Ending fossil-based growth: Confronting the political economy of petrochemical plastics

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Perspective
Ending fossil-based growth:
Confronting the political economy
of petrochemical plastics
Joachim Peter Tilsted,
1,
*Fredric Bauer,
1,2,
*Carolyn Deere Birkbeck,
3
Jakob Skovgaard,
4
and Johan Rootze
´n
5
1
Environmental and Energy Systems Studies, Department of Technology and Society, Lund University, P.O. Box 118, SE-221 00 Lund,
Sweden
2
CIRCLE, Lund University, P.O. Box 117, SE-221 00 Lund, Sweden
3
Forum on Trade, Environment & the SDGs (TESS), The Graduate Institute Geneva, Chemin Euge
`ne-Rigot 2, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland
4
Department of Political Science, Lund University, P.O. Box 52, 221 00 Lund, Sweden
5
IVL Swedish Environmental Research Institute, Aschebergsgatan 44, P.O. Box 530 21, SE 400 14 Gothenburg, Sweden
*Correspondence: joachim.tilsted@miljo.lth.se (J.P.T.), fredric.bauer@miljo.lth.se (F.B.)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2023.05.018
SUMMARY
The expanding petrochemical industry depends on fossil fuels both as feedstock and a source of energy and
is at the heart of the intertwined global crises relating to plastics, climate, and toxic emissions. Addressing
these crises requires uprooting the deep-seated lock-ins that sustain petrochemical plastics. This perspec-
tive identifies lock-ins that stand in the way of ambitious emission reductions and ending plastic pollution. We
emphasize that addressing the growing plastic production and consumption requires confronting the polit-
ical economy of petrochemicals. We put forward key elements needed to address the dual challenges of
moving away from the unsustainable production of plastics and drastically reducing emissions from the
petrochemical sector and argue for attention to the links between fossil fuels and plastics, which in turn in-
volves challenging entrenched power structures and vested interests linked to the fossil-based plastics
economy. A critical step would be ensuring attention to the production of petrochemicals and related up-
stream issues in the upcoming global plastics treaty.
INTRODUCTION
Linking together the crises of climate change, plastic pollution,
and toxic emissions, the petrochemical industry uses fossil fuels
for the production of the molecular building blocks for plastics
and other petrochemicals (see Figure 1).
1–3
The production pro-
cesses have a direct climate impact of around 4% of global
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
4
generate 460 Mt of plastics
(of which more than 350 Mt end up as plastic waste),
5
and
require one-quarter of the Earth’s total carrying capacity for their
operation.
6
The manufacturing, use, and end-of-life treatment of
many petrochemicals are hazardous to humans,
7
ecosystems,
1
and drive biodiversity loss,
8
making petrochemicals a threat to
planetary health.
9
As the main product segment for the petro-
chemical industry, plastics alone are associated with 4.5% of
global GHG emissions across their life cycle
2
and have been
identified as a principal reason for why the planetary boundary
for novel entities is greatly exceeded.
3
Petrochemicals, in short,
present an urgent sustainability challenge from the local to the
global scale.
Petrochemical production relies on fossil fuels as both feed-
stock and energy carrier, and the sector therefore has the high-
est energy demand among the energy-intensive processing
industries.
10
The fact that fossil carbon is used not only as fuel
but also forms the material basis for petrochemicals also makes
a low-carbon reorientation of the industry a unique challenge
compared to sectors that use fossil fuels for energy purposes
only, such as energy and transport.
11,12
And unlike fossil fuel
use for direct energy supply and transportation, petrochemical
production is projected to expand significantly, thereby
increasing the demand for fossil fuel feedstocks.
13,14
Accord-
ingly, the International Energy Agency points to the prospects
of petrochemicals becoming the biggest driver of oil demand
growth in this decade.
10,15
To capture opportunities implied by
the expectations of increased petrochemical use, leading pro-
ducers have invested massively in new fossil-based production
in recent years.
16
The growth in petrochemicals is underpinned by a political
economy of deep-seated carbon lock-ins and tight connections
between the fossil fuel, chemicals, and plastics industries.
16–21
These ties go back to the origin of the industry and are not
only material in the form of integrated production facilities but
are also institutional, organizational, and economic. Large multi-
national companies dominating the industry have applied a
shared knowledge base to engage in activities ranging from fos-
sil fuel extraction to plastics manufacturing in consolidated
global production networks, oftentimes in integrated industrial
facilities and clusters,
22–27
and the trend continues to this day.
For example, the oil major Saudi Aramco and the chemical giant
Dow have, supported by public finance, recently started the joint
operation of the Sadara complex, the world’s largest petrochem-
ical facility, locking in capital, infrastructure, and organizations in
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continued fossil dependence for decades.
28
The connections
and lock-ins that characterize the petrochemical industry make
it of central concern for the global energy transition and the
need to phase out fossil fuels.
29–31
Addressing the full scale of the socio-ecological crises associ-
ated with petrochemicals will require significant reductions in
virgin petrochemical plastic flows and attention to upstream
issues from extraction of fossil fuels to polymer production. In
this perspective, we call for and identify possible supply-side in-
terventions to address the overall supply of (virgin) plastics and
other petrochemicals as vital complements to plastic pollution
reduction strategies focused on waste management and
recycling. Limiting supply, however, is not possible without ad-
dressing the political economy of petrochemicals and its
defining lock-ins, i.e., the technological, institutional, and behav-
ioral phenomena that collectively hinder transformative change.
