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The Harm Principle and Global Ethics
Abstract
Various international legal conventions create the obligation not to cause 'serious bodily or mental harm' to members of one's society or to other social groups. The existence of these obligations raises the question of whether widespread aversion to pain and suffering provides the best foundation for 'moral progress' in world politics. Support for a global version of the harm principle is evident in various liberal moral and political writings, but these are vulnerable to two lines of criticism. Some critics have argued that the concept of harm is more complex and elusive than liberals suggest; others that the liberal version of the harm principle is inadequate because it privileges the negative obligation to avoid injury over positive obligations of rescue. Having reviewed these debates, this paper argues for a global version of the harm principle which defends negative and related positive obligations.
... For our purposes, in an interlinked world where sporting events are increasingly being used as 'soft power' generators by non-democratic countries where 'political motivations outweigh the economic rationale' (Cornelissen 2016;13; see also Grix and Brannagan 2016), there is a larger question at stake, posed by Linklater (2006), who draws upon J.S. Mill, to ask: 'whether only those who harm others have a responsibility to do something about it; conversely, it is whether the indifference of the bystander to injuries that others cause should be regarded as harmful in its own right' (339). The demands of the international community that ISAs accept this responsibility have grown in proportion to the growth of ISAs' influence throughout the twentieth century. ...
... FIA, by contrast, has yet to produce a similar policy, having apparently failed to realize that the awarding of sporting events such as Formula 1 Grand Prix to nondemocratic states requires a more comprehensive explanation than brief statements on neutrality. Hence, in light of Linklater's (2006) argument, the examples above demonstrate why the situation requires at least a deliberation of the universality of the FIA's principles as neutrality may flout its global reach: ...
... Given that our interpretation of 'inaction' is viable, our discussion of the three issues with Mill's theory serves to show why the FIA could shift from 'simple' to 'complex' responsibilities as the foundation for their policies. According to Linklater (2006) this means: ...
International sporting associations (ISAs) like the International Federation of Football Associations (FIFA), the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) have throughout the twentieth century promoted political neutrality as a source of autonomy. With FIFA and the IOC’s official adherence to the United Nations’ human rights conventions in 2017, FIA remains one of the few large ISAs where neutrality is not underpinned by a corrective on human rights. However, this position is in conflict with the ethical obligations FIA contracted when it was given full recognition by the IOC in 2013. To discuss this problematic, this paper draws upon J.S. Mill’s On Liberty and the concept of ‘inaction’ as a source for ways in which the FIA might reconsider its current stance.
Abbreviations: IOC (International Olympic Committee); FIA (Federation Internationale de l'Automobile); FIFA (International Federation of Football Associations); ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross); ISA (International Sporting Associations); UEFA (Union of European Football Associations)
... 32 But despite their relative vagueness on economic subtleties, Held's ideas can nevertheless be helpfully applied in this section's examination of the legitimacy conditions of national exercise of monetary sovereignty. 33 Also Andrew Linklater's (2006Linklater's ( , 2011 work on the global harm principle proves useful. Held (2010, 107-110) discusses economic cosmopolitanism as one aspect of his overall vision, alongside legal, political, and cultural aspects. ...
... A cosmopolitan condition on legitimate national exercise of monetary sovereignty can be developed further by viewing it as an instance of a global harm principle (see Linklater 2006Linklater , 2011. In a weak form, this condition would require each state to exercise its monetary sovereignty in a fashion that is (merely) compatible with basic cosmopolitan values and does not harm (interfere with) the ability of other states to conduct their own preferred versions of (similarly cosmopolitan) economic policies. ...
The increasingly influential neochartalist Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) comes with a nation-state-centric framing of politics. The neochartalists argue that many alleged globalisation-related constraints on national economic policy are illusory or seriously overstated. In their view, monetarily sovereign states enjoy substantial autonomy over their fiscal and monetary policy decisions. The neochartalist diagnosis thus seems to undermine cosmopolitan calls for supranational forms of macroeconomic governance. However, this paper argues that if we pay serious attention to a range of subtler obstacles and strategic incentives that apply especially to small currency-issuing states, cosmopolitan aspirations remain well-motivated. Accordingly, the political implications of MMT are reexamined and a case for supranational exercise of monetary sovereignty is made. The paper goes on to demonstrate how the standard state-centric approach to currency privileges can prove counterproductive from the perspective of democratic governance. It is concluded that neochartalism and cosmopolitanism can fruitfully both correct and enrich each other.
... The principle of non-maleficence is the most fundamental and bottom-line ethical principle in bioethics. In today's morally diverse world, this principle serves as a "global ethic" or "universal ethic" that is widely recognized and applied worldwide (Linklater, 2006). The principle of non-maleficence does not require the complete avoidance of harm; instead, it acknowledges that the development of any technology inevitably brings some degree of harm and necessitates weighing potential harms to choose the lesser harm. ...
Background: In recent years, biomedicine has witnessed rapid advancements in applying synthetic biology. While these advancements have brought numerous benefits to patients, they have also given rise to a series of safety concerns.
Methods: This article provides a succinct overview of the current research on synthetic biology’s application in biomedicine and systematically analyzes the safety risks associated with this field. Based on this analysis, the article proposes fundamental principles for addressing these issues and presents practical recommendations for ethical governance.
Results: This article contends that the primary safety risks associated with the application of synthetic biology in biomedicine include participant safety, biosafety risks, and biosecurity risks. In order to effectively address these risks, it is essential to adhere to the principles of human-centeredness, non-maleficence, sustainability, and reasonable risk control. Guided by these fundamental principles and taking into account China’s specific circumstances, this article presents practical recommendations for ethical governance, which include strengthening ethical review, promoting the development and implementation of relevant policies, improving legal safeguards through top-level design, and enhancing technical capabilities for biocontainment.
Conclusion: As an emerging field of scientific technology, synthetic biology presents numerous safety risks and challenges in its application within biomedicine. In order to address these risks and challenges, it is imperative that appropriate measures be implemented. From a Chinese perspective, the solutions we propose serve not only to advance the domestic development of synthetic biology but also to contribute to its global progress.
... Yet the debate also suggests that there may be more progressive and more regressive forms of securitisation. Thus, securitisation may be considered progressive if it leads to a widening of security that allows threats to be tackled that would otherwise lead to unnecessary harm (Linklater 2006), while at the same time avoiding the exclusion of those who disagree from the political process. Such an understanding of progressive securitisation will always imply a deepening of security as well, as it is individuals (and possibly other, non-human beings) that suffer from harm, not states. ...
