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A
Critique
of
The
Boyd
Theory
-
Is
It
Relevant
to
the
Army?
A
Monograph
By
Major
Robert
B.
Polk
United
States
Army
School
of
Advanced
Military
Studies
United
States
Army
Command
and
General
Staff
College
Fort
Leavenworth,
Kansas
First
Term
AY99-00
20000321
033
Approved
for
Public
Release;
Distribution
is
Unlimited
DTIC
QUALITY
INSPECTED
3
SCHOOL
OF
ADVANCED
MILITARY
STUDIES
MONOGRAPH
APPROVAL
Major
Robert
B.
Polk
Title
of
Monograph:
A
Critique
of
The
Boyd
Theory
-
Is
It
Relevant
to
the
Army?
Approved
by:
James
Schneider,
Ph.D.
Monograph
Director
Col.
Robin
P.
Swan,
MMAS
Director,
School
of
Advanced
Military
Studies
Dr.
Robert
Berlin,
Ph.D.
Director,
Graduate
Degree
Program
Accepted
this
15
Day
of
December
1999
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
Page
I.
Introduction:
Relevance
and
Implications
1
II.
Setting
the
Stage:
Boyd's
Theories
on
Conflict
and
Competition
7
III.
The
Boyd
Theory
in
Action
18
IV.
Synthesis
and
Conclusion
32
AppendixA
C2
and
Boyd's
Theory
44
Figures:
1.
Boyd's
Initial
OODA
Loop
Model
8
2.
Boyd's
Final
OODA
Loop
Model
8
Endnotes
55
Bibliography
64
ABSTRACT
A
CRITIQUE
OF
THE
BOYD
THEORY—IS
IT
RELEVANT
TO
THE
ARMY?
By
Maj
Robert
B.
Polk,
68
pages
Col.
John
Boyd,
USAF
(Ret),
famous
for
developing
the
OODA
(Observe-Orient-
Decide-Act)
loop
model,
spent
most
of
his
adult
life
trying
to
convince
the
U.S.
military
establishment
of
the
merits
of
his
theory
for
maneuver
warfare
later
called
the
Boyd
Theory.
With
the
exception
of
the
Marine
Corps,
his
message
found
only
limited
appeal.
Most
of
the
services
incorporated
his
four-step
model
into
their
doctrine
simply
to
help
describe
the
military
command
and
control
process.
In
contrast,
the
Marine
Corps
accepted
his
completed
thoughts
as
a
theory
of
warfare
and
adopted
it
as
the
basis
for
their
capstone
operational
philosophy.
This
paper
explores
the
complete
theory
espoused
by
Col.
John
Boyd
in
an
attempt
to
uncover
the
true
meanings
behind
the
famous
model.
The
intent
is
to
determine
what
it
is
and
whether
it
has
any
utility
to
Army
operational
philosophy.
This
monograph
begins
with
an
exploration
of
the
first
question—what
is
the
Boyd
Theory?
To
many
it
is
simply
the
OODA
loop
depicting
the
human
behavioral
cycle
of
decision-making.
To
others
it
is
a
description
of
command
and
control.
To
true
believers,
it
is
a
profound
theory
of
warfare.
To
answer
this
question,
this
study
begins
with
a
review
of
several
primary
source
documents
including
Boyd's
1976
unpublished
essay
entitled
Destruction
and
Creation
to
discern
the
basic
elements
of
his
theory.
Building
on
this,
the
study
explores
the
remaining
unpublished
primary
source
writings
(slide
presentations)
that
Boyd
developed
over
a
period
of
approximately
10
years
to
understand
the
completed
form
of
his
theory.
After
establishing
a
base
knowledge
of
his
theory,
the
study
measures
Boyd's
ideas
against
those
of
several
recent
critics.
The
monograph
concludes
that
the
Boyd
Theory
is
primarily
a
conception
of
human
interaction
in
conflict.
As
such,
his
ideas
encompass
both
the
process
of
command
and
control
and
the
ideas
behind
maneuver
warfare.
