The War of Narratives: The Image of Ukraine in Western, Russian and Ukrainian Media (1991-2022)

Abstract

The report provides an analysis of narratives about Ukraine spread in mass media from 1991 to 2022. The publication is designed to help politicians, journalists and the expert community develop a deeper understanding of the narratives that have shaped the image of Ukraine in the Western, Russian and Ukrainian mass media in recent decades.

Full text

THE WAR OF NARRATIVES:
UKRAINE’S IMAGE IN THE MEDIA
KYIV – 2023

ISBN 978-617-7574-83-4
Analytical report. The War of Narratives: Ukraine’s Image in the Media / authors: О. Davlikanova, А. Kostenko
et al – Kyiv: LLC «Vistka», 2023. – 146 p.
This report provides an analysis of narratives about Ukraine spread in the mass media from 1991 to 2022.
The publication is designed to help politicians, journalists and the expert community develop a deeper
understanding of the narratives that have shaped Ukraine’s image in the Western, Russian and Ukrainian
mass media in recent decades.
© Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Office in Ukraine, 2023

CONTENTS
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................................................... 5
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................................................6
ABBREVIATIONS .........................................................................................................................................................7
CHAPTER 1. THE NATURE OF NARRATIVES: AN INSTRUMENT FOR DECODING REALITY,
CONTROLLING THEMASSES AND WARFARE ...............................................................................9
CHAPTER 2. A WESTE RN LENS FOR UN DE RSTANDIN G UKR AINE .............................................14
SUICIDAL NATIONALISM AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS .................................................................................... 14
RUSSIA–UKRAINE – UNBREAKABLE TIES ........................................................................................................ 17
UKRAINE BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE EAST – NATIONAL AWAKENING AND
PRO-EUROPEAN SELF-AWARENESS ...................................................................................................................20
FAILED DEMOCRACY AND FAILED REVOLUTION ...........................................................................................24
UKRAINE UNDER THE PROTECTION OF “BIG BROTHER” – NON-ALIGNED STATE OR RUSSIA’S
NEXT MILITARY TARGET? ......................................................................................................................................26
UKRAINE BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE CUSTOMS UNION ...........................................35
UKRAINE DIVIDED AND A “CIVIL WAR” ...............................................................................................................37
UKRAINIAN RIGHT-WING RADICALISM .............................................................................................................42
OCCUPATION, ANNEXATION AND FEDERALIZATION ...................................................................................45
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST ON THE TERRITORY OF UKRAINE ..............51
A BRAVE COUNTRY DEFENDING THE WHOLE DEMOCRATIC WORLD ....................................................55
INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................65
CHAPTER 3. RUSSIAN ME DIA ON UKRAINE: THE WAR FOR MI NDS ...........................................67
UKRAINE AND RUSSIA ARE BOUND BY A COMMON HISTORY, BUT WILL BUILD EQUAL
RELATIONS ..................................................................................................................................................................72
A WEAK STATE POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY .....................................................................................73
BLOOD-RELATED NATIONS DIVIDED ...................................................................................................................76
THE “RUSSIAN WORLD” AND THE THREAT FROM THE WEST ................................................................... 79
GAYS, RADICALS, NATIONALISTS / NAZIS, FASCISTS TOOK POWER IN UKRAINE ............................. 83

UKRAINE AS A NON-EXISTENT STATE ...............................................................................................................91
DENAZIFICATION AND DEMILITARIZATION OF UKRAINE ...........................................................................95
“RETREATING OFFENSIVE”, “GESTURES OF GOOD WILL” AND OTHER CREATIVE
ACHIEVEMENTS OF RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA .................................................................................................97
INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................99
CHAPTER 4. UKRAINIAN MEDIA OPTICS: FROM THE REPRODUCTION OF RUSSIAN
NARRATIVES TOSHAPING THE NATION’S SELF-AWARENESS .......................................................101
A PEACEFUL WAY TO INDEPENDENCE ................................................................................................................102
INTEGRITY OF THE UKRAINIAN BORDERS ......................................................................................................... 105
UKRAINE AS A NEUTRAL, NON-ALIGNED AND NON-NUCLEAR STATE ........................................................107
UKRAINE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE EU / NATO COUNTRIES .....................................................................109
ARTIFICIAL DIVISION OF UKRAINE ......................................................................................................................... 112
ECONOMICALLY PROFITABLE AND VITALLY NECESSARY FRIENDSHIP ......................................................117
MULTI-VECTOR POLICY AND NON-BLOCK STATUS ........................................................................................... 119
ASSOCIATION WITH THE EU = UKRAINE’S ECONOMIC COLLAPSE ............................................................... 120
THE REVOLUTION OF DIGNITY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM ..........................................................122
UKRAINE AGAINST RUSCISM ................................................................................................................................126
GUARDING THE WHOLE DEMOCRATIC WORLD .................................................................................................130
UNBREAKABLE PEOPLE OF AN UNBREAKABLE COUNTRY ............................................................................132
INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................... 141
EPILOGUE .......................................................................................................................................142

5
Summary
SUMMARY
In Russia's war against Ukraine and the "collective West", the media is a real and effective force, indeed
a weapon. To achieve its political and military goals, the Russian Federation actively uses “asymmetric”
information campaigns to intentionally distort facts and spread false information with the aim of
manipulating and influencing mass consciousness and shaping political processes. As for Ukraine,
in the conditions of open aggression against it, and even hybrid special operations, we are talking not
only – and perhaps not so much – about propaganda, but about a veritable war of ideas.
In order to spread Russian narratives about Ukraine that create a false impression of the country
among external and internal audiences, the Russian Federation uses a whole complex of information
and communication channels. Their main task is to replace the target audience's existing ideas about
the real, factual state of affairs with ideas that are considered to be more beneficial to the aggressor
country. Russia rejects democratic principles and Ukraine's desire for a European future. Depending
on the tasks and results (successes/failures) of operations to influence the internal politics of Ukraine
and the formation of its image among the Western audience, Russian narratives changed from a
presentation of Ukrainians and Russians as “brotherly” peoples or even one people to the importance
of the complete extermination of "Ukrainian nationalists and Nazis," denial of the very existence of
Ukrainians as a distinct ethnic group (thereby “ justifying” genocide), returning supposed "historical
territories of Russia," and promoting the idea that Ukraine has never really been a proper state or is a
historic mistake.
The narratives of Russian propaganda intertwine, sometimes reinforcing and sometimes contradicting
each other. But whatever the Russian narrative may be, its main goal is to undermine Ukraine’s
democratic development and its integration into the Western world, to weaken the desire of Ukrainians
to determine their future outside Russian influence, within the European family, as well as to weaken
international support for Ukraine.
The Kremlin's disinformation campaign led to the emergence of a number of stereotypes that
influenced the decision-making of Ukraine's partners at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, which
led to numerous human casualties, the destruction of Ukrainian economy and infrastructure, and a
real threat to the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Fortunately, Ukraine has persevered.
Unbreakable people of an unbreakable country continues its fight not only for itself but the whole
democratic world.

6THE WAR OF NARRATIVES: UKRAINE’S IMAGE IN THE MEDIA
INTRODUCTION
“The world” might be described as, in a sense, a collection of stories about nations and states. Such
stories may unite nations or unleash wars, glorify the past or strike terror with predictions about the
future, debunk policies (or ideologies) or give hope for a better future. Often, narratives are a means of
constructing meaning, interpreting reality, and explaining or justifying domestic and foreign policies. With
their help national interests may be voiced and implemented. Methodical and consistent promotion of
narratives may form a stable image of the state, what may become its established image. Or inversely,
they may be used for manipulation, to create an alternative, imagined reality, and become a tool of
disinformation and propaganda. At a meeting with an international delegation of rabbis, Vladimir Putin
remarked: "Goebbels said: the more incredible a lie is, the faster it will be believed. And he achieved his
goals, he was a talented person.1” Needless to say, his use of such “talents” in managing the state and
“mobilizing” the masses led to the commission of some of the most terrible crimes against humanity.
History is repeating itself, and the country (and its predecessor the Soviet Union) that has devoted itself
to “appropriating” the victory over fascism in the Second World War is itself now resorting to the most
inhumane methods of the past.
Modern political narratives are used mainly in adversarial, conflictual discourse and are part of
contemporary “hybrid” warfare. The political narrative seeks to shape the picture of the world not only
for ordinary citizens, but also for the international community and political elites, because it is presented
as factual material that reflects reality. Perceptions and interpretations of political events are shaped by
narratives disseminated by key political actors, changing meanings in accordance with the situation.
If narratives are used as propaganda tools, the result is that fiction or manipulation may become fact,
and myth may be perceived as reality.
Thus the narratives about Ukraine created by Russian propaganda influenced the Russian population’s
attitude to Ukrainians, as well as that of Western partners of Ukraine and their decisions in the first
weeks after the full-scale invasion. Clearly it is of the utmost importance for the country to formulate
an image based on reality and that corresponds with its strategic goals.
This publication focuses on the key narratives about Ukraine that have been distributed in Western,
Russian and Ukrainian mass media since Ukraine achieved its independence (1991). Since 1991 and
until 2022, Russian narratives depicted Ukraine as a semi-failed state, asserting Russian claims on
Ukrainian territory and even demonizing democratic and European integration processes.
We intend to track the transformation of the image of Ukraine and the influence of Russian propaganda
on this process by means of narratives: from the “triune fraternal people of Russians-Ukrainians-
Belarusians” and the “wise care of the elder brother (Russia cares for Ukraine)” to talk of a “Ukrainian
coup”, “the struggle between Russia and the Collective West on the territory of Ukraine”, “Ukrainian
Nazism” and the denial of Ukraine’s very existence as a nation.
Therefore, the publication is designed to help all interested parties to free themselves from the
captivity of Russian propaganda and to separate myths from reality to enable more informed policy
formation regarding Ukraine, as well as to help Ukrainians themselves on the path of self-awareness
and self-determination.
1 A meeting with representatives of international public and religious organizations, Sobytiya, 2014.
Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46180

7
abbreviationS
ABBREVIATIONS
AA – Association Agreement
ATO – anti-terrorist operation
BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation (national broadcaster of the United Kingdom)
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States
CJSC – Closed joint-stock company
CNN – Cable News Network (US broadcasting company)
CPRF – Communist Party of the Russian Federation
DPR – Donetsk People's Republic
DW – Deutsche Welle (German media company)
FSB – Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KGB – Committee for State Security
LGBT – lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
LPR – Luhansk People's Republic
MAP – Membership Action Plan
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPLP – National Council of Electronic Media of Latvia
OC – Operational Commands
PMC – Private military company
RF – Russian Federation
Roskomnadzor – Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology
and Mass Media

8THE WAR OF NARRATIVES: UKRAINE’S IMAGE IN THE MEDIA
RT – Russia Today
SDPU(u) – Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united)
SMO – Special military operation
Sr – Senior
SSR – Soviet Socialist Republic
UN – United Nations
UNA-UNSO – Ukrainian National Assembly — Ukrainian People's Self-Defense
US – United States of America
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics / Soviet Union
VPN – Virtual private network

