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SOLAR-POWERED IRRIGATION
IN YEMEN:
OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND POLICIES
This policy brief was prepared by Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, in coordination with the project partners DeepRoot Consulting and CARPO
– Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient.
POLICY BRIEF
Co-funded by
the European Union
No: 22
Date: April 29, 2021
Yemen is one of the most water-scarce countries in
the world, with renewable water resources currently
capable of providing only 75 m3 per capita per year
– well below the water scarcity threshold. And this
volume is steadily dropping. The agricultural sector in
Yemen is the dominant user of groundwater resources,
accounting for around 90 percent of total consumption.
Due to the current crisis, fuel required for pumps has
become scarce and very expensive; as a result, solar
energy has begun to play a role in the extraction and
supply of groundwater for irrigation. However, there is
concern about the misuse of this new technology. This
study examines the current trend of solar-powered
irrigation system (SPIS) use in Sana’a Basin, identifying
the pros and cons of this approach. It presents the
perspectives of farmers and experts in terms of what is
happening and what should be done to maximize the
benets and minimize the negative impacts of SPIS.
The incidence of SPIS installation is increasing at a
rate of more than 4 percent annually. Farmers spoken
to as a part of this study expressed enthusiasm to use
SPIS and cited capital cost as the biggest obstacle to
their acquiring this technology. This paper proposes
governance and policy recommendations for overall
water management and, in particular, for future studies
and regulation of SPIS-driven groundwater use. Setting
appropriate policies for water-pumping powered by
renewable energy will help to conserve groundwater
sources and sustainably preserve livelihoods.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
By Musaed M. Aklan & Helen Lackner
1. INTRODUCTION
Yemen has experienced unrest for many
years, suffering from civil conicts, wars,
a deteriorating economy and severe
depletion of water resources.[1] The country’s
aridity, limited water resources, and the
mismanagement and overexploitation of
water contribute to Yemen’s water insecurity.
The current war has had a signicant impact
on water use and the performance of the water
and irrigation sectors.[2] Ongoing instability
in the country has had negative impacts
on the availability of fuel and electricity –
energy sources that have typically been used
to extract and transport groundwater. As a
result of the increased scarcity of electricity
and fuel, water resources have been harder
to access and water services have become
less reliable. Solar energy has started to
play a role in providing water to different
users, including farmers, who rely to a large
extent on groundwater for their agricultural
activities. Going beyond generalities, this
paper looks in detail at the current uses and
potential impact of solar-powered irrigation
systems (SPIS) on the sustainability of the
use of Yemen’s scarce water.
2Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April, 2021
This study focuses on Sana’a Basin, where the shortage of water is among the most
problematic. Of all global national capitals, Sana’a has often been identied as the one
most likely to run out of water rst.[3] It is important to remember that the hydrology
of Yemen varies considerably and therefore ndings about Sana’a cannot be assumed
to be valid for other basins and regions. However, there are some principles and
recommendations of a general nature that are valid across the country. Strategies and
detailed policies must, of course, be specic to each basin and region.
None of the ofcial authorities and their related policies/strategies, including the
Ministry of Electricity and Energy (MEE), the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE)
and the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Fisheries (MAIF), have addressed the
issues associated with the use of solar energy in Yemen.
[4]
There are a few studies about
solar energy for domestic use,
[5]
but these have little bearing on the technology’s use
for agricultural water extraction. A 2019 UNDP report, the only study so far to discuss
the use of SPIS in Yemen, determined the positive advantages of SPIS and promoted its
use, but said little about the possible impact of SPIS on groundwater sources.
[6]
One of the main issues in water management in Yemen is the considerable
groundwater over-extraction, which threatens the viability of life in many parts of
the country, as water availability diminishes. One of the problems faced by planners
is the complete absence of policies and regulations for the management of new
solar energy technologies used for water extraction, but they must also contend
with the absence of detailed analysis based on actual eld data for SPIS. This paper
contributes to reducing this gap. If the over-extraction issue remains unaddressed,
the further deterioration of water availability will make life in parts of the country
more challenging, if not impossible. With the growing demand for SPIS in Yemen –
and given its ability to provide affordable, clean-energy solutions – this paper aims
to propose recommendations for governance and donor/nancer approaches to the
recognition and regulation of SPIS-driven groundwater use.
1) Hany Sady et al. “Prevalence and associated factors of Schistosomiasis among children in Yemen: implications for an effective
control programme,” PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases, vol. 7, no. 8 (August 2013).
2) Talha Burki, “Yemen’s neglected health and humanitarian crisis,” Lancet, vol. 387 (2016); “Yemen Humanitarian Crisis
Analysis 2016,” Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), February 20, 2016, https://doi.org/10.1016/
S0140-6736(16)00389-5.
3) Misiedjan D, Van Rijswick M, Kwoei ATA “A human right to water while the well runs dry: Analysing the legal and regulatory
framework of Yemen water law” Journal of Water Law, vol. 24, (August 2014).
4) There is a 10 page document by the General Department for Renewable Energy at the Ministry of Electricity and Energy. It
is called “National Strategy for Renewable Energy and Energy Efciency”, which listed renewable energy options, efciency
targets, etc. However, it does not rise to the level of what we call a strategy and has not been approved by the cabinet. https://
www.climate-laws.org/geographies/yemen/policies/national-strategy-for-renewable-energy-and-energy-efciency.
5)
A. M. Al-Ashwal, “Market development of PV Solar Home System (SHS) and PV pumping in Yemen,” 18th International Conference
on Sustainable Energy Technologies, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2019; Murad Almekhla, “Justication of the Advisability of Using
Solar Energy for the Example of the Yemen Republic Technogenic and Ecological Safety,” Scientic and Technical Journal (2018);
Adel Saleh Rawea and Shabana Urooj, “Strategies, current status, problems of energy and perspectives of Yemen’s renewable
energy solutions,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 82, part 1 (February 2018); A. Abdullah, “Sustainable Energy
Futures, Energy Poverty in Yemen School of Engineering” (conference paper), University of Edinburgh, 2018.
6) “Good Practices and Lessons Learned: Solar Interventions under ERRY Project in Yemen (Abyan, Hajjah, Hodeidah, and Lahj),”
UNDP, February 27, 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/good-practices-and-lessons-learned-solar-interventions-under-
erry-project-yemen-abyan.
3
Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April 2021
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Water situation in Yemen
There are 29 million Yemenis, 70 percent of whom live in rural areas and more than
50 percent of whom depend on agriculture. Yemen has no lakes or permanent rivers:
rainfall and groundwater are the main sources of water in the country. Agriculture is
estimated to use 90 percent of groundwater resources in Yemen, even though it only
generates less than 20 percent of GDP.[7]
Yemen suffers from extreme water scarcity. Per capita water availability has dropped
steadily in past decades as known available resources have remained static or have
diminished while the population has increased. The annual volume of renewable
water per capita declined from 221 m3 in 1992 to 80 m3 in 2014 and to only 75 m3 in
2017;[8] the latter is just over one percent of the global per capita average (5,925 m3)
and 14 percent of the Middle East and North Africa region per capita average (554 m3).