More
importantly,
Boyd
offers
the
broader
conceptualizations
of
how
to
think
about
modern
military
operations.
It
is
in
this
broader
context
that
the
Boyd
Theory
is
best
viewed.
It
offers
useful
perspectives
to
an
Army
in
search
of
a
comprehensive
operational
philosophy.
To
begin
with,
the
Boyd
theory
implicitly
encourages
a
dynamic
approach
to
strategic
and
operational
thinking
in
the
nature
of
Gestalt.
This
contrasts
with
the
inherently
analytical
nature
of
Army
planning
and
decision-making.
While
recognizing
the
necessity
of
analysis,
Boyd
expounds
on
current
operational
theory
to
further
the
role
of
synthesis
as
an
enabler
to
intuition.
It
is
perhaps
this
in-depth
exploration
of
synthesis
as
the
element
of
the
Orientation
phase
in
the
OODA
loop
that
represents
his
most
profound
contribution
to
the
body
of
Army
operational
thinking.
Synthesis
is
the
key
to
a
broader
understanding
of
his
ideas.
Synthesis,
as
a
tool
to
help
make
sense
of
emerging
realities,
enables
one
to
adapt
appropriately
to
complex
and
uncertain
environments.
According
to
Boyd,
doing
this
faster
than
the
enemy
allows
one
to
achieve
the
requisite
advantage
of
getting
inside
an
adversary's
moral-mental-time
cycle.
Coupled
with
increased
freedoms
for
subordinate
decision-making,
these
operating
approaches
can
combine
to
help
friendly
forces
take
advantage
of
the
discontinuities
of
unforeseen
and
unfolding
events.
Contrary
to
popular
critiques,
the
ability
to
out
OODA
an
opponent
while
difficult
to
execute
has
application
in
the
Army
precisely
because
of
the
unique
frictions
of
ground
operations.
Predating
Dr.
Henry
Mintzberg's
writings
in
the
Rise
and
Fall
of
Strategic
Planning,
Boyd
also
implicitly
warns
of
the
pitfalls
in
strategic
and
operational
formulation.
In
true
Clausewitzian
fashion,
Boyd
cautions
against
the
false
notions
of
predetermination
(Mintzberg)
in
operational
thinking.
Equally
important,
Boyd
encourages
aggressive
engagement
of
elements
in
both
the
internal
and
external
environments
in
an
effort
to
stay
outwardly
focused.
Boyd's
insistence
on
the
outward
orientation
contributes
to
the
notion
of
staying
properly
plugged
in
to
on-going
operational
realities
while
formulating
future
actions.
In
this
sense,
the
Boyd
Theory
addresses
Mintzberg's
warning
against
detachment
of
forward-looking
planners
from
the
shifting
sands
of
current
operations.
Boyd
encourages
constant
repositioning
of
mental
models
to
more
quickly
adjust
and
respond
to
emerging
strategies
than
an
opponent.
This
has
the
added
affect
of
creating
a
mind-set
more
predisposed
to
fighting
the
opponent
rather
than
the
plan.
Boyd's
understanding
of
pattern
recognition
also
supports
well
Dr.
Gary
Klein's
encouragement
of
naturalistic
or
intuitive
decision-making
in
time-sensitive
situations.
Boyd
offers
few
practical
guidelines
but
his
logic
is
sound
and
his
message
is
sorely
under
appreciated
in
the
Army
today.
Boyd
also
contributes
to
modern
operational
philosophy
with
his
warnings
against
relying
on
hard
data
for
solutions
to
military
problems
in
what
is
essentially
a
human
endeavor.
This
emphasis
on
the
human
aspects
of
conflict
and
competition
so
often
lost
in
today's
notions
of
C4ISR
deserves
special
recognition.
As
the
Army
gets
smaller
and
learns
to
act
faster
and
farther
in
more
complex
environments,
Boyd's
ideas
offer
great
insights
into
dealing
with
adversity.
