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Accountability in French non-profit organizations: between
paradox and complexity
Guillaume Plaisance
Research Institute in Management Science (Univ. Bordeaux, IRGO, EA 4190)
Bordeaux University, Bordeaux, France
Article published in the Journal of Applied Accounting Research
DOI: 10.1108/JAAR-01-2023-0006
Accepted for publication on 23-Jun-2023
Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial International Licence 4.0
(CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract
Purpose: This article examines whether accountability can contribute to the analysis of
effectiveness in grassroots voluntary organizations (GVOs) in France.
Originality: The French context of mistrust of certain managerial approaches and the
development of codes of governance based on a disciplinary vision are confronted with a
growing and critical literature on accountability in non-profit organizations (NPOs).
Design/methodology/approach: Based on recent studies and stakeholder theory,
hypotheses are formulated about the negative link between accountability and financial
effectiveness and a positive link between accountability and non-financial effectiveness.
Findings: The findings show that accountability practices are positive determinants of
financial indicators (apart from ROA) and employment of people in difficulty. In contrast,
the other non-financial indicators are not explained by accountability practices.
Research limitations/implications: The study points out the complexity and paradoxes
surrounding accountability and highlights the risk of insensitivity to it. It thus underlines
a specific French situation, close to the risks of myopia linked to accountability. One
possible explanation could be the coupling and decoupling mechanisms that allow NPOs
to regain power. Given the sometimes-random effects of accountability, producing
nuanced theories is necessary and governance should oscillate between equilibrium and
adaptation in the face of stakeholders. Finally, this article introduces the risk of
insensitivity of NPOs to accountability (i.e. they act as they wish, regardless of control
mechanisms such as accountability).
Practical implications: This study thus reveals governance dilemmas, which could be
solved through less formal, more mission-oriented, more creative and therefore heterodox
accountability.
Keywords: governance – effectiveness – accountability – stakeholder theory – French
nonprofit organizations
Funding: The author was supported by a thesis scholarship from the French Department
of Research.
Conflict of Interest: No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Availability of data and material: Raw data were generated by IDEAS. Derived data
supporting the findings of this study are available from the author on request.
Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank Pascal Barneto and Elisabeth
Bertin, his supervisors, for their support and Alpa Dhanani and Ciaran Connolly for their
advice and for agreeing to forward their checklist tool.
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1. Introduction
The Covid-19 crisis has considerably affected the survival and the effectiveness
of non-profit organizations (NPOs), but in fact, NPOs have been under pressure for a long
time. These organizations’ growing political, social and economic position in society is
accompanied by increasing stakeholder requirements (Costa and Goulart da Silva, 2019).
Little by little, stakeholders are asking for more and more before they agree to allocate
resources to NPOs. They no longer trust or believe NPOs (Greiling and Stötzer, 2016)
and ask for proof in order to assess NPOs’ outcomes and performance (Mitchell and
Berlan, 2018).
NPOs are therefore in a constant search for legitimacy (Yasmin and Ghafran,
2021) and the non-profit literature associates this concept with accountability. It can
indeed be defined as the “liability for ensuring a task is satisfactorily done” (McGrath and
Whitty, 2018, p. 702). However, the literature on accountability in non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and national forms of NPOs is still “embryonic” (Yasmin and
Ghafran, 2019, p. 3). Renz, Brown and Andersson (2023) also point to the lack of research
dedicated to NPOs’ accountability but also of a critical approach on the associated issues.
Until now, the results are rather contrasted and mainly focused on the financial
effects of accountability. It was this finding that led Yasmin and Ghafran (2019) to
describe accountability as a potentially “problematic” process. The use of accountability
is therefore sometimes questioned or even limited in some countries. One example could
be the French case (Plaisance, 2023).
The French NPO sector is marked by a historic scandal that has disrupted their
management. In 1996, an audit by the public authorities of the Association for Cancer
Research revealed that only a quarter of the money collected actually financed medical
research. Since then, governance and control principles have been developed to counter
the problem. Despite this scandal, governance and accountability remain concepts that
NPOs are wary of. NPO federations (e.g. Le Mouvement Associatif) question their
relevance and adaptation to French NPOs (CPCA, 2012).
This mistrust can be explained by the underlying theoretical vision in France.
Even governance codes are rooted in disciplinary approaches, even though NPOs do not
have owners in the shareholder sense. Furthermore, the recent literature constantly
emphasizes the importance of opening up to other theoretical currents when studying
organizations in general (Hitt et al., 2021), and NPO accountability in particular (Pilon
and Brouard, 2022).
This article therefore proposes to confront recent critical studies, which remains
sceptical about the development of disciplinary accountability, with the French non-profit
governance codes that defend this approach to improve organizational effectiveness. In
this, the research question is:
RQ: To what extent do French NPOs adopting good accountability practices see
their effectiveness improve?
This study is based on an analysis of French NPOs’ reports, of their financial
health and of their social and environmental practices. It participates in the reflection on
the link between accountability and overall effectiveness, one of the main challenges of
the accountability literature. The literature on the subject is still emerging and is polemical
in questioning the relevance of accountability. A gap is particularly open in non-profit
research because it remains close to a financial vision of accountability (similar to the
agency theory) whereas it is appropriate to extend effectiveness to social and
environmental issues (Coupet and Broussard, 2021). This research therefore contributes
to the literature on several aspects: given the sometimes-random effects of accountability,
it is necessary to produce nuanced theories; governance should oscillate between
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equilibrium and adaptation in the face of stakeholders; and finally, this article introduces
the risk of insensitivity of NPOs to accountability (i.e. they act as they wish, regardless
of control mechanisms such as accountability).
This paper starts with a literature review on accountability and effectiveness in
NPOs, in which the relevance of stakeholder theory is recalled. The hypotheses are based
on this theory and the empirical literature, before the method is presented. The results of
the regressions conducted are proposed before a discussion of the contributions of the
article.
2. Literature review: defining accountability and effectiveness in NPOs
2.1. Accountability in non-profit organizations
In a rather broad view, accountability may allow stakeholders to verify that the
NPO act as they expect. It is defined by Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006, p. 351) as the
“mechanisms through which all those affected by an organization’s actions can demand
an account from the managers of that organization regarding how and why the
organization has acted in the manner it has”. An example of accountability is reporting
(Ling Wei et al., 2008), widely used by NPOs due to certain legal obligations: annual
activity, financial and moral reports are produced. Accountability can be the recognition
of the existence of an authority to which the organization is responsible for its actions
(Ebrahim, 2005). In addition, Benjamin (2008, p. 207) proposes the concept of account
space as “the explanatory accounts that non-profits give when they fail to meet the
expectations of a stakeholder”. Accountability is therefore as important for success as for
failure. As a result, accountability is eminently contextual (Williams and Taylor, 2013),
subjective (Dhanani and Connolly, 2012) and consequently socially constructed
(Kennedy, 2019). This complexity implies for NPOs as well as for researchers specific
approaches (Ebrahim, 2003), for example based on a country, as proposed by the present
study. Accountability practices are evolving rapidly, particularly thanks to the Internet
and social networks (Amelia and Dewi, 2021). Moreover, it is not limited to the financial
or activity reports that NPOs are used to produce: it is extended to “social” data (dedicated
to members, volunteers or employees), internal life, environment, or even sustainability
of the action (Carvalho et al., 2017). Accountability therefore tends to broaden (Morrison,
2020), in line with the growing consideration of stakeholders in management. For
example, Dainelli et al. (2013) emphasize the requirement to hear and respond to the
stakeholders’ needs. This approach corresponds to the growing application of stakeholder
theory in the field of non-profit accountability (Chen et al., 2020).
