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Global Governance
Abstract
In other chapters, it has already been discussed to what extent international organizations, networks and NGOs have driven or limited globalization, that is, how they have acted as additional actors in the emerging complex world governance, which is now commonly referred to as ‘global governance’. What this global governance means, which international, state, societal and private actors are involved, why they should be involved and why governmental networks or organizations are no longer sufficient to cope with the increasingly complex problems of world governance, has been discussed over and over again, so it should only be summarized in the shortest possible way. It is less common to have an overview of how this world governance has been expressed in possibly sectorally different institutional forms and which problems, which have arisen or at least aggravated by the world economic and world social intertwinement, have been identified and—also or not—tackled.
Türkiye is committed to lowering its greenhouse gas emissions, adhering to the terms of the Paris Climate Agreement, which it has endorsed. In this context, there is significant interest in environmental tax reform that merges carbon regulation with the reduction of other distorting taxes. This study assesses the effects of motor vehicle tax (MVT), energy consumption, and economic growth on Türkiye’s carbon footprint from 1995 to 2020, framed by the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). Utilizing the ARDL technique, a method for analyzing time series data, the research reveals that the EKC hypothesis does not apply. Additionally, the study finds that MVT, as an included variable in the EKC model, does not significantly influence the carbon footprint. It is crucial to acknowledge that all variables in the model interact and collectively influence the analysis of variable relationships. As a result, crafting policy recommendations on this matter requires a comprehensive, multidisciplinary approach. Therefore, adjusting and implementing MVT in a manner consistent with the objectives of the Paris Climate Agreement could serve as a pivotal strategy for advancing both Türkiye’s economic and environmental goals.
Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and their member states enjoyed a transitory monopoly in global governance during a particular historical moment, when state hierarchies asserted their control over markets, internally and internationally. This Bretton Woods moment, in the decades after 1945, was an extension of the domestic regulatory state. Both before and after those decades, alternative forms of global governance emerged. During the interwar decades, networks and markets were embedded in private and hybrid modes of governing international monetary and financial affairs, cartels, and commercial arbitration. As liberalization encouraged by the Bretton Woods institutions expanded during the 1970s and 1980s, markets and networks resumed their earlier prominence in public and private governance. Economic globalization was a primary driver of this evolution in global governance, creating demand for governance as well as shaping supply.
International organizations (IOs) are perceived as increasingly important, yet also severely challenged actors in world politics. How authoritative are IOs, how do they exercise authority, and how has their authority evolved over time? The International Authority Database (IAD) offers a novel measure of IO authority built from several aspects of an IO’s institutional design. We provide systematic data on how IOs exercise authority across seven policy functions, using a representative sample of 34 IOs, based on coding over 200 IO bodies, and covering the period 1920–2013. Empirical applications illustrate how the IAD advances our understanding of IOs in novel and important ways.
In order to overcome the crisis besetting the world’s multilateral structures, the Europe-ans in particular would do well to pursue a set of more realistic concepts. While Beijing and Wash-ington may, in the future, be somewhat more kindly disposed toward the idea of a global regulatory framework, they will, in the medium term, be unwilling to make any major conces-sions as far as their national sovereignty is con-cerned. What is first needed to be able to effec-tively tackle global problems like climate change, epidemics, state failure, and nuclear proliferation is a resolution of the representation crisis. Only in the spirit of fair compromise will it be possible to overcome the present state of polarization and to lay the foundation for political compro-mise on specific substantive issues.
The contemporary global order is widely said to be in crisis. But despite a rapidlyproliferating literature on the subject, there is little clarity or consensus aboutwherein the‘crisis’consist, or what precisely is under threat. We offer arestricted characterization of the post-war global order based on itsfundamental substantive and procedural ordering principles: sovereign inter-state relations and a relatively open global economy, characterized bypractices of inclusive, rule-bound multilateralism. We argue that only if one ofmore of these foundational principles are systematically violated, can wespeak of a demise of the order. To this end, we consider the extent to whicheach of these basic principles is currently endangered. We conclude that what we are witnessing is not the collapse of the current world order, but rather its transformation and adaptation into a broader, more flexible and multifaceted system of global governance–a change within the order rather than of the order.
