ArticlePDF Available

Figures

Content may be subject to copyright.
(IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,
Vol. 14, No. 5, 2023
135 | P a g e
www.ijacsa.thesai.org
Cybersecurity in Healthcare: A Review of Recent
Attacks and Mitigation Strategies
Elham Abdullah Al-Qarni
Department of Computing and Information Technology
University of Bisha
Bisha-Saudi Arabia
AbstractCyberattacks on several businesses, including those
in the healthcare, finance, and industrial sectors, have
significantly increased in recent years. Due to inadequate
security measures, antiquated practices, and sensitive data,
including usernames, passwords, and medical records, the
healthcare sector has emerged as a top target for cybercriminals.
Cybersecurity has not gotten enough attention in the healthcare
sector, despite being crucial for patient safety and a hospital's
reputation. In order to prevent data breaches that could
jeopardize the privacy of patients' information, hospitals must
deploy the proper IT security measures. This research article
reviews many scholarly publications that look at ransomware
attacks and other cyberattacks on hospitals between 2014 and
2020. The report summarizes the most recent defensive measures
put forth in scholarly works that can be used in the healthcare
industry. Additionally, the report provides a general review of
the effects of cyberattacks and the steps hospitals have taken to
manage and recover from these disasters. The study shows that
cyberattacks on hospitals have serious repercussions and
emphasizes the significance of giving cybersecurity a priority in
the healthcare sector. To combat cyberattacks, hospitals must
have clear policies and backup plans, constantly upgrade their
systems, and instruct employees on how to spot and handle online
threats. The article comes to the conclusion that putting in place
suitable cybersecurity safeguards can reduce the harm brought
on by system failures, reputational damage, and other associated
problems.
KeywordsCybersecurity; healthcare industry; malware;
ransomware; DoS; DDoS
I. INTRODUCTION
The healthcare sector is very concerned about security,
especially on the internet, where cyberattacks are becoming
more common and sophisticated. Access control violations,
assaults that inject and execute malware, and denial of service
(DoS) attacks are some of the most frequent threats to
healthcare security. In contrast to Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) assaults, which employ numerous hosts to
attack a system, DoS attacks include a single source that
floods the target system with requests. This makes it difficult
to pinpoint the attack's origin. Patients may suffer as a result
of these attacks, and healthcare organizations may suffer
reputational damage [1].
Another major threat to the healthcare sector is malware,
which virtually always comes in new varieties. Ransomware is
one malware family that healthcare institutions are becoming
worried about. Ransomware was listed second on a list of
cybersecurity dangers to healthcare companies in a poll by the
Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society
(HIMSS), with 17% of respondents reporting having been the
victim of a ransomware attack [2].
Healthcare businesses have been the subject of several
high-profile cyberattacks in recent years. For instance, a
ransomware assault that affected the Irish Health Service
Executive (HSE) in 2021 severely disrupted healthcare
services [3]. Similar to this, over 150 nations were impacted
by the WannaCry ransomware assault in 2017, which forced
the UK's National Health Service (NHS) to reschedule
procedures and cancel appointments [4].
Healthcare institutions must put robust cybersecurity
safeguards in place to stop cyberattacks and safeguard
sensitive patient data. Many healthcare institutions, however,
continue to lack adequate security protocols, leaving them
open to intrusions. Only 44% of healthcare businesses,
according to a study by the Ponemon Institute, have a
thorough security policy in place [5].
Based on responses from 167 healthcare cybersecurity
specialists, Fig. 1 shows the survey's ranking of cyberattacks
in 2021. The author's method involved doing a content
assessment of scientific papers from 2014 to 2020 that
discussed malware, DoS, and social engineering attacks on
hospitals.
There are five sections in the paper. Hospitals that
experienced cyberattacks from 2014 to 2020 are covered in
Section II. Hospitals can apply the measures discussed in
Section III to lessen or prevent a cyberattack. Results and
discussion are presented in Section IV, and the paper is
wrapped up in Section V.
(IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,
Vol. 14, No. 5, 2023
136 | P a g e
www.ijacsa.thesai.org
Fig. 1. A list of the most significant cyberattacks for 2021 [2].
II. CYBERSECURITY IN HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS
In this section, we'll talk about a number of hospitals that
experienced cyberattacks, the steps we took to deal with the
situation, and the effects of the attacks.
Table I gives a summary of cyberattacks on hospitals,
including ransomware and distributed denial of service
(DDoS), as well as the results. For instance, on March 20,
2014, a DDoS attack targeted Boston Hospital, causing a
network outage that lasted two weeks and adversely disrupting
hospital operations. In 2016, ransomware that used social
engineering techniques struck Lukas Hospital and Hollywood
Presbyterian Medical, disrupting the systems and making
patient data unusable. In 2020, ransomware attacks affected
three hospitals, one each in the Czech Republic, the United
States, and London. Boston Children's Hospital had the
longest attack duration, lasting 14 days, while Champaign-
Urbana Public Health District had the shortest, lasting only
four days.
