A Critique of The Boyd Theory - Is It Relevant to the Army

Abstract

Col. John Boyd, USAF (Ret),famous for developing the OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) loop model, spent most of his adult life trying to convince the U.S. military establishment of the merits of his theory for maneuver warfare later called the Boyd Theory. With the exception of the Marine Corps, his message found only limited appeal. Most of the services incorporated his four-step model into their doctrine simply to help describe the military command and control process. In contrast, the Marine Corps accepted his completed thoughts as a theory of warfare and adopted it as the basis for their capstone operational philosophy. This paper explores the complete theory espoused by Col. John Boyd in an attempt to uncover the true meanings behind the famous model. The intent is to determine what it is and whether it has any utility to Army operational philosophy. This monograph begins with an exploration of the first question-what is the Boyd Theory? To many it is simply the OODA loop depicting the human behavioral cycle of decision-making. To others it is a description of command and control. To true believers, it is a profound theory of warfare. To answer this question, this study begins with a review of several primary source documents including Boyd’s 1976 unpublished essay entitled Destruction and Creation to discern the basic elements of his theory. Building on this, the study explores the remaining unpublished primary source writings (slide presentations) that Boyd developed over a period of approximately 10 years to understand the completed form of his theory. After establishing a base knowledge of his theory, the study measures Boyd’s ideas against those of several recent critics. The monograph concludes that the Boyd Theory is primarily a conception of human interaction in conflict. As such, his ideas encompass both the process of command and control and the ideas behind maneuver warfare. More importantly, Boyd offers the broader conceptualizations of how to think about modern military operations. It is in this broader context that the Boyd Theory is best viewed. It offers useful perspectives to an Army in search of a comprehensive operational philosophy. To begin with, the Boyd theory implicitly encourages a dynamic approach to strategic and operational thinking in the nature of Gestalt. This contrasts with the inherently analytical nature of Army planning and decision-making. While recognizing the necessity of analysis, Boyd expounds on current operational theory to further the role of synthesis as an enabler to intuition. It is perhaps this in-depth exploration of synthesis as the element of the Orientation phase in the OODA loop that represents his most profound contribution to the body of Army operational thinking. Synthesis is the key to a broader understanding of his ideas. Synthesis, as a tool to help make sense of emerging realities, enables one to adapt appropriately to complex and uncertain environments. According to Boyd, doing this faster than the enemy allows one to achieve the requisite advantage of getting inside an adversary’s moral-mental-time cycle. Coupled with increased freedoms for subordinate decision-making, these operating approaches can combine to help friendly forces take advantage of the discontinuities of unforeseen and unfolding events. Contrary to popular critiques, the ability to out OODA an opponent while difficult to execute has application in the Army precisely because of the unique frictions of ground operations. Predating Dr. Henry Mintzberg’s writings in the Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, Boyd also implicitly warns of the pitfalls in strategic and operational formulation. In true Clausewitzian fashion, Boyd cautions against the false notions of predetermination (Mintzberg) in operational thinking. Equally important, Boyd encourages aggressive engagement of elements in both the internal and external environments in an effort to stay outwardly focused, Boyd’s insistence on the outward orientation contributes to the notion of staying properly plugged in to on-going operational realities while formulating future actions. In this sense, the Boyd Theory addresses Mintzberg’s warning against detachment of forward-looking planners from the shifting sands of current operations. Boyd encourages constant repositioning of mental models to more quickly adjust and respond to emerging strategies than an opponent. This has the added affect of creating a mind-set more predisposed to fighting the opponent rather than the plan. Boyd’s understanding of pattern recognition also supports well Dr. Gary Klein’s encouragement of naturalistic or intuitive decision-making in time-sensitive situations. Boyd offers few practical guide lines but his logic is sound and his message is sorely underappreciated in the Army today. Boyd also contributes to modern operational philosophy with his warnings against relying on hard data for solutions to military problems in what is essentially a human endeavor. This emphasis on the human aspects of conflict and competition so often lost in today’s notions of C4ISR deserves special recognition. As the Army gets smaller and learns to act faster and farther in more complex environments, Boyd’s ideas offer great insights into dealing with adversity. The Boyd Theory is less a call for emasculation of current Army doctrine than a warning to resist existing inclinations. It is not whether the modern Army operational paradigm fails to provide a process for thinking through issues, it is the fact that it does that makes the Boyd Theory all the more attractive. By adhering to the process, Army leaders may fail to recognize and respond quickly to the important subtleties inherent in the ever-shifting realities of military operations. In the final analysis, the Boyd Theory as a major contributor to the modern maneuver warfare movement has even more to offer the Army at the turn of the century than ever before.

Full text

A
Critique
of
The
Boyd
Theory
-
Is
It
Relevant
to
the
Army?
A
Monograph
By
Major
Robert
B.
Polk
United
States
Army
School
of
Advanced
Military
Studies
United
States
Army
Command
and
General
Staff
College
Fort
Leavenworth,
Kansas
First
Term
AY99-00
20000321
033
Approved
for
Public
Release;
Distribution
is
Unlimited
DTIC
QUALITY
INSPECTED
3

SCHOOL
OF
ADVANCED
MILITARY
STUDIES
MONOGRAPH
APPROVAL
Major
Robert
B.
Polk
Title
of
Monograph:
A
Critique
of
The
Boyd
Theory
-
Is
It
Relevant
to
the
Army?
Approved
by:
James
Schneider,
Ph.D.
Monograph
Director
Col.
Robin
P.
Swan,
MMAS
Director,
School
of
Advanced
Military
Studies
Dr.
Robert
Berlin,
Ph.D.
Director,
Graduate
Degree
Program

Accepted
this
15
Day
of
December
1999
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
Page
I.
Introduction:
Relevance
and
Implications
1
II.
Setting
the
Stage:
Boyd's
Theories
on
Conflict
and
Competition
7
III.
The
Boyd
Theory
in
Action
18
IV.
Synthesis
and
Conclusion
32
AppendixA
C2
and
Boyd's
Theory
44
Figures:
1.
Boyd's
Initial
OODA
Loop
Model
8
2.
Boyd's
Final
OODA
Loop
Model
8
Endnotes
55
Bibliography
64

ABSTRACT
A
CRITIQUE
OF
THE
BOYD
THEORY—IS
IT
RELEVANT
TO
THE
ARMY?
By
Maj
Robert
B.
Polk,
68
pages
Col.
John
Boyd,
USAF
(Ret),
famous
for
developing
the
OODA
(Observe-Orient-
Decide-Act)
loop
model,
spent
most
of
his
adult
life
trying
to
convince
the
U.S.
military
establishment
of
the
merits
of
his
theory
for
maneuver
warfare
later
called
the
Boyd
Theory.
With
the
exception
of
the
Marine
Corps,
his
message
found
only
limited
appeal.
Most
of
the
services
incorporated
his
four-step
model
into
their
doctrine
simply
to
help
describe
the
military
command
and
control
process.
In
contrast,
the
Marine
Corps
accepted
his
completed
thoughts
as
a
theory
of
warfare
and
adopted
it
as
the
basis
for
their
capstone
operational
philosophy.
This
paper
explores
the
complete
theory
espoused
by
Col.
John
Boyd
in
an
attempt
to
uncover
the
true
meanings
behind
the
famous
model.
The
intent
is
to
determine
what
it
is
and
whether
it
has
any
utility
to
Army
operational
philosophy.
This
monograph
begins
with
an
exploration
of
the
first
question—what
is
the
Boyd
Theory?
To
many
it
is
simply
the
OODA
loop
depicting
the
human
behavioral
cycle
of
decision-making.
To
others
it
is
a
description
of
command
and
control.
To
true
believers,
it
is
a
profound
theory
of
warfare.
To
answer
this
question,
this
study
begins
with
a
review
of
several
primary
source
documents
including
Boyd's
1976
unpublished
essay
entitled
Destruction
and
Creation
to
discern
the
basic
elements
of
his
theory.
Building
on
this,
the
study
explores
the
remaining
unpublished
primary
source
writings
(slide
presentations)
that
Boyd
developed
over
a
period
of
approximately
10
years
to
understand
the
completed
form
of
his
theory.
After
establishing
a
base
knowledge
of
his
theory,
the
study
measures
Boyd's
ideas
against
those
of
several
recent
critics.
The
monograph
concludes
that
the
Boyd
Theory
is
primarily
a
conception
of
human
interaction
in
conflict.
As
such,
his
ideas
encompass
both
the
process
of
command
and
control
and
the
ideas
behind
maneuver
warfare.
More
importantly,
Boyd
offers
the
broader
conceptualizations
of
how
to
think
about
modern
military
operations.
It
is
in
this
broader
context
that
the
Boyd
Theory
is
best
viewed.
It
offers
useful
perspectives
to
an
Army
in
search
of
a
comprehensive
operational
philosophy.
To
begin
with,
the
Boyd
theory
implicitly
encourages
a
dynamic
approach
to
strategic
and
operational
thinking
in
the
nature
of
Gestalt.
This
contrasts
with
the
inherently
analytical
nature
of
Army
planning
and
decision-making.
While
recognizing
the
necessity
of
analysis,
Boyd
expounds
on
current
operational
theory
to
further
the
role
of
synthesis
as
an
enabler
to
intuition.
It
is
perhaps
this
in-depth
exploration
of
synthesis
as
the
element
of
the
Orientation
phase
in
the
OODA
loop
that
represents
his
most
profound
contribution
to
the
body
of
Army
operational
thinking.
Synthesis
is
the
key
to
a
broader
understanding
of
his
ideas.
Synthesis,
as
a
tool
to
help
make
sense
of
emerging
realities,
enables
one
to
adapt
appropriately
to
complex
and
uncertain
environments.
According
to
Boyd,
doing
this

faster
than
the
enemy
allows
one
to
achieve
the
requisite
advantage
of
getting
inside
an
adversary's
moral-mental-time
cycle.
Coupled
with
increased
freedoms
for
subordinate
decision-making,
these
operating
approaches
can
combine
to
help
friendly
forces
take
advantage
of
the
discontinuities
of
unforeseen
and
unfolding
events.
Contrary
to
popular
critiques,
the
ability
to
out
OODA
an
opponent
while
difficult
to
execute
has
application
in
the
Army
precisely
because
of
the
unique
frictions
of
ground
operations.
Predating
Dr.
Henry
Mintzberg's
writings
in
the
Rise
and
Fall
of
Strategic
Planning,
Boyd
also
implicitly
warns
of
the
pitfalls
in
strategic
and
operational
formulation.
In
true
Clausewitzian
fashion,
Boyd
cautions
against
the
false
notions
of
predetermination
(Mintzberg)
in
operational
thinking.
Equally
important,
Boyd
encourages
aggressive
engagement
of
elements
in
both
the
internal
and
external
environments
in
an
effort
to
stay
outwardly
focused.
Boyd's
insistence
on
the
outward
orientation
contributes
to
the
notion
of
staying
properly
plugged
in
to
on-going
operational
realities
while
formulating
future
actions.
In
this
sense,
the
Boyd
Theory
addresses
Mintzberg's
warning
against
detachment
of
forward-looking
planners
from
the
shifting
sands
of
current
operations.
Boyd
encourages
constant
repositioning
of
mental
models
to
more
quickly
adjust
and
respond
to
emerging
strategies
than
an
opponent.
This
has
the
added
affect
of
creating
a
mind-set
more
predisposed
to
fighting
the
opponent
rather
than
the
plan.
Boyd's
understanding
of
pattern
recognition
also
supports
well
Dr.
Gary
Klein's
encouragement
of
naturalistic
or
intuitive
decision-making
in
time-sensitive
situations.
Boyd
offers
few
practical
guidelines
but
his
logic
is
sound
and
his
message
is
sorely
under
appreciated
in
the
Army
today.
Boyd
also
contributes
to
modern
operational
philosophy
with
his
warnings
against
relying
on
hard
data
for
solutions
to
military
problems
in
what
is
essentially
a
human
endeavor.
This
emphasis
on
the
human
aspects
of
conflict
and
competition
so
often
lost
in
today's
notions
of
C4ISR
deserves
special
recognition.
As
the
Army
gets
smaller
and
learns
to
act
faster
and
farther
in
more
complex
environments,
Boyd's
ideas
offer
great
insights
into
dealing
with
adversity.
The
Boyd
Theory
is
less
a
call
for
emasculation
of
current
Army
doctrine
than
a
warning
to
resist
existing
inclinations.
It
is
not
whether
the
modern
Army
operational
paradigm
fails
to
provide
a
process
for
thinking
through
issues,
it
is
the
fact
that
it
does
that
makes
the
Boyd
Theory
all
the
more
attractive.
By
adhering
to
the
process,
Army
leaders
may
fail
to
recognize
and
respond
quickly
to
the
important
subtleties
inherent
in
the
ever-shifting
realities
of
military
operations.
In
the
final
analysis,
the
Boyd
Theory
as
a
major
contributor
to
the
modern
maneuver
warfare
movement
has
even
more
to
offer
the
Army
at
the
turn
of
the
century
than
ever
before.

SECTION
1
INTRODUCTION—RELEVANCE
AND
IMPLICATIONS
Since
his
death
in
1997,
Col.
John
Boyd's
(USAF
Ret.)
OODA
loop
theory
of
warfare
has
generated
a
revival
of
interest
among
military
theorists
and
practitioners.
His
simple
construct
for
conflict
and
competition
resonates
well
with
those
in
search
of
new
paradigms
for
dealing
with
the
impending
complexity
and
dynamism
of
the
twenty-first
century.
Yet,
while
some
armed
services
embrace
his
theory
as
a
viable
operational
concept,
others
continue
to
relegate
Boyd's
OODA
loop
(Observe,
Orient,
Decide,
Act)
to
a
simple
tactical
device
for
decision-making.
This
paper
seeks
to
uncover
the
true
meaning
behind
the
design
of
Boyd's
Loop
in
an
attempt
to
determine
its
relevance
to
the
Army's
concept
of
operations.
The
OODA
loop
found
its
genesis
from
observations
of
fighter
pilot
actions
over
the
skies
of
Korea.
Boyd
theorized
that
the
Americans'
increased
ability
to
observe,
orient,
decide,
and
act
from
the
bubble-shaped
canopy
of
their
F-86
Sabre
enabled
them
to
defeat
the
superior
Chinese-flown
MIG-15's.
The
American
pilots'
ability
to
defeat
an
adversary
through
"fast
transient
maneuvers"
formed
the
basis
of
his
future
theories
on
conflict.
Building
on
this
insight,
Col.
Boyd
in
retirement
absorbed
himself
in
the
further
study
of
military
theory
and
history
during
a
period
of
15
years
between
1977
and
1992.
His
basic
theory
developed
into
a
concept
summarized
as
follows:
Conflict
can
be
seen
as
time-competitive
observation-orientated-decision-
action
cycles.
Each
party
to
a
conflict
begins
by
observing.
He
observes
himself,
his
physical
surrounding
and
his
enemy.
On
the
basis
of
his
observation,
he
orients,
that
is
to
say,
he
makes
a
mental
image
or
"snapshot"
of
his
situation.
On
the
basis
of
this
orientation,
he
makes
a
decision.
He
puts
the
decision
in
to
effect,
i.e.,
he
acts.
Then
because
he
assumes
his
action
has
changed
the
situation,
he
observes
again,
and
starts
6

the
process
anew...
With
each
action,
the
slower
party's
action
is
inappropriate
by
a
larger
time
margin.
Even
though
he
desperately
strives
to
do
something
that
will
work,
each
action
is
less
useful
than
its
predecessor;
he
falls
farther
and
farther
behind.
Ultimately,
he
ceases
to
be
effective.'
In
the
end,
he
concluded
that
the
OODA
loop
applied
equally
well
to
ground
combat
as
to
air-to-air
maneuvers.
This
not-so-subtle
shift
from
tactical
fighter
pilot
metaphors
to
operational
and
strategic
theory
found
its
voice
as
the
"Boyd
Theory."
2
As
an
extension
of
the
OODA
metaphor,
the
Boyd
Theory
along
with
the
German
example
became
the
backbone
of
the
modern
maneuver
warfare
movement.
Never
attempting
publication,
Boyd
instead
developed
a
compelling
five-part
series
of
briefings
he
called
Discourses
on
Winning
and
Losing
to
convince
audiences
of
generals,
politicians,
scientists,
journalists,
and
academics
of
the
full
merits
of
his
theories
for
ground
combat.
The
world
of
military
theorists
took
notice.
One
in
particular,
William
S.
Lind,
former
advisor
on
military
affairs
for
U.S.
Senator
Gary
Hart
and
President
of
the
Military
Reform
Institute,
noted
his
enthusiastic
support
of
Boyd's
ideas
in
his
book,
Maneuver
Warfare
Handbook.
Lind
codified
Boyd's
theory
into
practical
application
specifically
tailored
to
the
Marine
Corps.
Citing
Boyd's
observations
of
ground
conflict
from
Leuctra
to
Vicksburg
and
the
Ardennes,
Lind
promulgated
his
own
theory
of
maneuver
warfare
imbued
with
the
Boyd
Theory
and
the
German
example.
He
argued
in
general
terms
that
future
ground
combat
would
be
dominated
by
those
who
could
decentralize
their
actions,
accept
confusion
and
disorder
while
avoiding
all
patterns
and
formulas
of
predictive
behavior.
3
These
would
combine
to
generate
abilities
to
"out-OODA"
the
enemy.

