Propaganda at Play: A Thematic Analysis of Belarusian Media Narratives in the Context of the Russo-Ukrainian War

Abstract

This study delves into the narratives employed by Belarusian propaganda during the Russo-Ukrainian War, examining 1,750 news items from Belarusian state media sources and the pro-government Telegram channels from September 1 st to November 30 th , 2022. The research employs the Looqme methodology, a robust content analysis approach that involves systematically coding and categorizing textual data to identify key thematic blocks and subthemes. The findings reveal a carefully crafted narrative aimed at demonizing Ukraine, promoting alternative realities, and glorifying military service. By portraying the West as a source of instability and danger, the propaganda fosters public support for Belarus's stance on the conflict. Additionally, the study exposes the use of historical manipulation and reinforcement of negative portrayals through quoting Russian authorities. The study highlights the role of language manipulation and selective presentation of events in shaping public opinion, providing valuable insights for countering disinformation and fostering objective reporting in times of conflict.

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Media Literacy and Academic Research | Vol. 6, No. 1, June 2023
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Studies
Propaganda at Play: A Thematic
Analysis of Belarusian Media
Narratives in the Context
of the Russo-Ukrainian War
Petro Katerynych
photo: Andrej Greguš
ABSTRACT
This study delves into the narratives employed by Belarusian propaganda during the Russo-
Ukrainian War, examining 1,750 news items from Belarusian state media sources and the pro-
government Telegram channels from September 1
st
to November 30
th
, 2022. The research employs
the Looqme methodology, a robust content analysis approach that involves systematically
coding and categorizing textual data to identify key thematic blocks and subthemes. The
ndings reveal a carefully crafted narrative aimed at demonizing Ukraine, promoting alternative
realities, and glorifying military service. By portraying the West as a source of instability and
danger, the propaganda fosters public support for Belarus’s stance on the conict. Additionally,
the study exposes the use of historical manipulation and reinforcement of negative portrayals
through quoting Russian authorities. The study highlights the role of language manipulation
and selective presentation of events in shaping public opinion, providing valuable insights for
countering disinformation and fostering objective reporting in times of conict.
KEY WORDS
Belarus. Belarusian Propaganda. Information Warfare. Media Narratives. Russo-Ukrainian War.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.34135/mlar-23-01-02

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1 Introduction
“If you’re not careful, the newspapers will have you hating the people who are being oppressed,
and loving the people who are doing the oppressing.”
Malcolm X
“The propagandist’s purpose is to make one set of people forget that certain other sets of
people are human.”
Aldous Huxley, 1937 “The Olive Tree”
The Russo-Ukrainian War has not only intensied the geopolitical tensions within the
region, but has also led to the proliferation of state-sponsored propaganda, shaping public
opinion and fostering division.
1
In this context, Belarus has emerged as a signicant player,
with its media landscape reecting the country’s complex political and social dynamics.2 The
Belarusian media landscape has been dominated by state-controlled outlets, allowing the
government to wield signicant inuence over public opinion.
3
Belarus, situated to the west
of Russia along Ukraine’s extensive northern border, is one of Moscow’s staunchest allies. It
facilitated Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 by enabling Kremlin forces to
enter from the north.4 Concerns persist that Belarus may once again serve as a launchpad for
oensives or that its military will join the conict.5
Belarusian social cohesion is vulnerable to Russian inuence in the information space
and information warfare. With 60% of Belarusian TV content produced in Russia, citizens
are exposed to the same messages as Russians, increasing their sense of belonging to the
“Russian world”.
6
Russian media is generally trusted more than Belarusian media, both ocial
and independent.7 Specically, the media promotes narratives that amplify the government’s
achievements while undermining its opponents.
8
Belarus is dominated by state-controlled
media, with limited freedom of speech and press under Alexander Lukashenko’s leadership.9
The country ranks 153rd (Russia 155th) out of 180 in the World Press Freedom Index (2022).10
Regional media in Belarus face challenges adapting to online formats, and the state-owned
company Beltelecom maintains an internet monopoly, blocking anti-regime information.11 The
Belarusian KGB monitors online communications, with most internet users in Minsk. After the
1 HANLEY, H., KUMAR, D., DURUMERIC, Z.: A Special Operation: A Quantitative Approach to Dissecting and
Comparing Different Media Ecosystems’ Coverage of the Russo-Ukrainian War. [online]. [2023-02-26].
Available at: <https://www.hanshanley.com/files/ICWSM_Eluosi.pdf>.
2 See: KOROSTELEVA, E., PETROVA, I.: Power, People, and the Political: Understanding the Many Crises in
Belarus. In Nationalities Papers, 2022, p. 1-13. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2022.77>.
3
See: GREENE, S.: You Are What You Read: Media, Identity, and Community in the 2020 Belarusian
Uprising.In Post-Soviet Affairs, 2022, Vol. 38, No. 1-2, p. 88-106.
4 See: MARPLES, D.: Russia’s War Goals in Ukraine.In Canadian Slavonic Papers,Vol. 64, No. 2-3, p. 207-
219.
5
GLOD, K.: The War in Ukraine One Year on: Will Belarus Join the Battlefield? [online]. [2023-03-11]. Available
at: <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-war-in-ukraine-one-year-on-will-belarus-
join-the-battlefield/>.
6
BOULÈGUE, M., LUTSEVYCH, O., MARIN, A.: Civil Society Under Russia’s Threat: Building Resilience in
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. [online]. [2023-03-22]. Available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/
sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-11-08-civil-society-russia-threat-ukraine-belarus-moldova-
boulegue-lutsevych-marin.pdf>.
7 Ibidem.
8 See: STEBLYNA, N., DVORAK, J.: Reflections on the Independent Mass Media of Post-Soviet Countries
and Political Competitiveness.In Politics in Central Europe, 2021, Vol. 17, No. 3, p. 565-588.
9 Ibidem, p. 570.
10 RSF’s 2022 World Press Freedom Index: A New Era of Polarisation.[online]. [2023-03-11]. Available at:
<https://rsf.org/en/rsf-s-2022-world-press-freedom-index-new-era-polarisation/>.
11
DVORAK, J.: Belarus. In MERSKIN, D. (ed.): The Sage International Encyclopedia of Mass Media and
Society. Thousan Oaks, CA : SAGE Publications, 2019, p. 160-162.

