral distinction between virtual murder and virtual child
molestation cannot be sustained. Adequately understood,
both acts take place in a fictional setting and are therefore
amoral: The maxims contain quasi-operators that make con-
tradiction with the categorical imperative impossible. How-
ever, as soon as the in-game actions are (mis)understood as
realizations of reprehensible maxims,as in case (C),virtual
murder and virtual child molestation are equally morally for-
bidden because both contradict the categorical imperative. As
a result, there is no Gamer’s Dilemma with Kant. The truth
of premises (i) and (ii) must be rejected. Virtual murder can
(also) be morally forbidden, and virtual child molestation
(also) be morally permitted, because an action’s moral clas-
sification depends solely on the agent’s maxims, not on its
depiction. For the moral distinction between virtual acts, the
(non-)presence of quasi-operators in the maxim is crucial, not
the superficial categorization into ‘murder’ or ‘child moles-
tation’. Intended quasi-murder and quasi-molestation are
permitted; intended murder and molestationare forbidden.
Countering two objections
Isn’t virtual child molestation worse thanvirtual
murder?
A first objection to the Kantian response may be stated
like this: Virtual child molestation is far worse than virtual
11 One may wonder at this point why anyone would consciously per-
form irrational actions. At first glance, this seems counterintuitive. In
fact, however, we regularly encounter cases in which we consciously
act irrationally. We take that third piece of cake even though we want
to go on a diet; we ride the bike without a helmet even though we
want to minimize the risks of serious injury; we play games even
though we want to perform the virtual actions for real. Apparently,
we often act irrationally on purpose. Why we do so is another ques-
tion,more psychological than philosophical.
Footnote 11 (continued)
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

S.Ulbricht
1 3
39 Page 8 of 11
murder!. This assumption is based on a robust moral intui-
tion—in fact, the very intuition that gives rise to the Gamer’s
Dilemma. Apparently, the Kantian response does not address
this intuition: It treats virtual murder and virtual child moles-
tation asmorally analogous. While the Kantian response
delivers a consistent moral analysis of virtual crimes, it
seemingly has difficulties grasping the intuitional ground of
the Gamer’s Dilemma and thus satisfying adequacy condi-
tion (1a).
There are numerous promising approaches within the
framework of Descriptive Ethics that are compatible with
the moral analysis given above and capable of explaining
our intuitions regarding the Gamer’s Dilemma (Kjeldgaard-
Christiansen, 2020; Montefiore & Formosa, 2022). Rather
than summarizing these approaches here, I will try to pro-
vide a Kantian explanation, which should add to the already
existing contributions. I begin with the following thesis: Due
to the intermedial omnipresence of killing acts, habituation
effects to corresponding depictions (murders included) have
occurred. This reduces the moral salience of corresponding
fictive acts. In the case of (child) molestation,as a taboo,the
opposite is true.12
This is a sociological thesis that needs empirical sub-
stantiation. However, I think it is hardly controversial and
issupported by our anecdotal experiences in different types
of media. Be itin novels, movies, or games, we regularly
witness acts of killing and murder, often included for enter-
tainment purposes and even performed by the heroes of
the story. In contrast, depictions of (child) molestation are
extremely rare and intuitively very sensitive: They stick
with us for a long time and are perceived as unthinkable
crimes for any (anti-)heroic character (Vaage, 2015, esp.
chapter5). This contrast affects the ‘moral salience’ of the
fictive actions. By this, I mean two things. First, our judge-
ment changes: Unlike (child) molestation, murder seldom
strikes us as morally problematic in fiction. Second, our per-
ceptions differ, especially in gaming: Unlike acts of moles-
tation, acts of killing are regularly not even perceived as
such while playingbut as entertaining obstacles, exercises
in skill, or competitive challenges. Experienced gamers do
not constantly think, “I am about to kill people!”, but “I am
about to finish the level!” or “I am about to win the game!”.
The first thesis is followed by a second one: The moral
salience of an action type influences our maxims when play-
ing this action type. To specify this, let us take a closer look
at Kant’s concept of maxims (1998, IV:421/31):
A maxim is the subjective principle of acting, and […]
contains the practical rule determined by reason con-
formably with the conditions of the subject (often his
ignorance or also his inclinations), and is therefore the
principle in accordance with which the subject acts[.]
