Branding Authoritarian Nations: Political Legitimation and Strategic National Myths in Military-Ruled Thailand
The 2023 Thai general election was fought on the question of what it meant to be Thai: the progressives arguably won the argument, but the conservatives seized power anyway. The progressive Move Forward Party became the largest single party in the new parliament but was barred from forming a government. At the final election rally of his conservative United Thai Nation (UTN) Party on 12 May 2023, incumbent prime minister and former 2014 coup leader General Prayut Chan-ocha paused his speech to show a video ad critiquing a slogan popularized by Move Forward, which had pledged to ensure that Thailand would “not be the same as before.” The UTN ad parodied the slogan, depicting a Thai family in which young adults were at cross-purposes with their parents and grandparents, reflecting a collapse in traditions and standards of behaviour. UTN's negative campaigning epitomised a shift among Thai voters along the lines of two major cleavages: age (younger voters versus older ones) and ideology (progressive voters versus those supporting conservative values). This article uses the UTN video to explore how these cleavages were central to the 2023 Thai election campaign. The video was a seminal text for this election, offering an extraordinary insight into the mentality and moral posturing of the conservative side.
Soft power, obtained when a state develops the ability to attract rather than coerce other actors because of the legitimacy of its values, has been on the national agenda in Thailand since 2010, when efforts were made to expand the Kingdom's creative industries. However, under nearly a decade of military rule after the May 2014 coup d'état, Thailand focused largely inward in order to secure its legitimacy and survival, consequently curtailing soft gains. The military junta frequently targeted public dissent, including Thai activist rappers Danupa "Milli" Kanaterrakul and Rap Against Dictatorship (RAD). This article reviews soft power and state repression during the Prayut Chan-o-cha era and makes two critical arguments, that nation branding and soft power, related concepts, require a degree of authenticity and that Thailand's soft power is increasingly outside of the government's ability to completely control. Consequently, in a new semi-democratic environment under Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, successful soft power and nation branding efforts are likely to occur outside the Kingdom's ideological constraints or self-serving elite interests or risk an unwanted paradox and an operating environment contradictory to either objective.
This book is available for free here (courtesy of NIAS)
https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:848532/FULLTEXT01.pdf
Contents
Preface to the paperback edition viii
Acronyms xii
Glossary of terms xiv
Acknowledgements xvi
1 Introduction: Talking democracy 1
2 Making democracy mean something 5
3 Before the doctrine: From constitutional democracy to Thai-style
democracy 34
4 Developmental democracy: Villages, insurgency and security 60
5 Delayed liberalism, the general will: The doctrine entrenched 92
6 Citizen King: Embodying Thainess 128
7 New times, new constitution 153
8 Liberalism, civil society and new projects of subjection 182
9 Rethinking the nation in times of crisis: Democracy, civic engagementand community 212
10 From the abstract citizen to concrete struggle 248
11 Conclusion: The lash of civic virtue, democracy and the politics of democrasubjection 265
Postscript 269 (Coup against Thaksin)
Select bibliography 275
Index 285
This article discusses the motivations behind the involvement of high school students in the anti-government protests across Thailand in 2020. Drawing on 150 school and 150 university student interviews, focus groups, and observation of sixteen protests conducted around the country, it argues that protesting youths were motivated by grievances against repressive, authoritative and unaccountable conservative education systems and political institutions, particularly the monarchy.
Though dominated by the monarchy and military, Thailand in 2020 has a highly factionalised, political party system ensconced within a defective democracy. When not under military rule, such a situation has been common. The country’s excessive level of factionalism across parties and over time is due to a long history of regionalised and decentralised parties that have invariably been dependent upon finance from faction leaders who have rarely been reined in by laws to limit factionalism. Only under Thaksin Shinawatra (2001–2006), did factionalism diminish in importance on the national level owing partly to 1997 constitutional alterations. Following a 2006 coup and the 2007 adoption of a military-endorsed constitution, a high level of intra-party factionalism returned across parties. Though the 2014 coup again ended the country’s faction-ridden democracy, the 2019 general election resurrected factionalism, which guaranteed weakness for party politics while benefiting the aristocracy and military.
