Content uploaded by Gregory Τ. Papanikos
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Gregory Τ. Papanikos on Aug 21, 2023
Content may be subject to copyright.
Content uploaded by Gregory Τ. Papanikos
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Gregory Τ. Papanikos on Jun 07, 2023
Content may be subject to copyright.
Content uploaded by Gregory Τ. Papanikos
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Gregory Τ. Papanikos on Jun 01, 2023
Content may be subject to copyright.
Content uploaded by Gregory Τ. Papanikos
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Gregory Τ. Papanikos on May 31, 2023
Content may be subject to copyright.
Content uploaded by Gregory Τ. Papanikos
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Gregory Τ. Papanikos on May 30, 2023
Content may be subject to copyright.
Athens Journal of Social Sciences, 2023, 10: 1-17
https://doi.org/10.30958/ajms.X-Y-Z
1
Explaining Electoral Successes in Greek Parliamentary
Elections: Is it the Economy Again?
By Gregory T. Papanikos*
This paper asks the following question: can the macroeconomic fluctuations of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) explain the electoral success of political parties?
Notwithstanding other important determinants such as the charisma of the leader
of a popular political party or ideology, the economy may very well explain
electoral successes. In this paper, I use a very simple variable to account for the
economy: the rate of growth of GDP. It is claimed that years of relative higher
growth are associated with the incumbent government retaining its power, while
years of zero or negative growth rates are related with the fall of an incumbent
government. The period between 1974-2023 shows evidence of Greek economic
growth and the impact on elections and therefore the hypothesis cannot be
rejected that the economy plays a central role in explaining electoral successes,
and especially failures, of incumbent governments.
Keywords: Greece, elections, economy, GDP, political parties, time series,
policy, political leaders
Introduction
In Greek politics, ideological and charismatic leaders have played an important
role in determining electoral successes. However, it seems that the performance of
the Greek economy—as primarily measured by the rate of growth of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP)—seems to be an important determinant of electoral
successes, despite the ideologies and charisma of political leaders. The purpose of
this paper is to test this simple hypothesis using descriptive statistical evidence and
a narrative of the Greek political process after the fall of the Colonels in 1974. This
hypothesis is not formally tested, but is simply inferred from a descriptive analysis
of the data.
This paper is organized into six sections including this introduction. The next
section briefly discusses some theoretical underpinnings in determining electoral
successes, emphasizing some economic aspects of it. In the following section, the
rate of growth of Greek GDP since the 1960s is examined, giving an overall
background of the economic performance of the Greek economy. In section four,
election results since 1974 are related to the Greek economic growth, including the
last two elections of 2023. These recent elections of 2023 are further examined in
section five where additional macroeconomic indicators are introduced to reinforce
the idea of a strong correlation between the economic and electoral successes or
failures. The last section concludes.
*President, Athens Institute for Education and Research, Greece.
Vol. X, No. Y
Papanikos: Explaining Electoral Successes in Greek Parliamentary…
2
The Performance of the Economy and Electoral Successes
1
The economic analysis of the voting process is based on the work of Antony
Downs (1957). In a democracy, it is through elections that governments are
appointed.
2
Voters are attracted to politicians through being offered policies. The
Down’s Median Voter Model assumes that political parties supply such policies in
order to meet the demand of the median voter.
Economic policies are included in the supply of policies offered by political
parties. The other variables are ideology and political leaders’ personal characteristics
such as charisma and ethics.
3
In general, we may classify the supply of political
parties’ policies into economic and noneconomic.
4
The personal and political
ideology of a leader as well as their personality attributes, including charismatic
traits are important noneconomic variables, but the emphasis in this paper is how
the leaders differ in their record of managing the economy
5
and leaders’ personal
charisma. These two characteristics are demonstrated in Table 1.
Table 1 shows that it is possible that a leader’s popularity (charisma) may win
elections even if the economy is perceived as not performing well under his/her
leadership.
6
However, if s/he lacks charisma and the challenger is more charismatic,
the leader may lose elections even if the economy is booming and will definitely
lose the elections if the economy is perceived by voters as underperforming.
Charismatic leaders and booming economies guarantee reelections.
1
This section of the paper is partially based on a relative work I did for the recent (2023) Turkish
elections; see Papanikos (2023a).
2
I discussed the issue of democracy in Papanikos (2011, 2016, 2017a, 2020a, 2022a, 2022b, 2022c,
2023); see also the comments by Meydani (2022) and Petratos (2022) and a number of recent papers
by Carrera (2022), Çelik et al. (2022), Coulter and Herman (2020), de Caria Patrício (2022), Fruncillo
(2017), Gilby (2021), Igwe (2021a, 2021b), Marchetti (2020), Obot (2019), Parziale and Vatrella
(2019), Rafapa (2018), Reid (2019) and Verharen (2020).