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August 2020 elections, the regime targeted both foreign and local journalists, detaining and
withdrawing accreditations.
12
Additionally, state-controlled outlets tend to portray Western
countries as hostile forces that threaten Belarusian national identity and sovereignty.13
Media freedom in Belarus has been suppressed since President Lukashenko’s election in
1994, with laws limiting journalists’ rights and with media restrictions.
14
In order to maintain
power, Lukashenko’s administration has manipulated elections, detained presidential contenders
to weaken the political opposition, and enacted strict internet regulations to quell public and civil
society demonstrations.15 In February 2022, amid escalating tensions in Ukraine, Lukashenko
solidied his control by passing a constitutional referendum. This granted him lifelong immunity
from prosecution, extended his time in oce, and allowed the permanent stationing of Russian
troops and nuclear weapons in Belarus.16 In March 2023, President Putin announced Russia’s
plan to station tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. A storage facility will be completed by
July, with an Iskander short-range missile system already transferred. Russia has also helped
Belarus modify 10 aircraft for nuclear warhead capabilities and will begin pilot training soon.
Belarus has had no nuclear weapons on its territory since the early 1990s.17
Belarusian authorities maintain tight control over media, with independent journalists
and bloggers facing harassment and detentions. The state actively targets media outlets and
individuals, blocking websites and tightening digital media control through legislation. As
independent news sources dwindle, more Belarusians turn to social networks.
18
In 2019, Belarus
was listed among the 10 most censored countries by the Committee to Protect Journalists.19
The situation worsened after the August 2020 election, leading to increased harassment
and imprisonment of journalists.
20
The government also oversees ISPs, information security
standards, digital surveillance, and top-level domains, according to Freedom House’s Freedom
on the Net report.
21
Amid the political crisis and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February
2022, the government escalated arbitrary arrests of media workers, bloggers, activists, and
users, imposing harsh sentences on detainees. Security forces used raids, torture, and forced
confession videos to suppress critical speech.
22
The war and international sanctions led the
government to intensify its propaganda and manipulation of the information landscape. IREX’s
Media Sustainability Index also deemed Belarusian media as unsustainable and anti-free due to
government obstruction.
23
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko fully supported Russia in
the Russia-Ukraine war, permitting Russian forces to use Belarusian infrastructure and territory.
12
DVORAK, J.: Belarus. In MERSKIN, D. (ed.): The Sage International Encyclopedia of Mass Media and
Society. Thousan Oaks, CA : SAGE Publications, 2019, p. 160-162.
13
See: DOVBYSH, O., LEHTISAARI, K.: Local Media of Post-Soviet Countries: Evidence from Belarus, Russia,
and Ukraine. In Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 2020, Vol. 28, No. 3, p.335-
343. [online]. [2023-03-11]. Available at: <https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/762318>.
14 See: RYNG, J., GUICHERD, G., SAMAN, J. A. et al.: Internet Shutdowns. In The RUSI Journal, 2023, Vol.
167, No. 4-5, p. 50-63.
15 Ibidem.
16 Ibidem.
17
LJUNGGREN, D.:Putin Says Moscow to Place Nuclear Weapons in Belarus, US Reacts Cautiously.[online].
[2023-03-27]. Available at:<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-moscow-has-deal-with-
belarus-station-nuclear-weapons-there-tass-2023-03-25/>.
18
10 Most Censored Countries. [online]. [2023-03-25]. Available at:<https://cpj.org/reports/2019/09/10-
most-censored-eritrea-north-korea-turkmenistan-journalist/#9/>.
19 Ibidem.
20 See: MUDROV, S.: “We Did Not Unleash This War. Our Conscience Is Clear”. The Russia-Ukraine Military
Conflict and Its Perception in Belarus.In Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe,2022, Vol.
30, No. 3, p. 273-284.
21
Freedom on the Net 2022, Belarus. [online]. [2023-03-25]. Available at:<https://freedomhouse.org/country/
belarus/freedom-net/2022/>.
22 Ibidem.
23
Media Sustainability Index 2019, Belarus. [online]. [2023-03-25]. Available at:<https://www.irex.org/sites/
default/files/pdf/media-sustainability-index-europe-eurasia-2019-belarus.pdf/>.

