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Bias and constructive processes in a self-memory system
Memory
Abstract
Martin Conway's influential theorising about the self-memory system (Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review, 107(2), 261-288) illuminated how the "working self" influences the construction of autobiographical memories. Moreover, his constructive view of self and memory is compatible with the occurrence of various kinds of errors and distortions in remembering. Here we consider one of the "seven sins" of memory Schacter, D. L. (2021). The seven sins of memory updated edition: How the mind forgets and remembers. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt) that we believe is most closely related to the operation of Conway's self-memory system: bias, which refers to the role of current knowledge, beliefs, and feelings in shaping and sometimes distorting memories for past experiences and attitudes. More specifically, we discuss recent research on three forms of bias - consistency, self-enhancing, and positivity biases - that illuminate their role in influencing how people remember the past and also imagine the future. We consider both theoretical and applied aspects of these biases and, consistent with Conway's perspective, argue that despite sometimes contributing to inaccuracies, bias also serves adaptive functions.
... Episodic remembering, empirically informed philosophical research indicates, is generative and constructive, rather than reconstructive and preservative (Dings & Newen, 2023;Michaelian, 2016;Michaelian & Robins, 2018;Werning, 2020). In the philosophy and cognitive science of memory, so-called memory distortions are taken as evidence for the view that constructive episodic remembering is adaptive (Michaelian, 2016;Schacter et al., 2011Schacter et al., , 2023 and can be epistemically beneficial for the agent (e.g., Fernández, 2015;Puddifoot & Bortolotti, 2019). Empirically evidenced memory distortions include, but are not limited to, transience, consistency bias, self-enhancing bias, and positivity bias (for a review, see Schacter, 2022). ...
... Rights reserved. assessment of one's past intentions, actions, and interactions (for a review, see Schacter et al., 2023). Arguably, these and other memory distortions might be contextually influenced and, at times, exacerbated by the very processes of textual self-narrativization. ...
Recently, research on grief has gained momentum in phenomenology and philosophy of mind. Grief, it is often assumed, is a temporally extended emotional experience of the irreversible, bereavement-induced loss of a significant person. On one interpretation, philosophical accounts frequently quote grief memoirs as if they were phenomenological evidence for the tenability of assumptions about the occurrence, structure, and unfolding of grief experiences. In this article, I argue that this observed research strategy is problematic. The reason is that it overlooks the epistemic status and artefactual configuration of grief memoirs. They are not phenomenological evidence of lived experiences, but carefully crafted and curated literary artefacts. As such, they explore and challenge the possibilities and limitations of autobiographical remembering, acts of remembrance, master narratives, and genre expectations. For this reason, grief memoirs are best understood as exemplars of literary griefworld technologies. The positive proposal is that the interdisciplinary investigation of grief memoirs could lead to new insights into the role of literary self-narrative practices for navigating and negotiating processes of grief.
... In this chapter, we review ndings and ideas regarding the nature of the distortion-related sins, focusing primarily on misattribution and suggestibility (for detailed discussion of recent ndings concerning various forms of retrospective bias, see Bernstein et al., 2016;Levine et al., 2018;Lotterman & Bonanno, 2014;Schacter et al., 2023;Van Boekel et al., 2017). We discuss mainly research that has been reported during the past two decades, following publication of both the seven sins of memory framework (Schacter, 1999(Schacter, , 2001 and the previous edition of the Oxford Handbook of Memory (Tulving & Craik, 2000). ...
... Moreover, the long-standing relevance of research on memory errors to crucial real-world issues such as the reliability of eyewitness memory and the accuracy of memories recalled in psychotherapy has only been heightened by developments during the past two decades (for detailed discussion, see Schacter, 2022). For example, recent research has linked memory distortion to the socially important topic of "fake news": A study of voters regarding the 2018 Irish referendum on abortion rights revealed that supporters and opponents of the referendum exhibited false memories for having previously seen fake news items that were generated by the experimenters and, to a greater extent, for fake items that depicted the other side in a negative light (Murphy et al., 2019; for discussion of related studies, see Schacter et al., 2023). In light of their broad theoretical relevance and everyday implications, we believe that during the upcoming decades, a continued focus on the analysis of memory errors and distortion will prove to be a rich source of insight into the operation of memory and cognition. ...
The Oxford Handbook of Human Memory covers the science of human memory, its application to clinical disorders, and its broader implications for learning and memory in real-world contexts. Written by field leaders, the handbook integrates behavioral, neural, and computational evidence with current theories of how humans learn and remember. Following a section of foundational chapters, subsequent sections include chapters that cover forms and attributes of memory, encoding and retrieval processes and their interactions, individual differences, memory disorders and therapies, learning and memory in educational settings, and the role of memory in society. The handbook’s authoritative chapters document the current state of knowledge and provide a roadmap for the next generation of memory scientists, established peers, and practitioners.
... In the study assessing actual task start (Study 2), participants reported task start from memory. Self-reported times might have included memory biases (Schacter et al., 2024) or rounding biases (Huttenlocher et al., 1990). It is important to note, however, that recall was relatively immediate (i.e., for the previous day) and daily recall has been shown to be reliable (Brown et al., 2007). ...
Le choix du moment où commencer une tâche peut être un aspect important de la gestion des tâches quotidiennes. Les individus préfèrent-ils débuter leurs tâches au début de l’heure, en utilisant l’heure comme repère pour leur planification? Une première étude a révélé une tendance à commencer les tâches à l’heure pile, même lorsque cela impliquait un coût pour le faire, dans des situations n’impliquant pas d’autres personnes, et à travers plusieurs formes de mesure des préférences de commencement. Une deuxième étude a examiné les rapports sur les tâches de la vie réelle : les participants ont identifié à l’avance les tâches à effectuer le lendemain, puis ont rendu compte de ces mêmes tâches deux jours plus tard. Le fait de commencer les tâches à l’heure pile n’était pas associé à des bénéfices pour la progression individuelle des tâches. Cependant, initier un pourcentage plus élevé de tâches à l’heure pile au cours de la journée était associé à une perception globale de la journée comme étant passée de manière plus efficace. En résumé, ces études montrent une préférence pour planifier et commencer les tâches à l’heure pile, mais les preuves des avantages réels de cette préférence sur l’accomplissement des tâches sont mitigées.
... Research has demonstrated positive memories are processed less effectively in emotional disorders (Dalgleish & Werner-Seidler, 2014;Hitchcock et al., 2017;Schacter et al., 2023;Walker et al., 2003). Metacognitive beliefs about positive memory recall may also contribute to these deficits. ...
Purpose
Metacognitive prediction of autobiographical remembering has long been overlooked. However, expected costs such as emotion dysregulation caused by negative memory recall and expected benefits such as improving mood induced by positive memory recall can affect autobiographical remembering. Such anticipations may contribute to abnormalities in autobiographical memory associated with emotional disorders, but those assessment tools have not yet been developed.
Method
In Study 1, we developed a self-report questionnaire MARQ (Meta-Autobiographical Remembering Questionnaire) in Japanese and examined its structural validity. In Study 2, test–retest reliability was assessed, and in Study 3, the convergent validity was tested. In Studies 4 and 5, we developed the English version of the MARQ, and tested its reliability and validity. In both versions, the MARQ consists of six factors: (a) emotion dysregulation and (b) avoidance of negative involuntary retrieval, (c) emotion dysregulation and (d) avoidance of negative voluntary retrieval, and (e) difficulty and (f) emotion dysregulation in positive voluntary retrieval.
