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Developmental Perspectives on the Root Causes of the Middle East's Challenges: The Question of Institutional and Social Adaptability

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The Middle East and North Africa is considered a region highly prone to instability and conflict, and where religiosity and sectarianism assumes prominence. It is commonly thought that the source of the MENA countries' troubles is primarily political in nature and hence they require mainly political responses. The region's historical legacies and geopolitics entailing foreign interventions would only reinforce such perception but 'hard politics' clearly has limitations in resolving such challenges. Instead, 'development' assumes much more pertinence than meets the eye; the multidisciplinary developmental approach opens a whole new window of opportunity for understanding the nature and root causes of the MENA's challenges and its way forward, by unraveling the complexities of the region. At the heart of the matter is the question of adapting to the changes of the times, of making the necessary institutional, social-behavioral changes to deal with the reality. The countries' major challenges are inherently due to their lack of development in the key areas: 'within-state development', 'participatory development', state capacity, and secularization..
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Journal of Management Policy and Practice Vol. 24(1) 2023 1
Developmental Perspectives on the Root Causes of the Middle East’s
Challenges: The Question of Institutional and Social Adaptability
Jong-Dae Park
Yonsei University
The Middle East and North Africa is considered a region highly prone to instability and conflict, and where
religiosity and sectarianism assumes prominence. It is commonly thought that the source of the MENA
countries’ troubles is primarily political in nature and hence they require mainly political responses. The
region’s historical legacies and geopolitics entailing foreign interventions would only reinforce such
perception but ‘hard politics’ clearly has limitations in resolving such challenges. Instead, ‘development
assumes much more pertinence than meets the eye; the multidisciplinary developmental approach opens a
whole new window of opportunity for understanding the nature and root causes of the MENA’s challenges
and its way forward, by unraveling the complexities of the region. At the heart of the matter is the question
of adapting to the changes of the times, of making the necessary institutional, social-behavioral changes to
deal with the reality. The countries’ major challenges are inherently due to their lack of development in the
key areas: ‘within-state development’, ‘participatory development’, state capacity, and secularization..
Keywords: institutional and social adaptability, within-state development, participatory development,
having culture and doing culture, state capacity, secularization
INTRODUCTION
It seems that the international community, as well as the natives of the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA), has not paid serious attention to the question of development for overcoming the problems that
have plagued this region for long. Come to think of it, the general public, intellectuals, government officials
and political leaders around the world are all too often consumed in the ‘current affairs’ and dramatic events
that mostly pertain to political-security domain. War and peace have traditionally served as key markers of
world history, and the Middle East has been a major theatre of international power politics. Besides Arab-
Israeli conflict, the region had witnessed numerous civil and regional wars within the Islamic nations. And
the rise of radical forces and terrorists groups, proxy wars, plus the popular uprising, the Arab Spring, that
took the countries’ leader by surprise, add to the perceived instability and insecurity of the region. The
dominance of Islamic religiosity and sectarianism are also important features of the region that affects the
general perception of the MENA.
This gives the impression that the major challenges of the MENA region are essentially political in
nature, and hence require political or politico-military responses. Of course, politics and political measures
cannot be underestimated but the problem is that political-oriented actions tend to be short-term, whimsical
or reactionary, and normally cannot yield credible and lasting outcomes by themselves. Rather, political
excesses can only fuel vicious cycle in which everything is increasingly entrenched in politics. Also, the
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idea of ‘Middle Eastern exceptionalism’ is exaggerated and may well be fallacious; it reflects overly
simplistic reading of the facts on the ground.
What is deemed lacking in the MENA is the developmental perspective and endeavors. Not enough
recognition has been given to what falls outside of the realm of political interest but which nonetheless
counts greatly for the welfare of nations, like the everyday activities and performances of public servants
and the people in general. In the Middle East, full-fledged democratic elections and political breakthroughs
are rarity but even if such political progress were to be made, it would pale in significance when compared
to the task of achieving an all-round transformational change that would fundamentally uplift a nation to a
higher of status. To attain genuine progress in the political domain, it is not enough to realize change in
power structure (like shift of power and sharing of power), but enhancement of governance like
improvement in administrative quality and capacity would also be necessary.
The nature of the challenges facing the MENA nations requires much more than political tactfulness or
wise political decisions on the part of their leaders; what is critical are the follow-up endeavors of the
government, which in turn, facilitates broad and active participation of the people. It all comes down to
whether and how a nation can embark on the heavy-duty work to bring about fundamental and far-reaching
change in every front, including social, political, and economic, in the most expeditious way as possible.
Here, speed is of essence because even with all the good intentions and well thought out plans, failure to
carry out the given tasks on time may not only offset any progress made up to that point, but also can create
new problems.
When we start to see MENA differently through the multidisciplinary lens of development, things
appear plainer and more understandable, helping demystify the region. This is the advantage of
developmental approach; the problems that appeared to be all too complex and contentious suddenly
become conceivable to be discussed and engaged with much more openness and comfort. We can overcome
narrow and biased thinking, even stubbornness, and find common grounds and understanding more easily
if we broaden the dimensions of deliberation, to see the big picture of where we stand in relations to others.
