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Central European Journal of International and Security Studies
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DOI: 10.51870/UXXZ5757
Research article
Ukraine at War: Resilience and
Normative Agency
Yulia Kurnyshova
University of Bremen, Germany, ORCiD: 0009-0006-5717-4804, corresponding
address: ikurnyshova@gmail.com
Abstract
Russia’sfull-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has transformed all aspects of
life in the country, including societal attitudes, national politics and Ukraine’sagency
on the international arena. The article seeks to discuss and conceptualise how practices
of resilience create discursive spaces for producing and shaping Ukraine’sagency.
In other words, how do experiences of resilience in four different spheres (societal,
institutional, communicative and subregional) affect Ukraine’scapacity not only to
cope with the intervention and survive as anation, but also to contribute to the future
of international security order. The author argues that by containing the Russian army,
Ukraine can be viewed as aco-producer of European security, which is particularly
acknowledged by European countries bordering on Russia. Ukraine’s agency, as
unfolded in 2022, addresses Western countries with an insistent demand to perceive
Ukraine as apart of the European normative order.
Keywords: Russia’swar in Ukraine, agency, resilience, EU integration, productive power
First published online on 14 April 2023
Introduction
For decades Ukraine was often perceived in the West as aweak, Russia-depen-
dent and peripheral country (See for example Gil, 2015) that did not much resist
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the annexation of Crimea and failed to prevent the occupation of Donbas in
2014. However, after the restart of the Russian invasion on 24 February 2022
this state of affairs has significantly altered: Ukrainian society has shown ade-
termination to fight back against the more resourceful invader, which boosted
Ukraine’spositions both in the battlefields and in relations with its internation-
al partners. Moreover, it turned out that major issues that the Ukrainian state
was negatively associated with – corruption and the oligarchic structure of the
Ukrainian economy, critical attitudes to the leadership, and cultural distinctions
between eastern and western regions – did not lead to the collapse of the Ukrai-
nian state. Instead, such novel topics as the robustness of Ukrainian society, the
scale of the volunteer movement and the functionality of Ukrainian public insti-
tutions, were placed in the limelight of public discourses.
From an academic perspective, these changes and their transformative effects
can be approached from the viewpoint of two interrelated concepts – agency
and resilience. Ukraine’sagency is amultifaceted phenomenon that is primarily
grounded in the strong resistance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces that, starting
from the very beginning of the intervention, were capable of thwarting the Rus-
sian army and thus created the solid and endurable basis for resistance. Yet in the
meantime agency has other non-hard-security components as well: politically
it is manifested in the persistent strategy of decoupling the country from the
‘post-Soviet’ legacy, breaking with the externally imposed constructs of ‘Eurasia’
and the ‘Russian world’, and consistently moving towards reasserting Ukraine
as afull-fledged European nation paying the dearest price for being accepted
in this capacity. From the practical vantage point, Ukraine’sagency is the ful-
crum for building enduring partnerships with its allies, and integrating with the
institutional structure of the broadly defined Euro-Atlantic community. From
the international perspective, key was the decision of the European Commission
to open the membership procedure for Ukraine, which is crucial for boosting
Ukraine’sagency.
This is exactly why the idea of resilience becomes an appropriate reference
point. Ukraine’s agency is to a large extent grounded in the ability and deter-
mination of Ukrainian society to withstand the Russian aggression, consolidate
human and material resources for resistance and thus provide asolid ground
for patriotic mobilisation and future de-occupation of the annexed territories.
This approach follows the logic of the critical tradition of international studies
through refocusing the security agenda from states and governments to societal
sources of agency, with such operational characteristics as ability to act, visibil-
ity, recognition and acceptance by other members of international society.
In my previous publications (Kurnyshova & Makarychev 2022) Ihave intro-
duced the concept of hybrid resilience which can be expanded and readjusted to
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the present research. More specifically, Isingle out four spheres – societal, public
institutional, communicational and local – where practices of resilience unfold
as preconditions for Ukraine’s agency, both domestically and internationally.
Therefore, the nexus of agency and resilience is key to my analysis. The research
question Iam going to address is how practices of resilience create discursive
spaces for producing and shaping Ukraine’sagency. In other words, how do re-
silience in four different spheres affect Ukraine’scapacity not only to cope with
the intervention and survive as anation, but also to contribute to the future of
the international security order?
My basic argument is two-fold. Iargue that Ukraine’sagency is grounded in
different yet interconnected types of resilience, which conflate and reinforce
each other, particularly in institutional and communicative domains. In the
meantime, agency, as an intersubjective construct, builds upon resilience and
due to its normative compatibility and consonance with the principles of demo-
cratic governance opens prospective avenues for Ukraine’seventual integration
with the Euro-Atlantic institutional and normative structures as apower capa-
ble of contributing to common security.
My methodological approach is grounded in the traditions of critical dis-
course analysis claiming that ‘narratives of international politics are not simply
reflections of reality but also constituting elements in their own right’ (Fazen-
deiro 2016: 497). Iagree with Theirry Balzacq’sassertion that ‘discourse is part of
agency in that it instantiates asphere of action wherein agents dealing with de-
fined questions operate’ (Balzacq 2005: 187). The emphasis on the discursive pro-
duction of agency in no way denies the centrality of practices and experiences
of resilience; it means to arm that these practices form abasis of people’satti-
tudes to public authorities of different levels and information producers. Beyond
discourse resilience might remain less visible and noticeable for abroader audi-
ence; it might not be properly reflected, timely communicated and discussed
as inherent components of agency-making. In the works of constructivist and
post-structuralist scholars this is called performativity, or an ability to practi-
cally activate the discursive resources of agency through speech acts and other
practices of communications (Wodak 2001). From this theoretical standpoint,
foreign policy is not simply afield where pre-given subjects operate and react
to the geopolitical and normative environments, ‘but the means through which
a particular mode of subjectivity is reproduced’ (Laffey 2000: 430-431). Along
these lines, Ukraine discursively builds its agency through reflecting upon and
assessing practices of resilience, and translates them into specific policies aimed
at prospective integration with European and Euro-Atlantic normative spaces.
My empirical base consists of two types of primary sources. One is the dis-
courses of top Ukrainian decision- and opinion- makers. Evidently, the key
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speaker exemplifying Ukrainian agency is President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who
after the full-scale invasion delivered amassive body of speeches (more than
300) for the internal and foreign audiences. Yet Ialso refer to other key public fig-
ures and decision-makers. Another source of data is of sociological background,
including opinion polls conducted by the most trustworthy Ukrainian polling
companies: Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives, Razumkov Centre, Rating
Group and Gradus Research.
