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Influences of Gender and Relationship on Moral Judgement

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Abstract

The morality of humanity has been discussed intensively and analyzed nowadays. Scientists believe that human beings have a natural moral standard. Plus, theories about ethics are always described into two main categories, i.e., utilitarianism and deontology. Even though people’s moral judgment is deeply investigated, the influences of relationships and genders are often neglected. Recently, some articles related to relationships and genders indicated that the two factors are very influential in making moral judgments. Not only the relationship between the witness and the moral transgressor may affect people’s moral judgment about the transgression, but also the relationship between the witness and the victim. Males and females sometimes respond with different moral judgments to the same situation due to gender differences, such as emotional repression and guilt-proneness. The influence of relationships also differs in genders. Existed experiments still have limitations, such as unauthenticity and division according to biological gender or gender identity. Future direction should focus on increasing the authenticity of moral scenarios and assessing the correlation between gender identity and moral judgment. For the development of curriculums regarding moral development, this review could provide some guidance.
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Influences of Gender and Relationship on Moral Judgement
Chenye Zhang*
College of Letters and Science, University of California, Davis, California, United States
* Corresponding Author Email: cyezhang@ucdavis.edu
Abstract. The morality of humanity has been discussed intensively and analyzed nowadays.
Scientists believe that human beings have a natural moral standard. Plus, theories about ethics are
always described into two main categories, i.e., utilitarianism and deontology. Even though peoples
moral judgment is deeply investigated, the influences of relationships and genders are often
neglected. Recently, some articles related to relationships and genders indicated that the two factors
are very influential in making moral judgments. Not only the relationship between the witness and
the moral transgressor may affect peoples moral judgment about the transgression, but also the
relationship between the witness and the victim. Males and females sometimes respond with
different moral judgments to the same situation due to gender differences, such as emotional
repression and guilt-proneness. The influence of relationships also differs in genders. Existed
experiments still have limitations, such as unauthenticity and division according to biological gender
or gender identity. Future direction should focus on increasing the authenticity of moral scenarios
and assessing the correlation between gender identity and moral judgment. For the development of
curriculums regarding moral development, this review could provide some guidance.
Keywords: Moral judgment, Relationship, Gender.
1. Introduction
Most people believe that the most significant difference between human beings and other animals
is that human has a sense of morality. Stealing someone’s belongings, intentionally harming others,
and producing rumors are all perceived as behaviors that break moral rules. And the transgressors are
always viewed as immoral people. In reverse, people who help other people and give up seats for
others are always admired and described as good people. The judgment people made about others’
morality is called moral judgment. By studying morality, human beings could have a clearer
understanding of how to make themselves better people, and how to make the world a better place in
the future. Moral judgment, as an important part of morality, was also studied by many experimenters
to find out any possible factor that may influence it.
A very trending topic in the field of morality these years is testing people’s decisions under
different moral dilemmas. These moral dilemmas, such as the trolley problem, often ask the
participants whether they are willing to sacrifice a few people’s interests or lives for the good of more
people. Responses to these moral dilemmas are always categorized into utilitarianism and deontology.
According to utilitarianism, behaviors that could increase the happiness of the total population could
all be considered moral and good [1]. Thus, utilitarianism could be perceived as a kind of
consequentialism in which the consequence of behaviors is the only standard to judge right or wrong.
Taking one of the moral dilemmas as an example, if pushing someone off the bridge could stop the
train from killing other five people, then the behavior of pushing could be viewed as moral. Moreover,
deontology suggests that the morality of one action should be based on whether the action itself is
moral or not under moral standards [2]. Thus, the consequence of action should not be taken into
consideration when evaluating morality. From the deontological viewpoint, even though pushing
someone off the bridge to save other five people are viewed as morally right behavior from a
utilitarian perspective, it is considered morally wrong since the behavior itself is immoral under any
circumstances.