From the vantage point of political economy of development, this paper researches the root causes of
the challenges facing MENA countries today. The study finds that it is essentially the lack of adapting to
the changes of the times that has brought about much of the troubles for the Middle Eastern and North
African countries; particularly, among other things, it is the failure to undertake the following key tasks:
(i) ‘within state’ development; (ii) participatory development; (iii) building capacity of state; and (iv)
religious reform and secularization. In most cases, fulfilling these tasks demand nurturing and strengthening
the ‘initial conditions’ for development which include both human and non-human (physical) factors. While
the countries in the MENA region are diverse and they show a wide variance in the level of development,
as well as other traits, it is also true that the countries are closely interlinked and engaged with one another
to share many concerns and challenges that cross cuts national borders.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIAL ADAPTABILITY TO CHANGE
The Question of Challenge and Response
Naturally, at the outset, we need to take a broad historical overview when contemplating why a region
in question, the Middle East and North Africa, would be prone to instability and conflicts to the extent that
doubts are cast as to whether the countries in the region are not profoundly entrenched in a rather insecure
and fluid state. To this end, instead of being so immersed in the historical facts and events that entails the
risk of missing the big picture, focusing on the significance of the region’s institutional and social-cultural
arrangements and how they have progressed or stagnated over time can provide highly useful insights for
our purpose. It is because institutional and social-cultural settings of society are important factors
influencing people’s perceptions and actions, and which is shaped by the latter in return.
Without needing to recall Arnold Toynbee, if we have learned any lessons from history, it is that the
fate of societies or civilizations is variable, that is, they rise and fall. Ibn Khaldun, Tunis-born scholar,
regarded as one of the greatest social scientists of the Middle Ages, is well known for his theory on the rise
and fall of nations. Khaldun describes how nomadic, barbarian tribes move in to occupy sedentary, civilized
Journal of Management Policy and Practice Vol. 24(1) 2023 3
culture by force, and over time they learn to govern and create a new civilization that combines the attributes
of both the nomadic and the civilized; with the growth of wealth and power, the citizenry start to show
weakness, and the luxury they enjoy attracts the attention of lurking barbarians on their borders; likewise,
the cycle of change in civilizations continues (Quintus Curtius, 2015).
An important takeaway from Khaldun’s theory may be that nations are always subjected to challenges
and they become vulnerable when staying in the comfort zone for too long. As Arnold Toynbee has pointed
out, what determines the rise and fall of nations is how effectively nations respond and adapt to changes
and challenges. In this context, it would be pertinent to explore the roots causes of the Middle Eastern
challenges in terms of the region’s adaptability and responses to various changes and challenges of the
times. This would require the longue durée viewpoint.
The Three Pillars of Long-Term Development of Nations
The progress of societies is crucial for the wellbeing of the inhabitants; and meaningful progress at any
level of human community is achieved by overcoming adversities and coping with challenges, as well as
seeking opportunities, over a long haul. Then, we should ask ourselves, as a nation, what enables us to
respond to challenges and seek opportunities? What fundamentally shapes our capability in this respect?
There would be all too many to think of, but it can be broadly broken down to the following three: (i)
science and technology; (ii) institutions; and (iii) behavioral culture.
The figure 1 below is an illustration of the three basic pillars or supporters of long-term development
which are complementary to one another. In the ideal state, all three can positively affect and reinforce one
another to serve the long-term development of nation or peoples. These are essential foundations as well as
tools that people rely on and utilize to conduct their everyday affairs.
First, science and technology includes a whole gamut of natural or material science, social science
including philosophy, and technologies and skills of all types and levels. Today, science and technology
tend to be rapidly diffused all over the world. Of course, developed countries mostly lead in inventing and
upgrading science and technology but developing countries also reap huge benefits from their spread. Why
is it that knowledge acquisition or education is universally sought more than ever today? It is because people
want to become better and have better lives; they want to bring about positive change in themselves for
themselves and others that they care about.
FIGURE 1
THREE PILLARS OF LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONS
Science and
Technology
Institutions
Behavioral
Culture
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The question of who invents or owns scientific knowhow is far less important than how many people
can have access to and utilize the technologies. What are important in this regard are the institutional
contents and settings that may encourage or discourage the promotion and application of science and
technology. In addition, people’s attitude and perception towards science and technology, and how they
respond and engage with these, also matter.
Secondly, institutions are also very wide-ranging in scope, encompassing political, legal,
administrative, economic, social and cultural fields, and varied in types. Institutions refer to many things
like patterns of behavior which become established over the course of time, large organizations that have
established codes of behavior; it can also mean important social entities like the state, the church, the family,
and the law, etc., that operate along given patterns of behavior. The significance of institutions on people’s
lives is all too evident. They can bound our activities, and can serve our needs as well; they are essential
for bringing orderliness and predictability in the society and individuals’ lives.
Lastly, behavioral culture is about people’s traits or orientation in their mindset and actions; here,
behavioral culture is considered from the development context. I have chosen the word ‘behavioral culture’
over ‘culture’ because the latter is a loose term that many scholars seem to use unscrupulously for
convenience. While in intellectual circles the meaning of the word ‘culture’ is stretched to include people’s
behavioral traits or modes, in common usage, ‘culture’ refers to forms of cultural heritage that are handed
down from the past.
While behavioral modes and cultural heritage (art and material culture) are all referred as ‘cultures’,
they have very different implications. The latter, like arts, music, literature, and traditional customs should
be cherished and preserved; they are endowed and valued because of their historicity and originality. On
the other hand, behavioral culture, including habits and practices, can and should undergo necessary
changes to keep up with times, or to be more rational and pragmatic. And the issue of making changes to
behavioral culture or modes in a community or society needs to be legitimately tackled for the benefit of
its members. Bunching such meaning as ‘attitudes’ and ‘behaviors’ into the term ‘culture’ to avoid being
seen as politically incorrect is rather facetious and pejorative. Development is about changing for the better.
If we believe people’s attitude and behavior cannot be changed what hope is there for development in the
first place?
Institutions do matter a great deal but its significance is often overblown by the Western scholars and
particularly the international organizations as if institutions by themselves can do wonders, just like those
who claim market mechanism will take care of everything for economy, and those who only preach
democracy as if it is a magic formula that will right the wrongs in human society. Institution encompasses
organizations, regulations, norms, and practices, and it is hard to define its meaning and generalize its
characteristics. While some are duly accepted or internalized by the members of society, there are many
others that are either too formal and complicated, or unfamiliar to the members, like those that have been
introduced from outside.
