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Journalism Studies
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjos20
Primetime Nationalism: Analysing Monologues on
India’s Republic TV and Times Now During Indo-
China Border Conflict
Anilesh Kumar
To cite this article: Anilesh Kumar (2023) Primetime Nationalism: Analysing Monologues on
India’s Republic TV and Times Now During Indo-China Border Conflict, Journalism Studies,
24:12, 1518-1538, DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2023.2230306
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2023.2230306
© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 06 Jul 2023.
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Primetime Nationalism: Analysing Monologues on India’s
Republic TV and Times Now During Indo-China Border
Conflict
Anilesh Kumar
Department of Journalism, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
ABSTRACT
Several studies exploring the sociology of news have identified and
established a range of factors that influence journalism and shape
media narratives. However, little has been known regarding the
narrative construction in the English language broadcast media in
India. Therefore, this study investigated the relationship between
(re)emerging right-wing nationalism and English language television
journalism in India. A qualitative thematic discourse analysis was
conducted on the monologues on Republic TV and Times Now’s
primetime debates during the India–China border conflict, 2020. The
study reports a major shift in the nature of TV journalism in India: far
from being passive observers of right-wing nationalist ideology in
the 1990s, TV journalists in contemporary India are acting as active
participants in propagating them. The study complements existing
works on sociology of news by demonstrating how journalism is
shaped by dominant political sentiments.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 18 January 2022
Accepted 19 June 2023
KEYWORDS
Conflict; discourse;
journalism; India–China;
monologue; nationalism
Seminal studies on journalism, situated in the broad field of sociology of news, have
shown how media narratives are shaped by economic, political, structural and cultural
issues (e.g., Hallin and Mancini 2004; Hanusch 2015), particularly by power relations
(e.g., Entman and Rojecki 2010; Gans 2004; Hall 1989; Herman and Chomsky 1988; Shoe-
maker 1991), and its theoretical explanations, too, are found in these factors (Hanitzsch
2007). These inquires have been strengthened by the comprehensive works of Glasgow
University Media Group (Philo and Berry 2004,2007,2011) which investigated various
aspects of TV journalism production and reception. While the above-mentioned studies
and their approaches are crucial to understanding the functioning of mass media, not
all could be employed in one study.
Therefore, to complement the existing scholarly works on the sociology of news, this
study approached journalism from a power relations paradigm. For the same, it focused
on the primetime discourse on two of the leading English language news channels in
India: Republic TV and Times Now during and after the India–China border conflict of
2020. The study aimed to understand whether media narratives were shaped by the
© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. The terms on which
this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.
CONTACT Anilesh Kumar 20481721@life.hkbu.edu.hk
JOURNALISM STUDIES
2023, VOL. 24, NO. 12, 1518–1538
https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2023.2230306
right-wing nationalist agenda of the ruling dispensation. Although previous studies
exploring media narratives during such conflicts report of a unidimensional media cover-
age in the favour of the host country (Miller 1994), the influence of the dominant political
ideology on the nature of journalism remains underattended. Further, studying TV news
was considered appropriate due to the “human connection”(Reuters Institute 2021, 17)
and audience’s“strong emotional attachment”(Schudson 2003, 125) with news presen-
ters. More importantly, despite rapid internet growth, TV remains a major source of
news, and its viewership continues to grow in India (Laghate 2021).
With 573 recognised TV channels (both news and non-news), over 17,000 newspapers
and more than 100,000 magazines, India has the largest media system in the world
(Telecom Regulatory Authority of India 2019). Until the early1990s, television news in
India had been a state monopoly with the national broadcaster “Doordarshan”being
the only source. Its monopoly was challenged by the rise of cable television in the early
2000s, as economic reforms contributed to an unprecedented growth in the Indian
media market (Cottle and Rai 2008; Kohli-Khandekar 2013; Parthasarathi 2018). While
TV news media has played a significant role in the functioning of democracy in India, con-
cerns have been raised over a continuous decline in production quality, a growing parti-
san approach, sensationalism, ownership concentration and increasing control by the
government (Thussu 2007; Parthasarathy 2015; Chadha 2017; Rowlatt 2018; Behl 2022).
In addition, a notable change in the quality and nature of TV journalism has been
observed since the unprecedented electoral victory of the right-wing Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) (Bhatt 2020; Varshney, Ayyangar, and Swaminathan 2021) which reflected a
global trend of resurgent right-wing populism (Moffitt 2016) and ubiquitous hyper-
nationalist politics (Bieber 2018). News organisations/journalists that have been critical
of the ruling dispensation have landed in legal and financial troubles (Goel and Gettleman
2020; Gopalakrishnan 2018). On the other hand, a large section of the mainstream news
channels (and an emergent ultra-right-wing digital eco-system) have been found to be
propagating BJP’s populist politics and accusing the left/liberal media of being biased (Sri-
vastava 2015; Chadha and Prashanth 2019; Sinha 2021). Several commentators have also
highlighted the current course in which Indian journalists seem to be worried about their
nationalist credentials than objectivity (Paul 2020; Subrahmaniam 2019).
Various past studies in the Indian context have assessed the role of mass media in the
rise of right-wing nationalist politics (e.g., Mankekar 1999; Mehta 2008a,2008b). In that,
the relationship between the rise of Hindu nationalism –a type of majoritarian national-
ism (for more on Hindu nationalism see: Varshney 1993; van der Veer 1994;Jaffrelot 1996,
2009; Corbridge and Harriss 2000; Anand 2011; Tharoor 2018; Bhatt 2020) has also been
explored and the media have been found to be sympathetic to such ideology (e.g., Kumar
2010; Manchanda 2002; Rajagopal 2001). It has also been found that at times of conflict,
and issues involving “national interest," the mass media seem to adopt an aggressive
reporting style (e.g., Nadaf 2021; Pandit and Chattopadhyay 2018). However, little is
known regarding how the English language journalism has been shaped by the prevailing
right-wing political sentiments. Therefore, this study aimed to fill the gap by exploring the
discourse on once considered “urban”and “elite”English language Indian media (Belair-
Gagnon, Mishra, and Agur 2014; Ninan 2007) known for its balanced and neutral coverage
compared to other languages and make a contextual contribution to understanding the
sociology of news in the world’s largest democracy.