The
Boyd
Theory
is
less
a
call
for
emasculation
of
current
Army
doctrine
than
a
warning
to
resist
existing
inclinations.
It
is
not
whether
the
modern
Army
operational
paradigm
fails
to
provide
a
process
for
thinking
through
issues,
it
is
the
fact
that
it
does
that
makes
the
Boyd
Theory
all
the
more
attractive.
By
adhering
to
the
process,
Army
leaders
may
fail
to
recognize
and
respond
quickly
to
the
important
subtleties
inherent
in
the
ever-shifting
realities
of
military
operations.
In
the
final
analysis,
the
Boyd
Theory
as
a
major
contributor
to
the
modern
maneuver
warfare
movement
has
even
more
to
offer
the
Army
at
the
turn
of
the
century
than
ever
before.
SECTION
1
INTRODUCTION—RELEVANCE
AND
IMPLICATIONS
Since
his
death
in
1997,
Col.
John
Boyd's
(USAF
Ret.)
OODA
loop
theory
of
warfare
has
generated
a
revival
of
interest
among
military
theorists
and
practitioners.
His
simple
construct
for
conflict
and
competition
resonates
well
with
those
in
search
of
new
paradigms
for
dealing
with
the
impending
complexity
and
dynamism
of
the
twenty-first
century.
Yet,
while
some
armed
services
embrace
his
theory
as
a
viable
operational
concept,
others
continue
to
relegate
Boyd's
OODA
loop
(Observe,
Orient,
Decide,
Act)
to
a
simple
tactical
device
for
decision-making.
This
paper
seeks
to
uncover
the
true
meaning
behind
the
design
of
Boyd's
Loop
in
an
attempt
to
determine
its
relevance
to
the
Army's
concept
of
operations.
The
OODA
loop
found
its
genesis
from
observations
of
fighter
pilot
actions
over
the
skies
of
Korea.
Boyd
theorized
that
the
Americans'
increased
ability
to
observe,
orient,
decide,
and
act
from
the
bubble-shaped
canopy
of
their
F-86
Sabre
enabled
them
to
defeat
the
superior
Chinese-flown
MIG-15's.
The
American
pilots'
ability
to
defeat
an
adversary
through
"fast
transient
maneuvers"
formed
the
basis
of
his
future
theories
on
conflict.
Building
on
this
insight,
Col.
Boyd
in
retirement
absorbed
himself
in
the
further
study
of
military
theory
and
history
during
a
period
of
15
years
between
1977
and
1992.
His
basic
theory
developed
into
a
concept
summarized
as
follows:
Conflict
can
be
seen
as
time-competitive
observation-orientated-decision-
action
cycles.
Each
party
to
a
conflict
begins
by
observing.
He
observes
himself,
his
physical
surrounding
and
his
enemy.
On
the
basis
of
his
observation,
he
orients,
that
is
to
say,
he
makes
a
mental
image
or
"snapshot"
of
his
situation.
On
the
basis
of
this
orientation,
he
makes
a
decision.
He
puts
the
decision
in
to
effect,
i.e.,
he
acts.
Then
because
he
assumes
his
action
has
changed
the
situation,
he
observes
again,
and
starts
6
the
process
anew...
With
each
action,
the
slower
party's
action
is
inappropriate
by
a
larger
time
margin.
Even
though
he
desperately
strives
to
do
something
that
will
work,
each
action
is
less
useful
than
its
predecessor;
he
falls
farther
and
farther
behind.
Ultimately,
he
ceases
to
be
effective.'
In
the
end,
he
concluded
that
the
OODA
loop
applied
equally
well
to
ground
combat
as
to
air-to-air
maneuvers.
This
not-so-subtle
shift
from
tactical
fighter
pilot
metaphors
to
operational
and
strategic
theory
found
its
voice
as
the
"Boyd
Theory."
2
As
an
extension
of
the
OODA
metaphor,
the
Boyd
Theory
along
with
the
German
example
became
the
backbone
of
the
modern
maneuver
warfare
movement.