9
Chapter 1. the nature of narrativeS: an inStrument for DeCoDing reality, Controlling the maSSeS anD Warfare
CHAPTER 1. THE NATURE OF
NARRATIVES: AN INSTRUMENT FOR
DECODING REALITY, CONTROLLING
THE MASSES AND WARFARE
The term “narrative” derives from the Latin word “narratio”, a story. Narratives, from one perspective,
are designed to help the human psyche understand complex reality and make sense of a diverse and
rapidly changing world. From the other perspective, they may be used as weapons in information
wars justifying blood-thirsty ideologies and genocides, misleading nations in their self-perception or
explaining unjust political decisions. The basis of narratives is myth – in other words, a narrative is
a story about a certain event or phenomenon (as an explanation of political or social realities, or an
interpretation of historical events), in which the interpretation of their nature and meaning may prevail
over facts.
Jean-François Lyotard points out that the narrative type of discourse is characterized by constant
repetition, while factual (scientific) discourse is supported by facts, accurate data. Narrative knowledge
does not require legitimation, does not need arguments, and its foundations comprise customs,
authorities, superstitions, prejudices, stereotypes, or ideology.2 Wolf Schmid claims that narratives
have the property of presenting and transforming reality through the lens of the narrator.3 Psychologists
Brockmeyer and Harré note that a narrative is not a description of reality, but an instruction for
understanding (decoding) it.4
Three levels of narrative can be distinguished for the purposes of this report: geopolitical (systemic),
national (identity narrative) and policy.5
(i) Geopolitical narratives explain the world. These are stories about how the world functions, what
laws govern it, including the concepts of “good” and “evil”. Conventionally, these are narratives on a
planetary scale, or grand narratives, such as the narratives of religions and ideologies, for example
about a struggle between communism and capitalism.
(ii) National narratives (identity narratives) are stories about states – their history, aspirations, desires,
actions; about how they see themselves and how others see them. Conventionally, such narratives
are an answer to the question “Who are we?” and “What do we want?” This is the visionary concept
of the nation.
(iii) Policy narratives are a tactical tool for explaining current state policy: why certain decisions are
made, how they will contribute to development, who are the participants in these decisions, what
the problem is, how certain events should be perceived, and so on.6
Narratives may be used to try to control the masses. The strength of narratives from this perspective
lies in the fact that, having absorbed a series of meanings and concepts, they are able to repackage
2 Lyotard, J.-F. (1984): The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
3 Shmid, V. (2003): “Narratology”, Languages of Slavic Culture. Moscow.
4 Brockmeyer, Y./Harré, R. (2000): Narrative: problems and promises of one alternative paradigm. Questions of Philosophy, No. 3,
pp. 29–42.
5 Miskimmon, A./O’Loughlin, B./ Roselle, L. (2013): Strategic Narratives. Communication Power and the New World Order. New
York: Routledge (1st edition).
6 In the research, we focus on geopolitical and national narratives that influence the formation of the image of Ukraine.

10 THE WAR OF NARRATIVES: UKRAINE’S IMAGE IN THE MEDIA
them into a short, understandable form that provokes people to form an attitude towards an event or
phenomenon and may even prompt them to act.
Modern narratives may reach the broad mass of the population because they are broadcast in the
information space. They may be embedded in mass consciousness by repetition, especially in conditions
in which there is a low level of development of critical thinking or limited access to alternative sources
of information. According to communication theory, repeated exposure to media content may lead to
a perception of statements as completely true. Cultivation theory states that media influence is based
on repetition, confirmation and reinforcement, and ultimately the cultivation of values and beliefs.
Narratives can reproduce themselves in society. The basis for reproducing a narrative arises from the
fact that people tend to believe familiar things, based on things that they have already seen, heard,
felt, or thought. Anything new and unknown, however, may lead to confusion, manifest as discomfort,
causing anxiety. Therefore, new messages are much less likely to be received. Conversely, if in response
to a story a person says: “I thought something like that myself” or “I always knew it”, the message has
a better chance of achieving its goal.7
With the help of narratives, states may try to articulate their interests and values,8 shape their country’s
image in the international arena, and seek to enforce the legitimacy of foreign and domestic policies.9
Because in our multipolar world there is confrontation in the political, economic, security and other
spheres between centers of power, battles may take place, if not on the battlefield or in the form of
economic wars, then in the form of so-called “narrative wars”. Narratives used for misinformation,
propaganda, or populist mobilization can undermine the value base of society and destabilize a state,
or help to expand the influence of a country, an ideology, or a regime. In the framework of hybrid
wars, propaganda and disinformation become tools of information and psychological influence, and
narratives become weapons.
7 Zolotukhin, D. (2022): Ukrainian strategic narrative: “basics” [Electronic resource]. Ukrinform.
Available at: https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/2620105-ukrainskij-strategicnij-narativ-matcastina.html.
8 Ibid.
9 Ozhevan, M.A. (2016): Global war of strategic narratives: challenges and risks for Ukraine. Series: Politics, No. 4, pp. 30–40.
Available at: http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/sppol_2016_4_6
NARRATIVE
ATTEMPT TO
UNDERSTAND REALITY
PERSUASION
SIMPLIFICATION
OF REALITY
EXPLANATION AND
INTERPRETATION
OF REALITY
Figure 1. Narrative
as a mean s of
inuencing public
consciousness

11
Chapter 1. the nature of narrativeS: an inStrument for DeCoDing reality, Controlling the maSSeS anD Warfare
The question arises of why, despite access to information from primary sources enabled by the latest
technologies, harmful narratives may capture people’s consciousness en masse and cannot quickly
be refuted?
Propaganda narratives often rely on “mythologemes”, images and symbols embedded in the historical
development of a particular society. Therefore, such narratives may have a special (sacred) meaning
for people who perceive them, because their content corresponds to their worldview. Narratives take
into account certain deep cultural codes, peculiarities of the national character, myths, imperatives,
traditions inherent in a certain culture, conditioned, among other things, by religious and historical
factors. Even people with similar or shared historical backgrounds often have different attitudes to such
concepts and phenomena as the right to personal freedom, life and work, attach different meanings to
the concept of “success” and the markers of “us” and “them”. Taking these codes into account allows
people to compose narratives and direct them to specific target audiences.
The historical and cultural plane is the basis for the construction of metanarratives, narratives under
whose umbrella others can be articulated and promoted. Historical and cultural metanarratives
assume the existence of an unlimited number of interpretations of certain stories and their free use by
all interested agents.
Modern Russian propaganda narratives are formed on the basis of exploitation (or twisting) of cultural
norms and historical facts. The “historization” of Russian domestic and foreign policy is aimed at
legitimizing the political regime with the help of historical arguments and aggressive imperial policy. This
may include interference in the internal affairs of independent neighboring countries, as well as military
campaigns aimed at changing the democratic order and seizing new territories. Such “historization”
is also used to mobilize the aggressor country’s own population for the sake of “protecting the state
and the regime in the sacred struggle against the enemies of Russia”, which may include the collective
West, the “Nazis”, NATO, and others.
In general, we can distinguish three main metanarratives promoted by Russia that form the basis for its
geopolitical and national narratives. The first is built around an idea of the “powerful USSR” and “Russia
as its rightful successor”. This makes up the framework for Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. However,
this metanarrative naturally omits such topics as the oppression of nations and ethnic groups, mass
repressions and forced displacements of population, the Holodomor (the severe famine in Ukraine
artificially created by the Stalin regime), the 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact between the USSR and
Hitler’s Germany, and the division of Poland and other crimes perpetrated by the oppressive Soviet
regime. Attempts to critically rethink Soviet history are also sharply condemned: Russia opposes the
policy of decommunization, including the removal of Soviet monuments or change of toponyms, and
the work of the NGO Memorial (an international human rights organization founded in Russia to examine
the human rights violations and other crimes committed under Stalin’s reign – ed.). Decommunization
is usually equated with fascism and the revival of far-right sentiments.
The victory in the ”Great Patriotic War” (1941-1945) and not the WWII (1939-1945) is presented as the
outstanding event not only of the twentieth century, but in the whole of history. Russia attributes this
victory exclusively to itself, “forgetting” the cooperation between the USSR and Nazi Germany before
1941, as well as role of the Western countries in defeating Nazis, in particular their supply of vast
quantities of weapons. The Russian Federation’s interpretation of historical events looks even more
shaky in light of its backing for far-right movements and parties in the EU in order to try to destabilize
it. Russia has created a false sense of guilt in Germany and its allies exclusively towards the Russian
Federation, although the territory of Ukraine and Belarus (the “Bloodlands”, ed.) suffered the most. It
also seeks to justify the repressive regime of Joseph Stalin as the “leader of a great victorious country”,
thus equating the concept of a “repressive (authoritarian) regime” with the concept of a “strong country”,
as opposed to “weak democracy”.10
10 Gromenko, S. (2022): Putin. How the historical machine of the Russian Federation works. Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of the Future.

12 THE WAR OF NARRATIVES: UKRAINE’S IMAGE IN THE MEDIA
The main goal of this metanarrative is to shape perceptions of the common Soviet history as positive
and of Russia as the leader in the region, positioning Ukraine as complimentary and subordinate to the
Russian Federation.
The second metanarrative is the historical and cultural narrative about “brotherly nations”. In this
narrative, Ukraine may claim a share of the common cultural heritage, which is often labeled “Soviet”,
but only on condition that Ukraine renounces its own subjectivity and assumes the role of “younger
brother” (or satellite). It is this paradigm that justifies the alleged “inauthenticity” of Ukrainian statehood
and tries to inculcate the idea of “one people” (Russians and Ukrainians are one people, not two different
ones – ed.).
In this context, Russia is presented as a civilizational and cultural center for countries that were part
of the USSR or were in its zone of influence. The purpose of this narrative is the erosion of national
identity, the strengthening of the hybrid influence of the aggressor state in the cultural sphere, the
marginalization of Ukrainian cultural heritage, and the strengthening of the so-called “kinship of nations.”
This metanarrative is reinforced by the third one, the concept of a “Russian world”. In its modern
politically-colored version it appeared in 1990s and reflects Russian ambitions to unite peoples
who, according to the Russian regime, are or should be in the Russian sphere of influence, which is
determined not by the borders on the political map, but by the halo of the Russian-speaking population,
a common vision of Russian culture, history, and Russian Orthodoxy. In 2000, a co-ideologists of a
modern version of the “Russian World” concept Pyotr Shchedrovitsky in the article "Russian World and
Transnational Russian Characteristics" emphasized the importance of the Russian language rooted
in the ideas of Johann Herder about the principle of linguistic relativity.11 In other words, those who
speak Russian come to think Russian, and eventually to act Russian. Protection against Russification
is so important, because it is primarily a matter of national security, and not an issue of the rights of
linguistic minorities. Everything Slav-related is presented as “historically Russian”. The history of Rus’
(Kyivan Rus’ was a state in eastern and northern Europe with its capital in Kyiv from the late ninth to
the mid-thirteenth century – ed.) is rewritten as the history of “Russia”, and other Slavic cultures are
presented as derived from it. This concept is used in tandem with the concept of Russia as a country
constantly under attack by enemies. The “hostile West” is presented as “morally corrupt”, somewhere
where “family values” are being eroded and “sanctuaries” are not respected. Russia has used this
narrative more aggressively since 2014 to try to legitimize its aggression in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine,
claiming that these territories are culturally, historically and in terms of values supposedly Russian.
Particular narratives are often instigated by Vladimir Putin himself through speeches and articles on
historical topics. The promotion of the official narrative in accordance with a single historical and
cultural standard is carried out by state institutions, the Russian Orthodox Church and its representative
branches in other countries, such as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), which
actually performs the function of intelligence gathering and engages in sabotage and spreading
propaganda on foreign soil. In addition, a well-built and generously funded propaganda machine is
reinforced by “troll factories”, which, in combination with a complete absence of independent media in
Russia, can be considered tools of information and even hybrid warfare.
Ukraine has also created metanarratives. The most important in the context of Russia’s imperialistic
ambitions is “Ukraine’s European future” and its affiliation to the “European family”. It substantiates
Ukraine’s historical ties with other European states, starting from the time of Kyivan Rus’, underlining
Ukrainians’ European identity. This narrative is aimed at strengthening European integration processes
and is presented as a civilizational choice.
11 Kudors, Andis. “Russian World”—Russia’s Soft Power Approach to Compatriots Policy. Russian Analytical Digest #81, 16 June
2010. Available at: 0http://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/117631/Russian_Analytical_
Digest_81.pdf

13
Chapter 1. the nature of narrativeS: an inStrument for DeCoDing reality, Controlling the maSSeS anD Warfare
The metanarrative “Ukrainian choice as a national idea of Ukraine” is based on the idea of national
identity and Ukrainians’ heroic struggle for their own national state and independence. Ukraine is
portrayed as a post-genocide society that has managed to survive, preserve its culture and language,
and achieve independence. However, Ukrainian culture, language and history are still under threat and
need to be protected from Russia. The purpose of this narrative is to unite society around democratic
Ukrainian traditions and strengthen statehood.
Throughout its independence, Ukraine has tried to find its own geopolitical place, which at certain
historical stages has been interpreted differently: “buffer zone”, “outskirts of the ‘Russian world’”, part
of Eastern Slavic Orthodox civilization, “gateway of Europe”, “a crossroads of civilizations”, “part of the
European family”, and so on.