The table shows that the effects are harsh regardless of the
attack strategies and tactics used by cybercriminals. Therefore,
if cybersecurity was given top priority in the healthcare sector,
system failures, reputational damage, and other related
problems might be lessened.
Table II lists the methods that hackers use to attack the
healthcare sector as well as the defenses used by hospitals to
fend against and recover from attacks. All of these institutions,
which were targets of various cyberattacks, including those at
Boston Hospital, Lukas Hospital, Brno Hospital, and Hancock
Hospital, followed the same course of action: they shut down
their systems to limit the harm. The table demonstrates that
hospitals did not have defined strategies or backup plans to
deal with intrusions, demonstrating a disregard for
cybersecurity. For instance, Brno Hospital continued to run
Windows XP into 2020. This emphasizes how important it is
for healthcare businesses to address cybersecurity and
implement preventative steps to lessen and eliminate online
dangers.
Information on the ransom payments made by hospitals to
hackers to recover access to their systems is shown in Table
III. In comparison to attempting to restore compromised
information technology systems without the decryption key
needed to remove the infection, paying the ransom may be
less detrimental to operations and profit margins. Boston
Hospital spent the most to restore its systems, close to
$600,000, and Champaign-Urbana Public Health District spent
the second-most, $350,000. The least amount was paid by
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical, at $17,000. Although
paying a ransom may incur financial costs, it is preferable to
endangering lives, tarnishing one's image, or disclosing
private information. Hospitals should put patients' safety first,
even if doing so would inspire hackers to undertake additional
cyberattacks. It is crucial that hospitals.
Fig. 2 illustrates how cyberattacks are divided into three
distinct attack categories.
1) Injection attack: A web application may be "injected"
with malicious data by an attacker, affecting the way it
operates by directing it to execute certain commands. Injection
is one of the early varieties of web-based attacks. Malware is
an illustration of an injection attack. According to [6],
malware is any computer code written with the purpose of
gaining unauthorized access to digital devices and IT
infrastructures. This is done by breaching the security
measures protecting them and taking advantage of security
flaws. Three distinct malware subtypes were discernible:
a) SamSam: Initially appearing in late 2015, a
ransomware malware, primarily targets the healthcare sector.
SamSam specializes in using RDP, FTP, and Java-based web
server vulnerabilities to access the victims' machines [7].
b) Locky: It is a ransomware family that uses a hybrid
cryptosystem and was launched in 2016. Its mechanism of
operation involves scanning the victim's drives, such as
network drives, for particular file types to encrypt them using
RSA and AES [8].
c) Netwalker: Also known as Mailto, is a type of attack
where the attacker uses the victim's network to encrypt all
Windows-based devices. The attacker can use either phishing
emails or executable files that travel throughout networks to
carry out his attack [9].
(IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,
Vol. 14, No. 5, 2023
137 | P a g e
www.ijacsa.thesai.org
TABLE I.
E
XAMPLE OF
H
OSPITALS
E
XPOSED TO
C
YBER
-A
TTACKS
Targeted system/ Region,
Year
Cyber
Attack
Category
Result
Source
Boston Children's Hospital/
Boston, 2014
DDoS
For a period of two weeks, the hospital's network was inactive, seriously
disrupting everyday operations and leading to the closure of the fundraising
website.
[21]
Lukas Hospital/ Germany,
2016
Social
engineering
& Malware
High-risk surgeries were postponed by the hospital while they evaluated
and sanitized their infected servers and computer systems.
[19] &
[21]
Hancock regional hospital/
United States, 2018
Malware
(SamSam)
The backup files are permanently destroyed.
[19]
Hollywood Presbyterian
Medical Center/ Los Angeles,
2016
Malware
(Locky) &
phishing
Staff employees were unable to access patient information, X-rays, and
other devices during the attack and were unable to use backup systems to
restore the data.
[22]
Champaign-Urbana Public
Health District/ United
States, 2020
Malware
(NetWalker)
In order to provide updates on COVID-19, the organization blocked its
website and used its Facebook page instead.
[27]
Brno University Hospital/
Czech Republic, 2020
Ransomware
The hospital's IT network was completely shut down as a result of a
significant service disruption, preventing personnel from accessing patient
records, X-rays, and other devices. Handwritten notes and transfer
procedures had to be used by the hospital, which may have compromised
patient safety and slowed down operations. Two further hospital
departments had to be shut down as a result, including the motherhood
department and the children's hospital.
[17]
Hammersmith Medicines
Study/ London, 2020
Ransomware
Birth dates, insurance numbers, and passport information were among the
many private details stolen from patient records.
[17]
TABLE II.
M
ETHODS OF
C
YBER
-A
TTACK ON
H
OSPITALS AND
R
ESPONSES TO
C
YBERATTACKS
Hospital
Attack method
Response
Sou
rce
Boston Children's
Hospital
The hospital network was targeted by hackers
who attempted to breach it by focusing on
"exposed ports and services," as well as
launching a phishing email campaign that
specifically targeted hospital employees.