JOURNALISM STUDIES 1519
In what is the remaining part of the paper, a contextual background on India–China
conflict has been provided in section two, following which the existing literature on jour-
nalism and nationalism has been explored. Importantly, the study is situated in the cul-
tural paradigm of media studies and the rationale for the framework has been
provided in the section. Data and methods have been explained in section three, while
findings have been discussed in section four. Section five entails conclusions and limit-
ations of this study.
India–China Border Conflict 2020
In June 2020, a violent clash broke out between Indian and Chinese soldiers along what is
called the Line of Actual Control (LAC) near Ladakh –a union territory which is adminis-
tered by India. The region is considered extremely important from geo-security perspec-
tive as it borders sensitive areas such as Jammu & Kashmir, Gilgit Baltistan, Xinjiang,
Himachal Pradesh, Aksai Chin and Tibet. Some of these areas have been disputed for
several decades with India, China and Pakistan staking claims in the region. The unre-
solved border issue between India and China could be traced back to 1959 when
skirmishes started for the first time between the two countries marking the end of
what was called Hindi-Chini, Bhai-Bhai (India and China are brothers) era in their relation-
ship (Shankar 2015; Chaowu 2016). The dispute led to a war between the two sides in
1962 and since then, although the economic cooperation between the neighbours
grew, the border row has always shadowed their relationship.
The June 2020 conflict between the two Asian neighbours was “the first fatal confron-
tation since 1975”(BBC 2021). It was unusual not just because India and China had main-
tained albeit an uneasy calm for decades but also because it was fought unconventionally
with fists, clubs, and spikes (Slater, Masih, and Shih 2020). Following violent clashes, the
Indian government accused China of a “pre-meditated action”(Ministry of External Affairs
2020) while the Chinese side accused India of breaching consensus on the border issue
(CCTV 2020). Since the incident, several rounds of talks between India and China, on
various levels, have been held; however, the situation remains tensed (PTI 2022). It is
against this backdrop, this study attempted to explore how media narratives are
shaped by the dominating by right-wing nationalist ideology of the ruling party.
Mass Media and Resurgence of Right-Wing Nationalism in India
It has been argued that the mass media in India has played a significant role in creating a
sense of national identity through various types of content broadcasted initially though
Doordarshan (India’s state broadcaster) and later news media. In one of the early
studies on the role of the state broadcaster in configuring, inter alia, religious, and
national identity, Mankekar (1999) drew attention to the symbolic representation of the
modern state as a “united family”through programmes on Doordarshan. She argued
that televising mythological epics such as The Ramayan and The Mahabharat facilitated
an imagination of a national consciousness and threats from the “Other”. The “Other”
in those epics were the unethical and immoral characters whose search in real-social
context ended in the reification of cultural and religious differences between majority
(Hindus) and minorities (primarily Muslims and Christians).
1520 A. KUMAR
Kumar (2010) has also recognised the influence of satellite TV in the hegemonic rep-
resentations of Indian nationalism. However, he contended against the emergence of
any one national identity even though the state broadcaster had a monopoly over infor-
mation and entertainment for decades. The rise of cable TV, he argued, had further com-
plicated the notion of Indian nationalism as local media operated with a global aspiration.
Such aspiration, combined with intercultural mobility and digital convergence, has left
the conventional concept of nation and community as a contested terrain in which
hybridity is the new reality of communities (1). In other words, while TV opened up
space for nationalist imaginations, the new media elites, according to Kumar, mobilised
digital and electronic capital towards a hybrid notion of Indian nationalism which looks
as much outside as within the identified boundaries of the nation.
Similarly, Mehta (2008a) explained how TV became a conduit of national and cultural
identity through “localising”programmes. According to him, TV provided an opportunity
to imagine, reimagine, and express what nationalism meant for Indians. However, inspired
by Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen’sThe Argumentative Indian, he placed those expressions
in the age-old Indian culture of debate that appear in the mythological epics as well as in
the localisation of western reality TV. Elsewhere, Mehta (2008b) concluded that the rise of
satellite TV and news channels in particular “altered the political matrix”(55) as TV became
indispensable for all kinds of political actors.
A consequence of this new avenue was the consolidation of right-wing nationalism in
India. One of the richest accounts on the role of TV’s contribution in that consolidation
and majority mobilisation has been provided by Arvind Rajagopal. He argued that
between 1980s and 1990s, the growth of media, opening up of the market and a political
crisis led to an evolved relationship between public and the Hindu nationalist ideology
(Rajagopal 2001, 273). These were complemented by the rise of sensationalist news cover-
age of erstwhile distanced religious issues and demolition of boundaries between the pri-
orities of the English and vernacular media.
Rajagopal’s assertion on the role of TV proving a catalyst for shaping political discourse
in India has been expanded in several studies. For example, Manchanda (2002) argued
that the mass media became an arena for describing Indian-ness and the right-wing
BJP sought to conflate India’s national security with its cultural (predominantly Hindu)
security to protect that Indian-ness. Drawing on a number of incidents, for example,
media discourse on the projection of Pakistan as a perennial enemy, antagonising
Muslims, and India’s bid to become a nuclear power as a step towards regaining the cul-
tural superiority, Manchanda (2002) concluded that the media displayed an “enthusiastic
support”(309) in legitimising jingoistic narratives on issues involving the “foreign”. The
Nehruvian consensus –a social contract between Indians for the foundation and function-
ing of a modern state (Sagar and Panda 2015) was increasingly challenged by a new form
of nationalism –right-wing nationalism –through the mainstreaming of their views on
the conceptions of what a “strong nation”meant. In those debates, media often sup-
ported the requirements of a muscular nationalism for a cultural recovery (Farmer 1996).