Thailand’s 2019 election was seen from the beginning to be a ritual to transform a military junta into an elected government. This qualitative paper draws on the critical analysis of theories in authoritarianism and electoral integrity to shed light on the concept of competitive authoritarianism. The paper, utilizing empirical data and historical narratives, illustrates Thailand’s legal and political environment governing this election. The electoral results and post-election political party landscape reveal unintended consequences in manipulating political institutions. Although the newly introduced electoral system and institutional manipulations allowed the military co-opted Palang Pracharat party to select the prime minister even without controlling a majority in the House of Representatives, as projected, the establishment was inadvertently left with two robust opposition parties, namely the old Pheu Thai and the new-born Future Forward parties. The former represents the strongest political machine in Thailand, which has won five consecutive elections, while the latter symbolizes a new divide in Thai politics, armed with the power of social media, and poses a bigger threat to the military establishment. Remarkably, the electoral result not only pointed to a continued polarization, dominated by the cleavages of ultraconservative versus progressive and an urban-rural, rich-poor cleavage, but also a new division between older and younger generations. This paper maintains that although Thailand’s civil-military government might be deposed in the future due to several challenges facing them, the undemocratic political structure of military electoral co-optation polity remains ingrained on account of the way that the 2017 Constitution was crafted.
While Thailand’s military government has attempted to postpone a general election, it is inevitable. In preparation for elections, the junta founded a pro-junta party and propped it up vigorously while continuing to impose restrictions on anti-junta parties.
This article develops the menu of autocratic innovation to account for a perceived transformation in the nature of autocratic rule. Drawing from an original list of 20 techniques intended to cultivate the pretence of accountability without permitting the actual practice of it, the article describes how autocratic innovation takes different forms (informational, legal, political, reputational and technological) and concerns different targets (citizens, civil society activists, opposition members and foreign policymakers). This theoretical framework is tested against nine autocratic regimes in Southeast Asia from 1975 to 2015. The evidence shows substantial variation in terms of the form and target of at least six distinct techniques: libel and defamation suits, anti-civil society measures, mock compliance to human rights agreements, public relations firms, think tanks and zombie monitors. The paper concludes by discussing three possible explanations for why autocratic innovation occurs: waves of autocratization, density of international linkages and leadership turnover.
- Prime Minister Prayut Chanocha’s visit to the United States on 2-4 October 2017
marked a normalisation of Thai-US relations after the coup in 2014. Above all, US
endorsement helps boost the regime’s international legitimacy.
- The visit also benefits Trump’s “America First” policy. The focus on trade deals
with Thailand aims to show the American public that restored ties with the junta
help boost American exports and jobs.
- The other beneficiaries are the military of both nations. The US military can now
resume regular contacts with its Thai counterparts for its defence strategy, while
the latter can proceed with their arms procurement plans.
- However, this “shopping diplomacy” aiming to please everyone in exchange for
their support is not sustainable. It will face limits in Thailand’s budget and affect
Thai producers and consumers. Also, military rule is vulnerable to international
criticism and complicates Thailand’s ability to maintain foreign policy balance
This article traces the limits of branding as a tool for (re)constructing nations as 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983). Drawing on examples from post-socialist Eastern Europe, I analyse discourses and practices of nation branding from a critical perspective, rooted in the theoretical traditions of political economy and cultural studies. Focusing more closely on branding campaigns implemented by post-Soviet Ukraine and post-war Kosovo — two nations seeking to assert themselves as independent actors on the global stage — I consider the impact of nation branding on national identities and democratic governance. I identify three interconnected limits of the branded national imagination as a structuring discourse for nation building. First, the branded national imagination is structured through its subjection to a foreign gaze; second, it is heavily dependent on commercial transnational media; and third, it produces branded national subjectivities that contradict the lived experiences of national populations. I argue that while nation branding effectively depoliticises national (re)definition, it may in fact serve to reinvigorate ethnic nationalisms in the post-socialist region. Finally, I suggest that although we must be aware of local histories and legacies, the post-socialist experience can inform our understanding of the structuring limits of the branded national imagination in other post-conflict and post-colonial contexts as well.