The hospital took the measure of stopping all web-facing
programs, including email services, to effectively close all
firewall entry points and prevent staff members from
accidentally clicking on a malicious link.
[18]
Lukas Hospital
Technique for social engineering
All systems have been turned off. Backups were used to
restore systems.
[19]
&
[20]
Hancock regional
hospital
The hackers utilized the Microsoft Remote
Desktop Protocol to infiltrate the
administrative account of a hardware vendor.
Turn off all desktop and network systems.
[19]
Hollywood
Presbyterian Medical
NAN
Pay a ransom
[20]
Champaign-Urbana
Public Health District
NAN
Employees exchanged information using their systems and
networks.
[23]
Brno University
Hospital
Exploiting vulnerability in the
WindowsXP operating system.
Shut down the entire information technology network
[17]
Hammersmith
Medicines Study
Use of the ransomware-as-a-service model.
NAN
[17]
TABLE III.
A
MOUNTS
P
AID BY
H
OSPITALS TO
R
ESTORE THEIR
S
YSTEMS
Financial Cost
Source
$300,000 - $600,000
[18] & [24]
$50,000
[25]
$17,000
[20]
$350,000
[26]
No ransom was paid
[17] & [27]
(IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,
Vol. 14, No. 5, 2023
138 | P a g e
www.ijacsa.thesai.org
Fig. 2. Cybersecurity attacks classification.
2) Social engineering: It is a method where an attacker
uses interpersonal interactions to prey on psychological flaws
in the victim to persuade them to divulge critical information
to the attacker [10]. Phishing is a type of social engineering
that hackers employ to trick their victims into divulging
sensitive information like usernames, passwords, bank account
details, etc. This is accomplished by tricking the user into
clicking on a link to a false website or downloading a
malicious program.
3) Denial of service attack: It is a type of cyberattack that
mostly focuses on consuming resources, including memory or
computing power. Both wireless and cable connections can be
used to carry out this assault [11]. A particular kind of DoS
assault that targets websites is known as a distributed denial-
of-service attack. To assault a single victim, an attacker uses
malicious script that has been placed on several other
computers. The website is intended to become inoperable [12].
III. MITIGATION STRATEGIES
As indicated in Fig. 3, we will cover risk classifications
and the most recent techniques hospitals can use to lessen the
effects of cyberattacks in this section.
According to [13], risk is the potential for loss or harm if
an attacker exploits a security hole. An operational risk
associated with online activities that threatens information
assets, resources for information and communication
technology, and technological assets and may cause material
damage to an organization's tangible and intangible assets,
business interruption, or reputational harm is another
comprehensive definition of cybersecurity risk [14]. Risk
reduction and risk avoidance are two alternatives provided by
risk mitigation strategies. Preventative measures are used in
mitigation strategies to lessen the possibility or impact of a
cyberattack. These tactics are focused on locating and
addressing any weak spots and security risks in the
organization's rules and information. Risk-mitigation
measures can include putting in place infiltration detection
systems and protection barriers, as well as updating software
and hardware often and training staff on best practices for
cyber security.
A. A Proactive Incident Response (IR)
Planning and preparation, detection, analysis, and
evaluation, containment and eradication, recovery, and post-
incident activities are the six steps that make up this
procedure. The firm must first establish its security policy and
incident response capability. This involves putting together a
team to manage incidents and acquiring the necessary tools
and supplies. In the second stage, an event is automatically
detected using tools like network- or host-based intrusion
detection systems or manually using manual requirements like
alerting users to problems. In the third stage following the
incident, the incident response team analyzes and verifies the
incident. Implementation of containment strategies, such as
sandboxing, occurs in the fourth stage. In stage five, the
administrator will check that the systems are operating
normally and correct any issues to prevent future occurrences.
After an incident, a meeting should be held as the final step.
The purpose of this meeting is to advance technology and gain
knowledge [15].
B. Secure Architecture based on Blockchain Technology and
Artificial Intelligence
Five layers make up the suggested architecture for a safe
system based on artificial intelligence and blockchain
technology. The first layer, referred to as the "data layer,
gathers information from patient sensors, including
temperature and heartbeat. Additionally, malware samples are
gathered in this layer and sent to the malware analysis layer.
Tools like Pestudio and Process Explorer are used in the
second layer, known as malware analysis, to examine the
malware. The second layer's harmless samples are included in
the third layer's intelligence, which checks them for security
flaws using artificial intelligence techniques like support
vector machines (SVM) and random forests (RF). Data
transferred from Layer 3 is safely stored in Layer 4, the
Blockchain layer. Hospitals, pharmacies, laboratories, and
ambulances are examples of healthcare data recipients at the
applications layer (layer three) [16].
Fig. 3. Proposed strategies to mitigate cyber-attacks.
(IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,
Vol. 14, No. 5, 2023
139 | P a g e
www.ijacsa.thesai.org
C. Design of a Multi-Agent Framework
The framework is created in two steps. First, five system
agents need to be made. Patient, nurse, doctor, ambient, and
database agents. The next step is to provide a tiered
architecture that classifies agents according to their data
storage and power capabilities. The wireless sensor network
platform was utilized in this framework [16].