(PDF) Of the Contemporary Global Order, Crisis, and Change. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336411920_Of_the_Contemporary_Global_Order_Crisis_and_Change [accessed Oct 28 2019].
Unter dem Begriff Global Governance wird seit einigen Jahren das Phänomen diskutiert, dass grenzüberschreitende Aktivitäten zunehmend Mischformen der Steuerung unterliegen. Traditionell wurde internationale Politik als Regierungshandeln aufgefasst: durch zwischenstaatliche Verträge, durch internationale Organisationen bzw. — in die Zukunft projiziert — durch eine Weltregierung. Heute wird für einzelne Politikfelder festgestellt, dass an der Vorbereitung, der Vereinbarung und sogar der Umsetzung von transnationalen Regeln nicht nur Vertreter von Regierungen beteiligt sind, sondern auch private Akteure, seien sie Vertreter von Wirtschaftsunternehmen, von traditionellen Verbänden, von Nichtregierungsorganisationen, Medien und von so genannten Expertengemeinden. Zugleich wird beobachtet, dass neben expliziten vertraglichen bzw. satzungsmäßigen Regelungen noch implizite Normen in die Steuerung einfließen (vgl. CGG 1995, 2).
Globalization, the end of the Cold War and increased involvement of non-state actors in global affairs represent fundamentally shifting relations of power, speeding up national economies' integration and contributing to the convergence of policies in different issue domains. This review considers the state of global governance by presenting a variety of global governance arrangements, key challenges facing governance in an increasingly globalized context and possibilities for the future governance. Current global governance arrangements favour flexibility over rigidity, prefer voluntary measures to binding rules and privilege partnerships over individual actions. This synopsis of the state of global governance examines the evolving role that sovereignty and the enduring human struggles for power and equity are playing in shaping international relations and governance. This contribution argues that individual empowerment, increasing awareness of human security, institutional complexity , international power shifts and the liberal world political paradigm will define the future of global governance. This article is published as part of a thematic collection dedicated to global governance.
The prevailing model of international economic regimes is strictly positivistic in its epistemological orientation and stresses the distribution of material power capabilities in its explanatory logic. It is inadequate to account for the current set of international economic regimes and for the differences between past and present regimes. The model elaborated here departs from the prevailing view in two respects, while adhering to it in a third. First, it argues that regimes comprise not simply what actors say and do, but also what they understand and find acceptable within an intersubjective framework of meaning. Second, it argues that in the economic realm such a framework of meaning cannot be deduced from the distribution of material power capabilities, but must be sought in the configuration of state-society relations that is characteristic of the regime-making states. Third, in incorporating these notions into our understanding of the formation and transformation of international economic regimes, the formulation self-consciously strives to remain at the systemic level and to avoid becoming reductionist in attributing cause and effect relations. The article can therefore argue that the prevailing view is deficient on its own terms and must be expanded and modified. Addressing the world of actual international economic regimes, the article argues that the pax Britannica and the pax Americana cannot be equated in any meaningful sense, and that the postwar regimes for money and trade live on notwithstanding premature announcements of their demise.