It requires confronting the entrenched power structures and
vested interests that support the existing petroleum-chemical-
plastic nexus, centering social contestation and struggles for
environmental and climate justice in the discussion of petro-
chemical transitions. Otherwise, effective and just upstream
measures that can drive a necessary shift to alternative feed-
stocks and renewable energy and control the production of
(and demand for) primary plastics will not come about.
By exploring the political economy of petrochemicals, map-
ping out a range of critical lock-ins, and pointing to pathways
for transformation and a just transition beyond fossil fuels, this
perspective offers a critical intervention coinciding with the ne-
gotiations on a new global treaty for plastics and efforts to step
up progress toward the Paris Agreement climate goals.
GROWTH OF THE PETROLEUM-CHEMICAL-
PLASTIC NEXUS
The chemical industry emerged in Europe in the 19
th
century,
supplying synthetic dyes and other chemicals to the rapidly
growing textile industry.
32
In the early 20th century, the German
chemical industry was a dominant force, with German firms be-
ing the first to commercially produce key chemicals such as
ammonia, ethylene, methanol, and vinyl chloride—all from
coal.
33
The shift toward oil and gas and the modern petrochem-
ical industry was largely a result of the efforts of the American
chemical industry, which saw the growing oil market as a key
resource opportunity on which it focused research, develop-
ment, and education.
34
Supported by strong interventions by
the US government, the industry grew rapidly and developed
technologies that, in the post-war era, were exported to coun-
tries needing to rebuild their industrial infrastructures (Germany,
the UK, and Japan), leading to a remarkable shift toward petro-
chemistry by the early 1960s.
35
Governments all over the world
continued supporting the industry as it was a strong contributor
to economic growth as demand for its products—not least
different plastics—was created, diffused, and inflated. This sup-
port took different forms and shapes, from nationalization of
parts of the industry after the energy crises of the 1970s, to
state-initiated cartels and other forms of subsidies such as tax
breaks and access to low-cost investment capital through public
financial institutions.
32
Over decades, these developments
solidified lock-ins across many domains involving both firms
and governments, including research, education, finance, and
regulation.
19
Mirroring expectations of continued economic and population
growth, the production of petrochemicals and plastics is pro-
jected to expand enormously.
10,14,15
The OECD, for example,
expects plastic use to almost triple by 2060 in their recent base-
line projection.
13
And growing production implies growing envi-
ronmental impacts along multiple planetary boundariess.
6,36
Already today, practically all chemical production transgresses
planetary boundaries—primarily boundaries related to climate
change but also boundaries related to biosphere integrity and
ocean acidification.
37
Plastics specifically are central to breaking
the planetary boundary of novel entity diffusion in global ecosys-
tems through their widespread pollution,
3
and they also interact
with processes impacting multiple other planetary bound-
aries.
9,38
At the same time, the purported socio-economics ben-
efits of continued growth are being questioned. Recent research
points to a global trend of ‘‘noxious deindustrialization,’’
39
where
fenceline communities no longer significantly benefit from the
industry in terms of jobs and public services while continuing
to be on the receiving end of negative health and environmental
impacts, and advocacy organizations and think tanks flag the
prospects of stranded assets.
40,41
Research has explored alternatives to the ongoing growth in
global petrochemical production, analyzing the sustainability
Figure 1. Main production routes from fossil fuels to plastics
Dark blue rectangles represent products/materials and yellow rectangles show processes.
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potential of different types of change to current patterns of
production and consumption under various scenarios. These
scenarios include carbon capture and utilization or storage,
renewable-based feedstocks (i.e., bio- or green hydrogen-
based), direct air capture (as source of carbon and to compen-
sate for unabated GHG emissions), improved plastic recycling,
and electrification of chemical production processes.
4,36,42,43
Each of these paths, however, comes with a new set of con-
cerns, limiting its feasibility. Particularly, there is a large risk of
shifting the burden of environmental impacts to new domains,
such as land use change, biodiversity loss, and increasing
competition for scarce biomass resources for industrial pur-
poses. For recycling, constraints are also socio-economic and
thermodynamic.
44–46
Moreover, these pathways mostly focus
on climate change and global boundaries for environmental
impact, lending less attention to the consequences of plastic
pollution for human and ecological health. Given these concerns,
it is for good reason that scenarios that identify pathways toward
chemical production within planetary boundaries typically
involve a significant reduction of plastic use compared to current
demand forecasts.
6,36,47,48
The centrality of reduced use places issues of growth and dis-
tribution at the heart of the discussion on petrochemical plastics.
The pursuit of growth, revenue, and profits motivates and struc-
tures decisions around investments, lobbying, and public-rela-
tions activities
49,50
and shape the actions of industrial and state
actors alike.
51,52
While scholars have called for a cap to global
plastics production
53
and civil society actors campaign under
the slogan of ‘‘#turnoffthetap,’’
54
incumbents seek to safeguard
their investments and ensure future operations and returns,
promising sustainable futures mainly through technological solu-
tions.
23
Such promises of technical fixes work both as defences
for existing investments, carrying out a system-conserving func-
tion, and as attempts to legitimize new avenues for growth in
reference to important societal problems.