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The state-controlled media justied the invasion with various reasons, while opposition media
showed pro-Ukraine sentiments.24 Russian and Belarusian state-sponsored propaganda evolved
before and after the 2020 presidential election, with signicant changes in mechanisms and
inuence. The ongoing geopolitical struggle for inuence in the post-Soviet space played a
major role in shaping these changes.25
The presented study seeks to contribute to the literature by conducting a comprehensive
content analysis of news items published by Belarusian state information resources and
pro-government channels between September 1st and November 30th, 2022. Drawing on the
theoretical frameworks provided by propaganda studies26 and media manipulation research27,
our analysis will explore the credibility, reliability, and manipulative techniques employed in
these news items, as well as their use of hate speech and disinformation.
The purpose of this article is to investigate and analyze the primary narratives employed
by Belarusian propaganda during the Russian-Ukrainian War. The article aims to uncover the
underlying patterns and strategies used by Belarusian state and pro-government media to
shape public opinion and advance their political objectives.
Three research questions derived from the article are:
RQ1. How does the Belarusian state media portray Ukraine and its people in the context of the
Russian-Ukrainian War, and what strategies are used?
RQ2. In what ways does the Belarusian state media present the Western countries, and how does
this narrative contribute to shaping public opinion and supporting the Belarusian government’s
stance on the conict?
RQ3. How does the Belarusian state media’s coverage of military successes and losses in the
Russian-Ukrainian War impact public perception and support for the government’s position
in the conict?
1.1 From Denial to Demonization: The Shift in Belarusian State Media’s
Coverage of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine
Belarus has two main national identity projects - the Belarusian national-romantic and the
Soviet project, represented by the Conscious and Soviet segments respectively.
28
The Belarusian
project is pro-European, promoting the Belarusian language and identity, while the Soviet
project is nostalgic for the Soviet era and friendly towards Belarusian culture. Additionally, there
is a modern Russian project supported by the Russied segment, which opposes Belarusian
identity and promotes integration with Russia.
29
The pro-European segments tend to be protest-
oriented, while the pro-Russian segments support union with Russia and view the US and the
EU negatively. Support for the pro-Russian vector has increased by 10% over the past year
due to the war and has intensied pro-Russian propaganda, but the choice is not always based
on rational factors.30 Integration supporters lack clear understanding and decisive support for
state merger.
24
Media Sustainability Index 2019, Belarus. [online]. [2023-03-25]. Available at:<https://www.irex.org/sites/
default/files/pdf/media-sustainability-index-europe-eurasia-2019-belarus.pdf/>.
25
See: MANAEV, O., RICE, N., TAYLOR, M.: The Evolution and Influence of Russian and Belarusian Propaganda
During the Belarus Presidential Election and Ensuing Protests in 2020.In Canadian Slavonic Papers,
2021,Vol. 63, No. 3-4, p. 371-402.
26 See: JOWETT, G., O’DONNELL, V.: Propaganda & Persuasion. Los Angeles, CA : SAGE Publications, 2019.
27 See: TANDOC, E., LIM, Z., LING, R.: Defining “Fake News” a Typology of Scholarly Definitions.In Digital
Journalism, 2018, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 137-153.
28
BIKANAU, P.: Belarusian Identity in 2022: A Quantitative Study. [online]. [2023-03-25]. Available at: <https://
library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/belarus/19777.pdf/>.
29 Ibidem.
30 Ibidem.