Results
Across five studies, we confirmed the reliability and validity for the original Japanese version and translated English version. Convergent validation showed that these factors were related to depressive symptoms and posttraumatic stress symptoms (PTSS) and related cognitive processes. The results highlighted reduced expected benefits and increased expected costs of autobiographical remembering in individuals with higher levels of depressive symptoms and PTSS.
Conclusion
Emotion dysregulation and avoidance of involuntary negative memories may generalize to voluntary memory, and the assessment and intervention focusing on these processes would inform transdiagnostic approaches based on memory research.
... That is, artificially enhanced perceptual representations that only get more amplified at higher vividness may help those memories to evoke positive affect even over longer delays, consistent with broadenand-build mechanisms that maintain or enhance the positivity of memories (Skowronski et al., 2014). This amplification of reconstructed visual features for positive memories aligns with the tendency to remember positive information with liberal biases, collectively fostering an overly favorable or "rosy" view of the past (Schacter et al., 2024). ...
Episodic memories are characterized by the vividness of their recollection. Recent findings show that low-level visual properties can quickly fade from memory and that more vivid memories are associated with less fading. However, further work is needed to clarify this effect over longer delays and how it may shift based on the emotional valence of a stimulus, as well as one’s age. Here, participants (n = 307, aged 19–78, recruited in 2023–2024) incidentally encoded positive, negative, and neutral images shown at different levels of color saturation, contrast, and hue. At a next-day recognition test, images identified as old were rated on subjective vividness and then reconstructed based on the remembered visual information from encoding. More arousing images were recollected with more subjective vividness, and vividness ratings were primarily associated with biases in reconstructed color saturation, but in both instances, the coherence between these measures diminished with increasing age. Negative and neutral images showed memory fading (color saturation underestimations) at lower levels of subjective vividness, and neutral images additionally showed evidence of fading via contrast reconstruction. Positive images did not show evidence of fading and were reconstructed with inflated color saturation and contrast at all levels of vividness relative to negative and neutral images. Our findings show that subjective vividness is not uniformly related to remembered low-level visual information but differs depending on the visual information reconstructed, the emotionality of an experience, and individual differences such as age.
... These are neocortical mechanisms that contribute to prospective memory [58] after recall using the hippocampo-neocortical connections (Fig. 1). Prospective memory involves the use of information from the past and the present to generate predictions about the future [58], may be implemented by the network mechanisms referred to here [2], and is inherently constructive [59,60]. ...
Generative Artificial Intelligence foundation models (for example Generative Pre-trained Transformer – GPT – models) can generate the next token given a sequence of tokens. How can this ‘generative AI’ be compared with the ‘real’ intelligence of the human brain, when for example a human generates a whole memory in response to an incomplete retrieval cue, and then generates further prospective thoughts? Here these two types of generative intelligence, artificial in machines and real in the human brain are compared, and it is shown how when whole memories are generated by hippocampal recall in response to an incomplete retrieval cue, what the human brain computes, and how it computes it, are very different from generative AI. Key differences are the use of local associative learning rules in the hippocampal memory system, and of non-local backpropagation of error learning in AI. Indeed, it is argued that the whole operation of the human brain is performed computationally very differently to what is implemented in generative AI. Moreover, it is emphasized that the primate including human hippocampal system includes computations about spatial view and where objects and people are in scenes, whereas in rodents the emphasis is on place cells and path integration by movements between places. This comparison with generative memory and processing in the human brain has interesting implications for the further development of generative AI and for neuroscience research.
... The extension of this pattern to future simulation in the present work supports this flexible recombination framework. Moreover, when interpreted in light of the self-memory system, these results provide insight into how one's self-concept can influence episodic memory retrieval, and demonstrate that this influence extends to future simulation (Conway, 2005;Schacter et al., 2023). Consistent with our findings, common tendencies between episodic memory and future simulation have been shown in many different psychopathologies, including major depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and schizophrenia (e.g., Williams & Dritschel, 1988;Addis et al., 2016;Brown et al., 2013;McLeod et al., 2006;see Brunette & Schacter, 2021 for a review of episodic simulation in psychopathology). ...
Little empirical work has examined future thinking in narcissistic grandiosity. We here extend prior work finding that people scoring high in grandiosity have self-bolstering tendencies in remembering past events, and we consider whether these tendencies extend to imagining future events. Across an initial study (N= 112) and replication (N= 169), participants wrote about remembered past events and imagined future events in which they embodied or would embody either positive or negative traits. Participants then rated those events on several subjective measures. We find that people scoring higher in grandiosity remember past events in which they embody positive traits with greater detail and ease than past events in which they embody negative traits. These same effects persist when people scoring high in grandiosity imagine possible events in their future. Those scoring higher in grandiosity endorse thinking about positive events in their past and future more frequently than negative events, and they judge positive future events as more plausible than negative future events. These tendencies did not extend to objective detail provided in their written narratives about these events. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that grandiosity is associated with self-bolstering tendencies in both remembering the past and imagining the future.
... Because memory formation is a constructive process, retrospective narratives about historical events such as the pandemic are at risk of significant distortion 1 . Beyond simple forgetting, recall and ex-post evaluation are prone to various forms of bias, reflecting differences in motivation and purpose (for example, a wish to conform with one's own or the prevailing opinion) [1][2][3]6 . For instance, people are more likely to remember true or false information from the past depending on pre-existing beliefs or previous behaviours in the context of vaccination, political campaigns or political riots 4,5,9 . ...
How people recall the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic is likely to prove crucial in future societal debates on pandemic preparedness and appropriate political action. Beyond simple forgetting, previous research suggests that recall may be distorted by strong motivations and anchoring perceptions on the current situation1–6. Here, using 4 studies across 11 countries (total n = 10,776), we show that recall of perceived risk, trust in institutions and protective behaviours depended strongly on current evaluations. Although both vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals were affected by this bias, people who identified strongly with their vaccination status—whether vaccinated or unvaccinated—tended to exhibit greater and, notably, opposite distortions of recall. Biased recall was not reduced by providing information about common recall errors or small monetary incentives for accurate recall, but was partially reduced by high incentives. Thus, it seems that motivation and identity influence the direction in which the recall of the past is distorted. Biased recall was further related to the evaluation of past political action and future behavioural intent, including adhering to regulations during a future pandemic or punishing politicians and scientists. Together, the findings indicate that historical narratives about the COVID-19 pandemic are motivationally biased, sustain societal polarization and affect preparation for future pandemics. Consequently, future measures must look beyond immediate public-health implications to the longer-term consequences for societal cohesion and trust.
... For example, an important difference between past and future autobiographical thinking is that memories of past events are more constrained than future thoughts; although not necessarily accurate, memories are constrained by what actually happened in the past, whereas the content of future thoughts can be given more free reign (but note that the perceived truthfulness of such thoughts is still constrained by our goals and general expectations about the future) (Ernst & D'Argembeau, 2017). Thus, future thoughts may be more susceptible to biases than memories of past events (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013;Schacter et al., 2023), which could have important implications for self-representation. A related question that deserves further investigation concerns possible individual differences in the impact of past and future thinking on self-conception. ...