55
To break carbon
lock-in, policy and research must therefore grapple with core is-
sues of political economy, confronting the questions of who ben-
efits and who suffers from which petrochemical futures, chal-
lenging the power of vested interests.
KEY LOCK-INS AND BARRIERS
The concept of lock-in captures how ‘‘the inertia of technologies,
institutions, and behaviors individually and interactively limit the
rate of (.) systemic transformations by a path-dependent pro-
cess’’
56
(see Box 1). Lock-ins are, however, not inescapable
phenomena that solely occur as unintended side effects of
path-dependency, i.e., inevitably shaped and constrained by
previous decisions and events; rather, lock-ins are also actively
strengthened and deepened through coordinated efforts by ac-
tors with interests in so doing.
16,19
The prospects for breaking up
existing lock-ins through political interventions thus depend both
on the credibility of the long-term direction of an economy-wide
transformation away from fossil fuels
57
and the power of short-
term interventions to reshape the current investment cycle.
58
This section reviews how different types of lock-ins are found
across the petrochemical and plastics value chain.
Infrastructural and technological lock-in
Emblematic for large-scale processing industries such as chem-
icals and plastics is the reliance on large investments in
infrastructure and technology. Such infrastructures include the
pipeline systems distributing oil, gas, and their derivatives from
extraction sites to oil refineries; steam crackers and downstream
processing units; as well as the ports and specialized terminals
for the import and export of feedstocks, intermediates, and
products like plastics. Petrochemical production facilities are
continuously operating assemblages of furnaces, compressors,
Box 1. The concept of carbon lock-in and different types of lock-in
Path dependence and lock-ins arising from historical choices and events have been recognized in the scholarly literature for a
number of decades.
59,60
At the beginning of this millennium, such insights were applied to the specificities of fossil fuel depen-
dence and conceptualized as ‘‘carbon lock-in.’’
61,62
Carbon lock-in captures the idea of how inertia in a range of domains—tech-
nology, institutions, and behavior—collectively inhibit systematic transformation. These different forms of lock-in work both sepa-
rately and interactively, and resistance to change tends to grow as the scale of production increases.
Infrastructural and technological lock-in refers to the lock-ins that arise from the long lifetime of existing physical infrastructure,
such as the value loss for capital owners that is associated with the early retirement of fossil assets.
63
Institutional lock-in concerns the institutional contexts—rules, norms, and constraints—that favor the interests of status quo-ori-
ented actors, emphasizing how events and choices at one point in time are shaped by earlier decisions.
56,64
An example is how
subsidies and tax credits for the extraction and processing of fossil fuels propagate through the value chains,
65
benefiting the pro-
duction of petrochemicals by reducing the total cost for feedstocks and energy.
Lastly, behavioral lock-in captures dynamics relating to lifestyles, cultural norms, and associated patterns of consumption.
Although historically not a key focus in the lock-in literature, research has emphasized the individual and social mechanisms
that lead to the persistence of carbon-intensive behaviors.
56,66
The global diffusion of disposable consumer packaging as well
as consumer expectations and marketing related to fast fashion have directly added to the growth in demand for plastics in these
domains.
These different types of carbon lock-in can mutually reinforce each other. Lock-in due to existing carbon-intensive infrastructure
can, for example, be reinforced through policy and cultural norms. Since its introduction, the lock-in concept has been further
expanded with, as with the notion of discursive lock-in, theorizing how discourses establish and legitimize technologies, institu-
tions and behaviors.
67
For example, oil majors have successfully engaged in the discourse on climate change mitigation to indi-
vidualize responsibility and frame continued use of fossil resources as rational and unavoidable.
68–70
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separators, and other units networked in a complex flow of ma-
terials often including several different facilities in petrochemical
clusters that have grown ever larger over the past decades.
Today, such clusters can process many million tonnes of chem-
icals per year and have become increasingly specialized at using
particular fossil feedstocks in production. As production facilities
are sensitive to impurities at the level of parts per million, a shift of
feedstocks tends to necessitate a significant redesign of existing
operations. Taken together, these characteristics mean that
petrochemical clusters are subject to a lock-in to fossil-based
technologies.
20,21
Steam crackers—the type of facility that produces ethylene
and many other platform chemicals that are subsequently used
to produce plastics—are a case in point. Global steam cracker
capacity is currently estimated to be around 200 million tons of
ethylene per year, with the largest capacities concentrated in
just a few countries. The production capacity of USA, China,
Saudi Arabia, and South Korea together make up more than
half of global ethylene production capacity, as shown in Figure 2.
Further, since 2011, global plastic resin production has
increased with an annual growth rate of about 3.5%
71
with in-
creases in plastic use outpacing all other commodities.
10
This
growth in demand for plastics has spurred a wave of investments
in crude-based production in the past decade, focused on maxi-
mizing the share of crude oil that is transformed into chemicals
and subsequently plastics. In such plants, the share of chemicals
exceeds 50% of the yield,
72
breaking with the logic of chemicals
simply using a minor, low-value fraction of oil and further contrib-
uting to the lock-in to petroleum in the industry.
Investments in existing technologies represent huge sunk
costs, which are normally repaid over several decades of opera-
tions. These sunk costs mean that where innovation occurs in
the petrochemical sector, it typically focuses on incremental pro-
cess improvements
74
and drop-in solutions rather than transfor-
mative change. Opportunities for larger changes in operations
and production processes are generally limited to the times
when facilities are revamped, which occurs on average every
25 years.