Stakeholder theory is indeed concerned with the people or groups that affect,
influence, are affected by or are influenced by the organization (Freeman et al., 2020).
The wide variety of their interests is therefore the main concern of NPOs. These interests
are sometimes divergent and sometimes convergent, and are particularly variable. NPOs
therefore face tensions between the stakeholders they manage. These extremely strong
relationships force managers to try and satisfy each of their stakeholders. This theory is
divided into three approaches (Mehedi and Jalaludin, 2020). The descriptive approach
promotes and explains how stakeholder management works. The instrumental
perspective looks at the consequences of such a strategy. Finally, the normative
dimension provides an ethical vision: organizations have to be oriented towards society
and stakeholders.
For NPOs, the descriptive and instrumental forms of this theory insist on their
democratic ideal. NPOs are indeed asked to integrate the stakeholders’ demands in
governance and in their mission. Moreover, NPOs are concerned with society and its
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well-being, in line with the normative vision of this theory. Beyond this transposition,
non-profit scholars have explained the relevance of this theory for NPOs (Andersson and
Renz, 2021; Renz et al., 2023; Van Puyvelde et al., 2012). First, it is relevant because
they are community organizations that need stakeholders to carry out their mission, which
is itself stakeholder-focused. Second, and consequently, this theory emphasizes that
NPOs are responsible and accountable to a wide range of stakeholders. Third, this theory
is useful for NPOs because it takes into account their organizational context, which is
precisely influenced by stakeholders. Finally, stakeholder theory takes precedence over
agency theory in studying NPOs.
According to Pilon and Brouard (2022), this theory is associated with a
stakeholder-oriented accountability that emphasizes the organization’s responsibility.
The theory thus highlights a strong link between accountability and effectiveness
(Ebrahim, 2005; Pawson and Joannidès, 2014). This fairly broad approach had also been
adopted by Dhanani and Connolly (2012, pp. 1145–1147), who constructed a list of
accountability practices, that can be qualified as disciplinary. Finances, performance and
activities are summarized within managerial (or strategic) accountability, the “core
purpose”. Organizational (or procedural) accountability presents teams and ethical
policies (“internal organizational operations”). Governance and its mechanisms are
explained in fiduciary accountability (“probity and compliance, and at an operational
level, good governance and control”). Finally, downward accountability is about
stakeholder participation, grant policies and team protection. Here, in line with Bovens
(2010), accountability is thus a formal and processual mechanism for values and strategy,
and not an ideal “virtue”. Following Andreaus and Costa (2014), this study is based on
two of the three pillars of accountability: the social dimension (linked to social and
environmental reporting) and the financial dimension (linked to the income statement).
2.2. Effectiveness issues in NPOs
Effectiveness is “the degree of success with which organizational goals are
achieved” (Mensah et al., 2008, p. 325) and is a part of performance in NPOs (Liket et
al., 2014). Adopting the stakeholder theory has important consequences for the definition
of non-profit effectiveness. It is “highly subjective and context-dependent” (Willems et
al., 2016, p. 454), for many reasons. First, it is particularly dependent on evaluation
methods and these methods are often unclear and vary according to the evaluators (Boon
et al., 2017; Molecke and Pinkse, 2017). Second, NPOs’ outcomes are almost
imperceptible, because they are “qualitative and vague”, “difficult to measure” and
because NPOs’ “interventions are uncertain” (Kleszczowski, 2017, p. 71). In other words,
understanding how invested resources are transformed into outcomes is complex. The
same is true for determining the extent to which the NPO and its action actually contribute
to the final societal outcomes (Kleszczowski, 2017). Third, NPO performance and
effectiveness are subjectively defined by each of its stakeholders (Mano, 2010):
stakeholders participate in defining, measuring and evaluating organizational
performance and provide resources in return. In this, NPOs’ effectiveness is a social
construct: “it exists in the minds of the organization’s diverse internal and external
stakeholders” (Murray, 2010, p. 433).
Stakeholder theory thus offers various dimensions of effectiveness, particularly at
the organizational, social and environmental levels. Recent studies indeed call for a
reflection on NPOs’ performance and effectiveness that are less focused on financial
health (Coupet and Broussard, 2021). The literature recognizes that performance is
multidimensional: it can be linked to “financial, stakeholder, market, mission” aspects
(Mihaltan et al., 2015, p. 369) or “overall” (Boateng et al., 2016).
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Following this approach, NPOs’ effectiveness can no longer be summarized as
financial capacity, but encompasses the social and environmental dimensions (Weinert,
2016). In this study, we will focus on three effectiveness dimensions (Verschuere and
Suykens, 2020). Financial effectiveness is linked to the ability to finance the NPO and
ensure economic viability. Social effectiveness is associated with actions in favour of and
developing human capital. Finally, environmental effectiveness is about initiatives that
protect the environment and ensure the sustainability of the organizational action.
3. Hypotheses development: recent developments on accountability
The link between accountability and effectiveness has already been studied in the
literature. the majority of empirical studies on the subject conclude that there is a positive
relationship, as indicated by recent literature reviews (Grossi et al., 2019; McGee and
Gaventa, 2010). This result was found in all types of organizations: companies (e.g., see
the two previous references), public administrations (Dikopoulou and Mihiotis, 2010;
Free and Radcliffe, 2009; Heinrich, 2002; Rabovsky, 2012), and NPOs (Costa et al.,
2011; Cutt and Murray, 2000; Hengevoss, 2023; Mohd Noor et al., 2017). Nevertheless,
the debate is beginning to open on the nature of accountability in order to rework this a
priori positive link (e.g. Ali and Nicholson-Crotty, 2021). The stakeholder theory is also
part of this debate and emphasizes that organizations seek to meet the demands of their
environment. In this, NPOs are held accountable less for their financial effectiveness than
for their ability to achieve their mission or be ethical. Both stakeholder theory and critical
studies thus make accountability a process for the “common good” (Pesci et al., 2020)
and much less about financial issues. This approach will therefore have consequences for
the formulation of hypotheses.
Financial effectiveness is linked to the capacity to attract public or private external
funders and is influenced by accountability (Costa et al., 2011; Ebrahim, 2005). This
process signals the financial, social, societal and environmental commitments that are
criteria for allocating funds to NPOs. Transparency is also known to enhance financial
effectiveness (Zainon et al., 2014).
Nevertheless, this conceptual approach is confronted on the one hand with
empirical literature and on the other hand with stakeholder theory. A recent study (Lee et
al., 2023) points out that, at the empirical level, the link between accountability and
financial effectiveness has been little tested. In support of their argument, the authors
point out that the managerial costs of accountability are high and that adapting to the
changing demands of stakeholders requires investment. Finally, their extensive empirical
study confirms that a high level of accountability worsens financial effectiveness.
Beyond that, the surge in transparency is beginning to raise questions in the
literature, which anticipates negative effects on organizations (Mayrhofer and Meyer,
2020). In the face of divergent interests and requirements, accountability can indeed have
perverse effects on financial effectiveness (Kim, 2005). In addition, stakeholder theory
leads to a preference for accountability based on organizational effectiveness,
collaboration and cooperation with stakeholders. Such an approach leads to a strategy that
emphasizes mission over finance (Morrison, 2020; Mourey, 2021). In this,
H1: The development of accountability practices in NPOs negatively affects their
financial effectiveness.
