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Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 3
The myth of Russia in Serbia .......................................................................................................... 3
A brief history of Serbian-Russian relations ................................................................................... 4
1: before 17th century .............................................................................................................. 4
2: “Balkan project” of Russian Empire .................................................................................... 4
3: Soviet period ........................................................................................................................ 6
4: after 1991 ............................................................................................................................. 7
Clash of Russian myth and reality – «White» émigré in Yugoslavia .............................................. 7
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 10
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Introduction
In this essay, I would like to attempt to explore the question of how the Serbian myth of
"Saint Russia" emerged, how rational it is and whether it has any relevance at all to real Russians
and real Russia. In the first part of the paper I will try to briefly describe the myth of Russia in
Serbia, in the second part give an overview of the history of Russian-Serbian relations as a possible
source of myth-making and in the third part I will give a brief overview of the mutual perception
of Serbs and Russian emigrants who come to Yugoslavia after the Russian civil war (1918-1922),
as the first practical meeting of the masses of Russians and Serbs.
1 The myth of Russia in Serbia
As Christopher Flood suggests, “a myth is a narrative, a story which presents a sequence
of connected events” (Flood, 2002). Political myths are narratives of past, present or predicted
political events which their teller wants to make understandable for their communities (Flood,
2002). George Schöpflin argues that myths provide a group with a story that help a group identify
where they have come from and what makes them different from others. These beliefs (mythos)
do not necessarily have to do with facts or rationality (logos). “Myth is about perceptions rather
than historically validated truths (in so far they exist at all), about the ways in which communities
regard certain propositions as normal and natural and others as perverse and alien” (Schöpflin,
1997). There are several types of political myths: primary myths concerning the origins of the
community; myths of "exceptionalism", which prove the uniqueness of the community and serve
as a source of pride for its members; "Golden Age" myths recall successful periods of history,
great days to remember; "Suffering myths" refer to difficult days in the past and give hope for the
future because the community was able to survive (Political Myth, Mythology and the European
Union, 2010).
There was a myth about Russia in Serbia. Probably this myth rooted in Russia's military,
political, financial and educational support for the Orthodox Serbs in their struggle for liberation
from Ottoman empire, as well as the cultural and religious closeness of the two nations. Probably
this myth is much older, Grigoriev and Zakowska claims that “in Serbian culture, Russia was
traditionally perceived as an Orthodox brother, an ‘eternal ally,’ and a future liberator. These
Russophile images were especially widespread among the Serbian folk and the conservative part
of the Serbian intelligentsia. Nevertheless, the specificity of the Serbian attitude towards Russia
consisted especially of strong mystical connotations of Russia’s image. One vision that was highly
influential was the idea of Russia-the-Saviour – the image of a Russian Messiah. This meant the
Serbian myth about Russia had much in common with Serbian quasi-sacralised beliefs about their
own national specificity… the Serbian myth about Russia was significantly influenced by the
Kosovo myth in the period we are considering: the image of Russia was predominantly perceived
through the prism of the significant component of that myth – the cult of self-sacrifice and death”
(RUSSIA IN SERBIAN NATIONAL MYTHOLOGIES SINCE XIX CENTURY UNTIL THE
FIRST WORLD WAR AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, 2018).
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Sergey Romanenko suggest that the myth of Russia as "patroness and protector" of the
Slavic and Orthodox peoples “performs the functions of support, self-identification, orientation,
demarcation (in other words, new self-definition of ethnicities and societies) as well as
compensation and protection (‘psychotherapeutic function’, helping to survive major
transformations and the heavy shocks that often accompany them)” (Romanenko, 2011 p. 29).
This myth is used to manipulate political consciousness, both mass and group, and even
professional and individual, and it is largely dehumanised: “indoctrinates the individual into
thinking that their individual life is nothing compared to the tasks facing the party, state or nation
(ethnos)” (Romanenko, 2011 p. 30).