The
Marine
Corps
whole-heartedly
embraced
the
idea
of
winning
in
the
time-
competitive
observation-orientation-decision-action
cycle,
recognizing
the
advantages
it
could
bring
to
a
service
which
often
fought
first
and
outnumbered.
Major
General
A.
M.
Gray
as
Commandant
of
the
Marine
Corps
made
it
official
when
he
adopted
William
Lind's
interpretation
of
Boyd's
maneuver
warfare
theory
as
Marine
Corps
doctrine
and
guaranteed
its
publication
in
FMFM
1
Warfighting.
4
The
current
Marine
Corps
capstone
manual,
MCDP
1,
gives
equal
if
not
greater
attribution
to
Boyd's
ideas.
5
This
assimilation
of
the
Boyd
Theory
by
the
services
has
not
been
limited
to
the
Marine
Corps.
The
Navy
and
Air
Force
combine
efforts
in
addressing
the
OODA
loop
in
varying
ways
and
degrees.
The
Navy's
manual
on
command
and
control,
NDP
6,
explicitly
states
that
the
naval
commander's
decision
and
execution
cycle
is
the
OODA
loop.
The
manual
goes
on
to
depict
a
two-sided
OODA
loop
model
relating
enemy
and
friendly
decision
cycles.
Interestingly,
of
all
the
services,
the
Air
Force
seems
the
least
interested
in
incorporating
Boyd's
theories
into
its
doctrine.
The
Air
Force
defines
the
OODA
as
a
theory
"contending
[the
author's
emphasis]
that
one
can
depict
all
rational
human
behavior,
individual
and
organizational,
as
a
continual
cycling
through
four
distinct
tasks:
O-O-D-A."
6
With
this,
the
Air
Force
consigns
the
Boyd
Theory
to
that
of
social
science
rather
than
a
fighting
doctrine.
Its
capstone
operational
doctrine,
AFDD
1,
gives
but
brief
reference
to
the
OODA
and
only
in
the
context
of
using
information
dominance
to
support
this
cyclical
behavior.
In
a
contrasting
perspective,
LTC
David
Fadok
argues
that
the
theories
of
both
Boyd
and
Col.
John
A.
Warden
have
formed
as
complimentary
concepts
and
in
fact,
manifest
themselves
equally
in
the
very
fabric
of
Air

Force
operational
philosophy.
7
Regardless
of
the
particular
bias,
few
can
disagree
that
the
Boyd
Theory
continues
to
influence
sister
service
doctrine.
In
contrast
to
the
Navy
and
the
Marine
Corps
in
particular,
Boyd's
OODA
loop
finds
only
occasional
explicit
reference
in
Army
doctrine.
According
to
its
lead
writer,
the
1999
draft
FM
100-34,
Command
and
Control,
is
the
first
and
only
Army
field
manual
to
depict
Boyd's
ideas
in
the
main
body
of
its
text.
Even
so,
the
FM
only
briefly
notes
that
the
OODA
loop,
"demonstrates
the
validity
and
need
for
accomplishing
the
multiple
cycles
in
deciding
and
acting
before
the
enemy
can
effectively
react
to
friendly
actions."
8
Interestingly,
the
FM
goes
on
to
warn,
"there
are
some
cautions
to
applying
it
directly
to
land
forces..
.it
vastly
simplifies
an
extremely
complicated
process..
."
9
The
Army
seems
purposely
out
of
step
with
other
services
in
application
of
Boyd's
theory.
As
we
will
see,
however,
this
is
more
perception
than
reality.
The
Boyd
Theory
and
it
more
famous
cousin,
the
OODA
loop,
are
no
strangers
to
critics
led
by
land
warfare
proponents
who
resist
the
notion
of
simplistic
approaches
to
operations
in
ground
combat.
Army
Captain
Robert
L.
Bateman,
in
a
recent
rebuttal
to
Boyd's
land
warfare
enthusiasts,
suggests
that
the
weakness
of
the
OODA
loop
lies
in
its
misunderstanding
of
the
unique
complexities
and
friction
of
ground
operations.
Bateman
argues
that
armies
rarely
make
singular
"observations"
about
the
enemy
from
perfect
and
direct
intelligence
as
a
fighter
pilot
might
from
a
cockpit.
Moreover,
Bateman
insists
that
operational-level
Army
commanders
can
never
directly
initiate
"actions"
against
an
opponent
but
rather
must
issue
directions
to
subordinates
that
set
off
OODA
cycles
at
lower
levels.
1
0
The
writers
of
FM
100-34
agree
and
quote
Bateman
as
further
evidence
as
to
the
limited
utility
of
the
OODA
loop
in
Army
doctrine.
9

The
challenge
in
accepting
Boyd's
ideas
often
stems
from
difficulty
in
defining
what
his
theory
represents.
References
to
it
as
either
the
Boyd
Theory
or
the
OODA
loop
adds
to
the
misunderstanding.
LTC
David
S.
Fadok
attempts
to
ameliorate
the
situation
when
he
writes,
Boyd's
theory
of
conflict
advocates
a
form
of
maneuver
warfare
that
is
more
psychological
and
temporal
in
its
orientation
than
physical
and
spatial...
[His]
theory
of
maneuvering
inside
the
enemy's
mental
process,
as
depicted
by
the
OODA
loop
model
is
more
philosophical,
abstract,
and
nonlinear.
He
recognizes
the
uncertainty
of
war
and
the
subsequent
need
for
mental
agility
and
creativity—in
short,
genius.
n
This
statement
begins
to
describe
the
essence
of
Boyd's
contributions
to
modern
military
theory.
Boyd
himself
would
likely
suggest
that
any
interpretation
derive
primarily
from
his
theories
about
maneuver
warfare.
Command
and
control
and
decision-making
are
subordinated
to
these
maneuver
concepts.
In
a
Clausewitzian
sense,
Boyd
would
also
likely
characterize
himself
as
someone
interested
in
the
heuristic
rather
than
prescriptive
Jominian
approach
to
warfare
theory.
As
did
Clausewitz,
Boyd
may
have
understood:
No
prescriptive
formulation
universal
enough
to
deserve
the
name
of
law
can
be
applied
to
the
constant
change
and
diversity
of
the
phenomena
of
war..
.Theory
should
be
studied
not
doctrine..
.It
is
meant
to
educate
the
mind
of
the
future
commander
or,
more
accurately,
to
guide
him
in
his
self-education
not
to
accompany
him
to
the
battlefield.
12
Unfortunately,
this
less
than
definitive
approach
leaves
the
Boyd
Theory
open
to
functional
misinterpretations.
Following
Boyd's
death,
in
a
farewell
article
in
honor
of
his
friend
and
compatriot
of
27
years,
Franklin
Spinney
addressed
other
popular
misconceptions
and
criticisms
regarding
the
simplicity
of
the
OODA
loop
and
those
who
questioned
its
relevance.
He
illuminated
the
sophistication
behind
the
OODA
construct
by
reiterating
the
claim
that
10

the
"key
to
appreciating
the
power
of
Boyd's
idea
is
to
understand
why
the
Orientation
function
is
the
door
through
which
a
competitor
can
penetrate
his
opponent's
decision
cycle."
I3
According
to
Spinney,
Boyd
understood
that
an
individual
or
group
uses
mental
models
to
orient
to
the
external
environment.
Consequently,
Boyd
believed
that
the
strength
of
the
OODA
was
in
its
ability
to
destroy
the
enemy's
paradigm
of
reality,
while
simultaneously
denying
him
the
opportunity
to
synthesize
a
new
paradigm
(creating
new
patterns
of
knowledge
when
existing
patterns
do
not
permit
the
understanding
needed
to
cope
with
novel
circumstances).
1
4
For
Boyd,
time
and
space
seemed
relative
leaving
plenty
of
room
for
exploiting
enemy
decision-cycles.
As
he
analyzed
ground
operations,
he
concluded
that
the
inherent
friction
of
ground
combat
actually
helped
to
set
up
advantageous
friendly
situations
for
such
exploitations.
Boyd
still
attracts
critics
and
advocates
each
with
their
own
perspective
on
what
he
said
and
what
they
want
to
add.
Yet
it
is
helpful
as
a
point
of
departure
to
note
that
John
Boyd
at
least
acknowledges
one
thing
his
basic
ideas
were
not.
They
were
not
all
new.
In
the
opening
of
his
presentation,
Organic
Designs
for
Command
and
Control,
Boyd
quoted
no
less
than
seven
prominent
historical
figures
from
Sun
Tzu
to
Nathan
Bedford
Forrest
of
their
versions
of
"gittin
thar
the
fustest
with
the
mostest."
The
idea
of
acting
in
time
and
space
faster
and
farther
than
the
enemy
has
been
a
mainstay
in
the
annals
of
military
operations.
Boyd
never
pretended
that
the
basic
ideas
were
new
but
he
felt
the
times
demanded
an
elaboration
and
extension
of
the
root
ideas
into
modern
and
practical
adaptations
of
the
theory.
He
found
a
message
imbedded
within
the
great
thoughts
of
the
past
and
an
audience
eager
for
new
perspectives.
Such
an
audience
was
found
at
the
1996
Cantigny
Leadership
Conference
at
the
Army
War
College.
Here,
11

experts
interested
in
discerning
the
best
model
for
decision-making
for
Army
leaders
in
the
twenty-first
century
debated
the
merits
of
Boyd's
OODA
loop
with
other
prominent
theories.
Billed
primarily
as
a
method
for
decision-making
rather
than
a
comprehensive
warfighting
concept,
the
OODA
loop
nevertheless
piqued
interests
and
demonstrated
the
extent
to
which
Boyd's
theory
had
infiltrated
Army
centers
of
thought.
1
5
Whether
a
construct
of
maneuver
warfare,
a
method
of
command
and
control,
or
a
decision-making
process,
Boyd's
simple
model
belies
its
sophistication.
As
it
experiments
with
such
future
warfighting
concepts
as
the
Army
after
Next's
Strategic
Preclusion
using
dominant
battlespace
knowledge
to
win
quick
decisive
campaigns,
the
Army
can
ill-afford
to
quickly
dismiss
any
new
ways
of
thinking
about
complexity.
1
6
The
review
of
Boyd's
discourses
seeks
to
reveal
the
true
essence
of
his
ideas
in
an
effort
to
determine
the
proper
influence
of
his
theories
on
Army
operational
thought.
In
the
final
analysis,
the
Boyd
Theory
may
prove
substantial
or
insubstantial
but
it
does
deserve
a
second
look.
This
monograph
seeks
to
provide
just
such
a
second
look
from
an
Army
perspective.
SECTION
2
SETTING
THE
STAGE:
JOHN
BOYD'S
THEORIES
ON
CONFLICT
AND
COMPETITION
John
Boyd
never
published
his
works.
Reportedly,
Boyd
felt
that
the
public
might
misinterpret
his
ideas
in
their
present
state
of
on-going
development.
1
7
He
captured
his
thoughts
instead
on
slide
presentations
with
which
he
eagerly
entertained
audiences
in
the
1980's
and
early
1990's.
The
Marine
Corps
University
Research
Archives
in
Quantico,
Virginia
proudly
houses
his
original
documents,
many
of
which
include
these
12

slide
presentations
signed
and
dated
on
the
coversheets
in
Boyd's
own
handwriting.
His
most
ambitious
document,
Discourses
on
Winning
and
Losing,
dated
1987
includes
a
compilation
of
his
seminal
works
such
as
Patterns
of
Conflict,
and
Organic
Design
for
Command
and
Control.
In
each,
he
elaborates
on
his
earlier
ideas
espoused
in
his
1976
essay
entitled
Destruction
and
Creation.
Because
of
his
reluctance
to
publish,
there
exists
a
scarcity
of
public
knowledge
on
the
ideas
behind
the
well-publicized
OODA
loop.
To
many,
the
model
depicted
below
and
its
call
for
observing,
orienting,
deciding,
and
acting
faster
than
the
opponent
is
all
they
will
ever
know
about
the
theory
and
the
man
who
made
it
famous.
1
8
Figure
1
Few
realize
that
his
ideas
continued
to
evolve,
as
did
the
model
of
the
OODA
itself.
By
the
early
1990's
the
model
depicted
in
figure
2
represented
Boyd's
final
attempt
to
convey
his
ideas
visually.
13

The
OODA
"Loop"
Sketch
Observation
Orientation
Click
on
box
to
expand
Decision
Action
Figure
2
Even
the
services
that
revere
his
contributions
fail
to
trace
publicly
the
intricacies
behind
his
simplistic
model
but
perhaps
for
good
reason.
His
rather
eclectic
discourses
on
conflict
and
competition
spanning
the
range
of
human
endeavors
from
man's
basic
survival
instincts
to
the
Indeterminacy
Principle
of
Werner
Heisenberg
challenge
modern
doctrine
and
its
desires
for
easy
reading.
Yet
in
spite
of
Boyd's
unpalatable
presentation,
the
fact
that
he
has
influenced
the
services
remains
undisputed.
As
noted,
Boyd
influenced
each
of
the
sister
services
in
one
way
or
another
over
the
years.
Even
the
Army
felt
the
impact
of
his
ideas
although
seemingly
loath
to
admit
it.
In
1986
the
Army
adopted
a
definition
of
agility
as
one
of
the
four
tenets
of
operations
in
its
maneuver-oriented
Air
Land
Battle
doctrine
which
still
stands
to
today.
Agility
is
the
ability
of
friendly
forces
to
react
faster
than
the
enemy..
.It
is
as
much
a
mental
as
a
physical
quality.
Greater
quickness
permits
the
rapid
concentration
of
friendly
strength
against
enemy
vulnerabilities.
Forces
may
need
to
concentrate
repeatedly
so
that
by
the
time
the
enemy
reacts
to
an
action,
another
has
taken
place,
disrupting
the
enemy's
plans
and
leading
to
late,
uncoordinated,
and
piecemeal
response.
This
process
of
successive
concentration
against
locally
weaker
or
unprepared
enemy
forces
enables
smaller
forces
to
disorient,
fragment,
and
eventually
defeat
much
larger
opposing
formations.
1
9
14

What
the
reader
may
not
recognize
is
how
this
definition
exemplifies
the
extent
of
John
Boyd's
influence
on
modern
Army
operational
thought.
In
his
1986
presentation,
Patterns
of
Conflict,
Boyd
outlines
on
chart
132,
how
one
could
operate
inside
the
adversary's
OODA
loop
or
get
inside
the
enemy's
Mind-Time-Space
to:
"1)
Employ
a
variety
of
measures
that
interweave
menace-uncertainty-mistrust
with
tangles
of
ambiguity-deception
novelty
as
a
basis
to
sever
an
adversary's
moral
ties
and
disorient...,
2)
Exploit,
rather
than
disrupt
or
destroy,
those
different
frictions,
and
obsession
of
an
adversary
organism
that
interfere
with
his
ability
to
cope...,
3)
Generate
uncertainty,
confusion,
disorder,
panic,
chaos..
.to
shatter
cohesion,
produce
paralysis
and
bring
about
collapse."
20
These
became
the
ideas
behind
the
term
Agility
used
in
today's
lexicon
of
modern
Army
doctrine
representing
only
a
small
measure
of
Boyd's
contributions
to
the
Army
of
today.
In
his
book,
In
Pursuit
of
Military
Excellence,
Shimon
Naveh
describes
Boyd's
influence
on
Army
doctrine
as
even
more
profound.
Naveh
credits
Boyd
as
the
intellectual
leader
of
the
group
of
civilian
military
activists
known
by
many
in
1970/80's
as
the
"reformers."
21
Naveh
reports
that
Boyd's
main
contribution
to
these
reformers
who
would
formulate
the
future
Airland
Battle
doctrine,
...concerned
his
conception
of
the
operational
principles
of
the
relational
maneouvre:
disruption
of
synergy
among
the
elements
combining
the
rival
system;
simultaneous
engagement
of
the
operational
components,
structured
hierarchically
along
the
entire
depth
of
the
opposing
system;
and
development
of
operational
momentum
exceeding
the
relative
reaction
capability
of
the
rival
system.
22
Furthermore,
Naveh
proclaims
that
these
ideas
were
interpreted
almost
literally
into
all
four
basic
tenets
comprising
the
conceptual
skeleton
of
the
Airland
Battle
doctrine,
15

namely:
initiative,
agility,
depth
and
synchronization.
(As
a
footnote,
William
Lind
would
disagree
that
Boyd
ever
endorsed
synchronization.
In
fact,
he
contends
that
Boyd
actually
detested
the
very
idea
of
trying
to
bind
combat
into
process
and
order.)
In
any
case,
the
question
remains
not
whether
Boyd
has
influenced
Army
doctrine
but
to
what
extent
should
his
ideas
continue
to
influence
it
in
the
future.
Destruction
and
Creation
To
appreciate
Boyd's
theories
fully,
one
must
begin
with
an
examination
of
his
originating
document
entitled
Destruction
and
Creation.
Here,
Boyd
lays
the
foundation
for
his
ideas
leading
to
theories
on
warfare.
Boyd
begins
it
all
with
a
reflection
on
human
behavior
and
an
assertion
that
"actions
taken
as
individuals
are
closely
related
to
survival."
23
With
this
very
basic
premise,
he
suggests
that
this
means
being
able
to
act
freely
in
ways
independent
from
debilitating
external
influences.
This
leads
one
to
conclude
that
a
basic
aim
of
an
individual
or
group
is
to
"improve
their
capacity
for
independent
action."
24
The
real
world
is
full
of
cooperation
and
competition
making
timely
actions
and
decisions
fundamentally
important.
"To
make
timely
decisions
one
must
be
able
to
form
mental
concepts
of
observed
reality,
as
we
perceive
it,
and
be
able
to
change
these
concepts
as
reality
itself
appears
to
change.
The
concepts
can
then
be
used
as
decision-models
for
improving
one's
capacity
for
independent
action."
25
Boyd
hypothesizes
that
there
are
only
two
ways
to
manipulate
mental
concepts
to
represent
observed
reality.
"We
can
start
from
a
comprehensive
whole
and
break
it
down
to
its
particulars
[general
to
specific
also
known
as
deduction,
analysis,
and
differentiation]
or
we
can
start
with
the
particulars
and
build
towards
a
comprehensive
whole
[specific
to
general
also
known
as
induction,
synthesis,
and
integration]."
26
16

According
to
Boyd,
these
two
opposing
idea
chains
form
the
basic
thought
processes
necessary
for
dealing
with
the
certain
chaos
of
the
world
in
which
we
live.
In
an
attempt
to
link
the
ideas
of
deductive
and
inductive
methods
of
observing
reality
to
the
ideas
of
attacking
an
adversary's
mind-time-space
later
espoused
in
his
OODA
loop
theory,
Boyd
introduces
his
terms
of
Destruction
and
Creation.
Boyd
believes
that
one's
objective
should
be
to
act
in
a
manner
which
destroys
an
adversary's
ability
to
see
reality
(destruction
of
a
domain
or
breaking
the
whole
into
its
respective
constituent
elements)
before
he
can
collect
linking
elements
to
recreate
a
new
and
improved
observation
(creation
of
new
perceptions
of
reality
through
specific
to
general
induction,
synthesis,
and
integration
of
common
qualities
or
attributes
found
in
the
chaotic
world).
The
side
that
executes
this
process
faster
and
more
accurately
will
win.
Boyd
emphasizes
that
this
process
of
creation
or
constructive
induction
begins
with
the
necessary
destruction
or
unstructuring
of
the
old
domain
for
both
enemy
and
friendly
forces.
This
destruction
frees
the
observer
to
create
new
perspectives
rather
than
simply
recreate
the
same
old
paradigms.
This
process
brings
with
it
the
consequence
of
inevitable
mismatches
between
ever
new
observations
and
the
observer's
most
recent
existing
mental
model.
Boyd
uses
specific
theories
from
the
world
of
mathematics
and
logic
to
highlight
this
anticipated
mismatch
and
further
explain
how
the
destruction
and
creation
process
helps
resolve
the
dilemma.
In
1931,
Kurt
Goedel
proved
in
his
postulate
on
incompleteness
and
consistency
that
any
conceptual
system
is
logically
incomplete.
He
revealed
that
there
are
true
statements
or
concepts
within
the
system
that
cannot
be
deduced
from
the
postulates
that
make
up
the
system.
He
then
proved
even
though
such
a
system
may
be
consistent,
its
17

consistency
cannot
be
demonstrated
within
the
conceptual
system
itself.
To
Boyd
this
meant,"..
.in
order
to
determine
the
consistency
of
any
new
system,
one
must
construct
or
uncover
another
system
beyond
it.
Over
and
over
this
cycle
must
be
repeated
to
determine
the
consistency
of
more
and
more
elaborate
systems..
."
27
For
Boyd,
consistency
equated
to
the
character
or
nature
of
a
system.
If
one
could
not
understand
the
nature
of
the
system
it
was
observing,
disorder,
chaos,
and
uncertainty
would
overwhelm
the
observer.
Boyd
used
Goedel's
Proof
to
suggest
that
one
must
orient
outside
of
one's
present
mental
model
to
achieve
an
enlightened
perspective
of
reality.
The
process
of
matching
up
one's
mental
models
with
observations
of
reality
is
further
complicated
by
the
fact
that
humans
use
the
same
powers
of
observation
to
formulate
new
mental
models
while
using
existing
models
to
shape
future
powers
of
observation.
Under
these
circumstances,
a
concept
[mental
model]
must
be
incomplete
[idea
taken
from
Goedel]
since
we
depend
upon
an
ever-changing
array
of
observations
to
shape
or
formulate
it.
Likewise,
our
observations
of
reality
must
be
incomplete
since
we
depend
upon
a
changing
concept
to
shape
or
formulate
the
nature
of
new
inquiries
and
observations.
28
According
to
Boyd,
the
differences
in
time
between
the
observations
of
reality
and
our
mental
models
will
always
create
a
mismatch.
Destruction
and
Creation
eliminate
this
gap
between
observations
of
reality
and
existing
mental
models.
Adding
to
Goedel's
insights,
Boyd
combines
the
theories
of
Heisenburg's
Indeterminacy
Principle
29
and
the
Second
Law
of
Thermodynamics
30
to
support
the
idea
that
"any
inward-oriented
...effort
to
improve
the
match-up
of
concept
with
observed
reality
will
only
increase
the
degree
of
mismatch."
31
He
uses
these
theories
to
argue
that
the
uncertainty
and
related
disorder
associated
with
a
closed-system
can
only
be
overcome
by
creating
a
higher
and
broader
more
general
concept
to
represent
reality
18