Since the second half of the twentieth century, the gradual nationalization of political authority that was typical for much of the State's history since the seventeenth century has come to a standstill and given way to the denationalization of political authority. Non-state actors acquire political authority, thus giving rise to a complex network of political authorities, in which the State is only one authority among others. Yet, the denationalization of political authority remains fragmentary and incomplete. No non-state authority, be it an international institution, a rivate business or transnational organization, has the capacity to supplant the State. In fact, they all remain reliant on the State because only the State can provide the complementary resources that non-state actors lack to exercise political authority effectively and legitimately. For this reason, the State remains the key body of authority despite denationalization and the accretion of political authority by non-state entities. Its role has hanged, however. The State no longer exercises authority always directly and exclusively through its own powers and resources, but more and more indirectly, by providing and complementing the powers and resources of non-state actors. The state remains the central authority but its role is transforming: once monopolist, the state is now becoming a manager of political authority -- Seit den 1970er Jahren kommt es zu einer Trendwende: weg von der Verstaatlichung von Herrschaft hin zu deren Entstaatlichung. Nicht-staatliche Akteure �ben in wachsendem Ma�e politische Herrschaft aus. Dadurch entsteht ein komplexes Geflecht aus Herrschaftsstrukturen, in denen der Staat nur noch ein Herrschaftstr�ger unter anderen ist. Diese Entstaatlichung bleibt jedoch bruchst�ckhaft und unvollst�ndig. Kein nicht-staatlicher Herrschaftstr�ger, weder internationale Institutionen, noch private Akteure oder transnationale Organisationen haben die Herrschaftsressourcen, um den S
Global governance has come under increasing pressure since the end of the Cold War. In some issue areas, these pressures have led to significant changes in the architecture of governance institutions. In others, institutions have resisted pressures for change. This volume explores what accounts for this divergence in architecture by identifying three modes of governance: hierarchies, networks, and markets. The authors apply these ideal types to different issue areas in order to assess how global governance has changed and why. In most issue areas, hierarchical modes of governance, established after World War II, have given way to alternative forms of organization focused on market or network-based architectures. Each chapter explores whether these changes are likely to lead to more or less effective global governance across a wide range of issue areas. This provides a novel and coherent theoretical framework for analysing change in global governance.
Global governance has come under increasing pressure since the end of the Cold War. In some issue areas, these pressures have led to significant changes in the architecture of governance institutions. In others, institutions have resisted pressures for change. This volume explores what accounts for this divergence in architecture by identifying three modes of governance: hierarchies, networks, and markets. The authors apply these ideal types to different issue areas in order to assess how global governance has changed and why. In most issue areas, hierarchical modes of governance, established after World War II, have given way to alternative forms of organization focused on market or network-based architectures. Each chapter explores whether these changes are likely to lead to more or less effective global governance across a wide range of issue areas. This provides a novel and coherent theoretical framework for analysing change in global governance.
Global governance has come under increasing pressure since the end of the Cold War. In some issue areas, these pressures have led to significant changes in the architecture of governance institutions. In others, institutions have resisted pressures for change. This volume explores what accounts for this divergence in architecture by identifying three modes of governance: hierarchies, networks, and markets. The authors apply these ideal types to different issue areas in order to assess how global governance has changed and why. In most issue areas, hierarchical modes of governance, established after World War II, have given way to alternative forms of organization focused on market or network-based architectures. Each chapter explores whether these changes are likely to lead to more or less effective global governance across a wide range of issue areas. This provides a novel and coherent theoretical framework for analysing change in global governance.
Global governance has come under increasing pressure since the end of the Cold War. In some issue areas, these pressures have led to significant changes in the architecture of governance institutions. In others, institutions have resisted pressures for change. This volume explores what accounts for this divergence in architecture by identifying three modes of governance: hierarchies, networks, and markets. The authors apply these ideal types to different issue areas in order to assess how global governance has changed and why. In most issue areas, hierarchical modes of governance, established after World War II, have given way to alternative forms of organization focused on market or network-based architectures. Each chapter explores whether these changes are likely to lead to more or less effective global governance across a wide range of issue areas. This provides a novel and coherent theoretical framework for analysing change in global governance.
Global governance has come under increasing pressure since the end of the Cold War. In some issue areas, these pressures have led to significant changes in the architecture of governance institutions. In others, institutions have resisted pressures for change. This volume explores what accounts for this divergence in architecture by identifying three modes of governance: hierarchies, networks, and markets. The authors apply these ideal types to different issue areas in order to assess how global governance has changed and why. In most issue areas, hierarchical modes of governance, established after World War II, have given way to alternative forms of organization focused on market or network-based architectures. Each chapter explores whether these changes are likely to lead to more or less effective global governance across a wide range of issue areas. This provides a novel and coherent theoretical framework for analysing change in global governance.