2 A brief history of Serbian-Russian relations
Alexei Timofeev in his work divides Russian-Serbian relations into four periods
(Timofeev, 2010):
2.1: before 17th century
The first period is from the establishment of the Russian state to the middle of the 17th
century. During this period, the eastern border of the Ottoman Empire passed through the territory
of modern Ukraine. The Orthodox peoples who were under Muslim rule were seen as distant and
unknown peripheries. Contacts were made through the Orthodox Church.
After the fall of Byzantium, Russia remained the only Orthodox state. This formed
messianic ideas in Russia, Moscow being proclaimed not just as the Third Rome, but also as the
Last Rome. The task of preserving Orthodoxy became the mission of Russia, and the fall of
Orthodoxy was seen as an apocalypse
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.
“Russia until the breakdown of Empire in 1917 represented not only an absolute monarchy
but also some form of ‘Orthodox Theocracy’. The role of the Orthodox Church was exceptionally
high as well as a level of religious motivation not only with wider social circles but also with ruling
Russian elites. Russia of Imperial times one can be compared to Saudi Arabia of modern times, a
country which supports follow believers in the world not only for the purpose of economic and
political but also for irrational and religious reasons” (Timofeev, 2010 p. 21).
On the other hand, Orthodoxy is the basis of self-identification of Serbs, it is the faith that
Serbs have kept during all occupations by all empires. If Serbs have always identified with
orthodoxy, then it is little wonder that they developed a bond (real or imaginary) with Russia.
2.2: “Balkan project” of Russian Empire
The second period which Alexei Timofeev defines as started with the reign of Empress
Catherine II (1762 - 1796). After the first Russian-Ottoman war (1768 - 1774) the Treaty of Küçük
Kaynarca was signed which gave to Russian Empire the right to protect Christians in the Ottoman
Empire. During the next Russian-Turkish war (1787 - 1792) Catherine II embarked on the "Balkan
Project" (the division of European Turkey into two parts between the Austrian and Russian
empires. Eastern Balkans with Constantinople would be transformed into a kind of "renewed
1
For more details, see work of Abalov and Inozemtsev “The Endless Empire: Russia in Search of Itself"
( Inozemcev, et al., 2020).
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Byzantine Empire", a Russian's vassal state with Catherine's grandson Constantine at its head).
However, the Western Balkans remained outside the sphere of Russian interests even in this most
ambitious project. Petersburg was never keen to incorporate these territories into the Russian
Empire, despite its support for the rebels during the First Serbian Uprising (1804-1813) and the
Second Serbian Uprising (1815-1817), participation of thousands of Russian volunteers during the
Serbo-Turkish War (1886-1887) etc. The Russian revolutionary Grigory Zinoviev claimed in his
work "Austria and the World War" that “the alpha and omega of Russian policy in the Balkans is
Constantinople and the Straits... The traditional policy of supporting the Balkan Slavs against the
Turks is linked to this particular goal of Russian diplomacy. Russian diplomacy was the initiator
and patron of the Balkan alliance. Its immediate aim was to open the Bosporus and the Dardanelles
to Russian military vessels...” (Zinoviev, 1918 p. 86).
Perhaps the 'protection of Orthodox Christians' (Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians, Montenegrins
and others) was just a tricky way to weaken the Ottoman (and later the Austrian) Empires? Russia
may have adopted not only Orthodoxy from Byzantium but also Byzantinism.
During this period Russian Empire promoted Rusophile and Slavophile ideas in the
Balkans. At the same time, Russia's own policies were as rational as possible. In 1878, after the
Treaty of San Stefano and the Berlin Congress “Russia directed its political aspirations in the
Balkans to Bulgaria, leaving Serbia willingly to the Austrian sphere of influence” (Jovanovic,
2010).