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During the Russia-Belarus negotiations on “further integration” from December 2018 to
April 2019, a surge of disinformation emerged. Utilizing framing theory, researchers uncovered
how Russian media outlets masqueraded as “objective” regional sources, disseminating pro-
integration discourse and advancing their agenda among Belarusian citizens.
31
The analysis
revealed that Russia strategically targeted local levels and leveraged social media to distribute
disinformation, lling gaps left by Belarusian authorities. This approach aimed to increase
Russia’s popularity within Belarusian regions and challenge the dominant narrative presented
by state-owned media.32
Integration between Russia and Belarus has been heavily promoted by bloggers, rather
than pro-Russian journalists.33 These narratives describe integration as a natural progression
in the historical relationship between the two nations, presenting it as advantageous and risk-
free for Belarus.
34
Benets are cited across various spheres, including economic, political,
military, cultural, and ideological ones. Bloggers argue that integration would bolster Belarusian
sovereignty, strengthen its national identity, and replace the ambiguous Belarusian ideology
with the concept of the “Russian world”.35
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, surveys by Chatham House and other
organizations have sought Belarusians’ opinions on Russia’s actions and Belarus’s potential
complicity. From March to September 2022, a concerning trend showed a consistently
high percentage of Belarusians approving of Russia’s actions, despite most not supporting
the “special operation”. For example, a Chatham House survey in March found that 28%
supported the invasion but didn’t want to participate, while in June, 33% eectively approved
of the intervention. Meanwhile, 35% opposed Russia’s actions, and another 8% expressed
some disapproval.
36
In August, the percentage of Belarusians who fully supported Russia’s
military actions in Ukraine increased to 18%, while those who expressed support but with
less condence decreased to 12%. Those who categorically opposed Russia’s military actions
remained unchanged at 35%, and those who were unsupportive of the Russian army increased to
10%. Some respondents chose not to answer.
37
However, a survey conducted by the Belarusian
Analytical Workshop in September revealed that 41.3% of Belarusians approved of Russia’s
actions against Ukraine, while 47.3% were against them.38
Between January 24
th
and February 3
rd
, 2023, a survey was conducted by Chatham
House with 813 participants. The sample size was adjusted using RIM weighting to reect
the demographic characteristics of the urban population of Belarus, including gender, age,
settlement size, and education level. The survey shows that in Belarus, state TV channels remain
dominant among urban populations (35%), with higher trust compared to other sources.
39
Non-
state media have a 20% audience share, while 26% use both types. State and non-state media
form two distinct information echo chambers in Belarusian society, with mutual distrust. This
31
See: NAVUMAU, V.: Integration or Absorption? Analyzing the Propagandist Narratives Generated
by Russia-Backed Online Regional Media in Belarus.In Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet
Democratization,2020, Vol. 28, No. 3, p. 461-484. [online]. [2023-03-03]. Available at: <https://www.muse.
jhu.edu/article/762317>.
32 Ibidem.
33
NAVUMAU, V., ILYINA, A., SHMATSINA, K.: The Stalemate of Deepened Integration: Analysis of the
Russian Anti-Belarus Disinformation Campaign in 2019.In Democracies in a Digital Era: Legal, Political
and Security Challenges, 2020. [online]. [2023-03-25]. Available at: <https://www.weasa.org/wp-content/
uploads/2021/02/WEASA-2019-publication.pdf#page=3/>.
34 Ibidem.
35 Ibidem.
36 Eight Survey Wave. [online]. [2023-03-25]. Available at: <https://belaruspolls.org/wave-8/>.
37 Ibidem.
38 Belarusians Are Increasingly Hesitant on the Issue of War and Sympathize with Russia? Results of a New
Survey and the Opinion of a Sociologist. [online]. [2023-03-15]. Available at:<https://news.zerkalo.io/
economics/23189.html/>.
39 Fourteenth Survey Wave. [online]. [2023-03-25]. Available at: <https://en.belaruspolls.org/wave-14/>.

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distrust is more pronounced among non-state media audiences, who largely distrust television
and have reduced trust in “new neutral media” since November 2022.40
It’s worth considering that many Belarusians may be hesitant to express their true opinions
due to fear of repercussions if their views deviate from the ocial narrative. Additionally, a
signicant proportion of people (ranging from 5.8% to 24% at dierent times) may be hesitant
to answer politically sensitive questions for various reasons.
41
As a result, even with data
from independent institutions, it is challenging to determine how accurately these surveys
reect the views of Belarusians, particularly regarding their stance on Russia’s aggressive war
against Ukraine and whether they approve of the destruction caused. It is uncertain whether a
signicant number of Belarusians are unaware of the catastrophe’s full extent or whether they
actively support it.
In April 2022, during the third month of Russia’s brutal full-scale war against Ukraine, even
as the world was exposed to shocking photos and videos of the Russian army atrocities in the
towns of Kyiv Oblast, 41% of Belarusians remained condent that Russian soldiers were not
using weapons against Ukrainian civilians.
42
More notably, by August, this percentage remained
unchanged, as evidenced by the Chatham House survey results.
43
This detachment from reality
could be considered paradoxical if it were not for the systematic eorts of Russian and Belarusian
propaganda, aimed at denying Russia’s war crimes, among other things. Propaganda has a
signicant impact on Belarusians, and the reasons for believing in it may vary. Some factors
contributing to the inuence of propaganda include: limited access to alternative sources of
information, historical and cultural ties with Russia, fear and insecurity.
2 Methodology
This research employs a comprehensive methodology to investigate the narratives in
Belarusian propaganda by analyzing 1,750 news items from Belarusian state media and the pro-
government Telegram channels between September 1
st
and November 30
th
, 2022. The research
included analyses of news and publications from three Belarusian state information resources
(ONT and STV television channels and the BelTA news agency) and two pro-government
telegram channels (Yellow Plums (Zheltye Slivy) and ATN News).
The LOOQME Mention Monitoring and Analysis Service monitored the messages using a
two-step algorithm, enabling analysis from both ocial media sources and Telegram. Technical
information and simplied tone were provided for each publication. The platform’s analysis
view was customized for the research period and search parameters. The qualitative content
analysis, as described by Krippendor
44
, was utilized to examine textual material in-depth,
particularly from the perspective of the context in which the chosen categories were presented.
The selection of texts for analysis was facilitated by the LOOQME platform for media analysis
and media ecosystems. Factors taken into account included reliability, presence of credible
or non-credible sources of information, manipulative headlines, manipulation of emotions in
news items, existence of hostile language, and the presence of fake information in the news.
This study adhered to established methodologies for content analysis and best practices for
identifying propaganda in media content, as outlined by Jowett & O’Donnell.45
40 Fourteenth Survey Wave. [online]. [2023-03-25]. Available at: <https://en.belaruspolls.org/wave-14/>.
41 Belarusians Are Increasingly Hesitant on the Issue of War and Sympathize with Russia? Results of a New
Survey and the Opinion of a Sociologist. [online]. [2023-03-15]. Available at: <https://news.zerkalo.io/
economics/23189.html/>.
42 Eight Survey Wave. [online]. [2023-03-25]. Available at: <https://belaruspolls.org/wave-8/>.
43 Ibidem.
44
See: KRIPPENDORFF, K.: Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology. Thousan Oaks, CA : SAGE
Publications, 2018.
45 See: JOWETT, G., O’DONNELL, V.: Propaganda & Persuasion. Los Angeles, CA : SAGE Publications, 2019.