This survey investigates the increasing importance of global public goods (GPGs) in today’s interdependent world, driven by ever-growing, cross-border externalities and public good spillovers. Novel technologies, enhanced globalization, and population increases are among the main drivers of the rise of GPGs. Key GPGs include curbing climate change, instituting universal regulatory practices, eradicating infectious diseases, preserving world peace, discovering scientific breakthroughs, and limiting financial crises. The survey presents a compact theoretical foundation for GPGs, grounded in the provision of public goods. Because countries may be contributors or noncontributors to a particular GPG, coalition formation and behavior play a role, as do strategic interactions between a contributor coalition and other countries. In the survey, recurrent themes include strategic considerations, alternative institutional arrangements, GPGs’ defining properties, new actors’ roles, and collective action concerns. The four properties of GPGs—benefit non-rivalry, benefit non-excludability, aggregator technology, and spillover range—influence the GPGs’ supply prognoses and the need for and form of provision intervention, which may affect the requisite institutional changes. Three representative case studies illustrate how theoretical insights inform policy and empirical tests. Regional public goods are shown to involve a question of subsidiarity and different actors compared to GPGs. (JEL C71, C72, D62, D70, H41, Q54)
Entwicklungsländer haben seit den 1990er Jahren rasche, aber höchst unterschiedliche Fortschritte gemacht. So weit, dass sich die Grenzen zu den traditionellen Industrieländern teilweise verwischt haben. Andererseits gibt es eine Reihe von meist fragilen Staaten, denen das nicht oder nur ansatzweise gelungen ist. Die Rede von der einen „Dritten Welt“ und gemeinsamen Entwicklungsproblemen erklärt also nur noch wenig. Stattdessen ist .
Lehrbuch nach den wesentlichen Entwicklungszielen und den dabei erzielten Resultaten aufgeschlüsselt und bewertet werden.
Der Autor
Prof. Dr. Joachim Betz war Principal Research Fellow am GIGA Institute of Asian Studies in Hamburg und ist emeritierter Professor für Politische Wissenschaft an der Universität Hamburg.
As International Organization commemorates its seventy-fifth anniversary, the Liberal International Order (LIO) that authors in this journal have long analyzed is under challenge, perhaps as never before. The articles in this issue explore the nature of these challenges by examining how the Westphalian order and the LIO have co-constituted one another over time; how both political and economic dynamics internal to the LIO threaten its core aspects; and how external threats combine with these internal dynamics to render the LIO more fragile than ever before. This introduction begins by defining and clarifying what is “liberal,” “international,” and “orderly” about the LIO. It then discusses some central challenges to the LIO, illustrated by the contributors to this issue as well as other sources. Finally, we reflect on the analytical lessons we have learned—or should learn—as the study of the LIO, represented by scholarship in International Organization , has sometimes overlooked or marginalized dynamics that now appear central to the functioning, and dysfunction, of the order itself.
The 1990s saw a systemic shift from the liberal post–World War II international order of liberal multilateralism (LIO I) to a post–Cold War international order of postnational liberalism (LIO II). LIO II has not been only rule-based but has openly pursued a liberal social purpose with a significant amount of authority beyond the nation-state. While postnational liberal institutions helped increase overall well-being globally, they were criticized for using double standards and institutionalizing state inequality. We argue that these institutional features of the postnational LIO II led to legitimation problems, which explain both the current wave of contestations and the strategies chosen by different contestants. We develop our argument first by mapping the growing liberal intrusiveness of international institutions. Second, we demonstrate the increased level and variety of contestations in international security and international refugee law. We show that increased liberal intrusiveness has led to a variety of contestation strategies, the choice of which is affected by the preference of a contestant regarding postnational liberalism and its power within the contested institution.