This paper contributes to the debate about the normative assessment of securitisation in light of Covid-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It develops the distinction of progressive and regressive securitisation. In doing so, it emphasises the processual, contextual and ambiguous nature of securitisation. I suggest that progressive securitisation is closely linked to the solidarisation, whereas regressive securitisation implies the pluralisation of international society. The two cases of Covid-19 and Russia illustrate that international order has increasingly been characterised by regressive securitisation and a pluralisation of international society, despite possible alternatives, such as a transnational response to the spread of Covid-19. They have thus contributed to the further demise of the post–Cold War liberal order, which despite its problems, has involved a re-orientation of security away from state territory and national identity as the core referent objects. I end with a plea to take the ethics of security more seriously again, and in particular to scrutinise the ways in which our own behaviour reinforces regressive securitisation.
... Or are they at most wrongful behaviors moral agents should avoid, but not ones that generate harms, or have particular relevance to assessment of medical practice? In this section, we look to other areas of philosophy that have generated more explicit discussions of the nature of harm than bioethics, most notably legal philosophy (Harman, 1981;Feinberg, 1984;Linklater, 2006;Dan-Cohen, 2009;Simpson, 2013). ...
Patient safety is a central aspect of healthcare quality, focusing on preventable, iatrogenic harm. Harm, in this context, is typically assumed to mean physical injury to patients, often caused by technical error. However, some contributions to the patient safety literature have argued that disrespectful behavior towards patients can cause harm, even when it does not lead to physical injury. This paper investigates the nature of such dignitary harms and explores whether they should be included within the scope of patient safety as a field of practice. We argue that dignitary harms in health care are—at least sometimes—preventable, iatrogenic harms. While we caution against including dignitary harms within the scope of patient safety just because they are relevantly similar to other iatrogenic harms, we suggest that thinking about dignitary harms can help to elucidate the value of patient safety, and to illuminate the evolving relationship between safety and quality.
... First, the American discourse of rights is no longer complemented with any discussion of duties and responsibilities, narratives which were central to the Revolution and to continental European political thought (Bailyn 1992, Glendon 1991, Smith 1997. Even within the classical liberal or libertarian tradition itself, there are limits to the exercise of individual rights and those limits are often dictated by the likely harm that could come to other people (Mill 2002, Linklater 2006). However, the contemporary "rights talk" pays little if any attention to harms resulting from individuals' exercising their various "rights." ...
American politics is characterized by two trends: social problems are framed as issues of competing rights which tends to obscure the costs and obligations associated with the exercise of individual rights, and partisan sorting has led to partisan polarization. This study claims that when issues are framed in terms of partisan rights, partisans are likely to assert co-partisans’ “rights” to engage in socially destructive behavior but deny the same “rights” to out-partisans. We test these hypotheses using three framing experiments referencing both politicized and non-political issues. The results show that partisans deny out-partisans’ right not to wear a mask, but assert co-partisans’ right to smoke in public. When it comes to a partisan right to own guns over out-partisans’ right to be free of gun violence, Republicans both deny democrats gun rights and assert their own, while Democrats only deny Republicans’ right to arms.
... Therefore, engagement in a cosmopolitan context requires more "nearness … to vulnerable, suffering, disadvantaged others" (Dobson 2006, 171). In order to operationalize the "nearness" to unknown (and sometimes unreachable) persons, it is essential-according to Andrew Linklater-to examine two very different mechanisms: the first has to do with "emotional dispositions" and empathy; the second consists of a much stronger model, that of the "cosmopolitan emotions" that are likely to surface when the actors become aware that they are causally responsible (even indirectly) for harming others and their physical environment (Linklater 2006;Dobson 2006). ...
Since the beginning of his mandate, Pope Francis has used
the concept of periphery as a metaphor of social
marginality. However, the notion of periphery also seems
to target the asymmetries generated by the liberal version
of globalization. An alternative way to analyze the role of
religions consists in considering them as agencies
defending the perspective of a universal community,
putting into question the national political boundaries and
contesting the existing global order.
In this context, it is of utmost interest to assess the
theoretical and pragmatic implications for international
relations and world politics of the new holistic approach to
environmental challenges articulated by Pope Francis in
the Encyclical Laudato Si’, particularly through the notion
of “integral ecology”.
... Therefore, engagement in a cosmopolitan context requires more "nearness … to vulnerable, suffering, disadvantaged others" (Dobson 2006, p. 171). In order to operationalize the "nearness" to unknown (and sometimes unreachable) persons, it is essentialaccording to Andrew Linklater-to examine two very different mechanisms: the first has to do with "emotional dispositions" and empathy; the second consists of a much stronger model, that of the "cosmopolitan emotions" that are likely to surface when the actors become aware that they are causally responsible (even indirectly) for harming others and their physical environment (Linklater 2006;Dobson 2006). ...
This paper analyzes the theoretical and pragmatic implications for international relations and world politics of the new holistic approach to climate change articulated by Pope Francis in the Encyclical Laudato Si’, particularly through the notion of “integral ecology”. It is not my intention to offer an exegesis of the Papal document. I will rather try to illustrate and discuss its planetary hermeneutics. I emphasize that the Encyclical’s perspective is not exclusively normative, and that, within the dynamic interplay between social structure and human agency, it can also be considered as a call to action. In this context, I suggest that both International Relations Theory and global politics have much to learn from the fundamental claims of contemporary religions in relation to climate disruption. In particular, Pope Francis’ document, far from being just a new chapter in the unfolding process of the “greening” of religions, raises the issue of the sustainability of the present world system. Therefore, I contend that the perspective of the Encyclical calls for a radical transformation of international relations, since it emphasizes the deep implications of environmental issues on the entire spectrum of security, development, economic and ethical challenges of contemporary world politics. Against this backdrop, my objective is to connect the main tenets of the Encyclical to the environmental turn in International Relations Theory and to the new epistemological challenges related to the paradigm shift induced by the new planetary condition of the Anthropocene and the relevant questions arising for a justice encompassing the humanity-earth system. The Encyclical seems to suggest that practicing sustainable international relations means exiting the logic of power or hegemony, while simultaneously operationalizing the concept of care.
... Similar to anti-cosmopolitan positions in IPT, pluralists would opt for some minimal duties to assist needy states. Linklater (2006) develops his concept of "harm conventions" as a possible compromise to bridge the gap in the English School, which would acknowledge some minimal common duty among human beings and states to protect people from gross injustices such as genocide. States might be able to agree on a consensus regarding how to avoid harm rather than aiming at "some universalizable conception of the good life which should be promoted everywhere" (Linklater 2001, p. 267). ...