The link between accountability and social effectiveness is differently
documented in the literature. Stakeholder theory leads to two observations. First, NPOs
belong to a social sector with strong human values. The development of individual
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stakeholders is an integral part of organizational issues (Freeman et al., 2021). Second,
as indicated in the literature review, new societal demands are emerging with respect to
working and volunteering conditions. The understanding and incorporation of these
societal expectations can then be achieved through accountability (Abbas and Ahmed,
2016). In addition, recent research (Jiao, 2021) has shown that the feeling of
responsibility resulting from accountability leads NPOs to make new commitments and
to do everything possible to develop their social performance. In short, the broad
accountability induced by the stakeholder theory implies a strong organizational
commitment (Pilon and Brouard, 2022). Because of NPOs’ dependence on human capital,
one of the ways to achieve their mission is to participate in skills development (Henderson
and Sowa, 2018).
Finally, the link between governance, accountability and social performance has
also already been analysed and is theoretically positive (Chu and Luke, 2023; Estapé‐
Dubreuil and Torreguitart‐Mirada, 2015). Some studies have empirically confirmed this
link (Bagnoli and Megali, 2011; Bradford et al., 2020), while pointing out that it is often
found in the medium term. More indirectly, studies have also shown that accountability
strengthens non-profit capacity and social performance (Nordin et al., 2022; Stainer and
Stainer, 2000). In this,
H2: The development of accountability practices in NPOs positively affects their
social effectiveness.
The same principles of stakeholder theory can be applied to environmental
effectiveness. NPOs that are effectively accountable to stakeholders feel more responsible
(Jiao, 2021), in particular because they listen to stakeholders’ expectations expressed in
the accountability process. Some of these expectations are linked to environmental
concerns and constitute incentives to make new commitments (Kassinis and Vafeas,
2006). These concerns become a social norm with which NPOs comply: in short, this is
an issue of competitiveness and legitimacy for a sector that is still not very committed to
its environmental performance (Dart and Hill, 2010).
In addition, more and more regulators and stakeholders require a detailed report
on the environmental impact of events they funded (Costa and Goulart da Silva, 2019).
Being accountable about this impact leads to an awareness (e.g. Chinander, 2001) or
becomes a constraint (Jiang et al., 2022). Organizational sustainability is part of societal
requirements and stakeholders’ expectations (Freeman et al., 2021) and the quality of the
activity can be influenced by accountability practices (Becker, 2018).
Finally, accountability is known to increase commitments to sustainable
development (e.g. IFRS, 2021; Jones and Mucha, 2014). An empirical link is also
established between accountability, adaptive capacity and environmental effectiveness
(Banjongprasert, 2022, cited by Nordin et al., 2022). In this,
H3: The development of accountability practices in NPOs positively affects their
environmental effectiveness.
4. Methods
4.1. The case of French NPOs
This article proposes a contribution to the study of NPOs that is still under-
explored. More specifically, this study is based on French NPOs, in particular because
management research dedicated to French NPOs is still emerging (Plaisance, 2021).
Consequently, current studies can only be based on the scarce data available which leads
to numerous methodological limitations.
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The majority of French NPOs are grassroots volunteer organizations (GVOs) and
are called “associations”. The French law of 1901 on “association contracts” states that
an association is a “convention by which two or more people pool, on an ongoing basis,
their knowledge or activity for a purpose other than sharing profits”. This subgroup of
NPOs is the one studied.
French NPOs play multiple roles in the economic and social development of
territories, in social cohesion and in civic and citizenship education. They are part of the
social and solidarity economy, defined by the Hamon Law of 2014. This law requires
NPOs to meet democracy criteria. Beyond this legal aspect, the principle of “one person,
one vote” is part of their democratic essence. NPOs are defined by an “associative
project” that specifies the organization’s vision for its future but also for society.
NPOs account for a budget close to 113 billion euros (4% of national GDP), 1.76
million employees (6.5% of employment, but 10% of private employment) and 31.2
million voluntary participations (Tchernonog and Prouteau, 2019). Recruitment in NPOs
has been double that of other sectors in recent decades (Archambault et al., 2014).
4.2. Data
The data are linked to IDEAS, the Institute for Development of Ethics and Action
for Solidarity. This NPO acts in favour of a better transparency in the third sector by
supporting in their daily life. In addition, in the past, IDEAS offered to NPOs the
possibility to publicly disclose their organizational results. In this, French NPOs were
able to declare parts of their legal documentation and disclose their organizational
characteristics and their governance practices. The public website (https://ideas.asso.fr)
was last accessed on in March 19, 2019 (close to Connolly and Dhanani, 2013). At that
date, 182 NPOs had released their 2018 information, including reports and social and
environmental commitments. The data from each page of each organization was recorded
in a table. Table I shows the data collected.
[Table I here]
Consequently, NPOs in the database have specific characteristics. First, they
choose to be transparent. This voluntary declaration represents a bias in the sample: they
are potentially the most invested in the indicators they publish. Secondly, IDEAS seeks
to promote good management and transparency. By disclosing, NPOs show that they are
confident about their functioning or that they are effectively supported by IDEAS.
Finally, the majority of the sample are large NPOs, as shown by the number of employees
or by their resources. It is therefore not a representative sample of French NPOs, but
rather a group of organizations with employees, well-developed management and large
resources.
4.3. Variables, statistical method and control variables
In order to test the hypotheses, three types of dependent variables are selected:
these effectiveness indicators are adapted from the IDEAS database. First, NPOs’
financial documents provide large volumes of data. One indicator of financial
effectiveness is calculated: the return on assets (ROA) as total revenue minus total
expenses divided by total assets (Ritchie and Kolodinsky, 2003). Other indicators of
resource attraction (incomes, grants, donations and memberships) come from the
literature (Epstein and McFarlan, 2011; Ritchie and Kolodinsky, 2003). Second, social
effectiveness indicators proposed by the IDEAS database relate to the existence of
training processes and of a policy for recruiting people in difficulty (with disabilities, in
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social and professional reinsertion, etc.). They illustrate social effectiveness because they
focus on employee development and the value of human resources (Estapé‐Dubreuil and
Torreguitart‐Mirada, 2015; Pope et al., 2018). Third, environmental effectiveness is
measured by three indicators. NPOs can indicate if (and what) initiatives are implemented
to improve environmental protection at headquarters and in the field (e.g. Maurel and
Tensaout, 2014) but also to develop the sustainability of action (e.g. Weerawardena et al.,
2010). In the database, the existence of each of the three types of initiatives results in
three binary variables.
The independent variables are linked to the accountability quality, which is
studied via the Accountability Disclosure Index (ADI) proposed by Dhanani and
Connolly (2012, p. 1153). The ADI provides a suitable score for understanding
accountability practices. The authors write: “ADIj [is] the accountability disclosure index
for each accountability theme and in total, for charity j” is calculated by summing the
quotient of each “nj, the number of accountability items relevant for the charity j” by “Xij
: 1 if the ‘i’th item for charity j is disclosed and 0 if it is not disclosed, so that 0 ≤ ADIj ≤
1”. A content analysis produces information for each item in each category for each type
of accountability. Organizational accountability refers to ethical policies (investment,
purchasing, fundraising, trading), staff, volunteer policies and stakeholders. Managerial
accountability highlights finance, overall organisation efficiency, fundraising efficiency,
direct charitable activities and performance. Fiduciary accountability relates to
organizational structure, governance, financial, risk management, compliance and
evaluation. Finally, downward accountability is interested in grant-making policies,
board representation, complaints procedures, health and safety, safety and security and
participation. ADI is the global indicator that is calculated on the basis of all items. The
other four indicators are calculated from the associated items. The higher the ADI, the
more items making up the four types of accountability are disclosed and the more
developed the accountability practices are.