Russia entered the First World War under the slogan of defending its Serbian brothers
against the aggression of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Meanwhile, there was no real
understanding of what this was all about in Russia. The famous Russian military commander
Alexey Brusilov wrote in his memoirs that the fate of Orthodox Serbia and Austrian and Balkan
Slavs did not touch the mind and soul of Russian soldiers. "As many times as I asked in the trenches
what we were fighting about, I always inevitably got the answer that some Archduke was killed
by someone, and then the Austrians wanted to offend the Serbs. But who the Serbs were - hardly
anyone knew, who is the Slavs was also unclear, and why the Germans had gone to war over Serbia
was completely unknown” (Romanenko, 2011 pp. 42-43). Representatives of the Serbian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in Petrograd reported on the situation in the summer of 1917: "Our problems
remain unknown to Russian society and to the masses of the Russian people in particular. It is
known that we exist somehow and somewhere, that we are demanding something. But what we
demand not many people know, and many don't want to know, because Russians are indifferent
by character and have enough problems of their own. On the other hand, our cause has gained
powerful and influential friends in Russia who sympathize us and advocate it. We can expect a lot
from them, in case they manage to get to the surface of this political swamp that is Russia
(Romanenko, 2011 p. 43).
In the summer of 1917 Serbian diplomats and representatives of the Yugoslav Committee
saw in the Bolsheviks a threat to Russia's participation in the war and began preparing the
assassination of Lenin. Serbian Ambassador in Russia Miroslav Spalajković called Lenin a "traitor
of the Slavic race" (Romanenko, 2011 p. 104).
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2.3: Soviet period
The third period came after 1917, when the Russian Empire broke up into more than 80
independent states and, after that, assembled by Communist party back as the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, USSR.
In March 1918 the Bolshevik government signed with the Central Powers the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk. Russia not only withdrew from the war, but also recognised the territorial integrity
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. “In the minds of the southern Slavs, Russia appeared as a state
that refused to support their aspirations for ethno-territorial integrity, national self-determination
and freedom” (Romanenko, 2011 p. 110). The victory of the October Revolution was perceived as
a victory for Germany and its allies.
2.3.1: 1918-1940
A.Timofeev connects this first sub period with the work of Kominterna – international
organization with the headquarters in Moscow with the desire to implement some “world
revolution”. Yugoslavia gave asylum to tens of thousands of opponents of the Bolsheviks in the
Russian Civil War and had no diplomatic relations with the USSR until 1940. Kominterna’s
position was not softer: “’Yugoslavia – a dungeon of peoples’ and ‘Great Serbian chauvinists –
oppressors of the suppressed Macedonians, Croatians, Albanians, Montenegrins, Hungarians,
Germans and Italians’. Later, due to the Hitlers’ coming into power and strengthening Stalin’s
authorities in the USSR, Kominterna softened its sharp criticism. There was a correction of
attitudes on Yugoslavia. Kominterna did not any more bring forward thesis on artificial Versailles
creation but only on the need for the federalization of Yugoslavia as a state. In summer of 1940,
after the breakout of the Second World War, Soviet – Yugoslav relations were created” (Timofeev,
2010 p. 22).
2.3.2: 1944-1948
A second short but important sub-period began in autumn 1944 with the arrival of Soviet
troops in Serbia. They helped liberate Serbia from German rule, but established the cruel regime
of Communist partisans. “From then on until 1948 a vassal towards Moscow regime was in power
in Yugoslavia. The roots of this state lied in earlier agreements between Stalin, Roosevelt and
Churchill. However, one should emphasize a relative low significance of the West Balkans region
on the map of Moscow interests. Easiness, with which Stalin accepted Churchill’s ‘fifty – fifty’ in
defining the future of Yugoslavia is very telling. It is less known that after the insight into the
opened Soviet achieves, it became obvious how easy Stalin gave up Yugoslavia after the conflict
of 1948. Although border skirmishes and provocations on the borders and propaganda activity
were not insignificant, all in all, Moscow never seriously considered an option of military/police
return of Yugoslavia under its control” (Timofeev, 2010 p. 22).