The introductory chapter outlines the rationale of the volume and the shared conceptual approach of the chapters. It situates the specific focus of the book on empirically observable justice conflicts and their consequences within the broader literature on justice, peace, and global governance, provides shared definitions of key terms, and sketches the research questions addressed jointly by all contributors. The introduction presents key insights and overarching research findings and concludes with a brief summary of the book’s chapters.
... Moreover, it is not quite apparent to me why, from a practical point of view, we should spend much time with debating the precise nature and historical origins of an injustice. Above all, we should focus on avoiding further harm (Linklater, 2002(Linklater, , 2007. Just take, as a final example, climate change: Is it an interactional or structural injustice? ...
Catherine Lu’s seminal Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics is right to stress the enduring nature of some colonialist structural indignities. It is less clear, however, if structural injustices justify Lu’s demand for revolutionary changes of the global order. Before transforming the pluralist state-centric system, we need transparent criteria that help us agree on the severity of structural injustices. Considering Lu’s strong focus on the colonialist origins of contemporary injustices, one would also like to know if and how their historical background affects their present moral status. The essay concludes that, in a multicultural global society with diverse moral values, we should focus on tackling the most glaring injustices and on rectifying those where accountabilities are least controversial.
... Avoiding harm is rooted in the utilitarian argument that minimising harm to members of society promotes the general welfare or well-being of society. This avoidance of harm is widely regarded as a universal norm that applies to all human activities (Linklater, 2006). Applying this principle to entrepreneurial settings poses particular challenges. ...
... Indeed, Article 2b of the 1948 Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and Article 2a (ii) of the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid created national obligations not to cause serious harm to ethnic and other groups. These international prohibitions of harm, among other prohibitions (e.g., The United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights), suggest that certain forms of harm should be eliminated from international society (see Linklater, 2006). Such prohibitions are a giant step forward for human coexistence. ...
Although victimized groups have a need to recover diminished power, perpetrator groups are often reluctant to support actions that may undermine their own systemic advantages. We hypothesized that perpetrator group members’ experience of empathetic collective angst—a group-based emotion focused on concern for the future vitality of an outgroup—mediates the relation between the perception of threat to the future of the victimized group and support for policies that may satisfy the group’s empowerment. Across 5 studies and 3 distinct intergroup contexts (victimization of Aboriginal Canadians by non-Aboriginal Canadians, Native Americans by non-Native Americans, and French Canadians by Anglophone Canadians), we showed that perpetrator group members who perceive (Study 1) or are manipulated to perceive (Studies 2–5) that the victimized group is under existential threat (vs. secure) experience greater empathetic collective angst for the victimized group. In no study did perceived existential threat to the victimized group influence collective guilt—a group-based emotion focused on illegitimate harms committed against an outgroup. Empathetic collective angst mediated the relation between perceived existential threat and support for victimized group empowerment (e.g., self-determination). Study 4 found that the relation between empathetic collective angst and support for victimized group empowerment was stronger among perpetrator group members than bystander group members. A synthesis of the findings showed that the indirect effect was statistically significant across studies. Results suggest that, in the aftermath of victimization, empathetic collective angst motivates perpetrator group members to support policies that may satisfy victims’ power needs.
... For defences of this principle, including discussion of how "harm" should be understood in a global context, seeLinklater (2006) and Vernon (2010: ch. 7). Rainer Bauböck -9781526105257 Downloaded from manchesteropenhive.com at 12/13/2018 05:15:31PM via free access ...
... This holistic emphasis requires that the self-realized Ecological Self should not act without understanding how that action will afect other living beings. An understanding of the unintended consequences of actions is the equivalent of the liberal harm principle [52,53]. To go from an understanding of unintended environmental consequences (i.e., humans as stressors) to an inclusion of ecosystems and ecological understanding in well-being (i.e., humans as part of ecosystems) is a logical and fairly straightforward thought process. ...
... 195 Contrary to the immutability associated with Huntington's thesis, CIT puts forward an emancipatory claim that affirms the human capacity to learn from harmful experiences. 196 The emancipatory claim of CIT is both constitutive and prescriptive. Linklater writes, This is partly a constitutive claim; to follow such a path is to become civil. ...
... The second is the nature of harm. Moral arguments as to the nature of harm-most notably in the liberal tradition (Linklater, 2006)-do not consider harm to non-humans, so the extension of the concept of harm to "structures, systems, or living beings" (Rid, 2013: 37) is philosophically problematic (also, Arimatsu, 2012: 97). "Harm" in this context must include the related concepts of "damage" or "impairment", which do apply to nonhumans and non-sentient systems. ...
Cyberweapons are a relatively new addition to the toolbox of contemporary conflict but have the potential to destabilize international relations. Since Stuxnet (a malicious computer worm) in 2010 demonstrated how computer code could be weaponised to generate political effect, cyberweapons have increasingly been discussed in terms of potential regulation and prohibition. Most analyses focus on how global institutions and regimes might be developed to regulate the development and use of cyberweapons and identify the political and technical obstacles to fulfilling this ambition. This focus on centralized authority obscures identification of existing governance efforts in this field, which together constitute an emerging global governance architecture for offensive cyber capabilities. This article explores three sources of cyberweapons governance—cyberwarfare, cybercrime and export controls on dual-use technologies—and briefly describes their political dynamics and prospects. It is argued that although fragmented, the global governance of cyberweapons should not be dismissed on this basis. Fragmentation is a condition of global governance, not its antithesis, and policy should respect this fragmentation instead of regarding it as an impediment to further development of cyberweapons governance. This article is published as part of a collection on global governance.
... On the other hand, however, discursive constructions are not better from a normative point of view simply because they are marginalised. In fact, limitations may be a good thing if they prevent harm from being done and if it is accepted that 'all human beings have a prima facie moral obligation not to harm each other' (Linklater, 2006: 343). ...
This article discusses the relevance of discourse in the analysis of EU foreign policy. Instead of using discourse as a structure, the discursive struggles in meaning production are emphasised. The article argues that the literature trying to make a contribution to the explanation of EU foreign policy has so far overemphasised the positive function of discourses in influencing policies in their substance. In contrast, the article focuses on the delimiting function of discourses in providing the boundaries of the kinds of policies which can be legitimately pursued. From this point of view, important discursive struggles take place exactly about these limits, and it is only through the setting of these limits that identities and norms are provided with clearer meanings. The article illustrates this framework by focusing on the debate about normative power Europe. It argues that an important aspect of this debate which has been missing from the literature so far is that it is indeed engaging in a struggle over what is acceptable as a policy of a normative power and is what not, and that it is therefore engaged in setting the limits of legitimate EU foreign policy.