75
In terms of the mid-century climate goals established
by COP27, the year 2050 is thus just one investment cycle away
in the industry. Steam crackers in China and the Middle East are
on average less than 10 years old and will therefore likely
continue to operate according to current specifications for
many years. In Europe and North America, by contrast, a large
share of the petrochemical production facilities are likely to be
revamped in the coming decade. Breaking the lock-in will require
investments in and focus on implementing near-zero emission
technologies and solutions using renewable energy to reduce
the use of fossil fuels significantly before 2030, as required to
align with scenarios leading to net zero emissions in 2050.
30
Institutional lock-in
In terms of institutional structures that support carbon lock-in, a
key challenge is skewed attention toward the downstream rather
than upstream factors driving plastic pollution, which is mani-
fested in the fragmented governance of petrochemicals.
76
In
terms of plastics and plastic pollution, governance arrangements
have long been focused on ‘‘downstream’’ challenges related to
improved waste management and recycling.
77
While there has
been a move toward ‘‘mid-stream’’ circular economy strategies
focused on the design of products to extend their durability, re-
use, repairability, and recyclability,
78
there is still far less policy
attention to the ‘‘reduce’’ and ‘‘substitute’’ imperatives of a shift
toward greater circularity.
79
Recently, however, as attention to
the plastics crisis has become more multi-faceted, instruments
regulating price or quantity on the supply side have been gaining
attention.
53,54
As for the chemical sector, there is no unified
framework at the global level, although several such sectoral
frameworks exist. Some international conventions address spe-
cific chemicals or groups of chemicals, e.g., the Stockholm
Convention addresses persistent organic pollutants.
80
However,
Figure 2. Ethylene production capacity by country in 2020
Source: Data from ICIS Worldwide Ethylene Plant Report 2020
73
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efforts to develop a more comprehensive framework, such as
through the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Man-
agement,
81
have been notoriously slow.
82–84
The petrochemical
sector has also received little specific attention in the context of
efforts to boost climate action. Only in the last year has the
chemicals sector come into greater focus in international climate
diplomacy with the EU’s introduction of carbon border adjust-
ment measures that cover fertilizers and a range of chemicals.
85
Adding another layer of institutional lock-in, state and domes-
tic industry interests influence developments in the petrochem-
ical industry.
27
Concerns related to job losses, international
competitiveness, and cross-border carbon leakage have shel-
tered the sector from strong energy and climate policies.
86
Coupled with the importance of chemicals to export-oriented
growth models, the prioritization of self-sufficiency,
25
and strong
state-industry networks,
27
several factors play into the promo-
tion of domestic petrochemical industries by national govern-
ments. At the same time, petrochemicals serve as a potential
diversification strategy for oil and gas incumbents.
87,88
As tradi-
tional sources of demand for oil—and for vehicle fuels in partic-
ular—are set to decline, and as demand for plastics continues to
rise, chemical manufacturing has increasingly become an attrac-
tive option to make up for losses in other markets.
89
For fossil
fuel-exporting countries, the prospect of valorizing fossil re-
sources by exporting refined and value-added products instead
of raw materials, can be appealing. In a range of Middle Eastern
and North African countries in particular, investments in further
processing capacity are viewed as a strategy to generate eco-
nomic growth and development, sustain or increase export rev-
enues, and stimulate employment.
87
A final key component of the institutional lock-in of carbon-
intense industries such as petrochemicals is institutionalized
political influence.
56
This influence takes place, particularly
through direct access to policymakers, corporatist structures
involving industry organizations and trade unions, and public-
private co-ownership of carbon-intense companies.
90–93
The
geographical concentration of carbon-intense industries plays
an important role in this respect: politicians elected in such con-
stituencies often work to promote industry interests and prevent
policies detrimental to them.
94
The influence of carbon-intense
industries often leads to feedback mechanisms, as they use it
to block challengers from low-carbon industries or to obtain
preferential treatments such as subsidies, which in turn in-
creases their influence.
95,96
Close ties between carbon-intense
industries and policymakers can amount to historical blocs
united by shared interests and ideas, which exercise power to
maintain their position.
49,97
For example, throughout the
2010s, major UK petrochemical producers worked to increase
policymakers’ dependence by, amongst other means, facili-
tating closer ties to key politicians through strategic partner-
ships. These corporate political strategies were key in opposing
and deferring low-carbon reorientation for the industry in times of
strengthening climate policy.
98
Likewise, in the early 2010s, a
group of emission-intensive companies including petrochemical
giants Dow and BASF along with fossil fuel and steel companies
lobbied the European Commission to avoid the costs of renew-
able energy subsidies and increase the production of shale
gas.
49
On the opposing side, groups with far less political influ-
ence and ties, such as the fenceline communities, who most
directly suffer from the toxic consequences of petrochemical
production,
99
challenge dominant actors from a marginalized
position, sustaining environmental injustices.
100,101
Behavioral lock-in
Plastics permeate ways of living in the industrialized world: from
the packaging around the food and products consumed to the
electronics used, the vehicles and infrastructure relied on, and
the garments worn. Identifying new applications and creating
demand for plastics across practically all domains of consump-
tion was a focused effort of the petrochemical and plastics in-
dustries in the late 20
th
century.