Yemen’s trajectory over the past three decades suggests available renewable water per
capita could drop to 55 m3 by 2030.
According to the internationally recognized Falkenmark indicator, absolute water
scarcity occurs if per capita water availability falls below 500 m3 per annum. That is
almost seven times the current water availability in Yemen. Since the beginning of
this century, Yemen has been using annually one third more water than its renewable
supply can support: in 2010, extraction was 3.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) while
renewable supply was 2.1 bcm; the 1.4 bcm shortfall was met by water pumped with
modern technology from non-renewable fossil aquifers.[9] The groundwater tables
have dropped severely, leaving the country in a state of extreme scarcity. For example,
in Sana’a Basin, the water table was at a depth of 30 m in the 1970s but had dropped
to between 200 and 1200 m by 2012.
There are three main reasons for water scarcity in Yemen. First, rapid population
growth, averaging 3 percent per annum, has increased demand thus reducing per
capita water over generations. Second, the introduction of diesel-operated pumps and
tube well-drilling technology in the past century for irrigation has affected the use
of traditional rainwater harvesting systems and enabled extraction of groundwater
signicantly above recharge levels. This has led to the expansion of agriculture areas
and the depletion of aquifers. Third, climate change is manifested through increasingly
violent and irregular downpours and other phenomena affecting water availability.
These irregular rainfall patterns have further reduced replenishment of aquifers,
as the loss of top soil prevents absorption of ows, particularly where terraces and
traditional spate systems have deteriorated due to lack of maintenance.[10]
7) Helen Lackner, Yemen in Crisis: The Road to War (New York: Verso, 2019), 247.
8) Most recent water statistic from FAO’s Aquastat “Country Statistics” tool, see: http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/
query/index.html?lang=en.
9) “Future Impact of Climate Change Visible Now in Yemen,” World Bank, November 24, 2014, https://www.worldbank.org/en/
news/feature/2014/11/24/future-impact-of-climate-change-visible-now-in-yemen.
10) Helen Lackner and Abdulrahman Al-Eryani, “Yemen’s Environmental Crisis Is the Biggest Risk for Its Future,” The Century
Foundation, December 14, 2020, https://tcf.org/content/report/yemens-environmental-crisis-biggest-risk-future/.
4Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April, 2021
2.2 Legal frameworks of water, agriculture and energy sectors
The irrigated area in Yemen has increased from 37,000 hectares (ha) in the 1970s to
more than 400,000 ha in the 2000s. During the same period, as irrigated areas increased
11-fold, the area supporting rain-fed agriculture declined by 30 percent.[11] Among the
most striking cases of unsustainable water management is the situation in Sana’a
Basin, where water resources serve the country’s rapidly growing capital city and high
value crops such as qat and grapes. Water extraction there is estimated at ve times
recharge levels.[12] A further example is that of fruit production in the Tihama: in the
middle of Wadi Zabid, a major area for banana cultivation, the irrigated area increased
from 20 ha in 1980 to 3,500 ha in 2000. The number of drilling wells increased by more
than ve times between 1987 and 2008, from about 2,421 to 12,339 wells.[13]
Water management policies and related national institutions have been weak.
Farmers with extensive landholdings and powerful social connections have more, and
unregulated, access to the resource than small landholders. Following years of benign
neglect, the National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) was established in 1995.
Ofcially, NWRA has full authority of water policy development and implementation
but, so far, it has been unable to address the complex social and political issues involved
in water management.
In July 2002, Law No. 33 of 2002 – known as the “Water Law” – was promulgated. It was
amended by Law No. 41 of 2006, but its by-laws were only issued in 2011, demonstrating
the intensity of the debate around its implementation. This delay took place despite
the fact that the newly created MWE had lost control of agriculture, the most water-
intensive sector, in 2003, when the irrigation sector was removed from its authority
within weeks of the ministry’s creation and returned to MAIF, the institutional base
for large landowners and foreign-nanced irrigation development projects.
In 2005, with support from the World Bank and other funders in the water sector, mainly
Germany and the Netherlands, the National Water Sector Strategy and Investment
Program (NWSSIP) was announced. It was updated in 2008 and contains impressive
proposed investments, few of which ever materialized. In January 2011, a Presidential
National Conference on Management and Development of Water Resources in Yemen
was held, producing a worthy statement of intent. The feasibility of these proposals
was never put to the test as the conference was soon followed by the national uprisings
and, later in the year, the political transition. NWSSIP, while addressing renewable
11) Alvar Closas and Francois Molle, “Groundwater Governance in the Middle East and North Africa,” IWMI Project Report No. 1,
December 2016, https://publications.iwmi.org/pdf/H048385.pdf.
12) “Yemen – Assessing the impacts of climate change and variability on the water and agricultural sectors and the
policy implications,” World Bank, April 22, 2010, https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/
documentdetail/979121468153566240/yemen-assessing-the-impacts-of-climate-change-and-variability-on-the-water-and-
agricultural-sectors-and-the-policy-implications; Taha Taher et al. “Local groundwater governance in Yemen: Building on
traditions and enabling communities to craft new rules,” Hydrogeology Journal, vol. 20 (May 21, 2012).
13) Wahib al-Qubatee et al. “Participatory Rural Appraisal to assess groundwater resources in Al Mujaylis, Tihama Coastal Plain,
Yemen,” Water International, vol. 42, no. 7 (September 2017).
5
Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April 2021
sources such as rainfall and rainwater harvesting, says nothing about the use of solar
energy for water. A further update was made in 2014, though it was not approved by
the cabinet due to the political crisis.
In 2013, the total capacity of the national electric grid in Yemen was 1,535 megawatts
(MW); 699 MW derived from diesel, 495 MW from steam and 341 MW from gas power
plants.[14] The country’s energy needs for lighting alone is estimated at 112 percent of
the total generated energy.[15] More than 50 percent of Yemen’s population lack access
to the national grid, and the remaining portion experiences frequent power outages.[16]
Yemen’s energy policy has largely been focused on diesel and gas electricity generation,
which supplied cities, leaving most rural areas without any national links. Yemen has
high potential for renewable energy sources – namely, solar, wind and geothermal.[17]
However, the country still lacks administrative strategies to promote and regulate the
use of sustainable energy resources.
2.3 Water and energy resources during the current war
Lack of government action to solve the crisis of basic service provision in Yemen
continued during the 2011-14 period while politicians were preoccupied with the
political transition and short-term urgent priorities. After 2015, the main immediate
impact of the conict on the majority of urban residents was the interruption of
electricity and water services. In rural areas, the main initial impact was the destruction
of infrastructure, affecting the inward and outward transport of basic necessities,
including agricultural inputs and food. The major fuel crisis that started early in the
war decreased energy available for water pumping and, as a result, seriously affected
the availability of water for urban households and for irrigated agriculture.