Structurally, the article is divided into three parts. Istart with an analyti-
cal overview of the academic literature that touches upon connections be-
tween agency and resilience, and inscribe the case of Ukraine into the exist-
ing theories, which requires some critical reexamination of certain scholarly
approaches. Then Iturn to four domestic facets of resilience and relate them
to Ukraine’sagency. Finally, Idiscuss external reverberations of the resilience–
agency nexus and argue that it is largely framed and shaped by the normative
principles constitutive for the EU and Euro-Atlantic political community in
abroader sense.
Resilience and agency: Aconceptual nexus
The concept of agency is approached differently by major international relations
theories. For realism, agency is derived from the possession of physical and mate-
rial resources, primarily military might. While for theories of liberal background,
agency implies aco-production of international mechanisms of promoting free-
dom, democracy and the rule of law. From the constructivist perspective that
Iam sympathetic with, agency is an intersubjective construct that involves con-
stant communication and interaction between producers of essential discourses
and the audience (Côté 2016: 554). Itend to agree that ‘agency entails “being” and
“doing”, implying a“self” defined by an identity, articulated through anarrative
and performed through practice and action, which is continuously regrounded
as areflexive project’ (Flockhart 2016: 813).
Within this framework, the spectrum of the most discussed academic ques-
tions is quite broad – from what constitutes actors’ agency and (metaphorically
speaking) ‘who should sit at the table?’ (Hofferberth 2019: 129) to ‘which qualities
enable the agents in the self-governing processes to engage in reflection and to
undertake the action that is needed to remain fit for purpose?’ (Flockhart 2020:
218). Agency has as its condition a‘purposive behavior’ (Carlsnaes 1992: 246), but
extends far beyond that to embrace such categories as the ability to make adif-
ference, to intervene in international relations, to influence and to exercise con-
trol – even if partially – over other actors. Agency might connote free will of po-
litical subjects and the capability of triggering meaningful changes (Berenskötter
2016: 273) within the normative order. By the same token, ‘agency denotes the
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ability to choose among different courses of action, to learn from previous expe-
rience, and to effect change’ (O’Neill, Balsiger & VanDeveer 2004: 155).
Of particular importance for my study is the idea of critical agency rooted in
post-colonial thinking that looks at how ‘the sum of disaggregated, uncoordi-
nated and fragmented, hidden, disguised and marginal agencies represents asig-
nificant totality’ and ‘how the “powerless” engage in politics and international
relations?’ (Richmond 2011: 434). Iagree with those scholars who argue that ‘pre-
war Ukrainian discourse was based not so much on the realization of national
interests, as on the low self-esteem, with constant eye on Moscow’sopinion, and
thus excluded the possibility of any major conflict with neighbor’ (Parahonsky
2022: 10). At the same time, it would be fair to say that Ukraine’scritical agency,
reinvigorated by Russia’sinvasion and overlooked by many in the world, is based
on the traditions of mass-scale emancipatory protests against injustice and au-
tocracy exemplified by the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity. In
this respect Ukraine’sagency is grounded in the previous experiences of build-
ing and fighting for national independence and sovereignty against the former
imperial hegemon.
Critical agency implies emancipation and resistance to imperial impositions,
which makes Oliver Richmond’swords of 2011 quite applicable to today’sUkraine:
‘Without incorporating critical agency and resistance into its conceptual, theo-
retical and methodological discourses, without recognizing its dynamics, abili-
ties, impacts and legitimacy, any peace that emerges will be acrude or subtle vic-
tor’speace’ (Richmond 2011: 436). In other words, any peace agreement without
due consideration of afull-fledged agency of Ukraine won’t last and will hardly
make any practical sense. This understanding of critical agency drastically chal-
lenges the logic of ‘resolving the conflict’ within the great power management
frame, as exemplified by Henry Kissinger, John Mearsheimer, Richard Sakwa,
Marlene Laruelle and some other scholars.
In aconstructivist logic, ‘agency emerges from relations and is always “per-
formed” within loose and ever-changing configurations’ (Hofferberth 2019: 138)
of policies and discourses. To put it bluntly, there is no agency prior to, with-
out or beyond performativity. Consequently, the state has to be approached
as one that ‘adiscursively produced structural/structuring effect that relies on
constant acts of performativity to call it into being… (A)gents (like the state)
are always effects of discourse and should be “decentred” rather than made the
starting point for theory’ (Dunn 2010: 80). In other words, the state, usually
being the most visible manifestation of agency, is not awell-fixed, constant or
pre-given unit, but aresult of multiple discursive practices that require the gov-
ernment, the presidency, the parliament and other institutions to operate in
aparticular way.
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This approach suggests looking more attentively at how agency is performed,
enacted and empowered. For that, in my analysis Iturn to the concept of resil-
ience that Ifind highly relevant for understanding the dynamic and the logic of
Ukraine’sagency. In the academic literature resilience is referred to as aprocess
of societal adaptation to complex shocks; it implies partnerships and self-reli-
ance, and envisages the ‘shifting of responsibility onto communities and promo-
tion of reflexive self-governance through strategies of awareness, risk manage-
ment and adaptability’ (Humbert & Joseph 2019: 216). Consequently, individuals
and groups are ultimately becoming responsible for their own adaptability vis-à-
vis external transgressions and crises.
Since resilience operates through many practices, this article focuses on con-
structivist interpretations of how they arise out of existing ‘webs of discourse’
(Bleiker 2003: 38). Key is that practices are ‘embedded in discourse(s) which en-
able particular meaning(s) to be signified’ (Doty 1997: 377). Thus, practices might
be differently named, and resilience relates them to specific meanings and inter-
pretations. Examples of the usage of resilience in various spheres are multiple:
in Western assistance programmes it is related to Ukrainian agriculture, the
civilian security sector, reconstruction of the destroyed civilian infrastructure,
and many others1. From aconstructivist viewpoint, by applying the concept of
resilience Ukraine’spartners wish to reach beyond charity or technical help; the
language they use puts an emphasis on strengthening Ukraine’sability to protect
itself in the future against Russia, whose behaviour is much harder to predict
and deter than to empower Ukraine. Asimilar logic applies to my characteri-
sation of local self-governance as local resilience, information management as
information resilience, institution building as institutional resilience and social
capital as societal resilience. Through this wording Iwant to underline the strat-
egy of self-reliance in an inevitable struggle with external aggression that is im-
possible to prevent.
However, the case of Ukraine deploys the concept of resilience in an explicit
hard security context, which differs from the bulk of the existing literature that
generally discusses resilience in non-military or soft security categories. For ex-
ample, some authors deem that ‘resilience and social inclusion are of greater
significance in maintaining and enhancing national security than are defense
and law enforcement systems’’ (Behm 2010: 60), while others assume that resil-
ience requires ‘adaptability and flexibility, rather than strength’ (Giske 2021: 5).