While the role of autobiographical memory in self-representation is well established, the identity function of future thinking has received much less attention. Yet, most people commonly imagine future events that convey meaningful information about the person they wish or expect to become. In three experiments, we assessed the extent to which thinking about such self-defining future events influences the current content of self-representation
(i.e., the working self-concept). Participants were asked to think about either a past or future self-defining event, or a control topic, before describing aspects of their identity in the form of ‘I am’ statements (Experiments 1 and 3) or completing scales assessing self-related dimensions (Experiments 2 and 3). We found that thinking about a future self-defining event led participants to conceptualize themselves more in terms of their psychological traits, as did thinking about a past self-defining event. Furthermore, thinking about a future self-defining event increased the sense of present-future self-continuity, whereas thinking about a past self-defining event increased the sense of past-present self-continuity. These results suggest that self-representations are fuelled not only by autobiographical memories, but also by projections into the future.
... Because memory formation is a constructive process, retrospective narratives about historical events such as the pandemic are at risk of significant distortion 1 . Beyond simple forgetting, recall and ex-post evaluation are prone to various forms of bias, reflecting differences in motivation and purpose (for example, a wish to conform with one's own or the prevailing opinion) [1][2][3]6 . For instance, people are more likely to remember true or false information from the past depending on pre-existing beliefs or previous behaviours in the context of vaccination, political campaigns or political riots 4,5,9 . ...
How people recall the SARS-CoV2 pandemic is likely to prove crucial in future societal debates on pandemic preparedness and appropriate political action. Beyond simple forgetting, previous research suggests that recall may be distorted by strong motivations and anchoring perceptions on the current situation. Here, based on four studies across 11 countries (total N = 10,776), we show that recall of perceived risk, trust in institutions and protective behaviours depended strongly on current evaluations. While both vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals were affected by this bias, people who identified strongly with their vaccination status—whether vaccinated or unvaccinated—tended to exhibit greater and, importantly, opposite distortions of recall. Biased recall was not reduced by providing information about common recall errors or small monetary incentives for accurate recall, but partially by high incentives. Thus, it seems that motivation and identity influence the direction in which the recall of the past is distorted. Biased recall was further related to the evaluation of past political action and future behavioural intent, including adhering to regulations during a future pandemic or punishing politicians and scientists. Taken together, the findings indicate that historical narratives about the COVID-19 pandemic are motivationally biased, sustain societal polarization and affect preparation for future pandemics. Consequently, future measures must look beyond immediate public health implications to the longer-term consequences for societal cohesion and trust.
Inúmeros estudos demonstram que o ato de lembrar intencionalmente conteúdos estudados pode promover a retenção destes conteúdos na memória de longo prazo, o que traz a possibilidade de se utilizar a “prática da lembrança” como uma estratégia de estudo. O objetivo do presente trabalho foi discutir os desafios da aplicação desta estratégia em contextos escolares, especialmente contextos escolares brasileiros. Além disso, o presente trabalho objetivou apresentar e discutir as principais propostas teóricas contemporâneas sobre os mecanismos subjacentes aos benefícios desta prática. A discussão da literatura demonstrou que a prática da lembrança apresenta benefícios importantes para o aprendizado em sala de aula, especialmente quando seguida de feedback corretivo e conduzida de maneira espaçada. Em contextos brasileiros, ela se mostra benéfica para o aprendizado de fatos científicos e ortografia por crianças do ensino fundamental, embora ainda exista uma importante escassez de trabalhos conduzidos no Brasil. Por fim, as principais teorias sobre os benefícios da prática da lembrança são apresentadas e discutidas, evidenciando uma ausência de consenso sobre os mecanismos subjacentes aos seus benefícios. Em conjunto, se torna evidente a necessidade de mais pesquisas translacionais, especialmente examinando os benefícios da prática da lembrança em relação a demais atividades tipicamente conduzidas em sala de aula.
The authors develop and test a theoretical framework to examine the impact of app crashes on app engagement. The framework predicts that consumers increase engagement after encountering a single crash due to their need-for-closure and curiosity, yet reduce engagement after experiencing repeated and concentrated crashes, primarily because of frustration and perceived task unattainability; the recency of crashes moderates these effects. Field data analysis reveals that while a crash truncates a session and reduces content consumption, it increases page views in the following session. However, this increase in page views does not compensate for the loss during the crashed session. Frequent and more concentrated crashes curtail engagement. Three experiments in which crashes are exogenously manipulated in a different context support the validity and generalizability of these findings, confirm the proposed mediators, and demonstrate how to lessen the negative impact of repeated crashes with post-crash messages. The research adds new dimensions to the task pursuit literature and provides managers with a framework to quantify the economic impact of crashes, analyze content substitution behavior, and assess the bias of a transactional view of crash incidents. Additionally, it offers insights into targeted feature release to more tolerant users and strategic design of post-crash messages.
People are prone to forming false memories for fictitious events described in fake news stories. In this preregistered study, we hypothesized that the formation of false memories may be promoted when the fake news includes stereotypes that reflect positively on one’s own nationality or negatively on another nationality. We exposed German and Irish participants (N = 1,184) to fabricated news stories that were consistent with positive or negative stereotypes about Germany and Ireland. The predicted three-way interaction was not observed. Exploratory follow-up analyses revealed the expected pattern of results for German participants but not for Irish participants, who were more likely to remember positive stories and stories about Ireland. Individual differences in patriotism did not significantly affect false memory rates; however, higher levels of cognitive ability and analytical reasoning decreased false memories and increased participants’ ability to distinguish between true and false news stories. These results demonstrate that stereotypical information pertaining to national identity can influence the formation of false memories for fake news, but variations in cultural context may affect how misinformation is received and processed. We conclude by urging researchers to consider the sociopolitical and media landscape when predicting the consequences of fake news exposure.
The authors describe a model of autobiographical memory in which memories are transitory mental constructions within a self-memory system (SMS). The SMS contains an autobiographical knowledge base and current goals of the working self. Within the SMS, control processes modulate access to the knowledge base by successively shaping cues used to activate autobiographical memory knowledge structures and, in this way, form specific memories. The relation of the knowledge base to active goals is reciprocal, and the knowledge base “grounds” the goals of the working self. It is shown how this model can be used to draw together a wide range of diverse data from cognitive, social, developmental, personality, clinical, and neuropsychological autobiographical memory research.
Though often reliable, human memory is also fallible. This article examines how and why memory can get us into trouble. It is suggested that memory’s misdeeds can be classified into 7 basic “sins”: transience, absent-mindedness, blocking, misattribution, suggestibility, bias, and persistence. The first three sins involve different types of forgetting, the next three refer to different types of distortions, and the final sin concerns intrusive recollections that are difficult to forget. Evidence is reviewed concerning each of the 7 sins from relevant sectors of psychology (cognitive, social, and clinical) and from cognitive neuroscience studies that include patients with focal brain damage or make use of recently developed neuroimaging techniques. Although the 7 sins may appear to reflect flaws in system design, it is argued instead that they are by-products of otherwise adaptive features of memory.