In a nutshell, the maxim is the synopsis of how the agent
understands her action. Accordingly, the second thesis refers
to how the player grasps her action factually and not to how
she should grasp it. This is the reason why empirical circum-
stances such as habituation effects may play a significant role
in the formation of maxims.
From the combination of both theses, thefollowing con-
clusions can be drawn: Killing, as anintermedial omnipres-
ent action type, tends to disappear from maxims of virtual
killing, but molestation, asan intermedial taboo, tends to
stick within maxims of virtual molestation. Some exam-
ples will illustrate this. Common maxims of virtual killing
might entail the following justifications: “I want to finish
the level!” or “I want to score points!” or “I want to defeat
my brother!” or “I want to save the kingdom!”. We usu-
ally accept these descriptions as reasonable justifications for
in-game killing and murder. The first description is a per-
fectly adequate reason for killing numerous creatures while
playing Super Mario Bros.(Nintendo Research, 1985). The
second and third descriptions are plausible justifications for
virtual killings within competitive games, such as Counter
Strike (Valve, 2000), Super Smash Bros. (HAL Laboratory,
1999), or Age of Empires (Ensemble Studios, 1997). The
fourth description justifies a variety of murderous actions
in role-playing games like The Legend of Zelda: Breath of
the Wild (Nintendo Entertainment, 2017) or The Witcher 3:
Wild Hunt (CD Project RED, 2015). Now imagine a gamer
who uses theabove justifications not for virtual killing or
murder but for virtual (child) molestation. Immediately,
we would no longer accept the justifications as reasonable
descriptions of her in-game acts. We would rather accuse the
gamer of overlooking something obvious when she describes
her play in this way. One important reason for this is that we
have not become as accustomed to fictive (child) molesta-
tion as we have to fictive killings. In fact, the vast majority
of gamers will find it very difficult to perform virtual (child)
molestation without explicitly intending what they are doing.
Molestation in games is so exotic that it is hard to imagine
its description disappearing from the maxim. The gamer’s
maxim seemingly has to integrate molestation asa goal.
This, in turn, immediately raises the moral question of how
exactly she understands her action and whether her maxim
12 I write of ‘killing’ and ‘murder’. These crimes are not the same.
Killing may be justified (e.g., in self-defense), but murder is not.
Intermedial conventions of representation differ as well;we witness
fictive killings more often than fictive murders. Nevertheless, both
practices are more common in media (esp. in computer games) and
intuitively more justified than (child) molestation (Formosa et al.,
2023). In addition, the boundaries between murder and killing are
often blurred in games, so that we virtually murder far more often
than we might think, e.g., when a game is set in war, when it is a
stealth game, or when murdering enemies is primarily an exercise in
skill.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

A Kantian response totheGamer’s Dilemma
1 3
Page 9 of 11 39
contradicts the categorical imperative. Specifically, whether
she negates the quasi-operator of her maxim or not.
To summarize, there is a Kantian answer to the first
objection. While there is indeed no categorical moral dif-
ference between virtual murder and virtual child molestation
from the deontological point of view, contingent intermedial
conventions of representation have led to cases of reprehen-
sible virtual child molestation being factually more likely
than cases of reprehensible virtual killing. The intermedial
omnipresence of killing acts (murders included) fosters a
habituation so profound that the description of the fictive act
may disappear entirely from the maxim of virtual murder.
As a result, corresponding actions are mostly clearly amoral:
There is nothing reprehensible about playing through levels,
scoring points, or saving (fictive) kingdoms. Unlike acts of
killing, acts of molestation,and child molestation in particu-
lar,constitute an intermedial taboo. There is increased sensi-
tization regarding corresponding depictions, which makes it
almost psychologically impossible not to refer to the fictive
act in maxims of virtual (child) molestation. We are morally
highly sensitive to such actions and cannot ignore them. This
has moral consequences. With Kant, virtual crimes may only
be immoral if the maxim entails the crime’s description.
Only thendoes negating the quasi-operator lead to moral
offense. So, the risk of immorality is de facto greater in cases
of virtual (child) molestation than in cases of virtual murder,
which may provide a normative foundation for our different
moral intuitions regarding the Gamer’s Dilemma.13
Aren’t real crimes worse thanvirtual crimes?