1 EU Resilience Programmes Examples in Ukraine: https://www.euam-ukraine.eu/
news/euam4ukraine-now-wholly-redeployed-euam-experts-continue-building-re-
silience-with-their-ukrainian-counterparts/; https://www.euam-ukraine.eu/news/
euam4ukraine-now-wholly-redeployed-euam-experts-continue-building-resilience-
-with-their-ukrainian-counterparts/; https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/forum-iz-
-ekonomichnoi-stiikosti-ta-vidbudovy-ukrainy-frantsiia-dopomozhe-ukraini-z-po-
sivnym-materialom
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Obviously, these recipes do not fully apply to Ukraine, which opens awide space
for adiscussion on how the Russian military interference might change the way
resilience is understood and academically problematised.
Some authors assume that in times of violent conflicts resilience produces
different forms of power (Korostelina 2020: 3), yet other scholars still suggest
that resilience is rarely discussed from the viewpoint of power and agency (Béné
et al. 2012: 13). One of the possible ways to relate resilience to agency is through
the Foucauldian concept of productive power as akey element of the governmen-
tality paradigm. The productivity of power was highlighted by Michel Foucault
as an opposite to its oppressive functions, and implied incentives on the side
of the state and responsibility on the side of society. In this respect the case of
Ukraine appears to support those scholarly voices who reject the detachment
of governmentality from sovereignty: to alarge extent the two overlap and in-
tersect, producing other forms of power. Institutional power is grounded in the
vitality and ecacy of public institutions as producers of norms and regulations
with ahigh degree of legitimacy and acceptance in society. Another – and closely
related – is communicative power as ‘aform of power being generated by com-
municative action’ (Flynn 2004: 445). As Manuel Castells (2013: 1) claimed, pow-
er relationships and ‘the foundations of institutions that organize societies are
largely constructed in people’sminds through the communication process’. The
effective functioning of communicative power presupposes a‘non-despairing,
non-cynical, and non-pessimistic’ discursive mode (O’Mahony 2010: 70), which
seems to be confirmed by the Ukrainian experience of information resilience to
be discussed below.
The following three perspectives are tied to my discussion on Ukraine’sre-
silience. First, the non-state-based concept of resilience seems to be too radi-
cal for Ukraine, since it was the state that generated prerequisites for resilience
through reforming state institutions, including the military sector and decen-
tralisation reform. The case of Ukraine does not support the idea that ‘resilient
peoples do not look to governments to secure and improve their wellbeing be-
cause they have been disciplined into believing in the necessity to secure and
improve it for themselves’ (Reid 2018: 648). When it comes to resilience during
military conflicts, the dichotomic distinction state–society does not seem to be
plausible: in Ukraine, the functionality of the government, the consolidation of
political elites and the professional communication and information manage-
ment boosted the legitimacy of the state as asecurity provider and simultane-
ously inspired resilience within society.
Second, Idisagree with authors who believe that resilience ‘discourages active
citizenship’, and even puts ‘into jeopardy the concept of public space’ (Juntunen
& Hyvönen 2014: 196). On the contrary, the Ukrainian experience proves that re-
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silience is deeply political since it ‘seeks to empower people to be agents of their
own vulnerability reduction in order to make the proper choices and avoid mal-
adaptation in an emergent environment’ (Grove 2014: 244). Therefore, practices
of everyday resilience ‘create subjects’ (Cavelty, Kaufmann & Kristensen 2015: 9)
– civil society organisations, grass-roots groups and networks as key sources of
the life-saving strategy of survival and safeguarding human security.
Third, another flaw in the extant body of academic literature concerns the
interpretation of resilience as an opposite to various forms of interventionism.
In David Chandler’sopinion, central is the differentiation between the resilience
paradigm and liberal internationalism: the former ‘puts the agency of those most
in need of assistance at the center, stressing aprogramme of empowerment and
capacity-building, whereas the (latter - Author) puts the emphasis upon the
agency of external interveners, acting post hoc to protect or secure the victims
of state-led or state-condoned abuses’ (Chandler 2012: 216). Therefore, for resil-
ience ‘the emphasis is on prevention rather than intervention, empowerment
rather than protection, and work upon the vulnerable rather than upon victims’
(Chandler 2012: 217). This interpretation highlights astructural change within
the Western political order towards ‘the post-liberal approach to resilience that
emphasizes the ongoing participatory and self-organizing empowerment of lo-
cal agents’ (Natorski 2022: 4).
Yet the case of Ukraine demonstrates that interventionism, rather than disap-
pearing, takes multiple forms which, again, largely depend on and is constructed
by discourses. Ishare the view that resilience-driven programmes ought to be
linked with arms supply and other forms of military assistance (Hamilton 2022).
Resilience, in other words, ought to ‘be seen as an integrated element of na-
tional security’ (Fjäder 2014: 123). The insucient interventionism exhibited by
the Western partners after the war started in 2014 might be among the root
causes of the further conflict dynamics. However, what makes a difference in
2022 is that Ukrainian leadership, building on the ability of the Ukrainian Army
to withstand and deter the superior Russian forces during the first months of
the full-scale invasion, persuaded western partners to unblock weapons delivery,
in some cases altering the existing skepticism regarding the matter. As aresult,
the Ramstein Contact Group on the defence of Ukraine was created, the law on
land lease was adopted in the US and the supply of American Patriot systems was
approved. Thus, the provision of external resources (being military or not) is em-
bedded in the resilience, but its acquisition is not assured until Ukraine’sagency
is performed and duly communicated. Furthermore, as it was underscored by
President Zelenskyy, ‘the provided military aid is not acharity but an investment
in global security’, and Ukraine, consequently, is acontributor to global security
(Zelenskyy 2022b).
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Based on these three critical points, Iconceptualise resilience as aset of perfor-
mative practices that conflate and constitute the foundation for Ukraine’sagen-
cy. In the next section Iwill specifically focus on four dimensions, or facets,
of this phenomenon and relate them to different types of power (productive,
institutional and communicative). The four types of resilience are connected
and synergetically reinforce each other. Thus, information resilience creates
asense of national unity which is indispensable for the society›sresoluteness
to go through the ordeals of the war. By the same token, local resilience, largely
stemming from decentralisation reform, operates hand in hand with the mecha-
nism of societal determination to thwart the Russian invasion. In its turn, in-
stitutional resilience is aprecondition for the effective functioning of the state
at both central and local levels, which serves as amajor reference point for the
Ukrainian media and an inspiration for multiple social groups (volunteers, fun-
draisers, urban activists, etc.).