3
In ancient Athens, as reported by Plutarch in his Parallel Lives (Aristides), when there was a
referendum to ostracize Aristides (540–468 BCE), who had built a reputation of being a fair man-
politician, a voter approached on the day of the vote without recognizing him and asked to put down
the name of Aristides because he did not know how to write it on the ballot. When he asked what had
Aristides done to him, he responded ‘nothing, I do not know the man, but I am disturbed to hear
everywhere that he is fair’. Plutarch describes the story as follows: γραφομένων οὖν τότε τῶν
ὀστράκων λέγεταί τινα τῶν ἀγραμμάτων καὶ παντελῶς ἀγροίκων ἀναδόντα τῷ Ἀριστείδῃ τὸ
ὄστρακον ὡς ἑνὶ τῶν τυχόντων παρακαλεῖν, ὅπως Ἀριστείδην ἐγγράψειε. τοῦ δὲ θαυμάσαντος καὶ
πυθομένου, μή τι κακὸν αὐτὸν Ἀριστείδης πεποίηκεν, “οὐδέν,” εἶπεν, “οὐδὲ γιγνώσκω τὸν ἄνθρωπον,
ἀλλ' ἐνοχλοῦμαι πανταχοῦ τὸν Δίκαιον ἀκούων.” ταῦτα ἀκούσαντα τὸν Ἀριστείδην ἀποκρίνασθαι
μὲν οὐδέν, ἐγγράψαι δὲ τοὔνομα τῷ ὀστράκῳ καὶ ἀποδοῦναι. τῆς δὲ πόλεως ἀπαλλαττόμενος ἤδη,
τὰς χεῖρας ἀνατείνας πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν εὔξατο τὴν ἐναντίαν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐχὴν τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ, μηδένα
καιρὸν Ἀθηναίους καταλαβεῖν, ὃς ἀναγκάσει τὸν δῆμον Ἀριστείδου μνησθῆναι. (Plutarch, Parallel
Lives: Aristides, 7).
4
Of course, all policies have economic effects but this is not an issue discussed here.
5
This is a subjective evaluation. Huberman et al. (2018) have demonstrated this as follows (p. 597):
“What does this question about economic conditions capture? First, what are people thinking about
when they give an answer regarding economic conditions “as a whole”: are they thinking about
themselves (i.e., pocketbook) or national economic indicators (i.e., sociotropic)? Second, are
respondents shifting their answers to signal something about their party (i.e., partisan cheerleading)
and/or do they shift their economic decision-making due to these beliefs?”
6
This seems to be the case in the recent Turkish elections where the incumbent president won the
elections even though his recent record was not very good; see Papanikos (2023a).
Athens Journal of Social Sciences
XY
3
Table 1. Election Results, the Economy and Leaders
The sitting leader is
Economy
more charismatic
than the Challenger
less charismatic than
the challenger
The economy is perceived by voters
as performing well
The leader is reelected
?
The economy is perceived by voters
as not performing well
?
The leader is not
reelected
Source: Papanikos (2023a).
The main hypothesis then becomes whether the economy is more significant
than anything else in determining electoral successes and failures. The Greek
election successes and failures of leading political parties which governed Greece
are used to test this hypothesis. The analysis is descriptive. The overall Greek
macroeconomic performance is examined in the following section of this paper, thus
setting the historical background of the analysis that follows.
Greek Economic Growth, 1961-2023
This section provides an overview of the Greek economic growth since the
1960s using the real GDP.
7
Alternatively, the rate of growth of per capita GDP could
be used, but this would not change the picture presented here.
Figure 1 gives the rate of growth of GDP from 1961 to 2024. The last two years
are estimates provided by the European Commission. As shown in the graph, during
this long period of economic growth over more than sixty years, the Greek economy
experienced three very serious economic troughs. All of which are explained if the
historical circumstances surrounding these sharp downturns are taken into
consideration. In what follows in this section, I briefly discuss these three downturns
because they all had an impact on the electoral successes of political parties and
leaders as outlined in the next section.
The first trough occurred in 1974. Turkey invaded Cyprus and since then,
occupies almost 36.2% of the island. This occupation still plays a role in the internal
and international Greek politics. At the time in 1974, this invasion and occupation
created political havoc in Greece. The risk of a full-fledged Greek-Turkish war was
imminent. Apart from any other domestic and international political repercussions
this invasion had, Greece’s booming economy at the time experienced a deep
decline in investment and as a result of a sharp drop in GDP growth. From 8.12%
in 1973, it fell to -6.5% in 1974. This resulted in a serious political crisis; not so
much because of the economic downturn but because of the Greek junta’s failure to
respond militarily to the Turkish invasion. The Greek dictatorship collapsed and
7
In Papanikos (2014a & 2019) I have examined in more detail the Greek macroeconomic
performance.
Vol. X, No. Y
Papanikos: Explaining Electoral Successes in Greek Parliamentary…
4
democracy was reestablished. In 1974, the first free elections
8
were held in this post-
dictatorship period as analyzed in the next section of this paper.
Figure 1. The Growth Rate of Greek GDP
Source: Eurostat (AMECO database)
In 2011, the Greek economy experienced its worst drop in the rate of growth of
GDP ever seen before in peace years. The growth rate dropped to -10.13%. This is
the result of many factors, internal and external, as I have analyzed in my book
(Papanikos, 2014a) and my paper (Papanikos, 2015a). In a nutshell, the Greek
economy was hit hard by an external macroeconomic shock. The so-called Great
Recession which started in the USA in late 2007 spread very quickly to Europe,
hitting the Greek economy the hardest among all European Union (EU) countries.