102
Plastics have rapidly diffused
into the value chains of all types of products to the degree that
they are almost impossible to even trace in trade statistics
beyond trade in specific categories of plastic resins and homo-
geneous products.
103
Through aggressive marketing, customers
have been taught to associate plastics with hygiene
104
and
freshness
105
and adopt new patterns of consumption made
possible by an extensive use of single-use plastics and plastic
packaging. In the current era of corporate sustainability commu-
nication, petrochemical firms strategically emphasize plastics
and other petrochemicals as necessary for the energy transition
and other sustainability-related purposes, invoking discourses of
delay to fend off against criticisms.
18,23
The use of plastics is, like most forms of consumption, closely
related to affluence. The consumption of plastics thus varies
significantly between countries and regions with much higher
consumption in richer countries, as shown in Figure 3. While
the consumption of plastics is only 16 kg/cap in sub-Saharan Af-
rica it is more than 15 times higher in the US where consumption
is 255 kg/cap, according to data from the OECD.
5
Consumption
in China, non-OECD Eurasia, and Latin America is closer to the
global average, which is about 60 kg/cap. Given relatively low
current levels of plastic consumption, global plastic demand
would expand considerably, if middle- and low-income coun-
tries are to reach consumption levels in the Global North. A
similar pattern is evident for plastic waste generation, which
closely follows overall consumption patterns. This happens
even though lots of long-lived plastics are used for modern
infrastructure and buildings, as plastic waste generation is domi-
nated by short-lived products such as packaging and single-use
items.
106
Behavioral norms, practices, and lifestyles that support,
enable, and perpetuate very high consumption of plastics prolif-
erate in the Global North.
44
In high-consuming regions, popula-
tions have arguably become accustomed to lifestyles built on the
disposability of cheap plastic products—from low-cost synthetic
clothes and consumer products to packaging and single-use
plastics that are used only once before being thrown away. At
the same time, systems to properly deal with the generated
waste have not been put in place.
107
Although different forms
of recycling schemes have been implemented, these have
focused on collecting plastic for recycling, primarily plastic pack-
aging, without ensuring that the plastic waste would or even
could ever be recycled. For other types of waste that contain
large volumes of plastics, such as electronics and apparel, plas-
tic waste has until recently not even been properly considered in
extended producer responsibility schemes and other policy in-
struments.
108
The plastic waste has thus continued to be
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landfilled, with the risk of toxic additives leaching, incinerated
(with high associated GHG emissions), or exported to countries
in the Global South already struggling to deal with the plastic
waste generated domestically.
109
NAVIGATING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
PETROCHEMICALS
Undoing carbon lock-in and reducing the production and use of
plastics and other petrochemicals entail critical issues of what
synthetic materials are essential, in what volumes, and how
these materials should be distributed. In the following section,
we therefore sketch out strategies for potential next steps on a
path away from petrochemical plastics, recognizing the political
economy in which they will need to be pursued. These steps
include adopting ambitious green industrial policies, eliminating
subsidies and financial support for investments in fossil fuel-
based chemicals and plastics, devising a stronger framework
for international governance of the petrochemical industry, and
supporting marginalized actors through coalition-building and
empowering social movements.
Beyond fossil revenue through green industrial policy
From the perspective of producers of petrochemicals, the
growing pressure to move away from petrochemical plastics
confronts them with the choice of which political and business
strategy to follow: to resist, hedge against or pursue transforma-
tive action.
110
These strategies can be followed simultaneously
in different dimensions (political, economic) and across geogra-
phies.
110,111
As such, engagement by industrial actors in prom-
ising projects (e.g., exploring electrification or developing prod-
ucts designed for circularity) does not guarantee pro-climate
behavior elsewhere and vice-versa. From the perspective of
(state) owners of petrochemical assets, pursuing a path away
from petrochemical plastics can ultimately be done by either di-
vesting, redirecting or phasing out carbon-intensive capital.
52
For petrochemicals, divestment means selling off existing and
cash-flow positive investments; redirection implies channeling
Figure 3. Plastics use and plastic waste
generation in 2019 in selected countries and
regions
Source: OECD Global Plastics Outlook database.
5
carbon investments into low-carbon pro-
duction instead (re-investing the capital
from divestment), possibly re-purposing
existing capital where applicable; and
phase-out includes abandoning all re-in-
vestments and retiring existing assets,
thereby breaking with the logic that plants
are never retired once they have been built.
In practice, these strategies can be pur-
sued in tandem but differ in effectiveness
and feasibility.
52
While divestment may
be more achievable when states have
smaller shares in carbon assets, the assets
that are divested are likely to be purchased
by entities that prioritize exploiting them
without regard for their climate consequences. Therefore,
divestment is not immediately effective on its own.
50,52
Recent
research has identified phasing-out as the most impactful strat-
egy for states with stakes in the petrochemical industry if the aim
is to lower emissions
52.
However, this strategy seems in many
cases to be the least likely option for owners of carbon capital
because it involves giving up on revenue and returns on invest-
ments,
112
as well as a near-term diversification strategy.
A range of arguments related to urgency, uncertainty, and the
ambition to not only reduce but eliminate emissions supports an
interventionist approach to climate policy,
113–117
including
comprehensive green industrial policy frameworks and strong
state interventions that provide clear directionality.