If an individual demonstrates accurate autobiographical memory in one task, will they also demonstrate accurate autobiographical memory in related tasks? Over 18 months, 213 participants completed 13 episodic memory tasks related to the same national referendum. Tasks included false memories for fake news, flashbulb memories, factual memories, memory for emotions, hindsight bias, eyewitness accuracy, susceptibility to leading questions and memory blindness. Although moderate to strong correlations were found over time for the same episodic memory tasks, correlations among differing memory tasks were very weak. Our findings suggest that individuals vary in how well they remember different elements of a public event. We conclude that episodic memory is a multi‐faceted construct and researchers should be slow to generalise from one task to another, even when the two tasks refer to the same public event (e.g., we should not presume that individual differences in event memory will predict false memories for fake news).
People high in depressive symptoms show probability bias: they think negative events are relatively likely, especially compared with positive events. However, their past- and future-related thinking also has other distinctive characteristics, so we wondered how independent probability bias is from these other phenomena. In two samples of Turkish students (Ns = 163 and 179), we found that depressive symptoms were the strongest predictor of probability bias even when rumination, intrusive future imagery, overgeneral memory and anxiety were controlled in our models; furthermore, probability bias remained a significant predictor of depression when these other variables were controlled. These results suggest that a relatively negative probability bias is an independent correlate of depressive symptoms, and is not simply confounded with other past- or future thinking-related phenomena that have been observed in more depressed individuals. We hope that future individual differences and clinical research will focus more on depression-related probability bias.
Misinformation continually threatens efforts to control the COVID‐19 pandemic, with vaccine misinformation now a key concern. False memories for misinformation can influence behavioural intentions, yet little is known about the factors affecting (false) memories for vaccine‐related news items. Across two experiments (total n = 1481), this paper explores the effects of pre‐existing vaccine opinions on reported memories for true and false news items. In Study 1, participants (n = 817) were exposed to fabricated pro‐ or anti‐vaccine news items, and then asked if they have a memory of this news event having occurred. In Study 2, participants (n = 646) viewed true pro‐ or anti‐vaccine news items. News items were more likely to be remembered when they aligned with participants' pre‐existing vaccine beliefs, with stronger effects for pro‐vaccine information. We conclude by encouraging researchers to consider the role of attitudinal bias when developing interventions to reduce susceptibility to misinformation.
Perceived stress undermines emotional wellbeing, and poorer emotional wellbeing may intensify perceived stress. The current studies examined whether biased memories contribute to the possible reciprocal links between perceived stress and depressive symptoms. Two longitudinal studies compared the stress people perceived for several weeks (Study 1, N = 308) or during a conflict interaction (Study 2, N = 261) with memories of perceived stress gathered in subsequent weeks. People with low depressive symptoms remembered their past as involving less perceived stress than they initially experienced (positive bias). By contrast, people with average or higher levels of depressive symptoms remembered their past as involving exactly as much perceived stress as initially experienced (depressive realism) or, at very high levels of depressive symptoms, more perceived stress than initially experienced (negative bias). These memory biases had important implications. Accounting for initial levels of perceived stress, more negative memories of perceived stress predicted greater weekly depressed mood (Study 1) and greater depressive symptoms across time (Study 2). Evaluating whether life has involved as much perceived stress as now remembered may help facilitate emotional wellbeing in the face of rising perceived stress and depressive symptoms. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
Previous research has argued that fake news may have grave consequences for health behavior, but surprisingly, no empirical data have been provided to support this assumption. This issue takes on new urgency in the context of the coronavirus pandemic, and the accompanying wave of online misinformation. In this large preregistered study (N = 3,746), we investigated the effect of a single exposure to fabricated news stories about COVID-19 on related behavioral intentions. We observed small but measurable effects on some behavioral intentions but not others-for example, participants who read a story about problems with a forthcoming contact-tracing app reported a 5% reduction in willingness to download the app. These data suggest that one-off fake news exposure may have behavioral consequences, though the effects are not large. We also found no effects of providing a general warning about the dangers of online misinformation on response to the fake stories, regardless of the framing of the warning in positive or negative terms. This suggests that generic warnings about online misinformation, such as those used by governments and social media companies, are unlikely to be effective. We conclude with a call for more empirical research on the real-world consequences of fake news. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
False memories may be especially likely when one is exposed to misinformation that is consistent with one's beliefs. Here, we assessed whether feminist attitudes predict susceptibility to feminism‐related fake news. In Experiment 1 (n = 1537), the more negative participants' attitudes towards feminism, the more likely they were to report a false memory for a fabricated event that negatively reflected on the feminist movement, and vice‐versa. This effect was only evident for those who interpreted the event as expected (e.g., those who rated the event as bad for feminism). When the purpose of the study was revealed, feminist attitudes also predicted ability to identify the stories as fake. We replicated these findings in Experiment 2 (n = 786), using fake stories that were less ambiguous. This study suggests that individuals are more susceptible to false memories for fake news stories that are ideologically congruent, even after a warning.
Amid rising political polarisation, inaccurate memory for facts and exaggerated memories of grievances can drive individuals and groups further apart. We assessed whether people with more accurate memories of the facts concerning political events were less susceptible to bias when remembering how events made them feel. Study 1 assessed participants’ memories concerning the 2016 U.S. presidential election (N = 571), and included 33 individuals with Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory (HSAM). Study 2 assessed participants’ memories concerning the 2018 referendum on abortion in Ireland (N = 733). Participants rated how happy, angry, and scared they felt days after these events. Six months later, they recalled their feelings and factual information. In both studies, participants overestimated how angry they had felt but underestimated happiness and fear. Adjusting for importance, no association was found between the accuracy of memory for facts and feelings. Accuracy in remembering facts was predicted by media exposure. Accuracy in remembering feelings was predicted by consistency over time in feelings and appraisals about past events. HSAM participants in Study 1 remembered election-related facts better than others, but not their feelings. Thus, having a good grasp of the facts did not protect against bias in remembering feelings about political events.
Exposure to ‘fake news’ can result in false memories, with possible consequences for downstream behaviour. Given the sharp rise in online misinformation during the coronavirus pandemic, it is important to understand the factors that influence the development of false memories. The present study measured susceptibility to false memories following exposure to fabricated news stories about the pandemic in a sample of 3746 participants. We investigated the effect of individual differences in (1) knowledge about COVID-19, (2) engagement with media or discussion about the coronavirus, (3) anxiety about COVID-19 and (4) analytical reasoning. Notably, objectively and subjectively assessed knowledge about COVID-19 were not significantly correlated. Objectively assessed knowledge was associated with fewer false memories but more true memories, suggesting a true discrimination between true and fake news. In contrast, participants who merely believed themselves to be very knowledgeable were more likely to report a memory for true stories, but showed no reduction in false memories. Similarly, individuals who reported high levels of media engagement or anxiety about COVID-19 reported an increase in true (but not false) memories. Finally, higher levels of analytical reasoning were associated with fewer memories for both true and fabricated stories, suggesting a stricter threshold for reporting a memory for any story. These data indicate that false memories can form in response to fake COVID-19 news and that susceptibility to this misinformation is affected by the individual’s knowledge about and interaction with COVID-19 information, as well as their tendency to think critically.
