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The Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Programs: Preliminary Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition Countries
... They found that the adoption of laws was associated with declines in many forms of corruption, although adoption of an anticorruption strategy (without targeted legislative components) was not significantly associated with changes in corruption between 1999 and 2002. A more recent update (Rousso and Steves 2005) examined changes between 2002 and 2005 and found no links between the anticorruption policies that were adopted between 1999 and 2002 and the subsequent changes in corruption. 18 A second data collection effort provides a needed time series. ...
... In contrast, Romania has undertaken many of these reforms under strong pressure from the EU, apparently with significant success (see Box 4.4). 22 The success of anticorruption strategies also varies, a key theme of the Rousso and Steves (2005) analysis. Armenia developed an Anticorruption Strategy and Action Plan in 2003 and created a high-level Anticorruption Council chaired by the Prime Minister in 2004, but the 2005 BEEPS results were significantly worse along many dimensions of corruption than the 2002 results. ...
... The Doing Business measures (including the ranks) are higher for countries with more onerous systems, so we would expect positive coefficients. The cross-cutting measures include the index of anticorruption legislation adopted between 1999 and 2002 from Rousso and Steves (2005), the World Bank's CPIA assessment of quality Adjusted R-squared 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.00 ...
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/7089
This is the third in a series of World Bank studies that examines patterns and trends in corruption in business-government interactions in the transition countries of Europe and Central Asia. The message of this series is positive: Corruption has fallen since 2000 in many transition countries in the region. Firms are paying bribes less frequently and in smaller amounts (as a share of revenues) than in the past, and they see corruption as less of a problem for business. Reforms have accelerated in the past decade. Many countries are cutting red tape, simplifying taxes, and strengthening audits. These reforms are translating into lower levels of corruption in areas such as tax and customs administration, business licensing, and inspections. While the impetus for reforms and their design and implementation vary across countries, the link between reform and results is unmistakable. There is no room for complacency, however. Corruption is not falling in all countries or all sectors, and even the most successful reformers still tend to have higher levels of firm-level corruption than in Western Europe. The burden weighs most heavily on the new private firms that are the engine of growth and employment in the region. And even in countries that are showing success, the gains are not irreversible. Leaders need to continue to open their economic and political systems to greater competition, foster transparency and accountability in the public sector, and reduce administrative and regulatory burdens for firms.
... Rose-Ackerman [20,21] studied concepts related to corruption, namely "poor governance, institutional structure, the transition from socialism, and anti-corruption policies". Rousso and Steves [32] examine corruption trends in Central and Eastern Europe and emphasise "integrated anti-corruption efforts to strengthen institutions of governance and accountability". With more countries becoming democracies, Kunicová [28] links "constitutional structures and voting rules to the perceptions of corruption". ...
... We have looked at many seminal political economy studies in Section 2.1 [20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36] that developed measures and emphasised the importance of institutions in fighting corruption. This section looks at recent econometric studies to identify the interrelated institutional factors controlling corruption. ...
Political and bureaucratic corruption is a societal threat in every country. It allows organised crime to flourish, slows economic growth, increases income inequality, reduces government effectiveness, and threatens citizens’ confidence in the rule of law. This study uses a “System Dynamics model” from a framework based on econometric analysis wherein the causal relationships between the economic and governance institutions were established. The calibrated model uses the data on institutional quality from 1996 to 2020 from “the World Bank and the World Economic Forum” to project institutional quality and control corruption in the future. The control of corruption was trending downward in the nations studied. The model shows that improving institutional quality can reverse this downward trend. However, improving institutional quality and controlling corruption requires a country-specific approach. This model suggests the most efficient ways that national leaders and policymakers can improve institutional quality and thereby control corruption in their country.
... World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys, Rousso and Steves [26] show that the impact of anti-corruption programs on reducing corruption is not statistically significant in twenty-seven post-communist countries. Therefore, there is little empirical evidence that anti-corruption measures curb corruption. ...
... This variable, however, does not have information about the size and power of those agencies. Rousso and Steves [26] created anticorruption activity indices by evaluating anti-corruption activities across the countries. These indices display the level of effort made to implement anticorruption programs to some degree, but they do not show how these efforts have changed over time. ...
To confront their struggles with corruption, many countries have adopted various anti-corruption policies. Do anti-corruption policies reduce corruption? Experts in this field have developed anti-corruption measures, and yet the current literature stops short of evaluating the effectiveness of anti-corruption tools due to a lack of data. Using the Anti-Corruption Initiative Assessment data and the Integrity Assessment data, this paper empirically tests the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies on the level of integrity amongst 183 public organizations in South Korea from 2013 to 2016. To capture the impacts of anti-corruption policies, this article employs a fixed effects model and time-lagged regression. A case study is presented to illustrate some interesting points that are related to the findings. This paper finds that the implementation of anti-corruption policies has a positive effect on the level of integrity in the public organizations. This result counters the conventional argument that we have failed to reduce corruption. In South Korea at least, the success of anti-corruption policies is not elusive. Corruption can be curbed when anti-corruption policies are vigorously implemented.
