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32 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2014)
THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: OBAMA’S FAILED RUSSIA “RESET”
AND THE PUTIN DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE
Mahir Khalifa-Zadeh*
Since 2009, under President Barack Obama, the U.S. has pursued a “Russian reset” policy, promis-
ing a fresh start to previously tense relations. Yet this policy has failed to improve American inter-
ests, particularly in the South Caucasus region, which is strategically important for both Israeli and
U.S. policy towards the greater Middle East and the post-Soviet space. This article examines the pri-
orities of both the Obama administration and President Vladimir Putin’s doctrine and evaluates the
implications of the Crimean crisis for the South Caucasus. Finally, it demonstrates that in light of
this failure, new U.S. initiatives are urgently needed to enforce peace along international borders
and America’s strategic interests in the South Caucasus and throughout Central Asia.
INTRODUCTION
Since the collapse of the USSR, the South Caucasus has become an arena for the power struggle
between the West and Russia. The South Caucasus is of great importance for its geostrategic location
and its access to Caspian’s energy resources. Geographically, the region is a land bridge between the
Black and Caspian Seas. Its proximity to the Middle East increases its importance for both the U.S.
and Israeli Middle East policies. The South Caucasus is also a politically sensitive region of the for-
mer Soviet Union. The large energy resources of the Caspian increase the South Caucasus’ role in
European and Israeli energy security.
IMMEDIATE POST-SOVIET PERIOD
The South Caucasus was a central focus of U.S. foreign policy toward the USSR. However, short-
ly after the Soviet Union’s disintegration in December of 1991, the first high-level contacts with
leaders of all three South Caucasus states took place when the Secretary of State, James A. Baker,
embarked on a historical trip to Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Central Asia on February 12, 1992 and to
Georgia on May 26, 1992. The visit proved the strategic importance of the South Caucasus states to
America’s interests in the post-Soviet space. It also generated a clear message that the U.S. had
strong intentions to launch active diplomacy towards all three newly-emerged countries of the South
Caucasus without discrimination. So, despite the strong opposition of the Armenian-American dias-
pora, the U.S. opened its Embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan without delay in March 1992.
In this period immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the newly emerged states of
the South Caucasus held unbalanced influence on Capitol Hill. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia at the time did not have influential diasporas or the relevant political experience to deal with
the U.S. Congress and administration. Thanks to its powerful diaspora, Armenia held a higher stand-
ing and perception within the U.S. So Armenia widely exploited its diaspora network to shift Ameri-
can policy towards a pro-Armenian stance in the South Caucasus.
Indeed, the U.S. Congress excluded Azerbaijan at that time from receiving U.S. government assis-
tance under Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act (FSA). Despite strong opposition from the
George H.W. Bush administration, the language of Section 907 of the FSA prohibited government-
to-government assistance to Azerbaijan. Capitalizing on its temporary advantage, the Armenian-
The South Caucasus: Obama’s Failed Russia “Reset” and the Putin Doctrine in Practice
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2014) 33
American diaspora tried to put Armenia at the center of America’s regional policy, pushing Armenia
as a key promoter of American interests in the South Caucasus. Strong efforts were also launched to
gain U.S. support for Armenia’s position in its conflict with Azerbaijan over Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-
Karabakh region. However, as further political events showed, the diaspora had miscalculated or
overestimated Armenia’s power in promoting U.S. interests in the region. Subsequently, both the di-
aspora’s and Armenia’s goals began to contradict America’s strategic interests in the South Caucasus
and in the Caspian Basin.
AZERBAIJAN’S “CONTRACT OF THE CENTURY” AND U.S. REGIONAL ENGAGE-
MENT
On September 20, 1994, Azerbaijan signed a production-sharing contract, or “Contract of the
Century,” with a consortium of international oil companies (British and American oil giants) to ex-
plore for oil in Azerbaijan’s Caspian Sea sector. The discovery of the Azeri, Chirag, and Guneshli oil
fields in that region significantly energized U.S. policy and diplomacy to transform the area into an
important source of non-Middle-Eastern energy. Huge Azeri oil and gas reserves also raised the issue
of energy transportation routes to bypass Russia. In this light, some experts have emphasized the
three main drivers of U.S. foreign policy at that time: the role of energy production to strengthen the
sovereignty of the South Caucasus nations; U.S. corporate interests; and the role of Caspian energy
resources for global energy security.1
There is no doubt that the decision of the late Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev to bring Amer-
ican and British oil giants into the South Caucasus and Caspian affairs was a successful step in his
strategy to find a delicate balance between enforcing Azerbaijan’s security and promoting U.S. inter-
ests. He and President Shevardnadze of Georgia also attempted to bring Azerbaijan and Georgia into
focus in U.S. policy and while countering Russia’s influence.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan tried to strengthen its national independence
and security while liberating lands occupied by Armenia. Azerbaijan needed to contain strong pres-
sure from both Iran and Russia, which both provided large-scale assistance to Azerbaijan’s regional
rival - Armenia. Trying to stabilize and strengthen Azerbaijan’s independence, the late Azerbaijani
President Heydar Aliyev oriented the country’s foreign policy towards the West and Israel. Thus the
“Contract of the Century” was President Heydar Aliyev’s strategic step to anchor Azerbaijan to the
West.
Undoubtedly, the Contract changed the region’s political landscape. The Contract confirmed
Azerbaijan’s strategic characteristics in promoting U.S. interests in the region. The Contract also be-
came a long-term tool to project U.S. power deep into Central Asia. In this way, the Contract opened
the gates for the West’s direct engagement into the South Caucasus and Caspian basin’s affairs.