through
the
dialectic
cycle
of
destruction
and
creation.
For
Boyd,
this
analytic/synthetic
process
is
a
natural
manifestation
regulated
by
the
continuous
effort
to
survive
and
improve
one's
capacity
for
independent
action.
The
ideas
expressed
in
Destruction
and
Creation
truly
underpin
the
entirety
of
Boyd's
theories
on
warfare.
Later,
in
his
elaboration
in
Discourses
on
Winning
and
Losing,
the
notion
of
OODA
takes
form
with
the
ideas
of
destruction
and
creation
as
the
engine
behind
the
all-important
Orientation
phase
of
the
process.
Understanding
this
allows
one
to
begin
exploring
the
deeper
meanings
behind
the
ideas.
Patterns
of
Conflict
In
1986,
Boyd
presented
the
first
of
his
Discourses
on
Winning
and
Losing,
in
which
he
intended,
"to
unveil
the
character
of
conflict,
survival,
and
conquest."
32
Although
a
lengthy
and
sometimes
difficult
journey
through
the
worlds
of
capitalism,
technology,
and
the
conduct
of
war,
Boyd
manages
to
reveal
many
of
the
underpinnings
of
his
OODA
loop
as
a
theory
of
operations.
He
reminds
the
reader
in
his
opening
charts
that
his
point
of
departure
is
the
air
to
air
fighter
metaphor.
This
metaphor
exemplifies
the
idea
of
operating
at
a
faster
tempo
to
"get
inside
the
OODA
time
cycle
or
loop"
of
an
adversary.
He
emphasizes
that,
"such
activities
will
make
us
appear
ambiguous
thereby
generate
confusion
and
disorder
among
our
adversaries
-
since
our
adversaries
will
be
unable
to
generate
mental
images
or
pictures
that
agree
with
the
menacing
as
well
as
faster
transient
rhythm
or
patterns
they
are
competing
against."
33
Building
on
these
ideas,
Boyd
uses
history
and
theory
of
war
to
further
develop
his
thoughts
on
maneuver
warfare
and
expand
the
influence
of
the
OODA
cycle.
19

While
inclusive
of
many
historical
perspectives,
the
Boyd
Theory
draws
heavily
upon
the
lessons
learned
from
the
German
experiences
in
WWII.
Boyd
argues
that
modern
maneuver
warfare
as
expressed
through
the
OODA
cycle
magnifies
friction
and
induces
paralysis
through
dislocation
of
enemy
forces
much
like
the
execution
of
Blitzkrieg.
Success
in
competition
depends
on
simultaneously
sustaining
tempo
while
"abruptly
adapting
to
changing
circumstance
without
losing
cohesion
or
coherency
of
the
overall
effort."
34
The
principles
involved
in
managing
this
challenge
are
central
to
Boyd's
ideas.
Clearly
for
Boyd,
part
of
the
"character
of
conflict,
survival,
and
conquest"
includes
the
generation
and
management
of
tempo.
To
him
this
seems
a
foregone
conclusion
but
he
understands
that
many
still
question
the
practicality
of
accomplishing
this
in
large,
complex
organizations.
An
organization
risks
failure
by
inappropriately
responding
at
every
level
to
the
competing
and
often
overlapping
OODA
phases.
In
response,
Boyd
counsels
that
the
time
needed
to
complete
an
OODA
cycle
increases
with
each
ascending
level
in
the
decision-making
hierarchy
as
the
number
of
events
one
must
consider
correspondingly
increases.
Consequently,
subordinate
levels
must
harmonize
their
work
within
the
higher's
slower
rhythm
and
larger
pattern
to
maintain
consistency
in
the
system.
Higher,
in
turn
must
"give
lower
commanders
wide
freedom,
within
the
overall
Mind-Time-Space
scheme
to
shape
and
direct
their
own
activities
so
that
they
can
exploit
faster
tempo/rhythm
at
tactical
levels..
."
35
The
key
to
harmonizing
the
commander's
intent
and
mission
with
subordinate
action
is
the
articulation
of
the
Schwerpunkt.
To
Boyd
Schwerpunkt,
20

..
.represents
a
unifying
medium
that
provides
a
directed
way
to
tie
initiative
of
many
subordinate
actions
with
superior
intent
as
a
basis
to
diminish
friction
and
compress
time
in
order
to
generate
a
favorable
mismatch
in
time/ability
to
shape
and
adapt
to
unfolding
circumstances.
36
Lind
describes
it
as
the
commander's
bid
for
a
decision
and
adds,
"It
is
not
just
the
main
attack
(though
the
main
attack
is
often
at
the
Schwerpunkt).
It
is
a
conceptual
focus,
not
just
a
physical
one."
37
All
subordinate
units
adjust
their
action
whether
directly
or
indirectly,
to
support
the
Schwerpunkt.
The
ensuing
harmonizing
effect
of
the
Schwerpunkt
provides
the
necessary
focus
needed
to
operate
at
increased
tempos.
The
ideas
behind
the
generation
and
management
of
tempo
are
often
misunderstood.
Boyd
argues
that
most
military
theories
miss
the
whole
idea
behind
variety/rapidity/harmony/initiative
as
the
basis
to
shape
and
adapt
to
circumstances—a
necessary
requirement
for
success
in
the
uncertain
and
ever-changing
environment
of
conflict
or
war."
38
Collectively,
these
characteristics
form
the
basis
of
successful
operations.
They
are
a
grouping
of
qualities
that
when
acting
together
improve
the
ability
to
minimize
one's
own
friction
through
initiative
at
the
lower
levels
harmonized
by
a
shared
vision
of
a
single
commander.
To
maximize
the
opponent's
friction,
one
must
attack
with
a
variety
of
actions
executed
at
the
greatest
possible
rapidity.
By
steadily
combining
these
complimentary
actions,
one
may
reduce
an
opponent's
mental
and
physical
capacity
to
resist.
Said
another
way;
this
enables
one
to,
Operate
inside
an
adversary's
observation-orientation-decision-action
loops
to
enmesh
the
adversary
in
a
world
of
uncertainty,
doubt,
mistrust,
confusion,
disorder,
fear,
panic,
chaos..
.and/or
fold
an
adversary
back
inside
himself
so
that
he
cannot
cope
with
event/efforts
as
they
unfold.
39
21

If
destruction
and
creation
act
as
the
engine,
the
variety/rapidity/harmony/initiative
process
forms
the
framework
for
the
completed
ideas
on
Boyd's
maneuver
warfare
theory.
Boyd
concludes
details
a
comparative
list
of
Principles
of
War
from
several
countries
to
argue
that
the
inconsistencies
among
them
prove
there
are
no
immutable
principles
of
war.
Boyd
concludes
that
his
ideas
of
destruction
and
creation
help
"collect
appropriate
bits
and
pieces
and
assemble
them
in
a
coherent
way
to
present
a
more
satisfying
picture."
4
0
This,
according
to
Boyd,
offers
a
convenient
alternative
to
the
over-reliance
on
static
principles
to
guide
action.
Organic
Design
for
Command
and
Control
(C2)
In
1986
Boyd
also
completed
a
slide
presentation
entitled
Organic
Design
for
Command
and
Control.
Building
on
previous
observations
in
both
Destruction
and
Creation
and
Patterns
of
Conflict,
Boyd
describes
the
unique
C2
philosophy
associated
with
his
maneuver
warfare
theory.
This
unique
philosophy
centers
on
C2
as
a
human
rather
than
a
technological
endeavor.
Boyd
worries
that
the
explosion
of
technology
in
the
information
revolution
risks
overshadowing
the
human
dimensions
of
C2
in
favor
of
hardware
solutions.
Consequently,
he
argues
for
a
command
and
control
system
that
focuses
on
what
he
calls
the
organic
aspects
of
C2.
He
begins
with
a
reminder
that
all
successful
maneuver
operations
must
address
the
functions
of
variety/rapidity
and
harmony/initiative.
These
functions
cannot
exist
without
a
command
and
control
process
that
harnesses
the
potential
of
these
competing
yet
complimentary
concepts.
The
Orientation
phase
of
the
OODA
cycle
is
the
key
to
actualizing
these
ideas.
22

As
detailed
earlier,
Boyd
considers
the
Orientation
as
the
critical
phasing
of
the
OODA
process.
He
now
adds,
..
.without
orientation
there
is
no
command
and
control
worthy
of
the
name..
.Orientation
shapes
the
way
we
interact
with
the
environment—
hence
the
way
we
observe,
decide,
and
act.
41
With
proper
orientation,
individuals
and
organizations
may
develop
a
common
shared
understanding
(CSU)
of
operational
situations.
CSU
once
developed,
guides
action
in
ways
that
free
subordinates
to
use
both
variety
and
initiative.
The
CSU
also
helps
to
reduce
friction
by
harmonizing
action
with
the
shared
vision.
As
the
dissemination
of
common
mental
images
or
patterns
increases,
so
does
the
opportunity
for
building
bonds
of
trust
within
the
organization.
This
increased
trust
can
lead
to
using
implicit
rather
than
explicit
communication.
In
mature
organizations,
this
implicit
communication
helps
form
a
C2
system
"whose
secret
lies
in
what
is
unstated
or
not
communicated
to
one
another..."
42
CSU
and
implicit
communication
combine
as
Boyd's
Implicit
Orientation.
Implicit
Orientation
allows
commanders
and
their
subordinates
to:
Diminish
their
friction
and
reduce
time,
thereby
permit
them
to:
Exploit
variety/rapidity
while
maintaining
harmony/initiative,
thereby
permit
them
to:
Get
inside
an
adversary's
O-O-D-A
loops,
thereby:
Magnify
an
adversary's
friction
and
stretch-out
his
time
for
a
favorable
mismatch
in
friction
and
time,
thereby:
Deny
an
adversary
the
opportunity
to
cope
with
events/efforts
as
they
unfold.
43
This
idea
of
implicit
orientation
becomes
the
enabling
element
of
Boyd's
command
and
control
philosophy.
The
final
portion
of
his
presentation
attempts
to
extend
these
ideas
into
a
practical
definition
of
command
and
control
itself.
For
a
more
in-depth
discussion
of
the
relationship
of
the
Boyd
Theory
with
modern
doctrine
and
theory
on
command
and
control,
see
Appendix
A,
C2
and
The
Boyd
Theory.
23

SECTION
3
THE
BOYD
THEORY
IN
ACTION
This
section
presents
at
once
the
strengths
and
weaknesses
of
John
Boyd's
arguments.
Here
we
explore
the
essence
of
his
theory
and
challenge
it
with
thoughtful
discourse
from
critics
and
proponents.
As
a
modest
disclaimer,
it
is
helpful
to
remember
that
Boyd
never
intended
to
prescribe
applications
of
his
theories.
Recognizing
the
evolving
nature
of
warfare,
he
like
so
many
theorists
in
the
Clausewitzian
tradition
believed
prescriptive
theory
useless
and
felt
content
to
leave
application
to
strategists.
It
is
also
worthwhile
to
note
that
Boyd's
central
message
developed
through
years
of
reflection
and
discussed
here,
focused
primarily
on
the
broader
ideas
behind
maneuver
warfare--his
thoughts
about
command
and
control
notwithstanding.
He
recognized
C2
as
supportive
if
not
inseparable
to
the
understanding
and
application
of
maneuver
warfare
but
only
as
a
part
of
a
holistic
equation.
Maneuver
Warfare
Maneuver
warfare
is
difficult
to
define
succinctly
but
the
characteristics
are
understandable
and
distinguishable
from
other
approaches.
Nothing
in
Boyd's
Discourses
on
Winning
and
Losing
suggests
that
he
even
used
the
phrase
himself.
William
Lind
may
be
credited
with
contemporary
promulgation
of
the
phrase
but
the
qualities
of
maneuver
warfare
unmistakably
derive
from
Boyd
and
the
German
example.
This
section
attempts
to
make
sense
of
it
all.
John
Antal
summed
up
the
modern
debate
on
the
future
of
maneuver
warfare
this
way:
24

Opponents
of
maneuver
theory
argue
that
maneuver
theory
is
all
"smoke
and
mirrors,"
that
maneuver
warfare
is
a
concept
that
can
only
be
portrayed
in
a
historical
context
and
is
used
by
victors
to
explain
how
they
defeated
their
dull-witted
opponents.
Fans
of
maneuver
warfare
theory
argue
that
the
Germans
had
the
right
idea
in
their
concept
of
Auftragstaktik.
Maneuverists
call
opponents
of
maneuver
theory
"attritionists"..
.The
debate
over
maneuver
warfare
is
an
important
exercise.
The
answer
to
this
debate
will
set
the
foundation
for
the
U.S.
Army
of
the
21
s
t
Century.
44
Even
a
quick
review
of
the
literature
on
maneuver
warfare
suggests
general
agreement
with
Antal's
assessment.
In
this
classic
debate,
some
still
argue
in
favor
of
treating
both
attrition
and
maneuver
theory
as
necessary
and
complimentary
while
others
abhor
even
the
continued
inclusion
of
the
word
"attrition"
in
the
official
lexicon
of
the
Army.
Some
argue
for
radical
and
bold
cultural
shifts
for
true
implementation
of
Auftragstaktik
or
mission
command
while
others
suggest
the
present
model
of
centralized
planning
and
decentralized
execution
is
sufficient.
Familiarity
with
these
and
other
such
aspects
of
maneuver
warfare
in
light
of
John
Boyd's
contributions
is
the
focus
of
the
following.
As
noted
earlier,
many
of
Boyd's
conclusions
on
maneuver-oriented
warfare
stem
from
his
analysis
of
German
operations
in
WWII.
For
Boyd,
the
most
important
lessons
came
from
his
understanding
of
the
German
operational
philosophy
and
not
their
tactics.
Summed
up
by
German
General
Guerth
Von
Blumentritt,
this
operational
philosophy
struck
at
the
very
core
of
Boyd's
ideas
on
warfare.
Blumentritt
said,
"The
entire
operational
and
tactical
leadership
method
hinged
upon..
.rapid,
concise
assessment
of
the
situation..
.quick
decision
and
quick
execution,
on
the
principle:
'each
minute
ahead
of
the
enemy
is
an
advantage.'"
45
In
his
own
words,
Boyd
believed
that
the
German
philosophy
based
upon
a
"common
outlook
and
freedom-of-action,
and
realized
through
their
concepts
of
mission
and
Schwerpunkt,
emphasized
implicit
over
explicit
25

communication."
He
believed
this
allowed
the
Germans
to
exploit
lower-level
initiative
while
realizing
higher's
intent.
In
other
words,
the
Germans
repeatedly
operated
inside
their
opponents'
OODA
loops.
It
would
be
wrong
to
leave
the
reader
with
an
impression
that
Boyd
only
considers
the
German
operational
philosophy
of
WWII
in
his
conclusions
on
maneuver
warfare.
Boyd
understands
well
the
Clausewitzian
view
of
the
unique
nature
of
every
war.
In
an
effort
to
address
the
broadest
range
of
theory
on
conflict
and
competition,
Boyd
analyzes
the
ideas
behind
guerilla
warfare.
His
observations
here
push
his
own
theory
of
warfare
far
beyond
that
of
mere
maneuver
philosophy.
In
contrast
to
more
popular
opinion,
Boyd
believes
that
guerilla
wars
bare
great
similarities
to
maneuver
warfare
rather
than
pose
intractable
differences.
In
his
assessment
of
guerilla
warfare,
he
argues
that
the
essence
of
the
guerilla
idea
is
to,
Defeat
existing
regime
politically
by
showing
they
have
neither
the
moral
right
nor
demonstrated
ability
to
govern
and
militarily
by
continuously
using
stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action
and
cohesion
of
small
bands
and
large
units
in
cooperation
with
political
agitation/propaganda
team
as
basis
to
harass,
confuse
and
ultimately
destroy
the
will
or
capacity
to
resist.
46
In
other
words,
the
strength
of
guerillas
lie
in
their
ability
to
penetrate
an
opponent's
moral-mental-physical
being
and
generate
moral-mental-physical
non-cooperative
centers
of
gravity
while
shaping
their
own
environment
and
attracting
more
to
their
cause.
He
further
argues
that
the
keys
to
successful
guerilla
operations
lie
in,
1)
dispersing
and
avoiding
strength,
2)
concentrating
to
destroy
isolated
factions,
and
3)
shifting
efforts
to
gain
and
keep
the
initiative.
47
Both
blitzkrieg
and
guerilla
warfare
similarly
embrace
the
ideas
of
avoiding
strength
and
"exploit
subversion,
surprise,
shock,
and
seizure
to
26

generate
confusion,
disorder,
panic,
etc.,
thereby
shatter
cohesion,
paralyze
effort,
and
bring
about
adversary
collapse."
48
Boyd's
view
of
both
high
and
low
intensity
conflict
harmonized
well
with
more
conventional
theories
of
warfare
and
his
ideas
of
"out-
OODA-ing"
an
opponent.
Satisfied
with
the
confluence
of
philosophy
expressed
through
Mao
and
Blumentritt,
Boyd
concludes
that
the
essence
of
maneuver
conflict
[his
term]
is
to,
create,
exploit,
and
magnify
ambiguity,
deception,
novelty,
fast
transient
maneuvers
to
create
disorientation,
disruption,
and
overload...[This
process
combines
with
the
aim
to],
generate
many
non-cooperative
centers
of
gravity,
as
well
as
disorient,
disrupt,
or
overload
those
that
the
adversary
depends
upon,
in
order
to
magnify
friction,
shatter
cohesion,
produce
paralysis,
and
bring
about
his
collapse.
49
By
encompassing
a
wide
range
of
military
operations,
Boyd
hopes
to
legitimize
his
ideas
on
maneuver
conflict
and
expand
it
into
a
comprehensive
theory
for
maneuver
warfare.
Reflecting
on
the
ideas
espoused
in
Destruction
and
Creation,
one
may
recall
that
Boyd's
theory
begins
as
an
observation
about
the
basic
nature
of
man.
Boyd
posits
that
it
is
man's
natural
instinct
for
survival
that
is
at
the
root
of
all
conflict
and
competition.
Since
man's
basic
instinct
has
changed
little
through
the
course
of
history,
Boyd
believes
that
it
remains
a
valid
point
of
departure
for
theory
on
modern
warfare.
Boyd
also
acknowledges
that
the
essence
of
his
theory
finds
its
genesis
deep
in
the
annals
of
world
history.
Since
the
dawn
of
modern
warfare,
post-Westphalia
in
1648,
the
great
Captains
of
the
eighteenth
and
nineteenth
century
demonstrated
time
and
again
the
mastery
of
many
of
the
rudimentary
concepts
of
present
day
maneuver
warfare.
As
an
example,
Frederick
the
Great
based
many
of
the
actions
in
his
campaigns
on
two
insights
both
of
which
are
key
elements
of
modern
maneuver
warfare:
"1)
a
keen
27