To date, (critical) geopolitics has had little to say about contemporary competitive identity practices of nation branding in global politics, while existing analyses of nation branding in other disciplines have tended to overlook its geopolitical dimensions. This expanded Introduction (and the special issue as a whole) therefore seeks to explore some of the implications of nation branding for geopolitics, while simultaneously utilising the insights of critical geopolitics to shed light on nation branding practices. The Introduction makes the case for a broad conception of nation branding that challenges claims it is immutably linked to capitalist logics in an era of globalisation. It subsequently explores claims that nation branding is simply an updated form of nation building and that it is also an inherently benign and peace promoting activity. The Introduction ends by highlighting how, despite claims that the contemporary prevalence of nation branding practices is indicative of a categorical shift from a geopolitical to a geoeconomic world, nation branding practices frequently remain deeply infused with rather traditional geopolitical scripts.
Constructing convincing legitimacy claims is important for securing the stability of authoritarian regimes. However, extant research has struggled to systematically analyse how authoritarians substantiate their right to rule. We analyse a novel data set on authoritarian regimes’ claims to legitimacy that is based on leading country experts’ assessments of 98 states for the period 1991–2010. This analysis provides key new insights into the inner workings and legitimation strategies of current non-democratic regimes. Closed authoritarian regimes predominately rely on identity-based legitimacy claims (foundational myth, ideology and personalism). In contrast, elections fundamentally change how authoritarian rulers relate to society. In their legitimacy claims, electoral authoritarian regimes focus on their ‘adequate’ procedures, thereby mimicking democracies. All regimes also stress their purported success in proving material welfare and security to their citizens.
This article examines Thailand's foreign policy posture towards China and the United States since the early 2000s. It argues that Thailand increasingly faces difficulties in maintaining its time-honoured diplomatic tradition of flexibility and pragmatism. The "China factor", together with domestic developments since the late 1990s, including the rise of nationalistic sentiment among the public and political polarization, have become important determinants in the decision making process vis-a-vis Thailand's relations with Washington and Beijing. As a result, compared to other US allies in Asia, Thailand does not always accommodate American policies but, in many circumstances, acts in favour of China instead. This policy posture is not a product of a well-planned strategy, but rather a reaction to the China factor and domestic sensitivities surrounding decision-making. This current stage of Thai foreign policy can be labelled "bamboo swirling in the wind" instead of the conventional "bending with the wind" diplomacy that tends to reflect a better-calculated strategy to balance Great Power influence.
Since it was first published in 2005, A History of Thailand has been hailed as an authoritative, lively and readable account of Thailand's political, economic, social and cultural history. From the early settlements in the Chao Phraya basin to today, Baker and Phongpaichit trace how a world of mandarin nobles and unfree peasants was transformed by colonialism, the expansion of the rice frontier and the immigration of traders and labourers from southern China. This book examines how the monarchy managed the foundation of a new nation‐state at the end of the nineteenth century, and how urban nationalists, ambitious generals, communist rebels and business politicians competed to take control through the twentieth century. It tracks Thailand's economic changes, globalisation and the evolution of mass society, and draws on popular culture to dramatize social trends. This edition contains a new chapter on Thailand's turbulent politics since 2006 and incorporates new sources and research throughout.
Responding to a recent call for more in-depth qualitative studies of electoral management bodies (EMBs), this article examines formally independent EMBs by using the example of the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) and the role it played in the recent 2019 election. We argue that in non-democratic regimes with high levels of political polarisation and entrenched elites, formal EMB independence may become part of the problem why elections fail. It creates opportunities for long-term EMB capture by actors who wield power outside of formal politics and are unaccountable to public interest. In case of the ECT, this has led to the decreasing electoral standards culminating in the highly contentious 2019 election where the ECT’s administrative efficiency and effectiveness of voting came secondary to pleasing the entrenched old Thai elite. Its conduct has reduced Thailand’s prospects for a peaceful transition to democratic rule as those who oppose the country’s old elite have increasingly limited opportunities to challenge it through formal means.