... Third, various combinations of these indicators have been used by scholars in cross-country studies of ethics (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997;Helliwell, 2003;Letki, 2006;Franke and Nadler, 2008;DeClercq and Dakhli, 2009;James, 2006James, , 2011. Fourth, since avoiding harm is widely regarded as a universal norm that applies to all human activities (Linklater, 2006), this measure captures how people think about the appropriateness of actions that either directly or indirectly result in harm to others (e.g., inappropriately claiming government benefits and cheating on taxes reduces public resources available to provide needed services to citizens). ...
Generalized morality reflects ethical norms in society about the inappropriateness of behaviors that can cause harm to others. Generalized morality may be an important factor affecting the economic performance of countries. A measure of generalized morality is constructed from data from the World Values Survey. One question examined is whether generalized morality is correlated with economic growth rates in per capita GDP across a sample of countries, controlling for institutions and other factors expected to affect economic performance. A second question examined is whether the path by which generalized morality affects growth is direct or indirect through generalized trust. The findings reveal that generalized morality is correlated with economic growth, but its effect is manifested primarily through generalized trust when economic institutions are weak.
Cross-disciplinary peace research frequently focuses on social and political power differentials between people. Like the tradition found in the broader social sciences, peace studies seeks to raise consciousness about, and address, unequal relationships and lends itself to the application of cross-disciplinary methodologies. It is concerned with relational inequities and how they might be remedied, including those between the researcher and research participants. This article discusses a suite of methods developed for a peace research agenda about Sri Lanka including intersectionality, social interactionism, semi and unstructured interviews, and interpretative phenomenological analysis. The methods were informed by Sri Lanka’s conflicted social and political spaces. Through the creation of spaces influenced by democracy and rights-based approaches, the methods sought to enable the exercise of participants’ democratic entitlements whilst extinguishing the potential for harm. Through the individual experiences of 22 participants, the methods selected helped to crystalise with greater clarity the structural barriers frustrating people’s agency and the reasons behind their resulting marginalisations. The article affirms that with patience and resources, ground constraints can be overcome, harm mitigated, bias reflexivity and positionality managed, and a set of methods constructed consistent with achieving a peace research agenda.
In 2022, the UN Development Programme ( UNDP ) released a Special Report on threats to human security in the Anthropocene, a year after UN Secretary-General António Guterres released his report Our Common Agenda . In anticipation of the 2024 Summit of the Future, both called for a reinvigoration of networked multilateralism and for solidarity to be adopted as a third human security pillar alongside protection and empowerment. This article explores those expectations against a deeper understanding of the UN history of human security and a cycle of declared concerns about human insecurity and precarity dating at least to UNDP ’s 1994 Human Development Report. It argues that there is little new in the “next-generation” model of networked multilateralism and that, as a global governance norm, solidarity for human security is underconceptualized and poorly operationalized. It points to the importance of reclaiming the local as a site of people-centered agency, care, and voice.
The UN Guiding Principles (UNGPs) and their concept of human rights due diligence (HRDD) cannot succeed in their current form, because they reify neoliberalism’s public/private divide. This article establishes this argument across historical, theoretical, and normative dimensions, and charts a new way forward. The UNGPs’ separation of the ‘state duty to protect’ from the ‘corporate responsibility to respect’ reflects a contestable conception of companies as private actors: free to act/transact in any way that is not harmful. This is a problem because harm is often invisible, even when taking an active due-diligence approach. To resolve this, HRDD practices must also be based on the positive value of equality. However, businesses are more than mere agents; they also coordinate production and enable social connections. These structural features reveal a ‘missing fourth pillar’ of the UNGPs: a collective political responsibility to challenge and change our current world order.
Neutrality is not a neutral word. Users of it must justify its content in order for it to make sense in given situations and contexts. Sport governing bodies (SGBs) have, however, escaped this simple requirement for more than a century. Resorting to the adage that sport and politics don’t mix, and that they therefore have no obligation to state their view on even the gravest of episodes where sport is used for political purposes is no longer justifiable. At the same time, considering the geopolitical landscape of 2022, there is little realism to be found among those who demand that FIFA become a world police of sorts or a global activist carrying the flag of human rights. But what FIFA and other SGBs can do is to assess the use of neutrality anew to strengthen their autonomy and credibility in social issues. This chapter outlines several reasons why the concept of neutrality is a relevant place to start—especially as not taking a stand is also a stand.KeywordsSport and politicsSport governing bodiesSocial responsibilityNew world orderCritical sociology of sport
This chapter outlines some reasons why the meaning of ‘neutrality’, and the uses of it, is much more diverse than Sport Governing Bodies (SGBs) usually take into account. It is crucial to acknowledge this diversity because of the geopolitical role SGBs have in modern society. Many states want to host major sport events in order to boost their national image, as a way to attract tourists and investments, and to make an entry into the global political elite. Others see SGBs as key partners in achieving social progress through human rights and sustainability provisions. This role inevitably involves a political dimension. For that reason, this chapter discusses the ramifications of neutrality along three dimensions—epistemological, moral, pragmatic—and how they correspond with the legal, diplomatic and political/ideological dimensions of neutrality. Lessons are gathered from humanitarian NGOs and diplomatic ventures and contextualised with references to thinkers like J.S. Mill and Karl Popper.KeywordsConceptual importancePolitics of neutralityHumanitarianismDiplomacyWar
This article begins by re-opening the Third Great Debate which established division lines between mainstream (realist/liberal/constructivist) and Critical (neo-Marxist/neo-Gramscian) theories of International Relations based on their different assumptions about the nature of the international system: anarchy and hierarchy, respectively. The first half of the article argues that adopting common definitions of these concepts makes the anarchy–hierarchy debate theoretically irresolvable and further demonstrates that mainstream and Critical theories do not share an understanding of these terms neither between, nor within, their own traditions. The second half of this article challenges and aims to correct the interpretation of three key political thinkers, Halford J. Mackinder, W. E. B. DuBois and Norman Angell as appropriated within the inter-paradigm debates of International Relations. It argues that the respective associations of these thinkers with early realism, critical theories and early liberalism are intellectually misguiding because their works exhibit a common understanding of the ‘international’ across macro- and micro-dimensions, which is uncharacteristic of ‘-isms’. This shows that popular interpretations of pre-1919 works through post-1919 paradigms can obscure more than they reveal. These findings do not seek to present new ideas but to produce a reflexive critique of IR which illuminates some, perhaps unintended, counter-productive systemic effects that inter-paradigm divisions can have on the discipline.