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The quantitative analysis examined the number of mentions and their dynamics, while
the qualitative analysis focused on the indicators of mentions by tone, role, topic, and media
visibility. On the basis of the results of the analyses (between September 1
st
and November
30th, 2022) – based on titles, keywords and thematic connotations – all the analyzed content
(n=1750) has been segmented into four thematic blocks, namely Portrayal of Ukraine (n=731),
Western Threat (n=269), Belarus as a Peaceful Country (n=255), and Military Successes and
Losses (n=495). This segmentation allowed for a comprehensive understanding of the various
narratives actively employed by Belarusian propaganda during the monitoring period.
Figure 1 shows the main propaganda narratives from the content analysis. They are grouped
into the 4 key themes that we identify in the analysis (per period).
FIGURE 1: Main propaganda narratives among the content analyzed (n=1750)
Source: own processing, 2023
3 Results
3.1 The Portrayal of Ukraine
Belarusian state media present a carefully crafted portrayal of Ukraine that demonizes
and dehumanizes its people, while legitimizing Belarus’s stance on the conict. The content
analysis identied 731 materials within this narrative theme, encompassing news reports and
articles in the media, as well as news reports on the Telegram channels. The main subthemes
include:
1.
Dehumanization of the Ukrainian Government and Some Ukrainians (n=202, except for
the categories related to Nazi terminology, which are quite extensive and are presented
in a separate topic group): Belarusian state media systematically dehumanizes Ukrainians
by employing Russian “newspeak” terms like “terrorists”, and “punishers”. They utilize
disinformation and manipulation to reinforce this hostile language. For instance, Belarusian

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propaganda frequently spreads hoaxes about Ukraine’s alleged intention to use a “dirty
bomb”46 despite being a non-nuclear state.
2.
Use of Nazi Terminology (n=58): State media draws parallels between the Ukrainian
government, certain Ukrainians, and far-right extremist ideologies, using Nazi terminology
to create a negative image of Ukraine in the minds of the Belarusian audience.
3.
Ukraine as the “Aggressor” (n=92): Belarusian state media portrays Ukraine as an
aggressive, hostile nation by emphasizing alleged acts of aggression, particularly towards
Belarus and its allies. It focuses on incidents of violence or unrest in Ukraine, presenting
them as evidence of the country’s inherent instability.
4. Incompetent and Corrupt Ukrainian Government (n=145): Media sources emphasize the
perceived incompetence or corruption of the Ukrainian government, arguing that they are
incapable of governing eectively. This narrative serves to justify intervention or support
for separatist movements.
5.
Victimhood (n=234): Belarusian media portrays Ukraine as a victim of Western manipulation
or geopolitical games, undermining its sovereignty and autonomy in decision-making.
Belarusian state-controlled media also reinforces these narratives by quoting Russian
authorities and experts who support these negative portrayals. For example, during the
monitoring period, a Belarusian television channel ONT quoted the speaker of the Russian
State Duma, Volodin, comparing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to the terrorist Osama
bin Laden due to the supposed “nuclear terror”.47
A quantitative content analysis of this narrative theme on the platforms analyzed by month
is shown in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2: Thematic spectrum of the narrative theme “Portrayal of Ukraine” (n=731)
Source: own processing, 2023
46
The Russian Defense Ministry Revealed Details of a “Dirty Bomb” Provocation Being Prepared by Kyiv. [online].
[2023-03-12]. Available at:<https://ont.by/news/v-minoborony-rossii-rasskazali-detali-o-gotovyashejsya-
provokacii-kieva-s-podryvom-gryaznoj-bomby/>.
47 Volodin Compared Zelensky to the Terrorist Bin Laden. [online]. [2023-03-24]. Available at:<https://ont.
by/news/volodin-sravnil-zelenskogo-i-terrorista-ben-ladena/>.