While such assertive nationalism is not a new phenomenon in India, it has become
“more confident, proud, brazen, and belligerent”(Anderson and Longkumer 2018, 371)
since the ruling BJP came to power in 2014 and subsequently in 2019. In support of
their ideology, the media act “like a vanguard of the ruling dispensation”(Jaffrelot
2021, 303) “mindlessly”co-opting their agenda (Parthasarathy 2015). Recent studies
JOURNALISM STUDIES 1521
have also found that TV journalism has become “aggressive”and pro-state (Pandit and
Chattopadhyay 2018; Kumar and Thussu 2023; Kumar 2023) while print media, too,
have displayed “assertive”characteristics (Nadaf 2021). Based on these studies, it would
be fair to conclude that mass media, especially TV, has played a key role in introducing
and mainstreaming right-wing nationalism in India.
Discursive Construction of Nationalism
Nationalism, like most other “isms”, remains a highly contested idea with various
definitions. It is due to the complexity and broadness of the topic that it has not been ade-
quately theorised despite its role in shaping the modern world (Waldron 1985). However,
some of the pioneering works on nationalism share a common thread in their conceptu-
alisation. For example, Anderson (2006) proposes nationalism as a sense of association
with an “imagined community”(6). This community, he argues, has a limit as its
members would not be able to access each other; however, there remains a horizontal
line of palpable communion among them. Calhoun (1997), too, takes the view that
nationalism seeks a continuous reduction of diversity and believes in “one essential com-
monality”(18).
Scholars such as Greenfield (2000) posit that nationalism could be considered as the
“foundation of social consciousness”(29) based on a feeling of superficial homogeneity
among the members of the nation. She locates the source of nationalism in individual
sovereignty and characterises it as the “most observable form of sovereignty”(Greenfeld
1992, 10). This sovereignty, according to Calhoun (1997), is created through discourse as
nationalism is a “way of speaking that shapes our consciousness”(3) and for nationalism
to prevail, the individual must be in congruence with the political (Gellner 2008). Smith
(1999), on the other hand, draws attention to the “myths”of “ethnic origin”used
to establish national identity and/ nationalism (15).
The role of media in producing and maintaining such myths have been high-
lighted in numerous studies as national unity gets emphasised through symbols
and interactions (Billig 2017; Castles 2011). Further, a feeling of shared culture and
identity is produced by media discourses that unify people in the broader “national
interest”(Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008), create political mobilisation (Coakley 2012)and
propagate “official nationalism”(Anderson 2006,159–160). The media claim to
present news in the national interest; however, the information is designed to engin-
eer “mass consent”for serving the interests of the powerful elite (Herman and
Chomsky 1988).
The idea of national interest in relation to news is complicated also because the iden-
tity and survival of the nation itself depends on a continuous conflict with other nation(s)
(Edelman 2013). These “nations”could be either people or geographically identifiable
pieces of land called countries. In other words, nations are recognised based on their
difference(s) with other entities. Those differences are often highlighted by the media,
especially during the times of conflict in which reporting becomes one dimensional as
media consider it incumbent upon them to stand against the “Other”. They operate on
a clearly defined group of “us”and “them”in which news or “media events”(Dayan
and Katz 1992, 1) are selected, distributed, and presented to support “us”and question
“them”–all in the name of national interest.
1522 A. KUMAR
The manifestation of such consideration by the media reflects in the inclusion and
exclusion of certain elements in a story to create a “collective memory”and deal with chal-
lenges posed by the enemy “Other”. Complex issues are presented as simple problems
and symbols of nationalism are manipulated to strike a chord with the people (Castles
2011). However, it is yet to be fully explored how the symbols are manipulated through
discourses on primetime debates. Although Anderson (2006) argued that “print capitalism
created languages of power”and laid the foundations of “national consciousness”(44-45),
its linguistic manifestations are yet to be adequately studied in the current English
language TV news media in India.
Journalism as a Discursive Process –a Cultural Approach
Understanding two key aspects of journalism–the process of news production and its
impact on society have unparallelly benefitted from research that explore the sociology
of news. Scholars such as Max Weber, David White and Warren Breed laid the foundations
of such studies on which various theoretical and methodological approaches were
erected. For example, Weber provided a rich understanding of how newspapers contrib-
uted to creating public opinion while David Manning contributed through “gatekeeping
theory”and Warren Breed highlighted the conditioning of journalists for the maintenance
of a status quo related to certain policies (Belair-Gagnon 2019). Their seminal works also
postulated that news is not a pure element that exists in the form of information, rather, it
is a contextual construction.
The above proposition was taken further by scholars such as Tuchman (1978) who
argued that news was not only constructed but it was a “socially constructed”product.
In line with this, Gans (2004) suggested that news does not exist out there to be seen
or understood but the discourse is created in a certain way due to several factors at
play including ownership structures, ideological affiliations, political pressures –in
other words power relations. Scholarly works that investigate media discourse for under-
standing the role of power relations inevitably place the study in the culture paradigm.
Owing to the significant contributions of Stuart Hall and Todd Gitlin, this paradigm is con-
cerned with the issue of representation and argues that media narratives are culturally
driven. It considers journalism as “a set of cultural practises”that “manage the flow of
information and ideas”(Meadows 1999, 47). Using this framework, Hackett and Zhao
(1998) describe journalism as a form of discourse which explains the positions of
power and knowledge in a Foucauldian sense. These authors link journalism with social
and political power and argue that the representation of issues are affected by certain
institutional practices. Such argument reflects Hall’s(1997) proposition of exploring the
power structures (ideology and politics) that influence the production of news content.