Coming so many years after the British withdrawal from Baku in August 1919, ending Western pres-
ence in the South Caucasus, the Contract sent Russia the message that the West had returned as a
strong and powerful actor in the region.
Indeed, the U.S., the European Union (EU), as well as Turkey and Israel, started to take increas-
ing roles in the South Caucasus affairs, which traditionally have been orchestrated by Iran and Rus-
sia. The Clinton and Bush administrations launched a package of long-term programs (Partnership
for Pease, Silk Road Strategy Act; and later, the Caspian Watch and the EU’s Eastern Partnership),
oriented to strengthen the West’s presence, while minimizing both Iranian and Russian influences.
After the tragic events of September 11, the U.S. significantly expanded its political, military, and
security cooperation with the countries of the South Caucasus, enlisting them in the U.S. war on ter-
ror. All three countries agreed to allow passage through their airspace. On December 16, 2001, U.S.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited all three capitals of the South Caucasus countries to con-
solidate U.S. military ties to this vital region. In Baku, Rumsfeld also announced that “the United
Mahir Khalifa-Zadeh
34 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2014)
States Congress appears within days of waiving sanctions imposed in 1992 under the Freedom Sup-
port Act”2.
By early 2002, the U.S. had initiated a train-and-equip program for the Georgian military. There
were also some indications that the U.S. Department of Defense intended to establish a military pres-
ence in Azerbaijan. In December 2003, in a meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev,
Rumsfeld expressed interest in establishing a U.S. air base on the Apsheron peninsula3. However,
Azerbaijan denied this option, so as not to anger Iran and Russia.
Within a couple of years, Azerbaijan and Georgia started to rank among the most reliable and
committed partners providing support for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan. The U.S. also realized that Azerbaijan and Georgia, unlike Armenia, were crucial coun-
tries that could promote America’s interests in the region and beyond. In this context, the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC), a main export pipeline to pump Caspian oil to world markets via
Georgia, was the next strategic step in involving Azerbaijan and Georgia in strengthening America’s
influence. The BTC also became a key element for Israel’s energy security4 . Finally, the BTC en-
forced the “Contract of the Century” strategy: to engage the West, while balancing Russia’s influ-
ence.
Meanwhile, massive long-term international projects aimed at pumping and transporting Caspian
energy while bypassing Russia shifted American policy towards the region. The South Caucasus be-
came an increasingly important component of U.S. foreign policy. Azerbaijan and Georgia both
aligned themselves with the U.S. and sought integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, while Armenia
deepened its ties with Moscow. So the U.S. began focusing on Azerbaijan and Georgia in its regional
policy and increased its direct assistance to Baku and Tbilisi5 . Finally, the large energy projects
pushed Washington to gain strategic momentum in the Caspian basin, which greatly angered Mos-
cow.
Once the BTC began operation in 2005, Russia realized that the U.S. had been rapidly increasing
its operational abilities, trying to limit Russia’s influence. Moscow understood that Washington had
become a powerful actor that could seriously jeopardize Moscow’s interests in this sensitive part of
the world.
RUSSIA’S RESPONSE: THE WAR WITH GEORGIA
Undoubtedly, Azerbaijan’s “Contract of the Century” accelerated American economic and politi-
cal penetration. Washington became a key player, directly engaged in complex affairs in the South
Caucasus and Caspian basin. The U.S. through its strategic initiatives, had gained significant mo-
mentum, expanding its influence in the region and beyond. This tendency created a serious concern
in Moscow and Tehran because it led to inevitable erosion of Russia’s and Iran’s historical domi-
nance6.
Indeed, Russia reacted angrily to America’s rapid advance into the region, which Moscow’s deci-
sion-makers traditionally considered part of Russia’s “backyard.” As scholar Marcel de Haas noted:
“...to counter this development, one of Russia’s tactics is to slow down Western advances... “7. Given
this context, it’s possible that the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 actually originated from these tactics.
Sources confirmed that the plan for Georgia was prepared by Russia’s Armed Forces General Staff
from the end of 2006 to the beginning of 20078, soon after the BTC started to operate in 2005. Mos-
cow’s goals were clear: stop Russia’s retreat, retake the strategic initiative from the U.S. and protect
Russian interests in the region.
Unfortunately, former Georgian President Saakashvili’s miscalculations led to Russian victory,
strengthening Moscow’s security position in the region. Moreover, the war with Georgia provided a
brilliant opportunity for Russia to shift the region’s balance of power and regain strategic momentum
to enforce Moscow’s influence in its immediate neighborhood. Russia had demonstrated to global
and regional powers that the South Caucasus (like the entire CIS) was Russia’s immediate area, giv-
The South Caucasus: Obama’s Failed Russia “Reset” and the Putin Doctrine in Practice
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2014) 35
ing Moscow exclusive rights to use force and manage the situation in accordance with its own strate-
gic interests.
A further result of this conflict has been that Georgia and Ukraine have given up their agenda of
advancing towards NATO membership. Additionally, two parts of Georgia have been recognized by
Russia as independent states. Krzysztof Strachota and Wojciech Gorecki pointed out in 2008: “West-
ern actors have in practice been forced to recognize Russia’s military dominance in the region and
act only in areas approved by Russia and within the limits set by Russia”9.