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3.2 The Western Threat
The Western threat narrative is a critical component of Belarusian state media’s coverage
of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Through this narrative, the media seeks to shape public opinion
by portraying the West as a source of instability and danger. The content analysis identied
269 materials within this theme, which can be divided into ve key subthemes:
1.
External Threats (n=62): Belarusian state media emphasizes external threats to the country’s
sovereignty and security, often targeting Poland and Ukraine as the primary sources of
danger. This narrative aims to justify the Belarusian government’s actions and instill a sense
of urgency in defending the nation against perceived foreign adversaries.
2.
NATO Expansion (n=19): The media highlights the expansion of NATO and its military
activities near Belarus’s borders, portraying it as a direct threat to the country’s security
and stability. This narrative serves to rationalize the Belarusian government’s eorts to
strengthen its military capabilities and forge closer ties with Russia, a fellow opponent of
NATO expansion.
3. US Inuence (n=66): Belarusian state media frequently focuses on the alleged nefarious
inuence of the United States in the region, accusing it of orchestrating regime change
attempts and supporting opposition movements in Belarus and other countries. This
narrative seeks to delegitimize pro-democracy movements and justify the government’s
crackdown on dissent.
4.
EU Interference (n=33): The media emphasizes the alleged meddling of the European Union
in the internal aairs of Belarus and its neighbors, accusing it of promoting instability and
division in the region. This narrative aims to discredit the EU’s policies and interventions,
portraying them as harmful to the interests of Belarus and its people.
5.
Western Manipulation of Ukraine (n=89): Belarusian state media portrays Ukraine as a victim
of Western manipulation or geopolitical games, further undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty
and autonomy in decision-making. This narrative serves to justify Belarus’s support for
Russia in the conict and discredit the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government.
Belarusian propaganda perpetuates the notion of being “surrounded by enemies”, instilling
fear in its citizens regarding external threats.
48
The most aggressive attacks are directed at Poland
and Ukraine, followed by the Baltic countries, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For
example, Belarusian media published articles alleging Poland’s intention to deploy US nuclear
weapons on its territory.49 To vilify Poland, Belarusian propagandists frequently distort historical
events, alleging that the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa) deliberately perpetrated a genocide
against Belarusians during World War II.50
The Western threat narrative in Belarusian state media encompasses various subthemes that
collectively portray the West as a source of instability and danger in the context of the Russo-
Ukrainian War. This narrative aims to shape public opinion, justify the government’s actions, and
emphasize the need to “protect” Belarus’s interests in the face of perceived external threats.
A quantitative content analysis of this narrative theme on the platforms analyzed by month
is shown in Figure 3.
48
The Special Services Will Never Let This Happen. Poland Sought to Seize Power in Belarus, Now It Is Awaiting
a Summons to an International Court. [online]. [2023-03-10]. Available at:<https://ctv.by/specsluzhby-
etogo-nikogda-ne-dopustyat-polsha-stremilas-zahvatit-vlast-v-belarusi-teper-eyo-zhdyot/>.
49
Lavrov Said That Poland’s Desire to Host U.S. Nuclear Weapons Is Alarming. [online]. [2023-03-10]. Available
at:<https://ont.by/news/lavrov-zayavil-chto-zhelanie-polshi-razmestit-u-sebya-yadernoe-oruzhie-ssha-
vyzyvaet-trevogu/>.
50 The Grodno Region Is Not Only Germans, It Is Also the Armia Krajowa. An Expert on the Genocide Case.
[online]. [2023-03-10]. Available at:<https://www.belta.by/regions/view/grodnenskij-region-eto-ne-tolko-
nemtsy-eto-i-armija-krajova-spetsialist-o-dele-po-genotsidu-532267-2022/>.

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FIGURE 3: Thematic spectrum of the narrative theme “Western Threat” (n=269)
Source: own processing, 2023
3.3 Belarus as a Peaceful Country
This narrative portrays Belarus as a responsible, non-aggressive actor in the conict, aiming
to shape public opinion and justify the government’s stance. The content analysis identied
255 materials within this theme, which can be divided into ve key subthemes:
1.
Defensive Posture (n=66): Belarusian state media emphasizes the country’s defensive
posture, asserting that it only resorts to military action when provoked or threatened.
This portrayal presents Belarus as a responsible and restrained actor on the international
stage, focused on preserving regional peace and stability.
2.
Mediator Role (n=51): The media highlights Belarus’s role as a mediator in peace talks
and negotiations between conicting parties, such as the Minsk Protocol. This emphasis
on diplomacy underscores the country’s commitment to resolving disputes and conicts
peacefully.
3.
Cooperation with International Organizations (n=34): Belarusian state media underlines the
country’s willingness to work with international organizations, such as the United Nations
and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to address regional
security concerns and promote peace and stability.
4.
Promotion of Regional Peace Initiatives (n=38): The media frequently covers Belarusian-led
or supported peace initiatives, such as the Eastern Partnership, which fosters closer ties
between the European Union and its Eastern neighbors, including Belarus, Ukraine, and
other countries in the region. This narrative highlights Belarus’s commitment to maintaining
a peaceful and cooperative regional environment.
5. Emphasizing the Human Cost of Conict (n=66): Belarusian state media regularly report
on the negative impact of war on civilian populations, including the plight of refugees and
displaced persons, as well as the destruction of infrastructure and cultural heritage. This
coverage underscores the importance of pursuing peaceful solutions to conicts and
avoiding unnecessary violence and suering.