A number of scholars, particularly linguists, have followed this cultural framework of
power relations and investigated media discourse to understand the nature of media rep-
resentation as well as the reasons behind them (e.g., Hartley 1982; Fowler 1991). However,
two scholars whose works have been synonymised with studying the complex relation-
ship between systems of representation by focusing on discourse are: van Dijk and
Norman Fairclough. For van Dijk (1990), discourse is linked with power relations that
shape the meaning of written or oral exchanges. He argues that texts or talks are
influenced by various sociocultural dimensions. These dimensions are linked to “social
JOURNALISM STUDIES 1523
power”that control the discourse structure and deploy them for producing and/ reprodu-
cing social dominance (van Dijk 2008). Discourse, in relation to news, is the organisation of
language and the control over topic through which representations are sustained and
legitimised (van Dijk 1995,2000).
The notion of representation linked to power and domination also echoes in the works
of Fairclough who describes discourses as “different perspectives on the world”(Fair-
clough 2003, 124). He views communicative events as the representation or “recontextua-
lization”of social events (139–155). Fairclough argues that discourses are not only meant
to recontextualise but also “change the world in particular directions”(24) which could be
understood by linking the “‘micro’analysis of texts to the ‘macro’analysis of how power
relations work across networks of practises and structures”(15–16). However, viewing dis-
course through the lens of power and social interests has been challenged by scholars
such as Philo (2007) who highlights the inadequacy of the Gramscian approach by
both van Dijk and Fairclough, and argues that “staying within the text”(187) falls short
in explaining the role of “social relationships which underpin the presentation”(187). Par-
ticularly, Philo emphasises “the study of the social structures from which competing ideo-
logical explanations develop”(175). Therefore, while this study identifies itself with the
cultural paradigm of sociology of news, it goes beyond the explicit meanings of the
content and situates the discourse in the (re)emerging right-wing nationalist politics to
understand the role of power relations at play reflected in primetime monologues.
Methodology
Data
The data for this study was obtained from two leading English language news channels in
India: Republic TV and Times Now. The selection of these news channels was based on
their pan national and international presence as well as viewership rankings by Broadcast
and Audience Research Council (BARC) –an organisation working in the fields of audience
measurement (BARC n.d.). According to BARC ratings, Republic TV was the most-watched
news channel during and after the June 2020 border clash, followed by Times Now.
Republic TV is a leading private news broadcaster in India. It is one of the most-
watched news channels in its language category and a part of Republic Media Network
which is the fastest growing news network in the country (Kurian 2022). Arnab
Goswami, the owner, and editor-in-chief of Republic TV, also the host for 9pm primetime
show, is a renowned journalist known for his aggressive debating style. Due to the
charged atmosphere on his show, some commentators have called the format an “yella-
thon," (Rickett 2016) while Arnab Goswami himself has been described as “India’s most
loved and loathed TV anchor”(BBC 2020). Times Now, too, is a private news broadcaster
owned by Bennett, Coleman and Company Limited –an Indian media conglomerate. The
company owns The Times of India –the largest read English daily in the country. Prime-
time shows on Times Now are hosted by senior journalists: Rahul Shivshankar (editor-in-
chief) and Navika Kumar (group editor, politics, Times Group).
Primetime (8–10pm) is considered the most important time slot on news channels
during which shows are hosted by senior journalists often editorialising key issues. The
editorialisation takes places through a long (ranging between 2 and 8 min) opening
1524 A. KUMAR
statement as the introduction of the topic commonly known as a monologue. In that
sense, primetime debates, and particularly monologues, are equivalent to a newspaper’s
editorial page through which news organisations share their own opinions. Therefore, a
careful examination of the monologues by prominent news presenters was expected
to provide a clear picture of the media narratives and by that extent news channel’s pos-
ition as they set the terms of debate in their opening remarks. Debate shows, which inevi-
tably have representatives of different political parties or their sympathisers, would
naturally have divergent and even polarising views on the topic. Following the argument
to prioritising richness of the data over quantity (Brennen 2021; Lincoln and Guba 1985),
the study focused on the monologues rather than analysing the views of the participants.
A total of 20 debates on India–China border conflict (10 each for Republic TV and Times
Now) were collected from the YouTube pages of the news channels using key words such
as: “India–China debate”,“India–China conflict”,“Galwan conflict debate”,“India–China
border row”,“Indian-Chinese soldiers”,“Indo-China border conflict debate”and “India–
China 2020”. The sample selection was based on a purposive sampling to gain in-depth
understanding. This sampling technique is a narrow down approach to collect pre-deter-
mined/defined data for obtaining rich information (Patton 2002). The selected debates
were broadcasted between 10 June 2020 and 10 July 2020 when the story of the
conflict was widely debated in the Indian media. A descriptive analysis of the sample
has been provided in Table 1.
Thematic Analysis
Themes have been described as “patterned response or meanings within the data set”
(Braun and Clarke 2006, 82) that explain what is relevant in the data in relation to the
investigation. Thematic analysis (TA) is a process of examining those “recognizable recur-
ring topics, ideas, or patterns (themes) within the data that provide insight into communi-
cation”(Allen 2017, 1756). Broadly, this method comprises three procedural components:
(i) recognising patterns, (ii) describing themes, and (iii) interpreting themes (1758–1759).
These procedures are fulfilled by (i) the deductive method –a top-down approach guided
by theories and (ii) the inductive method –a bottom-up approach looking for patterns
within the data (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006). This study adopted a bottom-up
approach as it was important to understand the “local”in the content and context in
which the discourse emerged. While TA has been widely used for its “flexibility”(e.g.,
Aronson 1995; Boyatzis 1998), a major shortcoming of this method is the limitations of
the identified themes to provide a comprehensive understanding of the topic under
investigation due to omission of relevant examples (Guest, MacQueen, and Namey
2011). To overcome such limitations, key quotes of the news presenters have been men-
tioned throughout the analysis.
Table 1. Descriptive analysis of the sample.