Ukraine’sresilience: Four domestic facets
As seen from the outside, resilience is viewed as defiance despite occupation,
sieges, energy blackouts and Russian war crimes including systematic sexual
violence, forced deportations and mass killings (Mefford 2022). Domestic so-
ciological data (Rating Group 2022c) indicated ahigh level of resilience among
Ukrainians – 3.9 points out of apossible 5. In this rating, resilience consists
of two indicators: physical health and psychological well-being and comfort,
including interest in life, feeling of usefulness, ability to make decisions and
plans for the future and lack of regret for the past. In my view, this is valuable
empirical material that can be interpreted in aconstructivist way. Isuggest
expanding this spectrum and singling out four facets of resilience to be tackled
below.
Societal resilience
The resumption of the war produced a strong anti-imperial momentum in
Ukrainian society. It implied an exponential growth of negative attitudes to-
wards the Russian state that had already been quite explicit since 2014. Both the
annexation of Crimea and the proxy war in Donbas had amajor impact on pub-
lic opinion. Thus, since December 2021 polls showed that about three quarters
of Ukrainians perceived Russia as ahostile state (KIIS 2021; Rating Group 2022).
Since the restart of the war the numbers have risen significantly to almost 100%.
By the same token, the shift in attitudes was even more dramatic in the case of
Belarus: the number of Ukrainians who saw this northern neighbour as ahostile
country jumped from 22% in late 2020 to 84% after the invasion in 2022 (Rating
Group 2022h; Ilko Kucheriv 2022a).
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Until the beginning of the invasion in February 2022, the south-east of
Ukraine demonstrated less animosity towards Russia, but the numbers of those
who saw Russia as an enemy were already high enough. Socioeconomic ties of
the south-east with Russia – exemplified by integrated supply chains and trans-
border economics – were damaged years ago. Since 2014 Ukraine and Russia
have gradually lowered their economic interdependence. If in 2013 bilateral
trade counted for almost $40 billion, by 2019 it had dropped to $10 billion (Zach-
mann 2020). These cuts left the alleged anity to Russia in the predominantly
Russophone regions of Ukraine without astrong material basis. The first days of
the full-scale invasion clearly showed that even in the largely Russian-speaking
areas no support for invasion existed, and in the areas that Russian troops put
under their control they were perceived as an occupation force. The vast major-
ity of the population in the south (90%) and in the east (85%) of Ukraine have
anegative attitude towards Russia (KIIS 2022a).
What changed indeed was the attitude towards Russians. Prior to the war
Ukrainians tended to make adistinction between the Russian state (seen as the
perpetrator of the conflict), and the Russian society, which was usually perceived
as friendlier or at least neutral to Ukrainians. The restart of the war and the
realisation of the fact that amajority of Russians support it, wiped out this dis-
tinction in Ukrainian public opinion. Now Ukrainians equally blame both the
Russian leadership and Russian people (Ilko Kucheriv 2022a), and almost 70%
of Ukrainians have negative feelings towards Russians (Rating Group 2022d).
The absolute majority of Ukrainians now are point-blank rejecting the idea that
Ukrainians and Russians are the same people, neither ethnically nor politically.
Only 8% of respondents still raise their voice in support of this Russian politi-
cal narrative, while less than ayear ago, in August 2021, almost 40% somehow
accepted it (Rating Group 2022c). The invasion of 2022 resulted in the rise of
ageneral anti-Russian mood in Ukraine, while massive pro-Russian sentiments
among the general public vanished much earlier.
The transformation of the public perceptions of Russia and Russians denotes
afurther shift in the identity politics of Ukraine. Alienation from associations
with Russia became auniversal trend. Since the restart of the war Ukrainians
revisited their views of common history and culture, moving apart from the
Russian state and society. The most notable shifts included the symbolic down-
grading of the Soviet era May 9 celebration: nowadays only asmall number of
Ukrainians treat it as ‘victory day’, thus distancing themselves from the Russian
historical narrative. Earlier attempts by the Ukrainian government to substitute
the Soviet era May 9 with the Day of Europe on May 8, undertaken since 2014,
initially faced massive opposition within society, not only in the south-east,
but even in the centre of Ukraine (Rating Group 2019). But since February 2022
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what was seen as agovernment-imposed narrative turned into aconsensually
accepted approach as the majority of Ukrainians voluntarily drifted away from
the Soviet/Russian interpretation of WWII.
Analysis of local electronic petitions allows us to monitor the changing at-
titudes and perceptions within the society. In 2022 the petitions most supported
in numbers demanded getting rid of Russian and Soviet cultural and political
legacy (Pidenko 2022). More than ever before, Ukrainian people do not want to
live on streets named after Russian notables and writers, aliate with the Or-
thodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate or tolerate monuments to the Rus-
sian imperial past. Similar shifts occurred with the linguistic self-identification:
according to the polls, the number of Ukrainians using the Russian language
decreased from 26% in 2021 to 15% in late spring 2022 (Rating Group 2022d;
KIIS 2022c). After the start of the invasion many Russian-speaking Ukrainians
switched to Ukrainian in daily life. For them this was apolitical gesture, as they
were keen to demonstrate the anity to Ukraine and to break up ties with Rus-
sia. For many Ukrainians this trend further developed into apersonal rejection
of Russian culture and references to it in their lives: this is manifested in calls to
cancel classes in Russian literature in school curricula, demands to ban Russian
popular culture (songs, books, movies) and massive support for removal of Rus-
sian and Soviet memories from Ukrainian toponymics (Hunder 2022).
This reactive negation of the Russian world ideology is, however, productive.
Apoll conducted at the very start of the Russian intervention showed that 82%
of Ukrainians were sure that it would be repelled (Gradus Research 2022a). Af-
ter Ukrainian forces withstood the first Russian assaults, confidence in the vic-
tory grew even further (95% in late March 2022 and January 2023 (Rating Group
2022b; KIIS 2023)). After months of fierce fighting and devastation Ukrainians
still remained positive that they will prevail – to such an extent that any territo-
rial concession to Russia is seen by 89% of Ukrainians as an unacceptable price
for peace, which is apush factor for eventually retaking the territories of Donbas
and Crimea occupied in 2014 (KIIS 2022d). Lack of overtly pessimistic attitudes
in public narratives also drives the dominant political narrative: as society does
not show demand for peace at any cost, there is no space for political actors with
explicit pacifist attitudes, or proponents of immediate peace talks with Russia.