There is a second objection: Carrying out real crimes is
much worse than carrying out virtual crimes!. Most peo-
ple would agree: Even if some virtual crimes are morally
reprehensible, they are not nearly as evil as their real-world
counterparts. At least with regard to the Gamer’s Dilemma,
this seems obvious: Unlike the real world, in game worlds,
no one is actually killed, no one is harmed, and so on. The
Kantian approach, however, has difficulties justifying this
distinction. Depending on the maxim, actions are either for-
bidden or permitted (or commanded), because Kant knows
no gradations of the (im)moral: Every crime is equally
objectionable,whether virtual or not. Even outside of gam-
ing contexts, Kant’s failure to give different weights to rep-
rehensible acts leads to counterintuitive conclusions: Lying
is as immoral as murdering, andfailed murder is as morally
forbidden as successful murder.
As a first approach to the objection, let us stay with the
last example and draw an analogy to our case. Important
insights can be gained by comparing reprehensible virtual
murder (e.g., Anton’s virtual murder under the description
(C) with a maxim that does not contain a quasi-operator and
therefore contradicts the categorical imperative) with (also
reprehensible) ordinary attempted murder. Both actions
share some morally relevant properties: the agent wants to
commit murder, the corresponding maxim contradicts the
categorical imperative, andno one dies. Considering these
similarities, it is actually not completely implausible to place
the virtual crime on a comparable moral level as the real
crime. Both can be understood as attempts to actually com-
mit murder. However, one normatively decisive aspect has
been omitted so far: Attempted murder does not fail will-
ingly and has a chance of success, whereas reprehensible
virtual murder does not. The latter is an attempt that can-
not succeed,and the gamer is aware of this: She knows that
her murder will fail. This results in a central irrationality
in her action: It contradicts her intention. But how is this a
contradiction to the categorical imperative? Actually, two
contradictions take place, which are normatively connected
by moral transitivity:
I. Rational contradiction: Action x is to be realized by
another, mismatched action y.
II. Moral contradiction: Action x contradicts the cat-
egorical imperative and is ipso facto immoral.
III. Moral transitivity: Action y, as intended (though mis-
matched) realization of action x, is immoral.
To illustrate this, let us again consider Anton’s virtual
crime under description (C):
I. Rational contradiction: Anton wants to commit real
murder and child molestation through virtual actions.
II. Moral contradiction: Real murder and child molesta-
tion contradict the categorical imperative and are ipso
facto immoral.
III. Moral transitivity: Thus, Anton’s virtual actions are
immoral, because they are intended to realize crimes
that contradict the categorical imperative.
Anton’s decision to carry out an action that is doomed to
fail represents his first central contradiction. Only because
of this irrationalitydoes his gaming maxim contradict the
categorical imperative. Such a derivational relation is not
found in ordinary crimes. But does this constitute a moral
difference? It does not. In both cases, the agent’s maxim
ultimately contradicts the categorical imperative. Thus,
both actions are to be judged morally the same: They are
forbidden.
13 The considerations in this section are purely descriptive. I make
no statement about whether it is desirable for habituation effects to
be present in the case of virtual murder but not in the case of virtual
(child) molestation. Presumably, it is not.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

S.Ulbricht
1 3
39 Page 10 of 11
However, while the specific characteristics of reprehen-
sible virtual crimes do not ground a categorical moral dis-
tinction in the deontological sense, they do provide clues to
further Kantian differentiations that may justify our diverg-
ing intuitions. For example, in his Groundwork of the Meta-
physics of Morals, Kant divides moral duties “into duties to
ourselves and to other human beings and into perfect and
imperfect duties” (Kant, 1998, IV: 421/31). This marks a rel-
evant distinction for our case: Attempted game-external mur-
der violates a perfect duty to other human beings, whereas
forbidden virtual murder violates a perfect duty to ourselves
because only the agent is affected by murder that necessarily
(and knowingly) fails.14 More important differences can be
found when taking a look at Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals,
where he distinguishes between fault and crime and between
just and unjust acts (Kant, 1991, VI: 224/50):
An unintentional transgression which can still be
imputed to the agent is called a mere fault (culpa).
An intentional transgression (i.e., one accompanied by
consciousness of its being a transgression) is called a
crime (dolus). What is right in accordance with exter-
nal laws is called just (iustum); what is not, unjust
(iniustum).