One might interpret the Georgia war as a direct message to the West: Russia recovers its old im-
perial ambitions, and the Russian military once again serves as a working tool in Moscow’s strategic
calculations. Mamuka Tsereteli, of the Washington, D.C.-based American University, emphasized:
“As the Russia-Georgia conflict demonstrates, military force has become a major factor in Russian
foreign policy”10. Moreover, Russia’s rapid advance deep into Georgia also confirmed that Russia
could reach both of the key U.S.’s partners’ capitals, Baku and Tbilisi, easily, meaning that no power
could stop Russia’s forces. The war demonstrated that the Western companies’ oil and pipeline infra-
structures in the Caspian could be under threat, and that the West had no effective tools to stop Rus-
sia’s military.
The Georgia war became a turning point in Russia’s foreign and security policy toward the former
Soviet republics. It seems that the Kremlin had adopted a new strategy: to expand Russia’s military
presence in its near abroad, and to keep former Soviet republics in Russia’s orbit. Moscow started to
intensify its military buildup in Russia’s immediate neighborhood, and increased its pressure on
neighboring countries to join to the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Union, to begin operating in 2015.
In parallel, Russia pushed the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russia-dominated
post-Soviet security block.
In fact, in 2009, soon after the Georgian war, Russia pressured Kyrgyzstan to close its U.S. mili-
tary air base at Manas, near Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan11. A year later, Russia extended its
lease for the military base in Armenia to 204412 and supplied large amounts of military hardware to
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the two Central Asian countries that also host Russian military bases13.
Russia had already signed a deal with Kyrgyzstan to allow Moscow to keep a military base in the
country until 203214. Russia also signed $4 billion military deal with Azerbaijan in 201015 and nego-
tiated plans to open military air base in Belarus in 201516. Russia increased its military personnel to
5000 soldiers, and added combat helicopters to the fighter unit in Armenia17.
Undoubtedly, the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 was a milestone development in the post-Soviet
space. Russia enforced its dominance in the near abroad and increased its efforts to launch the Mos-
cow-dominated Eurasian Union. However, the U.S. was shocked and pushed to adopt a new strategy.
AMERICA’S RESPONSE: “RUSSIA RESET” POLICY
When Obama took office in 2009, he immediately announced a new foreign policy strategy: to re-
start or reset relations with Russia. Relations between the U.S. and post-Soviet Russia had deteriorat-
ed to the point where some observers characterized them as a new Cold War18. However, attempts to
improve relations with Russia were not unique to the Obama administration. As Paul J. Sanders, Ex-
ecutive Director of the Nixon Center, wrote, “... efforts made by previous two administrations in-
cluded resets that ultimately failed to live up to expectations”19. But Dr. James M. Goldgeier of the
Hoover Institution emphasizes that the origin of America’s Russia “reset” policy has roots that run
deeper, dating to the Clinton-Yeltsin period20.
Meanwhile, in 2009, the “reset” policy was launched following serious disagreements between
Washington and Moscow on the Europe-based missile-defense system, Iran’s nuclear program, post-
Soviet politics, NATO’s eastward expansion, the Georgia war of 2008, and other issues. In this con-
text the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 was a crucial factor in the South Caucasus’ “ front line” of op-
position between the U.S. and Russia, which pushed the Obama administration to reset its relations
Mahir Khalifa-Zadeh
36 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2014)
with Russia. Political analysts even suggested that the war in Georgia was a proxy American-Russian
war, for the Georgian forces were supplied and trained by Washington21. The Obama administration
considered this “reset” an essential step in improving relations and overcoming the sense of distrust
between the countries. Some expert commentators, such as Thomas E. Graham of Kissinger Associ-
ates and Peter Baker of the New York Times, believed that Obama’s reset was a “new partnership”22.
In fact, both Obama and Russian President Medvedev considered their personal friendship to be
evidence for the reset’s success. At the 2010 APEC summit in Japan’s Yokohama, Obama met with
Russian President Medvedev in an informal meeting to discuss a wide range of bilateral and global
issues. Obama made statements such as, “my friend Dmitri,” calling Medvedev “an excellent part-
ner,” while President Medvedev replied in kind, calling his relationship with Obama “very pleasant
for me” and saying that he and Obama “understand each other very well”23.
For Obama, the goal of the “reset” was to replace conflict with cooperation, or “selective coopera-
tion” with Moscow on issues that were among the top U.S. priorities, such as the war in Afghanistan,
Iran’s nuclear-weapons aspirations, New START and nuclear proliferation24.
DOUBTS ABOUT OBAMA’S “RUSSIA RESET” POLICY
At the time, political analysts from both sides of the Atlantic expressed serious doubts about
Obama’s success in improving Russian-U.S. relations. Some called Obama’s reset a “capitulation”
and stated it was a “dangerous bargain.” They also regarded it as a policy of “seeing no evil”25. They
directly criticized the Obama administration for its wrong approach and for the possible “grand bar-
gain,” or political deal behind closed doors, between the U.S. and Russia as part of the administra-
tion’s reset efforts with Russia.26
David J.Kramer, former deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs in
the George W. Bush administration, wrote in the Washington Post: “... the administration would pur-
sue a ‘Russia first’ policy at the expense of Russia’s neighbors. The problem, it appears, is actually
worse: the administration seems to have moved toward a ‘Russia only’ approach, neglecting and
even abandoning other countries in the region”27.
Dr. Ariel Cohen of the Washington, D.C.-based Heritage Foundation claimed this “Russia first”
approach seriously damaged U.S. interests. He argued that Obama’s “reset” policy had failed to im-
prove bilateral relations and that Obama conceded too much to Russia. He stated: “... the Kremlin is
exploiting Obama’s ‘see no evil’ approach in Russia’s expansion into former Soviet space and coop-
eration with anti-Western regimes. The Obama administration’s Russia policy will inevitable pro-
duce a massive loss of American influence in Eurasia and jeopardize the security of the U.S. and its
friends and allies east of the Order”28.