Never
attempting
publication,
Boyd
instead
developed
a
compelling
five-part
series
of
briefings
he
called
Discourses
on
Winning
and
Losing
to
convince
audiences
of
generals,
politicians,
scientists,
journalists,
and
academics
of
the
full
merits
of
his
theories
for
ground
combat.
The
world
of
military
theorists
took
notice.
One
in
particular,
William
S.
Lind,
former
advisor
on
military
affairs
for
U.S.
Senator
Gary
Hart
and
President
of
the
Military
Reform
Institute,
noted
his
enthusiastic
support
of
Boyd's
ideas
in
his
book,
Maneuver
Warfare
Handbook.
Lind
codified
Boyd's
theory
into
practical
application
specifically
tailored
to
the
Marine
Corps.
Citing
Boyd's
observations
of
ground
conflict
from
Leuctra
to
Vicksburg
and
the
Ardennes,
Lind
promulgated
his
own
theory
of
maneuver
warfare
imbued
with
the
Boyd
Theory
and
the
German
example.
He
argued
in
general
terms
that
future
ground
combat
would
be
dominated
by
those
who
could
decentralize
their
actions,
accept
confusion
and
disorder
while
avoiding
all
patterns
and
formulas
of
predictive
behavior.
3
These
would
combine
to
generate
abilities
to
"out-OODA"
the
enemy.
The
Marine
Corps
whole-heartedly
embraced
the
idea
of
winning
in
the
time-
competitive
observation-orientation-decision-action
cycle,
recognizing
the
advantages
it
could
bring
to
a
service
which
often
fought
first
and
outnumbered.
Major
General
A.
M.
Gray
as
Commandant
of
the
Marine
Corps
made
it
official
when
he
adopted
William
Lind's
interpretation
of
Boyd's
maneuver
warfare
theory
as
Marine
Corps
doctrine
and
guaranteed
its
publication
in
FMFM
1
Warfighting.
4
The
current
Marine
Corps
capstone
manual,
MCDP
1,
gives
equal
if
not
greater
attribution
to
Boyd's
ideas.
5
This
assimilation
of
the
Boyd
Theory
by
the
services
has
not
been
limited
to
the
Marine
Corps.
The
Navy
and
Air
Force
combine
efforts
in
addressing
the
OODA
loop
in
varying
ways
and
degrees.
The
Navy's
manual
on
command
and
control,
NDP
6,
explicitly
states
that
the
naval
commander's
decision
and
execution
cycle
is
the
OODA
loop.
The
manual
goes
on
to
depict
a
two-sided
OODA
loop
model
relating
enemy
and
friendly
decision
cycles.
Interestingly,
of
all
the
services,
the
Air
Force
seems
the
least
interested
in
incorporating
Boyd's
theories
into
its
doctrine.
The
Air
Force
defines
the
OODA
as
a
theory
"contending
[the
author's
emphasis]
that
one
can
depict
all
rational
human
behavior,
individual
and
organizational,
as
a
continual
cycling
through
four
distinct
tasks:
O-O-D-A."
6
With
this,
the
Air
Force
consigns
the
Boyd
Theory
to
that
of
social
science
rather
than
a
fighting
doctrine.
Its
capstone
operational
doctrine,
AFDD
1,
gives
but
brief
reference
to
the
OODA
and
only
in
the
context
of
using
information
dominance
to
support
this
cyclical
behavior.
In
a
contrasting
perspective,
LTC
David
Fadok
argues
that
the
theories
of
both
Boyd
and
Col.
John
A.
Warden
have
formed
as
complimentary
concepts
and
in
fact,
manifest
themselves
equally
in
the
very
fabric
of
Air
Force
operational
philosophy.
7
Regardless
of
the
particular
bias,
few
can
disagree
that
the
Boyd
Theory
continues
to
influence
sister
service
doctrine.