14 THE WAR OF NARRATIVES: UKRAINE’S IMAGE IN THE MEDIA
CHAPTER 2. A WESTERN LENS FOR
UNDERSTANDING UKRAINE
Since 1991 Western media’s coverage of events in Ukraine sometimes lacks a sense of context,
reflecting Russian propaganda narratives and passing on prejudices and stereotypes about Ukraine.
Russia aggressively uses its entire information arsenal to influence the international community, in
particular via TV channels such as “Russia”, “RTR-Planeta”, CJSC “Pervyi Kanal – World Network” and
others. For example, the 24-hour TV channel Russia Today (hereinafter RT) was broadcast in more
than 100 countries around the world until recently, with its own branches in Washington and London.
In addition, RT publishes its own product on YouTube. At the end of 2014, the internet portal “Sputnik”
was additionally launched to spread RT TV channel content to a broader audience.
Although after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European Union, by decision of the Council
of the EU, suspended the broadcasting of the propaganda TV channels Sputnik and Russia Today,
including RT English, RT UK, RT Germany, RT France and RT Spanish, Russia continues to conduct its
global disinformation campaign.12
Thus, during the past 30 years, the image of Ukraine in the Western media has been formed in an
environment of aggressive Russian anti-Ukrainian narratives, which are reviewed in detail in Chapter 3.
SUICIDAL NATIONALISM AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In the 1990s, Ukraine’s image in the West was perceived through the lens of Soviet history. Given the
shock of the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union13 and the fear that decentralization processes could
lead to destabilization of the region, Ukraine’s independence was presented rather in the context of
an uncertain future and possible risks for the world security system. A new country with the largest
territory in Europe after the Russian Federation, nuclear weapons and no clear self-identification, at
that time Ukraine seemed unpredictable to the rest of the world.
Even then, Ukrainians’ aspirations for independence were labeled “nationalist”, which carried negative
connotations. US President George Bush Sr., when speaking in Kyiv, called on the deputies to support
Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms and abandon “suicidal nationalism”.14 “I come here to tell you: we support the
struggle in this great country for democracy and economic reform. In Moscow, I outlined our approach.
We will support those in the center and the republics who pursue freedom, democracy and economic
liberty… Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny
with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic
hatred.”15 The US president supported democratic developments in the USSR and emphasized the need
for close cooperation between the USA and the USSR. This speech went down in history as the “Chicken
Kyiv Speech” and in retrospect “may have been the worst speech ever by an American chief executive”.16
12 Council of the EU (2022): EU imposes sanctions on state-owned outlets RT/Russia Today and Sputnik’s broadcasting in the EU.
Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/02/eu-imposes-sanctions-on-state-owned-
outlets-rt-russia-today-and-sputnik-s-broadcasting-in-the-eu/.
13 Gordienko, T. (2017): Eight publications about the independence of Ukraine – a review of foreign media. Media Sapiens.
Available at: https://ms.detector.media/presa-u-sviti/post/19533/2017-08-24-visim-publikatsiy-pro-nezalezhnist-ukrainy-oglyad-
inozemnykh-media/
14 “Chicken Kyiv. How the USA and Bush Sr. tried to save the Soviet Union from collapse”, Om TV. 2021.
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wo_3-_UNgwU.
15 Ibid.
16 Carafano, James (4 квітня 2011): How to be a freedom fighter. The Washington Examiner. Original archive, June 10, 2014.
Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20140610060102/http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-28353164.html

15
Chapter 2. a WeStern lenS for unDerStanDing ukraine
Screenshot 2. Artic le: “In Pictures: U kraine’s
Path to Ind ependence in 19 91”, Radio Free
Europe, Au gust 24, 2022. Sou rce:
https://www.rferl.org/a/31994070.html
The speech was labelled so disparagingly by New York Times columnist William Safire to underline its
“colossal misjudgment”, very weak tone and miscalculation.17
NOTE:
The nickname for the speech given by US President George H.W. Bush in Kyiv, Ukraine, on
August 1, 1991, the Chicken Kyiv speech, was intended to reect the moderate US position on
decentralization processes in the USSR (Chicken Kyiv is the name of a famous local dish – chicken
cutlet). The scenario of the peaceful collapse of a multinational state with nuclear potential did
not seem the most realistic, especially because the open aggression of the Russian Federation
against Ukraine, launched in 2014, can be regarded as a seizure of a collapsing totalitarian
empire. The speech was given three weeks before Ukraine’s Declaration of Independence and
four months before the December independence referendum, in which 92.26 percent of Ukrainians
voted to leave the Soviet Union. The speech was written by Condoleezza Rice, later Secretary
of State under President George W. Bush. It outraged Ukrainians longing for independence and
also American conservatives.
In fact, the US President’s attempt to convince Ukrainian parliamentarians to remain part of the
USSR contradicts V. Putin’s thesis that the West wanted the “collapse of the USSR.” It is clear
that the West did every thing it could to prevent the break-up of the Soviet Union as it was afraid
of destabilization in the region. On the contrary, the USA did not want to lose a reliable ally in
the person of Gorbachev, and was also worried of the unforeseen consequences of the USSR’s
deconstruction. “In fairness, President Gorbachev has achieved astonishing things, and his policies
of glasnost, perestroika and democratization point toward the goals of freedom, democracy and
economic liberty.”18
In re a l it y, th e co llapse of th e So v iet Uni o n wa s th e result of a natural pro c e s s of co llapse of an em p ire
under the weight of its internal economic and political problems, as well as historical oppression
of minority nations, including the genocide of Ukrainians in 1930s, which, in turn, intensied
decentralization processes.
However, already on November 30, 1991 The New York Times published another article covering these
historical events, which from today’s standpoint demonstrates that Russian-Ukrainian relations had been
misunderstood, along with Ukrainians’ aspirations and motives: “Minority rights are also far from secure.
Ukrainians justly hold Moscow responsible for their predicament, but too many associate Moscow [as
the USSR decision-making center – ed.] with Russians, as if no Ukrainians served in the higher reaches
of the party or the army. That narrow nationalism makes the many Russian residents of Ukraine fear
17 Safire, William (1991): “Ukraine Marches Out”, Opinion Essay, The New York Times, November 18, 1991.
Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/18/opinion/essay-ukraine-marches-out.html
18 Ibid.

16 THE WAR OF NARRATIVES: UKRAINE’S IMAGE IN THE MEDIA
for their rights… Nationalist-minded Ukrainians are planning for a 400,000-man army– twice the size of
neighboring Poland’s, larger than united Germany’s and far larger than Ukraine’s economy can afford.
And some Ukrainians prefer to share control over nuclear arms instead of getting rid of them.”19
The world community was especially worried because of Ukraine’s nuclear status. The collapse of the
former Soviet republics was portrayed in the Western media as a threat because of the potential loss
of control over nuclear weapons, and there was a demand to reduce the number of “Nuclear Club”
members. The New York Times wrote that even though “the Soviet state, marked throughout its brief
but tumultuous history by great achievement and terrible suffering, died today after a long and painful
decline. It was 74 years old”, nevertheless “the great Eurasian entity on which it fed remained very much
alive, as Russia, as a new Commonwealth of 11 republics, as a culture and a worldview, as a formidable
nuclear arsenal, as a broad range of unresolved crises.”20
Screenshot 4. Ar ticle: “Chic ken
Kiev, the Sequel”, The N ew York
Times, November 3 0, 1991.
Source: https://www.nytimes.
com/1991/11/30/opinion/chicken-
kiev-the-sequel.html
Screenshot 3. Article: “Es say:
Ukraine Marches Out ”, The New
York Times, November 18, 1991.
Source: https://www.nytimes.
com/19 91/11 /18/o pinio n/essay-
ukraine-marches-out.html
Being aware of the threat of Russia’s nuclear potential, Ukraine at the beginning of its independence
tried to preserve its nuclear status, which led to calls in the media to put pressure on its government:
“Ukraine, which once promised to get rid of all its nuclear weapons, has begun to balk. Unless the Bush
Administration exerts pressure promptly, Ukraine could become the third-biggest nuclear power in the
world.”21
Ukraine was even accused of nuclear blackmail: “The world received an implied threat of nuclear
blackmail last month from a country whose president – supported by an Army infiltrated by officers
loyal to the current regime – maintains an iron grip on the government and the economy. North Korea?
Libya? Iraq? Hardly. The culprit is one of the newest members of the international community, Ukraine.”22
19 Opinion. “Chicken Kiev, the Sequel”, The New York Times, November 30, 1991.
Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/30/opinion/chicken-kiev-the-sequel.html
20 “End of the Soviet Union. The Soviet State, Born of a Dream, Dies”, The New York Times, December 26, 1991.
Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/26/world/end-of-the-soviet-union-the-soviet-state-born-of-a-dream-dies.html
21 “Nuclear Backsliding in Ukraine”, The New York Times, May 4, 1992.
Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/04/opinion/nuclear-backsliding-in-ukraine.html?searchResultPosition=19
22 Nichols, T. (1992): “Nationalism and Nukes”, The Christian Science Monitor.
Available at: https://www.csmonitor.com/1992/1201/01181.html

17
Chapter 2. a WeStern lenS for unDerStanDing ukraine
Screenshot 5. Ar ticle: “Nat ionalism
and Nukes”, Christ ian Sci ence Mo nitor,
Decemb er 1, 1992 .
Source: ht tps://www.csmonitor.
com/1992/1201/01181.html
Linking the narrative of “Ukrainian nationalism” to the “nuclear danger” allegedly created by Ukraine
initiated the wrong interpretation of Ukrainian nationalism – which is essentially a liberation movement
from a repressive totalitarian empire – as a threat to collective security.
NOTE:
Media and political pressure on Ukraine led to the signing of the Budapest Memorandum on
Security Assurances on December 5, 1994, in accordance with which Ukraine gave up the
third most powerful nuclear arsenal in the world, and the USA, Russia and the United Kingdom
became guarantors of Ukraine’s territorial integrity within the borders as they stood in 1991.
However, the annexation of Crimea, the beginning of the war in Donbas in 2014 and the full-scale
invasion of the Russian Federation in Ukraine in 2022 have undermined other countries’ trust in
such guarantees and the feasibility of giving up nuclear weapons.
Only nuclear disarmament, which took place under political pressure from the international community,
changed the narrative regarding Ukraine. In 1997, during his visit to Kyiv, NATO Secretary General Dr.
Javier Solana stated: “Ukraine’s decision to renounce nuclear weapons and to accede to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty greatly contributed to the strengthening of security and stability in Europe. It
has earned Ukraine special stature in the world community.”23 The events of 2014 and 2022 have called
this statement into question.
RUSSIA–UKRAINE – UNBREAKABLE TIES
This narrative is very complex and includes socio-economic, security, cultural, historical, linguistic and
other aspects. It has been exploited in all kinds of ways since the time of the Russian Empire, receding
somewhat only since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That is why it will reappear in one form
or another elsewhere in this discussion of narratives.
Ukraine inherited systemic socio-economic problems from the Soviet Union, as a result of which it is
perceived to have a weak economy, a low standard of living, large-scale corruption, political instability
and unbreakable historical and economic ties with Russia. It cannot be claimed that these “labels” do
not correspond to reality at all, but such problems are faced by all post-Soviet republics, including the
Russian Federation, which has solved its economic problems, to the extent it has, virtually exclusively
through rising energy prices. Russia has invested considerable effort in portraying itself in the foreign
23 Speech by the Secretary General at the “Ukraine House” Kyiv, Ukraine, NATO Speeches, 1997.
Available at: https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970507a.htm.