Shortly after, Kant makes a further distinction between
legality and morality: “The conformity of an action with the
law of duty is its legality (legalitas); the conformity of the
maxim of an action with a law is the morality (moralitas) of
the action” (Kant, 1991, IV: 225/51).
Following this classification, attempted game-external
murder is a deliberate violation of external legislation, in
which not only the maxim but also the act are contrary to
duty. It is therefore an illegal and unjust crime. By contrast,
reprehensible virtual murder has other normative character-
istics. It is usually an unintentional violation of the moral
law, in which only the maxim contradicts the duty. Forbid-
den virtual murder is thus an immoral but just fault. It is
‘just’ because it is lawful according to external legislation—
no applicable law forbids gaming. But why is it usually
unintentional and thus only a fault? Admittedly, this point
is debatable. But consider the following: The immorality of
virtual murder essentially depends on rational contradiction,
which ultimately consists in self-deception. Anton imagines
that he could fulfill his game-external maxim while playing.
The key word is ‘imagines’: Anton does not forget that he is
only playing. He knows that he is not really murdering any-
one (otherwise he would not have to imagine it). He knows
that he is the only one affected by his action. From this, I
conclude that he is potentially unaware of nonetheless com-
mitting amoral offense. He may think his imaginative play
protects him from moral guilt. However, the opposite is true:
His fiction-transformative imagination leads to the moral
condemnation of his actions. This is why forbidden virtual
acts may usually count as faults and not crimes.
To sum up, reprehensible virtual murder, unlike game-
external murder, affects only the agent and is neither illegal
nor unjust. Furthermore, it is usually only a fault and not
a crime. It is forbidden just like real murder, but the latter
primarily concerns legality while virtual murder primarily
concerns morality. Thesame conclusions can be drawn with
regard to other moral offenses, such as (virtual) child moles-
tation. Therefore, the second objection can be countered as
follows: With Kant, reprehensible in-game actions have no
different deontological status than their game-external coun-
terparts. Both are morally forbidden for the same reason:
They contradict the categorical imperative. Nonetheless,
Kant allows us to identify important normative differences
between the acts that may ground our intuitions. However,
for deeper evaluative weightings, one must turn to other,
value-based ethics.
Funding Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt
DEAL. No funds, grants, or other support was received.
Declarations
Competing interests The author has no relevant financial or non-finan-
cial interests to disclose.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attri-
bution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adapta-
tion, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes
were made. The images or other third party material in this article are
included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated
otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in
the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not
permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will
need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a
copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen ses/ by/4. 0/.
References
Ali, R. (2015). A new solution to the gamer’s dilemma. Ethics and
Information Technology, 17(4), 267–274. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/
s10676- 015- 9381-x
Ali, R. (2022). The video gamer’s dilemmas. Ethics and Information
Technology. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s10676- 022- 09638-x
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1963). Intention. Harvard University Press.
Bartel, C. (2012). Resolving the gamer’s dilemma. Ethics and Infor-
mation Technology, 14(1), 11–16. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/
s10676- 011- 9280-8
14 Furthermore, in reprehensible virtual crimes, rational contradic-
tion is key, which in itself only violates the imperfect duty of acting
prudentially. However, its combination with the moral contradiction
leads to violating a perfect duty, just like real crimes.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

A Kantian response totheGamer’s Dilemma
1 3
Page 11 of 11 39
Bicchieri, C. (2006). The Grammar of Society. Cambridge University
Press.
Börchers, F. (2018). Handeln. In D. M. Feige, S. Ostritsch, & M.
Rautzenberg (Eds.), Philosophie des Computerspiels. Theorie –
Praxis – Ästhetik (pp. 97–122). J. B. Metzler.
CD Project RED (2015). The Witcher 3: Wild Hunt. Bandai Namco
Entertainment. PlayStation 4.
Chalmers, D. J. (2017). The virtual and the real. Disputatio, 9(46),
309–352. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1515/ disp- 2017- 0009
Davidson, D. (2002). Essays on actions and events. Oxford University
Press.
Davnall, R. (2021). What does the gamer do? Ethics and Informa-
tion Technology, 23(3), 225–237. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/
s10676- 020- 09558-8
Ensemble Studios. (1997). Age of Empires. Microsoft. PC Windows.