118–121
For
the petrochemical industry, the need for directionality, i.e., dedi-
cated interventions that shape the direction of socio-technical
transitions,
122
is particularly urgent given the systemic and inter-
woven nature of the plastic and climate crises. Beyond direction-
ality, a green industrial policy framework must include support
for knowledge creation and innovation, carrots and sticks for
creating and reshaping markets, efforts to build government
capacity for governance and change, attention to international
coherence, and sensitivity to socio-economic implications of
phase-outs.
118
Efforts to scale up production of new polymers
designed to be non-toxic, recyclable, and based on renewable
or fully circular sources of carbon
123
illustrates the need for a
coherent industrial policy, as it requires both technologically
focused support as well as an instruments that push fossil alter-
natives out of the market, either through direct bans or more
market-oriented instruments. More broadly, interventions need
to facilitate the immediate and full abatement of emissions of
the most powerful GHGs and toxins from plastics productions
as well as a moratorium on all plans for expanding the most emis-
sions-intensive routes for plastic production, particularly coal-
based routes. Common and stringent international standards
for the carbon content of petrochemicals and plastics, as is be-
ing attempted for key industrial materials such as steel, iron, and
cement,
124
could be important to a fair green transition away
from petrochemical plastics.
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If green industrial policy successfully reshapes existing market
conditions and establishes security around investments needed
for a near-zero chemical industry, it can make resistance ineffec-
tive as a business and political strategy. In such an environment,
short-termgains through lobbying against regulatory interventions
are not as attractive, given that measures that demand serious
change have already been put in place. Green industrial policies
also strengthens the companies benefitting from environmental
regulation, and consequently enhances their lobbying power to
act as a counterweight to the anti-regulation lobbying from incum-
bents.
125,126
Although it is critical to challenge the distribution of
benefits and the opportunities for profitable investments (i.e.,
rents) associated with green industrial policy,
127,128
such strate-
gies represent a vision that goes beyond phase-out and in this
sense offers a hopeful path away from petrochemical plastics.
Ending financial flows to expansion of petrochemical
plastics
The expansion of petrochemical plastics production capacity
over the last decade has been underpinned by a continuation of
the financing of large-scale projects (see Figure 4). As such, it is
necessary to address and redirect capital flows supporting this
expansion. Currently, international and national public financing
play important roles in financing the expansion of petrochemicals
production, including by leveraging, de-risking or crowding in pri-
vate finance for large-scale projects. For example, the Sadara
petrochemical complex in Saudi Arabia obtained more than
$6.5 billion in direct financial support from national and interna-
tional public financial institutions, including the US Export-
Import Bank, leveraging private finance.
28
An important action
would therefore be to end all public finance for petrochemical in-
frastructures that do not align with a low-carbon reorientation of
the industry. Public financial institutions are generally well-suited
for low-carbon projects as they tend to be less profit-driven and
operate with longer time horizons than private finance.
28
How-
ever, given institutional lock-in and how domestic public finance
is often tied up with national fossil fuel and petrochemical inter-
ests, international public finance may play a more catalytic role
in driving transformation. To the extent that international public
financial institutions are independent of revenues and returns
from fossil-based operations, they are not directly bound by ma-
terial interests that work against established global climate goals.
Figure 4. Capital expenditure in large
projects (>1bn US$) for plastic production
from 2010 to 2020
Private capital accounted for the majority of the
funding (134.8 bn US$) while almost a fifth (30.3 bn
US$) originated from public financial institutions,
together totaling more than 165 bn US$. Based on
Skovgaard et al.,
28
data from IJ Global.
Breaking the ties between public finan-
cial institutions and fossil fuel and petro-
chemical interests will be essential for
undoing the petrochemical lock-in. Due
to the strength of institutional lock-in,
however, this will not be an easy task.
Global fossil fuel subsidies are at roughly the same levels
today as immediately after the 2009 G20 commitment to re-
form such subsidies, despite several other international insti-
tutions such as the Sustainable Development Goals having
included similar commitments.
129–131
And in the context of
climate finance, high-income countries still do not live up to
their commitments to provide climate finance agreed in the
context of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC).
132
For petrochemicals, more pre-
cise commitments than those concerned with fossil fuel sub-
sidies are probably necessary along with improved monitoring
and enforcement of existing safeguards set up to ensure the
environmental integrity of international public finance such
as export credits and development assistance. Existing com-
mitments regarding public finance for fossil fuels, such as the
commitment of 39 public actors adopted in the context of the
26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties
133
to end
public finance for unabated fossil fuel energy could be
strengthened to also include commitments and provisions
on petrochemical finance. Strengthened international commit-
ments to end fossil fuel subsidies will in itself impact the eco-
nomics of petrochemicals to the extent that subsidies for fos-
sil fuel extraction diffuse through the value chain and lower the
downstream costs for fuels used in petrochemical production
(especially as petrochemical infrastructures are often placed
close to fossil fuel extraction sites). For commitments to end
public finance for petrochemicals and fossil fuels to deliver
real outcomes, however, nations must be held accountable
to their commitments, breaking with the tendency of previous
international declarations.