D. Scheme Relies on Stacked Autoencoder for Intrusion
Detection
Scheme's framework for intrusion detection uses stacked
autoencoders. Data pre-processing, feature extraction, and
intrusion behavior determination make up the method' three
steps. Infiltration behavior is defined at the Data Pre-
Processing phase. A stacked autoencoder is used in the feature
extraction stage to get parameter weights for various features.
The XGBoost algorithm is used in the Intrusion Behavior
Determination stage to determine if a behavior is normal or
intrusive.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As healthcare companies become more popular targets for
hackers, cyberattacks against hospitals are on the rise,
according to the evaluation of scholarly articles done for this
research paper. Because of its outmoded practices, weak
security measures, and sensitive data, the healthcare sector is a
prime target for hackers. These attacks can have serious
effects, including harm to patients, harm to the reputation of
healthcare organizations, and monetary losses.
The study also outlines a number of research papers'
protection against cyberattacks and solutions that healthcare
institutions might use. These tactics comprise staff training,
routine system updates, and the application of cutting-edge
security tools like intrusion detection systems and firewalls.
According to the study, hospitals should prioritize
cybersecurity and have detailed strategies and backup plans to
deal with intrusions.
Hospitals are vulnerable to attacks because of insufficient
security standards, according to the assessment of scholarly
studies. The majority of healthcare firms do not have a
thorough security strategy, which shows a disregard for
cybersecurity. The study recommends that healthcare
institutions take proactive steps to safeguard sensitive patient
data and lessen the effects of system errors, reputational
damage, and other related problems.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
This study concludes by emphasizing the urgent necessity
for healthcare institutions to address cybersecurity in order to
prevent data breaches that could jeopardize patient
information. Hospital cyberattacks can have serious
repercussions, so healthcare companies need to create clear
policies and backup plans to cope with these situations. The
report provides a summary of hospital cyberattacks from 2014
through 2020, including ransomware assaults, and offers many
tactics hospitals might employ to lessen or prevent a hack.
Future studies can concentrate on creating innovative
techniques and tools to defend healthcare companies against
cyberattacks. For instance, research may look into how to
employ machine learning and artificial intelligence to detect
and stop cyberattacks on hospitals. Additionally, studies might
look into how cyberattacks affect patient security and consider
the moral ramifications of data breaches in the healthcare
sector.
Overall, the importance of cybersecurity in the healthcare
sector is highlighted in this research study, and healthcare
companies must take proactive steps to safeguard sensitive
patient data. Healthcare institutions must emphasize
cybersecurity given the increase in cyberattacks on hospitals
in order to limit losses from system failures, reputational
damage, and other associated problems.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The author wishes to express her deep appreciation and
respect to Salahaldin M.A. Abuabdou for inspiring and
motivating her to write this paper.
REFERENCES
[1]
Mirkovic, J., & Reiher, P. (2004). A taxonomy of DDoS attack and
DDoS defense mechanisms. ACM SIGCOMM Computer
Communication Review, 34(2), 39-53.
[2]
Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society, "2021
HIMSS Healthcare Cybersecurity Survey Report," 2022. [Online].
Available: https://www.himss.org/resources/2021-himss-healthcare-
cybersecurity-survey-report. [Accessed: 18-Apr-2023].
[3]
M. O'Brien, "Ireland’s Health Service Executive hit by ransomware
attack," The Guardian, 14 May 2021. [Online]. Available:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/14/irelands-health-
service-executive-hit-by-ransomware-attack. [Accessed: 18-Apr-2023].
[4]
A. Osborn, "NHS cyber-attack: GPs and hospitals hit by ransomware,"
BBC News, 12 May 2017. [Online]. Available:
https://www.bbc.com/news/health-39899646. [Accessed: 18-Apr-2023].
[5]
Ponemon Institute, "Sixth Annual Benchmark Study on Privacy &
Security of Healthcare Data," 2016. [Online]. Available:
https://www.ponemon.org/library/2016-ponemon-institute-benchmark-
study-on-privacy-security-of-healthcare-data. [Accessed: 18-Apr-2023].
[6]
M. Ashawa and T. Morris, "Understanding and Mitigating Malware
Attacks," in Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Cyber
Warfare and Security (ICCWS 2019), vol. 1, pp. 1-10, 2019.
[7]
V. Arora, A. Varshney, A. Arora, and N. Shukla, "Assessment of
SamSam Ransomware Attack on Healthcare Sector and Way Forward,"
Journal of Information Privacy and Security, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 1-12,
2019.
[8]
S. Almashhadani, T. Almarshad, and A. Al-Salman, "Ransomware: The
Past, Present, and Future," in Proceedings of the 3rd International
Conference on Computer Applications & Information Security (ICCAIS
2019), vol. 1, pp. 1-6, 2019.