Despite the fact that a lot of studies related to morality were conducted in recent decades, the
majority of the studies were focusing on how the participants reacted to the moral violations
committed by strangers [3]. Nowadays, scientists have realized the significance of studying how
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relationships with transgressors influence people’s moral judgment. This is because there is growing
evidence suggesting that participants reacted very differently to proposed scenarios where
transgressors are their friends, family, or loved ones. Two possible theories were proposed trying to
explain the trending topic: the correlation between witnesses’ relationship with transgressor and their
moral evaluation. The first one is the theory of moral universalism. Supporters of this theory believe
that there is a universal standard of morality across all races, nationalities, cultures, and religions. The
alternative theory is moral partiality. This theory suggests that people have a greater inclination to
help and protect close ones compared to strangers or distant others. The basis of this theory could be
traced back to the ancient Chinese philosopher Confucius, which emphasized the importance of
family members helping and loving each other [4]. Furthermore, different genders are likely to have
different social rules. Thus, the difference in social interaction is going to lead to different
perspectives about problems. In this paper, studies that are related to relationships and gender would
be demonstrated, and the influence of the two factors when making moral judgments will be analyzed.
2. The effect of relationship on moral judgment
2.1. The impact of closeness with perpetrator
In the case of an individual witnessing a stranger committing a crime, it is very likely that the
individual would report it to the police. Nevertheless, if the individual witnessed his close friend
committing a crime, he may hesitate to report the crime. The severity of the crime is also related to
the likelihood of reporting. Berg and her colleagues conducted three experiments by using neural and
self-report methods to assess how relationships bias people’s moral reasoning [5]. After collecting
the data from the experiments, researchers found that when the perpetrator with a close relationship
with the participant, the likelihood of protection increases compare with distant others. Moreover, it
is shown that participants are more likely to report crimes with higher severity compared with lower
severity. One possible explanation of participants’ inclination to protect the transgressor is that they
might focus on the perpetrator instead of the crime itself if they share a close relationship with him.
When crime behavior is emphasized, participants would report a more punitive response even if the
perpetrator is close to them. The results of the studies support the argument that people are more
likely to have a higher moral judgment toward close-relationship perpetrators and they tend to protect
those perpetrators instead of punishing them.
Another possible explanation for people making higher moral judgments and protecting close
others is that human beings have an intrinsic obligation to help those close to them. This kind of
obligation to help may lead to covering up perpetrators’ moral transgressions and favoritism when
making moral judgments. In the study by McManus et al., the relationship between potential helpers
and beneficiaries is the key component in the strength of the obligation to help [6]. The experiments
were conducted with moral values questionnaires. In the first experiment, the result showed that
participants think the obligation to help is stronger for the target agent when the beneficiaries are
genetically closer under the “no choice” situation (only one potential beneficiary was presented).
However, if the target agent chooses to help more distant beneficiaries compared with closer
beneficiaries (“choice situation”), the target agent would be viewed as less morally good than those
who choose the opposite. In the second experiment, the researchers removed the “stranger” category
and only focused on cousins and siblings. It is found that the obligation is lower in helping cousins
compared with helping siblings in both situations (no choice vs. choice). Participants tended to think
target agents are more obligated to help friend-like relatives rather than stranger-like relatives.
Furthermore, the endorsement of family values is positively correlated with the obligation of helping
family members in both experiments. Therefore, people perceive themselves to have the obligation
to help those that are close to them, and the helping behaviors are always reflected by a higher moral
judgment after witnessing the transgression conducted by their close-relationship transgressor than
strangers. The closer the relationship is, the greater the obligation and the higher the moral judgment
would be.