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Belarusian state media continually reassures its citizens that the country will not engage
in military aggression unless provoked. However, this reassurance is not without manipulation,
as Belarusian ocials and media dismiss the possibility of military aggression in the absence
of “provocations”
51
, which are, in fact, staged by the republic itself.
52
The narrative theme of
“Belarus as a Peaceful Country” in Belarusian state media encompasses various subthemes
that collectively portray Belarus as a responsible and peace-loving actor in the context of the
Russo-Ukrainian War.
A quantitative content analysis of this narrative theme on the platforms analyzed by month
is shown in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4: Thematic spectrum of the narrative theme “Belarus as a Peaceful Country” (n=255)
Source: own processing, 2023
3.4 Military Successes and Losses
The narrative theme of military successes and losses in the Belarusian state media focuses
on the Russo-Ukrainian War and plays a crucial role in shaping public opinion and supporting
the Belarusian government’s stance on the conict. The content analysis identied 495 materials
within this theme, which can be divided into ve key subthemes:
1.
Alternative Reality of Russian Military Success (n=77): Belarusian state media presents
an alternative reality where Russian forces achieve signicant successes against Ukraine,
downplaying or ignoring the achievements of Ukrainian forces. This narrative aims to
legitimize Russia’s actions and maintain public support for Belarus’s backing of Russia.
51
Lappo About the Situation on the Ukrainian Border: Any Provocation in Our Direction Will Be Adequately
Responded to. [online]. [2023-03-10]. Available at:<https://www.belta.by/society/view/lappo-o-situatsii-
na-ukrainskoj-granitse-na-ljubuju-provokatsiju-v-nashu-storonu-budet-adekvatnyj-otvet-532292-2022/>.
52 Dzermant: We’re Not Preparing for Any Attack, We’re Preparing so We Won’t Be Caught off Guard and We
Can Fight Back. [online]. [2023-03-10]. Available at:<https://ctv.by/dzermant-my-ne-gotovimsya-ni-k-
kakomu-napadeniyu-gotovimsya-chtoby-nas-ne-zastigli-vrasploh-i-my/>.

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2. Downplaying Ukrainian Forces’ Achievements (n=101): The media tends to minimize the
successes of the Ukrainian military and exaggerate the setbacks they experience. This
narrative serves to demoralize the Ukrainian side and reinforce the perception that the
conict is unwinnable for Ukraine.
3. Emphasizing Russian Military Might (n=55): Belarusian state media frequently highlights
the strength and capabilities of the Russian military, portraying it as an unstoppable force
destined to prevail in the conict. This narrative seeks to bolster public condence in the
Russian-led military campaign and justify Belarus’s continued support for it.
4.
Underreporting Losses and Setbacks (n=204): The media downplays the losses and
setbacks experienced by Russian and Belarusian forces, avoiding reporting on the full
extent of casualties and diculties faced on the battleeld. This narrative aims to maintain
public support for the war eort and prevent the emergence of anti-war sentiment.
5.
Heroism and Sacrice (n=58): Belarusian state media emphasizes the heroism and sacrice
of Russian and Belarusian soldiers ghting in the conict, portraying them as valiant
defenders of their homeland and the Slavic brotherhood. This narrative serves to rally
public support for the war eort and create a sense of national pride and unity.
A quantitative content analysis of this narrative theme on the platforms analyzed by month
is shown in Figure 5.
FIGURE 5: Thematic spectrum of the narrative theme “Military Successes and Losses” (n=495)
Source: own processing, 2023
The narrative theme of “Military Successes and Losses” in Belarusian state media
encompasses various subthemes that collectively seek to shape public opinion about the
Russo-Ukrainian War and its implications for Belarus. This narrative aims to legitimize the
conict, maintain public support for Belarus’s backing of Russia, and rally the nation around
the war eort. By selectively emphasizing Russian victories
53
and minimizing Ukrainian
53
Russian Defense Ministry: Four Ukrainian Ammunition Depots Destroyed in One Day. [online]. [2023-03-10].
Available at:<https://ont.by/news/minoborony-rossii-za-sutki-unichtozheno-chetyre-ukrainskih-sklada-
boepripasov/>.