Thus, at the end of the 2022, 82% of Ukrainians believed that things in Ukraine
were going in the right direction, compared to only one fourth of respondents
who agreed with that prior to the war (Rating Group 2022i; KIIS 2023). Amid
worsening economic, social and security situations this poll reflects not alack
of critical thinking among Ukrainians, but rather their readiness to accept hard-
ships in order to secure independence and ademocratic future. Since the start
of the war collective interests of national survival, freedom and sovereignty have
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prevailed, which has turned out to be the socio-political foundation for resil-
ience. More than half of the population (56.9%) were physically and financially
involved in volunteering (Reznik 2022). Indicatively, in the words of the head of
the Central Bank of Ukraine, societal resilience translates into afinancial and
economic asset due to adaptability and flexibility of the Ukrainian labour force,
even during the war (Verbyany 2022).
By the same token, the war displayed mechanisms through which social capi-
tal and family networks became helpful elements of resilience, including new in-
centives for collective actions, solidarity and mutual aid. Ties between relatives,
neighbours and communities serve as a critical engine in resilience-building:
thus, according to asurvey, the number of Ukrainians who trust the residents of
their locality almost doubled (from 35% to 62%), two-thirds of citizens (67%) trust
neighbours and people living nearby and as many as 80% of the respondents
declare that they trust their acquaintances (Gradus Research 2022b). Members
of large families from the war-torn regions have found refuge in the western
part of Ukraine. Neighbourhoods, where residents relied on mutual help and
assistance, could better overcome shared problems (Opanasenko 2022). These
practices of grass-roots resilience are substantial components of Ukraine’sde-
velopment as anetworked society where the middle class has proven capable of
taking social and financial responsibility in times of previous crises, including
the Maidan Revolution, protection of doctors at the forefront of the fight against
COVID-19 and now the war with Russia.
My analysis shows that the war enhanced the attraction of Ukrainian and Eu-
ropean cultural identity for most Ukrainians, while elements of Russian-oriented
self-identification are vanishing from the national mindscape. Ukraine’sagency
is not elite-driven, but rests on strong grass-roots components. This agency im-
plies the erasure of aRussia-promoted narrative of asplit within Ukrainian iden-
tity and the allegedly unbridgeable gaps between different parts of the country.
Ukraine’sagency in this respect is explicitly anti-post-Soviet in the sense that the
country does not wish to position itself within the geopolitical cage of ‘former
Soviet republics’, and preferred along-term strategy of cultural and normative
association with Europe. The productive negation of path dependence on Rus-
sia might be seen as aform of power that drives Ukraine in the direction of the
Euro-Atlantic security community, which requires an institutional backup to be
discussed next.
Institutional resilience
The war didn’t just overshadow every other issue of political relevance in the
country – it literally ‘silenced’ political life compared to the one before the inva-
sion. All of public politics is almost entirely focused on supporting the common
Ukraine at War 13
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cause of defeating the aggressor, and foreign, economic, financial and legisla-
tive policy agendas are significantly streamlined in accordance to this priority.
Undoubtedly, the functionality of the main public institutions is conditioned by
the military ecacy of the Ukrainian Army that during the first phase of the war
managed to repel superior Russian forces and regain control over some territo-
ries. This created preconditions and facilitated the coping of Ukrainian public
institutions with numerous challenges with IDPs, relocation of enterprises and
operation of social and economic systems; later on, when Russia resorted to the
tactic of missile attacks against energy infrastructure, public authorities’ efforts
were focused on repairing the damage and sustaining basic heating and water
supplies during the winter season.
From an institutional viewpoint, anumber of shifts happened due to the war.
President Zelenskyy became an icon of Ukrainian resistance both at home and
abroad. His robust leadership style won apredominant support of almost 90% of
Ukrainians, with his political reputation index at an all-time record of 77% (Gra-
dus 2022a; Ilko Kucheriv 2022b). Zelenskyy’smodel of leadership encouraged
Ukrainian society to self-mobilise for the sake of shared goals, encouraging ev-
eryone ‘to do their part from their place’, as they see fit to achieve victory (Pisano
2022: 11). The high approval rating of Zelenskyy is handing him huge authority
to lead the changes in the country, even bigger than he had after the landslide
victory in the 2019 presidential election. He is now in the position to define the
direction of Ukraine’sreconstruction and reforms, and has enough reputational
resources to revamp both his party and the presidential oce.
After the first month of the war, when the Ukrainian Army withstood the
initial assault by the Russian troops, many Ukrainians found another national
hero in the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, with whom
the leadership in strategic planning is associated (Romanyuk 2022). In public
opinion Valeriy Zaluzhny is perceived as the only figure – besides the President
– who can share the glory of successful leadership during this war (Rating Group
2022g; Razumkov 2023).
In some Ukrainian regions too, military commanders responsible for the suc-
cessful defense and counter-offensive gained trust and support from the local
population and are considered as potential runners-up for regional public oc-
es. One example is Major General Viktor Nikoliuk, the key figure in the defense
of Chernihiv. Additionally, some veteran organisations have already shown
themselves as political actors in recent years, and with many more veterans com-
ing home after the current phase of the war, these groups can be even more
influential than before – both as grass-roots movements and as national NGOs.
The high level of trust in the President and the army can be attributed to the
rally- round-the-flag effect, which for Ukraine, where society has been tradition-
Yulia Kurnyshova
14
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ally critical of authorities, is anovelty. At the same time, it should not gloss over
the fact that the high level of society–state unity and almost entire absence of
internal critique – 82% of respondents believe that things in Ukraine are going
in the right direction (Rating Group 2022i; KIIS 2023) – are wartime conditional
only, and can barely be suitable for apost-war democratic society. As research
literature suggests, such vertical social cohesion is usually bolstered by external
physical threats and has the increased demand for decisive military response as
its flip side (Lambert et al. 2010).
The Verkhovna Rada clearly confirms this argument. Earlier abackbone of
pluralism as any parliament in ademocratic society, it currently functions as the
‘legislative department of the President’ (Rahmanin 2023). The actorship of most
political parties presented there have diminished during the war. Anumber of
parties designated as pro-Russian collaborators were banned by the decision of
the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on 18 March 2022, and
approved by the majority of Ukrainians (Rating Group 2022d). But the presiden-
tial party is also facing achallenge when appealing to the wide public: while still
the most popular among voters, ‘The Servant of the People’ with an approval
rating of only 45% (NDI 2022) is lagging far behind its leader. Since parliament is
akey actor to enable reforms, it should be arespected force on its own, capable
of forming coalitions necessary for constitutional changes and of developing
along-term strategy even beyond the (potential) second term of Zelenskyy. Yet
the weakness of the presidential majority in the Rada lies in the low level of trust
in the parliament. For Ukrainians it is one of the least respected political institu-
tions, trusted by only aquarter of the population (IRI 2022; Ilko Kucheriv 2022b).
Apotential political landscape with ahighly popular president and amuch less
popular Rada could be acause of institutional destabilisation as there might be
atemptation to preserve such a disposition in order to enable resilience-laden
reforms and to secure their support among Ukrainians.