Total/Sample Republic TV Times Now
Total 10 10
Sample 10 10
Language English English
Time Slots 9–10.30pm 8–10pm
JOURNALISM STUDIES 1525
More importantly, this study relied on the works of Braun and Clarke (2006,2012,2013)
who developed a systematic process entailing six steps for thematic analysis. These steps
are: (i) familiarising with the data, (ii) generating codes, (iii) searching for themes, (iv)
reviewing themes, (v) defining and naming themes, and (vi) producing the report. Famil-
iarising refers to “immersing”into the data through repeated reading. The initial codes are
generated as the second step to enlist the important patterns whereas themes are created
as the third step. The fourth step requires refining codes while the themes are named and
defined as the fifth step. The sixth and final step refers to analysing those themes and pro-
viding evidence for the arguments.
The steps mentioned above were followed in their sequence. At the first stage, the
downloaded audio of monologues was transcribed using a digital platform –“Otter”–
an artificial intelligence led auto-transcription service (Otter n.d.). The transcripts were
further proofread, and corrections were made by manually listening to the content
which could not be captured in the auto-transcription process. This was essential to
capture the jibes, metaphors, and insinuations which were sometimes expressed colloqui-
ally or had names of places and people which could not be transcribed due to the
language limitations of the software. At the second stage, in line with the thematic
approach, a “complete coding”(Braun and Clarke 2013) of the data was done. For the
same, both semantic and latent codes were generated. This step resulted in six broad cat-
egories: (i) untrustworthy China, (ii) emphasis on strength (moral and military), (iii) exag-
geration and hyperbole, (iv) attribution of blame, (v) call for national unity, and (vi)
support for the government.
These categories were then collapsed into overarching themes to understand their
meanings as well as their relationships. The themes were first named and defined, and
each corresponding theme was added to the broad category. This step resulted in
three major themes: (i) anti-China bias rooted in cultural superiority, (ii) the enemy of
the government is enemy of the nation, and (iii) exaggerated sense of imagined
victory. The name of the themes, their definitions, and related examples from the
content have been illustrated in Table 2.
Findings and Discussion
Based on the above-explained methodology, three major themes emerged from the
media discourse: (i) anti-China bias rooted in cultural superiority (ii) the enemy of the gov-
ernment is enemy of the nation, and (iii) exaggerated sense of an imagined victory. Each
of these themes is strongly linked to various frameworks of right-wing nationalism and
has been explained below.
Anti-China Bias Rooted in Cultural Superiority
This theme refers to a biased representation of China reflected in inaccurate comparisons
of unconnected events. To establish China as untrustworthy, here is how it was referred
by a presenter on Republic TV.
Has China ever declared how many really died in the COVID infection that spread from China in
the first place? And do you think they’re going to give you an unbiased and truthful account of
1526 A. KUMAR
how many died in this attack by the Indian soldiers who rebuffed the attack from the Chinese
soldiers, they never will.
Samples like this reveal an invariable representation of China as an “enemy”who cannot
be trusted under any circumstances. To discredit the Chinese claims, the presenter
accused them of hiding information over the spread of Coronavirus. The origin of Coro-
navirus and the alleged lack of transparency from the Chinese government has been a
subject of much debate all over the world. The origin of the virus is still under investi-
gation while social media platforms have been found to be filled with conspiracy theories.
Such situations call for more responsible journalism to avoid confusion that could lead to
severe social consequences (Gripsrud 2000). For example, several incidents of racial
attacks against “visibly Chinese”people were noted in many countries, including India,
in the aftermath of Coronavirus outbreak (Haokip 2021).
However, the presenter did not mention any on-going efforts to trace the Covid truth;
rather, expressed their opinion against China to entrench suspicions, if any, among the
Indian audiences as “good propaganda has to fit with what is already known and what
seems plausible”(Miller 1994, 287). Also, noteworthy is the attempt to convince the audi-
ence that the Indian soldiers had already retaliated the alleged incursion. This was to
assuage any anger against the government as 20 Indian soldiers were killed in the
border clash while any details of casualty were not revealed by the Chinese side for
over seven months. There was no information on whether the Chinese army had incurred
Table 2. Mapping thematic analysis findings.
Type of theme Theme description Examples
Anti-China bias rooted in
cultural superiority
This theme represents “the other”(in this case
the Chinese side) as untrustworthy.
References from previous unrelated events
are used as examples in the monologues to
claim that the other side cannot be trusted
under any circumstances. Also, a cultural
superiority reflects in how China is referred.
“We are dealing with medieval brutes.”
“The Pandavas are a striking example of
how five fingers can come together and
take on any form of evil.”
The enemy of the
government is enemy
of the nation
This theme refers to characterising people,
organisation(s), political parties, and all
those as the enemy of the nation who
question the government.
“There is an army of doubters, also in this
country who want to poke holes at
everything our army does on the
borders.”
“Those within our country (are) questioning
our forces and our government. We
demean our national leadership at a time
when there is an imminent threat to the
nation then we are on the side of the
enemy.”
Exaggerated sense of an
imagined victory
This theme refers to undermining the
consequences of all types of conflict (e.g.,
armed, economic, etc.) on the self and
representing the other side as weak bound
to suffer.
“What are the Chinese? An army that’s
never fought a war …an insecure and
crumbling country. A weak nation that
cannot manage Hong Kong. They must
be delusional to try and take us.”
“This is the only way to make China feel the
pain, then so be it, boycott Chinese
goods.”
“This is not Nepal; this is not Pakistan. This
is not Sri Lanka; this is India that is it. We
will stand toe to toe, and we will pull your
eyes out if it comes to it.”
JOURNALISM STUDIES 1527
a similar loss. The emphasis on the alleged lack of information in their tone and question-
ing the audience, rather thank seeing answers from the government, reflects an attempt
to create support for the “strong”and “nationalist”government which could not be seen
to have suffered more damage than the “Other”.