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achievements
54
, the media supports the Belarusian government’s position
55
, and reinforces the
notion of Russia as a powerful ally in the face of the regional conict.
4 Discussion
This study aimed to explore the primary narratives employed by Belarusian state and pro-
government media during the Russo-Ukrainian War and understand the underlying patterns and
strategies used to shape public opinion and advance their political objectives. Our analysis led
to the identication of several key themes in the Belarusian media landscape. In this discussion
section, we delve deeper into these themes, reecting on their implications for the understanding
of the Belarusian propaganda apparatus.
The portrayal of Ukraine in Belarusian state media is characterized by demonization and
dehumanization, achieved through the strategic use of language, selective presentation of
events, and reinforcement of negative portrayals by quoting Russian authorities and experts.
By presenting Ukraine as a nation lled with “Nazis”, “terrorists”, and “punishers”, Belarusian
propaganda seeks to legitimize its own stance in the conict and shape public opinion. This
portrayal is not only detrimental to Ukraine’s international image, but also serves to foster
animosity between the two nations, potentially exacerbating the ongoing conict (RQ1).
The Western threat narrative is a critical component of Belarusian state media’s coverage
of the Russo-Ukrainian War. By portraying the West as a source of instability and danger, the
media aims to shape public opinion in favor of the Belarusian government’s actions. This
narrative encompasses several subthemes, including external threats, NATO expansion, US
inuence, EU interference, and Western manipulation of Ukraine. By perpetuating the notion
of being “surrounded by enemies”, Belarusian propaganda instills fear in its citizens, further
justifying the government’s actions and policies (RQ2).
The narrative theme of Belarus as a peaceful country portrays the nation as a responsible,
non-aggressive actor in the conict. This theme aims to shape public opinion and justify the
government’s stance by emphasizing the country’s defensive posture, its role as a mediator,
cooperation with international organizations, promotion of regional peace initiatives, and the
human cost of the conict. However, the reassurance provided by this narrative is not without
manipulation, as the Belarusian government stages “provocations” to justify its military actions.
In the context of military successes and losses, the Belarusian state media selectively
emphasizes Russian victories, while minimizing Ukrainian achievements, aiming to legitimize the
conict and maintain public support for Belarus’s backing of Russia. The media often downplays
the losses and setbacks experienced by Russian and Belarusian forces, avoiding reporting on
the full extent of casualties and diculties faced on the battleeld. This selective coverage
serves to rally public support for the war eort, create a sense of national pride and unity, and
reinforce the notion of Russia as a powerful ally in the face of the regional conict (RQ3).
5 Conclusion
In conclusion, this study sheds light on the intricate narratives and tactics used by Belarusian
state media during the Russo-Ukrainian War, oering a comprehensive understanding of how
disinformation is spread during times of conict. By revealing four key thematic blocks, namely
54 NATO Officer: A “Logistical Nightmare” for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. [online]. [2023-03-10]. Available
at:<https://ont.by/news/oficer-nato-dlya-vsu-nastupil-logisticheskij-koshmar/>.
55 Matvienko: The Main Priorities of the Presidents of Belarus and Russia Are National Interests. [online].
[2023-03-10]. Available at:<https://www.belta.by/politics/view/matvienko-glavnye-prioritety-prezidentov-
belarusi-i-rossii-natsionalnye-interesy-531928-2022/>.

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The Portrayal of Ukraine, Western Threat, Belarus as a Peaceful Country, and Military Successes
and Losses, our research helps to uncover the underlying patterns and strategies employed to
shape public opinion and advance political objectives.
The demonization and dehumanization of Ukraine, along with the emphasis on the Western
threat, serve to legitimize Belarus’s stance in the conict and rally public support for its policies.
The portrayal of Belarus as a peaceful, responsible actor serves to justify the government’s
actions and reassure the public of the country’s commitment to regional stability. Selective
coverage of military successes and losses, on the other hand, aims to maintain public support
for Belarus’s support of Russia and to bolster Russia’s image as a powerful ally in the face of
the regional conict.
As we continue to navigate an increasingly polarized media environment, it is crucial
to understand and address the tactics used by state-controlled media to manipulate public
opinion, and foster a more accurate and nuanced understanding of complex geopolitical issues.
By recognizing and confronting these manipulative narratives, we can empower ourselves to
make informed decisions and contribute to a more transparent, balanced media landscape.
5.1 Limitations and Further Research
Despite the valuable insights provided by this study, there are several limitations that
should be acknowledged. Initially, the study concentrated on a particular timeframe (September
1st to November 30th, 2022), which might not comprehensively represent the development of
narratives used by Belarusian state media over the entire course of the Russo-Ukrainian War.
Additionally, the analysis was limited to three Belarusian state information resources and
two pro-government Telegram channels, potentially excluding other sources that may also
disseminate disinformation and propaganda. Further research could expand the scope of the
study by examining a broader range of media sources and analyzing a more extended time
frame, thereby providing a more comprehensive understanding of the narratives and strategies
used by Belarusian propaganda. Additionally, comparative research could explore the similarities
and dierences in propaganda tactics employed by various state actors involved in the conict,
illuminating the ways in which dierent countries utilize media manipulation to advance their
political objectives. Finally, future research could also investigate the impact of these propaganda
narratives on public opinion and behavior, providing insights into the eectiveness of these
tactics in shaping the beliefs and actions of the target audience. This information would be
valuable in informing strategies for countering disinformation and promoting objective, fact-
based reporting in times of conict.
Acknowledgement: We would like to thank the Armed Forces of Ukraine for providing security
to perform this work. This work has become possible only because resilience and courage of
the Ukrainian Army.
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Author
Petro Katerynych (Kyiv, Ukraine) is a university lecturer at the Department of Cinematography and Television
Arts of the Educational and Scientic Institute of Journalism at Taras Shevchenko National University in
Kyiv, Ph.D. He is a member of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine and the author of publications in
the national ranking periodicals “Ukrainska Pravda” (“Ukrainian Truth”) and “Den” (“Day”). He has interned
at the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine and the Presidential Administration of Ukraine. He
is the winner of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Prize for Outstanding Achievements of Youth in the
Development of Ukraine and the recipient of the Mykhailo Hrushevskyi Academic Scholarship for Ph.D.
students. Information security, information landscape of Ukraine, Poland, Russia and Belarus are among his
research interests. Petro’s hobby is bird photography. He is a winner of various international photography
competitions, including “Bird photographer of the year” (2022, Bristol, UK, gold medal in the “Creative
Imagery” category).
Petro Katerynych, PhD.
Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv
Educational and Scientic Institute of Journalism
Yuriy Illienko St. 36/1,
020 00 Kyiv
UKRAINE
katerinich1993@gmail.com
ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5967-2368