It is generally regarded that a robust global financial safety net is a global public good. Yet public goods models that explain the existence of the global financial safety net cannot also explain why it is highly fragmented and provisioned so inequitably. This study shows that the global financial safety net's existence, fragmentation, and inequitable coverage can be explained by modeling the global financial safety net as a global club good. The primary finding of the model is that when a state has a monopoly on the provision of a non-rival and excludable good (i.e., a club good), separate multilateral and bilateral club governance structures emerge, each with a unique structure and cost. Brief case studies of the global financial safety net provisioned by the International Monetary Fund, the Federal Reserve, and the Bank for International Settlements support the model.
The West is turning inward. Donald Trump’s presidency, Britain’s decision to leave the European Union, and the spread of populist parties in Europe are the most visible signs of this retreat. The shift is not as recent as these examples suggest, however. In this paper, we show that Western governments’ support for liberal internationalism has been receding in important ways for over fifteen years, and argue that this trend is best understood as part of a larger “hollowing out” of the political center in Western democracies. Drawing on an array of cross-national data for industrialized democracies and for hundreds of political parties in those democracies, we document the erosion of Western government and party support for liberal internationalism from its Cold War apex, through the 2008 global economic downturn, and to the present. We show that this erosion in Western governments’ support for liberal internationalism corresponds to a steady weakening of mainstream parties’ electoral strength across OECD countries, and hence, to their declining policy-making influence. The erosion of the “vital center” has opened up political space for radical-right and radical-left parties which have been the vehicles of the current backlash against liberal internationalism. We discuss the implications of these trends for the future of the Western liberal international order and strategies now on offer to repair it.
Is the contemporary global order under threat? This contribution weighs the case for and against the notion that we are witnessing an existential challenge to the contemporary global order. We show that there are grounds for optimism with respect to the endurance of the first two ordering principles of the contemporary global order: a state-led global order and economic liberalism, because states remain key actors in the current world order and because overall support for economic liberalism remains strong. However, we see greater challenges to the procedural principle of inclusive, rule-based multilateralism, such as unilateral disintegration challenges and rising popular scepticism about international institutions that provide considerable reasons to worry about the future of the global order. Yet, given that the global order has proven robust time and again in the past, we see some reasons for cautious optimism overall, despite considerable risks.
The liberal international order, erected after the Cold War, was crumbling by 2019. It was flawed from the start and thus destined to fail. The spread of liberal democracy around the globe-essential for building that order-faced strong resistance because of nationalism, which emphasizes self-determination. Some targeted states also resisted U.S. efforts to promote liberal democracy for security-related reasons. Additionally, problems arose because a liberal order calls for states to delegate substantial decisionmaking authority to international institutions and to allow refugees and immigrants to move easily across borders. Modern nation-states privilege sovereignty and national identity, however, which guarantees trouble when institutions become powerful and borders porous. Furthermore, the hyperglobalization that is integral to the liberal order creates economic problems among the lower and middle classes within the liberal democracies, fueling a backlash against that order. Finally, the liberal order accelerated China's rise, which helped transform the system from unipolar to multipolar. A liberal international order is possible only in unipolarity. The new multipolar world will feature three realist orders: a thin international order that facilitates cooperation, and two bounded orders-one dominated by China, the other by the United States-poised for waging security competition between them. © 2019 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
This chapter puts the topic of global governance in the context of governance and governance systems more generally. Although global governance has many special features and is indeed the most complex and also a frequently contested governance system, it nonetheless shares many basic principles and performance criteria with other forms of managing public problems, be they at the national or the local level or designed for one policy field or another. Global governance is set apart by the legitimacy of international or supranational government given the growing interdependence of formally sovereign nation-states; the institutionalization of measures for global problem-solving, especially regarding the challenges of transgressions and voids; and the specific nature of innovation in a system yet to gain levels of capacity and readiness to cope with the task of managing a globalized world. This chapter addresses these and related issues of global governance in turn.