9
Many reasons can explain this asymmetric effect, but as I argued in Papanikos
(2015a), an overvalued euro made the shock impact even worse. At a time just
before the Great Recession, one euro was traded at 1.3 US$. Today in 2023, it is
almost at a parity. Undeniably, Greek economic policymaking was a disaster
throughout the entire period of adopting the euro as the new national currency. In
Papanikos (2014a), I explain in detail what happened and how Greece could not
cope with its worst recession in peace years. The Great Recession changed the entire
Greek political spectrum which will be analyzed in the next section. It brought into
the political foreground new political parties and new leaders – that many serious
commentators rightly claimed—would never have a political chance if it were not
for the Great Recession.
8
As a matter of fact, these were the first free elections of the entire period after the second world war.
Prior to 1974, not all political parties were allowed to run for elections.
9
This also has had an effect on Greek voters’ attitudes towards the EU along with other issues
that relate to Greece’s role in the wider area of the Mediterranean Basin; see Papanikos (2008 &
2017b).
-12%
-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
1961
1964
1967
1970
1973
1976
1979
1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
Rate of Growth of Greek GDP (%)
Athens Journal of Social Sciences
XY
5
The last trough occurred in 2020 when the Greek GDP growth dropped by
9.03%. This time the cause was the global effect of the pandemic.
10
The Greek
economy bounced back immediately in 2021 with a rate of 8.43%. Despite the
Russia invasion of Ukraine,
11
the Greek economy continued to perform relatively
well, and will be further discussed in the fifth section of this paper where the recent
elections of 2023 are discussed.
These economic troughs are of great interest to this paper because they relate
to electoral failures of incumbent governments irrespectively of how charismatic or
ideological a prime minister may be. Figure 1 depicts what has happened to the
Greek economy after the end of second world war in 1944 and a dire Greek civil
war that ended in 1949.
12
Both wars destroyed the Greek private and public
infrastructure. However, by the late 1950s (not shown in the graph) and into the
1960s, the rate of growth of Greek GDP reached historically-unprecedented high
rates of growth. Many commentators at the time were describing this achievement
as a Greek economic miracle.
The following three decades (1970-2000) were marked by lower growth rates.
However, beginning in the new 21st century there was high economic optimism
because Greece became one of the founding members of the eurozone. In 2002 the
euro was adopted as the new official national currency in Greece, joining other EU
countries. The first decade of the new century did not refute these great positive
expectations. The average growth rate of the 2001-2007 period was 4.06%, but
faced a downturn during the next decade (2011-2020)—this was the worst of the
entire period shown in the graph. The average growth rate of the decade was -2.43%
making this time period the worst economic performance ever in Greece, thanks to
the joint effect of the Great Recession and the pandemic.
The first four years of the third decade are marked by relatively higher-than-
average growth rates. On average, the growth rate of this four-year period is
expected to reach 4.69% which, as shown below, is higher than the average growth
rate of the EU countries.
The next section links these macroeconomic fluctuations to electoral successes
and failures of both political parties and leaders.
Successes and Failures in Greek Elections
After the fall of the dictatorship in 1974, Greece has enjoyed its longest-ever
period of freedom. Elections were held throughout this period to elect members of
parliaments and of course leaders and political parties. Table 2 gives the years that
Greece had parliamentary elections since 1974 and Table 3 shows the annual GDP
growth rates.
10
I have examined the economic impact of COVID 19 in Papanikos (2020b, 2020c, 2021a, 2021b,
2012c).
11
In a series of papers, I have discussed various facets of the Russian-Ukraine war; see Papanikos
(2022d, 2022e, 2022f, 2022g, 2022j).
12
I have examined the civil war of the 1940s in my book, see Papanikos (2020d).
Vol. X, No. Y
Papanikos: Explaining Electoral Successes in Greek Parliamentary…
6
Table 2. Greek Elections
Dates
Results and Notes
Growth
1
17 Nov
1974
A new leader emerged victorious as a prime minister with
52.72%
-6.50%
2
20 Nov
1977
The incumbent prime minister was reelected with 41.84%.
2.93%
3
18 Oct 1981
A new prime minister was elected with 48.07% but the
incumbent elected prime minister became the President of the
Greek republic and a new prime minister was appointed by the
ruling political party at the time.
-1.58%
4
2 Jun 1985
The incumbent prime minister was reelected with 45.82%.
2.52%
5
18 Jun 1989
No political party could form a government. A coalition
government was formed.
6
5 Nov 1989
No political party could form a government. A coalition
government was formed.
3.78%
7
8 Apr 1990
A new prime minister was elected with 46.89%.
0.00%
8
10 Oct 1993
The incumbent prime minister failed to be reelected and a new
prime minister emerged victorious with 46.88%.
-1.55%
9
22 Sep 1996
The incumbent prime minister died in 1996 and the ruling
political party elected a new prime minister who called a new
election. He won with 41.49%
2.90%
10
9 Apr 2000
The incumbent prime minister was reelected with 43.79%.
3.95%
11
7 Mar 2004
The incumbent prime minister did not run for reelection but
remained at the post until the elections. A new political leader
was elected by the ruling political party. In the elections the
incumbent prime minister lost and a new prime minister was
elected with 45.36%
5.05%
12
16 Sep 2007
The incumbent prime minister was reelected with 41.87%
3.27%
13
4 Oct 2009
The incumbent prime minister failed to be reelected and a new
prime minister emerged victorious with 43.92%.