Presenter on Times Now, too, sought to establish deaths of Chinese soldiers, claimed to
have proper information; however almost paradoxically did not reveal them. The presen-
ter said:
The Chinese can no longer tuck its responsibility to tell the world at large, how many of its own
soldiers, and I know those numbers viewers because we’ve been speaking with the army com-
manders who have retired but had served in that particular area till very recently and they’ve
been in touch with the troops, and we know exactly the number of Chinese troops that have
been decimated by India’s brave army. So, you cannot lie anymore.
The use of the adverb “anymore”implies a precedence of such occurrences. It creates an
image that the country in question has been deceitful in the past; therefore, even if there
was no information or confirmation regarding casualty, the Indian audiences must feel
assured of an equal or even bigger damage on the other side. Also note that the
source of information, as described by the presenter themselves, were “retired comman-
ders”who had “served in that area”. These officers were neither working nor were present
on the location. In fact, the geographical constrains in region are such that even after the
conflict subsided, journalists could not reach the location. However, the presenter claimed
that they knew the exact number (of soldiers) “decimated by India’s brave army”but did
not share them. Once again, any information “present or absent”(Entman 1993) from the
Chinese side were hinted as untrustworthy.
More importantly, in line with the ideology of ruling party’s cultural nationalism –
Hindu nationalism –China was characterised as uncivilised and inferior. Here is an
excerpt from Republic TV.
We are dealing with mediaeval brutes, and we know how to deal with them. We are dealing with
an enemy that has no scruples and if they create a warlike situation, we will have to go all out
and give them a very bloody nose.
Reference to the Chinese side as “mediaeval brutes”is not an aberration but a reflection of
media’s alignment with the politics of cultural superiority which often references to an
imagined glorious past and deems others less and/uncivilised. The media’s alignment
emerged in use of nouns such as “brute”. This word was used in the context of the
nature of brawl between Indian and Chinse soldiers. The 2020 border conflict was uncon-
ventional as the two sides fought with clubs and fists; however, the presenter did not
mention that both parties used the same "weapons". Such selective description of the
Chinese soldiers was employed to create their image as primitives. Their characterisation
as “brute”while portraying the Indian soldiers as humane, modern, and civilised is a clear
manifestation of the superior “self”versus the inferior and/uncivilised “Other”.
The narratives on Times Now, too, reflected a bias against China. Similar to Republic TV,
culturally loaded insinuations were prevalent throughout their monologues. For example:
Remember viewers when you have to punch above your weight, when you have to land a punch,
you have to ensure that all your fingers come together and form that one hammer like weapon
that you can sock to your opponent. Even if one of these fingers don’t shut viewers, your punch
1528 A. KUMAR
will not pack power. The Pandavas are a striking example of how five fingers can come together
and take on any form of evil.
The metaphorical use of the Pandavas is evidence of how the discourse was rooted in cul-
tural superiority. Pandavas were five brothers depicted as fighting for a noble cause
against powerful enemies in the great Hindu epic –The Mahabharata. By equating the
conflict as battle between just and unjust sides, the presenter seemed to be appealing
the majority –Hindu constituency of the ruling party and/government. Characterising
China as “evil”naturally places self as virtuous and expects a national unity from the audi-
ence at a time when the government is trying to “punch”that “evil”. The emphasis on the
consequence of non-aligned fingers is an indirect appeal to the audience to stand united
in the sacred battle of which on one side is the government and on the other side is the
army of the “evil”.
The Enemy of the Government is Enemy of the Nation
This theme refers to characterising people, organisation(s), political parties, and anyone as
“the enemy of the nation”who question the government. Here is what a presenter on
Times Now said when Congress Party (the principal opposition party in India) asked the
Prime Minister to update the parliament over the border situation.
All the political parties till now have come out and reaffirmed their faith in the Prime Minister’s
leadership. They have condemned China unilaterally and unconditionally, and most importantly,
have saluted the martyrdom of our Braves. All parties except viewers, the Sonia Gandhi led Con-
gress Party. In fact, the Sonia Gandhi party, the Congress Party has asked six embarrassing ques-
tions of the Prime Minister. Nothing wrong if you want to embarrass your prime minister, that’s
your choice in front of the entire nation.
Government in democracies are answerable to the people and media are expected to
question those in power (Curran 2011). Contrary to the bedrocks of democratic and jour-
nalistic values, the above sample demonstrates that the media discourse was heavily
slanted in the favour of the government. Rather than providing the opportunity to the
opposition to ask questions of legitimate concerns at a time of evident crisis, it issued
a subtle warning and reminded them that their “choice”was “in front of the entire
nation”hinting at the potential negative electoral consequences. Further, questioning
the prime minister was portrayed as embarrassing him. More importantly, note how the
information was placed to create a sense of disrespecting the soldiers by the opposition.
Just after reminding the audience that some political parties had “saluted the martyrdom”
of the soldiers, the presenter, then, informed the audience about questions being raised
by the opposition. Although, those two are separate events that need separate attention;
their juxtaposition provides a sense that one on hand while the government had acknowl-
edged the sacrifice of the army, the opposition was embarrassing them. The discourse on
Republic TV was also along the same lines. One of their presenters said:
If the political differences become acute, and unsolvable, to the point where to settle our pol-
itical differences, we demean our national leadership at a time, when there is an imminent
threat to the nation, then we are on the side of the enemy. For Rahul Gandhi (former
leader of the opposition) to tweet this morning that Narendra Modi is “Surrender Modi”,is
not a pun. It is an effective and deliberate attempt at demeaning the Indian national leader-
ship at a time when national unity is paramount.