This article offers a preliminary analysis of the hundreds of youth-inspired mass protests staged in Thailand during 2020. It argues that while calling for reforms and flirting with revolutionary rhetoric, the protestors lacked a clear programmatic agenda and were primarily engaged in disrupting dominant narratives about the country’s politics, especially in relation to the previously taboo question of the political role of the monarchy. Despite the ad hoc and sometimes incoherent nature of the protests, the students mounted a dramatic challenge to Thailand’s ruling elite. Ultimately, the conflict exemplified a generational divide: people from Generation Z, aged under 25, have radically different understandings of power, deference and legitimacy from older population groups. Whatever happens to the protest movement in the short term, the demonstrators have made a decisive break with the old social consensus that existed during the long reign of the late King Bhumibol (1946–2016).
In the second decade of the 21st century, the practices, discourses, and implications of nation branding have attracted growing interest from scholars in the humanities and social sciences seeking to understand the linkages between national identities, reputations, governance, and the phenomenon of nation branding. This strand of critical research, as opposed to instrumentalist approaches, is the focus of this review. In line with the scope of the journal, the review looks at nation branding research that relates to the countries of the former communist bloc. The analysis finds that the state of the field is fragmented due to its multi-disciplinary nature. It is also argued that the field may be suffering from methodological nationalism. The discussion identifies epistemological and theoretical approaches, pointing out gaps and limitations along the way. It is suggested that research in the field can be grouped into “identity studies” and “practice studies” as a way to better understand key theoretical influences. Finally, it is proposed that future research should look at nation branding both as a field of practice that merits critical examination in its own right and as a lens that can be used to investigate changes in the state of nationhood today.
Why has the practice of nation branding and its competitive imaginary become common sense in Korea? This article retraces the domestication, in Korea, of nation branding into an unquestioned policy imperative and of a competitive common sense. It shows how, in Korea, nation branding emerged as a policy solution to four national urgencies in the post-democratisation political economic context. It was adopted in conjunction by the state and the chaebol to resolve obstacles to capital accumulation. Korean policy-makers hired promotional consultants to participate in agenda -making processes. However, these consultants were not hired by the Korean government to design Korea's branding policies. Their power was essentially cultural. Their discourses provided policy justification and functioned as a governing device to exhort citizens to accept global competition as an unquestionable social reality and the pro-capital reforms that are (supposedly) needed to cope with competition.
The purpose of this research is to understand how nation branding initiatives complement education diplomacy for a country such as China and to investigate how country distance shapes perceptions of China across a large international student contingency in China. We use Ghemawat’s [(2001). Distance still matters. Harvard Business Review, 79(8), 137–147] CAGE distance framework, nation branding theory [Anholt, 2007. Competitive identity: The new brand management for nations, cities and regions. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan] and brand equity theory [Aaker, D. A. (1991). Managing brand equity. New York, NY: The Free Press; Yoo & Donthu (2001). Developing and validating a multidimensional consumer-based brand equity scale. Journal of Business Research, 52(1), 1–14] to provide theoretical support for the answers to our questions. It was found out that country distances are relevant in determining national images. While national image dimensions for China positively influence behavioral intentions related to China and positively contribute to the brand equity of HEIs. A multi-group analysis shows that significant differences exist between international students belonging to different regions in their disposition towards China as a country and China as a destination for higher education. The international strategies of firms in shaping perceptions related to national images.