Over the past century, psychologists have discussed whether forgetting might arise from active mechanisms that promote memory loss to achieve various functions, such as minimizing errors, facilitating learning, or regulating one's emotional state. The past decade has witnessed a great expansion in knowledge about the brain mechanisms underlying active forgetting in its varying forms. A core discovery concerns the role of the prefrontal cortex in exerting top-down control over mnemonic activity in the hippocampus and other brain structures, often via inhibitory control. New findings reveal that such processes not only induce forgetting of specific memories but also can suppress the operation of mnemonic processes more broadly, triggering windows of anterograde and retrograde amnesia in healthy people. Recent work extends active forgetting to nonhuman animals, presaging the development of a multilevel mechanistic account that spans the cognitive, systems, network, and even cellular levels. This work reveals how organisms adapt their memories to their cognitive and emotional goals and has implications for understanding vulnerability to psychiatric disorders.
Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 72 is January 4, 2021. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
Repetition increases belief in false statements. This illusory truth effect occurs with many different types of statements (e.g., trivia facts, news headlines, advertisements), and even occurs when the false statement contradicts participants’ prior knowledge. However, existing studies of the effect of prior knowledge on the illusory truth effect share a common flaw; they measure participants’ knowledge after the experimental manipulation and thus conditionalize responses on posttreatment variables. In the current study, we measure prior knowledge prior to the experimental manipulation and thus provide a cleaner measurement of the causal effect of repetition on belief. We again find that prior knowledge does not protect against the illusory truth effect. Repeated false statements were given higher truth ratings than novel statements, even when they contradicted participants’ prior knowledge.
Misinformation causes serious harm, from sowing doubt in modern medicine to inciting violence. Older adults are especially susceptible—they shared the most fake news during the 2016 U.S. election. The most intuitive explanation for this pattern lays the blame on cognitive deficits. Although older adults forget where they learned information, fluency remains intact, and knowledge accumulated across decades helps them evaluate claims. Thus, cognitive declines cannot fully explain older adults’ engagement with fake news. Late adulthood also involves social changes, including greater trust, difficulty detecting lies, and less emphasis on accuracy when communicating. In addition, older adults are relative newcomers to social media and may struggle to spot sponsored content or manipulated images. In a post-truth world, interventions should account for older adults’ shifting social goals and gaps in their digital literacy.
The current study examined false memories in the week preceding the 2018 Irish abortion referendum. Participants ( N = 3,140) viewed six news stories concerning campaign events—two fabricated and four authentic. Almost half of the sample reported a false memory for at least one fabricated event, with more than one third of participants reporting a specific memory of the event. “Yes” voters (those in favor of legalizing abortion) were more likely than “no” voters to “remember” a fabricated scandal regarding the campaign to vote “no,” and “no” voters were more likely than “yes” voters to “remember” a fabricated scandal regarding the campaign to vote “yes.” This difference was particularly strong for voters of low cognitive ability. A subsequent warning about possible misinformation slightly reduced rates of false memories but did not eliminate these effects. This study suggests that voters in a real-world political campaign are most susceptible to forming false memories for fake news that aligns with their beliefs, in particular if they have low cognitive ability.
People often prioritize their own interests, but also like to see themselves as moral. How do individuals resolve this tension? One way to both pursue personal gain and preserve a moral self-image is to misremember the extent of one’s selfishness. Here, we test this possibility. Across five experiments (N=3190), we find that people tend to recall being more generous in the past than they actually were, even when they are incentivized to recall their decisions accurately. Crucially, this motivated misremembering effect occurs chiefly for individuals whose choices violate their own fairness standards, irrespective of how high or low those standards are. Moreover, this effect disappears under conditions where people no longer perceive themselves as responsible for their fairness violations. Together, these findings suggest that when people’s actions fall short of their personal standards, they may misremember the extent of their selfishness, thereby potentially warding off threats to their moral self-image.
It is well established that processing information in relation to oneself (i.e., self-referencing) leads to better memory for that information than processing that same information in relation to others (i.e., other-referencing). However, it is unknown whether self-referencing also leads to more false memories than other-referencing does. In the current two experiments with European and East Asian samples, we presented participants the Deese–Roediger–McDermott lists together with their own name or other people’s name (i.e., “Trump” in Experiment 1 and “Li Ming” in Experiment 2). We found consistent results across the two experiments; that is, in the self-reference condition, participants had higher true and false memory rates compared with those in the other-reference condition. Moreover, we found that self-referencing did not exhibit superior mnemonic advantage in terms of net accuracy compared with other-referencing and neutral conditions. These findings are discussed in terms of theoretical frameworks such as spreading activation theories and the fuzzy-trace theory. We propose that our results reflect the adaptive nature of memory in the sense that cognitive processes that increase mnemonic efficiency may also increase susceptibility to associative false memories.
Electronic supplementary material
The online version of this article (10.3758/s13421-018-0851-3) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
Several laboratory techniques have been developed over the last few decades that reliably produce memory distortions. However, it is unclear whether false memory production in one experimental paradigm will predict susceptibility to false memories in other paradigms. In Experiment 1, 202 undergraduates participated in a misinformation experiment and semiautobiographical tasks involving three measures of memory distortion (suggestion, imagination, emotion). We established high internal consistency in individual differences measures and statistically significant experimental effects where we would expect them (e.g., the misinformation effect). However, false memory production in one task did not predict false memories in other paradigms. In Experiment 2, 163 adults participated in a misinformation experiment, a false memory word list task (Deese–Roediger–McDermott), and semiautobiographical false news story tasks. Again we found no consistent predictive relationships among various false memories. In both studies, no individual differences predicted memory distortion susceptibility consistently across tasks and across experiments. At this time, false memory production in a given laboratory task does not appear to adequately predict false memories in other tasks, a finding with implications for using these tasks to predict memory distortion in real world situations.
People frequently engage in future thinking in everyday life, but it is unknown how simulating an event in advance changes how that event is remembered once it takes place. To initiate study of this important topic, we conducted two experiments in which participants simulated emotional events before learning the hypothetical outcome of each event via narratives. Memory was assessed for emotional details contained in those narratives. Positive simulation resulted in a liberal response bias for positive information and a conservative bias for negative information. Events preceded by positive simulation were considered more favorably in retrospect. In contrast, negative simulation had no impact on subsequent memory. Results were similar across an immediate and delayed memory test and for past and future simulation. These results provide novel insights into the cognitive consequences of episodic future simulation and build on the optimism-bias literature by showing that adopting a favorable outlook results in a rosy memory.
Positivity biases in autobiographical memory and episodic future thinking are considered important in mental wellbeing and are reduced in anxiety and depression. The inhibitory processes underlying retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) have been proposed to contribute to these biases. This investigation found reduced positivity in past and future thinking to be associated with reduced memory specificity alongside greater levels of anxiety, depression, and rumination. Most notably, however, RIF was found to significantly predict memory valence. This indicates that RIF may be important in maintaining such biases, facilitating the forgetting of negative memories when a positive item is actively retrieved.