This book offers a major new theory of global governance, explaining both its rise and what many see as its current crisis. The author suggests that world politics is now embedded in a normative and institutional structure dominated by hierarchies and power inequalities and therefore inherently creates contestation, resistance, and distributional struggles. Within an ambitious and systematic new conceptual framework, the theory makes four key contributions. Firstly, it reconstructs global governance as a political system which builds on normative principles and reflexive authorities. Second, it identifies the central legitimation problems of the global governance system with a constitutionalist setting in mind. Third, it explains the rise of state and societal contestation by identifying key endogenous dynamics and probing the causal mechanisms that produced them. Finally, it identifies the conditions under which struggles in the global governance system lead to decline or deepening.
Rich with propositions, insights, and evidence, the book promises to be the most important and comprehensive theoretical argument about world politics of the 21st century.
These are not happy times for liberal internationalists. No one can be sure how deep the crisis of liberal internationalism runs. However, in what follows, I argue that despite its troubles, liberal internationalism still has a future. The nature of the crisis is surprising. The threats to liberal internationalism were expected to come from rising non-western states seeking to undermine or overturn the postwar order. In the face of hostile, revisionist states, the United States and Europe were expected to stand shoulder to shoulder to protect the gains from 70 years of cooperation. But, in fact, liberal internationalism is more deeply threatened by developments within the West itself. The centrist and progressive coalitions that lay behind the postwar liberal order have weakened. Liberal democracy itself appears fragile and polarized, vulnerable to far right populism and backlash politics. In recent decades, the working and middle classes in advanced industrial democracies—the original constituencies and beneficiaries of an open and cooperative international order—have faced rising economic inequality and stagnation. Within the West, liberal internationalism is increasingly seen, not as a source of stability and solidarity among like-minded states, but as a global playing field for the wealthy and influential. Liberal internationalism has lost its connection to the pursuit of social and economic advancement within western countries.
Der Band setzt sich kritisch mit dem Konzept der Global Governance auseinander. Ausgehend von dem Problem einer scheinbar unkontrollierten Globalisierung gehen die AutorInnen der Frage nach, ob und wie die politische Handlungsfähigkeit im internationalen System durch multilaterale Koordinationsmechanismen zurückgewonnen werden kann. Die AutorInnen prüfen ein vom Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden (INEF) entwickeltes Konzept von Global Governance aus zwei Perspektiven: Aus theoretischer Sicht wird das Konzept mit Fragen nach den Machtbeziehungen im Internationalen System oder dem Verhältnis zwischen Politik und Ökonomie konfrontiert. Gleichzeitig werden anhand von Ergebnissen aus Politikfeldern wie Sicherheit, Menschenrechte oder internationale Handelspolitik die Realisierungschancen einer Global Governance im internationalen System analysiert. Damit liefert der Band eine umfassende Einführung in das Thema und ermöglicht ein tieferes Verständnis von Global Governance.
The latest wave of regional organizations may pose a more serious risk of fragmentation in global governance than earlier regional initiatives. Although these new organizations offer additional resources for global ends, the benefits of specialization, and innovation that could improve global governance, they also risk uncoordinated fragmentation, competition that undermines global norms, and a neglect of important global policy aims. Reinforcing global institutions, building consensus on global purposes and a global-regional division of labor, and establishing informal and formal organizational links between regional and global institutions can offset risks and expand the benefits of the new regionalism.
Undoubtedly one of the highlights of the 1999 Conference was the plenary session in which Professors David Held and Mahdi Elmandjra came together to discuss the theme of ‘“Globalization”: Democracy and Diversity’. The Conference also witnessed the launch of Global Transformations (Polity Press, 1999), at which David Held was joined by two of his three coauthors, Professor Anthony McGrew and Dr Jonathan Perraton. Global Transformations is the product of almost a decade’s work by a research team (based at the Open University and supported by the ESRC) who have produced what James. N. Rosenau has called ‘the definitive work on globalization’. It is a study which not only synthesises an extraordinary amount of information from research on globalization in a range of social science disciplines, but also makes its own distinctive contribution to our understanding of the complex range of forces which are reshaping the world order. We are delighted to be able to reproduce here an ‘executive summary’ of Global Transformations that summarises the major findings of this 500-page survey in just six thousand words.
