Radicalization from a societal perspective

Abstract

Studies on radicalization tend to focus on the dynamics of extremist groups and how they exploit grievances of vulnerable individuals. It is imperative, however, to also understand the societal factors that lead to such vulnerabilities and grievances. Our social environment plays a key role in how we view the world and shape our beliefs. By understanding the social dynamics, we can gain insight into the motivations that drive people to extremism. Throughout this paper, we examine the societal factors and processes such as discriminative institutional structures and social norms/practices that can make an individual vulnerable and serve as a driving force for them to join a radical group. To do that, we use the process-oriented psychology of Arnold Mindell and the phenomenology of whiteness of Sara Ahmed as our theoretical framework. These frameworks help us map out the societal dynamics causing individuals to carve social niches out of their current social group and into an extremist group. We use interviews with ex-militants of the radical group, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, to show how certain societal dynamics, such as social injustice, misuse of power, marginalization and discrimination, served as key factors that led these individuals to identify and sympathize with radical ideology. The aim of this paper is to emphasize that, to develop effective preventative measures against recruitment into extremist groups, it is imperative to have a profound understanding of the social dynamics that make an individual susceptible to radicalization in the first place.

Full text

Frontiers in Psychology 01 frontiersin.org
Radicalization from a societal
perspective
DelaramShafieioun
† and HinaHaq *†
Institute of Cognitive Science, Osnabrück University, Osnabrück, Germany
Studies on radicalization tend to focus on the dynamics of extremist groups and
how they exploit grievances of vulnerable individuals. It is imperative, however,
to also understand the societal factors that lead to such vulnerabilities and
grievances. Our social environment plays a key role in how weview the world
and shape our beliefs. By understanding the social dynamics, wecan gain insight
into the motivations that drive people to extremism. Throughout this paper,
weexamine the societal factors and processes such as discriminative institutional
structures and social norms/practices that can make an individual vulnerable
and serve as a driving force for them to join a radical group. To do that, weuse
the process-oriented psychology of Arnold Mindell and the phenomenology of
whiteness of Sara Ahmed as our theoretical framework. These frameworks help
us map out the societal dynamics causing individuals to carve social niches out of
their current social group and into an extremist group. Weuse interviews with ex-
militants of the radical group, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, to show how certain
societal dynamics, such as social injustice, misuse of power, marginalization and
discrimination, served as key factors that led these individuals to identify and
sympathize with radical ideology. The aim of this paper is to emphasize that,
to develop eective preventative measures against recruitment into extremist
groups, it is imperative to have a profound understanding of the social dynamics
that make an individual susceptible to radicalization in the first place.
KEYWORDS
terrorism, radicalization, discrimination, marginalization, social-injustice, power, society
Introduction
As social beings, humans live in societies that are shaped by shared norms, values, and
beliefs. Members of society interact with each other and with the world around them to create
a sense of identity and purpose. However, there can always bean element of social inequality in
society. Dorling (2010) explains that social inequality persists in a society in such a way that it
becomes the part of everyday normal life. As a result of social injustice, prejudice and
discrimination may become normalized. A pattern of discrimination and stigmatization can
result in feelings of rejection, self-stigmatization, internalized shame, and lowered self-esteem
(Burke and Parker, 2007), leading to eventual reaction. is reaction can take a variety of forms.
As a group, the reaction may take the form of protest, which, if provoked further, may lead to
riots. One recent example of this is the Black Lives Matter movement, which was triggered by
anger following the murder of George Floyd in Minnesota on May 25, 2020, by a white
police ocer.
Individuals are also aected by systemic discrimination and marginalization. Marginalization
and discrimination may lead to feelings of alienation, exclusion, and deprivation. ese feelings can
change an individual’s perspective on society. In such a case, she may choose to leave the said society
or join an ideology or group that oers her a chance to get her grievances addressed. In recent years,
OPEN ACCESS
EDITED BY
Sonya Faber,
University of Ottawa, Canada
REVIEWED BY
Rehman Abdulrehman,
University of Manitoba, Canada
Monnica T. Williams,
University of Ottawa, Canada
*CORRESPONDENCE
Hina Haq
hhaq@uni-osnabrueck.de
†These authors have contributed equally to this
work and share first authorship
RECEIVED 30 March 2023
ACCEPTED 09 May 2023
PUBLISHED 23 May 2023
CITATION
Shafieioun D and Haq H (2023) Radicalization
from a societal perspective.
Front. Psychol. 14:1197282.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1197282
COPYRIGHT
© 2023 Shafieioun and Haq. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution License
(CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction
in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) and the copyright owner(s)
are credited and that the original publication in
this journal is cited, in accordance with
accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which
does not comply with these terms.
TYPE Original Research
PUBLISHED 23 May 2023
DOI 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1197282

Shafieioun and Haq 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1197282
Frontiers in Psychology 02 frontiersin.org
radical groups like Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS) have also exploited
societal injustices to recruit marginalized people. In this paper, wewill
discuss this aect. is is especially true in the case of people who join
extremist groups or extreme ideologies. According to the Council of e
European Union (2014) report “Violations of human rights can give rise
to grievances and the very conditions conducive to the spread of
radicalization and recruitment to terrorism.” erefore, it is vital to ensure
that human rights are respected and protected in order to reduce the risk
of extremism.
is paper aims to emphasize that understanding the social
dynamics that make individuals susceptible to radicalization in the
rst place is critical to developing eective preventative measures
against recruitment into extremist groups. A review of radicalization
studies will be presented in the following section, along with a
discussion of why wemust take a step back to understand the social
imbalance of power in a society in order to understand the reasons
that make it inevitable for someone to move toward extremism.
Extremism and society
Globally, there has been a rise in religious extremism and right-
wing extremism. In recent years, European countries have adopted a
number of National Action Plans to combat radicalization and violent
extremism. A major focus of these action plans is to promote basic
and practical research into the root causes and processes that lead to
violent engagement (Ajil, 2022). Many of these studies focus on
individual and group dynamics without taking into account broader
socio-political issues (Sedgwick, 2010; Kundnani, 2012; Ahmad and
Monaghan, 2019). is paper aims to ll that gap in the literature by
emphasizing the role that societal structures play in radicalization.
Radicalization is a multi-pathway, multi-factor complex process (e.g.,
McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; Kruglanski and Webber, 2014;
Hafez and Mullins, 2015). It is essential that weunderstand all possible
pathways and processes involved in radicalization in order to develop
an eective prevention plan. In this paper, wewill illustrate how
society itself can play a critical role in inuencing an individual’s
decision to move toward the path of extremism.
In the past decade, there has been an increase in support for and
direct participation in radical groups. For example, when the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) movement took hold, almost 40,000 foreigners
joined from 130 countries (Barrett, 2017). is raises the question of why
people leave their home countries and risk their lives to join radical
groups. To understand this, researchers in the eld of radicalization
studies have identied dierent factors and processes that pave the path
for individuals to adopt a radical ideology. Some of these factors and
processes include uncertainty in life (Hogg and Adelman, 2013; Hogg
et al., 2013), collective identity problems (Moghaddam, 2012),
experiencing alienation (Horgan, 2008; Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010),
unsuccessful integration, political grievances which are usually combined
with moral outrage and feelings of revenge (e.g., McCauley and
Moskalenko, 2008; Sageman, 2008; Schmid, 2013), quest for signicance,
i.e., the fundamental human need for belonging, respect, performance
and self-esteem (Kruglanski etal., 2014), and manipulation of so-called
positive emotions like pride, feeling of power, love and the sense of
belonging by radical groups to attract and retain recruits (Haq etal., 2020).