18 THE WAR OF NARRATIVES: UKRAINE’S IMAGE IN THE MEDIA
media as the heir of the Soviet Union and as the leader (“elder brother” or “big brother”) among the
states of the former socialist camp, while Ukraine has been portrayed as apparently incapable of
building its own effective state, remaining dependent on the Russian Federation. According to this
“historical logic”, Ukraine should remain in the Russian sphere of influence.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, to the West, Ukraine looked like Russia, only smaller in size. Even in
2022, after eight years of war, some in the West did not expect such fierce resistance from Ukrainians,
simply because it considered Ukrainians and Russians much more similar than different. This narrative
has found its continuation in others, for example, concerning the “fraternal nations”, “the one nation”,
“attempts of the West to cause ‘unnatural separation’ of Ukrainians and Russians”, “split of Ukraine”,
and others. Amidst debates on “gas wars” or European or NATO integration, the “close ties” narrative
is used to explain the slow pace of rapprochement with the West. In fact, this expression should be
understood exclusively as a euphemism to indicate the Russian Federation’s desire to maintain control
over Ukraine, at any cost.
Screenshot 7. Article: “Cur rent
Statu s, November 1997: Nuclear
power plants in Ukraine”, Bellona,
Novembe r 19, 1997.
Source: http://bit.ly/3ZvkdjY
Screenshot 6. “The End of t he Great
State”, 19.06.199 4, Der Spiegel.
Available at: https://www.spiegel.
de/politik/ende-einer-grossmacht-
a-f602c929-0002-0001-0000-
000013686548?fbclid=IwAR0rDS
Gwwk8VaQqt67zByWvOC8ToR_
mxbjsZuIhaNb8hg Auzzp1w4R5LyBU
“Why does Ukraine, which the great Russian writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn likes to call ‘Little Russia’,
want so badly to be an independent state? Many of its citizens queuing for bread doubt themselves: the
independent state of Ukraine is nearing economic collapse, and it could soon split in two… The way back,
the longing for common ground with Russia grows, as the plate is filling up again [the standard of living
improves].”24 This article in Der Spiegel absorbed all the stereotypes and Russian narratives: about the
deep canyon dividing Ukrainian society (a Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking population), about alleged
“Nazi” sentiments in the western regions of the country, although it also referred to crimes committed
by the Russians against the Ukrainian nation. But more damaging was a misconception of Ukrainians’
motivation for independence. The author believed that it was the sheer size of Ukraine’s territory, its rich
soil (“black earth”, amounting to nearly one quarter of the world’s most fertile soil), its industry, though
unreformed for a decade, the second largest army in Europe and the third biggest nuclear arsenal
that fueled what he called its “national arrogance”. In fact, what drives Ukrainians is the desire to use
another historic opportunity to finally get rid of moribund totalitarianism, reestablish social justice and
finally put human beings, rights and liberties at the center of its value system, something which is
absolutely foreign to the Russian mentality.
24 “The End of the Great State”, Der Spiegel, 1994. Available at: https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ende-einer-grossmacht-a-f602c929-
0002-0001-0000-000013686548?fbclid=IwAR0rDSGwwk8VaQqt67zByWvOC8ToR_mxbjsZuIhaNb8hgAuzzp1w4R5LyBU

19
Chapter 2. a WeStern lenS for unDerStanDing ukraine
Screenshot 8. Article: “Ukraine a nd
Russia seal a deal”, The Economist,
June 5, 1997. Source:
https://www.economist.
com/leaders/1997/06/05/
ukraine-and-russia-seal-a-deal
Screenshot 9. Ar ticle: “Losing Ukra ine”,
The Wall Street Jo urnal, October 27,
1999. Source: https:// ww w.wsj.com /
articles/SB94 0977547601510377?mod
=Searchresults_pos3&page=1
Screenshot 11. A rticle: “Uk raine
and Russ ia make pe ace”, Le Figa ro,
April 22, 2010. Sour ce: htt ps://w ww.
legaro.fr/blogs/geopolitique/2010/04/
la-russie-et-lukraine-font-la.html
Screenshot 10. Ar ticl e: “Hope for
reforms ”, Svenska Dagbla det, Ap ril 3,
2002. S ource: ht tps://ww w.svd.
se/a/3028b826-9c19-31ac-9846-
0681f5a5e12b/hopp-om-reformer
Another Der Spiegel article claimed that most residents of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea long for a return
to the Soviet Union and a planned economy, citing the fact that Ukrainians voted for Leonid Kuchma in
the presidential election.25 It is worth noting that such an interpretation of Ukrainian elections can be
attributed to a misunderstanding of Ukrainian politics, because Leonid Kuchma never declared a desire
to restore the USSR and even wrote a book entitled ‘Ukraine Is Not Russia’. However, such articles
cemented the narrative about an alleged deep mental division of Ukraine along territorial and linguistic
lines.
At the same time, American editorials emphasized that it was Moscow that mentally was unable to let
Ukraine go. Commenting on the collapse of the Soviet Union, Washington Post journalists emphasized
that “Unlike the Baltic republics, which also have declared their independence, Ukraine is regarded by
25 “Wieder Sklaven Rußlands”, Der Spiegel, 1994. Available at: https://www.spiegel.de/politik/wieder-sklaven-russlands-a-487815cb-
0002-0001-0000-000013683557?fbclid=IwAR1RjSJRkss3bWN23XjI4OvxdoQxmHJTUXgj50NqklhTa6vGAH1RncisXEY

20 THE WAR OF NARRATIVES: UKRAINE’S IMAGE IN THE MEDIA
many Russians as part of a Slavic homeland.”26 The Guardian (UK) notes: “Moscow has always seen
Russia and Ukraine as inseparably linked.”27 The Economist described Ukraine in that period as follows:
“While Americans are delighted with their new friendship with Russia, Western policy towards Ukraine
and Belarus in the past ten years has been much less successful, though Ukraine has managed at least
to maintain its independence without being badly hamstrung by Russia. But Belarus and Ukraine are
worrying messes on Europe’s eastern frontier. It would be an irony if it were Russia, their old imperial
master, that had to start nudging them in the right direction. No sign of that—yet.”28
UKRAINE BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE EAST – NATIONAL
AWAKENING AND PRO-EUROPEAN SELF-AWARENESS
Because of its geographical location, Ukraine has always been strategically important for both the
Russian Federation and the West. Moreover, with the onset of democratic transformations on the
territory of the former USSR, Ukraine was viewed as a country that had to make a choice between the
West and the East. And when authoritarianism reasserted itself in the Russian Federation, it became
an arena for a clash of mindsets.
During his 1992 election campaign US presidential candidate Bill Clinton said: “In my view, a democratic
Ukraine should be an important stabilizing factor in Europe. Assisting the successful transformation of
Ukraine into an integral part of the democratic community of nations will be an important foreign policy
priority for a Clinton administration.”29
Several year later, during his visit to Kyiv in 1997, the Secretary General of NATO said: “The Alliance
acknowledges that Ukraine has an important and even unique place in the European security order. An
independent democratic and stable Ukraine is one of the key factors of stability and security in Europe.
Its geographical position gives it a major role and responsibility.”30
The process of Ukraine’s transformation into a truly democratic state was a thorny one. For more than
two decades the country was considered to be underdeveloped, not only economically, but also in
terms of civil society, protection of civil rights and freedoms, and the rule of law, which many took to
indicate that Ukraine was not yet part of the Western world.
Screenshot 12. A rti cle: “The Ukrainian
Question”, The Eco nomis t, November
18, 1999.Source: https://w ww.
economist.com/leaders/1999/11/18/
the-ukrainian-question
Screenshot 13. A rticle:
“Hesi tati ons before Ukra inian
Elections”, Svenska Dagbladet,
Februa ry 19, 20 02. Source:
https://www.svd.se/a/34a1a71c-
e629-338a-b672-46043884ebd1/
tvivel-infor-valet-i-ukraina
26 Antonov, N. (1991): “Ukraine Declares Independence, Sets Referendum”, The Washington Post.
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/08/25/ukraine-declares-independence-sets-referendum/
ee9266e3-dd83-4568-b7e5-40715ca0c77a/.
27 Steele, J., Marta, D. and Meek, J. (1991): “Ukrainians push USSR to brink”, The Guardian.
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/1991/dec/02/ukraine.jamesmeek.
28 “Sour Slavs in the slow lane”, The Economist, May 30, 2002.
Available at: https://www.economist.com/europe/2002/05/30/sour-slavs-in-the-slow-lane
29 “Campaign’ 92: Gov. Bill Clinton on the record for Ukrainian Americans”, Ukrainian Weekly, 1992, №. 45. С3.
Available at: http://ukrweekly.com/archive/1992/The_Ukrainian_Weekly_1992-43.pdf
30 Speech by the Secretary General at the “Ukraine House” Kyiv, Ukraine, NATO Speeches, 1997.
Available at: https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970507a.htm.

21
Chapter 2. a WeStern lenS for unDerStanDing ukraine
Periodically, the topic of Moscow’s efforts to keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence and the
post-Soviet republic’s difficulties at the ideological crossroads of the West and Russia arises: “With
a significant Russian-speaking minority (30 percent of the population) living in the eastern regions
of the country, with four churches (Orthodox, Uniate, Catholic, Protestant), this state [Ukraine – ed.]
aspires to one day integrate into the EU and NATO, at the same time maneuvering within the limits of
its relations with Russia, its indispensable partner, on which a large part of its economy depends.”31
The Economist notes that the Russian Federation is interested in maintaining control over Ukraine
“because of Russia’s business interests in Ukraine; partly because of Russia’s naval base in the Crimea,
and [because Russia– ed.] worries about what might happen to it if Ukraine really did join NATO. But
mainly because of post-Soviet neuroses...”32
NOTE:
In the course of the presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004, Russia actively supported the
pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych, who was declared the winner, despite the obvious
election fraud. The evidence of numerous violations at the polling stations led to the beginning
of the Orange Revol ution, when tens of tho usand s of Uk rainians joi ned in ma ss protest s acr oss
the country. The main result of the revolution was the decision of the Supreme Court to rerun
the second round of presidential elections and the initiation of constitutional reform, which
provided for a reduction in presidential powers. After the rerun, the pro-Western politician
Viktor Yushchenko became the President of Ukraine.
The Orange Revolution (November 22, 2004 to December 26, 2004 — ed.) became a catalyst for the
discussion about the value of Ukraine for the West, when the Ukrainian people loudly declared their
intention to make Ukraine a true European democracy.
Screenshot 15. A rticle: “Open the doo r
to Ukraine”, Wyborcza, M ay 21, 200 5.
Source: https: //wyborcza.pl/
magazyn/7,124059,2086886.html
Screenshot 14. Article: “Ukraine is
attracted by Brussels and held back
by Mosco w”, Le Mond e, April 12,
2004. S ource: https: //www.lemonde.fr/
archives/article/2004/04/12/l-ukraine-
attiree-par-bruxelles-et-retenue-par-
moscou_ 360809_1819218.html
The coverage of the revolution in the Western media was diverse, sometimes focusing on public
demonstrations of the country’s pro-democratic and pro-European choice, sometimes on the
interventions of the USA or Russia and their confrontation on the territory of Ukraine. Some openly
31 “Ukraine is attracted to Brussels and is kept back by Russia”, April 12, 2004, Le Monde. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/
archives/article/2004/04/12/l-ukraine-attiree-par-bruxelles-et-retenue-par-moscou_360809_1819218.html
32 “On the border and on the brink”, The Economist, October 28, 2004.
Available at: https://www.economist.com/special-report/2004/10/28/on-the-border-and-on-the-brink