Two control variables were available and thus selected: age of the organization
and number of employees (Bryan, 2019, p. 894). In this, the empirical model can be
summarized as follows (see Tables III for abbreviations). OLS regressions are estimated
for financial effectiveness indicators analysis (testing H1) and probit regressions are
estimated for social and environmental effectiveness indicators analysis (testing H2 and
H3):
• financial effectiveness indicators = α0 + α1 × Age + α2 × Size + α3 × ADI + α4 ×
(ADIFA) + α5 × (ADIOA) + α6 × (ADIDA) + α7 × (ADIMA) + ε.
• social effectiveness indicators = β0 + β1 × Age + β2 × Size + β3 × ADI + β4 ×
(ADIFA) + β5 × (ADIOA) + β6 × (ADIDA) + β7 × (ADIMA) + ε’.
• environmental effectiveness indicators = γ0 + γ1 × Age + γ2 × Size + γ3 × ADI + γ4
× (ADIFA) + γ5 × (ADIOA) + γ6 × (ADIDA) + γ7 × (ADIMA) + ε’’.
Endogeneity and robustness tests are proposed and fully detailed in Table IVd.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
Descriptive statistics (Table II) call for some remarks. First, the sample is
composed of fairly old organizations with a large number of employees. Financial
effectiveness indicators confirm this impression as do report budgets averaging around
20 million euros. On average, one-third of this budget is allocated through grants. About
their social performance, the NPOs in the sample are particularly committed to volunteer
training. One in two NPOs implements a policy of environmental protection or a measure
to sustain its action. The correlation matrix (Table III) calls for a few remarks. First, the
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size is not related to the different indicators selected; while age has multiple effects. Not
surprisingly, the different accountability indicators are correlated, as NPOs generally
engage in parallel efforts to develop their transparency. Finally, significant correlations
appear within each type of effectiveness. This can be explained by the high dependence
of NPOs on grants and the simultaneous adoption of social and environmental initiatives.
[Tables II and III here]
5.2. OLS and Probit regressions
First of all, the OLS regressions on financial effectiveness indicators have
contrasted results. ROA is not explained by control variables or accountability (the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected, F = 0.42; p = 0.89), unlike the other three more descriptive
indicators of financial effectiveness. However, accountability helps to understand the
other, whose regressions are presented in Table IVa. First, the ADI aggregate plays a
positive role on the amount of grants (α = 98,849; p < 0.10). In France, accountability for
grant-funded activities is mandatory but this result shows that accountability quality is
beneficial to grant amounts. Second, donors and members have a sensitivity to fiduciary
accountability (α = 17,460; p < 0.05). Knowing the organization’s governance and
financial policies therefore helps to engage them. Organizational accountability,
illustrating both human resources and ethical principles, has a positive effect on the total
incomes (α = 227,832; p < 0.001), the grants (α = 57,216; p < 0.10) and the donations and
memberships (α = 12,824; p < 0.10). In other words, the emphasis on ethics and people
(and in particular on dependence on people) does have a major effect on financial
indicators.
The results about social effectiveness indicators (Table IVb) show that the
implementation of training for employees is not explained by accountability but they are
more developed in mature NPOs. The employment of disadvantaged people or with
disabilities is supported by good organizational (β = 1.87; p < 0.10) and downward
accountability (β = 1.49; p < 0.10). This result is understandable in light of their content:
NPOs mention the importance of human capital, stakeholder participation or their ethical
principles.
Finally, none of the regressions about environmental effectiveness indicators are
significant (Table IVc). The null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the three indicators
(the p-values vary between 0.10 and 0.20). No control variable is even relevant.
[Tables IVa,b,c here]
5.3. Endogeneity tests: 2SLS regressions
The two control variables participate to control endogeneity in the relationship
between accountability and effectiveness. Nevertheless, numerous questions remain
about possible causalities between these concepts. In theory, in NPOs, this endogeneity
is particularly reduced in the absence of owners and because of the major differences
between for-profit and not-for-profit governance.
However, a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regression analysis is proposed. In
view of the independent variables available, the two control variables (age and size) and
and, in congruence with Dhanani and Connolly (2012)’s construction of their indices, the
4 sub-dimensions of the ADI were retained as instrumental variables. The ADI variable
is the explanatory variable. In this, the selected system of equations becomes:
• Effectiveness indicators = β0 + β1 × ADI + u
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• ADI = γ0 + γ1 × Age + γ2 × Size + γ3 × (ADIFA) + γ5 × (ADIOA) + γ6 × (ADIDA)
+ γ7 × (ADIMA) + v
The tables IVd present the results of these 2SLS regressions.
[Tables IVd here]
Consistent with the results of the OLS regressions, the regression dedicated to
ROA remains insignificant. In addition, improved accountability (ADI) has a positive
effect on total incomes (β = 200,461; p < 0.01), grants (β = 83,633; p < 0.01), and
donations and memberships (β = 29,949; p < 0.001). In this, the hypothesis H1 is rejected,
because it focused on the negative financial effects of accountability. However, no
relationship is found with financial effectiveness ratios, which further nuances the
hypothesis.
Then, the 2SLS regression shows a positive effect of ADI on the employee
training plans (β = 0.75; p < 0.01) and on the employment of disadvantaged people or
with disabilities (β = 0.71; p < 0.05). As expected, NPOs are organizations with deep-
rooted values that are promoted in their accountability reports and that they apply in
practice. In addition to the congruence with the Probit regressions in the case of
employment of disadvantaged people or with disabilities, the 2SLS regressions add
information about the employee training plan. While the development of certain
dimensions of ADI has no direct effect, a better overall quality of ADI does have an effect.
There is thus a synergistic phenomenon here. In this, the hypothesis H2 is supported.
By contrast, consistent with the results of the Probit regressions, the regressions
of the environmental effectiveness indicators are not significant and this is confirmed by
the other endogeneity tests: the hypothesis H3 is rejected.
5.4. Robustness checks
To investigate the robustness of the results, three additional studies were
conducted. They are available in Supplementary Materials. Their variety confirms the
complexity of the concepts studied and the fact that they are sometimes paradoxical.
The first study focused on a sub-sample that would include only NPOs with
national activities (Appendix A). International NPOs are indeed subject to more
regulatory and managerial pressures. This new sample is composed of 147 NPOs. The
results remain robust, but a nuance must be made: the employment of disadvantaged
people or with disabilities is no longer explained by the ADI – DA.
The second is a sub-sample of 130 NPOs that belong to a network or federation,
which would allow NPOs to be accompanied in their management (Appendix B). The
results also remain robust (the incomes total is even better explained by the variables),
but two nuances must be made. On the one hand, donations and memberships are no
longer explained by the ADI – FA and the employment of disadvantaged people or with
disabilities is no longer explained by the ADI – DA.
Finally, the third study is dedicated to a subsample of 138 NPOs that did not
comply with a donor protection charter (Appendix C). The NPOs have therefore not
developed specific management processes on the subject. The results are still robust (the
grants, the donations and memberships and the employee training plan are even better
explained by the variables), but a nuance must be made: the total incomes is no longer
explained by the ADI – OA.