In
contrast
to
the
Navy
and
the
Marine
Corps
in
particular,
Boyd's
OODA
loop
finds
only
occasional
explicit
reference
in
Army
doctrine.
According
to
its
lead
writer,
the
1999
draft
FM
100-34,
Command
and
Control,
is
the
first
and
only
Army
field
manual
to
depict
Boyd's
ideas
in
the
main
body
of
its
text.
Even
so,
the
FM
only
briefly
notes
that
the
OODA
loop,
"demonstrates
the
validity
and
need
for
accomplishing
the
multiple
cycles
in
deciding
and
acting
before
the
enemy
can
effectively
react
to
friendly
actions."
8
Interestingly,
the
FM
goes
on
to
warn,
"there
are
some
cautions
to
applying
it
directly
to
land
forces..
.it
vastly
simplifies
an
extremely
complicated
process..
."
9
The
Army
seems
purposely
out
of
step
with
other
services
in
application
of
Boyd's
theory.
As
we
will
see,
however,
this
is
more
perception
than
reality.
The
Boyd
Theory
and
it
more
famous
cousin,
the
OODA
loop,
are
no
strangers
to
critics
led
by
land
warfare
proponents
who
resist
the
notion
of
simplistic
approaches
to
operations
in
ground
combat.
Army
Captain
Robert
L.
Bateman,
in
a
recent
rebuttal
to
Boyd's
land
warfare
enthusiasts,
suggests
that
the
weakness
of
the
OODA
loop
lies
in
its
misunderstanding
of
the
unique
complexities
and
friction
of
ground
operations.
Bateman
argues
that
armies
rarely
make
singular
"observations"
about
the
enemy
from
perfect
and
direct
intelligence
as
a
fighter
pilot
might
from
a
cockpit.
Moreover,
Bateman
insists
that
operational-level
Army
commanders
can
never
directly
initiate
"actions"
against
an
opponent
but
rather
must
issue
directions
to
subordinates
that
set
off
OODA
cycles
at
lower
levels.
1
0
The
writers
of
FM
100-34
agree
and
quote
Bateman
as
further
evidence
as
to
the
limited
utility
of
the
OODA
loop
in
Army
doctrine.
9
The
challenge
in
accepting
Boyd's
ideas
often
stems
from
difficulty
in
defining
what
his
theory
represents.
References
to
it
as
either
the
Boyd
Theory
or
the
OODA
loop
adds
to
the
misunderstanding.
LTC
David
S.
Fadok
attempts
to
ameliorate
the
situation
when
he
writes,
Boyd's
theory
of
conflict
advocates
a
form
of
maneuver
warfare
that
is
more
psychological
and
temporal
in
its
orientation
than
physical
and
spatial...
[His]
theory
of
maneuvering
inside
the
enemy's
mental
process,
as
depicted
by
the
OODA
loop
model
is
more
philosophical,
abstract,
and
nonlinear.
He
recognizes
the
uncertainty
of
war
and
the
subsequent
need
for
mental
agility
and
creativity—in
short,
genius.
n
This
statement
begins
to
describe
the
essence
of
Boyd's
contributions
to
modern
military
theory.
Boyd
himself
would
likely
suggest
that
any
interpretation
derive
primarily
from
his
theories
about
maneuver
warfare.
Command
and
control
and
decision-making
are
subordinated
to
these
maneuver
concepts.
In
a
Clausewitzian
sense,
Boyd
would
also
likely
characterize
himself
as
someone
interested
in
the
heuristic
rather
than
prescriptive
Jominian
approach
to
warfare
theory.
As
did
Clausewitz,
Boyd
may
have
understood:
No
prescriptive
formulation
universal
enough
to
deserve
the
name
of
law
can
be
applied
to
the
constant
change
and
diversity
of
the
phenomena
of
war..
.Theory
should
be
studied
not
doctrine..
.It
is
meant
to
educate
the
mind
of
the
future
commander
or,
more
accurately,
to
guide
him
in
his
self-education
not
to
accompany
him
to
the
battlefield.