e above-mentioned processes and factors are valuable and
illuminate various aspects of the complexity of radicalization. But in order
to understand the complete picture of radicalization wealso need to
understand why some people feel a certain way in the rst place (e.g.,
humiliated, alienated, marginalized, etc.), which makes them vulnerable
toward radical ideologies. Weneed to understand the structures in society
that construct an environment of mistrust, discrimination, and alienation
for certain individuals, and encourage them to seek out groups that
promise acceptance and belonging. Our aim in this paper is to emphasize
the importance of acquiring a better understanding of the social dynamics
that push vulnerable individuals out of society.
e literature on radicalization studies focuses, to some extent, on
social aspects that can lead to radical pathways. On the practical level,
more emphasis is placed on counter-narratives that challenge
predominantly the ideologies of radical groups. For instance,
organizations such as the International Center for the Study of Violent
Extremism (ICSVE) are focused primarily on combating radical
narratives by creating counter narrative videos. As with policies at the
government level, the emphasis is more on proling individuals who may
be“vulnerable” to radical ideologies. ese proles target individuals
based on their appearance, religion, race, etc. (Blackwood etal., 2015;
Abbas, 2017; Schclarek Mulinari, 2019; Abbas etal., 2021). A more blunt
statement would bethat the governmental eorts to prevent and counter
terrorism in the UnitedStates and Europe, especially aer 9/11, are
primarily based on the use of racial proling. For instance, in the case of
Muslim immigrants in Europe who experience Islamophobia on behalf
of the host population can induce the feeling of being ashamed or
humiliated (Kruglanski and Webber, 2014, p.381). e feeling of shame
and humiliation, combined with systematic discrimination and
marginalization based on governmental policies or on lasting prejudices
in society can result in creating an environment for the targeted people
which make them feel that they are forcefully pushed out of their
own society.
In order to enhance our knowledge about the radicalization
process and create better counter-radicalization and prevention
policies, wehave to take a step back, and look at the existing social
structures that could act as “push” factors for some individuals or
groups to the extent that they leave their society and join radical
groups and movements. Some of these “push” factors can beidentied
as systematic discrimination, racism and marginalization, which are
the violation of basic human rights.
e purpose of this article is to provide a deeper understanding
of how societal factors such as discrimination, oppression, and racism
can facilitate an individual toward the pathway of radicalization. To
reach this objective, werely on Mindell’s (1995) take on the matter of
riots and violence in society and the concept of ‘phenomenology of
whiteness’ by Ahmed (2007) as our theoretical framework.
In the late 1970s and 1980s, Arnold Mindell developed the approach
of process-oriented psychology (also known as process work) in
Switzerland. Heoriginally started his work in conict resolution with
individuals and then realized that mere work on an individual level may
not be enough to tackle those issues. In his view, although couple
therapies, individual therapies, and family therapies are signicantly
helpful, our constant embeddedness in political, social, or cultural settings
demands a framework that considers all of these aspects. As a result,
Arnold Mindell started developing other aspects of process work, namely
“worldwork” that focuses on working with small and large groups,
organizations, and open city forums (Mindell, 2008).
To complement Mindell’s approach on how our constant
embeddedness in political, social, and cultural structures is felt and

Shafieioun and Haq 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1197282
Frontiers in Psychology 03 frontiersin.org
perceived by individuals, weuse Ahmed’s concept of “phenomenology of
whiteness” (Ahmed, 2007), which accentuates that concepts such as racism
are institutional and deeply rooted in our societies. Racism does not belong
to history, rather it is ongoing and still lived by some of us, while for others,
it is already part of history which is over. Further, wefocus on the
interviews of some individuals recruited by radical groups, specically
“Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” (ISIS) in order to have a more
comprehensive understanding of how these individuals narrate their
experience about the “push” factors which they have experienced within
their society. Our theoretical framework helps to highlight those less
attended aspects of the process of radicalization; namely, how the existing
discrimination in societies create a form of social trauma for some
individuals and pushes them toward extremism, where they have an
opportunity to opt for violence as a solution to their problems.
In the following section, wewill start by elaborating on Mindell’s
view about issues such as terrorism in society and how they come
into existence.
Societal vs. individual narratives:
terrorists or freedom fighters?
When it comes to terrorism-related cases, the media has the
power to generate and frame narratives. e impressions wegain from
narratives heavily depend on how they are formulated and presented.
ere is a great deal of misinformation about terrorists in the media
and in the legal system because of the way they are portrayed (Mindell,
1995). When an incident happens in the spotlight of the media, it is
oen the search for an individual motive and the case is interpreted
independently from other parallel political movements and social
situations. To counter this, Mindell suggests a rather novel denition
of terrorism, according to which “[t]errorism is not just a political
activity, but a frequent and unseen group interaction based upon the
sense of being treated unjustly” (Mindell, 1995, p.78). Hefurther
states that ‘terrorist’ is a word that is used in media discussions to
describe people who call themselves ‘freedom ghters.’ is is a unique
but important denition since it demonstrates why there are two very
dierent narratives around the same concept. However, portraying
terrorism as a “disempowered group’s attack on the mainstream for the
sake of equality and freedom” (Mindell, 1995, p.91) can raise a
problem that wewould like to clarify before moving on and using that
denition. Our connotation with the word ‘terrorism’ is far beyond
‘freedom ghters,’ which implies that these actions are justied and
moral. It is important to keep in mind that nothing can justify the act
of terrorism and using this denition is not an excuse for justifying
terrorism. It is, however, an explanation for why terrorism in some
cases happens and how wecan understand and counter it more
suciently. Mindell further elaborates on his denition of terrorism:
Poverty, drugs, joblessness, lack of education, racism, sexism, and
social abuse promote violence.
1
at social injustice foments
revenge should beobvious from the fact that the vast majority of
1 Recent research incorporating machine learning also shows that low social
status and problematic social relationships can contribute to extremism
(Ivaskevics and Haller, 2022).
those incarcerated for violent acts in all countries come from the
groups with the fewest social privileges. In other words, violence
occurs, in part, because the oppressed cannot defend themselves
from the intentional and covert use of mainstream rank.
2
(Mindell,
1995, p.78)
In the case of ISIS formation as a group, the Hague Center for
Strategic Studies report (Oosterveld etal., 2017) mentioned that to
some ISIS appeared out of nowhere and was born suddenly around
2013–2014 when this organization caught international attention
owing to its proclamation of a state and broadening its borders. “It is
clear that ISIS is a distinct product of its time, geography and
circumstances: it grew out of the convulsions of the war in Iraq (2003–
2011), the Arab revolutions (2010-present) and the civil war in Syria
(2011-present)” (Oosterveld etal., 2017, p.5). ISIS came into existence
as a result of constant war, instability, and extreme poverty in the area.
ey propagate their ideology in a way that inuences people,
especially Muslim minorities, in dierent countries. is is done by
taking advantage of the social oppression and marginalization that
vulnerable individuals experience in their societies (Speckhard and
Ellenberg, 2020). ISIS propagate their ideology in a way that it looks
like they are oering vulnerable individuals a chance to stand up
against injustice and take revenge for the humiliation and
discrimination which they (and other Muslims around the world) are
experiencing. e stated mission/agenda of ISIS is to “re-establishing
a 7th century Caliphate” and rearmation of Islamic norms to guide
Arab societies (Oosterveld etal., 2017). In other words, ISIS propagate
that they oer the possibility of living a utopian life under the so-called
Khilafat they have created.
e interviews by the International Center for the Study of Violent
Extremism (ICSVE) show how the above-mentioned factors promote
violence as a reaction against felt exclusion and oppression. Especially
poverty fosters the feeling of insecurity, as well as lack of education
and oppression may breed humiliation and frustration. ese
examples indicate how oppression in dierent forms led the
individuals to become a part of ISIS.
Abu Ghazwan, a 33-year-old former ISIS member, was imprisoned
in Iraq because of a family matter and despite his innocence, the
ocials did not drop the charges because hewas Sunni, and his
friends were released because they were Shia. He describes his
motivation as follows:
We joined ISIS because weare Sunnis, so that we, Sunnis, become
one hand and take over the country, so that it will become a Sunni
country, and everyone takes what is his. Youtake your rights back
from those who hurt you. [I believed that Iraq] will become a
Sunni country and I will take my revenge on those who
imprisoned and hurt me. (Rewards of Joining the Islamic
State, 2018)
Salma, a 22-year-old former ISIS member who le Belgium to
follow her father to Syria aer her father told her: “Life is better here.