[9]
Gómez-Hernández, J. A., García-Teodoro, P., & Díaz-Verdejo, J. E.
(2022). Analysis of Netwalker Ransomware: Detection, Prevention and
Recovery. Computers & Security, 106, 102556.
[10]
W. Wang, Y. Zeng, X. Zhang, X. Xu, Y. Xiang and X. Shen, "A Survey
on Social Engineering Attacks and Defenses in Online Social
Networks," in IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 22, no.
2, pp. 1342-1372, Secondquarter 2020, doi:
10.1109/COMST.2020.2974247.
[11]
Singh, R., Singh, S., & Saini, D. (2019). Denial of Service Attacks:
Impact, Detection, and Mitigation Techniques. Journal of Network and
Computer Applications, 135, 62-80.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2019.02.015.
[12]
Singh, A., Kumar, A., & Tyagi, S. (2020). A Comparative Analysis of
Detection and Mitigation Techniques against Distributed Denial of
Service Attacks. In Proceedings of the International Conference on
Smart Technologies in Computing and Communication (pp. 259-269).
(IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,
Vol. 14, No. 5, 2023
140 | P a g e
www.ijacsa.thesai.org
Springer.
[13]
Kandasamy, P., Perumal, M., & Naresh, R. (2022). Cybersecurity Risks
and Their Mitigation Strategies for Healthcare Industry. In
Cybersecurity and Privacy Issues in Industry 4.0 (pp. 19-37). Springer,
Singapore.
[14]
Strupczewski, A. (2021). Cybersecurity Risk Management in the
Healthcare Industry. In Handbook of Research on Information Security
and Cyber Threats in the Fourth Industrial Revolution (pp. 103-116). IGI
Global.
[15]
Y. He, X. Lu, Y. Yao, W. Zhang and W. Tang, "A Cyber Security
Incident Response System with Automated Forensics and
Orchestration," in IEEE Access, vol. 10, pp. 113773-113786, 2022, doi:
10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3140703.
[16]
Alabdulatif, A., Ahmad, A., Khan, M. K., Azeem, A., Al-Khateeb, A., &
Al-Salman, A. (2022). A secure architecture based on blockchain
technology and artificial intelligence for healthcare applications. Future
Generation Computer Systems, 127, 487-495.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2021.09.0.
[17]
Ramadan, R. A., Aboshosha, B. W., Alshudukhi, J. S., Alzahrani, A. J.,
El-Sayed, A., & Dessouky, M. M. (2021). Cybersecurity and
Countermeasures at the Time of Pandemic. Journal of Advanced
Transportation, 2021, 119. doi: 10.1155/2021/6627264.
[18]
Wilner, A. S., Luce, H., Ouellet, E., Williams, O., & Costa, N. (2021).
From public health to cyber hygiene: Cybersecurity and Canada’s
healthcare sector. International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global
Policy Analysis, 76(4), 522543. doi: 10.1177/00207020211067946.
[19]
Argaw, S. T., Troncoso-Pastoriza, J. R., Lacey, D., Florin, M.-V.,
Calcavecchia, F., Anderson, D., Burleson, W., Vogel, J.-M., O’Leary,
C., Eshaya-Chauvin, B., & Flahault, A. (2020). Cybersecurity of
Hospitals: Discussing the challenges and working towards mitigating the
risks. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making, 20(1), 146. doi:
10.1186/s12911-020-01161-7.
[20]
Paul III, D. P., Spence, N., Bhardwa, N., & PH, C. D. (2018). Healthcare
facilities: another target for ransomware attacks.
[21]
Cox, J. (2018, January 19). The Cyber AttackFrom the POV of the
CEO. Hancock Regional Hospital.
https://www.hancockregionalhospital.org/2018/01/cyber-attack-pov-ceo/
[22]
Coventry, L., & Branley, D. (2018). Cybersecurity in healthcare: A
narrative review of trends, threats and ways forward. Maturitas, 113, 48
52. doi: 10.1016/j.maturitas.2018.04.008.
[23]
Saleous, H., Ismail, M., AlDaajeh, S. H., Madathil, N., Alrabaee, S.,
Choo, K.-K. R., & Al-Qirim, N. (2022). COVID-19 pandemic and the
cyberthreat landscape: Research challenges and opportunities. Digital
Communications and Networks, S2352864822001274. doi:
10.1016/j.dcan.2022.06.005.
[24]
Ghayoomi, H., Laskey, K., Miller-Hooks, E., Hooks, C., & Tariverdi,
M. (2021). Assessing resilience of hospitals to cyberattack. DIGITAL
HEALTH, 7, 205520762110593.
https://doi.org/10.1177/20552076211059366.
[25]
Burrell, D. N., Aridi, A. S., McLester, Q., Shufutinsky, A., Nobles, C.,
Dawson, M., & Muller, S. R. (2021). Exploring System Thinking
Leadership Approaches to the Healthcare Cybersecurity Environment.
International Journal of Extreme Automation and Connectivity in
Healthcare (IJEACH), 3(2), 2032.
https://doi.org/10.4018/IJEACH.2021070103.