-4.31%
14
6 May 2012
The elected prime minister quitted among unpreceded economic
crisis. An emergency government took over and new elections
were called but government was formed. There was a wide
dispersion of votes among many political parties. Seven political
parties won seats in the Greek parliament from all political
spectrum including for the first time a Nazi party.
-7.11%
15
17 Jun 2012
A coalition government was formed mainly by the two parties
which ruled Greece since 1974 with a new prime minister.
-7.11%
16
25 Jan 2015
The incumbent prime minister failed to be reelected and a new
prime minister emerged victorious with 36.34%.
-0.17%
17
20 Sep 2015
The incumbent prime minister called again elections because he
lost the majority in the Greek parliament and regained it with
35.46%
-0.17%
18
7 Jul 2019
The incumbent prime minister failed to be reelected and a new
prime minister emerged victorious with 39.85%.
1.88%
19
21 May
2023
No government was formed and new elections were called even
though the incumbent prime minister got a higher percentage of
the popular vote and increased drastically his difference with the
second party but because of the new electoral system introduced
by the previous government he could not get a majority in the
parliament.
2.45%
20
25 Jun 2023
A strong majority was established by the leading party.
2.45%
Athens Journal of Social Sciences
XY
7
In total, Greece has had 20 parliamentary elections. On average, one election
per 2.5 years. The entire electoral period of the 50 years (1974-2023) is
characterized by relative political stability with very few exceptions which are
characterized by repeating elections in a short period of time (a few months) because
the parliament failed to support any political coalition to govern Greece.
However, it should be emphasized that at no point in time during this period
democracy and free elections were undermined, even during the deep economic
crisis of the 2010s which brought into surface a Nazi party; a threat to what Greece
had achieved all these years. Now this party is outlawed because of criminal acts
they committed including a murder.
What does the evidence of Table 2 show? Does the economy matter? A look at
Table 2 shows that after ruling a few years, no incumbent political party and prime
minister was reelected at a year of negative or zero economic growth—not even
when the dictatorship collapsed in 1974 leaving behind a negative growth rate (-
6.5%). The other years that reelection was not achieved when the GDP growth rate
was zero or negative were (in parentheses the GDP growth rate of the year): 1981 (-
1.58%), 1990 (0%), 1993 (-1.55%), 2009 (-4.31%), 2012 (-7.11%), 2015 (-0.17%).
Incumbent governments did not achieve to be reelected even though the rate of
growth was positive: in 2004 (5.05%) and in 2019 (1.88%). In all other elections, the
incumbent prime minister or the ruling party was reelected: 1977 (2.93%), 1985
(2.52%), 1996 (2.9%), 2000 (3.95%), 2023 (2.45%).
Table 3. Greek Economic Growth (% of GDP), 1974-2024
Year
Growth
Year
Growth
Year
Growth
1974
-6.50%
1991
3.08%
2008
-0.33%
1975
6.37%
1992
0.68%
2009
-4.31%
1976
6.91%
1993
-1.55%
2010
-5.47%
1977
2.93%
1994
1.99%
2011
-10.13%
1978
7.28%
1995
2.08%
2012
-7.11%
1979
3.28%
1996
2.90%
2013
-2.49%
1980
0.68%
1997
4.48%
2014
0.45%
1981
-1.58%
1998
3.86%
2015
-0.17%
1982
-1.14%
1999
3.07%
2016
-0.51%
1983
-1.08%
2000
3.95%
2017
1.08%
1984
2.03%
2001
4.13%
2018
1.69%
1985
2.52%
2002
3.91%
2019
1.88%
1986
0.52%
2003
5.80%
2020
-9.03%
1987
-2.30%
2004
5.05%
2021
8.43%
1988
4.32%
2005
0.60%
2022
5.96%
1989
3.78%
2006
5.64%
2023
2.45%
1990
0.00%
2007
3.27%
2024
1.93%
Note: in bold are the election years of the period.
A number of conclusions emerge from the above descriptive evidence. Firstly,
there is not a single instance of an election where an incumbent prime minister and
Vol. X, No. Y
Papanikos: Explaining Electoral Successes in Greek Parliamentary…
8
his political party was able to be reelected during a year of zero or negative
economic growth. Secondly, reelections were not achieved even in a year with a
positive economic growth; this happened in 2004 and in 2019.
Possible explanations for the 2004 results could be that the difference of the
previous elections between the two parties who competed in the 2000 elections was
only 1.05% and the incumbent prime minister had ruled Greece for eight years.
However, it should be mentioned that the elections were fought not between the
incumbent prime minister and the challenger, but with a new leader who emerged
after the prime minister at the time resigned from the presidency of his political party
but retain his position as prime minister until the next elections were held. Thus, the
result can be explained by both voters’ fatigue and the charisma of the challenger.
The 2019 elections had different characteristics. It was a coalition government
which disarrayed just before the elections of 2019 over an important national issue:
the new agreement with North Macedonia. Many Greeks, especially in Northern
Greece, voted with this in mind.