There are inevitable gaps between institutions’ designs, and what actually takes place, that is, the
actions to implement them by the people concerned. People don’t just conform to institutions; sometimes
they break or bypass laws and regulations knowingly or unknowingly; they often deviate from the
institutional lines and challenge the establishments. In this respect, what counts enormously but is not given
due attention is the attitudes and behaviors of people. After all, institutions do not function automatically
like machines but need to be worked on by humans to perform properly; they are only as good as the people
who operate them. So, having ‘good institutions’ in appearance is a far cry from what actually needs to be
done. Institutions should be refined and updated over time but ultimately, their success rests on how they
are implemented by individuals, day in and day out.
Hence, the three pillars - science and technology, institutions, and behavior culture - must be worked
on together to yield complementary and synergistic effect for the long-term development of nations. Many
persistent and structural problems we see in the developing world, including the Middle East and North
African countries, can be understood in the context of the incongruence or mismatch between these three
pillars. Now, we will summarily sketch the historical developments in the Middle East to put the region in
perspective of political economy of development.
Journal of Management Policy and Practice Vol. 24(1) 2023 5
HISTORICAL VICISSITUDES OF THE MIDDLE EAST
The Rise of the Early Arab World
The Middle East bears prominence as the cradle of human civilizations, namely the Mesopotamian and
Egyptian. The era of Hellenism was the period of fusion of Western and Eastern cultures, engendering
cosmopolitanism. The Middle East and the Western world, effectively connected by the Mediterranean sea,
could be well considered as having formed one big regional community in the past. At the time when Europe
was ruled by Christianity, the Roman emperor Justinian I, in AD 529, ordered the closure of the two
academies established by Plato and Aristotle, citing that these institutes were teaching philosophy that had
nothing to do with Christianity (Haruaki Deguchi, 2019). As a result, the Western scholars who lost their
profession all of sudden moved to Jundi-Shapur University in the southern Sassanid Persia, today’s Iran;
this was because the Sassanids, which inherited the spirit of Mesopotamian world empire after the fall of
the Akkadian empire, actively accommodated and protected higher learning.
The first 150 years of the Abbasid Empire, that began in 750 and were represented by such caliphs as
al-Mansur (754775), Harun al-Rashid (786809), and al-Ma‘mun (813833), were the times of relative
political stability, enormous economic prosperity, and increasing universalism within the central Islamic
domains (William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, 2013). During this Islamic Golden Age, there was a
major translation movement of Greek and Roman classics, reaching its culmination in the era of al-Mamun,
the 7th caliph. The enthusiasm for academic activities, centered around the House of Wisdom (or the Grand
Library of Baghdad) led to scholarship and knowledge production - the convergence of art, science,
philosophy and technology that realized the creative intellectual, cultural, and creative apex of Medieval
Arabic civilization (Jim Al-Khalili, 2010). The academic activity flourished as the Abbasids learned the art
of paper-making from the Tang craftsmen they captured in the Battle of Talas (751).
It is also well known that Prophet Muhammad laid great emphasis on learning and education, and many
prophetic teachings encourage Muslims to acquire all kinds of knowledge from any corner of the world.
For instance, quotes from the Hadith (a collection of traditions containing sayings of the Prophet
Muhammad) include the following: “whoever takes a path upon which to obtain knowledge, Allah makes
the path to paradise easy for him’; “a father gives his child nothing better than a good education”; “the ink
of the scholar is more holy than the blood of the martyr”; “seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave”
(Abdul Fattah Abu Ghuddah and Mahomed Mahomedy, 2003).
While the Western world was in the Dark Ages spanning some 900 years from the fall of the Roman
Empire to the Renaissance, in contrast, the Middle East experienced the flourishing of educational and
scientific institutions previously unknown in the ancient world, which led to the promotion of various fields
like agriculture, arts, medicine, etc., and the economic development in general. During the Islamic Golden
Age, the geographical scope of trading networks greatly expanded beyond the Middle East and its vicinity,
thanks to the activities of explorers and traders of the region. Not only did the Middle East inherit the
Hellenistic legacies, it greatly benefited from the knowledge that they obtained from the much more
educated neighbors in the East. All this helped established the Islamic Empire as the world’s leading power
throughout the 7th century to 13th century.
The Divergence in the Development Path of the Middle East and Europe After the Middle Ages
In Europe, the church became dominant following the fall of the Roman Empire. Christianity,
specifically Catholicism, was the only religion recognized and it dominated the lives of the ruling class and
those who were ruled alike. The claim that the Catholic church held back scientific advancement maybe an
overstatement and it would be fair to say that both Christian and Islamic scholars practiced science to serve
theology, to understand the universe in a way that made sense to their religious beliefs (James Hannam,
2012). However, in Europe, at least in the beginning of the Middle Ages, there had been very little
advancement in the scientific world, and it was only toward the middle and end of the Middle Ages that a
great deal more research went into science (Simon Newman, 2012).
There is no denying that during this period of the Islamic Golden Age, the Arab-Islamic empire was
reaching its heights of academic and scientific advancements. The scholars of the Golden Age of the Arab-
6 Journal of Management Policy and Practice Vol. 24(1) 2023
Islamic Empire achieved a level of interdisciplinary, intercultural and interfaith cohesion in pursuit of
scholarship and knowledge that is regrettably not realised in the Arab region today (Suzi Elhafez, 2017).
The Arabic thoughts and science and those which are Greek that the Arabs were able to preserve and
develop helped Europe realize the Renaissance and the Scientific Revolution.