appreciation
for
the
importance
of
operational
tempo,
and
2)
a
willingness
to
take
risks
in
order
to
be
strong
at
the
decisive
place
and
time."
50
These
particular
insights
from
one
of
history's
most
respected
military
practitioners
helped
form
one
the
more
important
pillars
of
the
Boyd
Theory—the
use
of
tempo.
It
is
this
enduring
element
of
tempo
and
the
increased
emphasis
placed
on
it
by
Boyd
that
separates
his
theory
of
warfare
from
those
of
the
past,
according
to
William
Lind.
As
noted
in
earlier
discussions,
this
basic
idea
is
not
unique
to
modern
warfare
but
Boyd's
perspectives
perhaps
offer
new
insights
into
existing
paradigms.
To
help
the
reader
understand
these
new
perspectives
and
the
obvious
challenges
to
each,
Boyd
begins
by
addressing
the
most
obstinate
question
first:
How
can
one
be
consistently
faster
than
the
enemy?
At
the
strategic
and
operational
level,
Boyd
believes
that
the
answer
lies
in
the
art
of
fighting
only
when
and
where
necessary
to
strike
at
the
enemy's
center
of
gravity.
At
the
tactical
level,
units
focus
on
"bypass
and
collapse"
rather
than
"close
with
and
destroy."
The
emphasis
must
remain
on
striking
as
directly
as
possible
at
the
enemy's
center
of
gravity
at
all
times.
Lind,
a
strong
believer
that
war
is
more
a
contest
in
time
than
in
space,
claims
that
only
in
the
past
twenty
years
has
this
dimension
of
being
consistently
faster
than
the
enemy
surfaced
as
the
most
critical
component
of
the
maneuver
warfare
theory.
It
is
truly
at
the
root
of
the
modern
maneuverists'
concept
of
warfare.
Boyd
learned
many
other
lessons
from
the
past.
He
understood
the
historical
progressive
nature
of
war
from
the
massed
armies
intent
on
the
Napoleonic
decisive
strategies
of
annihilation
to
those
of
exhaustion
in
WWI.
Reflecting
on
this
same
period
he
noted
the
evolution
of
warfare
from
the
concentric
to
the
dispersed
operation
28

supported
by
the
increasing
mobility
in
the
air,
on
land,
and
at
sea.
It
is
likely
that
Boyd
looked
ahead
in
the
aftermath
of
the
Cold
War
and
Desert
Storm
with
the
same
vision
as
he
did
post
Korea
and
Vietnam.
He
understood
that
new
political
and
resource
realities
were
driving
unprecedented
changes.
He
also
understood
that
the
future
would
increasingly
rely
on
smaller
armies
to
do
even
more
with
less.
51
Boyd
would
embrace
this
future
for
it
is
precisely
this
dilemma
of
doing
more
with
less
that
his
theory
and
the
ideas
behind
maneuver
warfare
propose
to
address.
Looking
into
this
future,
experts
agree
that
the
inevitable
chaos
and
uncertainty
of
conflict
generated
by
the
natural
friction
inherent
in
complex
operations
will
demand
new,
dynamic,
and
adaptable
methods
of
warfare.
Maneuver
warfare
enthusiasts
posit
Clausewitz's
dictum,
"in
war
everything
is
simple,
but
even
the
simplest
thing
is
extremely
difficult"
as
proof
that
ideas
such
as
synchronization
are
useless
paradigms
for
dealing
with
the
future
chaos.
5
2
They
argue
that
terms
like
synchronization
have
led
the
Army
in
true
Jominian
style,
to
believe
in
an
ability
to
prescribe
order
to
warfare
while
the
real
world
suggests
otherwise.
5
3
Warfare
must
remain
adaptable
using
conceptual
tools
such
as
destruction
and
creation
to
adjust
actions
to
the
changing
environment
faster
than
the
opponent.
This
allows
one
to
drive
change
rather
than
by
being
driven
by
it
and
is
key
to
surviving
in
the
emerging
complex
security
environment
of
the
twenty-first
century.
Citing
Boyd,
Lind
posits
that
one
of
the
practical
tools
for
driving
change
on
the
battlefield
is
the
exercise
of
reconnaissance
pull
tactics
in
offensive
operations.
5
4
This
technique
of
identifying
"gaps"
or
weak
points
in
an
enemy's
sector
to
exploit
while
avoiding
decisive
engagement
along
the
"surfaces"
or
strengths
is
at
the
heart
of
29

maneuver
warfare
tactics.
55
This
tactical
technique
may
have
operational
ramifications.
With
true
"recon
pull"
implementation,
a
higher
headquarters
never
knows
exactly
the
time
and
place
of
the
penetration
before
operations
commence.
Actions
follow
only
after
identification
of
these
gaps
by
subordinate
reconnaissance.
Decentralized
decision-
making
and
action
to
exploit
the
gaps
allows
friendly
units
then
to
drive
operational
tempo.
Since
reconnaissance
pull
tactics
cannot
exist
without
decentralized
action,
true
decentralized
action
can
only
come
from
full
implementation
of
Auftragstaktik
or
mission
tactics.
Maneuver
Warfare
builds
on
this
as
a
cornerstone
for
decentralized
action
so
necessary
for
dominating
the
mind-time-space
of
an
opponent.
According
to
Boyd,
mission
tactics
may
be
thought
of
as
series
of
contracts
between
superior
and
subordinates.
The
superior
pledges
to
make
his
desired
result
crystal
clear
and
then
leave
his
subordinate
maximum
latitude
attaining
that
result.
The
leader
also
pledges
to
back
him
up
when
he
makes
mistakes
so
long
as
they
are
mistaken
initiatives
and
not
the
result
of
passivity.
The
contract
of
course
includes
subordinate
responsibilities
as
well.
The
subordinate
pledges
to
pursue
the
superior's
goals
vigorously
in
order
to
achieve
the
operational
aim.
He
will
discipline
himself
so
that
his
initiative
serves
his
higher
commander's
intent.
The
subordinate
must
also
be
willing
to
risk
making
mistakes.
Unfortunately,
toleration
of
mistakes
and
use
of
initiative
is
antithetical
to
modern
Army
culture~so
often
touted
but
consistently
ignored.
American
military
history
is
not
completely
void
of
either
but
the
singular
examples
lack
sufficient
reinforcement
in
modern
day
training.
Little
in
the
present-day,
time-compressed
Army
training
structure
fosters
an
environment
conducive
to
risk
taking.
Every
training
event
whether
a
few
days
30

in
a
local
training
area,
a
simulations
training,
or
a
CTC
rotation,
competes
jealously
for
time
and
resources
often
at
the
exclusion
of
toleration
of
mistakes
and
use
of
initiative.
56
Time
is
precious
and
mistakes
waste
time.
NCOs
and
officers
quickly
learn
that
if
one
does
only
what
is
expected,
trouble
may
be
avoided.
Doing
something
extra
without
being
told
often
brings
at
best
a
cautionary
pat
on
the
back.
Conformity
is
rewarded
much
more
than
initiative.
As
an
interesting
contrast,
the
German
Wehrmacht
tolerated
mistakes
derived
from
too
much
boldness
while
dismissing
only
those
who
proceeded
from
overcautious
or
unwilling
decision-making.
This
American
resistance
to
such
ideas
would
make
true
implementation
of
Auftragstaktik
(mission
tactics),
Schwerpunkt,
and
high
tempo
operations
problematic
at
best.
The
final
component
of
the
mission
tactics
"contract"
is
the
mutual
agreement
to
focus
all
efforts,
"outward
on
the
situation,
the
enemy,
and
what
must
be
accomplished
to
defeat
him,
rather
than
inward
on
process,
procedure,
format,
and
hierarchy."
57
This
completes
the
contract
but
not
the
connection
between
mission
tactics
and
maneuver
warfare.
It
leads
one
to
a
final
critical
component
of
maneuver
warfare
theory-trie
use
of
a
unifying
aim
to
guide
decentralized
execution
in
the
time-competitive
environment
of
combat.
As
noted
earlier,
Boyd
uses
the
German
concept
of
Schwerpunkt
to
describe
this
unifying
quality
so
necessary
for
mission
tactics.
With
the
specified
Schwerpunkt,
the
commander
ruthlessly
decides
what
action
will
attain
a
decision.
Resources
are
then
focused
with
a
conscious
effort
to
acknowledge
the
associated
risks.
Too
often,
commanders
fail
to
focus
the
distribution
of
resources
choosing
instead
to
act
in
a
manner
that
seems
fair
in
an
attempt
to
cover
all
the
bases.
This
fairness
can
lead
to
a
complete
31

loss
of
focus
and
a
failure
to
attain
a
decisive
result.
Worse
yet,
according
to
Lind,
if
a
commander's
character
or
military
judgment
is
weak,
he
will
simply
be
incapable
of
designating
a
Schwerpunkt
because
he
is
either
unwilling
or
unable
to
make
the
necessary
decisions.
He
adds
that
as
the
situation
evolves,
the
Schwerpunkt
may
change
and
commanders
at
all
levels
through
mission
tactics
must
learn
to
adapt
accordingly.
5
8
An
Opposing
View
Daniel
Bolger
strikes
hard
at
the
maneuver
warfare
concept
with
frankness
and
a
bit
of
levity.
Bolger
attempts
to
punch
holes
in
the
"facade"
of
maneuver
warfare
by
measuring
the
theory
against
practical
application.
He
begins
with
a
roll-up
assessment
of
modern
maneuver
warfare
theory
as
he
argues
that
maneuver
warfare
enthusiasts
base
their
ideas
on
four
faulty
assumptions:
1)
A
maneuverist
believes
that
the
human
activity
known
as
war
can
be
understood
through
the
medium
of
social
science.
2)
..
.that
war
is
war,
whether
conducted
at
low
or
high
intensity,
at
the
tactical
or
strategic
level,
on
land,
sea,
or
air.
3)..
.there
is
a
need
to
emphasize
the
dislocating
effects
of
maneuver
over
the
killing
effects
of
firepower.
4)..
.military
history
proves
this.
59
Bolger
asserts
that
from
these
assumptions
flow
a
number
of
prescriptions
such
as
the
imperative
of
avoiding
enemy
strength
and
attacking
weaknesses,
encouraging
subordinates
to
seize
battlefield
initiative,
and
winning
wars
at
the
operational
level
devoid
of
the
distractions
of
politics
and
tactical
friction.
He
concludes
with
a
sarcastic,
"Too
bad
that
it
[the
entire
maneuver
warfare
concept]
has
very
little
to
do
with
the
messy
realities
of
war."
6
0
His
critiques
strike
hard
and
deep
as
we
shall
see.
Wars
are
Wars:
Bolger
argues
that
maneuver
warfare
enthusiasts
seem
interested
only
in
WWII
reruns
of
a
European,
mid-intensity
mechanized
environment.
He
chides,
32

"The
relevance
of
this
fixation
is
questionable,
as
it
currently
accounts
for
only
about
four
days
out
of
the
last
4
l
A.
decades
of
post-WWII
American
military
experience."
61
He
further
insinuates
that
these
enthusiasts
led
by
Boyd
dogmatically
subscribe
to
the
tenets
of
Blitzkrieg
as
the
epitome
of
maneuver
warfare.
By
now
the
reader
should
recognize
that
Bolger's
charges
are
not
entirely
fair.
With
its
assessment
of
both
conventional
and
guerilla
warfare,
the
Boyd
Theory
accounts
for
a
broad
historical
perspective.
In
a
fair
treatment
of
the
history
of
warfare,
Boyd
rightly
includes
an
analysis
of
the
Wehrmacht.
Yet
Boyd
focuses
on
the
German
operational
philosophy
rather
than
the
tactics
commonly
associated
with
the
WWII
style
Blitzkrieg.
The
discussions
of
the
lessons
learned
from
the
Wehrmacht
are
intended
as
a
point
of
departure
rather
than
an
end
in
of
itself.
Boyd
actually
joins
Bolger
in
warning
against
dogmatic,
prescriptive
theories
of
warfare.
In
this
sense,
he
encourages
a
philosophical
reflection
rather
than
a
doctrinal
following.
Avoiding
Enemy
Strengths:
Bolger
challenges
the
implication
by
maneuver
enthusiasts
that
all
competent
military
actions
should
take
the
indirect
approach
to
attack
an
enemy
strength.
He
asks,
"How
does
one
avoid
enemy
strength
when
forced
to
storm
a
bristling
embassy
complex
full
of
hostages..
.Does
the
operational
level
of
war
comfort
a
flier
forced
to
hit
a
certain
heavily
defended
Scud
missile
launcher
to
appease
an
American
ally?"
Bolger
adds
in
his
critique,
that
terrain
in
addition
to
mission
often
dictates
the
course
of
action.
Numerous
examples
exist
of
the
inherent
friction
between
the
indirect
approach
and
the
terrain
available.
"The
1
s
t
Marine
Division
had
only
one
way
out
of
the
Chosin
Reservoir
in
1950,
and
the
Chinese
knew
it."
62
For
each
side,
the
terrain
determined
the
action
and
neither
could
avoid
its
consequences.
Bolger
offers
33

other
examples
of
operations
that
required
a
direct
approach
towards
an
enemy
strength:
Vicksburg
(although
he
got
it
dead
wrong
here-Grant's
success
actually
owed
to
his
indirect
approach),
relief
of
Bastogne,
Entebbe
to
name
a
few.
In
a
different
context,
Bolger
charges
that
maneuverists
offer
a
poor
defense
against
his
arguments.
Their
claim
that
enemy
strengths
are
not
always
physical
but
may
include
"command
structure,
mode
of
warfare
and
combat
array,
or
even
actual
technical
systems,"
63
amounts
to
little
more
than
a
loophole.
To
Bolger,
this
overly
broad
perspective
conveniently
allows
maneuver
enthusiasts
to
designate
almost
any
operation
as
an
attack
against
an
enemy
strength.
64
For
true
maneuverists,
Bolger's
criticisms
seem
petty
but
the
questions
do
raise
issues
about
the
blanket
application
of
theory.
Boyd
would
likely
avoid
the
entanglements
of
discussing
specific
target
choices
or
objectives
in
support
of
his
theory.
In
a
related
sense,
even
Clausewitz
ventured
a
more
prescriptive
view
of
such
ideas
as
centers
of
gravity
than
did
Boyd.
Boyd
preferred
to
address
himself
to
the
larger
aim
of
war—that
of
imposing
one's
will
forcefully-as
the
focus
of
his
ideas.
Whether
this
is
accomplished
by
attacking
tangible
or
intangible
centers
of
gravity
was
of
little
concern
to
Boyd.
He
would
likely
accept
the
notion
of
a
varied
target
set
and
application
according
to
METT-TC
as
long
as
the
aim
conformed
to
his
ideas
of
getting
inside
the
Mind-Time-Space
to
"out-OODA"
an
opponent.
This
broader
perspective
in
true
Clausewitzian
fashion
rarely
satisfies
the
eager
critic
looking
for
the
school
solution
for
war.
Maneuver
vs.
Firepower.
With
Bolger
as
only
the
most
recent
critic,
others
continue
to
charge
that
maneuverists
avoid
the
complimentary
affects
of
maneuver
and
firepower.
Here
Bolger
labels
this
as
aversion
to
attrition
warfare.
The
literature
on
this
34

subject,
however,
simply
does
not
support
his
claim.
Boyd
would
likely
agree
with
Col.
Dave
Palmer,
author
of
Summons
of
the
Trumpet,
that
"Attrition
is
not
a
strategy,
it
is
in
fact,
irrefutable
proof
of
the
absence
of
strategy."
65
The
question
lies
not
in
the
use
or
avoidance
of
fires
but
the
aim.
Maneuverists
use
fires
to
position
forces
deep
to
create
shock-inducing
paralysis
both
physically
and
temporally.
The
alternative
uses
maneuver
to
position
fires
with
destruction
rather
than
paralysis
as
the
primary
aim.
Depending
on
the
situation,
the
U.S.
has
used
both
methods
of
warfighting
in
recent
operations.
Boyd
would
encourage
the
judicious
use
of
fires
in
keeping
with
the
overall
aim
of
maneuver
warfare.
Misuse
of
History.
Bolger
offers
different
perspectives
on
the
much-touted
examples
of
maneuver
warfare
such
as
the
German
Blitzkrieg
or
the
Arab/Israeli
wars.
For
those
who
pick
and
choose
history
to
suit
their
cause
such
as
the
German
success
in
France
in
1940,
Bogler
asks
what
about
Russia
the
following
summer
or
later
operations
like
Kursk,
Omaha
Beach,
and
Operation
Cobra?
According
to
Bolger,
the
successes
accrued
to
the
Germans
and
the
Israelis
resulted
from
the
low
caliber
of
their
opponents
rather
than
the
strengths
of
their
own
operational
paradigms.
This
debate
lingers
and
it
is
beyond
the
scope
of
this
paper
to
pronounce
a
definitive
conclusion
to
the
issue.
It
is
true
that
history
reveals
that
many
of
these
classic
cases
of
victory
often
occurred
through
happenstance
rather
than
calculated
action
with
the
results
somewhat
skewed
in
the
process.
Yet
the
resulting
observations
however
different
from
expectations,
do
permit
reasonable
inference
of
some
valuable
lessons
for
future
synthesis
into
theory.
35