General Audience Summary
Imagine a world that considers knowledge to be “elitist.” Imagine a world in which it is not medical knowledge but a free-for-all opinion market on Twitter that determines whether a newly emergent strain of avian flu is really contagious to humans. This dystopian future is still just that—a possible future. However, there are signs that public discourse is evolving in this direction: terms such as “post-truth” and “fake news,” largely unknown until 2016, have exploded into media and public discourse. This article explores the growing abundance of misinformation in the public sphere, how it influences people, and how to counter it. We show how misinformation can have an adverse impact on society, for example by predisposing parents to make disadvantageous medical decisions for their children. We argue that for countermeasures to be effective, they must be informed by the larger political, technological, and societal context. The post-truth world arguably emerged as a result of societal mega-trends, such as a decline in social capital, growing economic inequality, increased polarization, declining trust in science, and an increasingly fractionated media landscape. Considered against the background of those overarching trends, misinformation in the post-truth era can no longer be considered solely an isolated failure of individual cognition that can be corrected with appropriate communication tools. Rather, it should also consider the influence of alternative epistemologies that defy conventional standards of evidence. Responses to the post-truth era must therefore include technological solutions that incorporate psychological principles, an interdisciplinary approach that we describe as “technocognition.” Technocognition uses findings from cognitive science to inform the design of information architectures that encourage the dissemination of high-quality information and that discourage the spread of misinformation.
The narcissism spectrum model synthesizes extensive personality, social-psychological, and clinical evidence, building on existing knowledge about narcissistic grandiosity and vulnerability to reveal a view of narcissism that respects its clinical origins, embraces the diversity and complexity of its expression, and reflects extensive scientific evidence about the continuity between normal and abnormal personality expression. Critically, the proposed model addresses three key, inter-related problems that have plagued narcissism scholarship for more than a century. These problems can be summarized as follows: (a) What are the key features of narcissism? (b) How are they organized and related to each other? and (c) Why are they organized that way, that is, what accounts for their relationships? By conceptualizing narcissistic traits as manifested in transactional processes between individuals and their social environments, the model enables integration of existing theories of narcissism and thus provides a compelling perspective for future examination of narcissism and its developmental pathways.
Across two studies, we investigated the influence of narcissism and self-esteem along with gender on phenomenological ratings across the four subscales of the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (AMQ; impact, recollection, rehearsal, and belief). Memory cues varied in valence (positive vs. negative) and agency (agentic vs. communal). In Study 2, we used different memory cues reflecting these four Valence by Agency conditions and additionally investigated retrieval times for the autobiographical memories (AMs). Results were consistent with the agency model of narcissism [Campbell, W. K., Brunell, A. B., & Finkel, E. J. (2006). Narcissism, interpersonal self-regulation, and romantic relationships: An agency model approach. In E. J. Finkel & K. D. Vohs (Eds.), Self and relationships: Connecting intrapersonal and interpersonal processes. New York, NY: Guilford], which characterises narcissists as being more concerned with agentic (self-focused) rather than communal (other-focused) positive self-relevant information. Narcissism predicted greater phenomenology across the four subscales for the positive-agentic memories (Study 1: clever; Study 2: attractive, talented) as well as faster memory retrieval times. Narcissism also predicted greater recollection and faster retrieval times for the negative-communal AMs (Study 1: rude; Study 2: annoying, dishonest). In contrast, self-esteem predicted greater phenomenology and faster retrieval times for the positive-communal AMs (Study 1: cooperative; Study 2: romantic, sympathetic). In both studies, results of LIWC analyses further differentiated between narcissism and self-esteem in the content (word usage) of the AMs.
People often think of themselves and their experiences in a more positive light than is objectively justified. Inhibitory control processes may promote this positivity bias by modulating the accessibility of negative thoughts and episodes from the past, which then limits their influence in the construction of imagined future events. We tested this hypothesis by investigating the correlation between retrieval-induced forgetting and the extent to which individuals imagine positive and negative episodic future events. First, we measured performance on a task requiring participants to imagine personal episodic events (either positive or negative), and then we correlated that measure with retrieval-induced forgetting. As predicted, individuals who exhibited higher levels of retrieval-induced forgetting imagined fewer negative episodic future events than did individuals who exhibited lower levels of retrieval-induced forgetting. This finding provides new insight into the possible role of retrieval-induced forgetting in autobiographical memory.
Although children's initial perceptions and judgments about sociomoral situations are being actively explored, little is known about what children remember about them. In four experiments testing over 400 children, we investigated children's memories for small acts of giving and taking. When asked to recall their own giving and taking, children were relatively accurate following a number of delays. In contrast, when asked to recall a child's giving or taking, children exaggerated the child's taking after a 1-day or 1-week delay. Notably, this pattern of misremembering occurred only when children recalled the actions of a child but not an adult. We consider the idea that children spontaneously engage in social comparison, which colors their memories of the social world. (PsycINFO Database Record
(c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).
The Five-Factor Narcissism Inventory (FFNI; Glover, Miller, Lynam, Crego, & Widiger, 2012) is a 148-item self-report inventory of 15 traits designed to assess the basic elements of narcissism from the perspective of a 5-factor model. The FFNI assesses both vulnerable (i.e., cynicism/distrust, need for admiration, reactive anger, and shame) and grandiose (i.e., acclaim seeking, arrogance, authoritativeness, entitlement, exhibitionism, exploitativeness, grandiose fantasies, indifference, lack of empathy, manipulativeness, and thrill seeking) variants of narcissism. The present study reports the development of a short-form version of the FFNI in 4 diverse samples (i.e., 2 undergraduate samples, a sample recruited from MTurk, and a clinical community sample) using item response theory. The validity of the resultant 60-item short form was compared against the validity of the full scale in the 4 samples at both the subscale level and the level of the grandiose and vulnerable composites. Results indicated that the 15 subscales remain relatively reliable, possess a factor structure identical to the structure of the long-form scales, and manifest correlational profiles highly similar to those of the long-form scales in relation to a variety of criterion measures, including basic personality dimensions, other measures of grandiose and vulnerable narcissism, and indicators of externalizing and internalizing psychopathology. Grandiose and vulnerable composites also behave almost identically across the short- and long-form versions. It is concluded that the FFNI-Short Form (FFNI-SF) offers a well-articulated assessment of the basic traits comprising grandiose and vulnerable narcissism, particularly when assessment time is limited. (PsycINFO Database Record
(c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).
Theories of cognition frequently assume the existence of inhibitory mechanisms that deactivate mental representations. Justifying this assumption is difficult because cognitive effects thought to reflect inhibition can often be explained without recourse to inhibitory processes. This article addresses the uncertain status of cognitive inhibitory mechanisms, focusing on their function in memory retrieval. On the basis of a novel form of forgetting reported herein, it is shown that classical associative theories of interference are insufficient as accounts of forgetting and that inhibitory processes must be at work. It is argued that inhibitory processes are used to resolve computational problems of selection common to memory retrieval and selective attention and that retrieval is best regarded as conceptually focused selective attention. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
We present a new theoretical account of retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) together with new experimental evidence that fits this account and challenges the dominant inhibition account. RIF occurs when the retrieval of some material from memory produces later forgetting of related material. The inhibition account asserts that RIF is the result of an inhibition mechanism that acts during retrieval to suppress the representations of interfering competitors. This inhibition is enduring, such that the suppressed material is difficult to access on a later test and is, therefore, recalled more poorly than baseline material. Although the inhibition account is widely accepted, a growing body of research challenges its fundamental assumptions. Our alternative account of RIF instead emphasizes the role of context in remembering. According to this context account, both of 2 tenets must be met for RIF to occur: (a) A context change must occur between study and subsequent retrieval practice, and (b) the retrieval practice context must be the active context during the final test when testing practiced categories. The results of 3 experiments, which directly test the divergent predictions of the 2 accounts, support the context account but cannot be explained by the inhibition account. In an extensive discussion, we survey the literature on RIF and apply our context account to the key findings, demonstrating the explanatory power of context. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved).