11
6. Discussion
The results of this study call for several comments, particularly with respect to the
effectiveness indicators not explained by the accountability. First, the ROA of the NPOs
in the sample is not explained by the selected variables. The concept of profitability is of
great concern to NPOs, particularly because their objective is above all to achieve their
mission and have a positive impact on society. Financial performance may be a
fundamental pillar of NPOs’ survival, but it is still a controversial subject. NPOs prefer
to highlight their actions rather than their balance sheets (Clerkin and Quinn, 2019).
However, the hypothesis H1 is essentially rejected because of the link between
accountability and financial effectiveness. In positioning the first hypothesis within the
most recent research streams (Lee et al., 2023), this study is finally confronted with two
dimensions of accountability that may have been overlooked. Its first characteristic is its
complexity: the determinants and effects of accountability in NPOs are unpredictable and
highly varied (Young, 2002). Its second characteristic is its paradoxical aspect: depending
on the period, the context, the people, etc., accountability can have opposite and
contradictory effects (Halligan, 2007). In sum, the results illustrate the synthesis of Renz
et al. (2023, p. 12) who advocate a “multifaceted and nuanced” research on non-profit
governance.
Hypothesis H2 is supported. This study is therefore in line with the literature
already mobilized on the subject (Jiao, 2021; Nordin et al., 2022). However, the fact that
NPOs are subject to regulatory pressures that lead them to adopt plans for training or
better integration of people in difficulty should not be underestimated. Consequently, in
future studies, new indicators of social effectiveness (in relation to volunteers, for
example) seem essential.
Then, all environmental indicators are not influenced by accountability practices.
The following comments therefore relate to the status of hypothesis H3. In their work on
NGOs, Yasmina and Ghafran (2019) have theorized the problematics of accountability.
The authors have pointed out the many issues of social construction, aporia and
uncertainty that surround accountability. Their approach even leads them to question the
ethics of transparency underlying accountability. For instance, some authors had shown
how transparency is important in a democratic ideal, but this ideal can be detrimental to
the organization if it is too extreme (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006).
Their vision is similar to Ebrahim (2005)’s work on the risk of myopia in
accountability: even if a long-term vision is much more important for ensuring the
organization’s survival and the stakeholders’ commitment, NPOs sometimes remain
focused on the financial aspects. The author stressed the importance of a “balance” and
“combination” of accountability mechanisms to meet the demands of the environment. In
this, the results obtained here highlight another issue, less violent than those pointed out
by Yasmina and Ghafran (2019) and complementary to myopia: insensitivity.
In other words, accountability quality has no effect on environmental
effectiveness, has little effect on social effectiveness, but does attract resources. The
quality of broad accountability defined by Dhanani and Connolly (2012) incorporates a
rather disciplinary view, trying to coerce the organization into reporting to inform and
engage its stakeholders. This disciplinary approach seems irrelevant insofar as NPOs are
insensitive to it: for instance, one out of two NPOs is engaged in actions related to
environmental effectiveness, regardless of its commitment to accountability.
Accountability has been reappropriated by NPOs, which seem to use it as a tool
to obtain funds rather than as a holistic tool for engagement. The literature has already
emphasized the ambiguity of the concept of accountability. As a result, some authors
(Pras and Zarlowski, 2013, pp. 24–27) point out that this ambiguity can become fruitful
12
for NPOs’ leaders, in line with the “ambiguity and compromise” in the objectives,
mission and NPOs in general. Accountability, thanks to the “coupling/decoupling” games
(Brandtner, 2021), then gives more latitude to the leaders and gives them back the power.
Nevertheless, the results presented here are congruent with Ebrahim (2005)’s
vision. The lack of a clear contribution of accountability quality to non-financial
effectiveness confirms the myopia that accountability can create: when organizations
focus on the short term, overall effectiveness and performance are neglected (Costa and
Goulart da Silva, 2019).
To conclude, this study illustrates the obstacles that NPOs face in broadening their
accountability (Morrison, 2020). Still in search of legitimacy (Yasmin and Ghafran,
2021), NPOs have to face their stakeholders’ mistrust and monitoring. Their
accountability is therefore formal and seeks to obtain funds in order to survive, and not
necessary to perform (cf. the contrasting result between ROA and the indicators of
obtained funds). Conversely, to develop their social and environmental effectiveness,
NPOs don’t develop formal accountability: they would rather need their stakeholders’
trust and to collaborate with them. This implies a less formal, more mission-oriented,
more creative and therefore heterodox accountability. Renz et al. (2023) also highlight
this challenge, noting that the societal issues associated with NPOs and accountability are
major.
7. Conclusion
Based on recent studies dedicated to non-profit accountability, this article sought
to investigate the link between this process and organizational effectiveness. A negative
link was expected in the case of financial effectiveness and a positive one in the non-
financial case. A partially positive result was obtained in the financial case and, with the
exception of specific social indicators, no link was found in the non-financial case. These
unexpected results challenge recent developments in accountability theory and return to
findings from twenty years ago.
In addition to the above discussion, this study offers theoretical contributions.
Twenty years after the studies pointing out the complexity and paradoxes of
accountability (Halligan, 2007; Young, 2002), the research dedicated to NPOs must
consider what to do with this process. Stakeholder demands remain important, but
managing them through accountability seems far too uncertain to remain the focus of
attention. The results of this study therefore call for a rethinking of the accountability in
NPOs, particularly because the concepts studied here (accountability, effectiveness, etc.)
are considered contingent by the literature.
This study followed the recommendations of Yasmin and Ghafran (2021). For the
authors, there was a need for accountability research that focused on relationships with
and between stakeholders and their attributes (i.e., interpretive researches) and on the
contradictions and paradoxes encountered in non-profit accountability (i.e., radical
researches). In fact, in line with Morrison (2020), the results suggest the need of a focus
on informal accountability, in order to approach the associated cognitive and behavioural
issues (Marnet, 2008).
Furthermore, the use of stakeholder theory to accurately describe the case of
French NPOs did not adequately explain the link between accountability and
effectiveness. Because of the dynamics that run through this sector, a combination of
governance theories seems necessary. The suggestion of Pilon and Brouard (2022) will
be a relevant guide for this. Finally, calls from research to study NPOs (for instance,
Erkens et al., 2015) or disclosure effects on performance (Grossi et al., 2017) are
addressed here.
13
Practitioner and societal contributions are of several kinds. The first one
corresponds to the previous call concerning accountability in NPOs: this process is
extremely complex, uncertain and full of paradoxes. The increasing demands on the
subject are not without risk and other approaches could be explored (e.g., evaluation and
control through relationship quality, Plaisance, 2022).
In the French case, the codes of non-profit governance refer to rather disciplinary
principles that would improve organizational effectiveness. The results are particularly
inconsistent on this subject. This study therefore calls for an update of these codes. They
could incorporate more informal governance mechanisms and consider cognitive and
behavioural issues, which are largely involved in accountability.
In addition, French NPOs are again particularly poorly informed by the results of
the international literature on governance and accountability (Plaisance, 2023). This
implies the development of contextualized research on French NPOs, but also the need to
develop the sector’s own best practices. As a result, this article questions the relevance of
developing codes of good practice and considers that they should rather focus on the
implementation of practices specific to NPOs and to each organization.
The different results and the sceptical literature on accountability do not mean that
French NPOs should not adopt such a process. However, they do call for an adaptation to
each organizational situation and for a reflection on the links with the stakeholders
requesting accountability processes.