Youcan wear your whole hijab. We’re not oppressed here” (A Belgian
2 Mindell defines rank as “the sum of the person’s privileges” in the society,
for instance, color of skin, education, social class, etc. (Mindell, 1995, p.28).

Shafieioun and Haq 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1197282
Frontiers in Psychology 04 frontiersin.org
Family in e Islamic State, 2018). She claims she has not even
watched one propaganda video before moving to Syria and her dad’s
words were enough for her to leave Belgium.
Another interview featured Albert Berisha, a 29-year-old Kosovar.
Hele Kosovo to ght in Syria. Hementions the following as his
motivation behind his actions:
We saw images of people who were constantly being tortured [by
the Syrian regime]. Wesaw images of killed children. Wesaw the
images of massacred children. We saw inhumane behavior
towards women. We saw people being burnt alive. We saw
bombings where entire families were killed at once. Wesaw events
as they were unfolding. Wehad a live stream of the events [on
YouTube], so to speak. Weexperienced almost the same scope and
nature of events in the [1999] Kosovo [war] as well. Wewere also
the victims of an unjust regime. But, during the war in Kosovo,
Iwas a child. en, Icouldn’t join the war to ght alongside the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Iwas only 12 or 13 years old.
Now, at [my] age, youcan’t just cross your arms and do nothing if
yousee that the same injustice is happening to someone else.
(Islamic State Live Streaming in Kosovo, 2019)
ese examples help to shed light on how important it is to
de-individualize terrorism. Looking at the overall picture shows that
most of the individuals who get radicalized are not subject to a
“mental disorder or dysfunction.” Or “should not bepathologized.”
ey are humans with histories of injuries and experiences of violence
without having enough strength or resources to defend themselves or
their families. Some of them have the basic goal of “gaining economic
support, freedom and the respect necessary to survive” (Mindell, 1995,
p.100).
Mindell (1995) mentions that for minorities and many
disenfranchised groups, life has been full of hatred, violence, and
revenge. e more invisible and insignicant minorities feel in their
environment, the more furious they become. e less the society
focuses on the issues that these individuals face, the louder it receives
the message: “‘Wake up! Youare on a trial! If youdo not listen to us,
we’ll put a bomb in your home. at should wake youup’” (Mindell,
1995, p.94). Repressed anger can form a desire for revenge. Passivity
is a sign of revenge, and it can have dierent forms. Passivity in forms
of shock, shame, numbness, and anxiety can show that someone might
have a desire to get revenge and either does not know how or is afraid
to do so with the fear of retaliation.
It is important to notice these early signs and listen to people who
feel hurt. Listen to their stories and give their anger, shame, and
numbness a legitimate platform to beexpressed. Otherwise, it can
result in violent responses. For instance, Brym (2007) writes that
emotions like anger and hate, when combined with opportunities for
revenge, act as a motivation for Palestinian bombers into action.
Radical groups like ISIS provide this opportunity for vulnerable
individuals and shape their aects according to what the group
desires. ere is a tendency in societies to ignore the early signs of
revenge and passivity, and by ignoring these signs, people neglect the
problems in the margin and neglect the necessity for change (Mindell,
1995). When the early signs are ignored, revenge alters its forms. It
might start with a demonstration against authorities, riots, civil
disobedience, and nally turn to a revolution to make the cultural
changes that are blocked (Mindell, 1995). Ignoring social
marginalization and discrimination by pushing marginalized people
away and trying to silence them does not make their voices go away.
Instead, they might rather become louder and louder until they are
heard. Before moving any deeper, it is important to clarify once again
that weare not justifying violence and crimes but trying to understand
the anger and frustration which can result in violent riots.
Mindell further elaborates that the political leaders suppress
people who are angry in order to keep their popularity and show
political success. In the rst encounter, this position might seem
reasonable, but it totally ignores where anger and violence come from.
Why are some people angry? Privileged people, in terms of belonging
to the majority and belonging to the center of the society, get angry
when their world and its cultural norm is not recreated. For instance,
how some conservative and far right governments target minorities.
ey condemn actions of minorities such as riots and retaliation and
suppress them without taking a peek at the roots (Mindell, 1995). As
a result, suppression leads to even more revolts, more unhappiness,
and does not make conict and violence disappear (Mindell, 1995).
To understand the anger and frustration of suppressed groups in
more detail, in the next section, wewill discuss the power imbalance
that enables one group to suppress another, resulting in an aective
push toward radicalization. To do so, werely on Mindell’s idea of rank.
Which refers to the imbalance of power in a society. e concept of
rank helps us to understand that when privileged groups abuse their
power, they create an environment that normalizes discrimination and
further marginalizes vulnerable groups. is results in anger and
frustration among them.
Social repercussions of
marginalization
Mindell argues that issues such as “riots” or “minority crime” are
related to their so-called “rank.” Hedenes rank as “the sum of the
person’s privileges” in the society, for instance, color of skin, education,
social class, etc. (Mindell, 1995, p.28). Heargues that problems do not
necessarily start from the mere existence of ranks, rather they develop
when the rank, or in other words the privileges, get forgotten by the
ones who have a higher rank. For instance, an educated person might
assume that people with less education are ignorant and that they are
the ones who cause the problems. On an international level, powerful
countries might blame the countries with less power for being violent
and supporting terrorism because privileged nations, even if they do
the act of international killing in less powerful countries, are always
associated with being “victims of terrorism” (Mindell, 1995, p.90).
One recent example is the refusal of the UnitedStates of America to
let the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigate the cases over
the alleged war crimes (involving torture and cruel treatment,
dehumanizing abuses, and rape and other forms of sexual violence)
committed by U.S. Army and CIA personnel during the invasion of
Afghanistan (Scheer, 2020).
In dierent societies, people with a specic prole have a higher
rank. As a result of having a higher rank, they form the center of that
society. People who do not represent the mainstream prole are
pushed to the margins. Along this line of thought, Ayata (2019)
suggests that the aective dimension of citizenship helps to understand
how aects and emotions are used to reinforce dierences and
dierential treatments among the members of a society:

Shafieioun and Haq 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1197282
Frontiers in Psychology 05 frontiersin.org
… while two individuals may beequal citizens from a legal point
of view, their perceived dierence in terms of religion, race, sex,
gender, or class may result in identifying one individual as the
proper, true citizen who is naturally entitled to the privileges and
status of citizenship, whereas the other may beidentied as a
“quasi” or “technical” citizen, whose belonging to the political
community remains in question despite holding citizenship.
(Ayata, 2019, p.332)
When power is abused, not only people are pushed to the margins,
but there is also a tendency of marginalizing these people’s problems
because what is experienced in the center is deemed to bemore
important and needs to befocused on. e ones in the center might
take an attitude and send an unintended message to the margin: “Stop
nagging, quit complaining and x your problem on your own”
(Mindell, 1995). Rejecting people and their problems from the center
and accepting that they and their problems belong to the margin is a
form of oppression. Mindlessly oppressing and marginalizing
individuals has consequences. e ones who are oppressed either
become silent or gain vengeance by becoming the oppressors (Mindell,
1995). e overall aective environment created by the ‘ruling class’
or ‘center’ results in clear discrimination, which may lead to fostering
frustration in the quasi citizen and result in conicts. In order to
understand how power imbalance in the societal structures aects
individuals, in the following section, we would like to use Sara
Ahmed’s idea about the ‘phenomenology of whiteness.’ Ahmed’s ideas
about the “white world” and its varying impacts on non-white
individuals provide a powerful context for Mindell’s work,
demonstrating how their perspectives can befurther enriched.