[26]
Strasburg, J., & Hinshaw, D. (2020). Cybercriminals Sweep In to Take
Advantage of Coronavirus. The Wall Street Journal, 24.
[27]
Mahadevan, P. (2020). Cybercrime Threats during the COVID-19
pandemic. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime,
Switzerlan.
... Data privacy in the IoMT involves ensuring that patients' personal health information is used and shared only with their consent, safeguarding against unauthorised access and misuse. In 2020, a ransomware attack on a German hospital disrupted patient care and potentially exposed sensitive health data [26]. While in 2019 there was vulnerability in the Medtronic insulin pump, which could allow unauthorised access to patient data, compromising patient privacy and safety. ...
Article
Full-text available
This study highlights ethical, security, and privacy barriers to IoMT adoption in developing countries and proposes strategies like regulatory frameworks, data encryption, AI transparency, and professional training to address these challenges. The Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) has the potential to revolutionize healthcare by enabling real-time patient monitoring, enhancing diagnostic accuracy, and supporting personalized treatments. However, significant privacy, security, and ethical challenges hinder its widespread adoption, particularly in underdeveloped nations. This study employs the PRISMA methodology to systematically review existing literature and identify key barriers to IoMT implementation in healthcare systems, with a focus on developing countries. Through a rigorous selection process, 80 studies were included in the analysis, revealing critical challenges such as inadequate data protection frameworks, ethical concerns around artificial intelligence (AI) in decision-making, and risks of patient data exploitation. The findings provide actionable recommendations for policymakers, including the establishment of robust ethical guidelines, implementation of strong security measures, and use of advanced encryption techniques. Addressing these challenges is crucial to fostering the ethical and secure adoption of IoMT, ultimately improving healthcare outcomes globally Key recommendations for IoMT adoption include the implementation of advanced encryption techniques to safeguard patient data, the establishment of clear informed consent protocols, and the development of ethical guidelines to manage AI's role in medical decision-making, ensuring transparency and patient autonomy.
... Age disparities among participants revealed differing perceptions of digitalization risks. Older professionals viewed digitalization as low-risk, whereas younger professionals emphasized risks associated with interconnected systems and public networks [13][14][15]. Elder doctors are particularly concerned about the excessive use of usernames and passwords to access patient data, the ability to retrieve specific health information during emergencies, and the potential for IT failures. ...
Article
Full-text available
The increasing integration of technology in European healthcare systems, including Romania, has highlighted the critical need for robust data privacy regulations under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This regulation is crucial for managing patient data and protecting individual rights. However, Romania faces challenges in implementing GDPR due to differing levels of awareness and the rapid advancement of healthcare technologies (e.g., lack of infrastructure or highly trained IT personnel). Methods: The study uses a privacy-focused survey to assess healthcare professionals' compliance, awareness of GDPR principles, and challenges in implementing GDPR requirements. The survey was distributed to 108 Romanian healthcare professionals during an economics and healthcare management course organized between July and September 2024, ensuring anonymity and informed consent. Results: While many practitioners demonstrate a foundational understanding of GDPR principles, gaps exist in practical applications, particularly in clinical settings. The digitalization of public institutions in Romania has been found to reduce the risk of confidentiality from a GDPR perspective, as evidenced by the responses of 82% of participants. Ethical concerns are cited as a significant rationale for not permitting exceptions. Primary challenges recognized by healthcare professionals in the implementation of GDPR requirements include accountability, communication, high volume of consents, laborious administrative duties, abusive use of GDPR, restricted access to specific health data, and administrative tasks. Healthcare professionals in Romania, compared to professionals in other European Union (EU) member states, face GDPR implementation challenges due to resource constraints and cultural barriers, but opportunities include increasing patient trust, innovation, international collaboration, and raising awareness. Conclusions: As technology advances and digitalization in Romanian hospitals continues to develop, software developers and cybersecurity experts must establish a secure system for managing medical data, thereby enhancing public trust in telemedicine and facilitating patient adoption of new technologies, with the aim of preventing or detecting certain diseases in their initial stages. Targeted training programs, resource allocation, and international best practices are essential to reduce gaps in GDPR implementation, alignment with EU standards, and integration into the European Health Data Space (EHDS).
... This is especially dangerous in healthcare settings, where timely access to data and services can be a matter of life or death. A well-known case occurred in 2017 when a DDoS attack targeted a major hospital network, halting communication between doctors and life-saving equipment, such as ventilators and heart monitors [33]. The resource-constrained nature of many IoMT devices makes them easy targets for DDoS attacks, as they often lack the computational power to fend off large-scale attacks. ...