This article provides a critique of the Thailand 4.0 strategy to push the country out of the middle-income trap through innovation-driven, inclusive and sustainable growth. First, it argues that the policies have insufficiently analysed the persistence of structural hierarchy and uneven development in the global political economy, which will constrain Thailand’s catch-up success in the future. Second, based on writings about progressive mission-led industrial strategies, it is argued that Thailand 4.0 ought to embed a progressive social and environmental agenda more clearly in its industrial strategy. Third, it is argued that Thailand 4.0 neglects to address the high concentration of political and economic power in the country, and also continues to allow unequal access to the policymaking process that has led to socio-environmental problems. Overall, this article argues that Thailand 4.0 will increasingly aggravate the two-tier fragmented nature of the political economic system of Thailand, where few can reap the biggest shares of the surplus and participate in more advanced sectors of the economy. It also calls for a more progressive industrial strategy and an alternative developmental path.
Since January 2004, a violent separatist insurgency has raged in southern Thailand, resulting in more than three thousand deaths. Though largely unnoticed outside Southeast Asia, the rebellion in Pattani and neighboring provinces and the Thai government’s harsh crackdown have resulted in a full-scale crisis. Tearing Apart the Land by Duncan McCargo, one of the world’s leading scholars of contemporary Thai politics, is the first fieldwork-based book about this conflict. Drawing on his extensive knowledge of the region, hundreds of interviews conducted during a year’s research in the troubled area, and unpublished Thai-language sources that range from anonymous leaflets to confessions extracted by Thai security forces, McCargo locates the roots of the conflict in the context of the troubled power relations between Bangkok and the Muslim-majority “deep South.” McCargo describes how Bangkok tried to establish legitimacy by co-opting local religious and political elites. This successful strategy was upset when Thaksin Shinawatra became prime minister in 2001 and set out to reorganize power in the region. Before Thaksin was overthrown in a 2006 military coup, his repressive policies had exposed the precariousness of the Bangkok government’s influence. A rejuvenated militant movement had emerged, invoking Islamic rhetoric to challenge the authority of local leaders obedient to Bangkok. For readers interested in contemporary Southeast Asia, insurgency and counterinsurgency, Islam, politics, and questions of political violence, Tearing Apart the Land is a powerful account of the changing nature of Islam on the Malay peninsula, the legitimacy of the central Thai government and the failures of its security policy, the composition of the militant movement, and the conflict’s disastrous impact on daily life in the deep South. Carefully distinguishing the uprising in southern Thailand from other Muslim rebellions, McCargo suggests that the conflict can be ended only if a more participatory mode of governance is adopted in the region.
Legitimacy is a key concept in political science. It has deep normative roots in democratic theory and refers usually to righteous, just, fair, and therefore acceptable rule. However, non-democracies also try to create a following among their citizens. They also engage in justifying their rule through politicization, be it of religion, ethnicity, or ideologies ranging from left-wing communism to right-wing nationalism. Against this backdrop, I pose the question: does it make sense to use the concept of legitimacy for both types of regimes, democracies and autocracies alike? Or, do we overstretch the concept when transplanting it to the non-democratic realm? And, empirically, how can we assess to what degree a non-democracy is viewed as legitimate by its citizens? I aim therefore at defining what legitimacy and legitimation is in autocratic settings; drawing a semantic map of rival concepts like support, trust, and loyalty; and tackling concrete challenges in measuring this elusive concept.
Cambridge Core - Comparative Politics - How Dictatorships Work - by Barbara Geddes
Drawing on the case of post-war Kosovo, this chapter explores how nation branding intersects with a neoliberal development agenda. The author argues that Kosovo’s “Young Europeans” campaign was an effort to legitimize the adoption of economic policies and ideologies that served the interests of global capital rather than of the local population. Furthermore, the campaign articulated a post-ethnic, cosmopolitan, entrepreneurial national subject, while disregarding real social divisions. By juxtaposing the campaign’s messages with material indicators of life in Kosovo, the analysis raises questions about the winners and losers of neoliberal development. The chapter ends with lessons for a broader understanding of the changing nature of the nation-state under a neoliberal regime and suggests directions for future research at the intersection of public diplomacy and development communication.