But towards the end of the Middle Ages, the tide would start to turn in a big way. The Abbasid Empire
collapsed in 1258 with the Mongolian occupation of its capital Baghdad, but the Abbasid Caliphate is
known to have undergone a slow and long decline before coming to this point; among other things, securing
steady revenues to maintain a massive multiethnic empire became increasingly difficult due to its
diminished authority, leading to local rebellions that established their own dynasties (The Saylor
Foundation, 2012).
Then, the Ottoman Empire emerged in 1280, embracing Islam, and expanded its rule over the Middle
East and North Africa, and parts of Europe. The Ottoman reached the peak of its glory during the reign of
Suleiman “the Magnificent”, and its success was due to competent leaders, efficient political and
administrative systems, and the practice of recruiting talents on merits (Hee-Seog Kwon, 2010). In the
European Christian world, the Ottoman Empire became the object of fear and hatred after it captured
Constantinople in 1453. Although the Ottoman Empire technically lasted until 1922, its decline is said to
have started as early as 1571 when it was defeated in the Battle of Lepanto by the Holy League. Further, it
was defeated by the united European forces in Vienna in 1683, and lost all three battles with Russia in the
18th century, to become the “sick man of Europe.”
The reasons for the Ottoman Empire’s decline are both internal and external: internally, it was due to
successive reign of incompetent sultans; backward military technology; tensions between the leadership
and the Janissaries (elite military unit); external reasons include decline of Ottoman transit trade owing to
geographical discovery by Europeans, and rise of science and technology in the Europe. All this made
managing the vast territory ever difficult (Hee-Seog Kwon, 2010).
If the Islamic world enjoyed superiority in knowledge over the Western world for up to nine hundred
years, the latter was able to reverse this lopsidedness to prevail over the former with the religious reform,
the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, as it advanced into the modern era. If we take the modern
ages to have begun from the late 15th century, then, it could be said that the West’s superiority over the
Middle East has continued for about 500 years. There is about 600 years’ difference between the birth of
Christianity and that of Islam; Christianity secularized a long time ago and perhaps Islamism will also take
the path of secularism in the future as did Christianity (Haruaki Deguchi, 2019).
THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE CHALLENGES FACING THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY
Overview
This section looks into the main root causes of the persistent problems that beset the countries in the
Middle East and North Africa today through the lens of development, which has the advantage of being
multidisciplinary. The nature of the region’s problems that we have generalized as a matter pertaining to
‘challenges and response’ or ‘adaptability to changes’ from historical, sociological viewpoint can be seen
as the issue of lack of development from the developmental standpoint.
The twentieth century provided a historic turning point for the developing countries. Most of the non-
Western nations that were colonized became independent. And for the vast majority of nations in the region
that were previously subjugated under the Ottoman Empire, statehood or nation-statehood was a new reality
and uncharted territory they were entering into. Added to the historical legacies of empires, and more recent
Western occupation or colonialism, what is deemed most consequential for the lives of the Middle
Easterners today is probably the nation-statehood. The root causes of the Middle East’s challenges
identified in this study are the following issues or the lack of development in the following key areas which
are all related to nation-statehood: ‘within-state development,’ ‘participatory development’, ‘government
capacity’, and religious reform and secularization.
Journal of Management Policy and Practice Vol. 24(1) 2023 7
The Lack of ‘Within-State’ Development
By ‘within-state’ development, I mean development that is oriented towards consolidating the notion
and substance of state, or more accurately, nation-state. Here, ‘within’ refers to ‘keeping with’ or being true
to the cause of nation-statehood, not allowing, for instance, tribalism or transnational cause or ideology to
take precedence over the state and come in direct conflict with and undermine the state. ‘Within-state’
development consists of the duo goal of state-building and nation-building. Establishment of sovereign state
means that the state assumes a major significance, and the most potent authority, as a ‘unit’ of human
community within the given territorial boundary. It means national leaders and citizens must think and act
in terms of common goals, interests, and obligations as entities of ‘state community’ or nation-state. No
doubt, individual rights and freedom must be assured, but this is all part of the tasks pertaining to
governance and harmonization between public and personal interests, or social contract. In the developing
world, ‘maladjustments’ to the reality of nation-statehood can hold back long-term progress of nations while
stirring political unrest, chaos, and conflicts.
We may think that state-building and nation-building are outdated subjects, and the ‘failed states’ or
‘fragile states’ are exceptional cases. But in actuality, there could be much more dysfunctional states than
functional ones, depending on how we define the word ‘functional.’ And what appeared to be a model,
well-functioning state can degenerate rather quickly into dysfunctional one. Today, unexpected global
crises can seriously hit any country if they have inherent weaknesses in the state capability.
State-building, which is about establishing state institutions, can appear to be a simpler task than nation-
building that requires a long-term process and efforts for formulating national identity and bringing people
together. Common wisdom would be that a practical thing to do is to first work on state-building, and follow
up with nation-building, exercising political authority and skills. But in the fragile context, state-building
is not good enough because “a viable state needs a national identity as a framework that holds people and
communities together despite the religious, cultural and regional differences” (Rene Grotenhuis, 2016).
In such instance where the sense of nation is all too weak, and people show loyalty to their identity
group such as clan or tribe, rather than to the state, in the absence of government authority and reliability,
the goal of having well-functioning nation state will be most difficult to attain. To bind people together to
build a thriving community, it takes more than well-organized and just state; what is needed is to have a
deeper, emotional relationship than formal or nominal ties, that is, love for nation (Martha Nussbaum,
2013). Under the current circumstances the MENA region finds itself in, it would be difficult to judge
whether political efforts to strengthen the sense of nation and solidarity among the people should be given
priority, or if it is more worthwhile to focus on enhancing the administrative capacity to better serve the
people. Surely, there will be a wide variance in the degree of development of state institutions and national
identity/unity across the states in the region, hence it should be judged case by case.