The elections of 2012 deserve further analysis because they were held at a year
of the worst performance of the Greek economy in an election year. GDP fell by
7.11% in 2012 which shattered the political landscape which had been constant
since 1974. For the first time, the two ruling parties at the time collaborated to form
a new government. In addition, a new party and a new leader emerged as the
opposition party in the 2012 and as a ruling party in 2015. It was the first time that
a party other than New Democracy and PASOK formed a government. This case
study can be also interpreted as being the effect of economic performance on
election results. In a series of papers and books, I have examined both the elections
of 2012 and the following elections of 2015; see Papanikos (2012a, 2012b, 2012c,
2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2015e, 2015f, 2015g, 2015h,
2015i).
In general, the economic performance of Greece seems to be associated with
the probability of a leader or a political party to be reelected. A good economic
performance increases the probability of reelection but is not guaranteed. What
seems to be guaranteed is that a negative or zero GDP economic growth rate never
secured a reelection. These overall conclusions are further reinforced by analyzing
in more detail the most recent elections of 2023. This is discussed in the next section.
The 2023 Elections
As a case study, the 2023 elections deserve a more detailed analysis because
for the first time the incumbent prime minister not only increased its percentage of
popular vote, but increased tremendously its difference from the second party. As a
matter of fact, the percentage of the incumbent leader is greater than the sum of the
percentages of the second, third and fourth party together.
Table 4 gives the elections results of the double 2023 elections. I only report
results for the first three parties which in the past had ruled Greece with a prime
minister coming from their own party.
Athens Journal of Social Sciences
XY
9
Table 4. The 2023 Election Results
Political Party
May 2023
June 2023
New Democracy
40.79%
40.56%
SYRIZA
20.07%
17.83%
PASOK
11.46%
11.84%
Has the Greek economic performance anything to do with such surprising
results? The answer is yes. I use a few indicators to validate this claim. Figure 2
compares the rates of growth of the Greek GDP with the growth rate of the EU.
This indicator is very important in Greek politics and is used by political parties
to either criticize the government if they are in opposition and take credit if they
rule. Greece has experienced a long period of economic underperformance relative
to the EU throughout the period during and after the Great Recession of 2009. It is
only in the last three years (2021-2023) that the Greek economy is outperforming
the EU. This period is almost identical with the ruling by the incumbent government
which was elected in mid-2019. In 2019, the growth rate of EU was lower than the
Greek one by 0.08%. The 2020 was a bad year for the Greek economy relative to
EU; a difference of 3.38% but this was accepted by the Greeks because nobody
would have predicted the pandemic and its detrimental impact on the Greek
economy, particularly its tourist sector as I have explained in Papanikos (2020b). In
2021 the economy bounced back at a higher rate than the average EU rate. The
difference was 2.99% and similar were the results of 2022 of 2.43% difference and
this year the difference is expected at 1.42%.
Figure 2. Growth Rates of GDP in the EU and Greece
-11.00%
-9.00%
-7.00%
-5.00%
-3.00%
-1.00%
1.00%
3.00%
5.00%
7.00%
9.00%
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
Growth Rate of Real GDP (%)
European Union Greece
Vol. X, No. Y
Papanikos: Explaining Electoral Successes in Greek Parliamentary…
10
Summing up these comparisons, if the Greek voters care about the economy
relative to the average EU, then it is not surprising that Greeks voted for the
incumbent leader at an even higher rate than they did in the previous elections of
2019 that brought them to power.
The growth of GDP is only one indicator. Another thorny economic issue in
Greek politics is the huge sovereign debt. Figure 3 gives the Greek public debt as a
percentage of GDP.
Figure 3. Greek Public Debt (% of GDP)
In 2020, the Greek debt was 206% of GDP which was the highest ever. Since
then, the Greek public debt is declining at a very high rate. It dropped to 195% in
2021, to 171% in 2022 and it is expected to further decline to 160% in 2023 and
154% in 2024.
The performance of the incumbent government of 2019-2023 to cope with the
politically notorious Greek public debt is an additional factor that can explain the
electoral successes of the incumbent prime minister.
The unemployment rate is another indicator which is used in political debates.
Figure 4 shows the record of the Greek economy relative to the average
unemployment rate of all EU countries.
In the beginning of this century, which is also the beginning of the eurozone
years, the Greek unemployment rate was about the same as the EU average. After
2009, the Greek unemployment rate is picking up at a faster rate than EU. By 2013
the Greek unemployment rate skyrocketed reaching 27.8%. The same year the EU
average was 11.3%. Since 2019, the Greek unemployment rate has been dropping
at almost the same rate as the EU rate.
The unemployment rate is still very high, but voters’ expectations seem to be
optimistic that the rate will continue to decline and sooner or later will converge to
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
Greek Public Debt as a % of GDP
Athens Journal of Social Sciences
XY
11
the EU average. Presumably, the Greek electorate credits the incumbent government
for making this possible. As a matter of fact, the prime minister used the labor
market developments to campaign that he deserves a second term. His argument is
that in the next four years, he aims to not only lower unemployment rate, but at the
same time increase the real wages, both the minimum wage and the average wage.
It echoed well to Greek voters’ ears.
Figure 4. Unemployment Rates in the EU and Greece
The last important indicator is the inflation rate which became an important
political issue after the Russian invasion of Ukraine because it raised the price of
energy, and as a result, many consumers’ goods and services. Greece’s performance
was as good as in other EU countries with similar characteristics. There are no data
for inflation rate for the total area of EU after 2022. Instead, I use the inflation rates
of Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal because these countries are usually used in the
Greek politics for making comparisons.