The overall functionality of the Ukrainian state apparatus and public institu-
tions under the dire conditions is akey factor defining Ukraine’sagency ground-
ed in what might be dubbed ‘democratic resilience’, or the ability of apolitical
regime to prevent or react to challenges without losing its ‘democratic character’
(Merkel 2023: 4). The legitimacy of the state apparatus and the ensuing institu-
tional power builds upon effective management during the war, its resoluteness
and strategic communication with society. The war catalysed major changes in
the nature of relations between the state and society in amore trustful and sup-
portive way. It created amobilised environment during the war, but also raised
expectations for the post-war transformation of the state, rather than areturn
to the old practices. This implies building socio-political relations without oli-
garchy, corruption and inecient bureaucracy, further expanding the rights of
Ukraine at War 15
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citizens and opportunities of communities, and the eventual membership in the
EU and NATO. As the key representative of Ukraine, President Zelenskyy per-
forms as both an incarnation of afunctional institutional apparatus and acom-
municative leader of international scale. Iwill dwell upon this in the last part
of this section, but before that let me show how Ukrainian subnational units
contribute to resilience and boost Ukraine’sagency.
Local resilience
In pre-war Ukrainian politics the central government usually respected the es-
tablished regional balances of power and avoided reshuing regional elites. Yet
since the restart of the war the President has appointed new cadres to key posi-
tions at subnational level. Under the martial law oblast administrations were
transformed into military–civil administrative units tasked with organisation of
defence and logistics for the military. In some cases governors were substituted
by high-ranking military ocers.
Overall, public institutions have remained functional in regions, including
those most affected by Russia’smilitary attacks. One third of local authorities
in Ukraine never halted their operations, almost half of them returned to nor-
mal functioning two weeks after the invasion or liberation, and amajority (72%)
haven’t stopped providing administrative services (Keudel 2023).
The key prerequisite for this is decentralisation reform which was among the
most successful transformations in Ukraine in recent years, and during the war
it paid off alot. It consolidated and empowered local governance through acom-
bination of local amalgamation and fiscal decentralisation. All the amalgamated
territorial communities were given independent budgets and direct access to
inter-budgetary relations with the central budget (Romanova 2022).
Even though at the initial stage of the invasion local self-governance in hro-
madas (communities) often were left on their own, in most cases they coped
fairly well with taking care of infrastructure and meeting daily demands of the
population (Local 2022). Most of the local authorities (92%) had emergency plans
(Keudel 2023). The findings of awide specialised research attest to their ability to
deal with such major shocks of the war as unexpectedness of the full-scale inva-
sion, missile strikes, disinformation and psychological operations of the enemy,
mass-scale influx of IDPs and threats to economic stability and critical infra-
structure (Rabinovich 2022).
Local authorities, businesses and social networks have been particularly es-
sential to resilience at the grass-roots level. In the first months of Russia’sin-
vasion, local governments and volunteers, rather than the central government
or international responders, were in the limelight of practical resilience. They
provided vital humanitarian aid, especially in remote and frontline areas, and
Yulia Kurnyshova
16
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helped communities to remain resilient during Russian occupation when ac-
cess to aid and public services was typically cut off. After the liberation of the
occupied parts of Kyiv, Sumy and Chernihiv, oblasts, local communities and vol-
unteers were helpful in restoring destroyed houses and transporting humanitar-
ian aid to the population. The role of local actors was particularly salient given
that international organisations (including the UN, Doctors Without Borders
and the International Committee of the Red Cross) were absent on the ground
during the first months of the invasion (Costa-Kostritsky 2022).
The experience of communities shows that local self-governance gained
amuch higher public confidence due to the successful management of the war
consequences both in the occupied/affected hromadas and elsewhere. What is
even more valuable for the development of local self-governance is people’shigh
level of confidence – up to 56% – in these institutions, which is higher than pub-
lic support for the Ukrainian government and the majority of national level pub-
lic institutions (KIIS 2022b). This gives local governance much popular credit for
amore active involvement with the nationwide politics of resistance and post-
war reconstruction to be largely funded from international sources, which in
the meantime might create competing claims over control and management of
financial flows between the central government and local/regional authorities.
Therefore apotential rise of local self-governance from mostly administra-
tive to more political roles is another trend affecting Ukraine’sresilience at sub-
national level. A decades-long balance of interests between different regions
in Ukraine has ultimately changed, and asearch for anew balance is about to
emerge. The major split in this regard is not cultural, linguistic or religious, but
economic. Since the massive privatisation of heavy industries in the aftermath
of the fall of the Soviet Union, two distinct economic models have been estab-
lished in two macro-regions of Ukraine. The industrial south-east was develop-
ing predominantly along export-oriented lines to sell low added value products
abroad, thus seeking cheap workforce and being interested in strong national
currency. Regional economies in the west, north and – to certain extent – the
centre of Ukraine rather consisted of large import-oriented companies (mostly
retailers), as well as small and middle businesses. These actors were economi-
cally more liberal, keen to establish a sizable internal consumer market and
aweaker national currency. As the interests of the two models diverged, their
lobbying efforts led to asimilar confrontation in politics in which identity and
historical memories were meticulously used to alienate one part of the country
from the other and to establish areliable and long-lasting electoral foundation
to sustain each model’sinterests. This disbalance may not live further because of
the changes caused by the war. Heavy industries of the southeast are damaged or
destroyed (World Bank 2022), mass migration is watering out acheap workforce
Ukraine at War 17
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(IOM 2022) and the conservative political camp is losing both its electorate and
economic foundations.
Alarge-scale movement within the country has aparticular imprint on the
mass resilience of Ukrainians. The displacement of one-third of the coun-
try’spopulation within Ukraine is aunique phenomenon with potentially posi-
tive repercussions, as despite mutual prejudices and stereotypes existed before
the war, residents of different regions had to cooperate and get to know each
other. This experience of domestic integration of residents of different regions
will hopefully contribute to an even greater consolidation of the nation and
acrystallisation of collective identity.
Therefore, the efforts undertaken by local governments and civil society
were an example of how decisions on responding to threats are made at the
lowest possible level, which corresponds to the principle of subsidiarity effec-
tively operational in Western federations. This is especially noteworthy given
that Ukraine lacked strong traditions of local self-government prior to the war.
Local resilience contributed to the ability of local governments, volunteers and
population to deal together with the shocks of war. The horizontal cooperation
of various local actors with clearly defined roles and responsibilities serves as
abasis for Ukrainian agency both in the sense of domestic coherence and con-
solidation, and in terms of consonance with an EU-promoted emphasis on reli-
ance on local resources and ownership for building resilient societies (Joseph &
Juncos 2020). The success of the decentralisation reform in Ukraine was already
acknowledged by the EU (von der Leyen 2022) and served as abuilding block for
granting Ukraine the status of candidate for EU membership.