JOURNALISM STUDIES 1529
The sample shows that opposition parties were accused of “weakening the nation”and
“siding with the enemy”as they had asked the government to clarify whether the
Chinese soldiers had crossed over and attempted to capture Indian territory. Importantly,
the government’s response over the border conflict was filled with contradictions, not the
least because in his televised address to the nation, the prime minister himself had said:
“neither anyone has intruded into our territory nor taken over any post”–in contrast with
a statement from the Ministry of External Affairs which read: “Chinese side sought to erect
a structure in Galwan valley on our side of the LAC”(Line of Actual Control) (Mitra 2020).
Similarly, a statement by the Ministry of Defence also contradicted the Prime Minister’s
statement as it mentioned an “increase in Chinese transgression over LAC”. The statement
was released on the twitter page of the Ministry of Defence but was later removed (Bhalla
2020). While the representatives of the government were yet to provide a coherent
account of the event, the media seemed more interested in gathering support for the
government rather than questioning them and “oiling the wheels of democracy”(Miller
1994, 277).
Noteworthy is how a sense of “us”and “them”is created through a careful use of the
language. Stress on “our”soldiers denotes that the presenter has defined and identified a
side which is with the nation. There is a distinction between our side that respects the
army and their side that questions the army or the ultimate other side –Chinese army
that caused the death of our soldiers. More crucial is the deeply problematic conflation
of the office of the prime minister as the government, government as the nation and
the prime minister as its embodiment. For example, in the above sample, the presenter
on Republic TV lamented questioning “our national leadership”. Such frequent mentions
of the prime minister as “our leader”,“supreme leader”,“elected leader”is an example of
how the media aligned itself with the policy of the government and attempted to legit-
imise the government narratives. In doing so, they hardly left any scope for objective
analysis of the situation.
Another clear example of such alignment reflected on Times Now. When the opposi-
tion parties questioned the efficacy of banning Chinese apps in India while big Chinese
businesses were still operating, a presenter on Times Now said:
Think about it. Brave sacrifice their lives and certain elements within the privileged NCR and the
political class can’t even sacrifice their compulsive need to play politics. In a crude and bitter
attack, the opposition and several defence experts that belong to a particular tribe dismissed
as a stunt, the Modi government’s decisive digital strike on Chinese apps.
Parallels drawn here are once again an example of how two unrelated incidents are jux-
taposed by the media to create narratives. The political parties who doubted any real
impact on the Chinese economy by banning their apps from operating in India were
accused of using the incident for scoring political points against the government. They
were portrayed as incapable of making sacrifice for the nation. Crucially, supporting
the government’s policy was likened with making sacrifice as if the government was
the nation. Also, an effort to discredit the opposition appears from their blanket charac-
terisation as “privileged”living in the NCR (National Capital Region i.e., Delhi and
around) –a right-wing trope for discrediting the opposition and the liberal media.
Calling the dissenters, a “tribe”explains the overall characterisation of any divergent
view holders as a small group of people who are not the members of the nation –the
1530 A. KUMAR
one that the presenter claimed to be a part of and, according to them, was rightfully rep-
resented by the prime minister.
Exaggerated Sense of an Imagined Victory
This theme refers to undermining the consequences of all types of conflict (e.g., armed,
economic, etc.) on the self and representing the other side as weak bound to suffer. In
one of their debates, a presenter on Republic TV said:
Ladies and gentlemen, the Prime Minister has warned of a payback and payback it’s going to be
for China at multiple levels: militarily, diplomatically, and economically. Tonight, a people’s
movement to boycott everything made in China is taking shape across the country. And the
very sight of it is making Beijing already very nervous …We shall defeat the Chinese. What
are the Chinese an army that’s never fought a war? An insecure and crumbling country. A
weak nation that cannot manage Hong Kong. They cannot manage Hong Kong ladies and gen-
tlemen. They cannot manage Taiwan ladies and gentlemen. They should be delusional to try and
take us.
Amid uncertainty over the future of the conflict and the course of action taken by the gov-
ernment, the media attempted to create an exaggerated sense of imagined victory
among their audience. Domestic political challenges faced by China were used to
portray that the country is neither united nor is their army prepared for
war. Importantly, the sample demonstrates that media support for the government
reflected on two levels: first, the prime minister was once again portrayed as a “strong”
leader who had “warned of a payback;" however, the details of what that payback
would be are left for the audience to guess. Second, China was shown as a country
“already nervous”due to the prospects of restricted economic activities or halting their
business in India. Once again, no details were shared to establish the nervousness of
the other side.
Business between two sovereign nations is a two-way traffic and any impact on such
relationships have consequences for both sides. However, the inconvenient side i.e., the
impact on Indian exports, investment in India, future of Indian businesses, joint ventures
with China etc. were not mentioned. The details were replaced with hyperbole and
aggression. Times Now also seemed to be following the suit.
The Chinese are upset, the Chinese are angry, the Chinese are insecure, but that cowardice is not
going to in any way intimidate us. We will not be bullied, China we will, in fact, teach you who
you are dealing with. This is not Nepal; this is not Pakistan. This is not Sri Lanka; this is India that
is it. We will stand toe to toe, and we will pull your eyes out if it comes to it.
These representations or “recontextualization”, as Fairclough calls it, are part of the
ongoing effort of the media to project India as the new “superpower”. In line with the
ruling party’s election campaign in 2019 that India was “on the verge of becoming a
superpower”or as claimed by the Prime Minister himself that only he could “make
India strong, superpower”, the media have been creating an image of a “strong
country”. In congruence with the claim of the ruling party that only their nationalist ideol-
ogy could bring back India’s ancient glory and ensure economic growth (Kaul 2017), the
prime minister’s routine foreign visits have been transformed into 24/7 media spectacles
in which endless commentaries are devoted to shaking hands or hugging his counter-
parts and describing them as the recognition of India’s emergence on the global stage.
JOURNALISM STUDIES 1531
In other words, the projection of China as an “insecure”country converges with the inter-
ests of the government and contributes to maintaining the image of a “strong India”
under a strong nationalist government. Similar narratives were found on Republic TV.