Now, while the war is ongoing, the public water network and electricity grid serve no
more than 10 percent of families.[18] All sectors, including agricultural, industrial and
services, experience signicant increases in input costs for irrigation, transportation
and marketing, resulting in lower production and exports.[19] Production has stalled,
negatively impacting both public and private sectors. The delivery of public goods
14) Murad Almekhla, “Justication of the Advisability of Using Solar Energy for the Example of the Yemen Republic Technogenic
and Ecological Safety,” Scientic and Technical Journal (2018).
15) Adel Saleh Rawea and Shabana Urooj, “Strategies, current status, problems of energy and perspectives of Yemen’s renewable
energy solutions,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 82, part 1 (February 2018).
16) A. Abdullah, “Sustainable energy futures, energy poverty in Yemen School of Engineering,” University of Edinburgh, 2018.
17) More information in forthcoming work: Akram M. Almohamadi “Priorities for the Recovery and Reform of the Electricity
Sector in Yemen” DeepRoot Consulting,
18) Musaed Aklan, Charlotte de Fraiture, Laszlo Hayde, “Which Water Sources Do People Revert to in Times of War? Evidence
from the Sana’a Basin, Yemen,” International Journal of Environmental Research, vol. 13, no. 4 (May 2019).
19) Clemens Breisinger et al. “Managing transition in Yemen: An assessment of the costs of conict and development scenarios
for the future,” International Food Policy Research Institute, 2012, https://www.ifpri.org/publication/managing-transition-
yemen; Adel Al-Weshali et al. “Diesel subsidies and Yemen politics: Post-2011 crises and their impact on groundwater use and
agriculture,” Water Altern, vol. 8, no. 2 (June 2015).
6Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April, 2021
and services – including health, education and social security – has been affected
throughout Yemen.[20] Fuel and cooking gas prices have become unstable; at times,
the cost of these commodities has jumped to more than 1,000 percent from a pre-war
baseline.
The war has affected water supply all over the country, in terms of availability,
accessibility, quality and affordability. Decentralized, community-based water systems
have shown more resilience than public, centralized systems; in many areas, people
have gone back to using sustainable techniques, like rainwater harvesting. However, it
is worth mentioning that the public water sector is one of very few sectors that have
continued to provide services, even if these services are reduced, irregular and reach
fewer Yemenis than before the crisis.[21]
The increasing availability and nancial accessibility of solar power – combined with
the years of intermittent and only occasional electricity service in towns, and even
less supply in rural areas – has led to solar energy’s expanded use throughout the
country during the war. More than 70 percent of households are now using solar
energy as their primary source.[22] Newly installed solar panels can be seen on almost
every house in Sana’a (gure 1). Simultaneously, and to some extent with the support
of humanitarian agencies, the use of solar-powered pumping to access water has
developed considerably throughout the country. This is the case for domestic supply
and even more so for irrigated agriculture, though the use of solar for the latter has
been nanced primarily by well owners and operators, and is thus more available to
the wealthier segments of society (gure 1).
Figure 1: Newly installed solar panels on Sana’a houses and SPIS at a farm in Sana’a Basin
20) Clemens Breisinger et al. “Managing transition in Yemen: An assessment of the costs of conict and development scenarios
for the future,” International Food Policy Research Institute, 2012, https://www.ifpri.org/publication/managing-transition-
yemen.
21) Musaed Aklan, Charlotte de Fraiture, Laszlo Hayde, “Which Water Sources Do People Revert to in Times of War? Evidence
from the Sana’a Basin, Yemen,” International Journal of Environmental Research, vol. 13, no. 4 (May 2019).
22) Ibid.
7
Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April 2021
Before the outbreak of the 2011 protests, a 2009-2020 plan to develop and modernize
the electric power infrastructure in Yemen was developed by the Public Electricity
Corporation (PEC). The plan proposed to increase electricity production to three
times 2009 levels, an increase equivalent to 3 gigawatts (GW), to serve factories and
new areas and homes that did not have access to the public network.[23] Due to the
unrest, all power plants stopped working completely in 2016.[24] Figure 2 illustrates the
planned and actually produced electricity over the plan’s time period. The decline in
the production of electrical energy began appearing clearly in 2011.[25] Since the war
started, the national network has largely ceased to function, replaced locally by small
private networks, primarily powered by household-level solar power, though few have
enough storage or capacity to operate equipment with high energy demands, such as
refrigerators.[26]
Figure 2: Strategic Electricity Plan up to Year 2020[27]
23) Adel Saleh Rawea and Shabana Urooj, “Strategies, current status, problems of energy and perspectives of Yemen’s renewable
energy solutions,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 82, part 1 (February 2018).
24) Ibid.
25) Ibid.
26) Frank van Steenbergen and Musaed Aklan “Yemen: Water and energy in times of war,” Down to Earth, November 14, 2016,
https://www.downtoearth.org.in/blog/water/yemen-water-and-energy-in-times-of-war-56298.
27) Adel Saleh Rawea and Shabana Urooj, “Strategies, current status, problems of energy and perspectives of Yemen’s renewable
energy solutions,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 82, part 1 (February 2018).
8Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April, 2021
2.4 New SPIS technologies in Yemen
Solar energy is an eco-friendly, renewable source but many commentators say that it
is a double-edged sword in Yemen.[28] While solar pumps can improve access to water
and save energy, they might affect aquifers. During the current fuel crisis, many urban
public water authorities have begun to use solar-powered groundwater pumping
systems to supply domestic water. Using solar pump systems for drinking water
supplies has a signicant positive impact on water accessibility and, consequently,
health and hygiene. However, the use of solar energy for irrigation might lead to over-
abstraction of groundwater and add pressure to already stressed water resources.
There are around 100,000 pumps in use in Yemen for irrigation purposes.[29] Replacing
diesel and electric powered pumps with SPIS without clear rules and restrictions,
particularly on qat farms, could lead to the expansion of the cultivation area and,
hence, to an unforeseen increase in groundwater abstraction.
SPIS, once installed, has a relatively low cost per unit of power generated. Having said
that, farmers try to maximize their use of groundwater in order to recover the high
capital costs of the SPIS – either by expanding their irrigated area or by selling water
to other farmers. This could lead to a race to the bottom unless regulations are put in
place and enforced. Another concern is the drop in costs of solar panel technology.
It dropped from around $76/W in 1977 to $0.30/W in 2015. This continuous drop,
coupled with increasing diesel prices, has made this type of technology more attractive
not only for farmers but also for many decision-makers, funders and technicians. SPIS
is an energy-and-water solution that has as much potential to aggravate the water-
scarcity problem as to improve the energy-access problem.[30] However, nancial
incentives to save energy cannot be applied here to avoid wasteful water use. The
risks posed by unregulated solar-powered pumping must be identied and addressed,
so as to clearly dene policies and regulations to mitigate these risks and incentivize
sustainable water use.