The region of the Middle East and North Africa boasts a very long history of rich cultural heritage and
advancements in many areas. In contrast to this, the MENA countries’ history of sovereign statehood is
very short. And only a handful of countries Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco all non-Arabian
Peninsula countries, have any experience of whatever form of pre-colonial statehood (Robert Springborg,
2020). For almost all the nations in the Middle East and North Africa, the formation of independent state
was realized only after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The territories of these countries in the MENA
region remained as ‘stateless’ or mere portions of empires or chiefdoms throughout long breath of their
history up until the twentieth century; and save for imperial power centers, a vast majority of people lived
in traditional or tribal society (Jong-Dae Park, 2022).
It is widely held that tribes and tribalism continue to play an important role in the Middle East. The
culture of nomadic tribalism, having deep historical roots in the Middle East and North Africa, has persisted
in the absence of governance or norms at a higher level of society that bind peoples’ actions (Philip Carl
Salzman, 2017). Indeed, with Islam, a higher form of loyalty emerged but it might be the case that, as it
turned out, Arabs “have succeeded in adapting Islam to serve the tribe, the family, and the clan” (Mamoun
Fady, 2011) instead of adapting the tribe to serve the Islam. People can show different levels of loyalty to
their state, tribe, ethnic group, religion, leaders, etc., but when a large segment of people show greater
8 Journal of Management Policy and Practice Vol. 24(1) 2023
loyalty to their identity lines rather than to the state, then the task of building nation-state would become so
much difficult.
Regarding culture and conflict in the Middle East, Philip Carl Salzman (2008), an anthropologist
specializing in social change in the middle East, claimed that the Middle East is characterized by social
arrangements to guarantee security in the form of “balanced opposition”, a system of decentralized ‘self-
help’ and ‘collective responsibility’; here, emphasis is laid on the loyalty along one’s identity lines: “my
lineage, my tribe, Muslims against infidels.” The practice of such decentralized, fragmented mode of taking
security measures is deemed to bear no small consequences on the political security situation in the MENA,
and this may explain the frequent occurrence of conflicts and unrest in this region.
The Challenges of Participatory Development
Besides ‘within-state’ building, another crucial area or task for realizing national development is
‘participatory development.’ Participatory development refers to a mode of activity in which “a large
segment of the population, the majority of the people, directly and actively participating in the process of
development, in economic, social, and political realms, in the 'balanced' manner, as both 'consumers' and
'suppliers'” (Jong-Dae Park, 2022). The idea of ‘participatory development’, as depicted in the figure 2
below, should be easy to understand as its logic is straight forward. But in practice, we hardly hear such an
idea being discussed. Why is this so? Is it because this is considered a matter of course, or because people
either think it is not that important or have forgotten about it?
Western nations followed such approach to achieve economic and political-social development over a
long stretch of time of many hundreds of years. However, due to the change of times, such as technological
diffusion and widespread democratization, there is no barring developing nations today from embarking on
such development scheme and reaping results expeditiously. Korea is a good example of ‘compressed’
economic and political development. Difficult as it may seem, it is not impossible.
FIGURE 2
PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT
Source: Jong-Dae Park (2022)
Figure 2 shows that people should engage actively in economic and political-social domains, playing
the role of both consumers and suppliers. This can be viewed as ‘multi-tasking development’ which, when
realized, can bring about much sought after ‘concurrent’ economic and political-social transformation of
nation. Idealistic may it seem, the reason why I should even bother to lay out the points that should be all
too obvious is that in reality, it is rarely happening. Ever since the mid-point of 20th century, the world has
become increasingly political, politicized, and progressive, while populism has been on the rise. The
evolution and deepening of welfare state regime, increasingly universalism spearheaded by the global
organizations like the United Nations and OECD, the impact of 2008 global financial crisis, the COVID
pandemic, and the Ukrainian crisis, together with climate warming all have contributed to this.
Journal of Management Policy and Practice Vol. 24(1) 2023 9
The outcome of such trend is that government spending and wealth redistribution have become all
important, and the people in the developing and developed world alike are believed to have acquired a
growing sense of entitlement. It appears that people in general and businesses alike are increasingly turning
to the state to get some sort of relief or assistance, and the political environment puts pressures on the
politicians and government leaders to be responsive. As a result, the general public are regarded or treated
mostly as consumers or ‘takers’ rather than suppliers, providers, or ‘doers’ by the government, the civil
society, and international organizations.
Under such conditions, citizens might lose the sense of obligation to act, on their part, as creators of
values in the economic domain as well as political. When everybody is equally and actively taking part in
the economic and political-social sphere not only to enjoy economic and political-social values but also to
contribute to creation of these values for others to consume, then the nation will be placed on the healthy
path towards stable and balanced development. Scandinavian model, which does not allow free-riding, and
demands everyone to do his or her share, is an exemplary case of participatory development.
The trend of politicizing just about everything has spread all over, and this phenomenon of
‘glopoliticization’ produced a world of two different cultures: ‘having culture’ and ‘doing culture’ (Jong-
Dae Park, 2021). The dynamism of ‘having culture versus doing culture’ is perhaps the most salient feature
that crosscuts the whole social science spectrum and depicts our reality today. The characteristics of these
two cultures are explained and contrasted as shown below in figure 3. ‘Having culture’ has more of post-
modernist attributes while ‘doing culture’ is more modernist. The societies in MENA region in general
show a rather strong tendency of having culture, and the leaders are populists in their own way. Both
cultures, and also hybrid forms of these, can exist together within any unit of human community.