PUTIN’S DOCTRINE AND ITS PRACTICE IN THE REGION
In a well-known statement, Putin has argued that the breakup of the USSR was “the biggest geo-
political catastrophe of the century”. Since his election in 2000, Putin has tried to recover for Russia
political and geostrategic assets that were lost by the USSR in 1991. Putin is attempting to renew
Russia’s status and influence in both regional and global politics, while claiming for the Russian
Federation the same great power once wielded by the USSR.
He began to increase Russia’s military budget while trying to frustrate and foil U.S. initiatives to-
ward the post-Soviet space, which he perceived as threatening Russian interests. He has also expand-
ed Russia’s relations with countries that share anti-American politics, and attempting to exploit dip-
lomatic friction between the U.S. and its allies. Putin’s attempt to restore the Russian sphere of influ-
ence and regain its superpower status, some analysts argue, is Russia’s new foreign policy concept,
otherwise known as the Putin Doctrine29.
The South Caucasus: Obama’s Failed Russia “Reset” and the Putin Doctrine in Practice
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2014) 37
The first component of Putin’s foreign policy consensus, as Leon Aron writes in Foreign Affairs,
is “to maintain Russia as a nuclear superpower”30 The second component is to export nuclear tech-
nologies, enhancing Russia’s position as a global power. The third component is to recover Russia’s
close relations with its former Soviet clients in the Middle East. Finally, the fourth component, as
Aron writes, is to ensure Russia’s regional hegemony in near abroad and “... to strive for the politi-
cal, economic, military, and cultural reintegration of the former Soviet bloc under Russian leader-
ship”. Regarding Russia’s efforts to strengthen its position in the near abroad, Aron also emphasizes
that
“[u]nder the Putin Doctrine, the pursuit of regional hegemony has acquired a new dimension:
an attempt at the ‘Finlandization’ of the post-Soviet states, harkening back to the Soviet Un-
ion’s control over Finland’s foreign policy during the Cold War. In such an arrangement, Mos-
cow would allow its neighbors to choose their own domestic political and economic systems
but maintain final say over their external orientation. Accordingly, Moscow has taken an espe-
cially hard line against former Soviet republics that have sought to reorient their foreign poli-
cy.”
Meanwhile, Russian opposition leader and former State Duma First Deputy Vladimir A.Ryzhkov
believes that “the doctrine includes Russia’s renunciation of attributing itself to the European and
Euro-Atlantic civilization; selective recognition of the norms of international law; selective coopera-
tion with international organizations; and the right to limit sovereignty of the post-soviet states, as
well as to ignore national sovereignty and territorial integrity of weaker states.”31
In fact, under direct pressure from Moscow, Ukraine’s President Yanukovych did not sign a polit-
ical association and free trade pact with the European Union, which was scheduled to take place at
the Eastern Partnership Summit on November 28-29, 2013 in Vilnius, Lithuania32. Armenia was
forced to abandon the process of signing a free trade agreement with the European Union as well33.
Russia has also pressured Armenia to join the Russia-led Customs Union of Belarus, Russia, Ka-
zakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which plans to transform into the Eurasian Union by 201534.
Meanwhile, Russia has been strengthening the Collective Security Treaty Organization of Russia,
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and it has been increasing its military
presence in all of these countries but Kazakhstan. The unchallenged Russian military’s superiority in
Russia’s immediate vicinity is a crucial element of the Putin doctrine, as it can keep former Soviet
republics under Moscow’s control while stopping NATO’s eastward expansion. Russia uses its mili-
tary installations as a tool to force the West to avoid deploying US/NATO troops or troops of any
NATO member country into Russia’s immediate neighbourhood.
In this way, Russia’s military base in Armenia transforms this country into a so-called “Russian
fortress,” ensuring Russia’s regional dominance and preventing NATO’s deployment in the South
Caucasus, which holds geostrategic importance for Israel, as part of the Greater Middle East, as well
as for the U.S. and Europe. The strategic characteristics of this base, thanks to newly deployed Ful-
crum fighter jets35 and attack helicopters36, render it a key military installation in the region to pro-
ject Russia’s military power as far as the Persian Gulf and deep into the Middle East.
Russia’s military base in Gyumri (Armenia) and its naval base in Tartus (Syria) are key elements
in Putin’s plans to expand Russia’s influence in the Middle East and undermine America’s domi-
nance in the region as well as to shake America’s global role, as it did during the Soviet era. In this
context, Russia is not interested in the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. If this occurs, there is no
doubt it will erode any grounds for keeping the base in Armenia.
Moreover, in light of Russia’s resent invasion of Crimea (Ukraine), the Russian military base in
Armenia has become a real threat to Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s independence. In 2008, as the Rus-
so-Georgia war started, Georgian President Saakashvili was seriously concerned about the possible
invasion of Russian troops from Russia’s military base in Armenia. Russia demands a corridor for its
Mahir Khalifa-Zadeh
38 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2014)
military base in Armenia through Georgia. Russia has also pushed Tbilisi to accept new realities and
to recognize South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence as a precondition of re-establishing dip-
lomatic ties that were broken after the 2008 war. In these ways, Russia is attempting to kill Georgia’s
NATO and EU ambitions.