28) Musaed Aklan, Charlotte de Fraiture, Laszlo Hayde, “Which Water Sources Do People Revert to in Times of War? Evidence
from the Sana’a Basin, Yemen,” International Journal of Environmental Research, vol. 13, no. 4 (May 2019).
29) “Water situation in Yemen” (presentation), NWRA, 2013.
30) Alvar Closas and Edwin Rap, “Solar-based groundwater pumping for irrigation: Sustainability, policies, and limitations,”
Energy Policy, vol. 104 (May 2017).
9
Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April 2021
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Study area
Yemen has 14 water basins. This study focuses on Sana’a Basin (gure 3). Sana’a Basin
has 22 sub-basins and spans nine administrative districts, including the Yemeni capital,
Sana’a city. The basin has an area of 3,240 km2 and hosts a current population of 4
million.[31] This study’s main unit of analysis is farmers from different hydrogeological
areas: Bani Husheish, Bani Mater and Hamdan. The climate of Sana’a Basin is arid
and mild throughout the year, with average temperature ranges between 12 and 25°
C.[32] Mean annual duration of sunshine per day is 9 hours.[33] Annual rainfall typically
ranges between 110 and 350 mm, with an average of 240 mm.[34] However, some years
have much higher rainfall, above 350 mm.[35] Rainy days range from 8 to 25 days per
year and mainly occur in the two rainy seasons: mid-March to beginning of April and
mid-July to end of August.[36]
Sana’a Basin relies to a large extent on groundwater for both irrigation and domestic
water uses.[37] As a result of rapid population growth in Sana’a city (over 5 percent),[38]
uncontrolled immigration and the expansion of agriculture activities, water demand
has increased tremendously in the last three decades and new wells continue to
be drilled.[39] Today there are more than 13,000 wells in Sana’a Basin. The point of
intersection, or balance, between groundwater recharge and abstraction was in 1985,
31) Musaed Aklan, Charlotte de Fraiture, Laszlo Hayde, “Which Water Sources Do People Revert to in Times of War? Evidence
from the Sana’a Basin,” Yemen International Journal of Environmental Research, vol. 13, no. 4 (May 2019).
32) Ahmed Al-Ameri et al. “Characteristics of Stable Isotopes of Oxygen-18 and Deuterium of Groundwater in the Sana’a Basin
Aquifer Systems, Yemen,” Arabian Journal for Science and Engineering, vol. 39 (April 23, 2014); Ahmed Mohamed Alderwish,
“Integrated water management for small catchments in arid mountainous region – Yemen,” Energy Environment and
Economics Research Compendium, vol. 19 (January 2013).
33) Ahmed Mohamed Alderwish, “Integrated water management for small catchments in arid mountainous region – Yemen,”
Energy Environment and Economics Research Compendium, vol. 19 (January 2013).
34) Ahmed Al-Ameri et al. “Characteristics of Stable Isotopes of Oxygen-18 and Deuterium of Groundwater in the Sana’a Basin
Aquifer Systems, Yemen,” Arabian Journal for Science and Engineering, vol. 39 (April 23, 2014); Jan Willem Foppen, M. Naaman
and Jack Schijven, “Managing water under stress in Sana’a, Yemen,” Arabian Journal for Science and Engineering, vol. 30, no. 2
(December 2005); Taha Taher, “Groundwater abstraction management in Sana’a Basin, Yemen: A local community approach,”
Hydrogeology Journal, vol. 24, no.6 (May 2016).
35) Abdulhakim Al-Kholid et al. “Approach to quantication drawdown of groundwater wells: A case study from Sana’a City,
Yemen,” Global Geology, vol. 13 (2010).
36) Ahmed Mohamed Alderwish, “Integrated water management for small catchments in arid mountainous region – Yemen,”
Energy Environment and Economics Research Compendium, vol. 19 (January 2013); Yahya Alwathaf and Bouabid El Mansouri,
“Hydrodynamic modeling for groundwater assessment in Sana’a Basin, Yemen,” Hydrogeology Journal, vol. 20, no. 7 (November
2012).
37) Abdulhakim Al-Kholid et al. “Approach to quantication drawdown of groundwater wells: A case study from Sana’a City,
Yemen,” Global Geology, vol. 13 (2010).
38) The annual growth rate in Sana’a Basin was 5.5 percent in urban areas (where 86 percent of the total population live) and 3.2
percent in rural areas (14 percent of population) as of the 2004 population census, according to the Yemeni Central Statistical
Organization (MOPIC CSO).
39) Ahmed Al-Ameri et al. “Characteristics of Stable Isotopes of Oxygen-18 and Deuterium of Groundwater in the Sana’a Basin
Aquifer Systems, Yemen,” Arabian Journal for Science and Engineering, vol. 39 (April 23, 2014); Yahya Alwathaf and Bouabid
El Mansouri, “Hydrodynamic modeling for groundwater assessment in Sana’a Basin, Yemen,” Hydrogeology Journal, vol. 20,
no. 7 (November 2012).
10 Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April, 2021
after which groundwater abstraction has kept constantly increasing beyond the basin’s
recharge (gure 4).[40] The groundwater aquifers of Sana’a Basin are now suffering over-
exploitation. Annual abstraction exceeds 220 million m3, ve to six times higher than
the volume added through natural recharge, and the water-level decline is about 4-8
m per year.[41] About 90 percent of Sana’a Basin groundwater is used for agricultural
activities, with qat and grapes as the most dominant crops.[42]
3.2 Research methods and data collection
This study conducted eld surveys in December 2020 and January 2021 among a
stratied sample of 88 farmers in Sana’a Basin, mainly from Bani Husheish, Bani Mater
and Hamdan.[43] The study also undertook key informant interviews (KIIs) with water,
irrigation and energy experts to ensure coherence between data at the farmer level and
professional- and administrative-level information. This approach facilitated a deeper
understanding, from different perspectives, of the future of SPIS, its uses and proper
management, in Yemen. After a quality check on the collected data, where needed,
participants were contacted by phone to verify unclear or incomplete points.
Sana’a Basin was selected as the study area because it faces water scarcity and has
deeper groundwater than other basins; information on the use of SPIS in such a deep
basin can be roughly extrapolated to apply to other areas, with the assumption that
SPIS use in shallower basins would be easier. However, to cross check, a small sample of
data (10 farmers) was collected from Hadramawt, where groundwater depth is <100 m.
40) Yahya Alwathaf and Bouabid El Mansouri, “Hydrodynamic modeling for groundwater assessment in Sana’a Basin, Yemen,”
Hydrogeology Journal, vol. 20, no. 7 (November 2012).
41) Jan Willem Foppen, M. Naaman and Jack Schijven, “Managing water under stress in Sana’a, Yemen,” Arabian Journal for
Science and Engineering, vol. 30, no. 2 (December 2005); Taha Taher, “Groundwater abstraction management in Sana’a Basin,
Yemen: A local community approach,” Hydrogeology Journal, vol. 24, no.6 (May 2016).