FIGURE 3
HAVING CULTURE VERSUS DOING CULTURE
Source: modified version of Jong-Dae Park (2021)
For any society and community, maintaining an appropriate balance between ‘having culture’ and
‘doing culture’ would be desirable to ensure stable and sustained development. Highlighting the dynamism
of having vs. doing culture helps us better understand the logic behind the participatory development. The
fact of the matter is that especially in low income countries where economic growth is most needed, the
level of people’s participation in economic activities is disappointingly low. People’s perception and
attitude would matter greatly especially in the adverse conditions of the poor nations. Achieving economic
development and democracy at the same time is a gargantuan task but the lack of desires and ambition, not
material resources, can be the greatest enemy of development. The negative effects of foreign aids, like the
dependency syndrome, among others, are at works.
Historically, in the West, economic development and democratization were done in sequence;
industrialization and economic growth preceded democracy, and full-fledge democratization occurred long
after the industrial boom. Given the situation, developing world cannot wait that long and there is no point
in procrastinating efforts to better themselves. In development, speed is of essence. The reason why various
economic social development plans carried out around the world yield little substantive results is because
they are generally not done expeditiously and in close conjunction with other related tasks.
10 Journal of Management Policy and Practice Vol. 24(1) 2023
Although MENA includes oil-rich countries, and the region fared relatively well compared to some
other developing regions in cross regional comparison in a number of development indicators, it is marked
by economic underperformance: lowest economic growth rates among developing regions; highest
unemployment rate, highest income inequality; low industrialization levels; falling economic productivity;
limited opportunities for socioeconomic advancement, among others (Melani Cammett, 2017). MENA
countries show, however, diversity in the level of resource endowment and economic development.
Countries relying on oil or other forms of windfall profits as a major portion of their national revenues,
like the oil-rich countries in the Persian Gulf, are referred as “rentier states. The revenue generated by oil
is considered as ‘rents’ which are “the income derived from the gift of nature” (Alfred Marshall, 1920).
Jordan receives large amounts of foreign aids while Egypt collects billions of dollars from Suez Canal
transit fees annually, and these are also considered as rents. From the standpoint of development, with
respect to governance and democracy, rentier states have certain unwholesome features. Rentier states’
efforts are focused on distributing wealth to people to win compliance and political support, to preempt
social demands for greater accountability of the state, instead of working to nurture conditions for
productive wealth generation in their societies (Hazem Beblawi, 1990).
Also, people’s participation in economic activities very much lags in terms of number of active
workforces, and intensity and quality of the work, in light of their national incomes’ levels. Most of all, the
unemployment rate of the youth is highest in the world (figure 4). Also, women’s labor force participation
rate in the MENA is the lowest among all regions (figure 5) and has not much improved over the last four
decades; according to a study by Council on Foreign Relations (2017), the countries in this region are not
expected to reach the current global average of women’s labor participation for more than 100 years.
One of the most persistent obstacles to participatory development in the MENA countries is that their
economic policies of countries have not and still do not encourage private sector employment. It may be
because the power holders would want to maintain the social contract in the way that serves them, by
making use of a large, overpaid and under productive public sector that mostly provides formal jobs in the
MENA (Joseph Pelzman, 2019). The logic of rentier state would prioritize offering of public sector jobs to
its citizens, hence we see the tendency of bloated public sector compared to private sector in the countries
(Figure 6).
FIGURE 4
YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IN SELECTED WORLD REGIONS IN 2000 TO 2020
Source: Statistica.com (June 2020)
Journal of Management Policy and Practice Vol. 24(1) 2023 11
FIGURE 5
FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE (2018)
Source: World Development Indicators (based on ILO estimates)
FIGURE 6
AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT SHARES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR THROUGHOUT THE 2000S
MENA COUNTRIES VS. OTHER MIDDLE-INCOME ECONOMIES
Source: Gatti, R., Angel-Urdinola, D., Silva, J., Bodor, A. Striving for Better Jobs: The Challenge of Informality in
the Middle East and North Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2014. (retrieved from IZA World of Labor
website)
Islam has been blamed for various ills that are said to hamper capitalist economic development,
including impeding independent reasoning (Noland and Pack, 2007). But a more objective view would be
that the issue lies more in how Islam is interpreted and practiced than to the religion of Islam itself. Islamic
societies were innovative and ahead of their times in creating flexible institutions to facilitate exchange;
and underdevelopment is not due to flaws within Islam as a religion but to the failure of these institutions
to adapt to new economic and social conditions, argues Timur Kuran (2011), the expert on Islamic
12 Journal of Management Policy and Practice Vol. 24(1) 2023
traditional institutions. Among the notable Islamic institutions that are considered to have inhibited capital
accumulation in the Middle East region figure inheritance laws, marriage regulations, trusts, and contract
systems, according to Kuran.
Weakness in Capability of State
State capability is crucial for political stability, peace and most of all, sustained national development.
MENA countries show a wide difference in the level of political stability, ‘authority’ of state, provision of
public services and economic management. The MENA region as a whole comes in a mixed bag of
everything. “MENA is not only highly diverse region, it also puts on a multitude of facets that often appear
contradictory…Yes, there are conflicts and violence happening…but in many MENA countries that we
know very well to be stable and peaceful, business and life cannot be more normal” (Jong-Dae Park, 2022).
Overly generalizing or viewing it from a narrow perspective of one or two things (ideology, religion,
geopolitics, power-struggle, sectarianism, tradition, etc.) has the danger of misrepresenting the region. It is
just that everything happening in the world is also happening in the region.