Sufficiency Economy is a local Thai alternative development paradigm, which has been enshrined in the Thai constitutions since 2006 and plays a central role in Thai political discourse since the Asian Crisis in 1997. However, the conflict between different visions of development was drawn into an intra-elite struggle, in the course of which formerly emancipatory development alternatives were co-opted into a highly authoritarian project. Today, it serves as one of the ideological foundations of the military regime, which came to power in a coup d’état in 2014. The character of this regime, however, goes beyond what Ziai (2004) calls ‘enlightened authoritarianism’. It is reminiscent of fascist regimes in Europe in the 1930s. Rather than treating the concept of Sufficiency Economy as such as an authoritarian or suppressive concept, it will be argued that the authoritarian character is a result of a three-step process of politicisation which has unfolded during the last two decades.
Purpose
The purpose of this article is to discuss gaps and key challenges facing higher education in Thailand with reference to the implementation of the policy of Thailand 4.0 adopted by the Royal Thai government.
Design/methodology/approach
In-depth interviews were conducted with Thai government officials, university administrators and faculty members to formulate the concept of a creative society in Thailand. Documentary analysis of university policy documents was used to investigate the roles and practices of universities in fostering creativity and innovation. Questionnaire surveys were used to obtain views of university administrators and faculty members on the existing roles and practices of Thai university in promoting a creative society, and their level of expectation towards the roles and practices required to promote a creative society. Priority Need Index (PNI) and One-way ANOVA were used to identify the gaps and challenges of Thai higher education in promoting a creative society.
Findings
The concepts of the creative society found in this study were in lines with the goals of Thailand 4.0 which are to foster creativity, innovation, inclusivity, and sustainability. It was found that development of learning networks, public-private-community engagement, new mind-set and skill-set of lecturers and students, and new technology are required for a successful implementation of Thailand 4.0.
Research limitations/implications
Although we have identified some progress in Thailand towards achieving the goals of Thailand 4.0, it is clear that key factors that contribute to the fostering of creativity and innovation require further investigation. These factors include socio-cultural factors, creative learning and teaching, mind-set and skill-set, new technology and learning networks, and public-private-community engagement.
Practical implications
The findings of this paper can be used to identify some of the key challenges of Thai higher education in achieving the aims of Thailand 4.0.
Originality/value
Research conducted by the author in 2013-2015 showed that some important reforms are being implemented to achieve some of the aims of Thailand 4.0.
'Imagined Communities' examines the creation & function of the 'imagined communities' of nationality & the way these communities were in part created by the growth of the nation-state, the interaction between capitalism & printing & the birth of vernacular languages in early modern Europe.
This article examines the transformation of Thailand’s ties with the United States away from its “special relationship” in the Cold War, when Thailand viewed the United States as an indispensable power. The relationship in the post-Cold War period is marked by significant disagreements. Structural theories predict that China’s rise and the regional uncertainty it has created would lead Thailand to strengthen its alliance with the United States as part of a hedging strategy. In recent decades, however, the United States has failed to provide the assistance Thailand expected and its criticism of the Thai military coups of 2006 and 2014 are perceived as illegitimate interference in Thai affairs. As domestic politics plays an increasing role in Thai foreign policy, Thailand is distancing itself from the United States and moving closer to China.
Thailand’s August 2016 constitutional referendum marked the second occasion on which a military junta has sought popular endorsement to legitimize its efforts to reform the country’s political system. As in the previous referendum of August 2007, Thai voters endorsed military plans to reduce levels of democracy. Draconian moves by the regime curtailed open debate about the content of the draft constitution, which virtually nobody had read. Partly as a result of the junta’s suppression of dissent, “No” votes declined —but the draft charter was still opposed by almost 40 per cent of voters, testifying to continuing high levels of political polarization along regional lines. This article argues that the referendum process may have helped the military to impose order on Thai society during the difficult period of royal transition, but did not create any genuine peace between the country’s fractious competing groups and interests.
A comprehensive survey of the key areas of research in cross-cultural communication, based on the authors' experience in organizing and delivering courses for undergraduate and postgraduate students and in business training in the UK and overseas.