22 THE WAR OF NARRATIVES: UKRAINE’S IMAGE IN THE MEDIA
spread Russian narratives about a “coup organized by the collective West / USA” and the “revenge of
Ukrainian nationalism.”
British online political magazine Spiked noted: “We can admire the verve of the crowd, demonstrating
in Kiev’s central square for four freezing nights. But they are little more than a stage army playing a
part written for them by Western governments. The fraught standoff in Ukraine is less the result of
an internal dispute, than of a geopolitical tussle between East and West. The country shares a border
with Russia on one side and the European Union (EU) on the other.” (Spiked was founded in 2001 with
the same editor and many of the same contributors as the journal Living Marxism, but since the 2022
invasion it has largely supported Ukraine – ed.).33
The Guardian emphasized that “Ukraine, traditionally passive in its politics, has been mobilized by
the young democracy activists and will never be the same again. But while the gains of the orange-
bedecked ‘chestnut revolution’ are Ukraine’s, the campaign is an American creation, a sophisticated
and brilliantly conceived exercise in western branding and mass marketing that, in four countries in
four years, has been used to try to salvage rigged elections and topple unsavory regimes.”34 Later the
column published a response to opinions expressed in the article: “Steele’s determination to interpret
the events entirely in the context of the Cold War is misleading and patronizing... The current crisis
is not about divisions between eastern and western Ukraine or Russia and the US. Ultimately it’s not
even about Yushchenko and Yanukovych. People across Ukraine took to the streets in their hundreds
of thousands because they were blatantly deprived of their democratic right for free and honest
elections… people are euphoric because for the first time in their history they feel they are a nation that
got up from its knees.”35
Western journalists actively covered the protests involving hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians.
NBC News called the protesters pro-democracy and the protests historic. It is interesting that the TV
channel called Viktor Yanukovych not just a pro-Russian, but even a pro-Soviet candidate.36
According to The Economist, the Orange Revolution “changed the perception of ordinary Ukrainians.
... The majority simply wanted honest government and fair elections,” thus reinforcing the opinion that
the driving force of democratization in Ukraine is the Ukrainian people. It also noted that “because of its
size and location, Ukraine matters more to America and the European Union than most of the former
Soviet Union”.37 Victory for pro-Western candidate Yushchenko would be a serious blow for Putin, who
visited Ukraine twice during the election campaign in support of Yanukovych (although he denies that
he went to Ukraine specifically for this). It would thus become much more difficult for the President
of Russia to continue to establish control over the former Soviet republics if one of them (the second
largest) were to slip out of his hands and go West.
In the European and US media, which covered the Orange Revolution objectively, there were differences
in emphasis. Two narratives were promoted in the European media, about the confrontation between
the West and Russia on the territory of Ukraine, as well as about Ukraine’s European choice. In the
US media, interpretations of the event focused on liberation from Russian authoritarian rule and the
struggle for freedom and justice.
33 “Ukraine takes the strain”, Spiked, 2004. Available at: https://www.spiked-online.com/2004/11/25/the-ukraine-takes-the-strain/
34 “US campaign behind the turmoil in Kyiv”, The Guardian, November 26, 2004.
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/26/ukraine.usa
35 “Ukraine gets off its knees”, The Guardian”, November 27, 2004.
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/27/ukraine.guardianletters
36 “Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution”, NBC News, 2004. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0nYAM-Jbfh4.
37 Ibid.

23
Chapter 2. a WeStern lenS for unDerStanDing ukraine
Screenshot 18. A rticle: “US c ampaign
behind t he turmoil in Kiev”, The
Guardian, November 26, 20 04.
Source: https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2004/nov/26/ukraine.usa
Screenshot 19. Ar ticl e: “Ukr aine gets off
its knees”, The Guardian, Novemb er 27,
2004. S ource: https: //www.the guardian.
com/world/2004/nov/27/ukraine.
guardianletters
Screenshot 17. Video: “Uk raine’s 2004
Orange Revolution”, NBC News, 200 4.
Source: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=0nYAM-Jbfh4
Screenshot 16. Ar ticle: “Ukraine is
seekin g its way – E ast or West?”,
Svenska Dagbla det, Ma rch 31, 20 02.
Source: https://www.svd.se/a/bfc2fa3f-
57a8-3549-aef5-3e3c367d012b/
ukraina-valjer-vag-mot-ost-eller-vast?f
bclid=IwAR3pDF9wzMQo25mnNMbs5
boQ9IUjOTZerkFcay9bZqSS3sODJLs
qEkRU_ 4o
Screenshot 21. A rticle: “Uk raine’s
two different revolutions”, ВВС,
Decemb er 3, 2013. S ource:
https://ww w.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-25210230
Screenshot 20. Artic le: “Viktor West
scores p oints agains t Vik tor East”,
Wiener Zeitung, December 23, 20 04.
Source: https://www.wienerzeitung.
at/nachrichten/politik /welt/301442-
Wiktor-West-punktet-gegen-Wiktor-Ost.
html?fbclid=IwAR0rUENukSN-PyUGa
Kjz8mWZEALuVPEpYgD98ueWWJuZ
p2f-Eidujr75LJ8

24 THE WAR OF NARRATIVES: UKRAINE’S IMAGE IN THE MEDIA
The victory of the Orange Revolution gave impetus to the discussion about the need for the European
Union to review its attitude towards Ukraine. In particular, the media wrote about the need to increase
European investments,38 albeit on condition that relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation,
not to mention between the West and the Russian Federation, should not deteriorate.
Almost a decade after the 2004 events, the well-known German media outlet Deutsche Welle
emphasized that the Orange Revolution had become an example for citizens of other countries to
follow, for example, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.39
FAILED DEMOCRACY AND FAILED REVOLUTION
The slow pace and minor successes of democratic reform in that period created the basis for the
narrative of the “failed” Orange Revolution.
Already in 2006, the Financial Times, describing the results of the Orange Revolution, noted that “the
events of 2004 were not a revolution in the sense of a fundamental change of the Ukrainian state.
The Orange coalition split, economic growth plummeted, reforms stagnated, and in free and fair
parliamentary elections this March, a pro-Russian group led by the ousted 2004 candidate Viktor
Yanukovych became the largest party. After months of political chaos, including hooliganism by both
sides in the Ukrainian parliament, Mr Yanukovych is now likely to lead a coalition government under his
rival, Viktor Yushchenko.”40
Screenshot 22. A rti cle:
“Wha t’s the Matte r with
Kiev? ”, Slate Online
magazi ne, Marc h 27,
2006.
Source: https://slate.
com/news-and-
politics/2006/03/what-s-
the-matter-with-kiev.html
Screenshot 23.
Arti cle: “Ri vals
weigh up options
after U krainian
poll”, The G uardian,
March 28, 2006 .
Source: https: //www.
theguardian.com/
world/2006/mar/28/
ukraine.tompartt
Screenshot 24.
Arti cle: “The failure of
the Orange Revolution
is an opportunity ”,
Financ ial Tim es, July
24, 2006. Sourc e:
https://www.ft.com/
content/9842d50a-
1b39-11db-b164 -
0000779e2340
Journalists cited the following as the main reasons for Ukrainians’ disappointment in the Orange
Revolution: Viktor Yushchenko had failed to introduce reforms in Ukraine and to embark on a path of
38 “Ukraine: Impuls für ausländische Investoren”, Wiener Zeitung, December 28, 2004.
Available at: https://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/politik/europa/301250-Ukraine-Impuls-fuer-auslaendische-Investoren.
html?fbclid=IwAR1fkGgaJyCr-kdVsfY2T9gtEr78lS85piTAhnQfQBLwTXlWMMyuElKwgdQ
39 Schaeffer, U. (2013): “Failed revolution”, Deutsche Welle.
Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/failed-revolution-ukraine-heads-back-to-soviet-past/a-16794088.
40 “The failure of the Orange Revolution is an opportunity”, The Financial Times, 2010.
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/9842d50a-1b39-11db-b164-0000779e2340

25
Chapter 2. a WeStern lenS for unDerStanDing ukraine
transformation from an oligarch-capitalist system to a market-oriented economic model; he had failed
to fulfill his revolutionary promise to eradicate corruption and “put all bandits behind bars”; and finally
he had concluded an agreement with Viktor Yanukovych.41
The New York Times noted that the collapse of the democratic coalition occurred “due to political
disputes, clashing egos and mutual accusations of corruption.”42
The narrative was strengthened by the results of the 2010 presidential elections, when the Ukrainian
people, tired of economic troubles, elected Viktor Yanukovych, who, despite his criminal record, was
presented by political spin doctors as an effective manager capable of ensuring stability and economic
development.
NOTE:
Viktor Fedorovich Yanukovych is a former Ukrainian politician and statesman. He was twice
el ecte d Prime Mi niste r of Ukra i ne (No vemb e r 21, 20 0 2— Janu a r y 5, 20 0 5 and Aug u st 4, 2006 —
December 18, 2007). He was twice a candidate for President of Ukraine (2004, 2010), as well
as Chairman of the Party of Regions (20 03 –2010). Fourth President of Ukraine (from February
25, 2010 to Februar y 22, 2014). The period of his presidency was marked by a strengthening
of authoritarianism, rampant corruption, rapprochement with the Russian Federation and the
failure of European integration. As a result of the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, he was stripped
of the title of President and found guilty of treason. He ed to Russia, which supported him and
in 2022 planned to return him to Ukraine as President after the planned military seizure of Kyiv.
The Wall Street Journal in its analysis indicated that internal political struggles, corruption and lack
of progress in European integration paved the way for Yanukovych’s victory in the 2010 presidential
election.43 According to Deutsche Welle, “The failure to stamp out corruption, speed up the reform
process or run the country in a more inclusive way stopped the advance of democracy and ultimately
put the opposition at the helm”.44 Supposedly, Ukraine began to return to its Soviet past because of the
failure of the revolution.
This led to a strengthening of Russia’s influence in Ukraine. Among the most significant events of that
period was the agreement on extending Russia’s lease of the port in Sevastopol until 2042, although
the term of this lease was due to expire in 2017. In exchange for the continued basing of the Black
Sea Fleet, Ukraine received a price reduction on Russian natural gas. The Guardian said: “The deal is
the most concrete sign yet that Ukraine is now back under Russia’s influence following Yanukovych’s
victory in February’s presidential elections. It appears to mark the final nail in the coffin of the Orange
Revolution of 2004.”45
41 “Ukraine: Why Are Ukrainians Disappointed with the Orange Revolution?”, Radio Free Europe, 2005.
Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/1063129.html
42 “After the Vote, Ukraine Faces Uncertainty Over Coalition”, The New York Times, March 28, 2006.
Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/28/world/europe/after-vote-ukraine-faces-uncertainty-over-coalition.html
43 Marson, J. (2010): “Yanukovych Declared Victor in Ukraine Vote”, The Wall Street Journal.
Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703447704575065222889490594.
44 Schaeffer, U. (2013): “Failed revolution”, Deutsche Welle.
Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/failed-revolution-ukraine-heads-back-to-soviet-past/a-16794088.
45 Harding, L. (2010): “Ukraine extends lease for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet”, The Guardian.
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/21/ukraine-black-sea-fleet-russia.

26 THE WAR OF NARRATIVES: UKRAINE’S IMAGE IN THE MEDIA
Screenshot 25. A rticle: “Uk raine ex tends
lease for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet ”,
The Guar dian, A pril 21, 2010.
Source: https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2010/apr/21/
ukraine-black-sea-eet-russia
This is how CNN covered this historic decision: “Russia’s president and the newly elected president of
Ukraine signed a landmark agreement on Wednesday that signals an end to years of enmity between the
two former Soviet republics… Ukraine and Russia had been at odds ever since the ‘Orange Revolution’
swept Yanukovych’s anti-Russian predecessor Viktor Yushchenko to power in 2005.”46
Overall, in the Western media during this period, the image of Ukraine underwent a significant
transformation, from hero to loser; a country that, after the Orange Revolution, could not maintain a
pro-European vector, demonstrated the weakness of pro-democratic forces and large-scale corruption.
Western media generally expressed disappointment in the Orange Revolution even ten years later. “We
are disappointed. We don’t believe the improvement, justice and honesty that we were waiting for will
come,”47 according to Ukrainians quoted by Deutsche Welle, adding that the population blamed the
political elite.
Screenshot 28.
Arti cle: “Fa iled
revolution”,
Deutsche Welle,
August 5, 2013.
Source: https://bit.
ly/3YX20w4
Screenshot 26. Artic le:
“Telia Sonera develo ps
in corru pt countries”,
SvD När ingsliv, June 15,
2005.
Source: https://bit.
ly/3KZaRHV
Screenshot 27. Article:
“Govern ment of Uk raine
prepar ing to hand over
gas pip elines ”, Wybor cza,
Decemb er 3, 2006.
Source: https://bit.
ly/3JNxA9j
UKRAINE UNDER THE PROTECTION OF “BIG BROTHER” –
NON-ALIGNED STATE OR RUSSIA’S NEXT MILITARY TARGET?
One stumbling block was Ukraine’s aspiration to strengthen its security, in particular by becoming a
NATO member. This is in the shadow of the territorial claims of the Russian Federation since 1991.
46 Watson, I. and Tkachenko, M. (2010): “Russia, Ukraine agree on naval-base-for-gas deal”, CNN, April 21, 2010.
Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/04/21/russia.ukraine/index.html
47 Failed revolution. Deutsche Welle, August 5, 2013. Available at:
https://www.dw.com/en/failed-revolution-ukraine-heads-back-to-soviet-past/a-16794088