Phenomenology of whiteness
Phenomenology attends, in general, to the tactile, vestibular,
kinesthetic, and visual character of embodied reality. However,
underlying all of these characters, as Frantz Fanon says, weshould
consider and think of a “historic-racial” scheme (Fanon, 1986, p.17).
Ahmed (2006) describes our societies as containing a historical and
racial dimension. In her view, these dimensions form individuals’
experiences in society dierently. As wearrive in this world, weare
born into an environment that conveys aective, historical, and racial
aspects that aect and direct our way of being in the world. e
history of the group or nation to which webelong provides us with
our rst aective environment. is provides an informative
perspective on why, and how, certain groups and individuals may feel
oppressed, or socially excluded, from traditional mainstream society
(e.g., Abdulrehman, in press).
Ahmed (2007) refers to the idea of whiteness not as a biological
characteristic of the body that weare born with. Rather, she denes
whiteness as an ongoing history and background of experience which
make the lived experiences of humans distinct from one another. is
history can enable some humans while disabling the others. is
concept of “whiteness” thus refers not only (or even primarily) to the
color of skin, it rather denotes an orientation that puts people in
dierent categories and creates dierent experiences. erefore,
weconsider it to bea promising concept for an in-depth exploration
of the perceived injustice by minorities. Whiteness is a determining
element of rank if weconsider whiteness as a feature of “the privileged,”
a feature that marginalized populations lack. In this regard,
“whiteness” is not only relevant for the Muslims in Europe and the
UnitedStates, but also Muslims in minority sects in other Muslim
countries, e.g., Sunnis in Iraq.
Ahmed argues that, because of the history of colonialism, welive
in a white world. e world of whiteness is the world which weinherit.
e world which is designed and has orders in a specic way. When
wecome to this world, wealready have a place in which wecan dwell,
have access, and reach certain objects. is world of whiteness is a
world in which certain things are within reach of certain bodies,
allowing them to successfully reach those objects while making it
dicult for others to do the same. As Ahmed states: “e ‘matter’ of
race is very much about embodied reality; seeing oneself or being seen
as white or black or mixed does aect what one ‘can do,’ or even where
one can go, which can bedescribed in terms of what is and is not
within reach” (Ahmed, 2006, p.112).
Ahmed argues that there are some bodies which are seen as
“alike”; since they are “sharing whiteness” and have similar objects
within reach. By having a common direction, not only does it give the
bodies that have the same direction a sense of community, but it also
makes them distinct from those with dierent directions. A we
emerges as an eect of sharing a common orientation and a they
emerges as an eect of cohering in a dierent direction. Ahmed states
that the other side of the world is associated with racial otherness,
meaning that weattribute all the otherness which wedo not recognize
as our common characteristics to the other side of the globe (Ahmed,
2006, p.121). Weare weand they are they. e following statement
from prime minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, is a good illustration
of what Ahmed refers to as “racial otherness” and “other side of the
world”: “We must state that wedo not want to bediverse and do not
want to bemixed: we do not want our own color, traditions, and
national culture to bemixed with those of others. Wedo not want this.
Wedo not want that at all. Wedo not want to bea diverse country”
(Bayrakli and Hafez, 2019, p.42).
In Orban’s statement above, an enormous wish for a distinction
between “us” and “them” is visible. e distinction based on the color
of skin, traditions and what one calls “national culture” which in e
Fundamental Law of Hungary is referred to as “Christian Culture”
(Bayrakli and Hafez, 2019, p.48), clearly ignores and devalues the
individuals who do not share their mainstream norms.
Ahmed (2006) claims that sharing “otherness” comes at the cost
of being stopped. Having a body that is not aligned with “white
bodies” can cause two problems. On the one hand, the diculty of
accessing objects because they are far away. On the other hand, the
body itself does not cooperate in trailing behind the action. A good
example of not having the objects within reach is the concept of ‘glass
ceiling.’ e non-white body does not only lack access to certain
objects due to living in a white world, but when it attempts to reach
for the objects, the non-white body raises against itself and prevents
the body from reaching it. e non-white body cannot go unnoticed
in the sea of whiteness because the spaces are made in a way that
makes the non-white body noticeable. Non-white bodies feel
uncomfortable, exposed, and visible as they try to take up space
because they do not share a certain likeness with white bodies.
Whiteness is the permission for some bodies to pass over repetitively,
while the others are being stopped (cf. also Bajwa et al., 2023).
Whiteness is invisible to the white bodies because they can fade in the
background, whereas the non-white bodies cannot pass and become

Shafieioun and Haq 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1197282
Frontiers in Psychology 06 frontiersin.org
hyper-visible. Non-white bodies appear to be “out of place,” and
therefore being stopped when crossing the line. Not being aware of the
invisibility of white bodies to them could bewhat Mindell referred to
as a form of rank abuse and, as already discussed, this could lead to
violent responses in the society. Being viewed as an outsider and a
constant failure is traumatizing. Being constantly stopped and pushed
away can cause a form of social trauma, which could motivate violence
from the oppressed group (e.g., Williams etal., 2023).
Trauma: a facilitator in the
radicalization process
In general, a cultural trauma may bedescribed as a physical and
psychological assault inicted by a group that is dominant. is assault
is on the culture of a group of people who shares a specic identifying
characteristic or aliation (e.g., ethnicity, religion) (e.g., Stamm etal.,
2004; Evans-Campbell, 2008). is trauma can manifest itself in
everyday life, oen leaving individuals feeling like they are not capable
of attaining the same opportunities as those without “otherness.” It can
be further compounded when those in positions of power and
privilege refuse to acknowledge this injustice, amplifying the feeling
of marginalization and exclusion. e “feelings of comfort, unease,
anger, empathy, (mis)trust, (dis)respect, love, and hate toward an
imagined ‘us’ and ‘others’ are regulated and reproduced in ocial
policies, discourses, and practices” (Ayata, 2019). is systematic
discrimination can lead to feelings of deep frustration and resentment,
which can lead to further alienation. is plays an important role in
the case of young people being recruited to groups like ISIS.
e interviews with former ISIS members and their families
conducted by Speckhard and Yayla (2016) indicate a common
storyline for the foreign ghters who joined ISIS from Europe,
especially Belgium. Many of them were encouraged by teachers from
a young age to pursue the (more basic) technical track in school, and
then later faced diculties nding a full-time job. However, even
when they have been to the university, they still have to face
discrimination in nding jobs and getting hired.
3
One mother
described the situation for her son, a second-generation immigrant,
like this: “He was smart and spoke multiple languages, but high school
teachers discouraged him and made him feel like hecould only bea
factory worker or garbage collector, so nally he dropped out of
school. en, of course, hecould only get those types of jobs, so hefelt
totally humiliated. e terrorist recruiter promised him much more”
(Speckhard and Yayla, 2016).
In one of the interviews done by ICSVE (2018) which wealready
referred to, Salma, the 22-year-old Belgian, talks about her experience
of joining ISIS. She states: “[In Belgium], sometimes youfeel targeted.
Youfeel watched upon as if youare not the same like them. If your
head is covered, youare wearing a hijab this big and everything,
youare watched upon.” (A Belgian Family in e Islamic State, 2018).
Another interview (Georges the Belgian Jihadist, 2018) with Georges
M., a 25-year-old from Belgium, who intended to join the uprising in
Syria but never succeeded, portrayed the common story of being
3 Papers that elaborate on immigrant workers’ discrimination on the European
job market, (see Weichselbaumer, 2017, 2020; Ball etal., 2022).
stopped, becoming hyper-visible and not being able to move upward.
Heconverted to Islam when hewas in high school and faced his
parents’ disagreement and disappointment. Hewas suspended from
high school for proselytizing, and heultimately dropped out of the
school. “I knew that if Istayed in that establishment or another, things
would get worse” (Georges the Belgian Jihadist, 2018). Hebegan
working in jobs below his intellect and, because of the lack of high
school nal certicates, he could not get a university education.