Several limitations need to be pointed out in this study. First, further studies are
necessary in order to remove the context of large NPOs. Second, new methods are needed
to replace the binary variables, develop new control variables and use qualitative methods
(e.g. textual disclosures, interviews, etc.). In addition, the effectiveness indicators were
imposed by the data. A questionnaire survey would allow the selection of new proxies.
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21
Table I. Variables and their measurement
N°
Nature
Measurement
Control variables
1
Age
Metric
Obtained by subtracting 2018 from the year
of creation (information provided on each
NPO’s page of the IDEAS website).
2
Size
Metric
Number of employees (information provided
on each NPO’s page of the IDEAS website).
Accountability variables
3
ADI
Ratio
Obtained by calculation according to the
method proposed by Dhanani and Connolly
(2012). The calculations are based on all the
reports that each NPO has made public on
the IDEAS website.
4
ADI – Fiduciary accountability (FA)
Ratio
5
ADI – Organizational accountability (OA)
Ratio
6
ADI – Downward accountability (DA)
Ratio
7
ADI – Managerial accountability (MA)
Ratio
Financial effectiveness variables
8
ROA
Ratio
Obtained by the total revenue minus total
expenses divided by total assets. The data
came from the financial reports.
9
Total incomes (in thousands)
Metric
Directly obtained from the financial reports.
10
Grants (in thousands)
Metric
Information provided on each NPO’s page
of the IDEAS website.
11
Donations and memberships (in
thousands)
Metric
Information provided on each NPO’s page
of the IDEAS website.
Social effectiveness variables
12
Employee training process
Binary
The presence (1) or absence (0) of this
commitment was directly indicated on each
NPO’s page of the IDEAS site.
13
Employment of disadvantaged people or
with disabilities
Binary
Environmental effectiveness variables
14
Concrete actions for the protection of the
environment at headquarters
Binary
The presence (1) or absence (0) of this
commitment was directly indicated on each
NPO’s page of the IDEAS site.
15
Concrete actions for the protection of the
environment in the field
Binary
16
Sustainability of action in the field
Binary
Source: Table created by author.
Note: The variables integrate four categories that constitute the four types of
accountability. For the items used for each category, see the checklist built by Dhanani
and Connolly (2012). The name of each type varies between the published article and the
tool transmitted by the authors: both terminologies were indicated in the literature
review.
22
Table II. Descriptive statistics
N°
N
Mean
Median
Standard-
Deviation
Control variables
1
Age
182
41.26
29
39.70
2
Size
1,569
17.5
16,381
Accountability variables
3
ADI
160
0.36
0.3719
0.16
4
ADI – Fiduciary accountability (FA)
0.18
0.2
0.16
5
ADI – Organizational accountability (OA)
0.16
0.125
0.15
6
ADI – Downward accountability (DA)
0.08
0
0.16
7
ADI – Managerial accountability (MA)
0.46
0.4444
0.22
Financial effectiveness variables
8
ROA
123
0.05
0.0154
0.22
9
Total incomes (in thousands)
176
19,678
1,345
98,296
10
Grants (in thousands)
175
8,421
200
47,960
11
Donations and memberships (in thousands)
176
3,685
179
11,858
Social effectiveness variables
12
Employee training process
182
0.69
1
0.46
13
Employment of disadvantaged people or with
disabilities
0.35
0
0.48
Environmental effectiveness variables
14
Concrete actions for the protection of the
environment at headquarters
182
0.52
1
0.50
15
Concrete actions for the protection of the
environment in the field
0.46
0
0.50
16
Sustainability of action in the field
0.55
1
0.50
Source: Table created by author.
23
Table III. Correlation matrix
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1. Age
1
2. Size
0.08
1
3. ADI
0.08
0.09
1
4. ADI–FA
0.14
-0.06
0.60***
1
5. ADI–OA
0.22**
0.03
0.55***
0.42***
1
6. ADI–DA
0.20*
-0.01
0.44***
0.55***
0.43***
1
7. ADI–MA
0.03
0.07
0.84***
0.42***
0.46***
0.36***
1
8. ROA
-0.09
-0.04
0.11
0.00
0.05
0.03
0.09
1
9. Incomes
0.25***
0.09
0.26***
0.29***
0.43***
0.29***
0.13
-0.04
1
10. Grants
0.17*
0.07
0.27***
0.19*
0.29***
0.19*
0.17*
-0.03
0.80***
1
11. Donations & membership
0.23**
0.08
0.29***
0.32***
0.32***
0.24**
0.25**
-0.07
0.63***
0.33***
1
12. Employee training
0.17*
0.06
0.24**
0.12
0.19*
0.18*
0.22**
-0.03
0.12
0.09
0.19*
1
13. Employments of d. people
0.16*
0.12
0.14
0.15
0.26***
0.25**
0.15
-0.09
0.25***
0.19*
0.35***
0.37***
1
14. Environment protection at headquarters
-0.12
0.08
0.03
-0.08
0.03
-0.06
0.03
0.14
0.08
0.09
0.04
0.22**
0.06
1
15. Environment protection in the field
-0.18*
0.08
-0.01
-0.12
-0.03
-0.07
0.02
0.19*
-0.01
0.08
-0.05
0.04
0.06
0.57***
1
16. Sustainability
-0.07
0.08
0.16*
0.04
0.08
-0.04
0.12
0.04
0.08
0.11
0.04
0.12
0.06
0.38***
0.51***
1
Source: Table created by author.
Reading: ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05.
The high coefficients within the accountability variables are due to the very nature of the index (Dhanani and Connolly, 2012) and the link between
incomes and grants is representative of the French case.
24
Table IV. Empirical results
Table IVa. OLS regressions of financial effectiveness indicators
ROA
Total incomes (in
thousands)
Grants (in thousands)
Donations and
memberships (in
thousands)
α
p
SE
α
p
SE
α
p
SE
α
p
SE
Constant
0.00
(0.04)
-47,721
*
(20,698)
-23,236
*
(11,083)
-6,155
*
(2,607)
Age
-0.00
(0.00)
334
^
(181)
134
(96)
42
^
(23)
Size
0.00
(0.00)
0.49
(0.42)
0.12
(0.22)
0.05
(0.05)
ADI
0.18
(0.20)
115,923
(99,489)
98,849
^
(53,270)
-815
(12,529)
ADI – FA
-0.09
(0.12)
90,578
(63,774)
-4,104
(34,147)
17,460
*
(8,031)
ADI – OA
0.06
(0.14)
227,832
***
(61,755)
57,216
^
(33,066)
12,824
^
(7,777)
ADI – DA
0.01
(0.11)
49,423
(57,554)
8,680
(30,817)
303
(7,248)
ADI – MA
-0.03
(0.13)
-100,353
(62,316)
-41,186
(33,366)
6,386
(7,847)
N
118
158
157
158
F
0.42
n.s.
8.04
***
3.05
**
4.94
***
R²
0.02
0.27
0.13
0.19
Ajusted R²
0.00
0.24
0.08
0.15
Source: Table created by author.
Reading: FA for fiduciary accountability, OA for organizational accountability, DA for
downward accountability, MA for managerial accountability. ***: p < 0.001, **: p <
0.01, *: p < 0.05 and ^: p < 0.10. SE: standard error; n.s.: not significant.