Ökonomische, soziale und kulturelle Globalisierungsprozesse sowie das globale Politische Heraus- Umweltsystem stellen die Nationalstaaten sowie die internationale Politik vor forderungen der schwierige Herausforderungen. Die Inkongruenz von territorialstaatlich organisierter Politik sowie grenzüberschreitenden Problemzusammenhängen (z.B. dem Klimawandel, weltweiter Migration) und Funktionssystemen (z.B. den globalen Finanzmärkten, dem Internet) auf der einen Seite und sich verändernde Machtge- füge zwischen (zumindest potenziell) weltweit mobilen Akteuren (Unternehmen, Kapitalbesitzern, Experten, Wissenschaftlern) sowie immobilen Akteuren (Regierungen, Gewerkschaften, Parteien, kommunalen Verwaltungen) auf der anderen Seite setzen die etablierten Institutionen der Politik unter Globalisierungsdruck. In der Debatte über Global Governance werden Antworten der Politik auf die Herausforderungen der Globalisierung gesucht.
Von jenen Organisationen, mit denen wir uns hier hauptsächlich befassen wollen, erwartet man, daß sie die Interessen ihrer Mitglieder fördern. Von Gewerkschaften erwartet man, daß sie sich um höhere Löhne und bessere Arbeitsbedingungen für ihre Mitglieder bemühen; von Bauernverbänden, daß sie sich um eine für ihre Mitglieder günstige Gesetzgebung bemühen; von Kartellen, daß sie sich um höhere Preise für die angeschlossenen Unternehmungen bemühen; von einer Aktiengesellschaft, daß sie die Belange ihrer Aktionäre för dert;1) und vom Staat, daß er die gemeinsamen Interessen seiner Bürger fördert.
Mit dem Ende der Systemkonkurrenz zwischen West und Ost durch die Implosion der Sowjetunion Ende der 1980er Jahre veränderte sich die Machtstruktur des vormals bipolar organisierten internationalen Systems. Neue Handlungspotenziale internationaler Politik zur Lösung globaler Probleme schienen sich jetzt zu eröffnen. Um diese Handlungspotenziale auszuloten, wurde auf Initiative des früheren deut-schen SPD-Politikers Willy Brandt unter dem Dach der Vereinten Nationen 1991 die Commission on Global Governance gegründet. Sie erhielt den Auftrag, Visionen für eine zukünftige internationale Politik zu erarbeiten. 1995 veröffentlichte die Kommission ihren Bericht unter dem Titel „Our Global Neighbourhood“. Populär wurde der Begriff Global Governance in Deutschland durch die Übersetzung des Berichtes durch die Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden (SEF) in Bonn und durch die Arbeiten des Instituts für Entwicklung und Frieden (INEF) in Duisburg.
Notwithstanding great progress in scientific and economic understanding of climate change, it has proven difficult to forge international agreements because of free-riding, as seen in the defunct Kyoto Protocol. This study examines the club as a model for international climate policy. Based on economic theory and empirical modeling, it finds that without sanctions against non-participants there are no stable coalitions other than those with minimal abatement. By contrast, a regime with small trade penalties on non-participants, a Climate Club, can induce a large stable coalition with high levels of abatement.
The cross-border flows of goods, investment, services, know-how and people associated with international production networks–call it ‘supply-chain trade’ for short–has transformed the world. The WTO has not kept pace. This paper argues that adapting world trade governance to the realities of supply-chain trade will require a new organization–a WTO 2.0 as it were. Reasoning on the optimal nature of the new organization is based on the nature of supply-chain trade, the nature of the disciplines that underpin it, and the nature of the gains from cooperation.