Stronger international governance
For actors to abide by international commitments such as those
related to finance described above, stronger international gover-
nance is needed. Counteracting institutional lock-ins and
enabling transformative change of the petrochemical industry
on a global scale, demands stronger global governance in both
environmental and economic dimensions.
18,76
At present, the
ongoing negotiations for a global plastics treaty offers a critical
opportunity to strengthen international governance of petro-
chemicals and has the potential to disrupt lock-ins by addressing
primary plastics production concretely and ambitiously through
legally binding obligations (see Box 2).
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Meanwhile, and subsequent to the plastics treaty negotia-
tions, global petrochemical governance will continue to have
many parts and require a range of different international actors
to drive systems change. For instance, to manage and regulate
trade in primary plastics, the World Customs Organization will
have a role to play in ensuring that governments can properly
identify and monitor primary plastics at the border.
144
The Inter-
national Maritime Organization has a role to play in better regu-
lating the transportation of primary plastics to prevent spillages
and losses. At the World Trade Organization, 76 members are
engaged in the ongoing Dialogue on Plastics Pollution, govern-
ments can provide concrete guidance and build cooperation
on trade-related measures that countries can take to regulate
trade in primary plastics and contribute to the implementation
of the eventual obligations under the global plastics treaty.
145
The need for stronger governance is also recognized in interna-
tional fora such as the OECD, which outlines the potential for
strong global action in one of their scenarios.
13
Given the strength of lock-ins and the resources of dominant
actors, strong global action will not come about without contes-
tation. Industrial actors with interests in petrochemical growth
enjoy an advantageous position in international environmental
governance
146
and moving away from petrochemical plastics re-
quires challenging not only the fossil fuel dependence of the in-
dustry but also the fossil fuel energy order. Breaking lock-in
therefore also demands new types of interventions. For example,
a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty
29,147
could help structure
managed decline of fossil fuel extraction with global justice as
a central pillar.
148
Including conventional petrochemical produc-
tion as part of the scope of such a treaty (e.g., by categorizing
such clusters as fossil infrastructure) could help structure the
phase-out of long-standing assets in coming decades. To coun-
teract the resistance of major producers, the treaty could be
formed as a club arrangement covering particular sources of fos-
sil fuels, and which then expands over time, building momentum
and pressure for a multilateral agreement.
149
Civil society pressures
Transformations to existing systems can emerge from move-
ments struggling for change through ongoing resistance,
campaigning, and building alternatives—or reactively when con-
fronted with tangible crisis.
150
Given the power of industrial
actors and the privileged position of fossil and petrochemical in-
terests, progressive change relies upon networks of counter-
movements gaining influence by mobilizing and coordinating
various forms of power.
49
In the context of global governance,
social movements can play a critical role through a variety of
strategies such as influencing the global policy agenda and
building narratives around root causes and specific lines of ac-
tion.
151
Examples of this include the ‘‘#turnoffthetap’’
54
campaign and the Break Free From Plastics movement’s calls
to move beyond a focus on plastics waste management and re-
cycling.
152
Other campaigns have focused on facilitating actors
through ‘‘naming and shaming’’ banks financing the expansion
of petrochemical plastics or exposing financial risks associated
with investing in plastics.
153–155
Civil society groups are also
Box 2. The Global Plastics Treaty
In 2022, the United Nations Environment Assembly adopted a resolution to launch negotiations for an international legally binding
instrument to end plastic pollution.
134
The resolution follows broad recognition that existing governance frameworks have failed to
address the mounting plastics crisis.
135
As governments engage in negotiations for a new instrument to comprehensively address
the issue of plastic pollution throughout the full life cycle of plastics, there are growing calls for the treaty to include controls on the
production of primary plastics as well as harmful additives used in plastics.
53
A key question is if the treaty will include legally bind-
ing controls, which could include measures to restrict or ban not only certain problematic, harmful, or unnecessary plastic products
but also the primary plastics from which products are developed. In terms of the linkages between plastics and petrochemicals, the
treaty also provides an opportunity to address hazardous and harmful chemicals found in plastics in the form of additives, process-
ing aids, and non-intentionally added substances
136
that restrict the potential for increasing circularity of plastics and are harmful
to the environment and public health.
137
The nature of the legally binding commitments that the treaty could include is the subject of ongoing negotiations. While some
countries favor an approach modeled on the Paris Agreement with nationally determined contributions to an overarching target,
138
the High Ambition Coalition on Plastic Pollution, gathering more than 50 countries, has emphasized the need for ambitious legally
binding commitments. Notably, the co-chairs of the High Ambition Coalition (Norway and Rwanda), have called for obligations in
the treaty to increase transparency and reporting on plastic and chemicals production, to reduce the production and trade of pri-
mary plastic polymers, and to eliminate specific polymers, chemicals, and plastic of special concern. Such measures could poten-
tially provide a way to address exports and imports even from countries that do not become parties to the convention to ensure that
countries that do not wish to reduce potentially listed polymers, chemicals, and plastic products are nonetheless constrained by
the treaty. If efforts to include such provisions are successful, the global plastics treaty could provide a legally binding framework
that could help to tackle lock-ins in ways that address both the plastics and climate crises. In so doing, there will be a need to
consider how to integrate the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities that underpins
many international environmental agreements in the context of legally binding international commitments.