Table IVb. Probit regression of social effectiveness indicators
Employee training plan
Employment of
disadvantaged people
or with disabilities
β
p
SE
β
p
SE
Constant
-0.50
(0.33)
-0.69
*
(0.30)
Age
0.01
*
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
Size
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
***
(0.00)
ADI
1.32
(1.57)
-2.55
(1.53)
ADI – FA
-0.77
(1.10)
0.81
(0.96)
ADI – OA
0.66
(1.08)
1.87
^
(0.99)
ADI – DA
1.20
(1.01)
1.49
^
(0.85)
ADI – MA
0.39
(1.01)
0.94
(0.95)
N
160
160
-2 Log(Likelihood)
19.97
**
34.10
***
R²(Nagelkerke)
0.17
0.26
Source: Table created by author.
Reading: FA for fiduciary accountability, OA for organizational accountability, DA for
downward accountability, MA for managerial accountability. ***: p < 0.001, **: p <
0.01, *: p < 0.05 and ^: p < 0.10. SE: standard error.
25
Table IVc. Probit regression of environmental effectiveness indicators
Environment
protection at
headquarters
Environment
protection in the
field
Sustainability
γ
p
SE
γ
p
SE
γ
p
SE
Constant
0.23
(0.29)
0.25
(0.30)
-0.26
(0.29)
Age
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
Size
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
ADI
0.47
(1.41)
-0.14
(1.44)
2.00
(1.44)
ADI – FA
-1.03
(0.91)
-1.33
(0.94)
-0.20
(0.92)
ADI – OA
0.37
(0.92)
0.09
(0.93)
0.03
(0.93)
ADI – DA
0.40
(0.82)
-0.03
(0.84)
-1.13
(0.82)
ADI – MA
0.08
(0.89)
0.54
(0.90)
-0.31
(0.90)
N
160
160
160
-2 Log(Likelihood)
9.78
n.s.
12.80
n.s.
13.06
n.s.
R²(Nagelkerke)
0.08
0.10
0.10
Source: Table created by author.
Reading: FA for fiduciary accountability, OA for organizational accountability, DA for
downward accountability, MA for managerial accountability. ***: p < 0.001, **: p <
0.01, *: p < 0.05 and ^: p < 0.10. SE: standard error; n.s.: not significant.
26
Table IVd. Endogeneity tests: 2SLS regressions
ROA
Total incomes (in
thousands)
Grants (in thousands)
Donations and
memberships (in
thousands)
β
p
SE
β
p
SE
β
p
SE
β
p
SE
Constant
0.00
(0.04)
-49,153
*
(23,934)
-21,709
^
(11,139)
-6,948
*
(2,711)
ADI
0.08
(0.10)
200,461
**
(60,870)
83,633
**
(28,258)
29,949
***
(6,896)
N
118
158
157
158
F
0.23
n.s.
10.84
***
8.76
**
18.86
***
R²
0.01
0.07
0.05
0.11
Ajusted R²
0.00
0.06
0.05
0.10
Source: Table created by author. Reading: ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05 and
^: p < 0.10. SE: standard error; n.s.: not significant.
Employee training plan
Employment of
disadvantaged people
or with disabilities
β
p
SE
β
p
SE
Constant
0.44
***
(0.10)
0.12
(0.11)
ADI
0.75
**
(0.25)
0.71
*
(0.27)
N
160
160
F
9.08
**
6.65
*
R²
0.05
0.04
Ajusted R²
0.05
0.03
Source: Table created by author. Reading: ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05 and
^: p < 0.10. SE: standard error; n.s.: not significant.
Environment
protection at
headquarters
Environment
protection in the
field
Sustainability
β
p
SE
β
p
SE
β
p
SE
Constant
1.53
***
(0.33)
1.41
***
(0.33)
0.40
***
(0.11)
ADI
0.12
(0.85)
-0.17
(0.85)
0.42
(0.28)
N
160
160
160
F
0.02
n.s.
0.04
n.s.
2.27
n.s.
R²
0.00
0.00
0.01
Ajusted R²
0.00
0.00
0.00
Source: Table created by author. Reading: ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05 and
^: p < 0.10. SE: standard error; n.s.: not significant.
27
Appendix A: First robustness check
Sub-sample including NPOs with national activities
OLS regressions of financial effectiveness indicators
ROA
Total incomes (in
thousands)
Grants (in thousands)
Donations and
memberships (in
thousands)
α
p
SE
α
p
SE
α
p
SE
α
p
SE
Constant
-0.02
(0.04)
-49,119
^
(27,866)
-26,074
^
(15,250)
-5,698
(3,625)
ADI
0.19
(0.23)
170,499
(151,020)
134,238
^
(82,651)
2,404
(19,650)
ADI – FA
-0.12
(0.15)
150,200
(93,598)
12,796
(51,224)
21,669
^
(12,179)
ADI – OA
0.01
(0.15)
385,470
***
(99,247)
89,526
^
(54,316)
22,072
^
(12,914)
ADI – DA
0.02
(0.12)
21,843
(79,694)
645
(43,615)
-4,812
(10,369)
ADI – MA
0.00
(0.14)
-176,770
(91,845)
-64,255
(50,265)
5,089
(11,950)
N
97
97
97
97
F
0.49
n.s.
9.41
***
3.10
*
4.08
***
R²
0.03
0.34
0.15
0.18
Ajusted R²
0.00
0.31
0.10
0.14
Source: Table created by author.
Reading: FA for fiduciary accountability, OA for organizational accountability, DA for
downward accountability, MA for managerial accountability. ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *:
p < 0.05 and ^: p < 0.10. SE: standard error; n.s.: not significant.
Probit regression of social effectiveness indicators
Employee training plan
Employment of
disadvantaged people
or with disabilities
β
p
SE
β
p
SE
Constant
-0.28
(0.31)
-0.59
^
(0.29)
ADI
1.12
(1.69)
-2.52
(1.59)
ADI – FA
-0.71
(1.17)
0.32
(1.03)
ADI – OA
1.35
(1.19)
2.39
*
(1.04)
ADI – DA
0.54
(1.04)
1.42
(0.90)
ADI – MA
0.92
(1.12)
1.55
(1.00)
N
129
129
-2 Log(Likelihood)
14.03
***
17.31
**
R²(Nagelkerke)
0.15
0.17
Source: Table created by author.
Reading: FA for fiduciary accountability, OA for organizational accountability, DA for
downward accountability, MA for managerial accountability. ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *:
p < 0.05 and ^: p < 0.10. SE: standard error; n.s.: not significant.
28
Probit regression of environmental effectiveness indicators
Environment
protection at
headquarters
Environment
protection in the
field
Sustainability
γ
p
SE
γ
p
SE
γ
p
SE
Constant
-0.24
(0.28)
-0.33
(0.29)
-0.77
**
(0.30)
ADI
1.34
(1.51)
0.44
(1.52)
3.67
*
(1.57)
ADI – FA
-1.00
(0.99)
-1.57
(1.02)
0.22
(1.00)
ADI – OA
0.37
(0.94)
0.03
(0.95)
0.32
(0.96)
ADI – DA
-0.48
(0.86)
0.50
(0.89)
-1.30
(0.89)
ADI – MA
-0.09
(0.95)
0.26
(0.96)
-1.14
(0.98)
N
129
129
129
-2 Log(Likelihood)
2.82
n.s.
2.73
n.s.
12.1
*
R²(Nagelkerke)
0.03
0.03
0.12
Nota: Although insufficient, the result is consistent with hypothesis H3 in the case of
sustainability in France. This confirms the complexity of our subject.