... La conceptualización de las actividades para combatir la corrupción y su gran diversificación, permiten encauzar la lucha contra la corrupción desarrollada por los Estados, así como la de los actores que participan en ella. "Las actividades se dividen en tres amplias categorías: programas integrados de lucha contra la corrupción, nueva legislación dirigida a reducir los incentivos para la corrupción y su adaptación, además de los convenios internacionales contra la corrupción" (Rousso y Steves, 2006). Con base en esta lógica se pueden detallar los diversos actos de la lucha contra la corrupción: ...
La presente investigación trata sobre los instrumentos en la lucha anticorrupción
dentro del Estado mexicano, y la importancia de una reingeniería de los mismos
donde se identifiquen las fuentes primarias y secundarias sobre las cuales se
fundamenta el marco teórico en el derecho sancionador; mismo que deriva del
derecho constitucional tanto en el "constitucionalismo clásico", como en el
"constitucionalismo moderno”; y la forma en la que proviene del derecho
administrativo, como sustento de esta investigación.
... Also, effective integrity systems and anti-corruption measures can ensure that justice is administered in a lawful, fair, effective, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l o f S o c i o l o g y a n d S o c i a l P o l i c y 3 efficient, and transparent manner (Basabe-Serrano, 2015). While integrity systems and anticorruption measures are primarily overseen by state agencies, non-governmental stakeholders like the media, civil society groups (CSGs), and the international community can play vital roles in developing and implementing integrity systems and anti-corruption measures (see Amagnya, 2020;Schütte et al., 2016;Rousso and Steves, 2006). ...
Purpose
The media is described as a fourth estate of the realm due to its ability to frame and shape discussions on governance and provide a stimulus for fighting corruption. But is the media really an effective tool for fighting corruption? This question arises due to the possibility of the media being used for propaganda, biased reporting and media owners’ and journalists’ engagement in corruption. The current study addresses the question by exploring the relationship between the media and corruption from the perspectives of Ghanaian justice and anti-corruption officials.
Design/methodology/approach
The study adopts a qualitative approach by interviewing justice and anti-corruption officials across three administrative regions in Ghana.
Findings
The results show that while justice officials describe the media as a medium for accusing officials unjustifiably and exaggerating the scale of corruption, anti-corruption officials believe the media helps to fight corruption. In addition to uncovering and exposing public officials’ corruption, the media is also a double-edged sword characterised by intra-vigilance: the media hold “their own” (i.e. journalists fighting corruption) accountable through criticism and exposure of wrongdoings.
Practical implications
The double-edged nature of the media can strengthen and enhance the fight against corruption because anti-corruption actors and journalists will be cautious as misjudgements or errors committed will not be overlooked or concealed by the media. Therefore, anti-corruption agencies in Ghana can collaborate with the media to uncover and expose corruption committed by public officials and even journalists or media owners.
Originality/value
This study is the first in Ghana to explore the relationship between the media and corruption from the perspectives of justice and anti-corruption officials. The approach, frameworks and methodology adopted in this study can be applied in similar studies in other countries on the African continent and beyond.
... These include strategies designed to enhance monitoring, destabilize corrupt agreements and encourage betrayal among corrupt actors (Lambsdorff et al. 2005). However, assessments with respect to the efficacy of these transaction cost-grounded strategies in reducing the prevalence of MNC engagement in foreign market corruption have been mixed (Lambsdorff 2007;Rousso and Steves 2006). Heeks and Mathisen (2012) propose that the limited effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives can be a consequence of design-reality gaps whereby theoretical assumptions embedded within the design of anti-corruption programs fail to accurately reflect the reality of the contexts within which these initiatives are deployed. ...