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However, even though people are likely to help and protect the perpetrators that are close to them,
it does not mean that they think the moral transgression conducted is understandable and it is
reasonable to protect them. Even though a lot of people are aware that they should not help the
perpetrators, they choose to do so eventually. In the studies by Soter and her colleagues, responses
toward others’ moral transgressions were assessed through self-report [7]. The experiment asked
participants to imagine a scenario in their closest and the most distant acquaintances conducting
serious theft. Then the participants need to self-report what they would do and what they think they
should do after witnessing the high-severity crime. It is found that participants showed more
protection for close others compared with distant acquaintances. The results showed that there is a
difference between what the participants think they would do and what they think is morally right.
The difference is greater when the relationship between the participant and the transgressor is closer.
This discrepancy indicates that relationship has a greater influence on people “would” judgment than
“should” judgment. Consistent with the moral partiality theory, the results indicate that people are
more inclined to help and protect close ones instead of distant others.
2.2. The effect of relationship with victim
After discussing the influence of the relationship between the witness and the transgressor, the
effect of the relationship with the victim should also be taken into account. As discussed above, people
who did not prioritize close perpetrators over distant perpetrators may be viewed as less morally good.
Besides this, when the victim is known by the perpetrator, the tendency of harming the victim
decreases. Dinić and her colleagues recruited hundreds of participants from the population in Serbia
and assessed their utilitarian moral judgment in the proposed scenarios [8]. The four proposed
scenarios are 1) personal (i.e., direct involvement) and unknown victim, 2) impersonal (i.e., indirect
involvement) and unknown victim, 3) personal and known victim and 4) impersonal and known
victim. The results suggested that levels of utilitarian judgments significantly differ among the four
dilemmas. Participants have the most moral judgment in impersonal and unknown victim scenarios
and the least moral judgment in personal and known victim scenarios. The result reveals that people
are more resistant when asking them to harm someone they know compared with unknown others.
This pattern is also due to people’s tendency to protect someone they know over someone they are
not familiar with. And moral judgment would be negatively correlated with the closeness with the
victim, which is the opposite of the relationship with the perpetrator.
3. Gender differences in moral judgement
The other significant factor that may influence people’s moral judgments is gender. Females are
in general considered more emotional than males. And emotions are more likely to influence females’
moral decisions than males. In the study by Armstrong et al., participants are recruited to assess the
gender difference in moral dilemma judgments [9]. Dilemmas include incongruent and congruent
situations. Incongruent conditions require participants to take actions that cause immediate harm and
congruent situations ask participants to take actions to prevent harm. In incongruent situations,
utilitarianism and deontology would lead to different judgments and congruent situations would have
the same judgments for both philosophies. The results suggested that under both conditions, females
have much higher scores in deontological inclination and no significant difference in utilitarian
inclinations. The explanation for the discrepancy between females and males is that females have a
greater action aversion and harm aversion than males. Therefore, when facing moral dilemmas,
females are less willing to take action or harm other people. The aversion to behavior and harm will
make females give lower moral judgments after witnessing moral transgressions committed by other
people.
The harm aversion of females is in accordance with the deontological perspective of morality,
which also opposes the action of harming under any circumstances, even when the consequences
would be much better for the majority. In this case, when facing moral dilemmas, females would
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make more deontological responses than males. In the study by Capraro et al., the evaluation of
gender-specific moral protagonists and the gender difference in moral judgment were assessed by
participants’ reports [10]. Experimenters proposed a typical personal moral dilemma, a typical
impersonal dilemma, and an intermediate dilemma (i.e., Footbridge Dilemma, Trolley Problem, and
Trapdoor Dilemma). The intermediate dilemma has the same violation of Kant’s practical imperative
but is less emotionally salient than the personal moral dilemma. Researchers first assessed
participants’ evaluation of moral agents with different gender by naming the agent Adam or Amanda.