Leonard
joins
Böiger
in
finding
fault
with
some
of
the
maneuver
warfare
theory.
In
contrast
to
Bolger's
claim
of
mission
tactics
as
an
American
tradition,
Leonard
observes
that
in
reality,
modern
practices
of
conformity
and
detailed
orders
risk
forming
new
traditions
averse
to
initiative.
Leonard
moves
on
to
describe
the
disadvantages
and
advantages
of
the
detailed
versus
mission
tactics
style
of
command
and
control.
Mission
tactics
or
as
Leonard
calls
it,
directive
control,
places
greater
burdens
on
the
inherently
less
experienced
subordinates
to
carry
the
day
in
the
heat
of
the
battle
where
decisions
are
often
clouded
by
the
stress
of
the
situation.
Additionally,
directive
control
violates
implicitly
the
principle
of
unity
of
command.
That
Schwerpunkt
would
be
the
saving
grace
of
this
problem
is
not
without
its
shortcomings.
Leonard
argues
that
as
a
compensating
function
to
overcome
the
drawbacks
of
diffuse
operations
inherent
in
mission
tactics,
Schwerpunkt
seriously
risks
falling
short
of
its
intended
unifying
affect.
It
assumes
that
the
commander's
intent
is
effectively
communicated.
Dr.
Gary
Klein's
shares
Leonard's
concerns.
His
recent
study
of
tactical
units
in
the
Marine
Corps
demonstrated
that
for
a
variety
of
reasons,
subordinates
in
the
field
understood
their
commander's
intent
only
50%
of
the
time.
66
In
contrast,
a
detailed
plan
does
not
need
to
rely
as
much
on
the
unifying
concept
as
it
is
implicit
in
the
order.
67
David
Fadok
noted
that
the
Soviet
Operational
Maneuver
Group,
a
concept
most
favored
by
Boyd
(Lind
disputes
this)
as
the
best
example
of
maneuver
warfare
implementation,
actually
discarded
the
idea
of
mission
tactics.
The
Soviet
concept
favored
simplifying
the
problem
set
for
subordinates
by
maintaining
a
centralized,
detailed
mission
concept.
Speed
was
achieved
through
concentrated
actions
not
free-flowing
adaptable
operations.
Cultural
characteristics
such
as
the
heterogeneity
36

of
the
Soviet
Army
and
the
desire
for
momentum
combined
to
necessitate
detailed
command
and
control
structures,
but
their
example
gives
pause
to
the
idea
of
universal
application
of
Auftragstaktik.
Leonard
joins
the
debate
again
with
a
claim
that
the
U.S.
military's
increased
reliance
on
technology
is
shifting
the
point
of
decision-making
to
the
level
that
controls
the
intelligence.
He
insinuates
that
control
of
intelligence
equates
to
control
of
information
about
the
battlefield.
Technologies
that
increase
the
ability
to
"see"
the
battlefield
with
real-time
sensor
connectivity
between
the
levels
of
command
will
drive
this
change.
The
net
effect
of
such
direct
access
to
information
sources
at
the
operational
level
will
result
in
gradual
absorption
of
tactical
level
decision-making
by
the
operational
commander.
As
Leonard
puts
it,
"He
who
controls
the
intelligence
controls
the
decision-
making."
68
Implementation
of
mission
tactics
faces
even
more
challenges
as
increased
requirements
to
operate
with
ad-hoc
coalitions,
inter-agencies,
and
reserve
forces
also
"connotes
an
even
greater
centralization
of
command."
69
Leonard
questions
not
the
integrity
of
the
maneuver
warfare
tenet
of
mission-tactics
but
its
practicality.
Returning
to
Bolger,
maneuver
warfare
gets
an
unlikely
boost
as
he
concludes
with
some
conciliatory
comments.
Maneuver
warfare
receives
high
marks
for
its
emphasis
on
men
over
machines
and
people
over
technology.
As
Bolger
puts
it,
"in
an
age
of
computerized
command
and
control,
maneuverists
stand
tall
for
the
central
importance
of
leader
initiative.
Most
important
of
all,
the
maneuverists
have
consistently
challenged
the
American
defense
establishment
to
look
at
itself."
70
Boyd's
theory
elaborates
on
many
of
these
themes
in
an
interesting
contrast
to
Bolger's
overwhelming
condemnation
of
maneuver
warfare.
37

Whether
fact
or
fiction,
the
Boyd
Theory
has
earned
a
place
in
the
mainstream
Army
debate
on
the
future
of
its
operational
philosophy.
What
remains
is
a
final
analysis
to
determine
the
extent
of
the
influence
it
should
have
on
the
outcome
of
this
debate.
SECTION
4
SYNTHESIS
AND
CONCLUSIONS
The
literature
covering
the
depth
and
breadth
of
the
dialogue
on
maneuver
warfare
is
immense.
Equally
intimidating
is
the
volume
of
expert
opinion
about
the
nature
of
future
conflict
from
the
possible
to
the
probable.
The
debate
will
not
end
here
but
we
may
at
least
postulate
the
proper
role
that
the
Boyd
Theory
should
play
in
Army
operations
given
current
trends.
In
true
Boyd
fashion,
we
might
say
that
the
question
of
relevance
posed
in
the
thesis
then
is
not
a
black
and
white
issue
but
one
of
measure
against
evolving
external
and
internal
requirements.
As
noted
earlier,
many
have
judged
Boyd's
entire
body
of
work
from
narrow
interpretations
of
his
simplistic
donut-shaped
model.
Paradoxically,
the
model
is
both
the
reason
for
his
theory's
success
on
one
level
and
the
failure
for
adoption
on
another.
Yet
we
understand
now
that
Boyd's
ideas
range
far
beyond
that
of
a
simple
construct
for
decision-making
or
command
and
control.
By
expanding
his
theoretical
focus
to
the
larger
aims
of
dominating
the
moral-mental
dimensions
of
conflict
and
competition,
Boyd
transforms
the
OODA
loop
from
a
model
of
human
behavior
into
a
conception
for
human
interaction
in
war.
As
such
his
ideas
encompass
both
the
process
of
command
and
control
and
the
ideas
behind
maneuver
warfare.
More
importantly,
Boyd
offers
broader
conceptualizations
of
how
to
think
about
modern
military
operations.
It
is
in
this
broader
context
that
the
Boyd
Theory
is
best
viewed.
38

Given
the
emerging
international
security
environment,
discerning
the
intersection
of
the
Boyd
Theory
with
current
Army
doctrine
is
more
relevant
than
ever.
71
A
final
review
of
the
more
prominent
issues
and
concerns
may
aid
in
analysis.
The
Final
Debate
The
debate
was
perhaps
best
typified
by
the
dialogue
between
William
Lind
and
Army
Col.
Huba
Wass
de
Czege
in
the
mid
1980's.
Lind,
ever
the
Boyd
proponent,
and
Col.
Wass
de
Czege
the
frustrated
maneuverist
charged
with
writing
the
Army's
capstone
manual
on
operations,
voiced
the
classic
opposing
views.
Col.
Wass
de
Czege
argued
that
maneuver
warfare
theory
was
based
on
three
primary
false
assumptions
rendering
it
virtually
unusable
as
a
prescription
for
doctrine.
First,
Boyd's
ideas
assume
"that
contemporary
armies
are
so
lacking
in
resiliency
that
they
are
easily
susceptible
to
psychological
disorientation
and
collapse."
72
Wass
de
Czege
notes
that
history
is
replete
with
examples
such
as
the
Nazi
invasion
of
Russia
in
WWII
in
which
the
German
opponent
failed
to
become
passive
or
despondent
in
response
to
overwhelming
odds.
The
second
reported
faulty
assumption
of
maneuver
warfare
includes
the
reliance
on,
..
.purposeful
ambiguity
and
the
creation
of
false
images
on
the
battlefield
to
disorient
and
collapse
an
enemy
require
that
the
enemy
be
sophisticated
enough
to
recognize
the
images
but
not
too
sophisticated
to
see
through
them.
To
make
it
the
sole
basis
of
a
doctrine
of
warfare
is
a
risky
and
dangerous
game.
Opponents
rarely
perceive
messages
as
we
think
they
do.
Finally,
with
this
focus
on
rapid
operation
of
the
decision
cycle,
the
maneuver
warfare
proponents
neglect
the
impact
of
numbers
in
warfare.
At
some
point,
numbers
do
count.
73
39

To
Col.
Wass
de
Czege,
the
methods
of
maneuver
warfare
designed
to
address
these
issues,
although
conceivable,
require
great
skill
for
ground
forces
to
execute
and
are
especially
difficult
for
an
army
so
dependent
on
reserves.
Lind
responds
with
a
reminder
that
Boyd's
maneuver
warfare
offers
hope
to
an
army
that
must
expect
to
fight
outnumbered.
"Against
physically
superior
forces,
an
attrition
contest
can
have
only
one
outcome,"
implying
that
the
alternative
however
flawed
is
better.
7
4
Even
Liddel
Hart
wrote,
"a
strategist
should
think
in
terms
of
paralyzing,
not
killing.
Even
on
the
lower
plane
of
warfare,
a
man
killed
is
merely
one
man
less,
whereas
a
man
unnerved
is
a
highly
infectious
carrier
of
fear,
capable
of
spreading
an
epidemic
of
panic."
75
Lind
would
likely
agree
with
Col.
Wass
de
Czege
that
there
are
many
historical
examples
of
the
impotent
use
of
maneuver
warfare
in
strategy
and
operations.
He
would
argue
though,
that
the
great
failure
of
maneuver
warfare
is
not
to
be
found
in
history
but
in
our
own
inability
to
understand
the
full
implications
of
implementation.
..
.maneuver
warfare
is
not
just
a
matter
of
rewriting
some
field
manuals.
It
is
a
call
for
fundamental
change
in
almost
every
aspect
of
the
Army's
life.
We
cannot
restrict
maneuver
warfare
to
doctrine
and
expect
it
to
be
of
more
than
academic
significance.
Having
a
maneuver
doctrine
is
one
thing;
being
able
to
practice
maneuver
warfare
consistently
on
the
battlefield
is
very
much
more.
76
He
adds
that
these
major
changes
would
include:
1)
creating
quality
individual
soldiers
imbued
with
great
cohesion,
esprit,
and
high
morale,
2)
changing
the
officer
education
system
to
reward
boldness
and
imagination
by
eliminating
the
up
or
out
fixation
as
a
starter,
3)
improving
the
officer
education
to
include
more
history
in
preparation
for
intuitive
decision-making,
4)
streamlining
organizations,
and
5)
changing
the
institutional
40

structure
of
the
Army
from
a
hierarchical
bureaucratic
organization
to
one
that
learns,
grows,
reacts,
and
polices
themselves
according
to
socialized
behavioral
norms
much
like
the
Marines.
77
Only
then
may
maneuver
warfare
ever
hope
to
improve
upon
past
mistakes.
In
the
end,
they
both
agree
more
than
they
disagree.
The
author
of
The
Defense
Reform
Debate
noted,
In
contrasting
the
chapters
by
Lind
and
Wass
de
Czege,
the
reader
is
likely
to
be
struck
initially
by
the
apparent
similarity
in
the
arguments
of
each.
Both
authors
accept
the
view
that
the
precepts
of
maneuver
warfare
represent
a
distinctly
more
intelligent
approach
to
combat
than
the
firepower-attrition
paradigm..
.
7
8
The
difference
lies
in
their
concept
of
what
doctrine
is.
Lind
states
that
"doctrine
is
a
way
of
thinking..
.not
what
to
think,
but
how
to
think."
Alternatively,
Wass
de
Czege
argues
that
"doctrine
must
tell
soldiers
today
how
to
fight
tomorrow..."
This
distinction
is
important
and
lies
at
the
heart
of
determining
the
relevance
of
Boyd's
teachings.
Its
is
in
this
realm
of
how
to
think
that
Boyd
makes
his
contribution.
Synthesis
and
Conclusions
In
the
final
analysis,
the
Boyd
Theory
a
major
contributor
to
the
modern
maneuver
warfare
movement
has
even
more
to
offer
the
Army
at
the
turn
of
the
century
than
ever
before.
As
the
Army
gets
smaller
and
learns
to
act
faster
and
farther
in
more
complex
environments,
Boyd's
ideas
offer
great
insights
into
dealing
with
adversity.
The
Boyd
Theory
is
less
a
call
for
emasculation
of
current
Army
doctrine
than
a
warning
to
resist
existing
inclinations.
It
is
not
whether
the
modern
Army
operational
paradigm
fails
to
provide
a
process
for
thinking
through
issues,
it
is
the
fact
that
it
does
that
makes
the
Boyd
Theory
all
the
more
attractive.
By
adhering
to
the
process,
Army
leaders
may
fail
to
41

recognize
and
respond
quickly
to
the
important
subtleties
inherent
in
the
ever-shifting
realities
of
military
operations.
In
short,
the
Army
should
pay
greater
attention
to
the
man
and
his
comprehensive
approach
to
warfare
as
articulated
in
the
Boyd
Theory.
To
begin
with,
the
Boyd
Theory
implicitly
encourages
a
dynamic
approach
to
strategic
and
operational
thinking
in
the
nature
of
Gestalt
™
This
contrasts
with
the
inherently
analytical
nature
of
Army
planning
and
decision-making.
While
recognizing
the
necessity
of
analysis,
Boyd
expounds
on
current
operational
theory
to
further
the
role
of
synthesis
as
an
enabler
to
intuition.
It
is
perhaps
this
in-depth
exploration
of
synthesis
as
an
element
of
the
Orientation
phase
in
the
OODA
loop
that
represents
his
most
profound
contribution
to
the
body
of
Army
operational
thinking.
Synthesis
is
the
key
to
a
broader
understanding
of
his
ideas.
Synthesis,
as
a
tool
to
help
make
sense
of
emerging
realities,
enables
one
to
adapt
appropriately
to
complex
and
uncertain
environments.
According
to
Boyd,
doing
this
faster
than
the
enemy
allows
one
to
achieve
the
requisite
advantage
of
getting
inside
an
adversary's
moral-mental-time
cycle.
Coupled
with
increased
freedoms
for
subordinate
decision-making,
these
operating
approaches
can
combine
to
help
friendly
forces
take
advantage
of
the
discontinuities
of
unforeseen
and
unfolding
events.
Contrary
to
popular
critiques,
the
ability
to
out
OODA
an
opponent
while
difficult
to
execute
has
application
in
the
Army
precisely
because
of
the
unique
frictions
of
ground
operations.
Predating
Dr.
Henry
Mintzberg's
writings
in
the
Rise
and
Fall
of
Strategic
Planning,
Boyd
also
implicitly
warns
of
the
pitfalls
in
strategic
and
operational
formulation.
In
true
Clausewitzian
fashion,
Boyd
cautions
against
the
false
notions
of
predetermination
(Mintzberg's
term)
in
operational
thinking.
80
Equally
important,
Boyd
42

encourages
aggressive
engagement
of
elements
in
both
the
internal
and
external
environments
in
an
effort
to
stay
outwardly
focused.
Boyd's
insistence
on
the
outward
orientation
contributes
to
the
notion
of
staying
properly
plugged
in
to
on-going
operational
realities
while
formulating
future
actions.
In
this
sense,
the
Boyd
Theory
addresses
Mintzberg's
warning
against
detachment
of
forward-looking
planners
from
the
shifting
sands
of
current
operations.
81
Boyd
encourages
constant
repositioning
of
mental
models
to
adjust
and
respond
more
quickly
to
emerging
strategies
than
an
opponent.
This
has
the
added
effect
of
creating
a
mind-set
more
predisposed
to
fighting
the
opponent
rather
than
the
plan.
Boyd's
understanding
of
pattern
recognition
also
supports
Dr.
Gary
Klein's
encouragement
of
naturalistic
or
intuitive
decision-making
in
time-sensitive
situations.
Boyd
offers
few
practical
guidelines
but
his
logic
is
sound
and
his
message
is
grossly
underappreciated
in
the
Army
today.
Boyd's
endorsement
of
naturalistic,
intuitive
thinking
is
important.
82
It
not
only
saves
time
but
also
fosters
flexibility
and
lower-level
initiative.
It
also
provides
the
fertile
ground
necessary
for
boldness,
Clausewitz's
luxuriant
weed,
to
grow.
8
3
These
qualities
will
become
even
more
vital
to
an
Army
increasingly
reliant
on
small
unit
actions
in
distributed,
complex,
nonlinear
operations.
Intuitive
thinking
does
have
its
limitations.
Dr.
Gary
Klein
and
Col.
Boyd
both
offer
solutions
for
complex
or
nonlinear
decision-making
when
pattern
matching
fails
or
is
inappropriate.
For
Klein,
these
solutions
include
the
use
of
leverage
points
to
make
sense
of
ambiguity
as
part
of
his
recognition-primed
decision-making
model
(RPD).
Leverage
points
are
those
features
of
a
situation
that
can
be
readily
exploited.
In
a
very
real
sense
they
resemble
the
destructed
or
dismembered
parts
of
the
whole
that
Boyd
43

introduced
in
his
essay,
Destruction
and
Creation.
In
Klein's
graphic
portrayal
of
his
nonlinear
account
of
problem
solving,
he
suggests
that
leverage
points
may
become
useful
when
ambiguity
pervades
during
the
problem
representation
stage.
At
this
point,
when
"we
do
not
recognize
what
to
do
we
must
rely
on
leverage
points
in
order
to
construct
a
new
course
of
action."
84
Klein's
problem
representation
and
use
of
leverage
points
corresponds
well
to
Boyd's
emphasis
on
understanding
the
Orientation
phase
of
the
OODA.
However,
in
an
acknowledgment
of
his
critics,
Klein
agrees
that
RPD
is
not
for
every
situation.
I
wouldn't
want
an
analytical
fireman
in
charge
of
putting
out
a
fire
in
my
house.
And
I
do
not
want
an
intuitive,
recognitional
accountant
telling
me
how
much
I
owe
in
taxes.
But
having
said
this,
we
find
that
the
great
majority
of
situations
are
inappropriate
for
analytical
strategies.
I
believe
the
Army
errs
in
pushing
analysis
in
too
many
places
where
it
does
not
belong,
and
in
failing
to
provide
the
experience
base
for
leaders
to
build
and
apply
their
expertise.
85
The
emphasis
should
remain
on
developing
decision-makers
capable
of
using
various
styles
of
decision-making
rather
than
relying
on
prescriptive
models
to
guide
action.
Klein
adds,
"I
don't
believe
you
would
want
to
teach
the
OODA
loop
[as
a
decision-
making
model]
itself
because
expertise
comes
from
experience,
not
from
following
the
OODA
loop
or
any
other
decision-making
model."
86
This
shift
from
focusing
on
models
to
an
emphasis
on
developing
deciders
equipped
with
a
variety
of
paradigms
and
models
to
choose
from
is
important.
It
is
a
distinction
between
prescriptive
modeling
and
encouragement
of
the
naturalistic
decision-making.
Boyd
would
endorse
Klein's
view.
Not
to
be
forgotten
is
Boyd's
emphasis
on
the
dimension
of
time
in
conflict
interaction.
This
remains
one
of
his
most
important
insights.
As
the
Army
moves
toward
44

a
smaller
and
lighter
force,
it
should
rely
on
new
operating
paradigms
to
overwhelm
opponents
with
its
increased
agility
and
massed
effects
rather
than
sheer
volume
of
forces.
This
increased
agility
includes
the
ability
to
achieve
a
certain
relative
advantage
in
speed
of
action.
The
significance
of
this
is
not
to
be
unappreciated
as
Sun
Tzu
noted
2000
years
ago:
What
is
of
the
greatest
importance
in
war
is
extraordinary
speed;
one
cannot
afford
to
neglect
opportunity...An
attack
may
lack
ingenuity,
but
it
must
be
delivered
with
supernatural
speed.
87
In
support
of
Sun
Tzu
and
Boyd's
thoughts
on
the
time-competitive
nature
of
war,
Dr.
Gary
Klein
offers
his
own
findings
on
the
critical
role
of
time
in
operations.
His
research
is
currently
leading
him
to
new
Soviet
studies
surfacing
that
reportedly
suggest
units
that
reduce
decision-making
times
in
half
may
consistently
defeat
opponents
five
times
as
large.
He
also
notes
how
this
finding,
if
verified,
compliments
his
own
research
on
"pilot-induced
oscillation"
found
in
human
factors
literature.
Here,
research
reveals
that
slow
decisions
create
penalties
for
failures
to
act.
The
incapacity
to
react
to
changing
situations
properly
often
results
in
overcorrecting
causing
unintended
destructive
consequences.
Klein
suggests
that
these
results
concur
with
Boyd's
assumptions
on
time
and
tempo
as
critical
factors
in
dominating
opponents.
88
Boyd
would
agree
that
an
opponent
might
also
use
the
extension
of
time
to
frustrate
friendly
tempo.
He
would
argue
though,
that
even
in
such
cases
the
opponent
operates
with
a
certain
necessary
tempo
that
is
vulnerable
to
exploitation.
The
Boyd
Theory
offers
a
method
of
gaining
and
maintaining
a
massed
temporal
effect
to
decisively
advantage
oneself
against
an
opponent
regardless
of
the
time
factors
involved.
The
viability
of
using
time
to
disrupt
the
other's
OODA
cycle
while
creating
opposing
non-
45