If we take capability of state to mean the ability of state of get things done, then this would entail so
many things. Governance and provision of public services are the basic functions of government, but
managing the economy to enhance economic activities for the sake of people’s livelihood has become ever
important capability of state. Figure 7 below shows the level of MENA’s governance in comparison to
other regions. While it clearly outperforms South Asia and Africa, it falls behind Asia and Latin America
markedly; its level in voice and accountability is the lowest of all the regions. Within the
MENA region, the authoritarian republics like Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen scored below
average, while Arab monarchies particularly Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait (followed by UAE, Oman, Qatar)
all scored higher than average in the level of governance (Robert Springborg, 2020).
The state capacity for economic development is perhaps most consequential for the MENA nations as
would for any other country in the world today. As was mentioned, the region performs poorly when it
comes to GDP growth rate and other basics economic indicators, and the rentier state features that more or
less characterize most of the countries restricts the dynamism and expansion of private sector which should
be the engine of economic growth. Even in the case of the countries with plentiful natural resources,
ensuring long-term development of their economy would not be possible without robust and competitive
private sector. This will be all the more so, given the dwindling oil reserve and the trend of de-carbonization.
Running the economy with a primary objective of attaining social peace and political conformity risks being
short-sighted and status quo oriented, which would only incur fundamental weakening of the economy in
the long run, mindful of the competitive international environment.
Developing world is in the ‘big stuck’ in state capabilities, specifically in terms of implementation
capacity; countries are as ‘developed in economic prosperity, social inclusion, being politically well
governed, etc. as their capability for implementation will allow (Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett, Michael
Woolcock, 2017). Grand visions and schemes, even well thought out policies would not matter if they are
not actually implemented to the very details in a timely fashion, similar to other forms of institutions. Once
again, ‘having’ and ‘doing’ are very different things. Economic tasks require economic approaches based
on economic logic. Without question, MENA nations are faced with an uphill battle to level up their state
capacity, and their focus should be on how to make changes in this regard.
Journal of Management Policy and Practice Vol. 24(1) 2023 13
FIGURE 7
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS FOR DIFFERENT REGIONS
(AVERAGE PERCENTILE RANK) 2012
Source: World Bank Governance Matters 2013
The Issue of Religious Reform and Secularization
Tackling the issue of secularization in the context of seeking harmony between religion and society
should not be about passing judgments on the religion itself. It should be about enabling coexistence of
religion and secular society, maintaining balanced and harmonious relations between the two. People adhere
to religion for good reasons, as humans are imperfect beings, and their lives are tumultuous. But in the
human nature there are contradictory traits that bind human thinking and actions. I call this the ‘default of
human mind’: emotions vs. reason; freedom vs. society (belonging); self-interest vs. moralism; stability vs.
change (Jong-Dae Park, 2021). Humans differ from other creatures in that we do not live on instincts alone
but have the ability to reason and act accordingly.
What needs to be considered is that to remain as humans, to keep human sanity, we need to have a
certain balance between these opposing tendencies of human nature. Individuals cannot be either all
emotional or reasonable all the time; people seek freedom but they also need to be a part of community;
people must satisfy their individual needs and interests but they also pursue moral values to fulfill their
lives; and there is a yearning in everybody for both stability and change, as life that is too disruptive would
be unbearable while that which is immutable and fixed would be lifeless and not worth living.
The fundamental spirit with which Prophet Muhammad managed the Umma and spread the Islam was
tolerance and mercy: Prophet Muhammad made commerce for a living, and his success as a trader could
not have been possible if he did not practice harmonious relations with others; for Muslims, true jihad
means the struggle against oneself, a great crusade that takes place within each individual to realize a world
of tolerance and mercy (Haruaki Deguchi, 2019). The issue of fundamentalism that is often associated with
radical Islamism is actually a universal religious issue, concerning also Christianity and Judaism. Pope
Francis mentioned that “Fundamentalism is a sickness that is in all religions … Religious fundamentalism
is not religious, because it lacks God. It is idolatry, like idolatry of money” (Pope Francis, Nov. 30, 2015).
And fundamentalism is actually a religion of rage (Karen Armstrong, 2001).
The reason why the teachings of Moses, Jesus, and Buddha were espoused by the people at the time
was that these teachings were accepted by the people to be desirable and valuable. If it is wrong to apply
the modern standard in criticizing the teachings of the religions in their old times, then, by the same token,
14 Journal of Management Policy and Practice Vol. 24(1) 2023
it is wrong to interpret the religious teachings of the old times in the literal sense without taking into account
the changes that have taken place over time, and today’s reality. Religious belief is based on awareness,
conviction and voluntary attraction. The interpreters of religion, or religious jurists, must be highly
knowledgeable and competent. If they don’t have the intellectual capacity and become out of touch with
the real world, how can they be relied upon?
It is the rule of nature or natural phenomenon that people and their society evolve with the passage of
time. This is what differentiates humans from other beings. If the substance and settings of society have
changed significantly with the passage of time, then the religious teachings should at least consider the
context of the world in which we live. Religion is powerful because it makes people believe. If religion is
forced upon people, then, it will not be the religion proper. Religious dogmatism or fundamentalism in
excess cannot but increase tension with secular society. Absolutism, whether political, ideological, or
religious, inevitably leads to a separation from reality. Secularism that is pursued in the context of
promoting harmonious coexistence of religion and secular society must be upheld. But secularism shouldn’t
mean denying the religion itself, and religiosity should not mean disallowing secularism and secular society.
In the West, there was the Renaissance and then effective religious reforms have taken place, followed
by the Scientific Revolution, and the Enlightenment. The Western thinkers have come up with ideas on
how religion and scientific reasoning can coexist or be reconciled. But in the Arab Islamic world, there is
a virtually unchallenged consensus that “religion has a primary, principle, sometimes even an exclusive
role in shaping a whole range of individuals’ thinking and behaviors in Muslim settings (Hassan
Mneimneh, 2020).