12
Unfortunately,
this
less
than
definitive
approach
leaves
the
Boyd
Theory
open
to
functional
misinterpretations.
Following
Boyd's
death,
in
a
farewell
article
in
honor
of
his
friend
and
compatriot
of
27
years,
Franklin
Spinney
addressed
other
popular
misconceptions
and
criticisms
regarding
the
simplicity
of
the
OODA
loop
and
those
who
questioned
its
relevance.
He
illuminated
the
sophistication
behind
the
OODA
construct
by
reiterating
the
claim
that
10
the
"key
to
appreciating
the
power
of
Boyd's
idea
is
to
understand
why
the
Orientation
function
is
the
door
through
which
a
competitor
can
penetrate
his
opponent's
decision
cycle."
I3
According
to
Spinney,
Boyd
understood
that
an
individual
or
group
uses
mental
models
to
orient
to
the
external
environment.
Consequently,
Boyd
believed
that
the
strength
of
the
OODA
was
in
its
ability
to
destroy
the
enemy's
paradigm
of
reality,
while
simultaneously
denying
him
the
opportunity
to
synthesize
a
new
paradigm
(creating
new
patterns
of
knowledge
when
existing
patterns
do
not
permit
the
understanding
needed
to
cope
with
novel
circumstances).
1
4
For
Boyd,
time
and
space
seemed
relative
leaving
plenty
of
room
for
exploiting
enemy
decision-cycles.
As
he
analyzed
ground
operations,
he
concluded
that
the
inherent
friction
of
ground
combat
actually
helped
to
set
up
advantageous
friendly
situations
for
such
exploitations.
Boyd
still
attracts
critics
and
advocates
each
with
their
own
perspective
on
what
he
said
and
what
they
want
to
add.
Yet
it
is
helpful
as
a
point
of
departure
to
note
that
John
Boyd
at
least
acknowledges
one
thing
his
basic
ideas
were
not.
They
were
not
all
new.
In
the
opening
of
his
presentation,
Organic
Designs
for
Command
and
Control,
Boyd
quoted
no
less
than
seven
prominent
historical
figures
from
Sun
Tzu
to
Nathan
Bedford
Forrest
of
their
versions
of
"gittin
thar
the
fustest
with
the
mostest."
The
idea
of
acting
in
time
and
space
faster
and
farther
than
the
enemy
has
been
a
mainstay
in
the
annals
of
military
operations.
Boyd
never
pretended
that
the
basic
ideas
were
new
but
he
felt
the
times
demanded
an
elaboration
and
extension
of
the
root
ideas
into
modern
and
practical
adaptations
of
the
theory.
He
found
a
message
imbedded
within
the
great
thoughts
of
the
past
and
an
audience
eager
for
new
perspectives.
Such
an
audience
was
found
at
the
1996
Cantigny
Leadership
Conference
at
the
Army
War
College.
Here,
11
experts
interested
in
discerning
the
best
model
for
decision-making
for
Army
leaders
in
the
twenty-first
century
debated
the
merits
of
Boyd's
OODA
loop
with
other
prominent
theories.
Billed
primarily
as
a
method
for
decision-making
rather
than
a
comprehensive
warfighting
concept,
the
OODA
loop
nevertheless
piqued
interests
and
demonstrated
the
extent
to
which
Boyd's
theory
had
infiltrated
Army
centers
of
thought.
1
5
Whether
a
construct
of
maneuver
warfare,
a
method
of
command
and
control,
or
a
decision-making
process,
Boyd's
simple
model
belies
its
sophistication.
As
it
experiments
with
such
future
warfighting
concepts
as
the
Army
after
Next's
Strategic
Preclusion
using
dominant
battlespace
knowledge
to
win
quick
decisive
campaigns,
the
Army
can
ill-afford
to
quickly
dismiss
any
new
ways
of
thinking
about
complexity.