cooperative
centers
of
gravity
remains
a
constant.
Out
OODA-ing
the
enemy
is
more
a
process
of
achieving
temporal
effects
than
it
is
a
process
of
being
faster
or
slower.
From
the
author's
own
experience
in
Bosnia,
the
idea
of
staying
inside
the
opponent's
OODA
cycle
is
an
important
component
of
military
and
political
strategy
even
in
operations
other
than
war.
Speed
may
contribute
less
but
tempo
is
no
less
important.
Staying
one
step
ahead
of
the
opponent
remains
a
critical
factor
in
such
environments.
In
fact,
dictating
pace
in
military/political
circles
at
tactical,
operational,
and
strategic
levels
is
often
the
greatest
deterrent
against
hostile
military
actions.
As
the
Army
adapts
to
the
information
revolution,
the
Boyd
Theory
gets
high
marks
for
warning
against
relying
on
hard
data
for
solutions
to
military
problems
in
what
is
essentially
a
human
endeavor.
Boyd's
emphasis
on
the
human
aspects
of
conflict
and
competition
are
often
lost
in
the
crowd
of
C4ISR.
The
Army
continues
to
believe
that
technology
can
tame
uncertainty
and
that
the
future
of
conflict
lies
more
in
the
art
of
mastering
the
science
of
well-laid
plans
than
in
fighting
the
opponent.
In
their
collaborative
article,
Fighting
in
the
Fog:
Dealing
with
Battlefield
Uncertainty,
Maj
John
Schmitt,
USMC,
and
Dr.
Klein
join
Boyd
in
warning
about
the
growing
reliance
on
information
technologies.
Their
study
suggests
that
a
new
mindset
is
growing
in
the
armed
services
that
everything
in
the
universe
is
made
up
of
a
finite
domain
of
knowable
datels.
This
school
of
thought
believes
that
all
information
is
essentially
binary—either
true
or
false.
Believers
argue
that
eliminating
uncertainty
is
merely
a
matter
of
finding
the
datels
and
arranging
them
together
as
some
jigsaw
puzzle
of
reality.
89
Schmitt
and
Klein
offer
several
reasons
why
these
assumptions
are
wrong.
Their
perspective
supports
Boyd's
notion
of
the
inherently
unpredictable
nature
of
46

warfare
and
the
importance
of
the
moral,
psychological
and
human
dimensions
of
conflict.
Schmitt
and
Klein
point
out,
First,
information
is
not
finite
but
infinite..
.Second,
information
is
essentially
fractal;
no
matter
how
much
resolution
you
achieve,
there
is
always
some
greater
level
of
detail
to
pursue.
Third,
information
is
not
intrinsically
structured
or
contextually
based.
Unlike
jigsaw
puzzles,
it
can
often
be
fitted
together
in
any
number
of
ways
to
create
any
variety
of
pictures.
Fourth,
information
is
not
intrinsically
binary;
rather,
it
is
fuzzy..
.Ground
truth
is
hardly
a
simple
matter..
.Finally,
and
perhaps
most
important,
even
if
we
could
collect
every
bit
of
information
we
wanted,
we
would
still
not
be
even
remotely
close
to
gaining
certainty.
This
is
because
the
digital
model
focuses
on
the
data
level.
The
digital
model
does
not
address
knowledge
and
understanding,
the
more
important
level
of
uncertainty.
90
This
in
no
way
challenges
Boyd's
ideas
on
using
destruction
and
creation
to
develop
situational
awareness.
91
On
the
contrary,
their
report
reaffirms
his
testament
on
the
dangers
of
over
reliance
on
technology
to
mediate
solutions
in
human
interactions.
Boyd's
call
for
synthesis
is
at
a
level
above
mere
information
gathering
for
the
purpose
of
creating
knowledge
and
understanding.
In
spite
of
his
contributions,
Boyd's
thoughts
on
using
such
concepts
as
synthesis
and
implicit
communication
remain
unfathomable
to
today's
sound-bite
generation.
Each
of
the
services
finds
it
easier
to
address
Boyd's
complex
truisms
with
simple
models
rather
than
lengthy
discourses
in
their
capstone
and
derivative
manuals.
This
is
not
all
bad.
Admittedly,
Destruction
and
Creation
was
not
meant
to
be
a
doctrine.
It
lacks
applicability
in
its
raw
form
so
necessary
for
effective
doctrine.
Unfortunately,
the
ideas
that
are
used
are
often
distorted
in
the
doctrinal
dumbing-down
process.
Infusing
more
Boyd
Theory
into
Army
operational
philosophy
seems
disadvantaged
from
the
start.
Maneuver
Warfare,
phrased
as
such,
receives
a
less
than
47

warm
reception
in
Army
circles
today.
In
contrast,
the
Marines
embrace
the
ideas
openly.
One
may
find
Boyd
and
the
OODA
loop
referenced
in
both
MCDP
1,
Warfighting
and
MCDP
6,
Command
and
Control.
Talk
of
precision
fires
consistently
receives
top
billing
over
ideas
such
as
Dominant
Maneuver
in
most
public
dialogue.
Paralysis,
while
acknowledged
as
an
operational
function
in
Army
doctrine,
is
more
practically
accomplished
today
by
fires
than
maneuver.
Proponents
of
the
Army
after
Next
(AAN)
dutifully
tout
such
grand
concepts
as
Strategic
Maneuver
and
Strategic
Preclusion
while
pinning
their
hopes
to
a
constrained
set
of
technological
innovations.
With
a
National
Command
Authority
renewing
emphasis
on
fires
and
their
effects,
a
cursory
analysis
suggests
concepts
such
as
AAN
look
more
like
a
deployment
methodology
(not
unlike
the
grand
French
plans
laid
in
the
late
1930's)
than
a
true
fighting
philosophy.
Consequently,
maneuver
concepts
risk
earning
an
attenuated
role
in
twenty-first
century
warfare.
Clearly,
while
the
merits
of
such
far-sighted
concepts
remain
hotly
debated,
few
can
contest
in
what
lane
the
operational
momentum
currently
resides.
In
the
end,
as
the
Army
wrestles
with
finding
its
relevant
niche
among
the
armed
services,
there
is
great
opportunity
for
change.
The
coming
FM
100-5,
billed
partly
as
a
transitional
document
to
the
twenty-first
century,
will
leave
the
door
open
for
new
approaches
to
Army
operational
thought
beyond
the
year
2006.
Likewise,
doctrines
for
Army
Vision
2010
and
Army
after
Next
remain
fertile
ground
for
new
ideas.
The
time
has
come
to
renew
interest
in
the
Boyd
Theory
and
its
relevant
contributions
to
the
future
of
Army.
48

Appendix
A:
C2
and
the
Boyd
Theory
The
1999
draft
of
FM
100-34,
Command
and
Control
states
that
command
and
control
exists
as
an
essential
element
of
the
art
and
science
of
warfare.
"No
single
specialized
function,
either
by
itself
or
in
combination
with
any
of
the
others,
would
be
purposeful
without
command
and
control."
92
Yet
with
no
shortage
of
attention
on
the
subject,
few
experts
even
share
a
common
perspective,
let
alone
a
common
definition
of
C2.
In
Principles
of
Command
and
Control,
the
authors
note:
This
question
haunts
every
inquiry
into
the
field.
While
the
organization
of
the
Joint
Chiefs
of
Staff
has
a
'definition'
of
C2,
it
is
significant
that
just
about
all
C2,
C3,
and
C3I
professionals
have
their
own
definitions,
and
that
precious
few
share
much
similarity.
As
it
turns
out,
C2
is
many
things
to
many
people.
93
Recognizing
this
dilemma,
John
Boyd
resolved
to
define
C2
as
it
applied
to
his
theory
of
maneuver
warfare.
The
result
was
his
1986
slide
presentation
entitled,
Organic
Design
for
Command
and
Control.
49

Building
on
previous
observations
in
both
Destruction
and
Creation
and
Patterns
of
Conflict,
Boyd
describes
the
C2
philosophy
associated
with
maneuver
warfare
theory.
This
unique
philosophy
centers
on
C2
as
a
human
rather
than
a
technological
endeavor.
Boyd
worries
that
the
explosion
of
technology
in
the
information
revolution
risks
overshadowing
the
human
dimensions
of
C2
in
favor
of
hardware
solutions.
Consequently,
he
argues
for
a
command
and
control
system
that
focuses
on
what
he
calls
the
organic
aspects
of
C2.
He
begins
with
a
reminder
that
all
successful
maneuver
operations
must
address
the
functions
of
variety/rapidity
and
harmony/initiative.
These
functions
cannot
exist
without
the
command
and
control
process
that
harnesses
the
potential
of
these
competing
yet
complimentary
concepts.
The
Orientation
phase
of
the
OODA
cycle
is
the
key
to
actualizing
these
ideas.
As
detailed
earlier,
Boyd
considers
the
Orientation
as
the
critical
phasing
of
the
OODA
process.
He
now
adds,
..
.without
orientation
there
is
no
command
and
control
worthy
of
the
name..
.Orientation
shapes
the
way
we
interact
with
the
environment—
hence
the
way
we
observe,
decide,
and
act..
.Orientation
shapes
the
character
of
present
OODA
loops
while
these
present
loops
shape
the
character
of
future
orientation.
94
With
proper
orientation,
individuals
and
organizations
may
develop
a
common
shared
understanding
(CSU)
of
operational
situations.
CSU
once
developed,
guides
action
in
ways
that
free
subordinates
to
use
both
variety
and
initiative.
The
CSU
also
helps
to
reduce
friction
by
harmonizing
action
with
the
shared
vision.
As
the
dissemination
of
common
mental
images
or
patterns
increases,
so
does
the
opportunity
for
building
bonds
of
trust
within
the
organization.
This
increased
trust
can
lead
to
using
implicit
rather
than
50

explicit
communication.
In
mature
organizations,
this
implicit
communication
helps
form
a
C2
system
"whose
secret
lies
in
what
is
unstated
or
not
communicated
to
one
another..."
95
CSU
and
implicit
communication
combine
as
Boyd's
Implicit
Orientation.
Implicit
Orientation
allows
commanders
and
their
subordinates
to..
.Diminish
their
friction
and
reduce
time,
thereby
permitting
them
to..
.Exploit
variety/rapidity
while
maintaining
harmony/initiative,
thereby
permitting
them
to..
.Get
inside
an
adversary's
O-O-D-A
loops,
thereby..
.Magnify
an
adversary's
friction
and
stretch-out
his
time
for
a
favorable
mismatch
in
friction
and
time,
thereby..
.Deny
an
adversary
the
opportunity
to
cope
with
events/efforts
as
they
unfold.
96
This
idea
of
implicit
orientation
becomes
the
enabling
element
of
Boyd's
command
and
control
philosophy.
Supporting
the
all-important
maneuver
warfare
concept
of
mission
tactics,
Boyd
builds
his
position
for
a
decentralized
C2
process
that
maximizes
the
freedom
of
leaders
to
execute
distributed
maneuver
more
rapidly
than
the
opponent.
For
Boyd,
the
key
to
rapid
action
is
a
system
of
communication
that
exploits
lower-level
initiative
while
realizing
higher-level
intent.
The
secret
of
the
system
is
the
implicit
communication.
He
goes
on
to
warn,
in
terms
reminiscent
of
his
thoughts
in
Destruction
and
Creation,
that
this
implicit
orientation
depends
on
full
access
to
and
extensive
interaction
with
the
external
environment.
Restricting
or
closing
this
interaction
for
fear
of
loosing
control
results
in
an
inward
focus
and
an
eventual
dissolution/disintegration
of
the
organic
whole.
97
In
this
case,
the
organic
whole
refers
to
the
organization's
ability
to
communicate
effectively
across
the
spectrum
of
capabilities
and
requirements.
Boyd
described
this
as
the
epitome
of
C2
wherein
lies
the
ability
of
the
leaders
to
use
the
implicit
nature
of
decision-making
to
deal
with
uncertainty,
change,
and
stress.
Classical
C2
represents,"..
.a
top-down
mentality
applied
in
a
rigid
or
mechanical
way
51

that
ignores
as
well
as
stifles
the
implicit
nature
of
human
beings..
."
9S
Shared
understanding
of
the
problem
allows
individuals
at
all
levels
to
observe
and
orient
simultaneously
within
the
organization.
This
shared
understanding
creates
an
environment
that
allows
individuals
to
act
independently
yet
harmoniously
and
outwardly
to
external
factors.
Without
this
outward
orientation,
individuals
turn
inward
to
get
direction
creating
a
closed
system.
Goedel,
Heisenburg,
and
the
Second
Law
of
Thermodynamics
remind
us
that
this
creates
disorder,
confusion,
and
chaos.
On
the
other
hand,
an
outward
focus
based
on
implicit
orientation
generates
the
ability
to
"create"
from
"destruction."
The
final
portion
of
his
briefing
attempts
to
extend
these
ideas
into
a
functional
definition
of
command
and
control
itself.
In
the
final
few
pages
of
Organic
Design,
Boyd
suggests
that
the
words
command
and
control
fail
to
portray
the
true
intent
of
action
behind
the
words.
Command
and
control
is
among
other
things,
a
process
of
leading
and
monitoring.
The
words
are
stigmatized
with
such
classical
understandings
of
command
as
directing,
ordering,
compelling
and
control
as
regulating,
restraining,
or
holding
to
a
certain
standard.
Consequently,
Boyd
argues
that
the
words
command
and
control
should
be
replaced
with
the
Leadership
and
Appreciation.
Leadership
implies
a
greater
range
of
respondents
within
the
organization
than
Command.
Appreciation
rather
than
monitor
or
control
connotes
a
greater
recognition
and
clear
perception
of
the
worth
or
value
of
the
idea
as
well
as
the
ability
to
monitor.
For
Boyd
the
key
to
the
leadership/appreciation
relationship
is
that
the
former,
"must
give
direction
in
terms
of
what
is
to
be
done
in
a
clear
unambiguous
way.
[The
latter]
must
provide
assessment
of
what
is
being
done
also
in
a
clear
and
unambiguous
52

way."
99
Command
should
be
evident
while
control
should
be
invisible
and
not
interfere
with
command.
This
then
describes
Boyd's
epitome
of
command
and
control.
Popular
Theory
and
Doctrine
In
the
draft
FM
100-34,
Command
and
Control,
the
Army
finds
more
agreement
than
disagreement
with
Boyd's
ideas
on
command
and
control.
A
quick
review
of
both
doctrinal
and
theoretical
discourses
helps
put
Boyd's
ideas
into
a
context
of
modern
thought.
The
FM
describes
command
as
the
personal
function
of
the
commander.
To
understand
command
beyond
the
inanimate
definition,
one
must
look
to
the
elements:
authority,
visualization,
decision-making,
and
leadership.
Visualization
consists
of
creating
and
thinking
in
mental
images
derived
from
three
sources:
1)
the
commander's
internalized
personal
principles,
attributes,
and
experiences,
2)
The
unit's
goals
and
endstates
often
expressed
in
his
own
and
higher's
mission
and
intent,
and
3)
the
allocation
of
resources
through
plans
and
supporting
branches
and
sequels.
100
The
above
citations
ring
of
Boyd's
familiar
and
enduring
emphasis
on
using
mental
images
to
create
a
shared
understanding
within
the
context
of
a
unifying
higher
aim.
The
author
gets
it
right
by
emphasizing
this
visualization
process
but
strays
briefly
from
Boyd's
intent
of
staying
outwardly
focused
on
the
external
realities
rather
than
on
any
well-intended
plans.
FM
100-34
suggests
that
commanders
choose
to
translate
their
vision
of
the
endstate
into
action
through
decisions.
These
decisions
are
either
reached
through
an
intuitive
or
analytical
process.
Each
carries
with
it
advantages
and
disadvantages
most
often
surfacing
through
the
experience
level
of
the
commander
and
the
time
available.
53

Boyd
would
certainly
agree
with
the
renewed
interest
in
emphasizing
intuition
versus
analytical
decision-making
as
a
preferred
method
for
saving
time
in
the
OODA
process.
Dr.
Gary
Klein,
a
renowned
expert
on
decision-making
suggests
that
one
of
the
OODA
Loop's
greatest
contributions
is
in
fact
its
encouragement
of
intuition
in
decision-
making.
1
01
He
notes
that
the
Marines
like
the
OODA
for
this
very
reason.
It
encourages,
"sizing
up
the
situation
and
reacting
in
accordance
to
learned
patterns.
This
allows
them
to
generate
tempo
where
they
can
rely
on
their
abilities...[In
contrast,]
Official
Army
approach
appears
to
encourage
careful
analysis
and
discourage
improvisation."
Klein's
approach
to
decision-making
rests
on
a
fundamental
supposition
that
crisis
reaction
decisions
most
often
derive
from
experience
or
intuition
so
important
to
Boyd's
concept
of
maneuver
warfare.
Klein's
Recognition
Primed
Decision-Making
model
(RPD)
is
based
on
the
recognition
of
patterns
familiar
to
similar
past
experiences.
This
pattern
recognition
usually
leads
to
the
creation
of
a
single
dominant
course
of
action
through
intuitive
decision-making
at
the
expense
of
detailed
analysis
in
an
effort
to
save
time.
This
results
in
a
solution
that
"satisfices"
or
accepts
the
first
workable
solution.
Some
critics
charge
that
this
methodology
requires
an
assumption
that
the
present
and
future
look
at
least
somewhat
like
the
past.
Furthermore,
many
believe
intuition
and
therefore
RPD
may
satisfy
tactical
level
decision-making
but
oversimplify
the
challenges
in
strategic
level
decision-making.
At
the
strategic
level,
analytical
methods
may
prove
more
appropriate
where
the
time
allows
and
the
situation
demands
choosing
optimum
solutions.
54

Control
differs
fundamentally
from
command
in
that
it
is
systemic
involving
the
whole
organization
while
command
pertains
to
an
individual.
1
03
According
to
FM
10-34
(draft),
Control
allows
the
commander
to
direct
the
execution
of
operations
to
conform
to
his
intent.
Unlike
command
functions,
which
remain
relatively
similar
among
the
echelons
of
command,
control
functions
and
their
complexity
increase
with
each
higher
echelon..
.and
extends
not
just
over
subordinate
units;
it
encompasses
the
entire
system...[the
commander]
is
governed
by
the
reciprocal
influence
between
his
forces
and
himself.
In
this
context,
control
in
mission
command
establishes
conditions
for
a
self-
regulating
organization
rather
than
one
regulated
externally.
1
04
Boyd
recognizes
the
natural
friction
inherent
in
the
large,
complex
organizations.
He
proposed
mission
tactics
as
the
solution
to
the
problem
with
adherence
to
the
German
idea
of
Schwerpunkt
as
a
necessary
unifying
element
to
distributed
maneuver
and
decentralized
command
and
control.
Like
command,
control
also
consists
of
elements
and
is
governed
by
unique
principles.
FM
100-34
(draft)
states
that
the
elements
of
control
include
relevant
information,
communication,
and
structure.
Relevant
information
equates
to
the
translated
data
useful
for
producing
a
common
understanding
for
the
commander,
his
staff,
and
the
organization
at
large.
The
communication
acts
as
the
"bridge
linking
information
to
decisions
and
decisions
to
action."
105
Structure
refers
to
the
overall
system
of
relationships
in
place
throughout
the
hierarchy
of
the
organization.
The
principles
of
control
include:
1)
Allow
maximum
freedom
of
decision
and
action
for
subordinates,
2)
create,
maintain,
and
disseminate
the
common
operational
picture,
3)
use
common
doctrinal
procedures,
and
4)
provide
flexibility
and
adaptability.
1
06
55