In Azerbaijan, Russia has kept the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict “frozen,” while holding the key to
unfreeze the conflict at any moment. Moscow has pressured Baku to formally desist from using force
to return Nagorno-Karabakh to its control. Russia is attempting to prolong the conflict and maintain
the Azeri-Armenian hostility, using these as effective tools with which to manipulate both Baku and
Yerevan to secure Russia’s interests and dominance in the South Caucasus. Recently, the Kremlin
has introduced semi-official speculations, including articles, analysis, interviews, and round-table
talks in the Russian mass media and among its expert community related to Abkhazia’s and South
Ossetia’s, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh’s membership in the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Union37.
This approach is designed to increase the pressure on Georgia and Azerbaijan. So Russian political
analysts do not exclude further cases of territorial “revisions” of both pro-Western Georgia and
Azerbaijan if they escape from Russia’s orbit.
In addition to these tactics, Russia has been increasing efforts to consolidate its influence in the
Caspian basin. On April, 22, 2014, during a meeting in Moscow of the foreign ministers of the Cas-
pian Sea’s littoral states--Iran, Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan--Russia (together
with Iran) warned these states against the military presence of any non-littoral states in the Caspian
Sea.38
CRIMEA CRISIS: THE END OF THE “RESET”? IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOUTH
CAUCASUS
Despite well-founded criticism of the Obama administration’s Russian “reset” policy, the key goal
of the “reset”--to replace conflicts with cooperation--was a valid and strategic goal to try to re-
normalize relations between the U.S. and post-Soviet Russia. Within the “reset” policy, the U.S.
gained Russia’s support on some of the key priorities of America’s foreign policy, such as on the is-
sues of Iran and Afghanistan. However, the U.S. canceled the planned deployment of missile inter-
ceptors and radars in Poland and the Czech Republic. The U.S. postponed offering the NATO Mem-
bership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine. Later, Washington began to send diplomatic
signals encouraging Tbilisi to improve its relations with Moscow, which were seriously damaged
after the Russo-Georgia war of 2008.
Meanwhile, there are indications that the Russian political elite interpreted Obama’s “reset” pol-
icy as a sign of American weakness39. The decade-long American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have
fully exhausted the U.S. military machine and pushed the Pentagon in 2010 to abandon its “two-war
doctrine,”40 which invoked America’s military goal of being able to “fight two simultaneous conven-
tional wars”41. The Pentagon’s move to reject this doctrine has generated serious speculation that
America’s global power is in decline.
Thus, the significant shift in America’s foreign policy, presented by Obama’s “reset” initiative, as
well the fact that the new U.S. military doctrine was focused on China not on Russia42, sent a mes-
sage that Russia was no longer “the enemy,” pushing the Kremlin to energize its newly-adopted for-
eign policy concept, the Putin doctrine. In addition, Obama’s policy of non-intervention in Syria as
well as Pentagon plans to shrink U.S. Army to its pre-World War II level43, probably reassured Mos-
cow that the U.S. was not interested in serving as a global arbiter44. Lilia Shevtsova of the Carnegie
Endowment wrote in The American Interest, “The Russian elite interpreted the reset as weakness on
the part of the Obama administration and as an invitation to be more assertive in the post-Soviet
space and beyond.”45 In this context, the Crimean crisis could be interpreted as the Kremlin’s power-
ful message to the world powers: Russia strongly intends to restore its non-Red Empire and retake its
The South Caucasus: Obama’s Failed Russia “Reset” and the Putin Doctrine in Practice
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2014) 39
superpower status. And Russia’s Crimean “anschluss” demonstrates the Putin doctrine in practice, a
clear sign of the threat to the post-Soviet states.
As if to emphasize this intention, on February 11, 2014, Russia started a large-scale military exer-
cise in Armenia46; moreover, since March 15, 2014 a group of Russia’s Caspian Flotilla ships, in-
cluding landing boats, have launched exercises in the Caspian Sea47. In February 2014, Vladimir
Zhirinovsky, Vice-Chairman of the Russian State Duma and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party
of Russia (LDPR), called for Russia to annex five entire countries--Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajiki-
stan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan--as Russia’s “Central Asian Federal Region.”48 He also called
on Russia to occupy Georgia and used offensive and humiliating words and phrases to refer to Azer-
baijan and Ukraine49.
Sergey Fedunyak, of the Kennan Institute, believes that
there is an increasing risk of the use of force by Russia against its neighboring countries, par-
ticularly, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. In the first three cases, it
may develop into hostilities of different intensity ranging from classical war with armed forces
to “hybrid wars” with a high autonomy of soldiers and subversive small units. Georgia has al-
ready suffered from, and Ukraine has begun to experience, Russia’s new approaches to war. In
the cases of Kazakhstan and Belarus, there may be a “mild” annexation of a part of a territory
or complete absorption that may be facilitated with populations’ psychological and military
unpreparedness to resist Russian occupation50.
Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula (Ukraine) is a failure of Obama’s “Russian Reset”
policy. The failure of the “reset” will have long-term implications for U.S. foreign and security poli-
cy. As Dr. Condoleezza Rice, former U.S. secretary of state, writes in the Washington Post “Most
important, the U.S. must restore its standing in the international community, which has been eroded
by too many extended hands of friendship to our adversaries, sometimes at the expense of our
friends”51.
Indeed, in the South Caucasus, the U.S. and NATO must reiterate their full support for independ-
ence, as well as for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Georgia are America’s allies, implementing pro-Western foreign policy that angers Moscow.