There was no problem of inflation rate in all these countries from 2000 to 2021.
Figure 5 compares the inflation rates of Greece and Portugal during the 2000-2024
period just to demonstrate the point that there was no problem of inflation.
After the Russian invasion, the inflation rate jumped to almost double digits in
Greece and in the other countries which are used here for comparison (see Table 5).
Greece’s inflation records in 2022 were the worst among the four countries but
the differences were not too far off. Actually, they were less than 2%. In 2023, an
election year in Greece, the inflation rate was lower than the Italian and Spanish
inflation rate, but trailing by less than one third of a percentage point the Portuguese
inflation rate.
Summarizing this section, it is more than obvious that the economic
developments during the term of the incumbent government (2019-2023) were very
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
Unemployment Rate (%)
European Union Greece
Vol. X, No. Y
Papanikos: Explaining Electoral Successes in Greek Parliamentary…
12
positive using the main macroeconomic indicators of growth rates, debt/GDP ratio,
unemployment and inflation rates.
This paper does not claim that these economic Greek achievements were the
results of a meticulous and effective macroeconomic policy, but rather were most
probably the result of a positive and conducive world economic developments.
Figure 5. Inflation in Greece and Portugal
Table 5. Inflation Rates in Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, 2020-2024
Year
Greece
Spain
Italy
Portugal
2020
-1.28%
-0.38%
-0.10%
0.00%
2021
1.20%
3.18%
1.85%
1.26%
2022
9.69%
8.31%
8.21%
7.84%
2023
4.24%
4.05%
6.09%
5.14%
2024
2.42%
2.73%
2.91%
2.70%
For example, the Greek tourist sector performed extremely well in 2022 and
continues this year at an even higher rate, which by itself can explain the good
economic performance.
This favorable world environment cannot be credited to the Greek government
but many voters perceived that some credit should be given to the incumbent and
therefore they presumably voted for the incumbent prime minister.
Conclusions
The hypothesis that the economy does play a role in shaping electoral outcomes
cannot be rejected. This is more evident when an election year is associated with
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
Inflation Rate (%)
Greece Portugal
Athens Journal of Social Sciences
XY
13
zero or negative economic growth rate. These elections were never won by an
incumbent prime minister and/or his political party. In this case, other factors such
as the ideology and personal charism of a leader does not seem to play a role.
On the other hand, positive economic growth rates during a year of
parliamentary elections are in most cases associated with reelection with two
notable exceptions: 2014 and 2019. Noneconomic factors seemed to have played a
more decisive role in both these elections. In the 2004 elections there was most
probably a voters’ fatigue with having the same party ruling them for so long (from
1993 to 2004). In the 2019 elections, the agreement that the government at the time
signed with North Macedonia most probably weighed more in Greek voters’
decision than the positive economic performance.
Acknowledgments
An early version of this paper was accepted to be presented at the 21st Annual
International Conference on Politics and International Affairs organized by the
Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER), 12-13 June 2023.
References
Carrera L (2022) (Ri) Educate To Political Participation: The Democratic Challenge. Athens
Journal of Social Sciences (forthcoming). https://www.athensjournals.gr/so cial/2021-
4567-AJSS-Carrera-05.pdf.
Çelik R, Koca F, Dadandi İ (2022) The Role of Self-efficacy and Educational Beliefs in
Democratic Values: The Case of Turkish Pre-service Teachers. Athens Journal of
Education 9(4): 559–574. https://www.athensjournals.gr/education/2022-9-4-2-Ce
lik.pdf.
Coulter X, Herman L (2020) The Lure of Autocratic Education in a Somewhat Democratic
Society. Athens Journal of Education 7(4): 331–352. https://www.athens journals.gr/
education/2020-7-4-1-Coulter.pdf.
de Caria Patrício R (2022) Brazil: Country on hold, Political Tension Running High. Athens
Journal of Social Sciences 9(2): 141–160. https://www.athensjournals.gr/social/2022 -
9-2-3-Patricio.pdf.
Downs A (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper.
Fruncillo D (2017) Populism and the Italian Electorate: Towards a Democracy without
Parties? Athens Journal of Social Sciences 4(3): 285–310. https://www.athensjour
nals.gr/social/2017-4-3-5-Fruncillo.pdf.
Gilby D (2021) Weaving the Body Politic: The Role of Textile Production in Athenian
Democracy as expressed by the Function of and Imagery on the Éπίνητρον. Athens
Journal of History 7(3): 185–202. https://www.athensjournals.gr/history/2021-7-3-1-
Gilby.pdf.
Huberman G, Konitzer GT, Krupenkin M, Rothschild D, Hill S (2018) Economic
Expectations, Voting, and Economic Decisions around Elections. In AEA Papers and
Proceedings 108: 597–602.
Igwe IOC (2021a) The Rule of Law and National Security in Nigerian Democracy: A
Contemporary Issue under the Aegis of International law. Athens Journal of Law 7(2):
149–168. https://www.athensjournals.gr/law/2021-7-2-2-Igwe.pdf.
Vol. X, No. Y
Papanikos: Explaining Electoral Successes in Greek Parliamentary…
14
Igwe IOC (2021b) Rule of Law and Constitutionalism in Nigerian Democracy: A Critical
Relativism Discuss in the Context of International Law. Athens Journal of Law 7(3):
317–334. https://www.athensjournals.gr/law/2021-7-3-3-Igwe.pdf.