Although a wide range of media interventions have been at the forefront of global humanitarian campaigns aimed at eradicating cultural body modification practices categorized as “harmful” in global health and development policy, such practices continue to persist. In this article, I single out one such domain of intervention – transnational humanitarian documentaries – to interrogate how they visualize the spatial landscape within which women and girls participate in these practices and the implications of such visualization for interventions aimed at eradicating them. I articulate the landscape as: the body which is the ultimate inescapable place where women and girls must live, and as a geo-spatial location where that body lives. With illustrations from documentary films on one specific “harmful” practice, female genital mutilation, I show how the visual framing of the landscape engenders: a (mis)conception of the harmed body as only a dystopic place, thus foreclosing the utopic dreams that motivate persistence of mutilation as a path to inhabiting (an)other (heterotopic) place; a spatialized hierarchy of coercive paternalistic interventions with counter-productive effects that have not only compromised the efficacy of mediated eradication campaigns, but have, by extension, inadvertently contributed to the very persistence of those “harmful” practices.
In the last 15 years, scholars have increasingly applied Axel Honneth’s recognition theory to global issues such as justice, poverty, solidarity, peace, cosmopolitanism, and climate change. UNHCR estimates that there are currently 12 million stateless people worldwide. Their citizenship rights and human rights are mis-recognized. As humans, their human rights and human dignity should be protected. However, this requires being a citizen of a state, which, by definition, excludes stateless people. Although representing a fairly large group among today’s irregular migrants, within the above Honneth scholarship, statelessness is seldom investigated. And if being explored, the primary focus is rights-based recognition within states. In contrast, therefore, I reconstruct what I perceive as a Honnethian idea of a “transnational struggle for recognition” of stateless people. First, I reframe the concrete universalism of the early Honneth’s philosophical anthropology, which includes stateless persons. It is concrete by being grounded in subjects’ bodily experiences, and it is universal by understanding recognition as a human condition. Second, building on his philosophical anthropology, I argue that embodied, vulnerable humans are motivated by mis-recognition. Stateless peoples’ transnational struggle for recognition is driven, then, by the lack of love, respect, and esteem. In some instances, however, statelessness even generates “refugee patients,” where stateless persons may be subjected to bodily experiencing, e.g., extreme traumatization due to the limbo situation often caused by statelessness. By being non-recognized, and not merely mis-recognized, stateless persons may be hindered from struggling for recognition. Finally, I emphasize the relevance of the entire Honnethian framework in the case of statelessness based on the suffering caused by the experience of mis-recognition as well as non-recognition. This approach involves applying all three forms of recognition: respect, love, and esteem. I conclude that this framing invokes what I conceptualize as a “transnational recognitive demand” that stateless people be recognized—as humans—in order to live a full life with dignity.
Cosmopolitan moral doctrines look plausible in theory, but why are we not more motivated in action? In this chapter I critically survey how reason, emotions, altruism, material connectedness and solidarity motivate moral actions. Afterwards, I argue that in addition to these common motivators, cosmopolitans should also consider tapping into self-interest and fear—the favourite moral ingredients of realists—to enrich their motivational tool kit. Last, I argue that it is insufficient to just focus on what motivates people. More importantly, cosmopolitans need to consider a problem that has been largely ignored in literature: who is best placed to use the motivational tools effectively? This problem of political agency must take priority for any cosmopolitan concerned with practical change.
The world's understanding of the action needed to advance human rights is deeply structured by the ‘respect, protect, and fulfill’ framework. But its potential is significantly undermined by a narrow conception of ‘respect’ for human rights. This paper systematically addresses these weaknesses and advances an original alternative. It first provides a historical account of the ‘do no harm’ conception of ‘respect’ in the political context of the late Cold War. It then analyzes this conception's empirical functioning today, using the example of unauthorized migration along the US–Mexico border. These points illustrate an overarching theoretical argument: the responsibility to respect human rights should be based on a responsibility not to dehumanize, rather than exclusively on a duty to do no harm. This involves the consideration of each person as a moral equal, the elevation of human rights practice as a basis for judgment inside of a moral agent's self, and the rejection of state-centrism as the basis for all political responsibility. This argument has implications traversing the theory and practice of human rights, including: the ability to translate and embed into practice the new meanings of ‘respect,’ ‘protect,’ and ‘fulfill’; and the need to re-consider the contemporary significance of 1980s liberalism.
ÖNSÖZ
Uluslararası İlişkiler alanındaki teorik tartışmalar oldukça dinamik bir özelliğe sahiptir. Yeni ortaya çıkan gelişmeler, bir taraftan mevcut teorilerin varsayımlarını test etme imkânı sağlarken, diğer taraftan bu gelişmeler karşısında açıklama gücünü kaybeden teori ve varsayımların ya yeni varsayımlarla güçlendirilerek yeniden ilerlemeci/işlevsel bir araştırma programı ve teori haline getirilmesine ya da terk edilerek onların yerini yeni teori ve paradigmaların almasına yol açmaktadır.
Nitekim Soğuk Savaş sonrası gelişmeler geleneksel/pozitivist teorilerin açıklama güçlerini zayıflatırken, post-modern teorilere olan gereksinimi arttırmıştır. Bu bağlamda eleştirel teoriler olarak da bilinen ve temel özellikleri sosyal, normatif, inşacı, reflektivist ve fikirsel olan bu teorilerin bir cazibe oluşturdukları ve son dönem olayları ve politikaları analiz ederken sıkça başvuruldukları görülmektedir. Modernist/pozitivist/rasyonalist teoriler maddi ve nesnel ontolojiye dayanırken bunlar maddi olmayan öznel ontolojiye dayanmaktadırlar. Bu yaklaşımların bir başka ortak özellikleri mevcut yapıları ve iktidar ilişkilerini sorgulamaları ve dönüştürmeye çalışmalarıdır.