Information resilience
The fact that the full-scale invasion was preceded by ahybrid war with Russia
has helped Ukraine to gain experience in countering Russian propaganda. Rus-
sian television channels in Ukraine were banned (2014), access to the popular
Russian social networks was halted (2017) and the broadcasting of several Ukrai-
nian TV channels, which systematically disseminated messages of Russian dis-
information, was stopped (2021). At the same time, it was important for Ukraine
that the EU countries perceive it as apart of their big family, so alot of effort
has been made to explain that these decisions about blocking propaganda re-
sources do not limit freedom of speech. In contrast to Russia, Ukrainian media
were characterised by diversity and pluralism of opinions before the war. This
remained in effect after the invasion, although media coverage sometimes suf-
fers from over-optimism (Dan’kova 2022).
As has been shown earlier, amid the Russian invasion all major political forces
in Ukraine publicly demonstrated unity and willingness to contribute to the de-
Yulia Kurnyshova
18
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fense of the country. Aset of meetings on 23-24 February 2022 in Rada resulted
in the coordination of legislative activities to put aside previous political con-
tradictions. No formal agreement was signed, but the de facto political armi-
stice was agreed upon from that moment and is mostly respected by key political
forces. This convention was widely promoted in the media space: many politi-
cians, especially those in opposition, were keen to underline their positive input
to the internal consensus by praising their restraint from criticising the head of
the state (Rahmanin 2023).
The first test to the unity of political actors was set in March 2022, when
the government pushed for unified information policy in the media space to
further consolidate public politics in Ukraine. Amajor element of those efforts
was the introduction of aunified information policy by the National Security
and Defense Council decision of 18 March 2022 to set asingle frame for news
coverage and political analysis as long as the martial law is in place. All-national
TV channels were to abide by the policy, while the presidential team effectively
limited national television broadcasting to one channel (United News), whose
information policy is under control of the President’s oce (Dan’kova 2022).
Also, Ukrainian journalists signed ajoint statement on maintaining abalance
between press access to events and state security and acknowledged their com-
pliance with the Commander-in-Chief’sorder on the rules of journalists’ work
in the area of hostilities (DetectorMedia 2022).
While centralisation of information management was justified by the ongo-
ing information warfare, there were concerns over its implications for democ-
racy and freedom of speech. Some politicians openly criticised this decision. The
opposition also instigated an anti-presidential campaign (primarily, in the social
media), whose main target was the President and his team’sfailure to properly
heed to the United States’ warnings about the imminent Russian invasion, com-
municated to Zelenskyy in December 2021–January 2022. The aim of this cam-
paign was specifically to discredit the President’sability to properly react to the
war threat, and thus to blame him for the losses and to devalue his merits in re-
sistance to Russia. This outburst of political fight in late May 2022 soon calmed
down, but demonstrated the true state of diversity in the Ukrainian political
landscape and attempts to find abalance between national unity and factional
political interests.
Ultimately, aNovember 2022 poll has shown that 84% of Ukrainian viewers
trust the United News (Ukrainian media 2022). The uniformity of the informa-
tion space contributed to the cohesion of society and improved attitudes to-
wards state institutions and the President. This was influenced by both the war
and the lack of opposition channels, which earlier criticised the authorities and
Zelenskyy personally. On the other hand, the monotony of the ocial telecast
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pushed viewers to turn more often to the Internet and social networks in search
for more diversity (Korba 2022).
To summarise my findings, information resilience is apowerful booster to
Ukraine’sagency. Three points are particularly important here: one is public
trust in media sources which was amajor basis for preserving a high morale
in society and maintaining confidence in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. An-
other important characteristic is the self-suciency of Ukrainian mediascape
that cut off Russian (dis)information sources and made them irrelevant even for
Ukraine’sRussophones. One more facet of information resilience is the volun-
tary responsibility of journalists, opinionmakers, media celebrities and cultural
producers: their consolidated position was instrumental in sustaining aconsen-
sual coverage of the Russian invasion and in diminishing the importance of do-
mestic contradictions between different fractions of political elite.
Ukraine’snormative agency: External manifestations
Multiple forms of resilience in Ukraine would not have been possible without
the prolonged support from the EU that produced and promoted resilience
discourses and practices to the entire neighbourhood area, facilitating reforms
and creating favourable conditions for resilience. The EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement of 2014 was the most comprehensive one that the EU has signed
with any other third country. Ukraine has received an unprecedented level of
financial support, which became an important contribution to the reification
of practices of resilience defined by the EU as the ability of states and societies
‘to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises’
(Shared 2016). Therefore, it would be fair to say that EU-promoted resilience acts
within the logic of the ‘power of attraction’ through grant-based assistance pro-
grammes aimed to boost civil societies of recipient countries, including Ukraine
(Lebrun 2018: 5).
In 2020 the EC presented the Eastern Partnership Policy ‘Reinforcing Re-
silience - an EaP that delivers for all’, which emphasised the positive results
achieved in three out of four priority areas (stronger economy, stronger con-
nectivity and stronger society) in the work plan for reforms ‘20 Deliverables for
2020’. As regards the stronger governance priority area, the document advocated
for ‘the need to significantly improve results’ in the governance sphere connect-
ed with anti-corruption efforts and empowerment of civil society (European
Commission 2020).
The decentralisation and self-governance reform in Ukraine has been one
of the pillars of this process. Besides, the EU assistance is instrumental in the
support of civil society, free media and grassroot activism in Ukraine, including
facilitation of ‘local ownership’ and ‘bottom-up’ engagements with the whole
Yulia Kurnyshova
20
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society, which allows Ukraine to remain on the right policy track for prompt
post-war recovery based on European norms of democracy, transparency and
good governance.
Against this background, the EU candidacy status is an important gain to en-
hance Ukraine’sresilience and political agency. The overwhelming support for
EU membership among Ukrainians turned out to be one of the few consensual
elements in Ukrainian politics since long ago. Approval rating for EU member-
ship was around 70% prior to the war, but since February 2022 it skyrocketed to
80% (Burkovsky 2022). What’simportant is that in 2022 Ukrainians’ perception
of the EU was much more pragmatic and responsible than ever before. With
aclear understanding that further reforms are aprecondition for eventual mem-
bership, many Ukrainians are ready to make sacrifices for the sake of ensuring
the ultimate success of the required transformations. Almost 70% of Ukrainians
support the idea that the necessary reforms are to be implemented regardless of
the war, with almost half of those believing the war must not impede even the
pace of the reforms (Gradus Research 2022c). Most political actors sustain these
popular sentiments for astrong support for the pro-EU reforms.