The new India, the India which in 10 years is on its way to being a superpower …that we, we the
people of India, not just our government, we are ready to fight the economic battle. That we
would do not put out empty threats into the air anymore. No, we don’t. We will fight the econ-
omic battle. The military will fight the military battle the diplomatic corps will fight the inter-
national battle. We don’t put out empty threats anymore. We have the ability, the reason the
confidence to fight the economic battle.
The above quote shows an interesting paradox. On one hand, the presenter claims that
the country does not put “empty threats anymore”implying its readiness to take on
the other side as well as having such precedents; however, almost paradoxically, seeks
audience’s support by creating a false sense of power. Furthermore, the
presenter attempts to convince the audience that different stakeholders will be contribut-
ing to this larger cause as if “the nation”has gathered together and formally agreed to do
so. Seeking support for the government and creating an imagined unity was also explicit
on many occasions. For example:
Viewers and fellow Indians, we really need to support what the government is doing now. Let us
also remember viewers today that it is a big battle that the Government of India duly elected is
fighting on behalf of more than 130 crore (1.3 billion) Indians. When we stand behind the Gov-
ernment of India, believe me, nobody can challenge India anywhere on this planet. Our greatest
strength is our unity.
Calhoun (1997) calls nationalism a way of discourse that is used to appeal to conscious-
ness. Such appeal to consciousness is evident in the sample mentioned above in which
the audience are addressed as “fellow Indians”. Through such personal references, the
journalist seeks to establish an individual relationship with the audience who otherwise
may not have “access”to the presenter. The journalist presents themselves as part of
the same social sphere in which news audiences reside alike. This projection is crafted
to depict oneself as vulnerable as those on the other side of the TV sets and create a
myth that the wall of asymmetrical relationship between the journalist and the audience
has shattered. However, through their open call for support to the government, they shed
the role of an impartial information disseminator and acted like an active stakeholder.
By invoking a false sense of “membership”the journalist attempted to creating a col-
lective national identity of the “1.3 billion people”. This identity is particularly required at
times of conflict as nationalism seeks support from the members of the nation and
reduces their diversity into a common characteristic (Calhoun 1997). In the present
context, that common characteristic is an expectation of a transformation of the news
audience from “viewers”to “fellow Indians”. In their new role as “fellow Indians”they
must display their allegiances and support what the government was “doing”;
however, no information about what the government was actually doing would be
shared with them. Perhaps the most important and self-explanatory quote that summar-
ises the Indo-China border conflict discourse and its relationship with right-wing nation-
alism, is the following by a presenter on Republic TV:
Nationalism is paramount. Nationalism is now our religion.
1532 A. KUMAR
Conclusion
This study set out to understand how media narratives are shaped by dominant pol-
itical sentiments. It examined the discourseonleadingEnglishlanguagenewschan-
nels (Republic TV and Times Now) in India and reports two key conclusions. First,
narratives on both news channels reflected a consonance with the right-wing nation-
alist ideology of the ruling dispensation. The second conclusion is an adoption of a
hyper-nationalist style of presentation. Far from objective analysis, ground reporting
or informing and educating the audience which the media ought to do, the discourse
appeared to be curtailing dissenting voices and shrinking the public sphere. Although
these findings complement the existing body of work on sociology of news, they high-
light an underexplored factor that might shape media narratives during the time of
conflict. The almost predictable nature of journalism, especially at a time when the
host country is directly involved in the conflict, has to be viewed from the lens of
the dominating political ideology of the country. In this case, the discourse regarding
the “Other”is not limited to that of a hostile country embroiled in a conflict but the
narratives traverse cultural, ethical, moral, and political landscapes and gravitate
towards an unapologetic support for the ideology of those in power. In other
words, this demonstrates that journalism at times of crisis is not a monolith exercise
providing moral support to the audience but a complex practise which is shaped by
the dominant political paradigm. Overall, to understand the nature of journalism,
the nature of politics has to be investigated.
These results also show a major shift in the relationship between TV journalism and
right-wing nationalism in India. While in the 1990s, media were found to be “uncritically
absorbing and mindlessly following”the agenda of the right-wing nationalists, this study
found their active participation in legitimising such ideology. TV journalists are no longer
passive spectators just providing a platform to all kinds of views and leaving to the audi-
ence to decide for themselves; rather, they appear as active participants, narrative setters,
and facilitators of the hyper-nationalist ideology of the ruling dispensation. These findings
corroborate the findings of previous studies exploring the impact of power relations on
journalism, although it must be noted that those studies have not been necessarily and
exclusively of the English language media in India.
However, despite the best possible efforts, the study has its limitations. First, the study
selected content only from two news channels in a country which has over 400 news
channels. The selected news channels were English language broadcasters aimed
mostly at urban elite viewers. Analysing the discourse on vernacular media might
provide a fuller picture on the relationship between media and right-wing nationalism.
However, the selection of news channels for this study was based on their viewership
rankings and pan national presence. While they might not represent the whole of the
Indian media, they are significant media players watched by a large number of people
as reflected in their rankings. Further, while this is a study of TV media, visual components
were not analysed. Future studies could look into the same and examine the visual dis-
course and the construction of nationalist narratives. However, this study selected
verbal discourse as they are equally important signifiers of media representations. Such
consideration was also backed by the relatively new and understudied trend of primetime
monologues in the Indian media.
JOURNALISM STUDIES 1533
Finally, an analysis of the Chinese media coverage during the same period would have
provided a scope of comparison between the media in India - a democracy currently gov-
erned by a right-wing nationalist ruling party vis-a-vis a party-state controlled media in
China. However, such comparison could not be possible as there was rather limited cover-
age and no TV debate over border conflict in the Chinese media. Therefore, this study
should be considered only as a starting point for examining the relationship between
right-wing nationalism and English language media in India and other similar developing
countries.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
The author did not receive any funding for the project.
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