Source: Table created by author.
Reading: FA for fiduciary accountability, OA for organizational accountability, DA for
downward accountability, MA for managerial accountability. ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *:
p < 0.05 and ^: p < 0.10. SE: standard error; n.s.: not significant.
29
Appendix B: Second robustness check
Sub-sample including NPOs belonging to a network or a federation
OLS regressions of financial effectiveness indicators
ROA
Total incomes (in
thousands)
Grants (in thousands)
Donations and
memberships (in
thousands)
α
p
SE
α
p
SE
α
p
SE
α
p
SE
Constant
-0.02
(0.04)
-58,796
^
(34,110)
-33,998
^
(19,074)
-4,371
(3,360)
ADI
0.18
(0.19)
343,398
*
(167,069)
207,356
*
(93,425)
25,775
(16,460)
ADI – FA
-0.02
(0.11)
6,726
(99,193)
-37,929
(55,468)
6,233
(9,772)
ADI – OA
-0.06
(0.12)
459,662
***
(107,802)
119,382
^
(60,283)
27,385
*
(10,621)
ADI – DA
-0.03
(0.12)
61,623
(101,766)
7,863
(56,907)
6,406
(10,026)
ADI – MA
-0.04
(0.12)
-256,966
*
(104,671)
-92,950
(58,532)
-14,944
(10,312)
N
83
83
83
83
F
0.31
n.s.
9.78
***
3.50
***
6.21
***
R²
0.02
0.39
0.19
0.28
Ajusted R²
0.00
0.35
0.13
0.24
Source: Table created by author.
Reading: FA for fiduciary accountability, OA for organizational accountability, DA for
downward accountability, MA for managerial accountability. ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *:
p < 0.05 and ^: p < 0.10. SE: standard error; n.s.: not significant.
Probit regression of social effectiveness indicators
Employee training plan
Employment of
disadvantaged people
or with disabilities
β
p
SE
β
p
SE
Constant
-0.07
(0.36)
-0.82
*
(0.34)
ADI
0.49
(1.83)
-0.46
(1.62)
ADI – FA
0.23
(1.24)
0.17
(1.02)
ADI – OA
1.24
(1.28)
2.56
*
(1.05)
ADI – DA
0.01
(1.23)
0.09
(1.02)
ADI – MA
0.99
(1.28)
0.58
(1.07)
N
115
115
-2 Log(Likelihood)
8.38
n.s.
11.37
*
R²(Nagelkerke)
0.11
0.13
Source: Table created by author.
Reading: FA for fiduciary accountability, OA for organizational accountability, DA for
downward accountability, MA for managerial accountability. ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *:
p < 0.05 and ^: p < 0.10. SE: standard error; n.s.: not significant.
30
Probit regression of environmental effectiveness indicators
Environment
protection at
headquarters
Environment
protection in the
field
Sustainability
γ
p
SE
γ
p
SE
γ
p
SE
Constant
-0.15
(0.32)
-0.18
(0.33)
-0.54
(0.34)
ADI
1.02
(1.57)
-0.28
(1.57)
1.78
(1.68)
ADI – FA
-1.13
(1.00)
-1.07
(1.02)
-0.28
*
(1.07)
ADI – OA
0.51
(0.96)
0.40
(0.98)
1.60
(1.06)
ADI – DA
-0.26
(0.99)
-0.56
(1.02)
-2.21
(1.05)
ADI – MA
-0.09
(1.02)
0.78
(1.03)
0.43
(1.10)
N
115
115
115
-2 Log(Likelihood)
2.28
n.s.
3.36
n.s.
12.02
*
R²(Nagelkerke)
0.03
0.04
0.14
Source: Table created by author.
Reading: FA for fiduciary accountability, OA for organizational accountability, DA for
downward accountability, MA for managerial accountability. ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *:
p < 0.05 and ^: p < 0.10. SE: standard error; n.s.: not significant.
31
Appendix C: Third robustness check
Sub-sample including NPOs without donor protection charter (“Trusted Donation
Charter” label)
OLS regressions of financial effectiveness indicators
ROA
Total incomes (in
thousands)
Grants (in thousands)
Donations and
memberships (in
thousands)
α
p
SE
α
p
SE
α
p
SE
α
p
SE
Constant
-0.03
(0.05)
-5,758
(4,516)
97
(1,171)
-528
(906)
ADI
0.14
(0.28)
-2,445
(25,829)
16,377
*
(6,698)
-3,190
(5,181)
ADI – FA
-0.10
(0.21)
7,295
(19,086)
-8,799
^
(4,949)
4,617
(3,828)
ADI – OA
0.06
(0.19)
15,803
(17,562)
6,917
(4,554)
-8,140
*
(3,523)
ADI – DA
0.00
(0.16)
14,767
(14,305)
8,148
*
(3,709)
6,607
*
(2,869)
ADI – MA
0.09
(0.20)
17,243
(17,927)
-10,011
*
(4,649)
6,409
^
(3,596)
N
84
84
84
84
F
0.67
n.s.
2.63
*
2.89
*
4.23
**
R²
0.04
0.14
0.16
0.21
Ajusted R²
0.00
0.09
0.10
0.16
Source: Table created by author.
Reading: FA for fiduciary accountability, OA for organizational accountability, DA for
downward accountability, MA for managerial accountability. ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *:
p < 0.05 and ^: p < 0.10. SE: standard error; n.s.: not significant.
Probit regression of social effectiveness indicators
Employee training plan
Employment of
disadvantaged people
or with disabilities
β
p
SE
β
p
SE
Constant
-0.20
(0.31)
-0.32
(0.31)
ADI
3.70
*
(1.84)
-2.85
(1.86)
ADI – FA
-2.67
*
(1.32)
-0.55
(1.26)
ADI – OA
0.86
(1.16)
2.28
*
(1.10)
ADI – DA
1.33
(1.12)
2.61
*
(1.08)
ADI – MA
-0.88
(1.23)
0.80
(1.25)
N
118
118
-2 Log(Likelihood)
10.87
^
14.05
*
R²(Nagelkerke)
0.12
0.16
Source: Table created by author.
Reading: FA for fiduciary accountability, OA for organizational accountability, DA for
downward accountability, MA for managerial accountability. ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *:
p < 0.05 and ^: p < 0.10. SE: standard error; n.s.: not significant.
32
Probit regression of environmental effectiveness indicators
Environment
protection at
headquarters
Environment
protection in the
field
Sustainability
γ
p
SE
γ
p
SE
γ
p
SE
Constant
-0.01
(0.30)
-0.17
(0.30)
-0.29
(0.30)
ADI
2.37
(1.71)
-0.85
(1.67)
3.07
(1.73)
ADI – FA
-2.18
(1.25)
-0.55
(1.19)
-1.86
(1.28)
ADI – OA
0.77
(1.04)
0.28
(1.01)
0.74
(1.07)
ADI – DA
-0.37
(1.02)
-0.64
(1.02)
-1.71
(1.13)
ADI – MA
-1.17
(1.16)
1.21
(1.15)
-1.20
(1.18)
N
118
118
118
-2 Log(Likelihood)
5.14
n.s.
2.30
n.s.
8.61
n.s.
R²(Nagelkerke)
0.06
0.03
0.09
Source: Table created by author.
Reading: FA for fiduciary accountability, OA for organizational accountability, DA for
downward accountability, MA for managerial accountability. ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *:
p < 0.05 and ^: p < 0.10. SE: standard error; n.s.: not significant.