Marchetti G (2020) The Role of Algorithms in the Crisis of Democracy. Athens Journal of
Mediterranean Studies 6(3): 179–214. https://www.athensjournals.gr/mediterranean/
2020-6-3-2-Marchetti.pdf.
Meydani A (2022) Applied Democracy in Light of the Five “Iso”s of Democracy. Athens
Journal of Humanities & Arts (forthcoming). 2022-AJHA-Meydani-03.pdf
(athensjournals.gr).
Obot C (2019) Political Reporting: Its Regulatory Framework and Imperatives on
Democracy and Democratisation of Communication in Nigeria. Athens Journal of Law
5(3): 221–240. https://www.athensjournals.gr/law/2019-5-3-1-Obot.pdf.
Papanikos GT (2008) The Euro-Mediterranean Economic Relations: Towards a Real Free
Trade Area. Mimeo. https://bit.ly/3Ew5MRg.
Papanikos GT (2011) The Current Mediterranean Crisis and the Quest for Democracy.
Opening Speech at the 4th Annual International Conference on Mediterranean Studies,
20-23 April 2011, Athens, Greece. https://bit.ly/342CahV.
Papanikos GT (2012a) The Greek Economic Crisis as a European Economic and Political
Crisis. https://bit.ly/32GS2WJ
Papanikos GT (2012b) The June 2012 Greek Elections: A Note. Mimeo https://bit.ly/3qv
BJUG
Papanikos GT (2012c) The Simple Arithmetic of the May 2012 Greek Elections. Mimeo.
https://bit.ly/3qq3cY8
Papanikos GT (2014a) The Greek Economic Crisis: A Class Analysis in Support of
Memorandums (in Greek) [Η Ελληνική Οικονομική Κρίση: Μία Ταξική Ανάλυση
Υπέρ των Μνημονίων]. Athens: ATINER. bit.ly/3P2bYtl.
Papanikos GT (2014b) January Poll Puts Syriza in Driving Seat – And Greece on Course
For Economic Turmoil https://theconversation.com/january-poll-puts-syriza-in-dri
ving-seat-and-greece-on-course-for-economic-turmoil-35824
Papanikos GT (2014c) A Syriza Election Win would be a Serious Setback for Greece
https://theconversation.com/a-syriza-election-win-would-be-a-serious-setback-for-
greece-35576
Papanikos GT (2014d) The Greek Sovereign Debt: Are there really any Options? Romanian
Journal of Fiscal Policy 5(2): 1-25. https://bit.ly/3HeEL6z
Papanikos GT (2015a) The Real Exchange Rate of Euro and Greek Economic Growth.
Journal of Economic Asymmetries, 12 (November): 100-109. https://bit.ly/3qq4m5H
Papanikos GT (2015b) The Long and Winding Road to Reform Greece’s Economy http://
theconversation.com/the-long-and-winding-road-to-reform-greeces-economy-38309
Papanikos GT (2015c) Greece’s New Debt Deal may Appease Creditors but it won’t Help
the Economy https://theconversation.com/greeces-new-debt-deal-may-appease-cre
ditors-but-it-wont-help-the-economy-37061
Papanikos GT (2015d) The "Works and Days" of Syriza's First Week in Power (4 February
2015) https://bit.ly/3qMNxSH.
Papanikos GT (2015) With Greece Backing Euro but Syriza in Government, another
Election may Beckon - This article was republished as a lead story in the New
Statesman. http://theconversation.com/with-greece-backing-euro-but-syriza-in-gover
nment-another-election-may-beckon-36718, http://www.newstatesman.com/2015/
01/greece-backing-euro-syriza-government-another-election-may-beckon.
Papanikos GT (2015e) ECB Decision should be Good News for Greece, but Syriza will get
in the way https://theconversation.com/ecb-decision-should-be-good-news-for-gree
ce-but-syriza-will-get-in-the-way-36578
Athens Journal of Social Sciences
XY
15
Papanikos GT (2015f) Hard Evidence: Can Germany throw Greece a Lifeline and Save the
Euro? http://theconversation.com/hard-evidence-can-germany-ease-greeces-debt-
burden-35870.
Papanikos GT (2015g) A Grexit would not be a Catastrophe for all Greeks http://blogs.lse.
ac.uk/europpblog/2015/05/27/a-grexit-would-not-be-a-catastrophe-for-all-greeks/.
Papanikos GT (2015h) The Greek Economic Crisis: Facts and Myths. Mimeo https://bit.
ly/3JkfFVQ
Papanikos GT (2016) What can we learn about Globalization from Ancient Athens? The
Democracy Effect. Opening Speech at the 10th Annual International Conference on
Global Studies: Business, Economic, Political, Social and Cultural Aspects, 19-22
December 2016, Athens, Greece. https://bit.ly/3z11BM9.
Papanikos GT (2017a) Democracy in Ancient Athens and in the Contemporary World.
Opening Speech at the 4th Annual International Conference on Humanities & Arts in
a Global World, 3-6 January 2017, Athens, Greece. https://bit.ly/3ib4PFk.