Preprint
The Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) has transformed the healthcare industry by connecting medical devices in monitoring treatment outcomes of patients. This increased connectivity has resulted to significant security vulnerabilities in the case of malware and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. This literature review examines the vulnerabilities of IoMT devices, focusing on critical threats and exploring mitigation strategies. We conducted a comprehensive search across leading databases such as ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore, and Elsevier to analyze peer-reviewed studies published within the last five years (from 2019 to 2024). The review shows that inadequate encryption protocols, weak authentication methods, and irregular firmware updates are the main causes of risks associated with IoMT devices. We have identified emerging solutions like machine learning algorithms, blockchain technology, and edge computing as promising approaches to enhance IoMT security. This review emphasizes the pressing need to develop lightweight security measures and standardized protocols to protect patient data and ensure the integrity of healthcare services.
... Nowadays, cybersecurity is extremely important to medical institutions because data theft, data breaches, and ransomware attacks can affect a variety of sectors, including health departments, care providers, diagnostic services, research institutions, and primary healthcare practices (Mahmoud & Al-Najjar, 2024). Cybersecurity is a major concern for the healthcare industry as cyber-attacks targeting the healthcare industry have been increasing at an alarming rate around the world (Al-Qarni, 2023;Tin et al., 2023). The healthcare sector throughout the world now prioritizes protecting patients' sensitive information, securing network infrastructure, and fighting against cyber-attacks (Bhosale et al., 2021). ...
... Nowadays, cybersecurity is extremely important to medical institutions because data theft, data breaches, and ransomware attacks can affect a variety of sectors, including health departments, care providers, diagnostic services, research institutions, and primary healthcare practices (Mahmoud & Al-Najjar, 2024). Cybersecurity is a major concern for the healthcare industry as cyber-attacks targeting the healthcare industry have been increasing at an alarming rate around the world (Al-Qarni, 2023;Tin et al., 2023). The healthcare sector throughout the world now prioritizes protecting patients' sensitive information, securing network infrastructure, and fighting against cyber-attacks (Bhosale et al., 2021). ...
Article
Full-text available
Electronic healthcare technology is pervasive throughout the globe, and it affords vast opportunities to enhance clinical outcomes, as well as for the transformation of models of care. Concerns are, however, growing, related to healthcare data and device security. Increased connectivity to legacy computer networks brought cybersecurity vulnerabilities for medical devices. Healthcare represents an attractive target for cybercrime because healthcare data is precious. This sector in present times is full of unique cybersecurity challenges, especially for susceptible kinds of patient information at stake. Second, many legacy systems will be prevalent—not adding more to that—with the changing face of cyber threats. Cybersecurity breaches have comprised stealing health information and focused ransomware attacks on hospitals; this could mean as vivid an attack as on implanted medical devices. This only points to the fact that ransomware attacks and other kinds of cyber-attacks against hospitals and other medical facilities are gaining ground; there is every reason to get alarmed and put in place stricter cybersecurity measures. An excellent healthcare cybersecurity strategy, therefore, has to consider access control, intrusion detection systems, encryption techniques, and periodic security testing. Data breaches and cyber-attacks are forcing any healthcare provider to invest in new state-of-the-art technologies related to keeping pace with trends regarding cybersecurity. The dangers that can be caused by cyber-attack include a considerable diminution in patient trust, potential health system collapse, human life threats, etc. On the whole, cybersecurity is strenuously linked with the question of patient safety.
Article
Full-text available
This research paper systematically reviews the financial system’s computer security risks associated with information theft. The objective is to explore the security risks and their implications concerning information theft in the economic system. Three research questions were formulated to identify these risks, their nature, and potential consequences to achieve this objective. Fifty-five articles obtained from reliable databases linked to both study variables were analyzed using the PRISMA methodology. To ensure the validity and reliability of the information, various filters were applied, such as year, keywords, and elimination of duplicate articles. In addition, an exhaustive reading of the content of each article was carried out, organizing all the information through a systematization matrix. After a thorough review of the research articles, mostly written in English and representing 34.55% of the total in 2023, risks associated with the financial sector were identified, including malware, ransomware, phishing, distributed denial of service (DDoS), hybrid XSS, eavesdropping, and social engineering. Geographically, India leads with 14.55% of the articles, followed by South Korea and the United States, with 12.72% each, while the other countries have lower percentages. In conclusion, these risks coincide with previous research and the consequences they generate, highlighting the importance of this type of study for the basis of scientific research.
Article
Full-text available
Although cyber technologies benefit our society, there are also some related cybersecurity risks. For example, cybercriminals may exploit vulnerabilities in people, processes, and technologies during trying times, such as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, to identify opportunities that target vulnerable individuals, organizations (e.g., medical facilities), and systems. In this paper, we examine the various cyberthreats associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. We also determine the attack vectors and surfaces of cyberthreats. Finally, we will discuss and analyze the insights and suggestions generated by different cyberattacks against individuals, organizations, and systems.