42) Taha Taher, “Groundwater abstraction management in Sana’a Basin, Yemen: A local community approach,” Hydrogeology
Journal, vol. 24, no.6 (May 2016).
43) The authors gratefully acknowledge the essential contribution made by the eld data collectors and all surveyed farmers.
Without their work and help, this report would not be possible.
11
Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April 2021
Figure 3: Hydrogeological map and cross-section (B-B) of the Sana’a Basin[44]
44) Taha Taher, “Groundwater abstraction management in Sana’a Basin, Yemen: A local community approach,” Hydrogeology
Journal, vol. 24, no.6 (May 2016).
12 Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April, 2021
Figure 4: Groundwater recharge and abstraction in Sana’a Basin[45]
45) Musaed Aklan, Charlotte de Fraiture, Laszlo Hayde, “Which Water Sources Do People Revert to in Times of War? Evidence
from the Sana’a Basin, Yemen,” International Journal of Environmental Research, vol. 13, no. 4 (May 2019).
13
Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April 2021
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The use of SPIS in Sana’a Basin is dramatically increasing. Today more than 30 percent
of farmers in this area are using SPIS (gure 5). This was not the case prior to the current
war, when almost all groundwater users in Yemen depended on diesel generators and
the electricity grid to pump for irrigation.[46] The early reasons for this shift (2015-
2017) were war-related – mainly the lack of electricity in the public network and the
scarcity and high price of diesel. Now, and with the growing experience of farmers, the
main reason for the shift to solar energy is the lower operation and maintenance costs
of SPIS (gure 6) and the fact that it is more reliable than diesel pumps. All users of
SPIS report being happy because they can get the quantity of water they used to have
and pay almost nothing, bar the capital cost.
Figure 5: Sources of energy for irrigation practices
(Jan 2021)
Figure 6: Reasons led to SPIS uses (Jan 2021)
The number of installed SPIS systems is increasing with time. It jumped from 0
percent in 2012 to 12 percent in 2017 to 31 percent by the end of 2020 (gure 7).
Likewise, the pumping capacity of SPIS, represented by pumping depth, has witnessed
a remarkable development in Sana’a Basin. SPIS use in 2014-2015 was limited to
shallow groundwater (<15 m) before increasing to 360 m in 2017 and reaching 500 m
in 2020 (gure 8). During the current war and the closure of most Yemeni airports and
seaports (particularly in the north), the average uptake of SPIS in Sana’a is increasing
by 4.4 percent per year. If this trajectory were to continue, all old pumping systems
in Sana’a Basin would be replaced or supported by SPIS within 15 years. If Yemen’s
sociopolitical and security situation stabilizes, the conversion to SPIS is predicted to
be far quicker; given the experience gained by farmers and the growing solar energy
market in Yemen, the country would be expected to witness a complete shift to SPIS
within only 7 years.
46) Ibid.
14 Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April, 2021
Figure 7: Accumulative installed SPIS
Figure 8: Installed SPIS, Related Costs & Pumping Depth (2014-2020)
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Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April 2021
The SPIS installation cost ranges between US$4,000 for shallow groundwater wells and
up to US$100,000 for deep groundwater wells (gure 6). The increased depth directly
correlates to increased cost; with time, SPIS installation depth and, consequently, costs
are increasing. However, the exact relationship between cost and depth is not constant.
The quality of the SPIS system (brand and country of origin) and the size (number of
solar panels) are also important factors in pricing. Water depth, sun exposure and the
system’s efciency and capacity are the main factors determining pumping capacity.
Some farmers said that SPIS secures them water quantities equal to what they used to
obtain using other pumps, while other farmers said they obtain even more using SPIS.
“Nine hours with the SPIS is equivalent to using a diesel pump from 6 in the early
morning until midnight,” a farmer said.
All owners of wells are willing to use SPIS and the main obstacle for most farmers (69
percent) is the capital cost of SPIS. One farmer regretted the opportunity he lost in 2008,
when he was offered a free SPIS and refused it. “I was unaware of its advantages,” he said.
In a number of areas in Sana’a Basin, farmers share ownership of the wells and pumps.
In these areas, local agreements require everyone to share ownership of wells located
within their property. When some have no money to pay their share for drilling the well
and installing the pump (mostly diesel and electric pumps), other farmers pay in advance
for them. The farmers who jointly own wells report facing difculties replacing their old
pumps with solar ones because they use time-based distribution allocations, which is not
fully applicable by SPIS. Whereas diesel pumping produces a constant amount of water,
variation in solar radiation means that solar pumping can extract different amounts of
water. The possible inequity in water quantities obtained in the time allocated means
that some joint owners have doubts about introducing solar pumping. Among all farmers
surveyed in Sana’a, 28 percent are unwilling to install SPIS due to these partnership
concerns and a small minority (3 percent) were not interested in a new SPIS system
because they rarely use their traditional pumping systems (gure 9).
Figure 9: why not SPIS until now?
16 Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April, 2021
Sandstone and quaternary alluvium areas in Sana’a Basin, such as Bani Husheish,
have, for the most part, seen a more drastic increase in SPIS systems as compared
with quaternary and tertiary volcanic areas, like Bani Mater. The at land in Sana’a,
such as Bani Husheish, is more fertile than mountainous areas and hosts more rich
farmers with qat farms. This signicantly helped the spread of solar energy pumps.
In Bani Husheish, more than 400 solar pumps had been installed by 2017 (gure 10),
approximately 20 percent of the total number of wells in that area.
Among the interviewees there were two farmers using SPIS in both Sana’a and
Hudaydah. Although the pumps in Hudaydah cost them less and need shallower
pumping depths (30-60 m) than in Sana’a, they are happier with their pumps in Sana’a
because the crop there is qat, which is more protable. The benets of SPIS in Sana’a
outweigh the initial costs because the crops grown there are lucrative. This nding
was also supported by the comparative experience of Hadramawt farmers, many of
whom have lower nancial capacity and have been forced to sell their old pumping
systems to cover part of their SPIS costs. In Sana’a, the majority of farmers keep their
old diesel/electrical systems and use them as a standby or supplemental system.
Figure 10: Digitizing map of 438 SPIS in Bani Husheish (2017)
17
Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April 2021
Sandstone and quaternary alluvium areas in Sana’a Basin, such as Bani Husheish,
have, for the most part, seen a more drastic increase in SPIS systems as compared
with quaternary and tertiary volcanic areas, like Bani Mater. The at land in Sana’a,
such as Bani Husheish, is more fertile than mountainous areas and hosts more rich
farmers with qat farms. This signicantly helped the spread of solar energy pumps.
In Bani Husheish, more than 400 solar pumps had been installed by 2017 (gure 10),
approximately 20 percent of the total number of wells in that area.