A modified version of Conway and Pleydell-Pearce's Self Memory System (SMS) account of autobiographical memory and the self is introduced. Modifications include discussion of a fundamental tension between adaptive correspondence (experience-near sensory-perceptual records of goal activity) and self-coherence (a more abstracted and conceptually-rich long-term store of conceptual and remembered knowledge). This tension is examined in relation to each SMS component - the episodic memory system, long-term self, and the working self. The long-term self, a new aspect of the model, consists of the interaction of the autobiographical knowledge base and the conceptual self. The working self, depending on goal activity status, mediates between episodic memory and the long-term self. Applications of the SMS to personality and clinical psychology are provided through analysis of self-defining memories and adult attachment categories, as well as case histories of traumatic memory. The SMS's role in imagination is examined through a brief discussion of Wordsworth's poetry.
The ability to mentally simulate hypothetical scenarios is a rapidly growing area of research in both psychology and neuroscience. Episodic future thought, or the ability to simulate specific personal episodes that may potentially occur in the future, represents one facet of this general capacity that continues to garner a considerable amount of interest. The purpose of this article is to elucidate current knowledge and identify a number of unresolved issues regarding this specific mental ability. In particular, this article focuses on recent research findings from neuroimaging, neuropsychology, and clinical psychology that have demonstrated a close relation between episodic future thought and the ability to remember personal episodes from one's past. On the other hand, considerations of the role of abstracted (semantic) representations in episodic future thought have been noticeably absent in the literature. The final section of this article proposes that both episodic and semantic memory play an important role in the construction of episodic future thoughts and that their interaction in this process may be determined by the relative accessibility of information in memory.
© The Author(s) 2010.
Little empirical work has examined future thinking in narcissistic grandiosity. We here extend prior work finding that people scoring high in grandiosity have self-bolstering tendencies in remembering past events, and we consider whether these tendencies extend to imagining future events. Across an initial study (N= 112) and replication (N= 169), participants wrote about remembered past events and imagined future events in which they embodied or would embody either positive or negative traits. Participants then rated those events on several subjective measures. We find that people scoring higher in grandiosity remember past events in which they embody positive traits with greater detail and ease than past events in which they embody negative traits. These same effects persist when people scoring high in grandiosity imagine possible events in their future. Those scoring higher in grandiosity endorse thinking about positive events in their past and future more frequently than negative events, and they judge positive future events as more plausible than negative future events. These tendencies did not extend to objective detail provided in their written narratives about these events. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that grandiosity is associated with self-bolstering tendencies in both remembering the past and imagining the future.
Memory for events can be biased. For example, people tend to recall more events that support than oppose their current worldview. The present study examined partisan bias in memory for events related to the January 6, 2021, Capitol riot in the United States. Participants rated their memory for true and false events that were either favourable to their political party or the other major political party in the United States. For both true and false events, participants remembered more events that favoured their political party. Regression analyses showed that the number of false memories that participants reported was positively associated with their tendency to support conspiracy beliefs and with their self-reported engagement with the Capitol riot. These results suggest that Democrats and Republicans remember the Capitol Riot differently and that certain individual difference factors can predict the formation of false memories in this context. Misinformation played an influential role in the Capitol riot and understanding differences in memory for this event is beneficial to avoiding similar tragedies in the future.
Objectives
The role of self in veridical memory has been extensively studied, but what is the role of self in false memory development across the life span? The current study examined the impact of self-reference on associative false memory in children, younger adults, and older adults, and further investigated possible mechanisms concerning how self-reference might impact false memory in different age groups.
Method
Combining a self-reference manipulation with the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, children, younger adults and older adults encoded DRM word lists as paired with their own name, another person’s name, or a red square. Later their true and false recognition memory as well as recollection and familiarity were measured.
Results
A self-enhanced false memory effect was found in all age groups. That is, participants generated more false memories in the self-reference condition relative to the other-reference and neutral conditions. Furthermore, when examining its underlying memory mechanisms, we found that self-reference mainly increased false recollection in younger adults but facilitated familiarity of critical lures in older adults.
Discussion
Although self-reference increases false memory in both younger and older adults, the underlying mechanisms are different in that older adults have more self-relevant false familiarity while younger adults generate more self-relevant phantom recollection. The current study also has implications for eyewitness reports, suggesting that the self-relevance of memory may be one relevant factor to consider when evaluating potential risk factors of false memory.
A broad functional approach is taken to the analysis of human memory. The overall importance of episodic memory, the capacity to remember specific events, is illustrated by the devastating effect that loss of this aspect of memory has on the capacity to cope in the case of densely amnesic patients. Recent applied research has however focussed heavily on factors compromising the reliability of eyewitness testimony in the forensic field and on the creation of false memories. While acknowledging the progress made on this issue, it presents two dangers. The first is practical, the danger of generalising too readily from laboratory-influenced simulations that differ in important ways from the context to which they are applied. This suggests a need for fewer but more realistically representative studies. The second is a broad theoretical issue, that of extending the findings from this important but limited applied area, within which precise detail may be crucial, to the whole of memory, consequently failing to appreciate its many strengths.
Exposure to fake news stories can result in false memories for the events portrayed, and this effect can be enhanced if the stories conform to the reader's ideological position. We exposed 1299 UK residents to fabricated news stories about Brexit. 44% of participants reported a false memory for at least one fabricated story, with a higher rate of false memories for stories that reflected poorly on the opposing side. This effect of ideological congruency was somewhat greater among participants who were exposed to a threat to their social identity as a Leave or Remain supporter; however, this moderating effect was only statistically significant in exploratory analyses using a more conservative definition of false memory. Participants with higher cognitive ability and analytical reasoning scores were less susceptible to false memories. Individuals with better knowledge about Brexit showed better discrimination between true and false stories, while self-reported engagement with the Brexit debate was associated with an increased tendency to “remember” any story, regardless of its truth. These results implicate a combination of social and individual factors in the development of false memories from fake news, and suggest that exposure to social identity threats may enhance the polarising effects of fake news.
Adults tend to remember themselves in a positive way. For example, they are more likely to remember their past good deeds rather than their past bad deeds. We investigated whether children (N = 40) are also biased in how they remember information related to themselves. Using the self-reference memory paradigm, we found that 8- to 10-year-olds’ source memory for mean action phrases (e.g., “Lie to someone”) was worse when the phrases were encoded with reference to themselves compared to when they were encoded with reference to others. Source memory for self-referenced mean phrases was also worse than source memory for self-referenced nice action phrases (e.g., “Be kind to someone”) and self-referenced neutral action phrases (e.g., “Draw a circle”). These results provide some of the first experimental evidence for self-enhancement in children's memory.