Heexplains that aer watching videos from Syria, heand his friends
felt the urge to go to Syria and help Muslims ght against Bashar
al-Assad. ey had to return home because the father of a friend took
them back. Here is a snippet demonstrating his perceived
the discrimination:
I wish everyone could practice his religion as hewants to like it’s
been done for a long time. Not only for Muslims, but also for
Christians and Jews. [But, here in Belgium] Icannot pray at work
like Iwant. If Iwear a beard, there are prejudices. If my wife wants
to wear the hijab, she’ll face discrimination. [At my job], Iasked
to do my prayers. Everybody goes out to smoke cigarettes. Why
can’t Igo out to do my prayer that doesn’t take more than ve
minutes? I am not in an Islamic land, but in a so-called
‘democratic’ country. [Here] there is no trust in the other.
(Georges the Belgian Jihadist, 2018)
When societies and institutions fail to provide spaces for some
individuals and groups to act freely as compared to the other groups
of society, trauma is generated. Aer 2001, identities of Muslim
citizens in America were put under surveillance and many were
perceived as dangerous or threatening. is created a comparable
aective register that highlights the two categories of citizens, one
(who were not Muslims) automatically shi to the naturally entitled
citizens, and others (Muslims) whose citizenship became conditional
and relegated to a formality if they do not act, feel and behave in a
desired way. is required additional emotional and aective eorts
to conrm the rightful political belonging (Slaby and von Scheve,
2019). Having the wrong name, the wrong color of skin, the wrong
nationality, the wrong religion, obstruct the path for individuals,
sometimes temporarily and sometimes forever. It ceases them and
their movements. Even if they have the right passport with a wrong
body, their way is blocked. erefore, if our nationality does not match
our body, if my name does not match my nationality, if my nationality
does not match my religion, then weare held as suspect and should
answer those inconsistencies and mismatches. Some bodies feel more
at home, and some feel the discomfort of being strangers. Some bodies
are recognized more as “strangers” and “out of the place” than others
(Ahmed, 2006). Being a stranger is being suspected of
sharing otherness.
What non-white bodies are facing is a form of social
traumatization, since it targets the entire group, and it is implemented
in a societal context. Another factor that aggravates this socially
embedded trauma is that the public fails to acknowledge or even
actively denies the trauma. A famous example is the debate about
Armenian Genocide. Even in trauma-related literature, this avoidance
of acknowledging oppressive traumatic experiences as trauma exists.
Holmes etal. (2016) criticized DSM 5 for not including dierent forms
of oppression (e.g., racism or sexism) as potentially traumatic events.
ey elaborate that empirical evidence has shown that marginalized

Shafieioun and Haq 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1197282
Frontiers in Psychology 07 frontiersin.org
groups experienced higher PTSD levels in comparison to the majority
(see Holmes etal., 2016). Despite established empirical evidence, the
current denition of trauma fails to include institutional, systemic and
psychological forms of violence as potentially traumatic experiences.
is kind of psychological violence which is usually “invisible” is a
form of social neglect of trauma. As mentioned before, social trauma
is an imperative element in the recruitment of young people by groups
like ISIS. On the one hand, not being able to move forward, feeling
hyper-visible, being stopped and interrogated, and being considered
as an outsider and on the other hand, the dream that ISIS sells, the
dream of having a home where youcan befree and belong to. is can
create a powerful contrast between the feelings of hopelessness and
the promise of security and belonging that ISIS oers, making the
group particularly attractive to vulnerable young people.
When hierarchies and the dierences in rank are institutionalized,
people with higher rank usually feel that they do not have to bear with
the problems of people with less rank. Hence, all the problems get
associated with the rank and the rank system gets internalized
(Mindell, 1995). Internalization of oppression is so strong that people
from minorities feel traumatized. ere is no doubt that the political
process in each country is dierent, but there are similar elements in
all of these processes: the structure of processes between center and
margin. Considering that almost all of our sources are linked to
cultures practiced in the center of the society and our embeddedness
in cultural systems, how wefeel, and think is also an eect of that
culture. Subsequently, our sense of self-worth and the worth of others
is linked to what we receive from that culture. As a result, it is
understandable that marginalized groups may lack condence.
“Unfullled needs,” “repressed feelings,” and “the search for the
meaning of life” of marginalized groups, play a crucial role in forming
a mass frustration (Mindell, 1995, p.24).
Sometimes people do support social order and let it continue as it
is; as if by nature, some are superior to others. For instance, when
people see that a considerable proportion of immigrants is
unemployed, they start doubting immigrants’ abilities and intelligence
instead of asking what would have happened if they would have gotten
the same amount of opportunities to unfold their talent as the
mainstream population (Mindell, 1995). is discriminatory approach
persists even in research literature. Jason Richwine, for example,
received a doctorate in public policy from Harvard in 2009. In his
dissertation titled “IQ and Immigration Policy,” he argues that
immigrants have lower IQs than native white Americans, and that
these low IQs are likely to persist for generations to come (Richwine,
2009). In addition, the book “e Bell Curve” by political scientists
Charles Murray and Richard Hermsteirrayn can be cited as an
example. ey argued in the book that poor people, especially poor
black people, were intrinsically less intelligent than white people
(Herrnstein and Murray, 1996). Mindell (1995) mentions that mass
frustration of minorities can ignite a revolution. In other terms, they
aim at the replacement of existing structures, i.e., a revolution that
replaces the current social, economic, or political structures.
Revolutions are more radical than reforms. Reforms are some
alternations in the existing systems, whereas revolutions aim to change
the entire system. If structures do not change enough with reform,
revolution follows (Mindell, 1995, p.225). e up-rise of ISIS as a
group might bea case in point. “It is no coincidence that ISIS and its
extreme jihadi message took root in a region that was experiencing
socio-political upheavals arguably of a ‘one in a century’ kind”
(Oosterveld etal., 2017, p.9). Aer the attacks of 9/11, the American
government started the war in Afghanistan and Iraq against Al-Qaeda.
In the time of Iraq’s invasion, Al-Qaeda was not yet grounded in Iraq,
but following years of chaos, the circumstances became ideal for them
to expand in Iraq and beyond. ere are two concrete fatal decisions
on behalf of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which assisted the
rise of ISIS, namely the de-Baathication of Iraq’s government and
disbanding the Iraqi army. ese decisions played an important role
in promoting and increasing Iraq’s sectarian conicts that played o
Sunni against Shia. Since the CPA’s decision had an exclusive impact
on Sunni population, Al-Qaeda which later became the Islamic State
of Iraq (ISI), found an opportunity and used the massive frustration
of the Sunni population against the Shia and Western forces
(Oosterveld etal., 2017). Not to mince words, the mass frustration of
the Sunni population with their governments and Western countries
for the marginalization, the help of former Iraqi Baathist ocials as a
signicant part of ISIS’ leadership, high goals of living in a society
without discrimination under Islamic laws, the failure of the governing
powers in Syria and Iraq, and lastly the unintentional support from
the outside by Western countries and rebels in Syria and Iraq,
contributed to the rise and development of ISIS.
In the following section, we highlight how the increase in
Islamophobia might have an imperative role in contributing to a
heightened sense of paranoia and fear of Muslims, adding to the
appeal for the vulnerable individuals to join the extremist groups
like ISIS.