139
Meanwhile, actors
with interests in the plastic and petrochemical industries continue to promote positions that limit the ambition of the treaty. Sub-
missions to the treaty process from some governments and industry stakeholders, for example, call for a treaty focused primarily
on plastic waste and voluntary actions.
140–143
Through the question of whether to directly address the petrochemical sector, the
treaty process has thus become a central site of contestation over the possibility of tackling the plastics and climate crises in
tandem.
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using litigation as part of their strategy to steer governments
away from the dominant voice of incumbents and to disrupt
the status quo. For example, ClientEarth has with 13 civil society
organisations pursued legal action to block INEOS’ plans to
invest 3Vbillion in ethylene production in Antwerp, Belgium.
156
Such litigation, although requiring significant legal expertise,
innovation, and resources, has the potential to influence devel-
opments well beyond specific cases.
157
To induce progressive change, environmental justice activism
from ‘‘below’’ can be effective, with several such examples from
around the world.
158
Participatory citizen science and ‘‘bearing
witness through embodied experience’’
158
highlight toxically
exposed citizens as active political actors,
159
and concerns
about the consequences for health and environmental racism
are mobilized in the efforts to stop petrochemical expan-
sion.
160,161
The existence of toxic pollution, however, is no guar-
antee that data and stories about such pollution from impacted
communities ‘‘count.’’
100
Social movements cannot easily match
the political access and influence of incumbents and the de-
mands of civil society actors run the risk of being watered
down or co-opted. Building coalitions for progressive change
and support that empowers social movements is therefore crit-
ical to make visible the consequences of petrochemical plastics
as well as the lobbying efforts of incumbents, and thereby chal-
lenge existing lock-ins. For example, the ‘‘Beyond Petrochemi-
cals’’ campaign backed by Bloomberg Philanthropies is explic-
itly targeting the expansion of petrochemical plastics in the
United States.
162
This campaign focuses specifically on the
inequitable toxic impacts on low-income and marginalized
communities, i.e., the environmental injustices, which petro-
chemical expansion exacerbates. Concerns about environ-
mental injustices are also a key reason that groups like Break
Free from Plastics and the International Pollutants Elimination
Network have engaged in global campaigns on plastics and
highlight reputational risks for investments in petrochemical
plastics. Narratives focusing on the localized impacts have
strong emotive power and help illustrate that visions around
petrochemical transitions must go beyond job replacement
and speak to wider themes of well-being and participation in a
holistic understanding of prosperity.
163
TOWARD A FUTURE BEYOND PETROCHEMICAL
LOCK-IN
Plastics are locked into the fossil fuel dependence of the petro-
chemical industry, resulting in large emissions of GHGs, other
pollutants, and toxins in primary production as well as
throughout the life cycle of plastics. A path toward more sustain-
able value chains and life cycles must be built on both short-term
and long-term interventions addressing the production of petro-
chemical plastics in line with the elements highlighted in the pre-
vious section (summarized in Figure 5).
Recent policy initiatives aiming to include energy and emis-
sions-intensive industries in the energy transition, such as the
Inflation Reduction Act in the USA and the Net-Zero Industry
Act in the EU, signal the potential for large-scale green industrial
policy and investments in low- and zero-emission technologies
and production processes. So far, however, limited funds have
been directed toward incentivizing transformation in the petro-
chemical and plastics industries. Moreover, initiatives focusing
on domestic industry in high-income countries do not address
the need for support for transformation in middle- and low-in-
come countries, epitomized by the failure of high-income coun-
tries to fulfill climate finance commitments. Taking seriously the
need to invest in transformation away from petrochemical plas-
tics on a global scale will require a concerted effort engaging
various actors in the financial system including central banks,
multilateral development banks, and export credit agencies.
Notwithstanding various efforts to challenge the expansion of
fossil-based chemicals, the global plastics treaty has the poten-
tial to become a crucial step toward undoing the carbon lock-ins
that support the proliferation of petrochemical plastics. To do so,
the treaty would need to live up to its declared ambition of ad-
dressing the full plastic life cycle, addressing upstream aspects
from fossil fuel extraction to petrochemical production, reducing
primary plastics production and eliminating harmful plastics and
associated chemicals of concern. In this way, the treaty could
counteract the fragmentation in the global governance of the pe-
troleum-chemicals-plastic-nexus. Avoiding questions of scale
and the supply-side dynamics of petrochemical plastics would
leave intact political and economic structures that catalyzed
and sustain the plastic crisis, allowing actors with vested inter-
ests to stay in the driver’s seat. Instead, we must address the
carbon lock-ins supported and upheld by the political economy
of petrochemicals head-on.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The research was supported by funding from the V. Kann Rasmussen Founda-
tion through the project Petrochemicals and Climate Change Governance –
Figure 5. The path away from petrochemical plastics
Undoing carbon lock-ins and transitioning away from petrochemicals will
require policy action at different levels, redirecting financial flows, strength-
ening governance, and civil engagement and pressure.
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Mapping Power Structures, and the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Environ-
mental Research (Mistra) through the program STEPS – Sustainable Plastics
and Transition Pathways.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
Conceptualization: J.P.T. and F.B.; writing - original draft preparation: all au-
thors; writing - reviewing and editing: J.P.T., C.D.B., F.B., and J.R.; visualiza-
tion: J.P.T.; supervision: F.B.
DECLARATION OF INTERESTS
The authors declare no competing interests.
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