2.3.3: 1948-1991
The third sub-period took place from the break-up of relations in 1948 until the collapse
of the USSR and SFRY. “The relations between Moscow and Belgrade of that time were based on
the bloc division in which Yugoslavia was not on the side of the USSR (for instance, during the
crisis in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia crisis in 1968, during Afghanistan war and Poland
events). It is symptomatic that in military rules and exercises the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army was
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preparing to defend the country both from the ‘blue arrows’ drawn from the West and from the
‘red arrows’ pointed from the East” (Timofeev, 2010 p. 22).
2.4: after 1991
The fourth period began with the fall of the Communist ideology and the disappearance
of the USSR and SFRY (Timofeev, 2010). In the 1990s relations between Russian President
Yeltsin and Serbian President Milosevic were complicated by the fact that Milosevic tried to
establish contacts with the conservative Soviet military leadership and hailed the attempted coup
of 19 August 1991 (Romanenko, 2011 p. 785). This was perceived as a threat by the separatist
(relative to the USSR) leadership of Russian Federation. This may have caused Russia's passive
role during the Bosnian war; Serbia received no help from Russia other than talk of "brotherhood"
and a very theatrical “March on Pristina” due the Kosovo war in 1999.
In the 1990s, “Milosevic’s Serbia often turned to “Majka Rusija”, expecting help (or rather,
expecting that the confrontation between Russia and the West will resume and that the FRY will
reoccupy its “comfortable” position between the two opposing blocs). In those years, Russia tried
to take part in making decisions on war issues in former Yugoslavia, but its engagement and power
failed to satisfy the unrealistic ambitions of the Serbian political leadership (who were, by the way,
too often tied with marginal persons from the Russian politics and even helped them financially,
hoping they will come to power), which constantly led to new disappointments (especially during
and after the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999)” (Jovanovic, 2010). Only two weeks before war
began in Kosovo in 1998, “an overwhelming 78% of Serbs believed that Russia would come to
Serbia’s aid if Serbia were to be bombed. The fact that Russia did no such thing shows that either
Serbs were overly optimistic about Russian assistance or that they had serious misconceptions
about Russian interests in the Balkans” (Contemporary Russian-Serbian Relations: Interviews with
Youth from Political Parties in Belgrade and Vojvodina, 2014).
In the 2000s Čedomir Jovanović, President of the Liberal Democratic Party, conceded that
Serbia “knelt before Russia for Kosovo” when it sold 51% of NIS (Serbia’s gas company) to
Russia. In other words, Serbia sold the majority of its most valuable asset in exchange for Russian
support for Serbia regarding Kosovo. No matter how people resolve to interpret Russia’s presence
in Serbian politics, the main point of issue is that they are likely to do so without trying to
understand Russia’s true positions, intentions, and interests (Contemporary Russian-Serbian
Relations: Interviews with Youth from Political Parties in Belgrade and Vojvodina, 2014).
3 Clash of Russian myth and reality – «White»
émigré in Yugoslavia
In fact, until the 20th century, Russians and Serbs had never really faced each other. In the
17th century a few thousand Serbs emigrated from the Austrian Empire to "New Serbia", a region
in what is now Сentral Ukraine, and to "Slovanoserbia", a region in the modern East Ukraine. By
the end of the 19th century this Serbs had been completely assimilated among Russians and
Ukrainians.