The double signal of islamophobia
According to Mindell (1995), being unaware of one’s rank could
bea trigger for conicts in the society. Heelevates his argument and
introduces the concept of “sending mixed signals” as one of the most
troublesome consequences of unawareness of rank. In our
communication, within families, groups, communities, and even on
an international level, two types of signals are sent. “Primary signals”
are the ones that are intended, and “secondary signals” are the signals
which are unintended and indicate another level of a person’s feeling
and unconscious sense of power and rank. Oen wesend the primary
message of “Let us talk” accompanied by a secondary message of “I
amsuperior and what Isay does not come in debate” or “stay where
youbelong” (Mindell, 1995, pp.49–60). Despite the primary signal
about “respect for religious diversity” the increase of Islamophobia not
just among the people, but also among politicians is a secondary signal
that is contrasting with the primarily intended message and thereby
stigmatizes Muslims in general. As an example of the contrary signals,
Canada can becited. While Canada emphasizes multiculturalism as a
primary message, it also conveys a secondary message through
institutional policies such as Bills 21 and 62. Policies like these target
Muslim women and marginalize them (Williams etal., 2022). In this
section, weexplain how the arising issue of Islamophobia, prejudice
against Muslims and the policies to combat these issues could send
such secondary signals.
ere has been an increase in Islamophobia and prejudice against
Muslims in recent years. Muslim identity has been portrayed as an
incompatible identity with modernity and democracy (Wike and
Grim, 2010). Muslims, and especially second-generation immigrant
Muslims, can have a strenuous life in Western societies. ere is

Shafieioun and Haq 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1197282
Frontiers in Psychology 08 frontiersin.org
unfortunately little research on the matter of “Western views towards
Muslims” but research by Wike and Grim (2010) has shown that
Western societies perceive Muslims as both a security and a cultural
threat which causes negative attitudes toward Muslims and therefore
people tend to bemore intolerant toward them. Wike and Grim cite
from Cesari (2004) that September 11 was a starting point for a “Bin
Laden eect” which caused discrimination and even violence against
Muslims in Western societies. “e ‘Bin Laden Eect’, according to
Cesari, ‘consists mainly of casting all Muslims within the U.S. and
Europe in the role of e Enemy, transforming them into scapegoats
for the entire society’” (Cesari, 2004). erefore, the perceived threat
identied with Muslims turns the majority (non-Muslims) against the
minority. e results of this research have shown that in the
investigated countries (Spain, the U.S., Britain, France, and Germany)
Muslims are regarded not only as a cultural but also as a security
threat. Negative attitudes regarding Muslims do not primarily arise
because of Westerners being worried about the incompatibility of
Islam with democracy and modernity, rather they lie in the perception
of extremism within Muslim communities. Certainly, there are
extremist groups both in Muslim countries and in the West. Research
has continuously shown that in most Muslim communities, only a
small minority holds extremist views, and the majority are against
extremism (Wike and Grim, 2010). For instance, in 2015 Pew
Research Centre collected data about how the countries with
signicant Muslim population hold negative views about extremist
organizations like ISIS (Poushter, 2015). Perceiving Muslims as a
security threat can lead to extreme reactions against them and a sense
of exclusion from society.
e European Islamophobia Report 2018 (Bayrakli and Hafez,
2019) was published with the nancial support of the European Union
on the matter of Islamophobia in Europe. is report was an
investigation on the dynamics that support anti-Muslim racism in
Europe in a direct or indirect way. A simple example would bethe
incidents in which Muslims are the target. ese are usually described
as hate crime, whereas in other cases, they would bereferred to as
terrorist attacks (e.g., Corbin, 2017). In the following paragraphs,
wewill provide an overview of this report.
During the last decades, far-right movements, nationalists, and
populists started rising in Europe, in countries such as Italy and Austria
they even have been in power and in coalitions for a while. Considering
that only 12% of Muslims who have been experiencing discrimination
report to the authorities (Bayrakli and Hafez, 2019), Islamophobia
incidents happen too frequently to beignored. Austria reported 540 cases
of Islamophobic incidents in 2018, which shows a 74% increase in
comparison to 2017in anti-Muslim racist attacks. In Belgium, 84% of
reported discriminations at workplaces were related to Islamophobia.
France documented a 52% rise of Islamophobic incidents in 2018in
comparison to 2017, with a total number of 676 incidents (which include
20 physical attacks). According to the police statistics in Germany, there
were 678 attacks on German Muslims; 40 attacks on mosques, and 1775
attacks on refugees in 2018. In the Netherlands, 91% of a total of 151
incidents of religious discrimination reported to the police were related
to Muslims. Violent acts against Muslims happened in dierent forms, for
instance, rape, shootings, planning to commit terrorist attacks against
Muslims such as poisoning halal foods, killing imams, physical attacks
against Muslim women, and so on.
Another dynamic against Muslims is the use of Islamophobic
language by high-ranking politicians. Most of these politicians
belonged in the far-right and their Islamophobic language normalizes
and decreases the threshold of what is appropriate to besaid in public
discourses. Using such a language normalizes and legitimizes
discrimination of Muslims in the society as citizens. Examples of the
use of Islamophobic language by high-rank politicians were collected
and reported by the European Islamophobia Report 2018 (Bayrakli
and Hafez, 2019): In Belgium, Bart de Wever, NVA leader stated: “Jews
avoid conict that is not the case with Muslims.” In Bulgaria, the
Prosecutor Nedyalka Popova mentioned: “At present, according to
statistics, Muslims are 10–12% in Bulgaria, and wehave no reason to
think that they will become less. When they reach 30%, the state is
already in danger. ey are a monolithic mass, who are easy to
manipulate during the elections, and they are almost like a militarized
structure. If they have been told to go and vote, they go.” In the
CzechRepublic, Dominik Hanko, vice-chair of the SPD party in the
Ústecký district, referred to the Muslim population as “locusts” that
destroy everything around them. In Denmark Erik Høgh-Sørensen, a
regional council member in Nordjylland and parliamentary candidate
for the Danish People’s Party addressed the rejected asylum seekers
and said that at Lindholm (detention center for rejected asylum
seekers) pork should always beincluded in all meals of the menu. In
Germany, aer the Chemnitz incident, the former German Minister
of the Interior, Horst Seehofer (CSU), said: “Migration is the mother
of all problems.” In Ireland, “the Identity Ireland leader Peter
O’Loughlin claimed that Islam was ‘destroying’ cities in Europe and
warned of the risk of ‘Sharia courts,’ ‘rape gangs,’ and ‘grooming gangs’
should a mosque bebuilt in Kilkenny. In Italy, the former Minister of
Interior Matteo Salvini warned of the danger of Islam in Italy and
stated that his future government put an end to the “irregular Islamic
presence” in Italy. Geert Wilders, a Dutch politician, produced and
spread a campaign video accompanied by horror music and the
following text with red letters: “Islam stands for hate against Jews,
Christians, women, and homosexuals.” is video ends with the
sentence “Islam is deadly” using red drops as a resemblance to blood.
In Norway, Per-Willy Amundsen, MP for the Progress Party and
former minister of justice, mentioned his right to say that “the
migration from Muslim countries should stop.” In Serbia, president
Vučić referred to Milošević, who was charged with Muslim genocide,
as a great Serbian leader, with good intentions yet bad results. Also,
Prime Minister Ana Brnabić stated on the Srebrenica genocide: “[It]
was a terrible, terrible crime but… genocide is when youare killing
the entire population, the women, children and this was not that case.”
Downplaying and denying the genocide could be one example of
public failing to acknowledge the trauma. In the UK, Boris Johnson
referred to women who wear Burqa as letter boxes and said that is a
ridiculous choice to walk around like that (Bayrakli and Hafez, 2019,
pp.40–44).