Among the interviewees there were two farmers using SPIS in both Sana’a and
Hudaydah. Although the pumps in Hudaydah cost them less and need shallower
pumping depths (30-60 m) than in Sana’a, they are happier with their pumps in Sana’a
because the crop there is qat, which is more protable. The benets of SPIS in Sana’a
outweigh the initial costs because the crops grown there are lucrative. This nding
was also supported by the comparative experience of Hadramawt farmers, many of
whom have lower nancial capacity and have been forced to sell their old pumping
systems to cover part of their SPIS costs. In Sana’a, the majority of farmers keep their
old diesel/electrical systems and use them as a standby or supplemental system.
Figure 10: Digitizing map of 438 SPIS in Bani Husheish (2017)
As is the case in Sana’a, farmers in Hadramawt prefer SPIS to other pumping systems.
The pumping depth in Hadramawt (30-60 m) is more suitable for solar pumps and
the use of SPIS has started to spread widely. It is worth mentioning that a number
of farmers in Hadramawt have expressed concern about the impact of solar energy
technologies on the groundwater levels in the absence of clear regulations and
policies. Nevertheless, the Hadrami farmers describe SPIS as a good system with fewer
technical problems than electric and diesel systems. The SPIS cost in Hadramawt
ranges from US$10,000 to 17,000. The capital cost is the main obstacle preventing
most Hadramawt farmers from owning SPIS technology.
The SPIS users in Sana’a and Hadramawt interviewed for this paper received no
training on installation, operation or maintenance except a little information about
installation from the marketing companies. These users conrmed that they do not
have any specic programs or policies to regulate the use of SPIS.
During the current war, farmers have not experienced the kind of drop in groundwater
levels experienced before the war.[47] “In the last three years I installed not a single
pipe,” one said, indicating that his supply had been sufcient. Long periods of diesel
crisis led to a drop in the operating hours of diesel pumps, meaning less water was
pumped and, consequently, groundwater resources were under less pressure. Moreover,
rainfall in 2019 and 2020 was far higher than usual. “If the rainfall continues as in
the last two years we will rarely use groundwater,” a farmer in Sana’a said. SPIS use
– while helping to mitigate the challenges posed by the fuel crisis – is not a reason
for increased groundwater stability reported by some farmers, primarily because it
is still in its early stages. Only 31 percent of surveyed farmers in Sana’a are using
these systems. Most of the SPIS adopters are large landholders – those who could have
afforded diesel to operate pumps, even in the current fuel crisis.
The diesel crisis is still relevant in early 2021 and many farmers buy diesel on the black
market. This study found that the average price of diesel per liter is YR500 and YR325
in Sana’a and Hadramawt respectively.[48] These prices, current as of January 2021, are
about ve and three times diesel’s pre-crisis price. Since 2011, diesel prices have, at
times, reached 15 times their pre-crisis levels. However, with more SPIS systems or
increased diesel availability, it is expected that farmers will gradually start to abstract
an even greater volume of groundwater than they did in the pre-war period.
Over the course of the conict, there has been a decline in crop production across
the country.[49] The number of qat farms is increasing at the expense of other crops,
47) Farmers are not able to measure the water level exactly; however, when the quantity of pumped water starts to drop and
more foam is produced in the pumping process, farmers know that the water level has likely decreased and more pipes must
be installed.
48) It is worth noting that fuel prices vary enormously according to the amount of fuel allowed to enter the country by the Saudi-
led coalition and the manipulations of stocks carried out by merchants who also, often, play a role on the black market. This
black market activity is, today, being practiced in plain sight.
49) Adel Al-Weshali et al. “Diesel subsidies and Yemen politics: Post-2011 crises and their impact on groundwater use and
agriculture,” Water Altern, vol. 8, no. 2 (June 2015).
18 Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April, 2021
whose area is diminishing. Wells are being drilled without any involvement of ofcial
authorities. “In our area there were more than 200 farmers of crops other than qat;
today, there are around 20,” one farmer in Bani Husheish noted. The expansion of qat
farms – which, because of the crop’s high water needs, are usually irrigated – increases
concerns about the future abstraction of groundwater, especially when Yemen’s
situation stabilizes and the availability of SPIS and diesel increases.
There is considerable interest from development actors to support the use of
SPIS in Yemen. A number of farmers have already received some support from
local organizations (Azal and Al-Wataniah were mentioned by respondents) and
international ones (e.g. FAO, IOM, UNDP, CARE, OXFAM and Mercy Corps). Some of
these supporting organizations control the maximum depth SPIS can be used for, but
this is not always the case. The farmers now know how to get technical support and
upgrade these systems. Farmers with large landholdings are able to both buy SPIS
systems and access further funds from organizations. Owners of smaller farms face
greater barriers to installing SPIS, and some farmers reported that they sold assets
like cars and gold in order to buy SPIS. The majority of respondents couldn’t yet afford
this technology, although they want it. Solar energy pumps are being promoted and
supported by many local and international organizations, on the basis that they save
fuel and electricity, protect the environment, reduce CO2 emissions and have health
benets and other social returns. However, there are concerns, mainly from water
experts, about the potential impact of SPIS. So far there has been no study in Yemen
on what can be done to regulate the use of solar energy, especially in the eld of
irrigation.
Solar pumps are seen as a potentially powerful solution to government shortcomings
in providing electricity grid connections for agriculture. The potential impact of solar
pumps on excessive groundwater extraction is generally not seen as a major concern
by most policymakers. Farmers are seeing solar pumps as both a pumping and an
energy solution. From an economic perspective, any resource that has become easily
accessible will inevitably be overexploited, unless access to and use of this resource is
restricted through government regulation and policies.
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Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April 2021
Expert Perspectives
Yemeni energy experts have posited that solar-powered water-pumping might help
to conserve groundwater and stabilize water levels, given the time restrictions on
pumping (8-10 hours a day) and the limited capacity of these systems. However, no
study has systematically assessed these trade-offs. Rather, some studies suggest
that the introduction of solar pumps could pose additional risks of over-extraction.
The risk that SPIS proliferation is likely to worsen over-exploitation of aquifers is
particularly clear given the cautionary tale of historic diesel subsidies, which led to
the over-exploitation and dramatic decline of groundwater resources over decades.[50]
Increased water wastage has been reported following extensive solar pumping in parts
of India and China, for example.[51]
The present study shows that most farmers kept their old pumps to use them at night
or when needed. All SPIS owners in Sana’a Basin kept their old pumps (mostly diesel)
as standby systems. Others (6 percent) have more than one well and operate both diesel
and solar pumping systems. The current users of SPIS rely mainly on solar systems
and use diesel pumps only when the SPIS supply is insufcient, mainly during night
time in the summer season or on cloudy days. In fact and as mentioned earlier, some
farmers have reported abstracting more with SPIS. There is growing evidence that the
low operational cost and available energy of SPIS contribute to excessive extraction of
groundwater, decreasing water tables and negatively affecting water quality.[52] Yemeni
energy experts are supportive of the use of solar energy in all sectors, with their main
concern being the quality of imported solar energy equipment, rather than any long-
term environmental impact.