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After the end of the Russian Civil War, Yugoslavia hosted 42,000 to 44,000 Russian Anti-
communist (“Whites”) émigré, three quarters of whom settled in Serbia. This could be called the
first real meeting between the Russian and Serbian nations. The emigrants pointed out that
nowhere else in foreign lands were forced to leave Russia the White Guard soldiers so hospitable,
as in Yugoslavia. The reason for this was Russia's defence of Serbia during the First World War
and the fact that after the war the political and spiritual leaders of the Slavic state were two
Russophiles: King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and Patriarch of Serbia Varnava (Romanenko, 2011
p. 273). Emigrants said that “People here love Russia as much as the Russians do” (Nikiforov,
2011 p. 72). The Russian writer Leonid Andreev wrote: "In Serbia we are loved with a warm,
heartfelt, almost tender love. Try, whoever you are, to travel through its blood-stained fields and
towns... and you will think you are a sovereign prince, a prophet, an angel of God himself - such
love and reverence will surround you with these exhausted people!" (Nikiforov, 2011 p. 72)
Russian émigrés generally experienced the Yugoslavs as “good-natured and kind, albeit
primitive and uncultured” (Political, Social, and Personal: The Encounters of theRussian
Emigration in Yugoslavia, 1921–41, 2007 p. 31). In émigrés’ memoirs “the locals are connoted
with imagery of noble barbarians. In fact, this axis of comparison prevails in émigré memoirs,
often mirroring the experiences described by scholars of the Russian diasporas in France and
Germany. That is to say that while the émigrés perceived themselves as Easterners in Western
Europe, vis-à-vis the Yugoslavs, it seems that Russians self-identified as Westerners… ‘Serbian
society with all its ways and manners and interests was absolutely alien to us’” (Political, Social,
and Personal: The Encounters of theRussian Emigration in Yugoslavia, 1921–41, 2007 p. 32).
Despite the proclamation of Pan-Slavism and "brotherhood" in everyday communication it
came out that Russians and Serbs are totally different. They have different language, mannerisms,
dress, habits, worldview, culture, perception of space, time, different attitude to children, to the
opposite sex and to the own body. Serbs were shocked by the emancipation of Russian women; by
men doing "women's work" at home; by the fact that Russians “drink tea all the time”; by Russians,
who carried vast personal libraries and subscribed to books and magazines from all over the world;
by Russians bathing in the sea in January and bathing in the nude; even by Russians feeding stray
cats (Nikiforov, 2011 p. 75) (Arseniev, 2019) (Political, Social, and Personal: The Encounters of
theRussian Emigration in Yugoslavia, 1921–41, 2007 pp. 33-34). Probably it was not just a
meeting of two different nationalities, but a meeting of urban, educated, culturally fluent, upper
classes of Russian society with the rural, patriarchal Balkans, where a minority of the population
was elementary literate.
Moreover, it seemed that Russian Orthodoxy and Serbian Orthodoxy were very different.
Toma K. Popović, a local historian and chronicler of the Montenegrin town of Herceg Novi,
recalled: “Russian people are too worshipful, if not superstitious. We Serbs, the most liberal of all
Slavs in this sense, find it strange to see a Russian general, or an admiral, or a professor, falls on
his knees and bangs his forehead on the floor in a church” (Arseniev, 2019 p. 116). The emigrants
noted that the Serbs were not used to long services and did not attend temples very diligently,
although they know the church liturgy better than the Russians. Their impression is that Serbian
monasticism was in decline and the monasteries were empty. Russian poetess Zinaida Gippius
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wrote that “Serbian Orthodoxy is not like Russian Orthodoxy: it is more domestic and popular,
simpler, and, most importantly, more fun” (Nikiforov, 2011 p. 76).
The Russian exile’s public figure and a member of the State Commission for Russian
Refugees Sergei Paleolog wrote that “the higher Government, the Clergy, the upper classes of the
intelligentsia and the officers treated us impeccably. City folk and merchants are totally indifferent
to the Russians, sympathy is almost exceptional. The villagers, with whom we have little to do
business, have a friendly attitude, but with sincere amazement they constantly ask ‘Зашто смо
допутовали из Русије?’ (Why did we come from Russia?)” (Nikiforov, 2011 p. 77)
More than a 100 Russian professors and scientists taught at the universities of the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, over seventy of them at Belgrade University alone. They argued
that the science of Yugoslavia should be 80 years behind that of the Russian Empire, with no
textbooks or elementary materials. (Sorokina, 2019). The Russian emigration brought enormous
contributions to the scientific, economic and social spheres of Yugoslavia. The cultural
contribution of Russian emigrants to inter-war Belgrade was enormous: from theatre, ballet and
opera to architecture and libraries, literature and art (Political, Social, and Personal: The
Encounters of theRussian Emigration in Yugoslavia, 1921–41, 2007 p. 27). But many Russian
“White” emigrants viewed Yugoslavia as a temporary refuge and tried not to assimilate, attempted
to keep their identity. Mixed marriages became a frequent phenomenon only in the second
generation of emigrants. Many Russians continued to feel like a "foreign body" in Yugoslavia, it
could be said that the Serbs did not know the Russians and were not interested in them, and the
Russians did not know the Serbs. Serbian society and Russian “White” émigrés had no common
ground.