27
Chapter 2. a WeStern lenS for unDerStanDing ukraine
After Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament and the signing of the Budapest Memorandum, Russia became
one of the guarantors of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, which is absurd from a historical standpoint.
Although the Russian Federation in this context created a narrative about being the “elder brother”,
which emphasizes not only its readiness to defend “younger” Ukraine, but also the close – “blood”
– even unbreakable ties between the two countries (in the Russian Federation, this narrative has a
positive tone), the Western media tends not to use the expression itself, but takes a descriptive
approach, comparing size of territory, economic indicators, military strength, the language issue and
common history. However, in English-language media, the term “big brother” is also associated with
Orwell’s dystopian 1984. In fact, this is a far more accurate reflection of reality. “After hundreds of years
…Ukrainians are forging a new relationship with Moscow – one of equals, whether Russia likes it or
not. Russians love to refer to relations between Russia and Ukraine as the relations between an older
and a younger brother,” said Anatoly Z. Moskalenko, a prominent Ukrainian historian and journalist.
“But in reality, the relationship is like that of a horse and a rider. The rider – Russia – has always done
everything it can to prevent the horse – Ukraine – from getting free.”48
The narrative about an “elder brother” who helps and protects Ukraine is a complete myth that is not
supported by historical facts. Besides several centuries of occupation of Ukraine, first by the Russian
Empire and later by the USSR, since 1991 the Russian Federation has periodically expressed territorial
claims on Ukraine. In these circumstances, Ukraine began to insist on signing an agreement between
the parties, which would first of all guarantee the inviolability of its borders. This became the Treaty
on friendship, cooperation and partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which
contained an article stating that the “High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the provisions of
the UN Charter and obligations under the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe, respect each other’s territorial integrity and confirm the inviolability of existing borders
between them”.49 In exchange, Ukraine was forced to sign agreements on the division of the Black
Sea Fleet, the status and conditions of stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine,
and a number of other matters.
NOTE:
The press secretary of President Boris Yeltsin stated that Russia reserved the right to tackle
the unresolved – in his opinion – issue of borders with republics of the former USSR that had
become independent states. He was supported by Mayor of Moscow Gavril Popov in a speech
on Central Television. The general claims made by the President’s press secretary were made
concrete in the Mayor’s speech: Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea and Odesa region was called
into question. Such statements caused serious complications in Ukrainian–Russian relations,
and Yeltsin, in order to ease tensions, had to send a representative delegation to Kyiv headed by
Vice President Rutskoi. However, territorial claims against Ukraine at the ocial level in Russia
continued. On January 30, 1992, Alexander Rutskoi published an article in Pravda in which he
accused “political leaders of national-careerism”, wanting to bring Russia back to the borders of
the twelfth century. In May 1992, an ocial statement was published, which claimed that the legal
acts transferring Crimea to Ukraine had no legal force. In July 1993, the Parliament decided to
grant Sevastopol the status of a city of the Russian Federation. Yeltsin distanced himself from this
resolution, and the UN Securit y Council declared it to be groundless and dangerous.50
48 “In the Shadow of ‘Big Brother’: Ukraine: Long under Russia’s thumb, the newly independent state struggles to change its
relationship to one of equals”, Los Angeles Times, May 1, 1992. Available at: https://lat.ms/3El8iMG.
49 Law of Ukraine “On the Ratification of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian
Federation”, N 13/98-BP of January 14, 1998. Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine, 1998, N 20, p. 103. Available at: https://bit.ly/45Nu0V6.
50 Kulchytsky, S.V. (2004): “Agreement on friendship, cooperation and partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation
1997”, in Smoliy V.A. et al. (eds), Encyclopedia of Ukrainian History, Vol. 2, Institute of History of Ukraine, published in Scientific
Thought. Available at: http://www.history.org.ua/?termin=Dogovir_pro_druzhbu_Ukr_Ros_1997

28 THE WAR OF NARRATIVES: UKRAINE’S IMAGE IN THE MEDIA
Screenshot 29. Article: “In the Shadow
of “Big Brother ”: Ukra ine: Long
under Rus sia’s thu mb, the ne wly
independent state st ruggles to change
its relationship to one of equal s”, Los
Angeles Times , May 1, 1992 . Sourc e:
https://www.latimes.com/archives/
la-xpm-1992-05-01-mn-1422-story.html
Screenshot 30. A rticle: “Uk raine:
Europe’s Linchpi n”, Foreign
Affa irs, May –Ju ne 1996. Source:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/russia-fsu/1996-05-01/
ukraine-europes-linchpin
Screenshot 31. Artic le: “Set ting Past
Aside, Ru ssia and Ukra ine Sign
Friendship Treaty ”, The New York
Times, June 1, 1997. Sourc e:
https://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/01/
world/setting-past-aside-russia-and-
ukraine-sign-friendship-treaty.html
Screenshot 33. Arti cle: “Ukrain e is
attracted by Brussels and held back
by Mosco w”, Le Mond e, April 12,
2004. S ource: https: //www.lemonde.fr/
archives/article/2004/04/12/l-ukraine-
attiree-par-bruxelles-et-retenue-par-
moscou_ 360809_1819218.html
Screenshot 32. A rticle: “Against the
wind: set ting c ourse for Europ e”,
Wiener Zeitung, June 26, 2002. Source:
https://bit.ly/42LDyxO
Screenshot 34. Arti cle: “N ATO
promises Ukra ine, Georgia entry one
day”, Reuter s, April 3, 200 8. Source:
https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-nato-idUSL0179714620080403

29
Chapter 2. a WeStern lenS for unDerStanDing ukraine
In fact, from the early 1990s, the Russian Federation sought to “restore” not only Crimea, but much
larger territories that are part of sovereign Ukraine: “Much of the Russian political spectrum, obsessed
with reclaiming great power status and reuniting the former Soviet republics, recognizes that Ukraine
is the key to its plans and openly espouses reabsorption.”51
These facts not only deny the moral right of the Russian Federation to act as a guarantor of the
territorial integrity of Ukraine, and call into question Russia’s motives as a self-declared “elder brother”,
whose history of relations with Ukraine resembles the story of Cain and Abel, but they also repudiate
arguments that seek to justify Russian aggression as a response to NATO’s expansion to the East.
Commenting on the signing of the Treaty, the New York Times indicated that Russia had taken this step
with an eye to NATO expansion: “But now, with NATO ready to expand eastward, Russia is looking to
bolster its defense and prove to the West that it still has power worth worrying about”.52
From the ascension to power of Vladimir Putin (May 7, 2000), who launched an aggressive foreign
policy towards the former Soviet republics, and in the face of Ukraine’s determination to develop as a
democratic sovereign state looking to the West, tensions between the countries increased. Western
media began to write about the disputes between the two states. The Austrian Wiener Zeitung wrote
that Kyiv had expressed a desire to join the EU and become a member of NATO, but also that such
a prospect was distant (long-term for the former but perhaps medium-term for the latter) because
Russia still has a strong influence on its “smaller neighbor” in the energy sector.53
One such dispute, which was widely covered in foreign media, was the conflict in the Kerch Strait, near
the island of Tuzla. Western media noted that tensions between Ukraine and the Russian Federation
were so high that it threatened to turn into a full-scale military conflict. Probably, this was the first time
in Western information space that a war between Ukraine and Russia was deemed possible.
NOTE:
In the fall of 2003, Russia began building a dam in the Kerch Strait in the direction of the
Ukrainian island of Kosa Tuzla. Kyiv perceived this as an attempt to redene borders and
annex its territory.54 The co ni c t was res olved after a perso nal me etin g betwe en the presi dent s.
Construction was halted.
Analyzing the conflict in the Kerch Strait, The Los Angeles Times drew attention to the fact that
the “issue of who owns Tuzla Island has been a matter of extreme inconsequence for as long as
anyone can remember. When Ukraine and Russia were adjoining republics in the Soviet Union, it
hardly mattered. When Ukraine declared independence more than a decade ago, it faced no serious
argument from Russia when it penciled its national boundary around Tuzla and began administering
the narrow shipping strait nearby that links the Black Sea with the Sea of Azov… Since independence,
Ukraine’s political fulcrum has turned on whether its interests lie eastward, with Russia, or westward,
with the United States and Europe. The balance appears now to have tipped. Parliament members
across the political spectrum united in a resolution condemning Russia’s actions as ‘hostile,’ and there
are widespread calls for speeding up Ukraine’s drive for membership in the European Union and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”55
51 Mroz, J. and Pavliuk, O. (1996): “Ukraine: Europe’s Linchpin”, Foreign Affairs.
Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/1996-05-01/ukraine-europes-linchpin.
52 Specter, M. (1997): “Setting Past Aside, Russia and Ukraine Sign Friendship Treaty”, The New York Times.
Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/01/world/setting-past-aside-russia-and-ukraine-sign-friendship-treaty.html
53 “Gegen den Wind: Kurs auf Europa”, Wiener Zeitung, 2002. Available at: https://bit.ly/45L9lku
54 Lambroschini, S. (2003): “Russia/Ukraine: Prime Ministers Meet Today Over Tuzla Dam Dispute”, Radio Svoboda.
Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/1104782.html.
55 Murphy, K. (2003): “Russia-Ukraine Ties Founder on the Shore of Tiny Isle”, Los Angeles Times.
Available at: https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-nov-03-fg-ukraine3-story.html.

30 THE WAR OF NARRATIVES: UKRAINE’S IMAGE IN THE MEDIA
NOTE:
Ukraine launched a dialogue with NATO the same year it got its independence and joined
the Nor th Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991) and the Partnership for Peace program (1994).
Already in 1997, the parties signed the Charter on a special partnership, on the basis of which the
Ukraine –NATO Commission was launched, the main task of which was to develop cooperation.
It is worth noting that the Russian Federation generally sought to undermine Ukraine’s national security
and opposed its efforts to become a member of NATO. Those intentions became especially obvious
at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, when Ukraine and Georgia were not invited to join the
Alliance Membership Action Plan. “Moscow lobbied hard to head off Georgia and Ukraine’s ambition
for membership at last month’s NATO summit in Bucharest”.56 Later, The Guardian assessed Ukraine’s
aspirations to join NATO as “unrealistic”. “Since then [since the summit – ed.], most NATO countries,
including the US and Britain, have realized membership of Ukraine and Georgia would provoke conflict,
notably with Russia.”57
NOTE:
On April 4, 2008, the NATO summit ended in Bucharest, at which prospects for expansion of
the Alliance were considered. Because the interests of Russia and the EU’s economic interests
were prioritized,58 and there were concerns about growing tensions in security relations with the
Russian Federation, the decision on Ukraine’s accession to the «Action Plan for the Acquisition
of Membership» was postponed.
The British news agency Reuters published an article by David Brunnstrom and Susan Cornwell
entitled “NATO promises Ukraine, Georgia entry one day.”59 It emphasized the role of the United States:
“Germany, France and smaller NATO states withstood pressure from U.S. President George W. Bush
to offer the two countries a Membership Action Plan (MAP), a first step towards entry, saying neither
was ready and Russia could be antagonized... Bush did not specifically refer to his failure at his farewell
summit to push Ukraine’s and Georgia’s MAP bids through but said NATO must continue to be open
to enlargement.”60 Despite the refusal, the presidents of Ukraine and Georgia perceived this summit as
historic and were extremely positive. However, as the publication points out, thousands of protesters
gathered in Ukrainian cities to denounce the prospect of NATO membership, which highlighted deep
differences in society on the question of which direction should Kyiv look in, the East or the West.
It is worth noting that the Russian Federation invested significant resources in a propaganda campaign
aimed at the Ukrainian population about the threat to Ukraine posed by efforts at NATO rapprochement.
“According to opinion polls, the Ukrainian population is also opposed to the plan. During the Cold War,
Soviet propaganda portrayed NATO as the enemy.”61 According to sociological surveys, as of 2008,
NATO support in Ukraine was no more than 25 percent.62
56 “Talking Tough”, Deutsche Welle, 2008. Available at: https://bit.ly/3qQUtCm.
57 “Ukraine drops ‘unrealistic’ plans for NATO membership”, The Guardian, May 27, 2010.
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/27/ukraine-drops-nato-membership-plan
58 “Losing business”, Deutsche Welle, 2008. Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/german-industry-leaders-warn-against-isolating-
russia/a-3599534
59 Brunnstrom, D. and Cornwell, S. (2008): “NATO promises Ukraine, Georgia entry one day”, Reuters.
Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-idUSL0179714620080403.
60 Ibid.
61 “Eastward Expansion”, Deutsche Welle, March 18, 2008.
Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-turns-to-germany-france-to-back-nato-bid/a-3200273
62 “Half of Ukrainians opposed to Ukraine’s membership of NATO, poll indicates”, Interfax-Ukraine, February 11, 2008. Archived from
the original on 4 June 2008. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20080604014018/http://www.interfax.com.ua/en/press-
center/press-conference/106882/