There is no doubt that Russia will consistently follow the policies already described here to under-
mine the West’s influence and to pressure America’s friends in the region.
Since Putin’s annexation of Crimea, it’s entirely possible that Moscow may select Azerbaijan
and/or Georgia as the next targets in Russia’s plan to protect Russians and Russian-speakers, contin-
uing its efforts to incorporate both Azerbaijan and Georgia into the so-called “Russian world.” If
Russia regains Azerbaijan and/or Georgia, this would reclaim full control over the Caspian energy
reserves and energy transportation routes, jeopardizing America’s interests and multi-billion dollar
oil investments. It would also put an end to the West’s new strategic plans to expand the Southern
Corridor to bring Caspian gas to Europe and so to decrease Europe’s dependence on Russia’s gas.
Meanwhile, European leaders recently agreed to step up their moves to cut energy dependency,
notably on Russia, after events in Ukraine. British Foreign Secretary William Hague suggested in-
creasing gas exports to Europe and supporting projects such as the Southern Corridor pipeline in Ba-
ku, Azerbaijan, to be constructed in 2017, which will bring Caspian natural gas to Europe, bypassing
Russia52.
In reducing Europe’s dependence on Russian gas, involving Turkmenistan within the Southern
Corridor is essential. The Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) project between Turkmenistan and Azerbai-
jan via the Caspian Sea needs to be on the table again to bring Turkmenistan’s gas to the European
Union via the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) projects. Pip-
ing Turkmen gas to Europe should be the next logical step in the development of the Southern Corri-
dor. The first Trilateral Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Azerbaijan and
Mahir Khalifa-Zadeh
40 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2014)
Turkmenistan in Baku, on May 26, 2014, was an important step in this direction. According to the
Turkish Foreign Ministry, “The meeting is expected to address the opportunities for developing co-
operation at bilateral and regional levels in matters of common interest to all three countries, espe-
cially in the fields of energy and transportation and to enable an exchange of views on international
and regional developments”53. Earlier, Ankara emphasized the importance of TANAP for the EU’s
energy security following Russia’s military intervention in Crimea.54
However, there is one problem: the West does not have an effective political or military tool to
balance Russia’s military in Armenia, which has created a serious and direct threat to America’s stra-
tegic interests since the Crimea crisis, threatening the security of Western-oriented Azerbaijan and
Georgia. It is also a threat to Western oil and gas infrastructures and pipelines.
The triangular cooperation between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia offers intriguing possibili-
ties, transforming this alliance into an effective defense tool to enforce peace, stability, and interna-
tional borders in the South Caucasus. Today’s cooperation addresses politics, security, energy, trans-
portation, trade and investment, but it needs to encompass a military dimension as well. A defense
alliance could be created on the basis of the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia triangle to protect Western
oil and gas infrastructure, and to enforce Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s independence. In this context,
Azerbaijani, Turkish and Georgian defence ministers meeting in August 24, 2014, in Azerbaijan’s
Nakhchivan is an important event in the right direction to discuss joint military exercises and meas-
ures to protect oil and gas pipelines55.
Another possibility would be for Turkey and Azerbaijan and/or Turkey and Georgia to sign bilat-
eral defense agreements to strengthen both Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s defense capabilities. Military
cooperation among these nations was discussed during the Tbilisi Summit of these nations’ presi-
dents, held on May 6, 2014. In parallel with this trilateral military cooperation, the U.S. must support
bilateral Turkish- Azerbaijani and Azerbaijani-Georgian military cooperation, which should be ex-
panded upon and transformed into defense alliances as soon as possible. Furthermore, the formation
of Azeri-Georgian or joint Turkish-Azeri-Georgian peacekeeping battalions is an attractive option as
well. These approaches, along with close cooperation with NATO, will improve both Azerbaijan’s
and Georgia’s defense capabilities. These measures may partially balance Russia’s military presence
in Armenia as well as prevent Russia from taking potentially irreversible and aggressive steps against
Georgia and Azerbaijan, essential given residents’ fears that Russia may take over as it did in 1920-
1921, when Bolshevik Russia occupied all three countries in the South Caucasus and terminated each
country’s short-lived independence.
Unfortunately, one negative outcome of the “Russian Reset” policy was that the U.S. has de-
creased its attention as well as its involvement within the South Caucasus region. As a result, the “re-
set” has failed to improve the political atmosphere and to solve “frozen” conflicts in the South Cau-
casus. Thus, there is no peace along the pipelines that are pumping Caspian energy to Europe. More-
over, there are indications that the region’s political situation has deteriorated and that America’s
strategic interests are now under threat. Russia has been strengthening its influence, cementing its
strategic positions in the region; it has also tried to secure its interests at any cost. Russia has pushed
America to retreat and increased pressure on Azerbaijan and Georgia, which are America’s real
friends. Indeed, on March 27, 2014, only two countries from the list of South Caucasus and Central
Asian states--Azerbaijan and Georgia--openly supported the U.S.-backed UN resolution on Ukraini-
an sovereignty and territorial integrity and deemed the referendum that led to Russia’s annexation of
the Crimean Peninsula illegal.
CONCLUSION
After Ukraine, what is Putin’s next target? This is an alarming question. The collapse of both
Azerbaijan and Georgia as independent states, will have irreversible consequences on the whole
post-Soviet region. The unstable Central Asian states may also become Russia’s next target. Russian
The South Caucasus: Obama’s Failed Russia “Reset” and the Putin Doctrine in Practice
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2014) 41
hardliners like Zhirinovsky have already begun urging Russia to protect Russians in Kazakhstan and
in other Central Asian states.