Yemeni water and irrigation experts agree and support the use of SPIS in Yemen but in
a way that prevents further depletion of scarce groundwater. The use of SPIS minimizes
consumption of imported fuel and electricity, alleviates the pressure on the economy
(since the Yemeni economy relies, to a large extent, on fuel) and, more importantly,
provides a cheaper and ecologically friendlier way of pumping water. This is particularly
important in rural areas, where agriculture is the main livelihood option. However, the
potential impact of SPIS on groundwater abstraction in the absence of clear policies
and regulations cannot be ignored. Therefore, more detailed comprehensive studies
on the potential negative impact of SPIS, compared to the traditional fuel-powered
systems, are needed.
50) Musaed Aklan, Charlotte de Fraiture, Laszlo Hayde, “Which Water Sources Do People Revert to in Times of War? Evidence
from the Sana’a Basin,” Yemen International Journal of Environmental Research, vol. 13, no. 4 (May 2019).
51) “Renewable energy in the water, energy and food nexus,” International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), January 2015.
52) Tushaar Shah and Avinash Kishore, “Solar-powered pump irrigation and India’s groundwater economy: A preliminary
discussion of opportunities and threats,” IWMI-TATA Water Policy Program, 2012, http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/iwmi-tata/
PDFs/2012_Highlight-26.pdf; “Renewable energy in the water, energy and food nexus,” IRENA, January 2015.
20 Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April, 2021
Although SPIS has limitations of capital cost and pumping time limits, there is still
a risk of over-exploitation of groundwater resources associated with the widespread
use of SPIS technology, hybrid solar systems and related subsidies. In Morocco,
for instance, targeted subsidies for solar pumping have been put on hold due to
the government’s growing concern over the depletion of groundwater resources.[53]
Another concern is that farmers might irrigate more during the daytime, which lowers
irrigation efciency and water productivity. Most farmers in Yemen are still practicing
old methods of ood irrigation and few have modern irrigation systems. These
concerns need to be addressed systematically at the community and policy levels, and
comprehensive policies and regulations must be prepared. Water experts don’t believe
that farmers should be supported with subsidies to cover the capital costs of SPIS,
instead advocating for support to be given in the form of technical assistance and
capacity building alongside information on sustainable water management.
From the point of view of the farmers surveyed, the main constraints on SPIS expansion
include the initial high investment cost, primarily, but also the variable quality of
panels, converters and pumps due to the absence of standardization, certication and
import controls, worsened in some cases by dishonest dealers.
Water-Energy-Food Nexus & SPIS
Food security is a challenge in Yemen. But a focus on that challenge should not come
at the expense of the country’s endangered water security. SPIS can increase food
production by harnessing reliable and sustainable energy to provide timely irrigation.
However, these benets may be at risk as many technical feasibility studies on
SPIS fail to appropriately evaluate available water resources and water use and the
arising trade-offs within the water-energy-food nexus (Figure 11). Efforts to achieve
food security in Yemen should always be linked with water security. Given the large
numbers of rural Yemenis and their dependence on agriculture, ensuring the use
of the most appropriate and water-saving irrigation technology is very important.
However, activating traditional rainwater harvesting systems and developing rain-fed
agriculture are of equal importance, as many areas have insufcient groundwater to
enable more than very minimal, supplementary irrigation; other areas have none. The
most suitable areas for irrigation using SPIS are those with annual rainfall ranging
from 300-400 mm, such as Hajjah and Ibb. In all cases, both the benet of SPIS and the
sustainability of groundwater in the area under study should be considered.
53) Alvar Closas and Edwin Rap, “Solar-based groundwater pumping for irrigation: Sustainability, policies, and limitations,”
Energy Policy, vol. 104 (May 2017).
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Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April 2021
Figure 11. The water energy food nexus with SPIS[54]
54) Alvar Closas and Edwin Rap, “Solar-based groundwater pumping for irrigation: Sustainability, policies, and limitations,”
Energy Policy, vol. 104 (May 2017).
22 Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April, 2021
5. CONCLUSIONS
Although the ndings of this study suggest caution in the use of solar power for
irrigation, it should be emphasized that its promotion both for the supply of domestic
water and of household electricity is an entirely positive development that should be
encouraged. Solar power is, in this way, providing basic services to the population,
particularly for thousands of rural households throughout the country who would
otherwise not have access to these essential facilities.
With respect to sustainable management of Yemen’s scarce water resources, the main
nding of this study is that SPIS requires better regulation and management, alongside
other water extraction mechanisms, primarily in agriculture, but also for domestic and
other uses. The eld data collected for this study demonstrates that the use of SPIS
has dramatically increased in the last decade in Yemen. The data also shows that the
use of solar energy for irrigation in solar-rich and groundwater-scarce Yemen is likely
to adversely affect groundwater resources, in the absence of effectively implemented
regulations. In other words, SPIS is yet another mechanism that, unless well managed,
could contribute to worsening Yemen’s overall water scarcity. The crucial factor
determining SPIS attractiveness for farmers is that the marginal cost of solar-powered
pumping is almost negligible once they have made the initial investment.
What is also clear is that the cost of a solar irrigation system increases signicantly with
the depth of the water table. In the case of Sana’a Basin, where wells are deep, costs for
installing SPIS reach up to US$100,000. This method of irrigation therefore increases
the gap between poor and rich farmers. Even where water can be reached at lesser
depths, the price of SPIS installation is still beyond the means of most smallholders.
SPIS is more accessible for the wealthiest farmers – those who own other businesses
and/or grow the highest value crops.
Overall, it is important to note that all forms of deep-well irrigation are beyond the
means of the majority of smallholders. This has a number of implications. First and
foremost, farmers can justify irrigating the highest value crops and, more likely than
not, they will expand their qat areas at the expense of cultivating basic food crops,
such as sorghum. Second, irrigation costs, alongside other economic pressures, are
likely to concentrate land ownership even further, as smallholders are forced to sell
their assets, thus gradually worsening social differentiation. Policies focused on
reducing inequality need to take these factors into consideration when planning water
management.
Sana’a Basin is not the only area where aquifers are now very deep; Sa’ada is
another. The risk of unsustainable over-exploitation of aquifers and, ultimately, their
exhaustion is high throughout the country. Exhaustion of aquifers means not only an
end to agriculture but the end of an area being habitable, ultimately leading to forced
migration.