Routledge.
Ferguson, C. J. (2015). Do angry birds make for angry children? A
meta-analysis of video game influences on children’s and ado-
lescents’ aggression, mental health, prosocial behavior, and aca-
demic performance. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10(5),
646–666. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1177/ 17456 91615 592234
Flattery, T. (2021). May Kantians commit virtual killings that affect
no other persons? Ethics and Information Technology, 23(4),
751–762. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s10676- 021- 09612-z
Formosa, P., etal. (2023). An empirical investigation of the Gamer’s
Dilemma: A mixed methods study of whether the dilemma exists.
Behaviour & Information Technology. Advance Online Publica-
tion. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1080/ 01449 29X. 2023. 21788 37
Huizinga, J. (1980). Homo Ludens. A study of the play-element in cul-
ture. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Kant, I. (1991). The metaphysics of morals. Introduction, translation
and notes by Mary Gregor. Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (1998). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated
and edited by Mary Gregor. With an introduction by Christine M.
Korsgaard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kjeldgaard-Christiansen, J. (2020). Splintering the gamer’s dilemma:
Moral intuitions, motivational assumptions, and action prototypes.
Ethics and Information Technology, 22(1), 93–102. https:// doi.
org/ 10. 1007/ s10676- 019- 09518-x
Laboratory, H. A. L. (1999). Super Smash Bros. Nintendo.
Luck, M. (2009). The gamer’s dilemma: An analysis of the arguments
for the moral distinction between virtual murder and virtual
paedophilia. Ethics and Information Technology, 11(1), 31–36.
https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s10676- 008- 9168-4
Luck, M. (2018). Has Ali dissolved the gamer’s dilemma? Ethics and
Information Technology, 20(3), 157–162. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/
s10676- 018- 9455-7
Luck, M. (2022). The grave resolution to the gamer’s dilemma: An
argument for a moral distinction between virtual murder and vir-
tual child molestation. Philosophia, 50(3), 1287–1308. https:// doi.
org/ 10. 1007/ s11406- 021- 00455-y
McCormick, M. (2001). Is it wrong to play violent video games? Ethics
and Information Technology, 3(4), 277–287. https:// doi. org/ 10.
1023/A: 10138 02119 431
Montefiore, T., & Formosa, P. (2022). Resisting the Gamer’s Dilemma.
Ethics and Information Technology. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/
s10676- 022- 09655-w
Nader, K. (2020). Virtual competitions and the gamer’s dilemma. Eth-
ics and Information Technology, 22(3), 239–245. https:// doi. org/
10. 1007/ s10676- 020- 09532-4
Nguyen, C. T. (2020). Games. Oxford University Press.
Nintendo Entertainment. (2017). The Legend of Zelda: Breath of the
Wild. Nintendo. Nintendo Switch.
Nintendo Research. (1985). Super Mario Bros. Nintendo. Entertain-
ment system. Nintendo.
Ostritsch, S. (2017). The amoralist challenge to gaming and the gam-
er’s moral obligation. Ethics and Information Technology, 19(2),
117–128. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s10676- 017- 9420-x
Ostritsch, S., & Ulbricht, S. (2021). The immorality of computer
games: Defending the endorsement view against Young’s objec-
tions. Ethics and Information Technology, 23(3), 199–205. https://
doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s10676- 020- 09549-9
Patridge, S. (2011). The incorrigible social meaning of video game
imagery. Ethics and Information Technology, 13(4), 303–312.
https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s10676- 010- 9250-6
Patridge, S. (2013). Pornography, ethics, and video games. Ethics and
Information Technology, 15(1), 25–34. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/
s10676- 012- 9310-1
Ramirez, E. J. (2020). How to (dis)solve the Gamer’s Dilemma. Ethical
Theory and Moral Practice, 23(1), 141–161. https:// doi. org/ 10.
1007/ s10677- 019- 10049-z
Reinecke, L., & Klein, S. A. (2015). Game studies und medienpsy-
chologie. In K. Sachs-Hombach & J.-N. Thon (Eds.), Game stud-
ies Aktuelle Ansätze der Computerspielforschung (pp. 210–251).
Herbert von Halem.