The EU’scontribution to boosting Ukraine’sresilience attests to the impor-
tance of the structure of international relations within which agency is practiced
and effectuated. It is the Euro-Atlantic political community that serves as the
major point of attraction and gravitation for Ukraine. Agency within this com-
munity is possible only on the basis of internalisation of democratic norms that
ought to be accepted and instrumentalised (Sending 2016: 67). Thus, Ukraine
builds its agency by incorporating it into abroader structure of the international
normative system. The Orange Revolution (2004) and the Revolution of Dignity
(2013), along with the implementation of the Association Agreement and the
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, as well as the newly acquired
candidate status for aprospective EU membership can be identified as the key
milestones of Ukraine’s pathway to normative agency that denotes an ability
to act and develop specific policies in accordance with values, principles and
rules of the Western democratic tradition. It is anormative agency that makes
Ukraine a full-fledged subject of international politics, particularly in the se-
curity domain. For example, cross-society resilience implied the adaptation of
NATO’sbest practices of armed forces transformation and mobilisation of net-
works of reservists (Shelest 2022), which in the future might become avaluable
asset for Ukraine’sintegration with the North Atlantic Alliance in the capacity
of acountry that, as the German Foreign Ministry acknowledges, ‘is defending
Europe’sfreedom’ (Federal Foreign Oce 2022).
The concept of productive power (Barnett 2005) that Ibriefly touched upon
earlier might be instrumental for my analysis of the resilience-grounded norma-
Ukraine at War 21
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tive agency which significantly differs from the status of Ukraine as merely avic-
tim of foreign aggression. Two points are particularly important to underline in
this respect. First, when it comes to resilience as ameaningful part of the EU–
Ukraine agenda, it results in a‘joint venture’ aggregating European experiences
and financial means, on the one hand, and Ukrainian practices of grass-roots self-
management and the institutional resources of governance on the other. More-
over, by containing the Russian Army, Ukraine can be viewed as aco-producer
of European security, which is particularly acknowledged by European countries
bordering on Russia. Ukraine’s agency, as unfolded in 2022, addresses Western
countries with an insistent demand to avoid negotiating Ukraine without Ukraine
(Yermak 2022), and to perceive military assistance to Ukraine as an investment in
common security, as opposed to charity toward the victim of aggression.
Second, this co-productive power is grounded in normative foundations.
Ukraine is fully aware of the fact that its road to Europe is paved with normative
commitments that require adherence to common and shared practices of demo-
cratic governance, checks and balances, the rule of law, strong civil society and
local self-government as preconditions for aresilient society.
However, both points require further problematisation. Chandler’sinterpre-
tation of resilience as part of the post-interventionist paradigm helps to bet-
ter understand Ukraine’sagency as co-produced by multiple Western invest-
ments in its resilience infrastructure. He also makes clear that assistance with
resilience does not guarantee protection; moreover, it may imply ashift from
the ‘responsibility to protect’ to apost-interventionist paradigm of empower-
ing vulnerable countries to secure themselves. This shift triggered by the cri-
sis of the liberal interventionism of the first post-Cold War decade explains the
hesitancy of many Ukraine’spartners to quickly supply the weapons requested
by the Ukrainian government, and reluctance to make steps that the Kremlin
might consider provoking further escalation. The hesitation of NATO members
to include amilitary component in any negotiated solution, dating back to the
previous experiences of US engagement with the issues of Ukrainian security
avoiding military options, looks quite illuminating in this respect.
Therefore, the structural circumstances of the Euro-Atlantic security order
are beneficial for strengthening Ukraine’sagency-through-resilience, yet in the
meantime they prevent major Western powers from playing arole of interven-
ing and securing actors, at least not to the extent that Ukraine might need it.
This ambiguity is core for the intersubjective understanding of agency and the
role of communication between Ukraine and its key partners: the former ap-
peals to the agency of Western governments in containing Russia to secure the
Euro-Atlantic liberal order, while the latter praise Ukraine’sresilience and incre-
mentally integrate it in their practical security measures.
Yulia Kurnyshova
22
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Conclusion
Ukraine demonstrated several important features of resilience that were not
suciently visible before the war and that define Ukraine’sagency. Ukrainian
society is characterised by ahigh level of self-organisation, social horizontality
and self-control. Ukrainian public institutions have largely remained functional,
including in the regions most affected by Russia’smilitary activities. The popu-
larity of Zelenskyy handed him ahuge authority to lead the country, but also put
the major question of whether he will be able to use the popular trust to con-
tinue crucial reforms in much more complicated circumstances. Even though
all political forces in Ukraine publicly demonstrate unity, oppositional political
interests have not disappeared. New political actors – either from war heroes or
renowned activists – will most certainly find their way to the political scene, and
regional elites may join the ranks of national party politics.
The article contributed to scholarly debate in international relations in
anumber of ways. It showed the nexus of resilience and agency as two sides
of the same coin, and discussed how agency functions as productive negation
in asense that rejection of compromises with the Kremlin-promoted ‘Russian
world’ served as abasis for state- and nation-building in Ukraine. Ialso demon-
strated that agency is grounded in different types of productive power, which
conflate and reinforce each other, particularly in institutional and communica-
tive domains. As my next step, Iposited that this power might be dubbed co-
productive since it was largely stimulated by multiple Western assistance pro-
grammes that before the war prepared Ukraine for aresilient agency, includ-
ing effective resistance to Russian encroachments. Finally, my last argument
concerned the concept of normative agency that treats resilience as astrategy
of self-reliance that in the meantime due to its normative compatibility and
consonance with the principles of democratic governance opens prospective
avenues for Ukraine’seventual integration with the Euro-Atlantic institutional
and normative structures as apower capable of contributing to common secu-
rity. Ukraine’ssuccess in this long pathway will largely depend on whether and
how its normative agency will be accepted and translated into specific policies
and decisions of the EU and NATO as two main pillars and gravitation polls for
Ukraine in the foreseeable future.
Funding
The study was carried out with the financial support of the VolkswagenFounda-
tion within the framework of the scientific project ‘Reacting to war - the impact
of crisis on social groups and political discourses’.
Ukraine at War 23
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Y K is apostdoctoral researcher in the Centre for East European
Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa) at the University of Bremen. Before mov-
ing to Germany in 2022, she had been working in National Institute for Strategic
Studies, USAID and EBRD programmes. Kurnyshova’sareas of expertise include
international security, US foreign policy as well as internal and foreign policy of
Ukraine. She received her Ph.D. in History from the National Taras Shevchenko
University of Kyiv (2004). Yulia Kurnyshova has authored alarge number of aca-
demic and analytical publications and is afrequent media commentator.
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