The traditional mode of governance of national and global monetary and financial markets was obviously too weak and piecemeal to hinder the recurrent outbreak of regional and worldwide crises. The latest and gravest in this series triggered a massive institutional and operational overhaul, achieved both by the creation of new institutions and also by old and new ones being made stronger and more inclusive, foremost by introducing major emerging countries into their steering and oversight bodies. During this endeavour, national and institutional self-interests were initially subdued, but would come out forcefully later. As a consequence, the new edifices for multilateral market regulation and surveillance, as well as its financing, went only as far as the difficult compromise of an enlarged body of players would allow. Therefore, regional solutions or cooperation between like-minded countries were often seen as alternatives to a strong multilateral understanding, but are only able to complement the existing international monetary and financial system.
Bei der letzten Tagung von IWF und Weltbank im April 2006 rief das globale Aktions netzwerk gegen Armut erneut zu umfassender Streichung der Schulden von ärmeren Entwicklungsländern ohne Bedingungen seitens dieser Institutionen auf. Sie verhin derten die Verringerung von Armut, seien wirtschaftspolitisch unnötig und untermi nierten die Fähigkeit der Schuldnerländer, eine selbst bestimmte Entwicklungspolitik zu betreiben. Analyse: Diese und zahlreiche ähnliche Äußerungen unterstellen eine beachtliche Durchset zungsmacht der internationalen Finanzinstitutionen (IFIs), die so aber kaum gegeben ist: Die Macht von IWF und Weltbank wird tatsächlich meist überschätzt, beide Institu tionen verfügen weder über große Apparate noch unendliche Mittel; ihre Durchset zungsfähigkeit gegenüber den Kreditnehmern ist begrenzt. Sie waren auch nicht sonderlich erfolgreich darin, parallel zu ihren eigenen Pro grammen zusätzliche private oder öffentliche Mittel zu mobilisieren. Sie sind aber nach wie vor entscheidende Agenturen für die Datensammlung und-aufbereitung, in der entwicklungspolitischen Diskussion und bei der theoretischen und praktischen Begleitung von Strukturreformen, auch wenn ihre Informations vorteile langsam schwinden. Letzteres hat paradoxerweise auch damit zu tun, dass ihre Transparenz im Umgang mit der meist kritischen Öffentlichkeit deutlich zugenommen hat.
At the outset, the article traces the increased prevalence of transnational collective action to globalization, technological progress, population growth and enhanced surveillance. The article then identifies 15 factors that facilitate successful collective action at the global and regional level. Generally, collective action problems with more of these facilitators are easier to address and, in some instances, will require no explicit policy intervention. By identifying essential facilitators and inhibitors, the article indicates where collective action has either a good or bad prognosis. Thus, scarce policy resources can be directed toward those issues where the prognosis is unfavorable. Much of the article concentrates on spatial considerations, institutional engineering and aggregator technologies. For regional collective action concerns, spatial considerations are particularly important since propinquity and relative location of countries influence how actions of other countries affect social well‐being. Simple institutional designs – cost sharing, thresholds and refunds – can effectively overcome impediments to collective action by making contributors view their net benefits from the viewpoint of the collective. Throughout the article, contrasts are drawn between global and regional collective action. Myriad examples and policy recommendations are offered.
Policy Implications
Global collective action can differ fundamentally from regional collective action. These differences must inform policy making in addressing collective action impediments.
Spatial considerations can play an important role in the underlying incentives motivating regional collective action.
Scarce policy‐making resources should be directed at those collective action problems that face the greatest impediments and/or the fewest facilitators – e.g. global warming.
The manner in which individual contributions add to the overall amount of the collective action is an essential consideration when designing policies.
Simple institutional designs – cost sharing and refunds – can effectively overcome impediments to collective action by aligning countries’ incentives.
Climate change, nuclear proliferation, and the threat of a global pandemic have the potential to impact each of our lives. Preventing these threats poses a serious global challenge, but ignoring them could have disastrous consequences. How do we engineer institutions to change incentives so that these global public goods are provided? Scott Barrett provides a thought provoking and accessible introduction to the issues surrounding the provision of global public goods. Using a variety of examples to illustrate past successes and failures, he shows how international cooperation, institutional design, and the clever use of incentives can work together to ensure the effective delivery of global public goods. Available in OSO: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/economicsfinance/9780199211890/toc.html
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