Putin’s assertion that Russia has the right to protect Russians and Russian-speakers outside of
Russia’s borders is an alarming new development within Putin’s doctrine, opening a door to Russian
military intervention in the post-Soviet space, as well as in Central and Eastern Europe56. Russia’s
annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea challenges the post-Cold War order and America’s role as a global
arbiter. It also provokes NATO’s defense strategies and challenges the vision that Europe is whole
and free.
The U.S. needs to abandon the “reset” policy. It has been utterly exhausted, and has failed to pro-
tect and advance U.S. interests. Moreover, Obama’s “reset” policy has led to a perception of Ameri-
ca as “weak,” likely resulting in Putin’s miscalculations of America’s global responsibility and in-
vestment in foreign policy goals. The U.S. must counteract this perception and reaffirm commit-
ments to its allies in Central and Eastern Europe by increasing its own engagement in the South Cau-
casus and Central Asia57.
In this context, the U.S. should launch a new assistance program to replace the old and out-of-date
Freedom Support Act (FSA) of 1992. The FSA does not reflect the new realities in the post-Soviet
space, since it mainly concentrates on Russia. Any new strategic program must focus on Russia’s
immediate neighbors to support their independence, territorial integrity, defense and economic capa-
bilities. Since the Crimean crisis, it has become clear that Russia does not need America’s assistance.
The U.S. and the European Union must increase their direct assistance to the countries of the for-
mer Soviet Union in order to help them continue asserting their independence in the region. The U.S.
must re-engage in affairs within the South Caucasus, forging a strategy aimed at strengthening the
region’s links with Europe. In parallel to this U.S. action, the European Union must update its East-
ern Partnership program, while NATO must update and expand upon its Individual Partnership Ac-
tion Plan (IPAP) with Azerbaijan for 2015-2016. A significant step in this direction occurred at the
September 2014 NATO summit in Wales, where it endorsed a “substantial package” for Georgia to
help it prepare for membership in the Alliance58.
There is no doubt that the doors of NATO and the EU must be open to new members. In parallel,
Dr. George Friedman (Chairman of Stratfor, a US-based geopolitical intelligence firm) argues that
the West must create containment alliances from Estonia to Azerbaijan to enforce independence of
the former Soviet republics and halt Putin’s plans for Russian advancement. As he writes, “The
United States has an interest in acting early because early action is cheaper than acting in the last ex-
tremity.”59
French President Francois Hollande’s visit to the South Caucasus, from May 11 to 13, 2014, as
well as U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s intention to visit Azerbaijan and Georgia in the near fu-
ture60 and announced plans related a new Southern Gas Corridor led by BP, which will bring Caspian
gas to Europe61 clearly demonstrate interest from the West, and particularly from the U.S., in enforc-
ing its continued presence and influence. This also signals Washington’s intention to oppose Russia’s
imperial ambitions in this sensitive part of the world. Further signaling this intention was U.S. Secre-
tary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s two-day visit to Georgia62 immediately after the NATO Summit in
Wales in September 2014.
In December 2012, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned that the U.S. is trying to pre-
vent Russia from recreating a new version of the Soviet Union63. Thus, now is the time for America
to abandon its “reset” policy with Russia and demonstrate America’s global power to enforce peace,
stability and international borders. However, such a policy will likely not be established under
Obama’s administration, which has invested a lot of political capital to reset its relations with Russia;
rather this may be left as an undertaking for the next U.S. administration.
If the U.S. forgets the South Caucasus countries, particularly Azerbaijan and Georgia, a trend ex-
acerbated by Obama’s “reset” policy, they will find themselves face-to-face with Russia’s military
Mahir Khalifa-Zadeh
42 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2014)
machine, as Britain did in 1919. In such a situation, there is no doubt Russia will “re-Sovietize”
them, leaving them and the West to pay the huge price for such a disastrous policy.
*Mahir Khalifa-Zadeh, Ph.D, is a political analyst based in Toronto (Canada). He is affiliated with
the Montreal-based Center for Research on Globalization and is a member of the Canadian Political
Science Association. He is also a Professor of Political Science at the Baku-based International
Ecoenergy Academy (Azerbaijan) and a regular contributor to international journals on global poli-
tics and security. His latest article is “Israeli-Azerbaijani Alliance and Iran” (GLORIA CENTER,
MERIA Journal Volume 17, Number 1, Israel, 2013).
NOTES
1 Svante Cornell, “US engagement in the South Caucasus: Changing gears,” Helsinki Monitor, 2005,
No. 2, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/0506_hmonitor.pdf
2 Thom Shanker, “A Nation Challenged: The Allies; Rumsfeld to Visit Troops Stationed in Afghani-
stan,” The New York Times, December 16, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/16/world/a-
nation-challenged-the-allies-rumsfeld-to-visit-troops-stationed-in-afghanistan.html
3 Bradley Graham, “Rumsfeld discuss Tighter Ties with Azerbaijan,” Washington Post, December 4,
2003, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-311304.html
4 Mahir Khalifa-zadeh, “Israeli-Azerbaijani Alliance and Iran,” Middle East Review of International
Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 17, No. 1, (Spring 2013), http://www.gloria-center.org/2013/03/israeli-
azerbaijani-alliance-and-iran
5 US Department of State, “U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia: Fact Sheets and Remarks,”
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ace/c11609.htm
6 Mahir Khalifa-zadeh, “Iran and the South Caucasus: A Struggle for Influence,” Journal of Central
Asia and Caucasus, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2011), http://www.ca-c.org/journal/2011-01-eng/05.shtml.