31
Chapter 2. a WeStern lenS for unDerStanDing ukraine
As of 2008, the Western media, when discussing Ukraine and Georgia, still referred to them as former
Soviet republics, which emphasizes their recognition of Russian Federation influence in the region and
nullifies the subjectivity of such independent countries and their right to self-determination when it
comes to foreign and security policy: “Rather than enhancing NATO security, both post-Soviet countries
represent a security risk for the alliance, argues the west European camp.”63 Another view was that
Germany does not support NATO accession for Georgia and Ukraine out of respect for Russia. The
German government believed that these countries need to become more stable and gain significant
popular support for joining NATO before starting the membership process. According to Deutsche Welle,
“Putin did criticize the Western military pact for promising Georgia and Ukraine eventual membership,
although NATO did not go so far as to put former Soviet states Georgia and Ukraine on a definite track
for membership by granting them so-called Membership Action Plans.”64
In another article about the results of the summit, Deutsche Welle emphasized that the reason
for refusing Ukraine and Georgia was the Russian Federation. “Russia opposes the plan to grant
membership on the grounds that such a move would pose a direct threat to its security and endanger
the fragile balance of forces in Europe. It also sees NATO’s willingness to enlarge eastward as the
continuation of the Western Cold War containment policy and the spread of a foreign military bloc
along its border.”65
In fact, this was direct blackmail of the international community with threats of military aggression. But
it should be noted that the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 had nothing to do with NATO expansion to the
east. The NATO issue was always raised by the Russian Federation for the purpose of manipulation
and to justify its aggressive imperialism.
A few months after the summit, the Russia-Georgia war began (August 8–12, 2008), which formed the
basis for the narrative about Ukraine as the next military target of the Russian Federation.
NOTE:
On August 1, 2008, South Ossetian militarized groups, supported by the Russian Federation,
opened re against Georgian forces, violating the 1992 ceasere agreement. On August 7,
Georgian army units were sent to the conict zone in South Ossetia and quickly took control of
most of Tskhinvali, a separatist stronghold. In response, Russia accused Georgia of «aggression
against South Ossetia» by launching a full-scale invasion of Georgia on August 8, 2008. Russian
troops occupied part of the territory of Georgia and stopped near Tbilisi. At the time, Moscow
accused the countr y of trying to forcibly restore the separatist region of South Ossetia, and called
its operation «forcing Georgia to make peace.» Instead, Georgia, like some Western countries,
called that war an act of aggression by the Russian Federation.
In September that year, The Guardian published an article by Andrew Wilson, “Is Ukraine next?” 66
According to the author, the “EU should be thinking about how it can extend a commitment to security,
democracy and prosperity to neighbours. The war in Georgia has clearly exposed the security vacuum
in the surrounding region, as well as a lot of raw nerves.”67 The article in a way predicted the fate of
Ukraine. The author emphasized that the European Union should advise Ukraine and help it to prevent
63 “NATO allies divided over Ukraine and Georgia”, The Guardian, 2008.
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/02/ukraine-georgia.
64 “NATO Summit”, Deutsche Welle, April 4, 2008.
Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/nato-summit-ends-on-positive-note-fails-to-heal-rifts/a-3244743
65 “Talking Tough”, Deutsche Welle, November 4, 2008.
Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/russia-talks-tough-in-response-to-natos-eastward-expansion/a-3261078
66 Wilson, A. (2008): “Is Ukraine next?”, The Guardian.
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/sep/05/ukraine.russia1.
67 Ibid.

32 THE WAR OF NARRATIVES: UKRAINE’S IMAGE IN THE MEDIA
challenges to its territorial integrity and sovereignty, especially in view of Russian interference in
Ukrainian elections, as well as to think about its own energy security.
Both democracies (Ukraine and Georgia – ed.), born as a result of bloodless revolutions, want to join
NATO and the European Union, and to establish close ties with the United States. This has led not only
to threats, but also to open aggression from the Russian Federation. The news agency Reuters also
emphasized that Ukraine may become Russia’s next military target: “Russia’s brief war in Georgia over
South Ossetia this month raised fears in Ukraine that it could be the next target of Russia’s campaign
to reassert influence over countries it long dominated in the Soviet Union.” 68 Max Boot in The Los
Angeles Times noted: “the Russian attacks on Georgia, if left unchecked, could easily trigger more
conflict in the future... Today, Georgia; tomorrow, Ukraine; the day after, Estonia?”69 Gary Schmitt wrote
about these events in The Wall Street Journal: “It is also about resisting Russia’s openly hegemonic
designs on its neighbors – including Ukraine, which Mr. Putin reportedly described as ‘not a real nation’
to President Bush at their meeting in Sochi earlier this year.”70 Bill O’Reilly on Fox News made a fairly
accurate prediction: “Putin is a real villain. Now the Third World War is upon us, ladies and gentlemen.”71
Screenshot 35. A rti cle: “Is U kraine next ?”,
The Guar dian, September 3, 200 8.
Source: https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2008/sep/05/ukraine.russia1
Media stressed Russia’s influence on EU and US politics. Commenting on the pressure Putin exerted
on NATO countries that led to their refusal to grant Ukraine a membership plan, it was noted that such
behavior encourages “a mistaken ‘neo-Ostpolitik’ in Berlin” and “will certainly encourage Vladimir Putin
to make further geopolitical advances”72 and demonstrate that “EU ‘soft power’ can be shown to be
nothing more than wordy weakness.”73
Some analysts warned against fear-mongering and said Ukraine could avoid confrontation by taking
a pragmatic stance and reforming its economy in the long term. While Politico noted that “Rapid
accession to either NATO or the EU is simply not realistic for several reasons, the least of which is that
Ukraine is nowhere near ready.”74
Ukraine’s aid to Georgia was also mentioned in the media. In 2009, a Radio Free Europe article on the
Russia-Georgia war aired the position of Russia, which stated that Ukrainian troops and volunteers
fought for Georgia in its war with Russia last year, in the latest sign of strained relations between
68 Elizabeth, P. and Kulikov, Y. (2008): “Ukraine condemns Russia’s move on Georgia regions”, Reuters.
Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-ossetia-ukraine-interview-idUSLR66952420080828.
69 Boot, M. (2008): “Stand Up to Russia”, Los Angeles Times.
Available at: http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-oe-boot12-2008aug12,0,6144433.story.
70 Schmitt, G. and De Lorenzo, M. (2008): “How the West Can Stand Up to Russia”, Wall Street Journal.
Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121850039382131705.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries.
71 O’Reilly, W. (2008): “World War III is on the horizon”, Fox News.
Available at: https://archive.thinkprogress.org/oreilly-on-russia-world-war-iii-is-on-the-horizon-118386913442/
72 “Diversifying and liberalising to control the ‘Heartlands’”, Politico, April 16, 2008. Available at: https://bit.ly/3qQUA0K
73 Ibid.
74 “Time for Ukraine’s leaders to rise above politics”, Politico, February 9, 2009. Available at: https://politi.co/3R1uzXh

33
Chapter 2. a WeStern lenS for unDerStanDing ukraine
the neighbors. Quoting Russian sources, the author speculated on the topic of Ukrainian nationalism,
mentioning the participation of UNA-UNSO: “Dozens of members of the UNA-UNSO paramilitary group
fought for Chechen rebels against Russian troops in the 1990s.”75
NOTE:
UNA-UNSO (Ukrainian National Assembly — Ukrainian People’s Self-Defense) is a Ukrainian
political party and public movement with a nationalist orientation. It was created in 1991.
After President V. Yanukovych came to power in 2010, in the wake of the signing of agreements on
prolongation of the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, tensions between the countries
subsided. American and European media widely covered the “Kharkiv Agreements” of 2010.
NOTE:
The agreement signed in Kharkiv by the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych and President
of the Russian Federation Dmytro Medvedev provided for the extension of permission for the
Russian Black Sea Fleet to remain in Crimea at least until 2042. In exchange Ukraine received a
discount on Russian gas in the amount of USD 100 for every 1,000 cubic meters.
Reuters depicted the events following the vote in the Parliament: “Opposition lawmakers hurled eggs
and smoke bombs inside Ukraine’s parliament on Tuesday as the chamber approved an agreement
allowing the Russian Navy to extend its stay in a Ukrainian port until 2042… Crowds of supporters
and opponents scuffled outside the Parliament building”.76 It called the pro-Ukrainian forces “Ukrainian
nationalists, led by Tymoshenko and former President Viktor Yushchenko”,77 who view the decision
as a betrayal of Ukraine’s national interests. However, in the best traditions of journalistic ethics, the
author presented all the arguments of opponents and proponents alike. While some emphasized the
threat to the security of Ukraine, others talked of the Russian Black Sea Fleet guarantor of the security
of the Black Sea region; and while some highlighted the violation of the Constitution of Ukraine, others
pointed to the influx of significant revenues and prevention of an economic crisis.
The Guardian described that move as “the most explicit sign yet of his [Yanukovich’s – ed.] new
administration’s tilt towards Moscow.”78 Luke Harding finds himself caught here in a somewhat
simplified dichotomy encompassing Ukraine’s split between a Russian-speaking east and a Ukrainian-
speaking west, which was viewed predominantly as a political division. It is on that basis that Harding
views Viktor Yushchenko’s vow to eject Russia’s Black Sea Fleet from the port of Sevastopol – on the
grounds that its presence was an affront to Ukraine’s sovereignty and a destabilising factor in Crimea –
as illegitimate. He states Crimea is “a majority ethnic Russian region with a strong pro-Soviet mood”,79
seemingly neglecting the rights and aspirations of Crimean Tatars and the fact that the matter under
question is not merely one of local but of regional security importance.
That year’s official refusal to allow Ukraine to join NATO, which was opposed by Russia, significantly
contributed to the “thaw”. “Mr Yanukovych has wasted no time in re-shaping Ukraine’s foreign policy in
75 “Russia Says Ukrainians Fought for Georgia in 2008 War”, Radio Free Europe, 2009.
Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/Russia_Says_Ukrainians_Fought_For_Georgia_In_2008_War/1806528.html.
76 Balmforth, R. (2010): “Protests as Ukraine approves Russian base extension”, Reuters, April 27.
Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-russia-fleet-idUSTRE63Q0YG20100427
77 Ibid.
78 Harding, L. (2010): “Ukraine extends lease for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet”, The Guardian.
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/21/ukraine-black-sea-fleet-russia.
79 Ibid.