The positivity bias in memory is a prevalent phenomenon. People tend to remember more pleasant than unpleasant events, to remember events more favorably than they actually were, and to view their past through rosy glasses overall. Apparent mainly in autobiographical memory and particularly for self-relevant information, positive memory biases emerge from the operation of powerful mechanisms aimed at maintaining the individual’s well-being. In the current chapter, we review these mechanisms and the various techniques by which they operate. Manifestation of the bias in clinical populations and the manner in which it is reflected in neural activations are described, alongside methodological limitations and directions for future research.
The self-memory system model of autobiographical memory has been highly influential in providing a framework in which to locate a wide range of research findings from neuropsychology, psychological illness, behavioral findings, to attachment and personality research. Here the authors update the model and clarify some common misunderstandings. They review the extensive and relatively recent findings from neuroimaging studies that have provided a striking brain basis for the model, update neuropsychological findings, and develop the model to apply to future thinking. Finally, they delineate a small set of fundamental problems suggested by these developments of the model.
Grandiose narcissism (characterized by an inflated sense of self) uniquely influences the encoding and retrieval of information important to one's identity including evaluative feedback, self-related traits, and life events. Depending on both the valence (positive or negative) and the agency (self- vs. other-focused) of the information or events, narcissists' memories may be more vivid, suppressed, or distorted. This chapter summarizes prior research on narcissism and memory as well as more recent studies focusing on the role of attention biases in the encoding of self-related traits and memories. Overall, studies support the agency model of narcissism's prediction of attention biases and memorial enhancement for positive-agentic (e.g., clever, talented) rather than positive-communal (e.g., cooperative, sympathetic) events or information. However, results are mixed for the attention to and encoding of negative-agentic traits/events (e.g., shameful, stupid) and may depend on the extent to which the information is ego-threatening as well as the subtype of narcissism (vulnerable or grandiose). © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018.
Remembering and imagining are intricately related, particularly in imagining the future: episodic future thinking. It is proposed that remembering the recent past and imagining the near future take place in what we term the remembering–imagining system. The remembering–imagining system renders recently formed episodic memories and episodic imagined near-future events highly accessible. We suggest that this serves the purpose of integrating past, current, and future goal-related activities. When the remembering–imagining system is compromised, following brain damage and in psychological illnesses, the future cannot be effectively imagined and episodic future thinking may become dominated by dysfunctional images of the future.
It has been suggested that the simulation of hypothetical episodes and the recollection of past episodes are supported by fundamentally the same set of brain regions. The present article specifies this core network via Activation Likelihood Estimation (ALE). Specifically, a first meta-analysis revealed joint engagement of core network regions during episodic memory and episodic simulation. These include parts of the medial surface, the hippocampus and parahippocampal cortex within the medial temporal lobes, and the lateral temporal and inferior posterior parietal cortices on the lateral surface. Both capacities also jointly recruited additional regions such as parts of the bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. All of these core regions overlapped with the default network. Moreover, it has further been suggested that episodic simulation may require a stronger engagement of some of the core network's nodes as wells as the recruitment of additional brain regions supporting control functions. A second ALE meta-analysis indeed identified such regions that were consistently more strongly engaged during episodic simulation than episodic memory. These comprised the core-network clusters located in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and posterior inferior parietal lobe and other structures distributed broadly across the default and fronto-parietal control networks. Together, the analyses determine the set of brain regions that allow us to experience past and hypothetical episodes, thus providing an important foundation for studying the regions' specialized contributions and interactions.
Copyright © 2015. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
In 1932, Cambridge University Press published Remembering, by psychologist, Frederic Bartlett. The landmark book described fascinating studies of memory and presented the theory of schema which informs much of cognitive science and psychology today. In Bartlett's most famous experiment, he had subjects read a Native American story about ghosts and had them retell the tale later. Because their background was so different from the cultural context of the story, the subjects changed details in the story that they could not understand. Based on observations like these, Bartlett developed his claim that memory is a process of reconstruction, and that this construction is in important ways a social act. His concerns about the social psychology of memory and the cultural context of remembering were long neglected but are finding an interested and responsive audience today. Now reissued in paperback, Remembering has a new Introduction by Walter Kintsch of the University of Colorado, Boulder.
Recent studies suggest that the content of confabulation is mainly positive and self-enhancing. In this group study, we aimed to investigate whether this positive bias is specific to self-referent information. Confabulating amnesic patients, amnesic non-confabulating patients and healthy controls were asked to reproduce a series of short stories. We manipulated the emotional valence of the material by including positive, negative and neutral story plots. We also manipulated the self-reference of the material by including self-referent versus other-referent encoding instructions. Confabulating patients were as impaired as a group of amnesic patients in the amount of information they recalled, both groups being worse than healthy controls. Importantly, confabulating patients showed a selective bias in the negative self-referent condition, in that they recalled such information in a manner which portrayed a more positive image of themselves. This positive bias was not present in stories that were not encoded in a self-referent manner and it was not significantly correlated to patients' self-reported mood. We propose that both confabulation and its motivated content result from a deficit in the control and regulation of memory retrieval, which allows motivational factors to acquire a greater role than usual in determining which memories are selected for retrieval. To this extent, the self-enhancing content of confabulation could be explained as a neurogenic exaggeration of normal self-serving memory distortion.
In the largest false memory study to date, 5,269 participants were asked about their memories for three true and one of five fabricated political events. Each fabricated event was accompanied by a photographic image purportedly depicting that event. Approximately half the participants falsely remembered that the false event happened, with 27% remembering that they saw the events happen on the news. Political orientation appeared to influence the formation of false memories, with conservatives more likely to falsely remember seeing Barack Obama shaking hands with the president of Iran, and liberals more likely to remember George W. Bush vacationing with a baseball celebrity during the Hurricane Katrina disaster. A follow-up study supported the explanation that events are more easily implanted in memory when they are congruent with a person's preexisting attitudes and evaluations, in part because attitude-congruent false events promote feelings of recognition and familiarity, which in turn interfere with source attributions.
How do partners in long-term relationships construct memories of the past? The current study examined 20 years of retrospective and longitudinal data from a sample of wives to evaluate two possible answers to this question. Findings indicate that wives invoke different theories of the past at different stages of life. At 10 years into the study, wives’ memories of the past were negatively biased, such that present ratings seemed a significant improvement. At 20 years into the study, wives’ memories of the past continued to be negatively biased; however, at this stage, recollections of the past resembled current perceptions. Across both intervals, concurrent ratings in fact declined significantly. Longitudinal analyses revealed that the degree of bias in wives’ memories at Time 2 predicted the course of their marital satisfaction over the subsequent 10 years. These results support the view that memory bias may be a mechanism of maintaining satisfaction in long-term relationships.
In this article I discuss how false memories do not always have to be associated with negative outcomes. Indeed, under some circumstances, memory illusions, like other illusions more generally, can have positive consequences. I discuss these consequences in the context of the adaptive function of memory, including how false memories can have fitness-relevant benefits for subsequent behavior and problem solving. My hope is that this article changes how illusions are conceptualized, especially those arising from memory. Rather than being a “demon” that vexes our theories of memory, illusions can be thought of as sometimes having positive consequences much in the same way as many of the other outputs of a very powerful, adaptive memory system.