Boyd
would
whole-heartedly
endorse
these
elements
and
principles
of
control
espoused
in
FM
100-34
(draft).
His
idea
of
implicit
orientation
rests
on
gaining
a
common
operational
picture
through
the
use
of
similar
shared
mental
images
of
the
situation
rather
than
time-wasting
explicit
systems
that
encumber
the
process.
Boyd
departs
with
FM
100-34
(draft)
in
his
greater
emphasis
on
the
time/tempo
relationship
to
the
opponent
and
the
compounding
effects
of
faster
decision-making
to
induce
disorder,
panic,
and
paralysis.
In
its
final
chapter,
FM
100-34
(draft)
describes
the
exercise
of
command
in
its
broadest
terms
using
the
cyclical
functions
of
assessing,
planning,
preparing,
and
executing
as
a
model.
This
cycle
suggests
that
the
exercising
of
C2
emphasizes
a
more
execution-focused
rather
than
planning-focused
process.
1
07
Here,
in
the
most
significant
acknowledgement
yet
of
John
Boyd's
theories,
the
Army
introduces
the
OODA
Loop
to
describe
the
C2
process
both
at
the
individual
and
organizational
levels.
In
discussions
of
the
assessment
function,
the
authors
cite
the
OODA
cycle
as
"imbedded
in
the
operational
system."
They
describe
C2
as
part
of
the
Information
System
(INFOS
YS)
contributing
to
the
creation
of
better
situational
awareness
for
the
commander
and
the
organization.
Later
the
authors
use
the
OODA
loop
to
help
describe
the
execution
cycle
of
assessing,
deciding,
and
directing.
Of
course,
neither
FM
100-34
(draft)
nor
Boyd's
theories
were
derived
within
a
vacuum.
Each
acknowledges
the
contributions
of
experts
from
historical
and
contemporary
studies
on
the
theories
of
command
and
control
and
warfare
in
general.
In
1990,
Crumley
and
Sherman
from
the
Army
Research
Institute
for
the
Behavioral
and
Social
Sciences
studied
a
plethora
of
theoretical
perspectives
on
C2.
In
a
comprehensive
56

ten-year
review
of
the
literature
on
command
and
control,
Crumley
and
Sherman
concluded
that,
"The
state-of-the-art
in
command
and
control
modeling
and
theorizing
is
not
well-developed..
."
108
Sutton,
in
a
review
of
the
more
general
literature
added,
"Most
of
the
articles
are
well
worth
reading,
but
one
is
soon
convinced..
.that
C2
is
defined
by
the
senior
man
present."
109
Recognizing
the
extent
of
the
problem,
Crumley
and
Sherman
resolved
not
to
add
to
the
confusion
with
yet
another
proposal.
Instead,
they
reviewed
66
models
of
command
and
control
and
successfully
developed
model
classifications
to
both
add
scientific
rigor
to
the
study
of
the
command
and
control
and
to
aid
in
categorizing.
Of
the
five
categories:
implementational,
organizational,
behavioral
system,
systems
oriented,
and
network,
the
authors
described
Boyd's
contributions
in
terms
of
the
organizational
category.
Under
this
category,
they
further
delineated
Boyd's
theory
into
the
sub-
category
of
organizational
process
models
for
decision-making.
The
unique
aspects
of
this
sub-category
evolved
from
such
theorists
as
Olmstead,
Zeitgeist,
and
Maillefert.
n
0
Each
helped
lead
the
movement
toward
decision-making
that
involved
cyclical
interaction
with
the
environment.
m
Maillefert
of
particular
note
suggested,
"command
and
control
is
an
input/output
system
designed
to
allow
the
maximum
integration
of
all
necessary
information
to
produce
a
meaningful
and
realistic
context
for
the
commander,
at
each
echelon's
nodal
point..
,"
112
Other
models
followed
with
some
variations
of
this
type.
One
theorist,
Lawson,
developed
an
organizational
decision-making
model
with
very
familiar
characteristics.
His
theory
stated
that
a
C2
system
needs
to:
sense
the
environment
(Observe),
process
information,
compare
present
and
desired
states
(Orient),
57

decide
on
an
action
(Decide),
and
act
(Act).
This
theory
defined
an
iterative
processing
system
that
continues
to
sense
or
monitor
the
environment
for
changes
that
create
further
decision
requirements.
113
Lawson
further
stressed
the
hierarchical
nature
of
his
model
highlighting
a
point
key
to
Boyd's
future
conceptualization
of
successive
"OODA
Looping"
at
the
different
echelons
of
command.
Lawson
believed
that
supervisors
had
one
of
two
choices
for
decision-making.
One
could
either
direct
an
action
of
their
subordinates,
or
one
could
set
a
desired
state
(objective)
required
of
a
lower
echelon
and
allow
them
to
use
their
own
C2
process
to
achieve
the
goal.
1
1
4
Lawson
would
later
develop
the
C3I
model,
specifically
including
an
intelligence
process
component
that
interacts
with
the
environment
and
the
C2
process.
It
is
here
where
Boyd's
theory
intersects
with
other
conventional
theories
according
to
Crumley
and
Sherman.
Orr
would
later
integrate
the
ideas
of
Lawson's
model
of
C3I
and
Boyd's
combat
process
into
bis
own
model
for
command
and
control.
11
5
Orr's
model
consisting
of
sensing,
processing,
deciding,
and
acting
corresponded
directly
with
Boyd's
OODA
phases.
His
model
more
explicitly
represented
Lawson's
contributions
associating
the
iterative
and
integrative
process
of
intelligence,
C2,
and
the
environment
with
both
higher
and
lower
echelons
of
decision-making.
Part
of
the
value
of
Crumely
and
Sherman's
research
lies
not
only
in
the
placement
of
Boyd's
theory
and
its
evolution
within
the
body
of
standing
literature
but
in
the
association
of
his
theory
to
models
that
support
decision-making
designed
for
staffs
and
commanders.
Most
behavioral
and
systems
oriented
research
usually
default
to
studies
that
focus
on
how
a
single
decision-maker
makes
decisions
based
on
orders
from
higher.
This,
while
important,
tends
to
ignore
the
majority
of
the
decision-making
that
is
58

done
by
a
staff
(organizational
level)
during
the
conduct
of
an
operation.
Crumley
and
Sherman
proceed
to
criticize
generally
those
proponents
of
the
behavioral,
systems,
and
information
processing
research
as
often
overly
attached
to
the
technological
or
analytical
tool.
Moreover,
these
proponents'
ideas
often
seem
disconnected
from
a
true
understanding
of
the
command
and
control
process.
The
result
is
a
poor
"..
.melding
of
the
sophisticated
to
the
little
known."
116
Many
of
the
ideas
espoused
by
Boyd's
command
and
control
philosophy
sound
good.
Who
would
not
aspire
to
a
system
that
optimizes
C2
in
a
distributed
environment;
that
maximizes
freedom
to
subordinates;
that
seeks
to
make
decisions
faster
and
better
in
order
to
achieve
a
Mind-Time-Spacial
advantage
over
an
opponent?
The
answer
seems
obvious.
The
implications
of
this
answer
are
less
obvious.
While
many
would
subscribe
to
these
tenets,
history
records
that
few
are
either
willing
or
capable
of
full
implementation.
59

ENDNOTES
1
William
S.
Lind,
Maneuver
Warfare
Handbook
(Boulder
and
London:
Westview
Press,
1985),
5-6.
2
William
S.
Lind,
"The
Case
for
Maneuver
Warfare,"
in
The
Defense
Reform
Debate
eds.
Asa
A.
Clark
IV/Peter
W.
Chiarelli/Jeffrey
s.
McKitrick/James
W.
Reed,
(Baltimore:
The
Johns
Hopkins
University
Press,
1984),
90.
3
Ibid.,
6-7.
Lind
is
answering
a
question
posed
to
himself:
How
does
one
consistently
maneuver
faster
than
the
enemy
to
maintain
the
advantage
of
the
OODA
cycle?
Here
he
answers
in
terms
of
general
theory;
things
to
think
about:
1)
Only
a
decentralized
military
can
have
a
fast
OODA
loop.
"If
the
observations
must
be
passed
up
a
chain
of
command,
the
orientation
made
and
the
decision
taken
at
a
high
level,
and
the
command
for
action
is
then
transmitted
back
down
the
chain,
the
OODA
loop
is
going
to
be
slow."
2)
Maneuver
warfare
means
you
will
not
only
accept
confusion
and
disorder
but
you
will
generate
confusion
through
such
maneuver
tactics
as
recon
pull.
In
such
cases,
higher
headquarters
can
neither
direct
nor
predict
the
exact
path
of
advance
but
neither
can
the
enemy.
3)
All
patterns,
recipes
and
formulas
are
to
be
avoided.
"If
your
tactics
follow
predictable
patterns,
the
enemy
can
easily
cut
inside
your
OODA
loop."
4
Lind,
Maneuver
Warfare
Handbook
,
1.
5
U.S.
Marine
Corps,
Warfighting
(MCDP-1)
(Washington
D.C.:
June
20,1997),
40,72,
105.
MCDP
1
doesn't
speak
of
Boyd
or
the
OODA
loop
within
the
body
of
the
main
text.
It
does
acknowledge
Boyd
and
Lind
in
the
endnotes
on
such
issues
as
tempo,
maneuver
60

warfare,
and
recon
pull.
In
MCDP
6
and
NDP
6,
Command
and
Control
the
OODA
loop
is
explicitly
depicted
as
the
point
of
departure
for
command
and
control
theory.
6
U.S.
Air
Force,
Air
Force
Glossary
(AFDD
1-2)
(Washington
D.C.:
Department
of
the
Air
Force,
1997),
22.
7
David
S.
Fadok,
LTC,
"John
Boyd
and
John
Warden:
Airpower's
Quest
for
Strategic
Paralysis,"
in
The
Paths
of
Heaven:
The
Evolution
of
Airpower
Theory
(Maxwell
AFB:
Air
University
Press,
1997),
357.
Fadok
contends
that
both
Boyd
and
Warden
share
a
fundamental
common
theme—the
goal
of
defeating
one's
adversary
by
strategic
paralysis.
He
is
unable
to
conclude
whether
Warden
derived
specifically
and
directly
from
Boyd,
but
he
uses
each
theory
to
make
the
case
that
the
Air
Force
needs
to
combine
both
into
a
workable
doctrine
for
the
future
of
the
Air
Force.
8
U.S.
Army,
Command
and
Control
(FM
100-34)
(Washington,
D.C.:
Draft,
1999),
A-3.
9
Mr.
Bill
Connor,
lead
writer
for
FM
100-34,
telephone
conversation,
24
August,
1999.
Mr.
Connor
stated
that
after
review
of
the
literature
on
decision-making
models,
Boyd's
model
lacked
anything
substantial
enough
to
dramatically
alter
current
Army
doctrine.
He
indicated
that
that
the
OODA
loop
seemed
only
a
convenient
way
of
describing
some
of
the
general
principles
of
C2.
Insinuating
that
he
was
still
open
new
insights,
Mr.
Connor
encouraged
the
author
to
pursue
the
investigation
of
the
Boyd
Theory
in
detail
with
a
request
to
review
the
findings.
10
CPT
Robert
L.
Bateman,
III,
"Avoiding
Information
Overload,"
Military
Review
,
July-
August
1998,
54-55.
11
Fadok,
361.
12
Carl
Von
Clausewitz,
On
War
,
eds.
Michael
Howard
and
Peter
Peret,
(Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press,
1989),
152,
141.
13
Frank
Spinney,
"Genghis
John,"
Proceedings
,
July
1997,47.
14
Ibid.
15
Stephen
A.
Shambach,
Strategic
Leadership
Workshop:
Strategic
Decision-Making
in
the
Information
Age
,
October
1-2,1996,
http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/dclm/wrkshop/rptprocd.htm/
(
August
19,1999),
1-23.
16
U.S.
Army
Training
and
Doctrine
Command,
Annual
Report
on
the
Army
After
Next
(AAN)
Project
(Fort
Monroe,
VA:
Training
and
Doctrine
Command,
1998),
6.
17
Janet
S.
Kennelly,
Archivist
at
the
Marine
Corps
University
Research
Archives,
telephone
conversation,
04
Sep
1999.
18
Frank
Spinney,
"Genghis
John,"
Proceedings
,
July
1997,42-43.
One
of
John
Boyd's
best
friends
and
associate,
Frank
Spiney
offers
a
short
biographical
sketch
of
John
Boyd.
Boyd
started
his
career
as
a
19-year
old
draftee
in
the
Army
occupying
Japan
during
the
cold
winter
of
1945-46.
He
first
gained
notoriety
when
he
led
a
revolt
against
the
terrible
conditions
his
soldiers
endured
including
damp
tents
and
uncooked
K-rations
while
the
officers
reveled
in
hot
food
and
warm
quarters.
Amid
these
conditions,
he
chopped
down
a
wooden
hanger
and
burned
it
to
keep
the
soldiers
warm
and
for
that
was
court-
martialed.
During
the
trial,
he
turned
the
tables
on
the
officers
in
a
referendum
on
leadership
and
responsibility
and
won.
He
left
the
Army
and
went
to
college
on
the
GI
Bill
where
he
met
his
wife.
He
graduated
with
a
degree
in
economics
and
was
commissioned
in
the
Air
Force.
He
flew
20
combat
missions
in
F-86's
at
the
tail
of
the
61

Korean
War
and
went
on
to
be
one
of
the
first
instructors
at
the
Fighter
Weapon
School.
Over
the
next
several
years,
Boyd
would
teach
himself
enough
calculus
to
develop
his
theory
of
energy-maneuverability.
The
E-M
theory
in
spite
of
the
critics,
proved
a
stunning
success
as
a
universal
language
for
translating
tactics
into
engineering
specifications
and
vice
versa.
This
would
lead
engineers
to
improve
and
develop
the
design
of
the
YF-16--still
one
of
the
most
successful
lightweight
fighters
in
the
world.
In
1973,
he
obsessed
in
his
quest
of
understanding
how
the
mind
creates
knowledge
through
the
studies
of
science,
philosophy,
and
the
humanities.
This
led
him
to
write
the
16-page
double-spaced
paper
entitled
Destruction
and
Creation.
He
didn't
publish
but
allowed
many
distinguished
scientists
and
mathematicians
to
try
to
poke
holes
in
the
theory
-
none
could.
Boyd
became
a
force
in
the
industry
with
his
unabashed
lifestyle.
He
worked
the
military-industrial-congressional
complex
with
abandon
and
unfettered
integrity
and
simplicity.
He
rankled
many
inside
the
Beltway
with
his
unorthodox
style
of
honesty
and
forthrightness
leaving
his
enemies
no
leverage
for
corruption.
When
asked
why
he
lived
this
way,
Boyd
responded,
"The
most
important
thing
in
life
is
to
be
free
to
do
things.
There
are
only
two
ways
to
insure
that
freedom—you
can
be
rich
or
you
can
reduce
your
needs
to
zero.
I
will
never
be
rich,
so
I
have
chosen
to
crank
down
my
desires.
The
bureaucracy
cannot
take
anything
from
me,
because
there
is
nothing
to
take."
He
died
in
1997
survived
by
his
wife
and
five
children.
19
U.S.
Army,
Operations
(FM
100-5)
(Washington,
DC:
Department
of
the
Army,
1993),
2-7.
20
John
Boyd,
"Patterns
of
Conflict,"
in
"Discourses
on
Winning
and
Losing,"(Unpublished
slide
show
archived
at
the
Marine
Corps
University
Research
Archives,
Quantico,
VA,
1986),
chart
132.
21
Naveh,
Shimon,
In
Pursuit
of
Military
Excellence
(Portland,
OR:
Frank
Cass
Publishers,
1997),
279.
22
Ibid.,
258.
23
John
Boyd,
"Destruction
and
Creation,"
(An
unpublished
16-page
essay
archived
at
the
Marine
Corps
University
Research
Archives,
Quantico,
VA,
1976),
chart
1.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.,
2.
26
Ibid.,
3.
27
Ibid.,
9.
28
John
Boyd,
"Destruction
and
Creation,"
chart
10.
29
Ibid.
"Heisenburg
in
1927
showed
that
one
could
not
simultaneously
fix
or
determine
precisely
the
velocity
and
position
of
a
particle
or
body.
Specifically
he
showed,
due
to
the
presence
and
influence
of
an
observer,
that
the
product
of
the
velocity
and
position
uncertainties
is
equal
to
or
greater
than
a
small
number
(Planck's
Constant)
divided
by
the
mass
of
the
particle
or
body
being
investigated..
.In
other
words,
when
the
intended
distinction
between
observer
and
observed
begins
to
disappear,
the
uncertainty
values
hide
or
mask
phenomena
behavior..
.Under
these
circumstances,
the
uncertainty
values
represent
the
inability
to
determine
the
character
or
nature
(consistency)
of
a
system
within
itself..
.Keeping
in
mind
that
the
Heisenberg
Principle
implicitly
depends
upon
the
indeterminate
presence
and
influence
of
an
observer,
we
can
now
see..
.that
the
62

magnitude
of
the
uncertainty
values
represent
the
degree
of
intrusion
by
the
observer
upon
the
observed.
When
intrusion
is
total
(that
is,
when
the
intended
distinction
between
observer
and
observed
essentially
disappears,
the
uncertainty
values
indicate
erratic
behavior."
30
Ibid.,
12.
"Entropy
is
a
concept
that
represents
the
potential
for
doing
work,
the
capacity
for
taking
action,
or
the
degree
of
confusion
and
disorder
associated
with
any
physical
activity.
High
entropy
implies
a
low
potential
for
doing
work..
.Low
entropy
implies
just
the
opposite.
Viewed
in
this
context
the
Second
Law
of
Thermodynamics
states
that
all
observed
natural
processes
generate
entropy.
From
this
law
it
follows
that
entropy
must
increase
in
any
closed
system—or,
for
that
matter,
in
any
system
that
cannot
communicate
in
an
ordered
fashion
with
other
systems
or
environment
external
to
itself."
31
Ibid.,
13.
32
John
Boyd,
"Patterns,"
chart
2.
33
Ibid.,
chart
5.
34
Ibid.,
chart
71.
35
Ibid.,
chart
72.
36
Ibid.,
chart
78.
37
Lind,
18.
38
Ibid.,
chart
182.
39
Ibid.,
chart
177.
40
Ibid.,
chart
183.
The
bits
and
pieces
include:
1)
compressing
one's
own
time
while
stretching
out
an
adversary's
time,
2)
generating
unequal
distributions
as
basis
to
focus
one's
own
moral-mental-physical
effort
for
local
superiority
and
decisive
leverage,
3)
diminishing
one's
own
while
magnifying
the
adversary's
friction,
and
4)
operating
inside
the
adversary's
OODA
loops
or
getting
inside
his
mind-time-space.
41
John
Boyd,
"Organic
Design
for
Command
and
Control,"
in
"Discourses
on
Winning
and
Losing,"
(Unpublished
slide
presentation
archived
at
the
Marine
Corps
University
Research
Archives,
Quantico,
VA,
1986),
charts
16,
25.
42
Ibid.,
chart
18.
43
Ibid.,
chart
23.
44
John
Antal,
"Thoughts
About
Maneuver
Warfare,"
in
Maneuver
Warfare
Anthology
ed.
Richard
D.
Hooker,
Jr.
(CA:
Presidio
Press,
1993),
57.
45
John
Boyd,
"Patterns
of
Conflict,"
in
"Discourses
on
Winning
and
Loosing,"(Unpublished
slide
show
archived
at
the
Marine
Corps
University
Research
Archives,
Quantico,
VA,
1986),
chart
79.
46
Ibid.,
chart
90.
47
Ibid.,
chart
96.
48
Ibid.,
chart
117.
49
Ibid.
50
Bruce
I.
Gudmundsson,
"Maneuver
Warfare:
The
German
Tradition"in
Maneuver
Warfare
Anthology
ed.
Richard
D.
Hooker,
Jr.
(CA:
Presidio
Press,
1993),
274.
51
Bevin
Alexander,
The
Future
of
Warfare
(New
York:
W.W.
Norton
&
Company,
1995),
62.
Bevin
Alexander
adds
in
his
analysis
of
the
coming
age
of
smaller
wars
that
63