Papanikos GT (2017b) Energy Security, the European Energy Union and the Mediterranean
Countries. Athens Journal of Mediterranean Studies 3(4): 341–354. (2) (PDF) Energy
Security, the European Energy Union and the Mediterranean Countries (researchgate
.net).
Papanikos GT (2019) Ανδρέας Γ. Παπανδρέου: Οικονομολόγος και Πρωθυπουργός. (Andreas
Papandreou: economist and prime minister). Athens: Publisher ATINER. https://bit.
ly/3FMYryl.
Papanikos GT (2020a) Η Δημοκρατία σε Δέκα Μαθήματα. (Democracy in ten lessons). Athens:
Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER). https://bit.ly/3Irc ZUv.
Papanikos GT (2020b) The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Greek Tourism.
Athens Journal of Tourism 7(2): 87-100. https://www.athensjournals.gr/tourism/
2020-7-2-2-Papanikos.pdf.
Papanikos GT (2020c) The Demographics of COVID-19 in the European Union. Athens
Journal of Social Sciences 7(4): 279-290. https://www.athensjournals.gr/social/20
20-7-4-4-Papanikos.pdf.
Papanikos GT (2020d) The Greek Civil War in the 1940s (in Greek) [Ο Ελληνικός Εμφύλιος
της Δεκαετίας του 1940]. Athens: ATINER. https://bit.ly/3etPbm.
Papanikos GT (2021a) Deaths due to COVID-19, Lockdowns, Vaccinations and Weather
Temperatures: The Case of Greece. Athens Journal of Health and Medical Sciences
8(3): 201-216. https://www.athensjournals.gr/health/2021-8-3-4-Papanikos.pdf.
Papanikos GT (2021b) Thucydides and the synchronous pandemic. Athens Journal of
History 7(1): 71-94. https://www.athensjournals.gr/history/2021-7-1-4-Papanikos.pdf.
Papanikos GT (2021c) The European Union’s Recovery Plan: A Critical Evaluation.
Athens Journal of Mediterranean Studies 7(2): 85-102. https://www.athensjour
nals.gr/mediterranean/2021-7-2-1-Papanikos.pdf.
Papanikos GT (2022a) The Five Ancient Criteria of Democracy: The Apotheosis of
Equality. Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts 9(2): 105–120. https://bit.ly/33EmFNk.
Papanikos GT (2022b) The Bright Future of Democracy is in Education. Athens Journal of
Education 9(2): 353–364. https://bit.ly/3sJGsoN.
Papanikos GT (2022c) Democracy and Politics: An Introduction to the Special Issue of the
Athens Journal of Social Sciences. Athens Journal of Social Sciences 9(2): 89–94.
https://www.athensjournals.gr/social/2022-9-2-Introduction.pdf.
Papanikos GT (2022d) The Ukrainian Migrant Flows to Greece due to the Russian-Belarus
Invasion. Athens Journal of Social Sciences 9(4): 305-316. https://bit.ly/
3MlMpOE
Papanikos GT (2022e) Europe, Ukraine and Russia: What is Really at Stake? Working
Paper, 04/2022 https://bit.ly/3Mkxcyv.
Vol. X, No. Y
Papanikos: Explaining Electoral Successes in Greek Parliamentary…
16
Papanikos GT (2022f) The War in Ukraine and the MENA Countries. Athens Journal
of Mediterranean Studies 8(3): 197-208. https://bit.ly/38KPZE0
Papanikos GT (2022g) The Greek Newspaper Coverage of the Ukrainian War: The Pre-
Invasion Phase and the Day of the Invasion. Athens Journal of Mass Media and
Communications (forthcoming). https://bit.ly/374hwQ4
Papanikos GT (2022j) Europe, Ukraine, Russia and USA: A Conspiracy Theory
Approach. Working Paper, 05/2022. https://bit.ly/3HQQo3B
Papanikos GT (2023a) Explaining the Electoral Success of the Turkish President: Is it the
Economy Again? Athens Journal of Mediterranean Studies 9(2): 133-146. https://bit.
ly/3MCRXXb
Papanikos GT (2023b) Whither democracy in the Mediterranean Basin. Athens Journal of
Mediterranean Studies (forthcoming).
Parziale F, Vatrella S (2019) Education and Universalism in Europe: when Education
Supports Democracy. Athens Journal of Social Sciences 6(2): 113–138. https://
www.athensjournals.gr/social/2019-6-2-3-Parziale.pdf.
Petratos P (2022) Some Remarks on the Five Criteria of Democracy. Athens Journal of
Humanities & Arts 9(3): 261–274. 2022-9-3-4-Petratos.pdf (athensjournals.gr).
Rafapa LJ (2018) Ruptures In Harmonizing Discourses: Exemplifications in some Works
of Black and White Writers in a Democratic South Africa. Athens Journal of Philology
5(2): 77–96. https://www.athensjournals.gr/philology/2018-5-2-1-Rafapa. pdf.
Reid JL (2019) Why Insurgent Campaigns Rarely Win the Democratic Presidential Primary
in the United States. Athens Journal of Social Sciences 6(2): 139–154.
https://www.athensjournals.gr/social/2019-6-2-4-Reid.pdf.
Verharen CC (2020) Democratizing Philosophy: School for Life, Life for School. Athens
Journal of Education 7(2): 139–152. https://www.athensjournals.gr/education/2020-
7-2-1-Verharen.pdf.