Article
Full-text available
The COVID-19 pandemic has ushered in a wave of cyberattacks targeting the healthcare sector, including against hospitals, doctors, patients, medical companies, supply chains, universities, research laboratories, and public health organizations at different levels of jurisdiction and across the public and private sectors. Despite these concerns, cybersecurity in Canadian healthcare is significantly understudied. This article uses a series of illustrative examples to highlight the challenges, outcomes, and solutions Canada might consider in addressing healthcare cybersecurity. The article explores the various rationales by which Canadian healthcare may be targeted, unpacks several prominent types of cyberattack used against the healthcare sector, identifies the different malicious actors motivated to conduct such attacks, provides insights derived from three empirical cases of healthcare cyberattack (Boston Children’s Hospital [2014], Anthem [2015], National Health Service [2017]), and concludes with lessons for a Canadian response to healthcare cybersecurity from several international perspectives (e.g., Australia, New Zealand, the UK, Norway, and the Netherlands).
Article
Full-text available
Objective This paper investigates the impact on emergency hospital services from initiation through recovery of a ransomware attack affecting the emergency department, intensive care unit and supporting laboratory services. Recovery strategies of paying ransom to the attackers with follow-on restoration and in-house full system restoration from backup are compared. Methods A multi-unit, patient-based and resource-constrained discrete-event simulation model of a typical U.S. urban tertiary hospital is adapted to model the attack, its impacts, and tested recovery strategies. The model is used to quantify the hospital's resilience to cyberattack. Insights were gleaned from systematically designed numerical experiments. Results While paying the ransom was found to result in some short-term gains assuming the perpetrators actually provide the decryption key as promised, in the longer term, the results of this study suggest that paying the ransom does not pay off. Rather, paying the ransom, when considered at the end of the event when services are fully restored, precluded significantly more patients from receiving critically needed care. Also noted was a lag in recovery for the intensive care unit as compared with the emergency department. Such a lag must be considered in preparedness plans. Conclusion Vulnerability to cyberattacks is a major challenge to the healthcare system. This paper provides a methodology for assessing the resilience of a hospital to cyberattacks and analyzing the effects of different response strategies. The model showed that paying the ransom resulted in short-term gains but did not pay off in the longer term.
Article
Full-text available
A Florida-based obstetrics and gynecology facility reported in February 2019 that they lost data because of a ransomware attack. In November 2017, 107,000 healthcare records were exposed from data breaches, and 340,000 records were exposed in December 2017. In 2019, 23,000 patient records at Critical Care, Pulmonary & Sleep Associates were compromised when a hacker gained access to an employee's email account and sent out phishing emails to the other employees, eventually exposing the patient data. On January 11, 2018, Adams Memorial Hospital and Hancock Regional Hospital, both in Indiana, experienced independent ransomware attacks, with Hancock Regional Hospital paying $50,000 in ransom. These incidents point to significant and complex cybersecurity risks for all healthcare organizations. Effectively managing these risks requires healthcare managers to develop system thinking and adaptive leadership skills. This paper explores the nuances and complexities around systems thinking in the healthcare cybersecurity environment.
Article
Full-text available
With the emergence of one of this century’s deadliest pandemics, coronavirus disease (COVID-19) has an enormous effect globally with a quick spread worldwide. This made the World Health Organization announce it as a pandemic. COVID-19 has pushed countries to follow new behaviors such as social distancing, hand washing, and remote work and to shut down organizations, businesses, and airports. At the same time, white hats are doing their best to accommodate the pandemic. However, while white hats are protecting people, black hats are taking advantage of the situation, which creates a cybersecurity pandemic on the other hand. This paper discusses the cybersecurity issues at this period due to finding information or finding another related research that had not been discussed before. This paper presents the cybersecurity attacks during the COVID-19 epidemic time. A lot of information has been collected from the World Health Organization (WHO), trusted organizations, news sources, official governmental reports, and available research articles. This paper then classifies the cybersecurity attacks and threats at the period of COVID-19 and provides recommendations and countermeasures for each type. This paper surveys the cybersecurity attacks and their countermeasures and reports the ongoing cybersecurity attacks and threats at this period of time. Moreover, it is also a step towards analyzing the efficiency of the country’s infrastructure as well as hackers and criminals’ social behavior at the time of the pandemic.
Article
Full-text available
Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) is a rapidly growing problem. The multitude and variety of both the attacks and the defense approaches is overwhelming. This paper presents two taxonomies for classifying attacks and defenses, and thus provides researchers with a better understanding of the problem and the current solution space. The attack classification criteria was selected to highlight commonalities and important features of attack strategies, that define challenges and dictate the design of countermeasures. The defense taxonomy classifies the body of existing DDoS defenses based on their design decisions; it then shows how these decisions dictate the advantages and deficiencies of proposed solutions.
Ireland's Health Service Executive hit by ransomware attack
  • M O'brien
M. O'Brien, "Ireland's Health Service Executive hit by ransomware attack," The Guardian, 14 May 2021. [Online]. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/14/irelands-healthservice-executive-hit-by-ransomware-attack. [Accessed: 18-Apr-2023].
  • A Osborn
A. Osborn, "NHS cyber-attack: GPs and hospitals hit by ransomware," BBC News, 12 May 2017. [Online]. Available: https://www.bbc.com/news/health-39899646. [Accessed: 18-Apr-2023].