1
6
The
review
of
Boyd's
discourses
seeks
to
reveal
the
true
essence
of
his
ideas
in
an
effort
to
determine
the
proper
influence
of
his
theories
on
Army
operational
thought.
In
the
final
analysis,
the
Boyd
Theory
may
prove
substantial
or
insubstantial
but
it
does
deserve
a
second
look.
This
monograph
seeks
to
provide
just
such
a
second
look
from
an
Army
perspective.
SECTION
2
SETTING
THE
STAGE:
JOHN
BOYD'S
THEORIES
ON
CONFLICT
AND
COMPETITION
John
Boyd
never
published
his
works.
Reportedly,
Boyd
felt
that
the
public
might
misinterpret
his
ideas
in
their
present
state
of
on-going
development.
1
7
He
captured
his
thoughts
instead
on
slide
presentations
with
which
he
eagerly
entertained
audiences
in
the
1980's
and
early
1990's.
The
Marine
Corps
University
Research
Archives
in
Quantico,
Virginia
proudly
houses
his
original
documents,
many
of
which
include
these
12
slide
presentations
signed
and
dated
on
the
coversheets
in
Boyd's
own
handwriting.
His
most
ambitious
document,
Discourses
on
Winning
and
Losing,
dated
1987
includes
a
compilation
of
his
seminal
works
such
as
Patterns
of
Conflict,
and
Organic
Design
for
Command
and
Control.
In
each,
he
elaborates
on
his
earlier
ideas
espoused
in
his
1976
essay
entitled
Destruction
and
Creation.
Because
of
his
reluctance
to
publish,
there
exists
a
scarcity
of
public
knowledge
on
the
ideas
behind
the
well-publicized
OODA
loop.
To
many,
the
model
depicted
below
and
its
call
for
observing,
orienting,
deciding,
and
acting
faster
than
the
opponent
is
all
they
will
ever
know
about
the
theory
and
the
man
who
made
it
famous.
1
8
Figure
1
Few
realize
that
his
ideas
continued
to
evolve,
as
did
the
model
of
the
OODA
itself.
By
the
early
1990's
the
model
depicted
in
figure
2
represented
Boyd's
final
attempt
to
convey
his
ideas
visually.
13
The
OODA
"Loop"
Sketch
Observation
Orientation
Click
on
box
to
expand
Decision
Action
Figure
2
Even
the
services
that
revere
his
contributions
fail
to
trace
publicly
the
intricacies
behind
his
simplistic
model
but
perhaps
for
good
reason.
His
rather
eclectic
discourses
on
conflict
and
competition
spanning
the
range
of
human
endeavors
from
man's
basic
survival
instincts
to
the
Indeterminacy
Principle
of
Werner
Heisenberg
challenge
modern
doctrine
and
its
desires
for
easy
reading.
Yet
in
spite
of
Boyd's
unpalatable
presentation,
the
fact
that
he
has
influenced
the
services
remains
undisputed.
As
noted,
Boyd
influenced
each
of
the
sister
services
in
one
way
or
another
over
the
years.
Even
the
Army
felt
the
impact
of
his
ideas
although
seemingly
loath
to
admit
it.
In
1986
the
Army
adopted
a
definition
of
agility
as
one
of
the
four
tenets
of
operations
in
its
maneuver-oriented
Air
Land
Battle
doctrine
which
still
stands
to
today.
Agility
is
the
ability
of
friendly
forces
to
react
faster
than
the
enemy..
.It
is
as
much
a
mental
as
a
physical
quality.
Greater
quickness
permits
the
rapid
concentration
of
friendly
strength
against
enemy
vulnerabilities.
Forces
may
need
to
concentrate
repeatedly
so
that
by
the
time
the
enemy
reacts
to
an
action,
another
has
taken
place,
disrupting
the
enemy's
plans
and
leading
to
late,
uncoordinated,
and
piecemeal
response.
This
process
of
successive
concentration
against
locally
weaker
or
unprepared
enemy
forces
enables
smaller
forces