In the twilight years of Thailand’s ailing King Bhumibol, battles between royalists and their red shirt opponents are increasing, and the tectonic shifts that lie beneath Thailand’s decade-old political crisis have become increasingly apparent. Serhat Ünaldi’s Working towards the Monarchy sheds new light on recent developments with its bold analysis of urban space in downtown Bangkok: buildings, the author finds, are abstractions of the complexities that shape Thailand’s transformation. Most criticism of the political role of the Thai monarchy-its deep involvement in Thailand’s uneven capitalist development, Bhumibol’s endorsement of military coups and his silent acquiescence to political violence-has focused on the role of individuals: The king, the royal family, or privy councilors. Ünaldi departs from such limited intentionalist approaches to show instead just how deeply enmeshed the monarchy is in Thai society as a whole. He demonstrates how and why Thais from all walks of life drew on royal charisma to advance their individual aims, in effect "working towards the monarchy." Ünaldi’s sociological analysis of urban space reveals how buildings and spaces have been constructed for political and economic ends, particularly to shore up the monarchy. For several decades the architecture in central Bangkok has helped protect the charisma of the monarchy, which dominates landholdings and investments in the area. Because the sacred aura of the royal family legitimized capitalist expansion and consumerism, it was defended and enhanced by those Bangkokians who profited from it. Yet politically and geographically marginalized Thais failed to benefit from this royalist-led capitalist development and eventually found a new leader, business tycoon-cum-politician Thaksin Shinawatra. When Thaksin’s followers turned against royal charisma and attacked the architecture that represented and supported it, movement away from royal charismatic authority became a real possibility for the first time. By combining sociology, political science, architecture, and anthropology, Working towards the Monarchy offers a unique interdisciplinary approach. It will interest scholars and generalists alike, particularly those involved in the comparative study of monarchies.
The article problematises a popular view in nation branding literature that equates nation branding with states’ attendant advertising campaigns. Instead, this article adopts a broader perspective that nation branding can also operate as a policy aimed at enhancing the sense of ontological security among states and as a practice to strengthen the position of the ruling regime by targeting particular audiences within a broader ‘strategic narrative’. From this perspective, this article aims to shed new light on non-liberal capitalist countries’ – specifically North Korea’s – attempts at nation branding policies in terms of various nation branding strategies. In so doing, Clifford Geertz’s anthropological concept of ‘theatre state’ is introduced as an important metaphor to broaden the existing understanding of nation branding by highlighting the unique characteristics of North Korea’s policies of nation branding and nation building. It is argued that great national spectacles such as the Arirang Festival and military demonstrations provide North Korea with a useful platform for participating in the identity competition among other nation states, as well as in the fierce recognition game against the rest of the Korean national community. Obviously, these strategic performances have contributed to communicating with the outside world, deliberately seeking more respect from others, but have simultaneously operated as nation building processes. Therefore, this work concludes that such staged events are sophisticatedly designed to enhance North Korea’s complex interest of nation branding, and, more importantly, argues that techniques and practices of nation branding are neither historically new nor confined to Western liberal capitalist regimes.
This historical study of higher education in Thailand argues that from the onset, it has been based on international models in scope and nature. The impact of colonisation across South and East Asia created the pressures necessary for Thailand to establish higher education programmes. From the nineteenth-century formation of palace schools to the rapid growth of international higher education programmes today, the system is designed to assist Thailand in the development process through educational, social and economic modernisation while maintaining and recreating concepts of Thainess. Whereas in the nineteenth century the goal was to facilitate Thai independence from imperialist intentions, today, the goal is to participate within an economy dominated by globalisation trends and massive expansion. A chronological description of the international nature of Thai higher education begins with the initial formation of higher education institutions in the mid-nineteenth century and concludes with the changes taking place in 2015.