In the Middle East religious reforms have not occurred in any significant way, although there have been
various reformist scholars at work. The earliest reformist scholars showed a scripturalist desire to return
Islam to the tenets of the sacred texts. The philosophy of renewal (ijtihad) and reform (islah) has been a
recurrent theme in Islamic intellectual and political history (Muqtedar Khan, 2015). In the 19th century, a
new wave of reform movements surfaced partly as resistance to European imperial expansion, on the
premise that this was due to religious laxity on the part of Muslims.
This 19th century reform movement included a new strain of Islamic reform that was modernist; like
earlier reformers, these modernists called Muslims to return to the sacred texts of Islam but the difference
was that they identified a happy coincidence between the spirit of these texts and contemporary European
values and institutions. Jamal al Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) sought
to establish Islam’s compatibility with scientific and rational thought, technological advancement, and the
social and political realities of modern life (Charles Kurzman, 2002).
Over the past several decades, the dominant trend in Islamism in the Middle East has been that of
political radicalism and intellectual conservatism, often referred to as fundamentalism. However, there has
also been a reformist tendency within many Muslim countries in the last two decades, and its goal has been
to “reinterpret many accepted Islamic axioms in light of new conditions in order to bring them closer to
modern standards of rights, responsibilities, and behavior” (Shireen T. Hunter, 2013).
There are three parties in the Arab and Islamic worlds that are engaged in a heated debate regarding the
need for a renewal of religious discourse. The first one considers religious reform a necessity for objective
reasons, notably as an antidote to extremism and terrorism; the second, while recognizing some validity in
such call for reform, sees it as insincere, having ulterior motives and hidden objectives, like seeding discord
among Muslims; the third party rejects the call as invalid a priori, asserting that Islam is perpetually relevant
with no need of change. It claims that deficiencies are not in the religion itself, but in its followers (Hassan
Mneimneh, 2020). Lately, the prominent Tunisian scholar Mohamed al-Haddad (2020) has called for a new
reformist departure that synthesizes modernism and core Islamic values, citing that the fundamentalism
embodied in Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood has failed, and that the traditional Islam no longer
attracts youth or the elites.
There is no question that religious reforms are needed, first of all, for the religious institutions’ sake,
for the maintenance of their relevance in society, before being a need for its citizens. Along with this,
secularization must be respected for the harmonious relationship between religion and society, and to
balance religion and modernity.
Journal of Management Policy and Practice Vol. 24(1) 2023 15
CONCLUSION
There is no arguing that societies, peoples and nations must adapt and respond well to the trends,
changes, and challenges of the times in order to endure and thrive. This means that over a long stretch of
time, it is necessary for them to undergo institutional and behavioral changes as deemed appropriate. The
reality and the status of the Middle East today is a huge disappointment when compared to what could have
been for the region given the long period of glory that it once enjoyed.
To put the MENA in proper perspective, it is imperative not to be bogged down in current events,
focused on particular features or issues of the region. There is also a big risk of misreading or over-reading
the implications of a particular factor in one-dimensional manner, like exaggerating the dominance of
religion, ‘lingering historical animosity,’ ‘Arab solidarity,’ etc. Of course, considering the political-strategic
architecture of the region has merits of its own and it would be beneficial for understanding the dynamics
of the region in terms of power relations among the nations concerned, for instance, as in the case of
Northeast Asia.
However, applying the framework of political realism to the Middle East and North Africa has
limitations because in reality, the countries lack coherence and unity as nation state actors. In fact, a majority
of the MENA countries are far behind in their task of ‘within-state development’ that includes state-building
and nation-building. Israel-Palestine conflict is just one component of many intra-regional conflicts that
have been taking place. The severity, scale and duration of human catastrophe that the civil wars and proxy
wars have incurred on the peoples over the last decade in particular attest to the lack of fundamental and
comprehensive development at the national level on the part of the countries concerned.
The essence of the problems plaguing many MENA countries, such as lack of economic opportunities
for the youth, misrule and mismanagement of state, political and social repression, sectarianism, inequality,
etc., that fuels division, instability, and conflicts, pertains to development. Why developmental approach is
relevant for tackling such challenges is that development is premised on change: to change and to bring
about change. In this respect, in the broad sense, efforts to strengthen, upgrade, update and harmonize all
three pillars of long-term national development science and technology, institutions, and behavioral
culture need to be embarked on with all seriousness and sense of urgency in the region.
With such frame of mind, this study examined the main root causes of the MENA’s challenges: lack of
or failure to achieve (i) within-state development; (ii) participatory development; (iii) capacity of state; (iv)
religious reform and secularization. Making progress in these areas is crucial for the MENA countries to
ultimately break the status quo and come out of the entrenched state that they find themselves in, to advance
along the path of sustained stability and prosperity. Statehood or nation-statehood is a given reality for all.
This must be recognized. The state is the most significant and potent entity or unit of ‘human community’
that bears permanence and profoundly affects our lives. Many nations in the MENA region have undergone
precarious and turbulent times because they have not been able to adequately carry out these core tasks that
are all relevant to the nation-statehood.
Taking steps to reverse the negative trends and rebuild the fundamentals of national development would
take a whole new mindset and determination. We live in this age of great irony where, despite technological
and scientific advancements and improvements in living conditions, extremely violent conflicts and blatant
atrocities against humans would occur. This calls for a sober and deep introspection of what has gone
wrong, or not been done, and a major turnaround in our approach. The answer lies in confronting and
adapting to realities, not in the escapism. Greatness comes from wisdom and reasoning, and human society
is made to evolve. When the context changes, so must the methods.
16 Journal of Management Policy and Practice Vol. 24(1) 2023
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