the
implications
as
described
by
the
Cantigny
Conference
members
include
an
Army
that
is
smaller
and
more
mobile.
"American
soldiers
in
future
wars
will
form
small
battle
groups
of
combined
arms.
These
groups
will
operate
independently
but
will
coordinate
with
other
groups.
They
will
possess
high
mobility
either
in
land
or
air
vehicles,
and
will
wield
weapons
that
are
deadly
and
accurate
at
long
ranges
against
enemy
weapons
and
peoples."
Gen.
Eric
Shinseki,
Chief
of
Staff
of
the
Army,
recently
recommended
a
move
in
this
direction
for
the
entire
Army
when
he
ordered
the
creation
of
the
two
medium
contingency
brigades
at
Ft.
Lewis.
His
vision
includes
a
medium
brigade
in
every
division
and
possible
elimination
of
all
tracked
vehicles
in
attempt
to
make
the
Army
into
a
more
modular,
faster
moving
force
both
strategically
and
operationally
than
ever
before.
All
of
this
supports
the
prevailing
notion
that
the
large
wars
of
massed
armies
have
been
replaced
with
the
smaller
conflicts
of
varying
intensities
fraught
with
asymmetric
threats.
52
William
S.
Lind,
"The
Theory
and
Practice
of
Maneuver
Warfare"
in
Maneuver
Warfare
Anthology
ed.
Richard
D.
Hooker,
Jr.
(CA:
Presidio
Press,
1993),
8.
53
Paul
J.
Berenson,
Memorandum
to
General
Foss,
18
April
1991.
Citing
a
conversation
with
John
Boyd,
Paul
J.
Berensen,
Scientific
Advisor
to
General
Foss
noted
in
a
memo
to
General
Foss
that
Boyd
believed
that
the
term
synchronization
was
no
longer
the
right
word
to
use
as
one
of
the
four
tenets
of
Army
operations.
He
recommended
the
term
Harmony
as
implying
a
better
description
of
free
interplay
with
a
proper
balance
of
actions
rather
than
a
prescriptive
lining
up
of
actions
in
concert
with
a
play
or
plan.
The
inherent
nature
of
war
demanded
a
more
free-flowing
doctrinal
approach
to
warfare.
54
Lind,
"The
Theory
and
Practice
of
Maneuver
Warfare,"
10.
The
idea
behind
recon
pull
is
to
use
reconnaissance
assets
to
find
the
gaps
and
surfaces
of
the
enemy
and
to
pull
the
main
body
towards
the
gaps
for
penetration.
It
implies
flexibility
and
adaptability
by
higher
headquarters
with
the
acceptance
that
the
reconnaissance
units
and
not
higher
headquarters
determine
the
point
of
penetration.
55
Ibid.
56
Robert
R.
Leonard,
"Maneuver
Warfare
and
the
United
States
Army,"
in
Maneuver
Warfare
Anthology
ed.
Richard
D.
Hooker,
Jr.
(CA:
Presidio
Press,
1993),
47.
Leonard
offers
his
personal
accounts
of
this
phenomenon
in
Desert
Storm
and
at
the
NTC.
"We
use
detailed
control
at
every
level
of
command.
From
my
personal
observations
during
the
Gulf
War
(I
served
in
an
infantry
battalion
in
the
3d
Armored
Division),
I
saw
no
freedom
for
small
unit
commanders
to
make
any
decisions
regarding
battlefield
maneuver.
Brigade,
battalion,
and
company
commanders
were
told
where
to
go,
when
to
move,
when
to
shoot,
and
when
to
cease
fire.
Above
all,
they
were
warned
to
keep
their
flanks
tied
in
with
friendly
units."
At
the
NTC,
Leonard
observed
that
"the
keys
to
success
in
the
training
scenarios
are
unity
of
command,
flawless
gunnery,
and
good
navigation.
Battle
is
inevitable
and
cannot
be
avoided
through
cleaver
maneuvering.
Therefore
there
is
little
opportunity
or
payoff
for
a
small
unit
commander
to
find
a
gap
in
the
enemy
defenses.
This
phenomenon
is
less
obvious
in
mixed
or
close
terrain.
When
terrain
or
vegetation
refocuses
the
small
unit
commander's
ability
to
see,
there
is
a
natural
tendency
to
rely
on
subordinates
more."
57
Lind,
"The
Theory
and
Practice
of
Maneuver
Warfare,"
12.
64

58
Ibid.,
14.
For
Lind,
the
concept
of
Schwerpunkt
"depends
on
multiple
thrusts
to
generate
massive
confusion
for
the
enemy
and..
.disguise
the
Schwerpunkt.
They
also
generate
opportunities
for
shifting
it."
This
is
an
important
contrast
to
criticisms
that
suggest
Schwerpunkt
is
concerned
only
with
a
single
bold,
deep
thrust.
Lind's
interpretation
also
suggests
that
Schwerpunkt
is
a
dynamic
process
as
much
as
a
statement
of
time
and
space.
59
Daniel
P.
Bolger,
"Maneuver
Warfare
Reconsidered,"in
Maneuver
Warfare
Anthology
ed.
Richard
D.
Hooker,
Jr.
(CA:
Presidio
Press,
1993),
21-22.
60
Ibid.,
22.
61
Ibid.,
25.
62
Ibid.,
30.
63
Ibid.,
32.
The
quote
here
is
from
Edward
Lurtwak
which
Bolger
cites
as
a
maneuverist.
64
Ibid.,
30.
65
Col.
Dave
R.
Palmer,
Summons
of
the
Trumpet
(New
York:
Ballantine
Books,
1984),
148.
66
Klein
&
Associates,
A
Decision-Centered
Study
of
the
Regimental
Command
Post
(Fairborn,
Ohio,
1996),
30.
67
Leonard,
46.
68
Ibid.,
49.
Leonard
describes
in
some
detail
how
new
technological
capabilities
such
as
positional
location
and
positional
reporting
will
combine
to
offer
increased
visibility
of
the
battlefield,
in
increasing
fidelity,
to
increasingly
higher
echelons
near-simultaneously.
This
unprecedented
increased
ability
to
see
the
enemy
will
cause
most
decision-making
to
gravitate
naturally
to
the
headquarters
where
the
intelligence
feed
is
the
greatest.
He
suggests
that
this
may
spell
the
end
of
mission
tactics
as
Boyd
visualized
it
below
the
operational
levels.
Leonard
adds
that
the
notion
that
higher
commanders
will
receive,
process,
and
disseminate
intelligence
then
pursue
mission-tactics
is
hogwash.
The
temptation
to
attach
orders
to
intelligence
reports
will
be
impossible
to
resist.
69
Ibid.,
53.
Robert
Leonard
deals
fairly
with
his
treatment
of
Boyd.
While
supporting
Boyd's
theoretical
approach
to
warfare,
Leonard
also
opines
about
the
possible
pitfalls
in
application.
First,
while
unquestionably
the
superior
method
of
fighting,
he
warns
that
maneuver
warfare
makes
a
dubious
deterrent.
Most
enemies
understand
and
fear
numerical
superiority
while
few
can
easily
visualize
being
dislocated,
disrupted,
or
paralyzed.
Secondly,
since
our
strategy
almost
invariably
assumes
allied
participation,
preemption
recedes
as
an
option
simply
because
the
addition
of
each
ally
(hence,
another
sovereign
government)
precludes
rapid
strategic
decision-making.
Leonard
charges
that
strategic
preemption,
a
bona-fide
cornerstone
of
future
concepts
of
maneuver
warfare,
is
unlikely
given
the
current
and
projected
political
climate.
America
does
not
go
to
war
suddenly.
This
argument
is
accurate
in
today's
context.
If
the
trend
continues,
AAN
with
its
notions
of
strategic
maneuver
and
preclusion
may
never
materialize.
Finally,
Leonard
adds
that
the
increased
complexity
of
tomorrow's
operations
breeds
vulnerability.
Clausewitz
noted
even
the
simple
friction
of
moving
or
supplying
an
army
can
undo
an
organization,
quite
apart
from
enemy
intentions.
70
Bolger,
37.
71
Stephen
A.
Shambach,
see
note
46.
65

72
Col.
Huba
Wass
de
Czege,
"Army
Doctrinal
Reform,"
in
The
Defense
Reform
Debate
,
eds.
Asa
A.
Clark
IV/Peter
W.
Chiarelli/Jeffrey
S.
Mckitrick/James
W.
Reed,
(Baltimore:
The
Johns
Hopkins
University
Press,
1984),
102.
73
Ibid.
103.
74
Lind,
92.
75
Basil
H.
Liddel
Hart,
Strategy
(London:
Faber
&
Faber,
1954),
212.
76
Lind,
"A
Case
for
Maneuver
Warfare,"
100.
77
Ibid.,
95-97.
78
Introduction
to
chapter
3,
"Doctrinal
Issues,"
author
unknown,
in
The
Defense
Reform
Debate
eds.
Asa
A.
Clark
IV/Peter
W.
Chiarelli/Jeffrey
S.
Mckitrick/James
W.
Reed,
(Baltimore:
The
Johns
Hopkins
University
Press,
1984),
85-86.
79
Society
for
Gestalt
Theory
and
its
Applications,
http://www.enabling.org/ia/gestalt/gerhards/gtaxl
.html
(January
5,
2000),
1-4.
According
to
William
Lind,
Boyd
subscribed
to
the
Gestalt
theory
as
an
important
contribution
to
the
understanding
of
the
ideas
behind
his
theory
for
human
behavior.
As
described
here
by
authors
from
the
Society
for
Gestalt
Theory
and
its
Application
(GTA),
one
may
see
the
connections
between
the
Gestalt
theory
and
the
ideas
described
in
his
essay
Destruction
and
Creation.
"The
Gestalt
theory
is
a
broadly
interdisciplinary
general
theory
that
provides
a
framework
for
a
wide
variety
of
psychological
phenomena,
processes,
and
applications...
Human
beings
are
viewed
as
open
systems
in
active
interaction
with
their
environment.
It
is
especially
suited
for
the
understanding
of
order
and
structure
in
psychological
events.
Gestalt
theory
is
not
limited
only
to
the
concept
of
the
Gestalt
or
the
whole,
or
to
the
Gestalt
principles
of
the
organization
of
perception
(as
it
is
presented
in
many
publications),
but
must
be
understood
as
essentially
far
broader
and
more
encompassing:
The
primacy
of
the
phenomenal:
Recognizing
and
taking
seriously
the
human
world
of
experience
as
the
only
immediately
given
reality,
and
not
simply
discussing
it
away,
is
a
fundamental
assertion
of
Gestalt
theory,
the
fruitfulness
of
which
for
psychology
and
psychotherapy
has
by
no
means
been
exhausted.
It
is
the
interaction
of
the
individual
and
the
situation
in
the
sense
of
a
dynamic
field
which
determines
experience
and
behavior,
and
not
only
drives
(psychoanalysis,
ethology)
or
external
stimuli
(behaviorism,
Skinner)
or
static
personality
traits
(classical
personality
theory).
Connections
among
psychological
contents
are
more
readily
and
more
permanently
created
on
the
basis
of
substantive
concrete
relationships
than
by
sheer
repetition
and
reinforcement.
Thinking
and
problem
solving
are
characterized
by
appropriate
substantive
organization,
restructuring,
and
centering
of
the
given
('insight')
in
the
direction
of
the
desired
solution.
In
memory,
structures
based
on
associative
connections
are
elaborated
and
differentiated
according
to
a
tendency
for
optimal
organization.
Cognitions,
which
an
individual
cannot
integrate,
lead
to
an
experience
of
dissonance
and
to
cognitive
processes
directed
at
reducing
this
dissonance.
In
a
supra-
individual
whole
such
as
a
group,
there
is
a
tendency
toward
specific
relationships
in
the
interaction
of
strengths
and
needs.
The
epistemological
orientation
of
Gestalt
theory
tends
to
be
a
kind
of
critical
realism.
Methodologically,
the
attempt
is
to
achieve
a
meaningful
integration
of
experimental
and
phenomenological
procedures..."
66

80
Henry
Mintzberg,
The
Rise
and
Fall
of
Strategie
Planning
(New
York:
The
Free
Press,
1994),
227-228,
339.
He
writes,
"Planning
assumes
predetermination
in
a
number
of
respects:
the
prediction
of
the
environment
through
forecasting...,
the
unfolding
of
the
strategy
formation
process
on
schedule,
and
the
imposition
of
the
resulting
strategies
on
an
acquiescent
environment..."
His
bottom
line
is
that
discontinuities
in
the
plan
invariably
arise
making
forecasting
notoriously
inaccurate.
He
adds
that,
"part
of
the
assumption
of
predetermination...
is
the
notion
that
while
planning
is
done,
and
historical
data
are
analyzed,
the
world
sits
patiently
by....
Here
we
wish
to
show
that
all
this
too
is
fallacious,
that
the
process
of
strategy
making
usually
takes
place
precisely
because
the
world
does
not
hold
still."
81
Ibid.,
256.
Mintzberg
notes
that
"Effective
strategists
are
not
people
who
abstract
themselves
from
the
daily
detail
but
quite
the
opposite:
they
are
the
ones
who
immerse
themselves
in
it,
while
being
able
to
abstract
the
strategic
messages
from
it."
The
idea
here
is
that
organizational
decisions
must
not
be
made
in
a
vacuum.
82
Gary
Klein,
gary@klein-inc.com
"OODA
loops,"
24
September,
1999.
Personal
email
(25
September,
1999).
83
Carl
Von
Clausewitz,
On
War
ed.
and
trans,
by
Michael
Howard
and
Peter
Peret,
(Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press,
1989),
190.
Clausewitz
comments
on
the
necessity
to
encourage
boldness
and
initiative
in
subordinates
in
spite
of
the
obvious
potential
for
mistakes.
"Happy
the
army
where
ill-timed
boldness
occurs
frequently;
it
is
a
luxuriant
weed,
but
indicates
the
richness
of
the
soil."
84
Gary
Klein,
Source
of
Power
:
How
People
Make
Decisions
(Massachusetts:
The
MIT
Press,
1999),
125.
85
Gary
Klein,
email.
86
Ibid.
87
Sun
Tzu,
The
Art
of
War
,
translated
by
Ralph
D.
Sawyer,
(Oxford:
Westview
Press,
1994),
198.
88
Gary
Klein,
email.
89
Maj
John
Schmitt
and
Dr.
Gary
Klein,
"Fighting
in
the
Fog:
Dealing
with
Battlefield
Uncertainty,"
Marine
Corps
Gazette
(August,
1996),
64-65.
90
Ibid.
91
Fadok,
391-392.
Fadok
notes
that
Boyd's
dialectic
process
of
destruction
and
creation
is
significant
on
another
level.
He
cites
Sharon
Begley's
definition
of
genius
as
that
which
rests
in
the
ability
to
combine
in
novel
ways
elements
from
seemingly
unrelated
fields.
For
Fadok
this
correlates
with
the
bi-hemispheric
organization
of
the
human
mind
as
indicated
by
modern
split-brain
research.
In
short,
Boyd
is
encouraging
the
notion
of
genius
in
leaders.
92
U.S.
Army,
Command,
Command
and
Control
(FM
100-34)
(Washington,
D.C.:
Department
of
the
Army,
draft
1999),
vii.
93
"Introduction,"
in
Principles
of
Command
and
Control
eds.
Jon
L.
Boyes
and
Stephen
J.
Andriole
(Washington,
D.C:
AFCEA
International
Press,
1987),
xi.
94
John
Boyd,
"Organic
Design
for
Command
and
Control,"
in
"Discourses
on
Winning
and
Losing,"
(Unpublished
slide
presentation
archived
at
the
Marine
Corps
University
Research
Archives,
Quantico,
VA,
1986),
16,25.
67

95
Ibid.,
18.
96
Ibid.,
23
97
Ibid.,
21.
98
Ibid.,
33.
99
Ibid.,
32.
100
FM
100-34,2-4.
101
Gary
Klein,
email.
Dr.
Klein's
thoughts
here
in
this
paragraph
are
in
line
with
many
of
his
published
ideas
on
decision-making
in
Sources
of
Power
,
but
were
expressed
to
me
personally
in
an
email.
He
was
generously
responding
to
a
list
of
questions
I
had
forwarded
to
Mr.
Buzz
Reed,
President
&
CEO
of
Klein
and
Associates.
Mr.
Reed
was
kind
enough
to
forward
them
to
Dr.
Klein.
102
Ibid.
103
FM
100-34,
3-1.
104
Ibid.,
3-2.
105
Ibid.,
3-6.
106
Ibid,
3-7.
107
Ibid.,
6-1.
108
U.S.
Army
Research
Institute
for
the
Behavioral
and
Social
Sciences,
Review
of
Command
and
Control
Models
and
Theory
(Alexandria,
VA:
1987-89),
vii.
109
Ibid,
viii.
110
Ibid,
90.
Olmstead
and
his
various
collaborators
introduced
the
concept
of
an
adaptive
coping
cycle
to
C2
research,
and
demonstrated
that
the
effectiveness
of
a
command
post
depended
largely
on
the
competence
of
the
staff.
111
Ibid,
20.
"Olmstead
and
his
coworkers
transformed
the
adaptive
coping
cycle
concept
from
organizational
theory
to
the
command
and
control
research
area.
Representative
models
in
this
class
do
not
appear,
however,
to
be
based
on
the
adaptive
coping
cycle
concept...
It
appears
that
a
Naval
War
College
study
by
Maillefert
describes
a
command
control
model
which
includes
both
a
decision-making
process
and
an
interaction
with
the
environment.
According
to
Maillefert,
the
decision-making
process
requires
the
use
of
information
and
communication
systems.
The
decision
process
itself
includes
a
definition
of
the
problem,
diagnoses,
search
for
information,
development
of
options,
and
the
selection
of
a
course
of
action;
these
steps
are
not
very
different
from
many
of
the
other
military
decision
making
models."
112
Ibid,
21.
113
Ibid.
Because
the
Lawson
model
could
be
applied
to
a
command
post
or
headquarters,
it
could
be
considered
as
an
organizational
or
individual
decision-making
process.
This
is
an
attempt
to
resolve
an
identified
tension
between
the
two
types
of
entities
and
decision-making
models.
114
Ibid.
115
Ibid,
23.
Orr
referenced
Boyd's
unpublished
"Patterns
of
Conflict"
in
his
July
1983
thesis
noting
that
Boyd's
thoughts
had
appeared
in
discussions
by
other
authors
including
Fallows
(1981).
116
Ibid,
91.
68

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Command,
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.
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W.W.
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1995.
Androle,
Stephen
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and
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eds.
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James
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