İlk cildini «Uluslararası İlişkilerde Postmodern Analizler-1» olarak yayınladığımız bu çalışmanın ikincisine «Postmodern Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri-2» demeyi uygun gördük. Herbiri kendi alanında uzman akademisyenlerce kaleme alınan makalelerden oluşan elinizdeki kitabın bu alandaki tartışmalara yeni perspektifler katacağını ve uluslararası ilişkilerde eleştirel yaklaşımlar konusundaki eksikliği bir ölçüde gidereceğini umuyoruz. Çalışma akademik ve bilimsel kaygılardan ödün vermeden hazırlanmış olmakla beraber, genel okuyucunun da rahatlıkla anlayacağı bir dille yazılmıştır. Makalelerin sırası takip edilirken, genelden özele doğru olması ve ilk defa bu konuları okuyan bir araştırmacının zorluk yaşamaması arzu edilmiştir.
Kitabın hazırlanmasında emeği geçen tüm arkadaşlarıma teşekkür ederim.
Editör
Prof. Dr. Tayyar ARI
Ekim-2014
This article argues that conceptualising the ethical/moral possibilities of international society can be enhanced by utilising the distinction between positive and negative duties rather than order versus justice. The main argument of the article targets the traditional pluralist account and claims that within this account far greater moves towards justice are possible, which can be seen through the lens of order versus justice. More specifically, it argues that a pluralist international society need not be indifferent to global injustices such as poverty, if the range of negative duties is expanded.
Este artigo faz um balanço do progresso teórico da disciplina de Relações Internacionais (RI). Identifica seis teorias principais em RI, apresentando uma síntese dos seus principais pressupostos e avanços teóricos. Finalmente, desenvolve uma discussão sobre a importância da teoria no atual momento pós-paradigmático da disciplina das RI. O artigo defende dois argumentos principais. Primeiro, embora a disciplina de RI viva um momento de maturidade teórica caracterizado pelo abandono dos grandes debates e da busca pela primazia paradigmática, não é o fim da teoria. Segundo, apesar do surgimento de uma primavera teórica, é necessário que a disciplina de RI, e as suas teorias, tenham mais ligação, relevância e impacto na prática diplomática e na decisão política.
For centuries, we have been puzzled by the question of if and to what extent war and morality might be accommodated, and if it makes sense to talk about justice and war in one and the same context in the first place. According to the traditional, realist understanding of organized violence, war is in many respects a situation of emergency in which military necessity overrules morality and in which proportionality sets out the furthest point we can go in facilitating moral norms and brutal warfare. From this starting point, even if war may not be an amoral enterprise altogether, its morality is drastically limited by military and political ends. At the same time, the just war tradition has always been interested in accommodating war and morality; the proponents of just war have throughout history maintained that war is not outside the sphere of deeper ethical evaluation, and that we can, and morally ought to, apply more than the basic principles of necessity and proportionality when we judge the ways in which war is waged. Even in an extreme situation of emergency such as war we are aware of right and wrong, just and unjust, and ought to act accordingly (for the development of just war thinking, see, e.g., Johnson 1984; Nardin 1996; Rengger 2002; Bellamy 2006).
Cosmopolitans, from the Stoics through to Kant, have argued in favor of a universal moral realm. Despite the division of humanity into separate historically constituted communities, it remains possible to identify one self with, and have a moral concern for, humanity. To have such a concern requires that no one is prima facie excluded from the realm of moral duty. The most sophisticated formulation of this fundamental value occurs in Kant’s “categorical imperative” requiring that we “treat others not merely as a means but always as an end in themselves.” I The major tasks of cosmopolitan theory are to defend this universalism, to develop an account of an alternative political order based on it, and to explore what it might mean tofollow Kant’s imperative in a world divided into separate communities.
Good international citizenship is generally seen, either implicitly or explicitly, as being a matter of fulfilling general duties in the realm of foreign policy. In this article, I challenge this prevailing view, by arguing that good international citizenship frequently involves discharging special responsibilities to protect, which in turn involves grants of asylum to refugees. While arguing that asylum should be seen as an important element of good international citizenship as a matter of course, it assumes an even more central role in this citizenship in two scenarios. The first is where humanitarian intervention is either imprudent or politically impossible without violating the procedural norms of international society. The second is when intervention – whether pursued for humanitarian or other reasons – creates refugees, and intervening states may thereby acquire special responsibilities to protect those refugees.
Cosmopolitan theory suggests that we should shift our moral attention from the local to the global. Richard Vernon argues, however, that if we adopt cosmopolitan beliefs about justice we must re-examine our beliefs about political obligation. Far from undermining the demands of citizenship, cosmopolitanism implies more demanding political obligations than theories of the state have traditionally recognized. Using examples including humanitarian intervention, international criminal law, and international political economy, Vernon suggests we have a responsibility not to enhance risks facing other societies and to assist them when their own risk-taking has failed. The central arguments in Cosmopolitan Regard are that what we owe to other societies rests on the same basis as what we owe to our own, and that a theory of cosmopolitanism must connect the responsibilities of citizens beyond their own borders with their obligations to one another.
This article offers an explication and evaluation of the ethics of critical international relations theory. It highlights the distinctive contribution to cosmopolitan ethical inquiry of the Habermasian branch of critical international relations theory, while also pinpointing certain unresolved ethical tensions and inadequacies associated with the discourse ethic. It shows that tensions arise, in part, from the fact that critical theory's ultimate purpose-emancipation-is not exhausted by the procedural requirements of the discourse ethics. The article also examines critical theory's reluctance to 'do ethics' in the applied sense of the term. The purpose is not to reduce the ethics of critical theory to applied ethics, nor to discount the importance of critical theory's procedural normative ethics. Rather, it is merely to suggest that, once critical theory acknowledges the extradiscursive underpinnings of its normative ethics, the door is opened to engagement in applied ethical debates.
This book offers a challenging and original normative approach to some of the most pressing practical concerns in world politics - including the contested nature of the prohibitions against torture and the targeting of civilians in the war on terror. The author's vision of 'embedded cosmopolitanism' responds to the charge that conventional cosmopolitan arguments neglect the profound importance of community and culture, particularity and passion. Bringing together insights from communitarian and feminist political thought, the author defends the idea that community membership is morally constitutive- while arguing that the communities that define us are not necessarily territorially bounded and that a moral perspective situated in them need not be parochial. The book employs this framework to explore some of the difficult moral dilemmas thrown up by contemporary warfare. Can universal principles of restraint demanded by conventional laws of war be robustly defended from a position that also acknowledges the moral force of particular ties and loyalties? By highlighting the links that exist even between warring communities, the author offers new reasons for giving a positive response- reasons that reconcile claims to local attachments and global obligations. The book provides an account of where we stand in relation to 'strangers' and 'enemies' in a diverse and divided world, and provides a theoretical framework for addressing the relationship between our moral starting point and the scope of our duties to others.