Unfortunately, the issue of Islamophobia is not limited to
Islamophobic language. In some cases, there are enforcements or
demands for laws from government or political parties that directly
target Muslims and put dierent restrictions on them in comparison to
other religious communities. e European Islamophobia Report 2018
(Bayrakli and Hafez, 2019) provides some examples of this legislation. In
Denmark, the Danish government introduced stricter legislation for
“Ghetto Package” who are low-income Muslim enclaves, to regulate life
in their community. Based on these sets of laws, they receive greater
penalties for crime, receive less money from the public section, and have
certain restrictions regarding the upbringing of their children. In general,

Shafieioun and Haq 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1197282
Frontiers in Psychology 09 frontiersin.org
there are 22 rules which the government believes should beapplied to
achieve their goals. e new set of laws aects not only these special
groups of Muslims in Denmark. ere has been a reform of the law on
daycare, based on which Muslim parents are deprived of the right to
choose where they want their children to go to daycare. Another
approved law in Denmark is the obligatory handshakes with the local
mayor at a citizenship ceremony (Bayrakli and Hafez, 2019). is is
potentially a problematic issue for Muslims since physical contact with
the opposite sex (with the exception of the family) such as handshaking
is discouraged and for some even prohibited.
e more these kinds of laws and open discrimination are enforced,
the more marginalized Muslim community gets within the society. ese
kinds of discriminatory conditions may push the vulnerable individuals
toward the extremist groups. e narratives that groups like ISIS use to
recruit individuals, highlights the injustice, collective grievances, and
discriminations, and also oer a way to ght such injustices. Grievances
and its associated emotions can lead individuals or groups of people to
search for a platform where they can redress it. e ‘seeking’ phase, as a
result of grievance, becomes a ‘vulnerability’ toward radicalization, since
it is in such vulnerable situations that individuals are receptive to other
worldviews that promise justice and revenge. Radical organizations use
their power, resources, and creativity to turn individual grievances and
emotions into collective claims and to stage opportunities to act upon
these claims (van Stekelenburg, 2017).
If wewant to ght extremism, it is not enough to ght how radical
individuals deal with injustice. Wehave to take a step back and also
ght the injustice itself. Wewould like to draw the attention once
again on how oppressing the whole group and systematic
discrimination can cause the outburst of anger and lead to extremism
or as a young second-generation Moroccan man stated: “If all the
white Belgians think I’m a monster, then Imight as well beone”
(Speckhard and Yayla, 2016).
ere are not always written laws that are oppressive. ere are
numerous things that are perpetrated by systemic racism that are not
written laws, and it is dicult to prove that they exist and ght against
them because on paper, “they do not exist.”
Conclusion
In our opinion, to tackle the issue of radicalization entails tackling
racism and oppression as well. e way wedeal with the radicalization
in our societies oen goes in the direction of pathologizing radical
members without considering their situation and backgrounds, before
going through the radicalization process. Oen the focus is so much
on proving the ideology wrong. ere is a tendency to forget that these
people have many psychological vulnerabilities, oen stemming from
the discrimination that they experienced in their society. erefore, it
is crucial to address systematic discrimination, racism, institutional
abuse, and imbalance of power between dierent groups in a
community to show how these issues can traumatize minorities and
how minorities react to this trauma. Groups like ISIS take advantage
of this trauma to sell their propaganda and recruit individuals by
promising them a life in Utopia and a chance to take revenge on their
oppressors. Mindell (1995) believes that the problem of terrorism will
not besolved if wejust take action on the international level. Wehave
to beready to deal with the roots steaming within families, churches,
mosques, local organizations, and governments. e mainstream nds
it dicult to accept that it shares a responsibility in pushing
marginalized people toward extremism. People do not show
fundamentalist and abusive behavior out of the blue, they have oen
been badly hurt (Mindell, 1995).
In our view, factors like systematic discrimination, abuse of power,
and constant marginalization play a pivotal role in pushing
discriminated individuals out of society (in some cases, as illustrated
in the examples) and into radical ideologies promising better lives.
However, having said that, wedo not want to justify and bring excuses
for violent actions. Wewant to stress that these types of violent actions
happen in a social context and if wecontinue treating terrorism just
as an indication of inner and individual problems rather than social
injustice, wecan never fully succeed in solving the issue.
Data availability statement
e original contributions presented in the study are included in
the article/Supplementary material, further inquiries can bedirected
to the corresponding author.
Ethics statement
Ethical review and approval was not required for the study on
human participants in accordance with the local legislation and
institutional requirements. Written informed consent from the
patients/participants or patients/participants’ legal guardian/next of
kin was not required to participate in this study in accordance with
the national legislation and the institutional requirements.
Author contributions
All authors listed have made a substantial, direct, and intellectual
contribution to the work and approved it for publication.
Funding
is work was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinscha
(DFG, German Research Foundation)—project number GRK 2185/2
(DFG Research Training Group Situated Cognition).
Acknowledgments
e authors would like to thank Achim Stephan, Sabrina Coninx,
Saad Shaheed, and members of the Reading Club Aectivity of the
Institute of Cognitive Science at Osnabrück University, for their
constructive feedback.
Conflict of interest
e authors declare that the research was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or nancial relationships that could
beconstrued as a potential conict of interest.

Shafieioun and Haq 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1197282
Frontiers in Psychology 10 frontiersin.org
Publisher’s note
All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent those of their aliated
organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the
reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or
claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or
endorsed by the publisher.
References
A Belgian Family in e Islamic State (2018). [YouTube video]. International Center
for the Study of Violent Extremism. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=phZsHWBzcbE&feature=emb_logo
Abbas, T. (2017). e “Trojan horse” plot and the fear of Muslim power in British state
schools. J. Muslim Minority Aairs 37, 426–441. doi: 10.1080/13602004.2017.1313974
Abbas, T., Awan, I., and Marsden, J. (2021). Pushed to the edge: the consequences of
the ‘prevent duty’ in de-radicalising pre-crime thought among British Muslim university
students. Race Ethn. Educ. 24, 1–16. doi: 10.1080/13613324.2021.2019002
Abdulrehman, R. (in press). “Developing anti-racist cultural competence” in Advances
in psychotherapy; evidence based practice series. (Göttingen, Germany: Hogrefe)
Ahmad, F., and Monaghan, J. (2019). Mapping criminological engagements within
radicalization studies. Br. J. Criminol. 59, 1288–1308. doi: 10.1093/bjc/azz023
Ahmed, S. (2006). “Queer phenomenology” in Queer phenomenology (Durham, North
Carolina, United States: Duke University Press)
Ahmed, S. (2007). A phenomenology of whiteness. Fem. eory 8, 149–168. doi:
10.1177/1464700107078139
Ajil, A. (2022). Politico-ideological violence: zooming in on grievances. Eur. J.
Criminol. 19, 304–321. doi: 10.1177/1477370819896223
Ayata, B. (2019). “Aective citizenship,” in Aective societies: key concepts. eds. J. Slaby
and C. von Scheve (New York: Routledge), 330–339.
Bajwa, M. J., von Maur, I., and Stephan, A. (2023). Colorism in the Indian
subcontinent—insights through situated aectivity. Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci. 22. doi:
10.1007/s11097-023-09901-6
Ball, E., Steens, M. C., and Niedlich, C. (2022). Racism in Europe: characteristics and
intersections with other social categories. Front. Psychol. 13:789661. doi: 10.3389/
fpsyg.2022.789661
Barrett, R. (2017). Beyond the caliphate: foreign ghters and the threat of returnees.
e Soufan Group. Available at: http://thesoufancenter.org/research/beyond-caliphate/
Bayrakli, E., and Hafez, F. (Eds.). (2019). European Islamophobia Report (p.848). Seta
| Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research. Available at: https://setav.org/
en/assets/uploads/2019/09/EIR_2018.pdf
Blackwood, L., Hopkins, N., and Reicher, S. D. (2015). ‘Flying while Muslim’:
citizenship and misrecognition in the airport. J. Soc. Polit. Psychol. 3, 148–170. doi:
10.5964/jspp.v3i2.375
Brym, R. J. (2007). Six lessons of suicide bombers. Contexts 6, 40–45. doi: 10.1525/
ctx.2007.6.4.40
Burke, P., and Parker, J. (2007). Social work and disadvantage: addressing the roots of
stigma through association. Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
Cesari, J. (2004). When Islam and democracy meet: Muslims in Europe and in the
UnitedStates. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Corbin, C. M. (2017). Terrorists are always Muslim but never white: at the intersection
of critical race theory and propaganda. Fordham Law Rev. 86:2.