Corporate anti-corruption initiatives can make a substantial contribution towards curtailing corruption and advancing efforts to achieve the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. However, researchers have observed that underdeveloped assumptions with respect to the conceptualization of corruption and how firms respond to corruption risk impeding the efficacy of anti-corruption programs. We investigate the relationship between the perceived level of corruption in foreign host countries and the organizational structure of subsidiary operations established by multinational corporations (MNCs). Foreign host market corruption is disaggregated into two components – private and public corruption. We employ an uncertainty-based perspective grounded in transaction cost theory to focus upon the distinct mechanisms through which private and public corruption can each be expected to impact a foreign subsidiary’s organizational structure (wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) or a joint venture (JV) with a local partner). We expect that each type of corruption fosters a different type of uncertainty (environmental or behavioral) which predominates in shaping the MNC’s choice of foreign subsidiary investment structure. Hypotheses are developed and tested with a sample of 187 entries into 19 foreign host markets. Each type of corruption was found to exert a distinct effect upon the organizational structure of foreign subsidiaries. More precisely, while heightened perceived levels of public corruption were found to motivate MNCs to invest through a JV with a local partner rather than a WOS, more pronounced private corruption precipitated the opposite outcome.
... Whether or not the urban legend about the Ukrainian police is true, the fact remains that most anti-corruption reforms orchestrated by Western capitalist democracies in less developed countries are largely ineffective (Rousso and Steves 2007;Tangri and Mwenda, 2006;Quah, 2008Quah, , 2010. Given the evidence that most corrupt behavior is based on logics of appropriateness rather than logics of consequence, it is hardly surprising that adjustments in incentive structures are likely to be unsuccessful. ...
... Very few authors have attempted to quantify anticorruption policies to allow for a cross-country analysis. Rousso and Steves (2007), for example, constructed an anticorruption intensity index that attempts to measure the extent and quality of a government's anticorruption activities based on the three dimensions: (i) integrated anticorruption programs, (ii) enactment of legislation, reducing incentives for corruption, and (iii) membership in international anticorruption coalitions and adoption of international anticorruption covenants. Each of these dimensions carries equal weight in the final index and is evaluated according to a number of subindicators that capture their comprehensiveness and to a lesser extent their quality. ...
Disclosure of income, assets and conflicts of interest can serve as powerful public accountability tools to draw attention to the abuse of public office, help prosecute corrupt offenders and create a culture of scrutiny in the public sector that deters corruption. Based on data of the World Bank’s Public Accountability Mechanisms initiative, we present the first indicator that captures a country’s financial disclosure in-law effort. By employing different panel data model specifications, we use this indicator to measure how the introduction of comprehensive financial disclosure systems impacted national corruption levels for 91 countries between 1996 and 2012. We present robust results that provide tentative evidence for a positive and significant relationship between a country’s capacity to control for corruption and the expansion of financial disclosure legislation for the years following the enactment.
Le renouvellement des élites et la négociation de nouveaux critères d’accès au pouvoir représentent des facteurs décisifs pour la transformation des systèmes politiques. Or, dans les pays postcommunistes, les principes de recrutement demeurent contestés bien après la rupture de 1989. Il est difficile de saisir dans quelle mesure les changements observés au sein des élites dévoilent une logique de professionnalisation ou, au contraire, d’oligarchisation. En partant du cas des élites ministérielles roumaines, l’article souligne les tensions entre les indicateurs classiques d’analyse des carrières politiques (suggérant des processus graduels de professionnalisation) et la continuité d’une logique de fonctionnement du politique en réseaux semi-privés .
Nearly thirty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, debates over paths to market liberalization have produced numerous studies across the social sciences. This groundbreaking work from Oleh Havrylyshyn offers a new perspective. Havrylyshyn, a former official in the post-independence Ukrainian government, provides a unique, primary source account of the people and problems at the heart of economic transitions. Grounded in three decades of data, along with experiential research gleaned from nearly thirty countries, this book contains the most up-to-date assessment of economic transitions in post-communist regions. It critically examines questions of gradual versus radical reforms, the relationship between democracy and market liberalization, and how history, individual personalities, and foreign influence determined political choices. Thorough research and accessible style make this work a valuable resource for students and specialists of economics, political science, and history as well as readers generally interested in international studies, government, and business.
Nearly thirty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, debates over paths to market liberalization have produced numerous studies across the social sciences. This groundbreaking work from Oleh Havrylyshyn offers a new perspective. Havrylyshyn, a former official in the post-independence Ukrainian government, provides a unique, primary source account of the people and problems at the heart of economic transitions. Grounded in three decades of data, along with experiential research gleaned from nearly thirty countries, this book contains the most up-to-date assessment of economic transitions in post-communist regions. It critically examines questions of gradual versus radical reforms, the relationship between democracy and market liberalization, and how history, individual personalities, and foreign influence determined political choices. Thorough research and accessible style make this work a valuable resource for students and specialists of economics, political science, and history as well as readers generally interested in international studies, government, and business.