The language of special responsibilities is ubiquitous in world politics, with policy-makers and commentators alike speaking and acting as though particular states have, or ought to have, unique obligations in managing global problems. Surprisingly, scholars are yet to provide any in-depth analysis of this fascinating aspect of world politics. This path-breaking study examines the nature of special responsibilities, the complex politics that surround them and how they condition international social power. The argument is illustrated with detailed case studies of nuclear proliferation, climate change and global i nance. All three problems have been addressed by an allocation of special responsibilities, but while this has structured politics in these areas, it has also been the subject of ongoing contestation. With a focus on the United States, this book argues that power must be understood as a social phenomenon, and that American power varies signii cantly across security, economic and environmental domains. © Mlada Bukovansky, Ian Clark, Robyn Eckersley, Richard Price, Christian Reus-Smit and Nicholas J. Wheeler 2012.
We are multiple, fragmented, and changing selves who, nevertheless, believe we have unique and consistent identities.What accounts for this illusion? Why has the problem of identity become so central in post-war scholarship, fiction, and the media? Following Hegel, Richard Ned Lebow contends that the defining psychological feature of modernity is the tension between our reflexive and social selves. To address this problem Westerners have developed four generic strategies of identity construction that are associated with four distinct political orientations. Lebow develops his arguments through comparative analysis of ancient and modern literary, philosophical, religious, and musical texts. He asks how we might come to terms with the fragmented and illusionary nature of our identities and explores some political and ethical implications of doing so.
This book defends the case for the expansion of the democratic model to the global political sphere. Concentrating on the democratic deficit of international affairs, it examines the nexus between the phenomenon of international exclusion and the political response of global democracy. This distinctive position is developed through a critical survey of the principal theories for and against global democracy. The main rival narratives (realism, nationalism, civilizationism, and liberal internationalism) are rebutted on grounds of failing democratic principles of inclusion. Based on a notion of interaction-dependent justice, these theories arguably provide a crucial ideological support to the exclusionary attitude of the current international system. Going beyond these exclusionary paradigms, the book defends a model of cosmo-federalism that is all-inclusive, multilayered and rooted. The text adopts an interdisciplinary perspective that combines three areas of scholarship: international political theory, international relations and political sociology. Within them, a number of contemporary controversies are analyzed, including the ethical dispute on global justice, the institutional debate on supranationalism, and the political discussion on social emancipatory struggles. From such an interdisciplinary perspective derives an engaged text that will be of interest to students and researchers concerned with the key political aspects of the discussion on globalization and democratic global order.
Hypercrime develops a new theoretical approach toward current reformulations in criminal behaviours, in particular the phenomenon of cybercrime. Emphasizing a spatialized conception of deviance, one that clarifies the continuities between crime in the traditional, physical context and developing spaces of interaction such as a 'cyberspace', this book analyzes criminal behaviours in terms of the destructions, degradations or incursions to a hierarchy of regions that define our social world. Each chapter outlines violations to the boundaries of each of these spaces - from those defined by our bodies or our property, to the more subtle borders of the local and global spaces we inhabit. By treating cybercrime as but one instance of various possible criminal virtualities, the book develops a general theoretical framework, as equally applicable to the, as yet unrealized, technologies of criminal behaviour of the next century, as it is to those which relate to contemporary computer networks. Cybercrime is thereby conceptualized as one of a variety of geometries of harm, merely the latest of many that have extended opportunities for illicit gain in the physical world. Hypercrime offers a radical critique of the narrow conceptions of cybercrime offered by current justice systems and challenges the governing presumptions about the nature of the threat posed by it.
The need to control violent and non-violent harm has been central to human existence since societies first emerged. This book analyzes the problem of harm in world politics which stems from the fact that societies require the power to harm in order to defend themselves from internal and external threats, but must also control the capacity to harm so that people cannot kill, injure, humiliate or exploit others as they please. Andrew Linklater analyzes writings in moral and legal philosophy that define and classify forms of harm, and discusses the ways in which different theories of international relations suggest the power to harm can be controlled so that societies can co-exist with the minimum of violent and non-violent harm. Linklater argues for new connections between the English School study of international society and Norbert Elias's analysis of civilizing process in order to advance the study of harm in world politics.
This article argues that - contrary to the way that it is often framed - the first pillar of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) is not best understood as an instantiation of a broader international responsibility to protect human rights. Firstly, the RtoP reverts to a discourse of powerful savours and passive victims, which runs against advocates'claim that the RtoP is a 'rights-based norm'. Secondly, although it distinguishes between prevention and response, the RtoP is still fundamentally a discussion of retrospective responsibility. The responsibility to protect human rights, by contrast, is importantly prospective. The article's separation of prospective/retrospective responsibility from the responsibility to prevent and to respond is an independent contribution, with broader significance beyond the RtoP context. Thirdly, the RtoP becomes activated when atrocity is building, imminent or underway; whereas the responsibility to protect human rights may be breached even without a clear causal link to harm.
Privacy is a basic human need. It is anthropologically and psychologically rooted in the sense of shame and the need for bodily integrity, personal space, and intimacy in interpersonal relationships. Especially in modern Western cultures, it is understood as a necessary condition for individual autonomy, identity, and integrity (Altman 1975; Westin 1967; see also Margulis, this volume, Chap. 2). The desire for privacy is historically variable and has increased noticeably throughout the process of modernization. As Jürgen Habermas (1962) has shown in his seminal study The Transformation of the Public Sphere, this process led to the emergence of the private sphere as a corollary to the public sphere: the private sphere offers the protection and freedom necessary for the undisturbed growth and self-fulfillment of the modern subject, who then, as a citizen, can participate in exchanging opinions and forming public discourse in the communicative space of the public sphere.
Current estimates indicate that several hundred thousand deaths per year can be attributed to climate change. Developed countries have reacted to this growing disaster by increasing the use of renewable energies, but what is to be done with the additional electricity thus generated? Should it be used for cutting back coal-fired energy production or can it be used for substituting nuclear energy? Priority must be given to replacing coal power, since developed countries have a strong duty to minimize the physical harm caused by their electricity generation. Dropping nuclear energy prior to coal power cannot be justified because the risks of nuclear energy pale in comparison to the suffering that emissions from coal-fired plants inflict both on their host countries and on poorer countries in the global South that (a) do not benefit from this energy and (b) have far less capacity to cope with the effects of climate change or other environmental damages. This article argues that when faced with a choice between operating coal-fired power plants or nuclear reactors, governments are obliged to opt for nuclear energy.
Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.3 (2004) 347-348
Contemporary philosophy in America tends to regard epistemological questions as the most fundamental of the discipline, but Susan Neiman's Evil in Modern Thought sets itself against this assumption in an attempt to sketch "an alternative history of philosophy." "It's possible to begin to worry about the difference between appearance and reality because . . . a dream is so vivid that you want to grasp one of its objects for a moment or two of sleepy half-consciousness," Neiman writes, but then "you wake up in your bed, slap your face if you have to . . . " (5). The problem of evil, in stark contrast to such skeptical speculations, is far more urgent and trenchant; it is "the place where philosophy begins, and threatens to stop" (ibid.). Moreover, the problem of evil, far from being merely a theological quandary, actually forms a link between metaphysics and epistemology by starkly posing questions about the intelligibility of the world: Why are things like that? wants the answer Because it's best that way. For the early modern period, these questions centered on the "theodicy" debates focused by the catastrophic Lisbon earthquake of 1755, while for us the holocaust threatens to explode all our hopes and expectations for the possibility of a world that is as it should be. Thus, Lisbon and Auschwitz frame for Neiman the historical topoi that ground discussion of the relation between natural and moral evils, the evolving philosophical understanding of which defines "who we have become in the three centuries that separate us from the early Enlightenment" (10).
The problem of theodicy is introduced through the figure of Alfonso X, king of Castille in 1252, and "the first Enlightenment hero" (14), according to Neiman. Having studied astronomy under the guidance of learned Jews from Toledo, Alfonso scandalously remarked "If I had been of God's counsel at the Creation, many things would have been ordered better" (15). Serving as a paradigm of blasphemy for half a millennium, Alfonso's boast also expresses the inevitable dismay that must accompany the delighted wonder at natural order exploited by the argument from design: while Creation is surely miraculous in its manifestation of seemingly intelligent structure, it is just as surely astonishing that so much of that structure seems so wantonly destructive. Can this really be the best of all possible worlds if innocent lives are cut short by cruel diseases or natural disasters while vicious villains prosper into comfortable old age?! Alfonso's remark serves Neiman as a leitmotif around which she orders central figures in the canon of western philosophy into two camps: those who struggled to reconcile natural evil with God's goodness or with reason (Leibniz, Pope, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx), and those who skeptically condemned reason by appealing to "brute appearances" (Bayle, Voltaire, Hume, Sade and Schopenhauer). Because the very categories of natural and moral evil tend to break down as a result of the development of psychology as a "science of nature" (to the extent that human motives are regarded as natural processes subject to empirical explanation, they cease to manifest a unique ontology), Nietzsche and Freud fall outside the philosophical canon thus construed—although Neiman's discussion of these two thinkers is perhaps the most compelling of the book.
No new interpretive ground is broken in the resulting exegesis of western philosophical history, but Neiman's treatment of each of these figures is intelligent and skillful. In discussing Kant, for example, a deep paradox at the center of his moral thought is brilliantly harnessed to the book's argument. Whereas theodicies from Leibniz onward had focused on attempts to show that Providence ultimately guaranteed a connection between virtue and happiness despite obvious evidence to the contrary, Kant took exactly the opposite tack. As Neiman puts it, "Solving the problem of evil is not only impossible but immoral. For knowing the connections between moral and natural evils would undermine the possibility of morality" (69). If we could be sure that good deeds would be rewarded...
This systematic introduction to Buddhist ethics is aimed at anyone interested in Buddhism, including students, scholars and general readers. Peter Harvey is the author of the acclaimed Introduction to Buddhism (Cambridge, 1990), and his new book is written in a clear style, assuming no prior knowledge. At the same time it develops a careful, probing analysis of the nature and practical dynamics of Buddhist ethics in both its unifying themes and in the particularities of different Buddhist traditions. The book applies Buddhist ethics to a range of issues of contemporary concern: humanity's relationship with the rest of nature; economics; war and peace; euthanasia; abortion; the status of women; and homosexuality. Professor Harvey draws on texts of the main Buddhist traditions, and on historical and contemporary accounts of the behaviour of Buddhists, to describe existing Buddhist ethics, to assess different views within it, and to extend its application into new areas.
L'A. mesure la legitimite morale et theorique des lois dites du mauvais samaritain qui definissent le devoir d'assistance a une personne en danger. L'A. montre que ces lois ne peuvent etre promulguees par un systeme juridique liberal sans: 1) menacer son engagement a la neutralite, 2) alterer sa conception de l'autonomie, 3) saper son opposition a toute forme de paternalisme legal
The Object of Morality is the title of a book I wrote a good many years ago shortly before I deviated irreversibly into university administration (often an intellectually terminal condition). I do not want to plug that book; nevertheless, it may not be completely irrelevant to say something of what it was about and take a rather rapid trot over its theme.
Object of Morality, p. 80; see also p
- Warnock
Warnock, Object of Morality, p. 80; see also p. 21.
An Introduction to Confucianism
- X Yao
X. Yao, An Introduction to Confucianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 213–214.
Sacred Pain: Hurting the Body for the Sake of the Soul
- A See
- Glucklich
See A. Glucklich, Sacred Pain: Hurting the Body for the Sake of the Soul (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001);
Notes on the Indian Penal Code
- Lord Macaulay
Lord Macaulay, " Notes on the Indian Penal Code ", in Collected Works, Vol. 7 (New York: Longman Green, 1897), p. 497.
The Harm Principle and Global Ethics Killing, Letting Die and Withdrawing Aid
- J Ibid
- Mcmahon
Ibid., p. 58. The Harm Principle and Global Ethics (1995), pp. 4–31; and J. McMahon, " Killing, Letting Die and Withdrawing Aid ", Ethics, Vol. 103 (1993), pp. 250–279.
The Moral and Legal Responsibility of the Bad Samaritan Freedom and Fulfilment: Philosophical Essays
- J See
- Feinberg
See J. Feinberg, " The Moral and Legal Responsibility of the Bad Samaritan ", in J. Feinberg, Freedom and Fulfilment: Philosophical Essays (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), ch.
175; and Feinberg Moral and Legal Responsibility " , p. 175. I am grateful to Robert van Vrees for the point about the harm of prolonging suffering
- Ibid
Ibid., p. 175; and Feinberg, " Moral and Legal Responsibility ", p. 175. I am grateful to Robert van Vrees for the point about the harm of prolonging suffering.
The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). I am grateful to Martin Weber for this reference
- A Honneth
A. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). I am grateful to Martin Weber for this reference.