N. Protopopov, who was born in Yugoslavia into a family of Russian émigré, wrote that
“Ordinary Yugoslav citizens shared an almost universal misunderstanding of who 'Whites' were,
how they had come to Yugoslavia and why they chose their difficult life as exiles in a foreign land
rather than living in their homeland... The Russian émigré took every opportunity to open people's
eyes to the bestial face of Bolshevism and the tragic fate of the Russians in the Soviet Russia.
Neither conversations with the locals, nor articles in periodicals, nor lectures and reports, nor,
finally, obvious facts reported in the western press - nothing could shake the scepticism of the
Serbs and Montenegrins in particular. Speaking about the Soviet Union many persisted in using
the expression "Majka Rusija" (Mother Russia). Soviet Russia and the USSR were identified in
the minds of many people with the traditional image of the "brotherly Slavic empire". These
"Russophile" sentiments worked to the advantage of local communists: “they took every
opportunity to deepen the trench of misunderstanding, misinforming the population and
discrediting Russian ‘anti-communist’ refugees in Serbian eyes. Many people simply could not
imagine the realities of Soviet Russia, which were so unreal in their cruelty and tragedy that it
seemed a malicious fabrication and a deliberate defamation to any normal person” (Romanenko,
2011 p. 274).
Finally, after the outbreak of World War II and the occupation of Serbia, the attitude of the
local population totally deteriorated. Emigrants were physically and verbally attacked and some
were murdered. "Оче Стаљин" (Father Stalin) and "Црвена армија" (Red Army) aroused
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diametrically opposed feelings among the masses of the Serbian population and the anti-
Communist Russian emigrants (Nikiforov, 2011 p. 78).
Conclusion
The Serbian myth of Russia has a huge impact on Serbian politics. 62% of Serbs believe
Russia is superior to the US in military power (Milo, 2021), Putin's rating in Serbia is higher than
in Russia (TASS, 2018). “Answering the question ‘Which country is the friendliest to Serbia?’
41% Serbs called Russia (while all other countries in the aggregate gained only 27 % of
supporters)” (RUSSIA IN SERBIAN NATIONAL MYTHOLOGIES SINCE XIX CENTURY
UNTIL THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE MODERN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2018).
At the same time, answering the question „Which state, other than Serbia, you would like
to live in?”, only 3% noted Russia (the EU countries together gained 36% of supporters)»
(RUSSIA IN SERBIAN NATIONAL MYTHOLOGIES SINCE XIX CENTURY UNTIL THE
FIRST WORLD WAR AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, 2018). Only 11% of Serbs were in Russia (Institut za evropske poslove, 2020).
Less than 1% of Serbian schoolchildren study Russian as their first foreign language (Milošević,
2020). A significant number of books about Russia are published in Serbia. However, they are full
of mythology and have nothing to do with the real Russia (Jovanovic, 2010).
This myth works despite President Putin's wars with "brotherly" Orthodox Georgia (in
2008) and Orthodox Ukraine (2014), his terrorist attacks with chemical weapons on Orthodox
Bulgaria (2015) and with conventional weapons on Slavic Czechia (2014), the creeping occupation
of Orthodox Belarus (2020), during which some Orthodox Slavs brutally torture other Orthodox
Slavs. Serbian society seems unwilling to see this, and the Russian opposition cries out in the
wilderness, just as the Russian "white" emigrantes told about the horrors of communist rule.
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