Bribery is perhaps the most visible and most frequently studied form of corruption. Very little research, however, examines the individual decision to offer or accept a bribe, or how understanding that decision can help to effectively control bribery. This book brings together research by scholars from a variety of disciplines studying the mind and morality, who use their research to explain how and why decisions regarding participation in bribery are made. It first examines bribery from the perspective of brain structure, then approaches the decision to engage in bribery from a cognitive perspective. It examines the psychological costs imposed on a person who engages in bribery, and studies societal and organizational norms and their impact on bribery. This is an ideal read for scholars and other interested persons studying business ethics, bribery and corruption, corruption control, and the applications of neuroscience in a business environment.
The turnover of elites and negotiations on the new criteria for public office-holding are decisive factors in changing a political system. In post-Communist countries, the principles of elite recruitment are— long after the rupture in 1989—still being disputed. Focusing on ministerial cabinets in Romania, this article draws attention to the tension between the classic indicators used to analyze political careers (suggesting a gradual professionalization) and the continuity in the pattern of operating politically through semiprivate networks. It is difficult to assess whether the changes observed in the elites correspond to a professionalization or, on the contrary, an oligarchization.
Corporate crime is a poorly understood problem with little known about effective strategies to prevent and control it. Competing definitions of corporate crime affect how the phenomenon is studied and implications for reducing it. Therefore, in this review, we use John Braithwaite’s definition (1984: 6) which specifies that corporate crime is “the conduct of a corporation, or of employees acting on behalf of a corporation, which is proscribed and punishable by law.” Consistent with this approach, this review focuses on various legal strategies aimed at companies and their officials/managers to curtail corporate crime. Interventions may be punitive or cooperative, but the goal is to prevent offending and increase levels of corporate compliance.
Our overall objective is to identify and synthesize published and unpublished studies on formal legal and administrative prevention and control strategies—i.e., the actions and programs of government law enforcement agencies, legislative bodies, and regulatory agencies on corporate crime. We then assess the impact of these strategies on individual and company offending. Included are legal and administrative interventions such as new laws or changes in laws, inspections by regulatory agencies, punitive sanctions and non-punitive interventions aimed at deterring or controlling illegal behaviors.
Out of the 40 possible treatment categories, we were able to calculate a mean effect size for 19. Although most showed a positive albeit non-significant treatment effect, some (including a significant effect) were iatrogenic. Looking at the specific mechanisms, the impact of law on corporate crime showed a modest deterrent effect at the firm and geographical level of analysis (there was not enough data to calculate effect sizes for individuals). However, this finding is limited to cross-sectional studies. For punitive sanctions, where there was substantially more data from which to calculate effect sizes, we observe a similar pattern: A tendency toward deterrence across units of analysis, with relatively few significant effects regardless of whether data are cross-sectional or longitudinal. The one area where there appears to be a consistent treatment effect is in the area of regulatory policy, but only at the individual level. Effects for other levels are contradictory (with some positive and others iatrogenic) and none are statistically significant. Regarding moderator effects, the least methodologically rigorous designs— those that were not experimental versus experimental designs and those without statistical control variables versus controls were associated with a treatment effect. We also found that older studies were associated with stronger deterrent effects—perhaps because the older studies are less methodologically rigorous that those that are newer. Other moderator results were less clear (publication bias, country bias, disciplinary bias; offense type), but given how few of the analyses revealed strong treatment effects overall we think it is premature to draw any conclusions from these findings and call instead for more methodologically rigorous and focused studies particularly in the punitive sanction and regulatory policy areas.
Corruption is an urgent problem in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Whereas the new Czech government has pushed anti-corruption plans, in Slovakia, a special court and prosecution office are in place facing constant challenges. In both countries, the issue has been highly politicised and the adaptation of anti-corruption institutions as well as the implementation of legislation have been poor. This paper examines whether those shortcomings can be explained by elite-based “politics of corruption”. Basically, on a general scale, the paper shows the relation between politics and corruption and identifies a gap between anti-corruption efforts and results. The conclusion finds that anti-corruption in both states has no serious political base while, depending on single personalities, there have been some achievements in this respect in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Zusammenfassung
Korruption stellt sich als dringendes Problem sowohl in der tschechischen Republik als auch in der Slowakei dar. Zwar wurden in beiden Staaten verschiedene Anti-Korruptions-Gesetze oder -Institutionen etabliert, dennoch bleibt Korruption eine konstante Herausforderung. In beiden Staaten bleiben Anti-Korruptions-Maßnahmen erheblich politisiert und die Umsetzung der installierten Anti-Korruptionsmaßahmen verbleibt auf niedrigem Niveau. Der Beitrag erarbeitet den Nexus zwischen der politischen Sphäre und der verbreiteten Korruption und erklärt die geringen Implementationserfolge in der Anti-Korruptionspolitik beider Staaten.
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