Council of e European Union (2014). Revised EU strategy for combating
radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism (No. 5643/5/14; Issue 5643/5/14). Council
of e European Union. Available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/
ST%209956%202014%20INIT/EN/pdf
Dorling, D. (2010). Injustice (revised edition): why social inequality still persists. 2nd
Edn Old Park Hill, Bristol, UK: Bristol University Press and Policy Press.
Evans-Campbell, T. (2008). Historical trauma in American Indian/native Alaska
communities: a multilevel framework for exploring impacts on individuals, families, and
communities. J. Interpers. Violence 23, 316–338. doi: 10.1177/0886260507312290
Fanon, F. (1986). Black skin, white masks. 1967. trans. Charles L. Markmann. London:
Pluto.
Georges the Belgian Jihadist (2018). [YouTube video]. International Center for the
Study of Violent Extremism. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=gW42Ln8ndZw&feature=emb_logo
Hafez, M., and Mullins, C. (2015). e radicalization puzzle: a theoretical synthesis of
empirical approaches to homegrown extremism. StudiesConict Terrorism 38, 958–975.
doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1051375
Haq, H., Shaheed, S., and Stephan, A. (2020). Radicalization through the Lens of
situated aectivity. Front. Psychol. 11:205. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00205
Herrnstein, R. J., and Murray, C. A. (1996). e bell curve: intelligence and class
structure in American life. (1st). New York: Simon & Schuster.
Hogg, M. A., and Adelman, J. (2013). Uncertainty-identity theory: extreme groups,
radical behavior, and authoritarian leadership: uncertainty-identity theory. J. Soc. Issues
69, 436–454. doi: 10.1111/josi.12023
Hogg, M. A., Kruglanski, A., and van den Bos, K. (2013). Uncertainty and the roots
of extremism: uncertainty and extremism. J. Soc. Issues 69, 407–418. doi: 10.1111/
josi.12021
Holmes, S. C., Facemire, V. C., and DaFonseca, A. M. (2016). Expanding criterion a
for posttraumatic stress disorder: considering the deleterious impact of oppression.
Traumatology 22, 314–321. doi: 10.1037/trm0000104
Horgan, J. (2008). From proles to pathways and roots to routes: perspectives from
psychology on radicalization into terrorism. Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. 618, 80–94.
doi: 10.1177/0002716208317539
Islamic State Live Streaming in Kosovo (2019). [YouTube video]. International Center
for the Study of Violent Extremism. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_
continue=335&v=d-Ct09gm7pQ&feature=emb_logo
Ivaskevics, K., and Haller, J. (2022). Risk matrix for violent radicalization: a machine
learning approach. Front. Psychol. 13:745608. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.745608
Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Bélanger, J. J., Sheveland, A., Hetiarachchi, M., and
Gunaratna, R. (2014). e psychology of radicalization and deradicalization: how
signicance quest impacts violent extremism: processes of radicalization and
deradicalization. Polit. Psychol. 35, 69–93. doi: 10.1111/pops.12163
Kruglanski, A. W., and Webber, D. (2014). e psychology of radicalization. Zeitschri
Für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 9, 379–388.
Kundnani, A. (2012). Radicalisation: the journey of a concept. Race Class 54, 3–25.
doi: 10.1177/0306396812454984
McCauley, C., and Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of political radicalization:
pathways toward terrorism. Terrorism Political Violence 20, 415–433. doi:
10.1080/09546550802073367
Mindell, A. (1995). Sitting in the re: large group transformation using conict and
diversity. Portland, OR: Deep Democracy Exchange.
Mindell, A. (2008). Bringing deep democracy to life: an awareness paradigm for
deepening political dialogue, personal relationships, and community interactions.
Psychother. Polit. Int. 6, 212–225. doi: 10.1002/ppi.173
Moghaddam, F. M. (2012). e omnicultural imperative. Cult. Psychol. 18, 304–330.
doi: 10.1177/1354067X12446230
Oosterveld, W. T., Bloem, W., Farnham, N., Kayaoğlu, B., and Sweijs, T. (2017). e
rise and fall of ISIS: from evitability to inevitability. e Hague: e Hague Centre for
Strategic Studies.
Poushter, J. (2015). In nations with signicant Muslim populations, much disdain for
ISIS. Pew Research Center. Available at: http://pewrsr.ch/1MkLqee
Rewards of Joining the Islamic State (2018). [YouTube video]. International Center
for the Study of Violent Extremism. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=6kHwyGLI5JQ
Richwine, J. (2009). IQ and immigration policy [Harvard University]. Available at:
https://gwern.net/doc/iq/ses/2009-richwine.pdf
Sageman, M. (2008). Leaderless jihad: terror networks in the twenty-rst century.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Schclarek Mulinari, L. (2019). e spectrum of repression: Swedish Muslims’
experiences of anti-terrorism measures. Crit. Criminol. 27, 451–466. doi: 10.1007/
s10612-019-09462-8
Scheer, D. J. (2020). e ICC’s probe into atrocities in Afghanistan: what to know.
Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/article/iccs-probe-
atrocities-afghanistan-what-know
Schmid, A. (2013). Radicalisation, De-radicalisation, counter-radicalisation: a
conceptual discussion and literature review. Terrorism Counter Terrorism Stud 4. doi:
10.19165/2013.1.02
Sedgwick, M. (2010). e concept of radicalization as a source of confusion. Terrorism
Political Violence 22, 479–494. doi: 10.1080/09546553.2010.491009
Slaby, J., and von Scheve, C. (eds.) (2019). “Introduction: aective societies–key
concepts” in Aective societies (New York: Routledge), 1–24.
Speckhard, A., and Ellenberg, M. (2020). ISIS in their own words: recruitment history,
motivations for joining, travel, experiences in ISIS, and disillusionment over time –
analysis of 220 in-depth interviews of ISIS returnees, defectors and prisoners. J. Strategic
Security 13, 82–127. doi: 10.5038/1944-0472.13.1.1791

Shafieioun and Haq 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1197282
Frontiers in Psychology 11 frontiersin.org
Speckhard, A., and Yayla, A. S. (2016). ISIS defectors: inside stories of the terrorist
caliphate. McLean, VA: Advances Press, LLC.
Stamm, B. H., Stamm, H. E., Hudnall, A. C., and Higson-Smith, C. (2004).
Considering a theory of cultural trauma and loss. J. Loss Trauma 9, 89–111. doi:
10.1080/15325020490255412
van Stekelenburg, J. (2017). Radicalization and violent emotions. Polit. Sci. Polit. 50,
936–939. doi: 10.1017/S1049096517001020
Weichselbaumer, D. (2017). Discrimination against migrant job applicants in Austria:
an experimental study. Ger. Econ. Rev. 18, 237–265. doi: 10.1111/geer.12104
Weichselbaumer, D. (2020). Multiple discrimination against female immigrants
wearing headscarves. ILR Rev. 73, 600–627. doi: 10.1177/0019793919875707
Wike, R., and Grim, B. J. (2010). Western views toward Muslims: evidence from a 2006
cross-national survey. Int. J. Public Opin. Res. 22, 4–25. doi: 10.1093/ijpor/edq002
Williams, M. T., Khanna Roy, A., MacIntyre, M.-P., and Faber, S. (2022). e
traumatizing impact of racism in Canadians of colour. Curr. Trauma Rep. 8, 17–34. doi:
10.1007/s40719-022-00225-5
Williams, M., Osman, M., and Hyon, C. (2023). Understanding the psychological
impact of oppression using the trauma symptoms of discrimination scale. Chronic Stress
7:247054702211495. doi: 10.1177/24705470221149511
Wilner, A. S., and Dubouloz, C.-J. (2010). Homegrown terrorism and transformative
learning: an interdisciplinary approach to understanding radicalization. Global Change
Peace Security 22, 33–51. doi: 10.1080/14781150903487956