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Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April 2021
Yemen’s formal legal frameworks on water are not fully implemented and, in any
case, fail to address the newly introduced SPIS technologies. All legal frameworks and
regulations concerning water and energy must be updated to take into consideration
the specicities of solar energy technologies, including the use of SPIS. In the short
term, it may be difcult to control technology uptake during the war. It is essential
that all SPIS users, including the companies and organizations carrying out SPIS
installations, increase their understanding of the fragility of water tables. This involves
the development of a massive awareness program, which would help to optimize SPIS
use and be a good start toward reducing the over-exploitation of aquifers. However, in
the medium and long terms, authorities should regulate SPIS and ensure the safe and
sustainable use of water resources in Yemen.
24 Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April, 2021
6. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the current conict, a number of the recommendations below will only be
applicable once effective government has been restored throughout the country.
Meanwhile, those which can be implemented should be done so as soon as practicable.
6.1 General recommendations
• National, governorate and local authorities should coordinate their water
management policies in order to ensure priority access to water for domestic use,
followed by livestock and other non-agricultural uses.
• The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and the MAIF should
aim to maximize the benets of rain-fed agriculture, through research on high
value rain-fed crops as well as high-yielding and drought-resistant staple crops.
Once sustainable methods have been identied, local MAIF ofces should develop
effective extension programmes to encourage their introduction.
• All water management authorities (NWRA, MAIF, local authorities) should ensure
that irrigation from groundwater is only permitted where replenishment of the
water source is guaranteed, whether from shallow or deep aquifers. At the local
level, regulations must be enforced with determination.
• NWRA and other water management-concerned authorities are not sovereign
bodies, and therefore strong coordination with and support from the ofcial
sovereign authorities are always needed, unless laws and policies will remain on
paper, as many of their predecessors.
• MWE and NWRA to reconsider the possibility of establishing judicial authority for
water, which began to be discussed at the beginning of the last decade.
• Central and local governments should jointly implement a national awareness
campaign on water management issues, including the risks of depletion of
resources, the local and national impact of over-extraction (including the
implications of upstream over-extraction on downstream users) and the positive
and negative potential impact of SPIS and other irrigation technologies.
• International funders should continue to nance and promote solar energy for
domestic use, for the supply of both water and electricity to households, particularly
in rural areas. Even more attention should be given to remote, dispersed and
isolated households. These domestic water and energy-supply projects should
be nanced through public or community organizations, and accompanied by
training in equipment maintenance, as well as effective certication of the quality
of the technology.
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Rethinking Yemen’s Economy | April 2021
6.2 SPIS-related recommendations
• NWRA, MAIF and AREA (Agricultural Research and Extension Authority) should
carry out studies in each water basin to assess the impact, opportunities and
limitations of SPIS, producing an SPIS risk map for the entire country to dene
the areas of high risk. The coastal groundwater reserves, with lower depth, are
likely to be more adversely affected by this technology than the highlands.
• International development partners should nance these studies, as well as
support mechanisms for quality control and certication of imported solar and
other technology. Local authorities should ensure that traders uphold the required
standards.
• The national authority of Yemen Standardization, Metrology and Quality Control
Organization should implement quality control, certication and standardization
protocols for SPIS technology and Tax Authority in the Ministry of Finance to
impose taxes on imported solar irrigation technology.
• An administrative SPIS unit should be established in the National Water Resources
Authority.
• MAIF and NWRA should formulate specic regulations determining permissible
pumping depths based on the actual groundwater level and renewable water
availability in each basin; for instance, in Sana’a Basin, SPIS should be allowed up
to a maximum depth of 200 m (as a safe depth for scarce and deep groundwater)
and with maximum outputs of up to 250 m3/day. Controlling pumping depth
facilitates control of actual water extraction, as this is determined by the number
of solar panels installed, which indicates the capacity of the pump. The number of
solar panels installed can be detected by satellite imagery as well as photographs
from UAVs, a technology that is now easily accessible.
• MAIF and NWRA should also ensure the implementation of additional restrictions
on the use of diesel and electric pumps, as they are the main driving forces of
groundwater depletion.
• In order to conserve groundwater and increase irrigation efciency and water
productivity, SPIS should be combined with modern irrigation technologies.
• Ensure the necessary support for farmers in training, awareness programs and
technical skills.
• To ensure successful and viable SPIS policies, promote the involvement of local
communities – including women and youth – and coordination across all related
sectors.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Musaed Aklan is a civil engineer and scientic researcher in
water and environment elds. He has 15 years of professional and
academic experience and has worked with several government
institutions, universities, and international organizations
including KFW, World Bank, GIZ, USAID and WHO. He is
currently a PhD research fellow in IHE-Delft, Water Science
and Engineering Department, The Netherlands, where he was
nominated as a member of PhD Association Board (PAB).
Helen Lackner is a visiting fellow at the European Council for
Foreign Relations and a research associate at SOAS. Her most
recent book is Yemen in Crisis: the road to war (Verso 2019). She
regularly contributes to Open Democracy, Arab Digest, Oxford
Analytica, Orient XXI, among others. She lived in Yemen for more
than 15 years in the past half century. Yemen’s environmental
issues, particularly climate change and water are among her main
interests.
Implementing Partners
The project is implemented by a consortium of the following three partners:
The Sana’a Center for Strategic
Studies is an independent think-
tank that seeks to foster change
through knowledge production
with a focus on Yemen and the
surrounding region. The Center’s
publications and programs, offered
in both Arabic and English, cover
political, social, economic and
security related developments,
aiming to impact policy locally,
regionally, and internationally.
www.sanaacenter.org
DeepRoot Consulting is a dynamic
social enterprise passionate about
Yemen’s development. DeepRoot
aims to help international develop-
ment actors, the private sector, local
civil society organizations and the
Yemeni Government anchor their in-
terventions in a deep understanding
of Yemen’s national and local con-
texts, and international best prac-
tices. Our leadership team and advi-
sory board has decades of combined
experience working in Yemen and
internationally in the public, private
and nonprot sectors.
www.deeproot.consulting
The Center for Applied Re-
search in Partnership with
the Orient (CARPO) is a Ger-
many-based organization whose
work is situated at the nexus of re-
search, consultancy and exchange
with a focus on implementing
projects in close cooperation and
partnership with stakeholders in
the Middle East. The CARPO team
has long-standing experience in
the implementation of projects
in cooperation with partners from
the region and a deep understand-
ing of the Yemeni context.
www.carpo-bonn.org
The Rethinking Yemen’s Economy initiative aims to contribute to peacebuilding and
conict prevention, (economic) stabilization and sustainable development in Yemen by
building consensus in crucial policy areas through engaging and promoting informed
Yemeni voices from all backgrounds in the public discourse on development, economy
and post-conict reconstruction in Yemen and by positively inuencing local, regional
and international development agendas. The project is implemented by CARPO – Center
for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient, DeepRoot Consulting and the
Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies. It is funded by the European Union and the Embassy
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to Yemen.
RETHINKING YEMEN’S ECONOMY
Contact: Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, Haddah Street, Sana’a, Yemen | Email: info@devchampions.org
www.sanaacenter.org
For more information and previous publications: www.devchampions.org
Co-funded by: the European Union and the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to Yemen