On May 20, 2014, the Royal Army imposed martial law on Thailand, with the declared purpose of restoring peace to the people. Allegedly, the military intervened to put an end to seven months of political turmoil that had begun when the PDRC—the English acronym for the Thai People's Committee for Absolute Democracy with the King as Head of State—occupied key street intersections and government offices in Bangkok. The conservative mobilization had demanded the deposition of elected Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and the complete dismissal of “the Thaksin system”—a network that had dominated electoral politics in the previous thirteen years, in the PDRC's view through corruption and vote-buying. To fight this injustice, the PDRC had called for deep constitutional reforms before the next elections could be held.
Acemoglu and associates argue that resistance to democratisation will be stronger where inequality is high. Piketty shows that shifts at the upper end of the distribution may be historically more significant than overall measures of inequality. In Thailand, the high level of income inequality has eased slightly since 2000, but there is a ‘1% problem’ as peak incomes are growing faster than the average. Newly available data show that inequality of wealth is very high. At the top of the wealth pyramid, family holdings of commercial capital are growing. A significant proportion of top entrepreneurs have emerged within the past generation. A second tier of the wealth elite has developed over the past generation from rising property values, financial investments and professional incomes. Although their individual wealth is much less than the corporate elite, their numbers are much greater. The existence of the prospering ‘1%’ and the emergence of the second-tier wealthy may corroborate Acemoglu’s proposition, but there are tensions within the wealth elite which may favour democracy.
This paper argues that recognising types of underlying narrative form which repeatedly occur across cases is critical to the study of nationalism. It proposes a method borrowed from the literary theory of Northrop Frye – archetypal criticism – for identifying the four basic forms of emotional architecture that characterise the myths of particular nations: tragic, romantic, comic and satiric. The study of nationalism has long acknowledged the importance of narrative in political behaviour. But consideration of how distinct types of narratives affect specific emotions is missing. The ‘narrative turn’ in the social sciences, which has responded to instrumentalist scepticism, has thus far focused on the cognitive functions of narrative. That is, how narrative influences the acquisition and interpretation of information and how stories are used to construct or reinforce a collective understanding of events. The undertheorised dimension of narrative in nationalism relates to the emotional structures embedded within narrative. This is where this paper makes its contribution.
Thailand is the only country currently ruled by a coup-installed military government. The 2014 coup aimed not only to abolish the influence of Thaksin Shinawatra but also to shift Thailand’s politics in an authoritarian direction. While the army authored the coup, the professional and official elite played a prominent role in engineering the coup and shaping political reforms. This article examines some historical antecedents of this authoritarian turn, first in the broad trends of Thailand’s modern political history, and second in the emergence and political evolution of the Bangkok middle class.
Far from sweeping the globe uniformly, the “third wave of democratization” left burgeoning republics and resilient dictatorships in its wake. Applying more than a year of original fieldwork in Egypt, Iran, Malaysia, and the Philippines, Jason Brownlee shows that the mixed record of recent democratization is best deciphered through a historical and institutional approach to authoritarian rule. Exposing the internal organizations that structure elite conflict, Brownlee demonstrates why the critical soft-liners needed for democratic transitions have been dormant in Egypt and Malaysia but outspoken in Iran and the Philippines. By establishing how ruling parties originated and why they impede change, Brownlee illuminates the problem of contemporary authoritarianism and informs the promotion of durable democracy.
Nominally the highest decision-making body in the Chinese Communist Party, the Party Congress is responsible for determining party policy and the selection of China's leaders. Guoguang Wu provides the first analysis of how the Party Congress operates to elect Party leadership and decide Party policy, and explores why such a formal performance of Congress meetings, delegate discussions, and nondemocratic elections is significant for authoritarian politics more broadly. Taking institutional inconsistency as the central research question, this study presents a new theory of “mutual contextualization” to reveal how informal politics and formal institutions interact with each other. Wu argues that despite the prevalence of informal politics behind the scenes, authoritarian politics seeks legitimization through a combination of political manipulation and the ritual mobilization of formal institutions. This ambitious book is essential reading for all those interested in understanding contemporary China, and an innovative theoretical contribution to the study of comparative politics.