7Marcel de Haas, “Current Geostrategy in the South Caucasus,” Eurasianet.org, January 06, 2007,
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp010707.shtml
8 “Russian Generals Accuse Medvedev of Hesitation in Russia-Georgia War,” Radio Free Europe,
Radio Liberty, August 08, 2012, http://www.rferl.org/content/putin-says-russia-had-plans-for-
georgian-aggression-in-late-2006/24670673.html
9 Krzysztof Strachota and Wojciech Gorecki, “The Southern Caucasus and Central Asia after the
Russian-Georgian War,” Center for Eastern Studies, September 24, 2008,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-
a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=92868
10 Mamuka Tsereteli, “The Impact of the Russo-Georgia War on the South Caucasus Transportation
Corridor,” The Jamestown Foundation, 2009,
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/Full_Mamuka_RussiaGeorgia.pdf
11 Luke Harding, “Kyrgyzstan to Close Key US military airbase,” The Guardian, February 4, 2009,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/04/kyrgyzstan-us-base-afghanistan
12 “Russia Extends Military Base in Armenia Through 2044,” RIA Novosti, August 20, 2010,
http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20100820/160276128.html
13 Fozil Mashrab, Russian Arms Nudge Central Asia to Edge,” Asia Times, January 8, 2014,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/CEN-01-080114.html
14 “Russia To Keep Kyrgyzstan Military Base, Forgive Debt,” Defense News, September 20, 2012,
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120920/DEFREG03/309200007/
15Zulfugar Agayev, “Azeri-Russian Arms Trade $4 Billion Amid Tension With Armenia,” Bloom-
berg News, August 13, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-13/azeri-russian-arms-trade-
4-billion-amid-tension-with-armenia.html
The South Caucasus: Obama’s Failed Russia “Reset” and the Putin Doctrine in Practice
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2014) 43
16 “Russia Sends First Fighter Jets to Belarus Base,” RIA Novosti, December 9, 2013,
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Base.html
17 “Russia to Deploy Combat Helicopters at Armenian Base,” RIA Novosti, October 18, 2013,
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Armenian-Base.html
18 Stephen F.Cohen, “The New American Cold War,” The Nation, July 10, 2010,
http://www.thenation.com/article/new-american-cold-war
19 Dr Paul J.Sanders, “The U.S.-Russia Reset: Status and Prospects,” Kennan Institute, January 10,
2011, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-us-russia-reset-status-and-prospects
20 James Mi.Goldgeiger, “A Realistic Reset with Russia,” Hoover Institution, Policy Review, No.
156, August 3, 2009, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5474
21 Stephen F.Cohen, http://www.thenation.com/article/161063/obamas-russia-reset-another-lost-
opportunity
22 Stephen F.Cohen, “Obama’s Russia “reset”: Another Lost Opportunity?” The Nation, June 20,
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23 Cohen, “Obama’s Russia “reset”: Another Lost Opportunity?”
24 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Obama Calls Arms Treaty a Priority,” The New York Times, November 13,
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25 Marina Aristova, “US-Russia Relations of Reset: Results and Perspectives,” Research Institute of
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26 Frank Gaffney, ““reset” Translates As ‘Capitulation’,” Center for Security Policy, September 17,
2009, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2009/09/17/reset-translates-as-capitulation-2/
27 David Kramer, “U.S. Abandoning Russia’s Neighbors,” The Washington Post, May 15, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/14/AR2010051404496.html
28 Ariel Cohen, “Time to Revise Obama’s Russian “Reset” Policy”, The Heritage Foundation,
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revise-obamas-russian-reset-policy
29 Ilai Saltzman, “The Putin Doctrine,” Los Angeles Time, September 12, 2013,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/12/opinion/la-oe-saltzman-syria-putin-doctrine-20130912
30 Leon Aron, “The Putin Doctrine: Russia’s Quest to Rebuild the Soviet State,” Foreign Affairs,
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31 Sergiy Fedunyak, “Putin’s Doctrine” as a threat to the International System,” Kennan Institute,
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32 Neil Buckley and Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine refuses to sign up to Europe deal,” Financial Times
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00144feabdc0.html#axzz2zj0nOWdC
33 “EU loses Armenia to Russia’s Customs Union,” EurActive.com, September 4, 2013,
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34 “Armenia signs Customs Union roadmap, Kyrgyzstan needs more talks,” Russia Today, December
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36 “Russia Forms Helicopter Squadron for Armenian Base,” RIA Novosti, January 17, 2014,
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Mahir Khalifa-Zadeh
44 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2014)
37 “Does the Eurasian Union Have a Separatist Problem?,” Eurasianet.org, June 05, 2014,
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38 “Caspian states agree to prevent foreign presence: Iran FM,” PressTv, April 23, 2014,
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39 Lilia Shevtsova, “A Second Act for U.S. Foreign Policy,” The American Interest, April 8, 2014,
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40 Anna Mulrine, “Pentagon to abandon two-war strategy, but at what cost to US security?”, The
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41 Alex Spillius, “Pentagon abandons two-war doctrine,” The Telegraph, February 2, 2010,
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44 Michael Cohen, “Americans are no longer interested in policing the world, Mr Obama”, The
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The South Caucasus: Obama’s Failed Russia “Reset” and the Putin Doctrine in Practice
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2014) 45
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63 Charles Clover, “Clinton vows to thwart new Soviet Union”, Financial Times, December 6, 2012,
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