Ryland, H. (2019). Getting away with murder: Why virtual murder in
MMORPGs can be wrong on Kantian grounds. Ethics and Infor-
mation Technology, 21(2), 105–115. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/
s10676- 019- 09498-y
Schulzke, M. (2010). Defending the morality of violent video games.
Ethics and Information Technology, 12(2), 127–138. https:// doi.
org/ 10. 1007/ s10676- 010- 9222-x
Sicart, M. (2009). The Ethics of Computer Games. MIT Press.
Ulbricht, S. (2022). Ethics of Computer Gaming. Palgrave Macmillan.
Vaage, M. B. (2015). The antihero in American television. Routledge.
Valve. (2000). Counter strike. Sierra Entertainment.
Waddington, D. I. (2007). Locating the wrongness in ultra-violent
video games. Ethics and Information Technology, 9(2), 121–128.
https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s10676- 006- 9126-y
Walton, K. L. (1978). Fearing fictions. The Journal of Philosophy,
75(1), 5–27. https:// doi. org/ 10. 2307/ 20258 31
Young, G. (2016). Resolving the Gamer’s Dilemma. Examining the
Moral and Psychological Differences between Virtual Murder and
Virtual Paedophilia. Palgrave Macmillan.
Publisher's Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Terms and Conditions
Springer Nature journal content, brought to you courtesy of Springer Nature Customer Service Center GmbH (“Springer Nature”).
Springer Nature supports a reasonable amount of sharing of research papers by authors, subscribers and authorised users (“Users”), for small-
scale personal, non-commercial use provided that all copyright, trade and service marks and other proprietary notices are maintained. By
accessing, sharing, receiving or otherwise using the Springer Nature journal content you agree to these terms of use (“Terms”). For these
purposes, Springer Nature considers academic use (by researchers and students) to be non-commercial.
These Terms are supplementary and will apply in addition to any applicable website terms and conditions, a relevant site licence or a personal
subscription. These Terms will prevail over any conflict or ambiguity with regards to the relevant terms, a site licence or a personal subscription
(to the extent of the conflict or ambiguity only). For Creative Commons-licensed articles, the terms of the Creative Commons license used will
apply.
We collect and use personal data to provide access to the Springer Nature journal content. We may also use these personal data internally within
ResearchGate and Springer Nature and as agreed share it, in an anonymised way, for purposes of tracking, analysis and reporting. We will not
otherwise disclose your personal data outside the ResearchGate or the Springer Nature group of companies unless we have your permission as
detailed in the Privacy Policy.
While Users may use the Springer Nature journal content for small scale, personal non-commercial use, it is important to note that Users may
not:
use such content for the purpose of providing other users with access on a regular or large scale basis or as a means to circumvent access
control;
use such content where to do so would be considered a criminal or statutory offence in any jurisdiction, or gives rise to civil liability, or is
otherwise unlawful;
falsely or misleadingly imply or suggest endorsement, approval , sponsorship, or association unless explicitly agreed to by Springer Nature in
writing;
use bots or other automated methods to access the content or redirect messages
override any security feature or exclusionary protocol; or
share the content in order to create substitute for Springer Nature products or services or a systematic database of Springer Nature journal
content.
In line with the restriction against commercial use, Springer Nature does not permit the creation of a product or service that creates revenue,
royalties, rent or income from our content or its inclusion as part of a paid for service or for other commercial gain. Springer Nature journal
content cannot be used for inter-library loans and librarians may not upload Springer Nature journal content on a large scale into their, or any
other, institutional repository.
These terms of use are reviewed regularly and may be amended at any time. Springer Nature is not obligated to publish any information or
content on this website and may remove it or features or functionality at our sole discretion, at any time with or without notice. Springer Nature
may revoke this licence to you at any time and remove access to any copies of the Springer Nature journal content which have been saved.
To the fullest extent permitted by law, Springer Nature makes no warranties, representations or guarantees to Users, either express or implied
with respect to the Springer nature journal content and all parties disclaim and waive any implied warranties or warranties imposed by law,
including merchantability or fitness for any particular purpose.
Please note that these rights do not automatically extend to content, data or other material published by Springer Nature that may be licensed
from third parties.
If you would like to use or distribute our Springer Nature journal content to a wider audience or on a regular basis or in any other manner not
expressly permitted by these Terms, please contact Springer Nature at
onlineservice@springernature.com