34 THE WAR OF NARRATIVES: UKRAINE’S IMAGE IN THE MEDIA
a more Moscow-friendly way,”80 wrote the BBC’s David Stern in Kyiv. It should be noted, however, that
Ukraine declined Moscow’s invitation to join the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation,
which groups Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.
President Yanukovych even received favorable remarks from high-ranking Western officials and the
media for his promise to abandon all highly enriched uranium by 2012, which generally helped to
improve Yanukovych’s image as a president who understands current trends in world development
and is ready to include Ukraine in them. The statement was made during the Nuclear Security Summit
in Washington in 2010 with the participation of US President Barack Obama.81
Screenshot 36. A rti cle: “Presiden t Obama
Hosts Wo rld Lead er at Nuclear Securit y
Summit ”, Zimbio, A pril 12, 2010.
Source: https://bit.ly/3O1DR3t
The article cites a White House statement in which Obama “praised Ukraine’s decision as a historic
step and a reaffirmation of Ukraine’s leadership in nuclear security and nonproliferation [of nuclear
weapons]”.82 It continues with the words of White House spokesman Robert Gibbs, who described
the step as “something that the United States has tried to make happen for more than 10 years… The
material is enough to construct several nuclear weapons. And this demonstrates Ukraine’s continued
leadership in nonproliferation and comes in an important region where we know a lot of highly enriched
uranium exists.”83
It should be noted that such a decision was particularly in the interest of the Russian Federation, which
had long been conducting special operations to undermine the Ukrainian state’s defense capabilities.
After the military aggression of the Russian Federation against Georgia and the postponement of
Ukraine’s prospects of joining NATO, the narrative of Ukraine as a “buffer zone” began to spread in
the Western media. The West’s aim in these terms was not to spoil relations with Russia because of
the Ukrainian issue, and for Russia to maintain its influence in Ukraine and to regard itself as thereby
diminishing the influence of the developed countries, democracy and NATO, keeping them as far as
possible from its borders. The New York Times, in justifying the preservation of Ukraine’s status as a
buffer zone, noted that some “might say these policy prescriptions amount to a defeat for America. On
the contrary, Washington has a deep-seated interest in ending this conflict and maintaining Ukraine
as a sovereign buffer state between Russia and NATO. Furthermore, good relations with Russia are
essential, because the United States needs Moscow’s help to deal with Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, and
eventually to help counter China, the only genuine potential rival to the United States.”84
In his piece for Politico Edward Lucas summarized all the Western pro-Russian sentiments of the
time − “new version of history is gaining traction. The crisis in Ukraine is overwhelmingly the West’s
fault. We abused and provoked Russia by heedlessly and recklessly enlarging NATO and the European
80 “Ukraine’s parliament votes to abandon NATO ambitions”, BBC, June 3, 2010.
Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/10229626
81 “Ukraine to get rid of ‘all’ highly enriched uranium”, France 24, 2010.
Available at: https://www.france24.com/en/20100412-ukraine-get-rid-all-highly-enriched-uranium.
82 Solash, R. (2010): “Ukraine Pledges to Dispose of Weapons-Grade Uranium”, Radio Free Europe. Available at: https://bit.ly/3YTHaOc.
83 Ibid.
84 “Getting Ukraine Wrong”, The New York Times, April 13, 2014. Available at: https://bit.ly/44rtk6F

35
Chapter 2. a WeStern lenS for unDerStanDing ukraine
Union. If we halt, or – better – reverse this process, all will be well.” And then he depicted the actual
consequences of this mistaken approach: “Imagine what this would mean in practice. First, lift all
sanctions and accept the occupation of Crimea. Second, make a public and irrevocable commitment
to stop NATO and EU expansion… It is certainly true, as Walter Russell Mead put it, that the West’s
behaviour has created “a restless, hostile Russia with a zone of instability around it”. But the real lesson
of the past is not that we were too tough. We were way too weak.
The countries of central and eastern Europe have been warning policymakers in Brussels and elsewhere
since 1991 that Russia was unpredictable and potentially menacing. The collapse of communism did
not free Russia of the legacy of its imperial past in the way that West Germany shed the Nazi legacy in
the years after 1945. That meant that no Russian neighbour could be fully safe.”85
UKRAINE BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND THE CUSTOMS UNION
With the coming to power of President Viktor Yanukovych, the Western media echoed the narrative about
the buffer zone in its security aspect, and the narrative about Ukraine’s balanced cooperation with both
the EU and Russia – in particular, economic cooperation – gained strength. The New York Times wrote
that “Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych said his country planned to sign an Association Agreement
with the EU in the course of 2013. But he also stressed that the country would develop its relations with
Russia’s Custom’s Union in areas which do not contradict other “international obligations”.86
It was quite obvious that Russia was putting pressure on Ukraine to join the Russian-led Customs
Union instead of signing the Agreement with the EU. The BBC reported that “contrary to the popular
view, Mr Putin did not start with sanctions. He offered Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych major
incentives: significantly lower gas prices, large-scale industrial co-operation projects, and soft credits.
In doing so, he appealed to the spiritual unity of two fellow Slav peoples, both largely adhering to the
Orthodox Christian tradition, and to the prominent role that Ukrainians had played in the history of the
Russian empire and then the Soviet Union.”87
NOTE:
The Customs Union is a form of interstate trade and economic integration of the countries of the
Eurasian Economic Union. The Union includes Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Russia.
The Customs Union came into being on January 1, 2015 and is the legal successor of the Customs
Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, which was in effect from January 1, 2010.
It was Ukraine, with the second largest economy in the region (after Russia), that was supposed to
provide the economic strength of the Customs Union, which Vladimir Putin sought.
In retrospect, it could be said that Yanukovych’s main mistake was not so much his refusal to sign the
Association Agreement, but a broad information campaign about a quick and successful rapprochement
with the EU. Ukrainians themselves were surprised to see how, after so many efforts by weak pro-
Western forces in Ukrainian politics, the so-called pro-Russian president was confidently leading the
country to rapprochement with the West. And when the realization of the dream of many Ukrainians
was already almost within reach, a sharp change of course in one night left many disappointed people
85 “The wages of weakness”, Politico, April 15, 2014. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/the-wages-of-weakness/
86 “Getting Ukraine Wrong”, The New York Times, April 13, 2014. Available at: https://nyti.ms/45xTHcK
87 “Analysis: Russia’s carrot-and-stick battle for Ukraine”, BBC, December 17, 2013.
Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25401179

36 THE WAR OF NARRATIVES: UKRAINE’S IMAGE IN THE MEDIA
with little choice. If Yanukovych intended to conduct politics with the aim of “sitting on two chairs
at once” (to develop balanced relations with the EU and Russia – ed.) or negotiating better terms
of cooperation with the Russian Federation in order to avoid the events that unfolded later on (the
Revolution of Dignity and the war – ed.), a better narrative would have been to the effect that the road
to the EU was long and thorny, Ukraine was doing its best, but it had not yet completed its “homework”.
The last straw for Ukrainians was the unsuccessful information campaign inside the country, bringing
the matter almost to the point of actually signing the Agreement, but then refusing to do so, offering
only weak excuses, and signing another agreement with the Russian Federation, followed by beating
up protesting students on Euromaidan. Ukrainians had finally had enough of perhaps the largest-
scale corruption in their history, the strengthening of authoritarianism, the curtailment of rights and
freedoms, and the rollback of the achievements of democracy.
Screenshot 37. Article:
“Ukra ine wants tra de
agreements wi th EU and
Russia”, EUR ACTIV,
Januar y 4, 2013.
Source: https: //www.
euractiv.com/section/
economy-jobs/news/
ukraine-wants-trade-
agreements-with- eu-
and-russia/
Screenshot 38. Arti cle:
“Russia behin d Ukraine
U-tur n on EU”, Poli tico,
Novembe r 23, 2013.
Sourc e:
https://www.politico.eu/
article/russia-behind-
ukraine-u-turn- on-eu/
Screenshot 39.
Arti cle: “Russia steals
‘Ukra inian b ride’ at
the alt ar”, Reuters,
Novembe r 23, 2013.
Source: https://bit.
ly /3O 2eY V z
NOTE:
Although the illusion was created that Viktor Yanukovych and his party made signicant efforts
to complete Ukraine’s «homework» for European integration, the President’s refusal to sign the
Association Agreement with the EU in 2013 provoked the protests that began on November 21,
2013, and grew into the Revolution of Dignity after the violent dispersal of a demonstration in Kyiv
on the night of November 30, 2013.
Speaking about the reasons for refusing to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, some Western
journalists actually repeated the narrative created in the interests of Russia about Ukraine as an
“unsuccessful country” that depends completely on Russia’s economic support, will and decisions.
They argued that an economic gap with the Russian Federation would be fatal for Ukraine. Viktor
Yanukovych’s decision is also explained by external and internal reasons: the pressure from the
President of the Russian Federation, his proposal for integration in the alternative geopolitical project
of the Eurasian Union, and the economic crisis in Ukraine.88
88 “Ukrainians want the EU more than the Customs Union”, BBC Ukraine, 2013. Available at: https://bit.ly/3R4I6gH.

37
Chapter 2. a WeStern lenS for unDerStanDing ukraine
In fact, it can be said that it was the reluctance of the pro-Russian leadership of Ukraine to carry out real
reforms, and economic, political and judicial corruption at the highest levels that held back Ukraine’s
economic development and access to new markets. In particular, as of 2013, the economic situation
in Ukraine worsened, so it was necessary to look for cheap energy sources, support its own industrial
producers and safeguard sales markets.89
UKRAINE DIVIDED AND A “CIVIL WAR”
The narrative created by Russian propaganda about the “split/division” of Ukraine along linguistic
and regional (territorial) lines began to spread in the Western media in the first years after Ukraine
gained independence and was not really subject to critical reassessment until the beginning of the
large-scale invasion of the Russian Federation in 2022. In general, the division of the population of
Ukraine into pro-Western and pro-Russian on linguistic or territorial grounds is a myth. After centuries
of Russification, a large part of Ukrainians considered Russian their native language, but this did not
mean they automatically belonged to the camp of “Russian world” adherents. In fact, this narrative
was used to support the Russian Federation’s territorial claims and its promotion of the idea of the
disintegration of the Ukrainian state.
What long served as the framework for a distorted view of processes in Ukraine is a deep
misunderstanding of the complexity of the new Ukrainian self-awareness, the main basis of which
is not language, but the desire for freedom, to take another historical opportunity to finally get rid of
stifling totalitarianism, to change the post-Soviet social contract and organize life in accordance with
a system of democratic values, which puts human beings at the center, along with human rights and
freedoms.
The narrative of a “split” based on pro-Russian or pro-Western moods prevailing in particular regions is
often illustrated by the results of the 2004 and 2010 presidential elections. But it is worth following the
full history of important votes, starting with the vote for independence. Except for Crimea, all regions
voted “for” by 83 to 98 percent of the votes. The presidential elections of 1991, 1999, 2014, and 2019
demonstrated the absence of large gaps that would make it possible to speak of a “split.” Rather, it
is worth taking into account the greater influence of the Russian Federation in the eastern regions
of Ukraine and the fact that during these elections not all Ukrainians were guided by the candidates’
promises regarding future foreign policy as a factor influencing their decision-making. And although
the demonstrative elections of 2004 and 2010 did indeed have significant regional differences in voting
results and were a confrontation over the dilemma of whether Ukraine should move towards the East
or the West, it is unlikely that Ukraine can really be called irreconcilably divided, and wrong to talk of a
“left-bank Ukraine”, one that sought to return to Russia. After all, the majority of citizens when voting
for a candidate vote in the hope of a better life, choosing between narratives according to which the
standard of living in the country will improve due to deeper cooperation with either Russia or the West.
Therefore, when Euromaidan began after the refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the EU,
it turned into the Revolution of Dignity, which led to the overthrow of the Yanukovych regime after the
beating of protesting students. In its essence, the Revolution was not about rapprochement with the
West, but about defending the hope of a democratic, not an authoritarian Ukraine. When security forces
in cooperation with the Russian special forces began killing protesters on the Maidan and the Heavenly
Hundred appeared, Russia began to invoke separatist sentiments (Russian special forces armed and
supervised separatist groups in all South-Eastern regions but operations were successful only in two
of them−Donetsk and Luhansk). After the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the war in the
east of Ukraine, it became clear to many that the Russian Federation is not the country that would
help Ukrainians to live better. Therefore, both the 2014 and 2019 elections showed what Ukrainians are
89 Konończuk, W. (2013): “Ukraine withdraws from signing the Association Agreement in Vilnius: The motives and implications”, OWC.
Available at: https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-11-27/ukraine-withdraws-signing-association-agreement-
vilnius-motives-and.