It was found that the evaluation has no significant discrepancy on agents with different genders in the
three dilemmas. Researchers then tested the gender difference in moral judgment under the three
conditions. The results have shown that females have a greater inclination to a deontological course
of action in the typical personal moral dilemma that has more emotional salience (gender difference
is not significant in the typical impersonal moral dilemma and intermediate moral dilemma). The
result of the first experiment suggests that the gender of the protagonist in a proposed scenario has no
impact on people’s hypotheses about the protagonist’s response. The second experiment indicates
that when facing moral dilemmas themselves, females have much more deontological response in the
typical personal moral dilemma which require them to take action to harm other people. This is
consistent with the argument that females are more likely to make a deontological response, but only
in personal moral dilemmas.
Gender differences also play a role in decision-making. Males are always perceived as more
generally rational than females. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that males are more likely to accept
unfair offers under specific circumstances, for example, the Ultimatum Game. Lucchiari and his
colleagues studied how gender differences may influence moral, economic, and shopping decision-
making [11]. Researchers proposed three different scenarios under the same structure as the
Ultimatum Game, which are the economic situation, moral situation, and shopping situation. The
economic situation is about splitting salaries after completing the same amount of work with
colleagues. The moral situation is about donating bonus salary in order to help colleagues in need.
The shopping situation is about using a voucher at a shop. The three kinds of offers that participant
had in the experiment are neutral (50%/50%), downward (participants benefited less), and upward
(participants benefited more). In the shopping situation, a downward offer suggests the voucher is for
an imperfect shirt and an upward offer suggests the voucher is for a more expensive shirt than the
participants wanted. If the participants refused the offer, neither side would receive anything. The
results of the experiment show that judges are more likely to accept offers within the moral situation
of the three. The acceptance rate of the shopping situation is much higher than the economic situation.
It is also found that males are more likely to accept offers in the economic and shopping situation
compared with females. Moreover, males show a significantly higher acceptance rate in upward offers
than in downward offers whereas the effect is not significant in females. The discrepancy of
acceptance rates in economic and shopping situations indicates that males are more likely to accept
offers that bring the greatest benefit to them whereas females much prefer a fair proposal. The
increased acceptance rate of offers under moral situations also supports that female are more
emotional and have a greater tendency to help others in need.
4. The Interaction between gender difference and closeness
Moreover, males and females have other differences such as guilt-proneness that may be
influential in making moral judgments. And closeness may have different impacts on females and
males. Compared with males, females are considered more caring to people that are not close to them.
In the studies by Ward and her colleagues, gender differences in emotion were assessed in five
experiments [12]. It was found that males had higher emotional suppression than females, and females
scored higher on the guilt-proneness subscales and the shame-negative self-evaluation subscale.
Rating of moral wrongness is positively related to the two subscales and negatively correlated with
emotional suppression. The result suggested that females’ higher attention towards emotion helps
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explain their lower likelihood of taking immoral actions. When females were asked to ignore
emotions, their tendency to make immoral decisions increased. Further study suggested that when
considering immoral behaviors, females showed higher self-conscious moral emotions and lower
positive emotions than males. Moreover, when recalling agentic transgressions (e.g., Acting
immorally for promotion), females showed higher levels of self-conscious moral emotions and regret.
But males and females showed similar levels in recalling relational transgressions (e.g., Doing
something immoral to people with close relationships), which suggests that females may have a less
contextualized notion of morality than males. The results suggest that males’ higher emotional
suppression and lower guilt-proneness lead to their higher likelihood of taking immoral actions and
less regret when recalling past moral transgressions. Moreover, males’ rationalism toward people that
do not share a close relationship with them makes them feel less guilty.
5. Conclusions
Relationships and genders are influential factors in making moral judgments. The relationship with
moral transgressors or victims would both influence people’s reactions and their moral evaluation of
the transgression. A closer relationship with the transgressor can lead to more positive moral
judgment, and a closer relationship with the victim may lead to a lower moral evaluation of the moral
violation. Furthermore, because of gender differences, such as different degrees of harm aversion and
emotional suppression, males and females would sometimes have inconsistent responses to the same
scenario. Females are more likely to have deontological responses to moral dilemmas and are more
refusal for harming others. The discrepancy between genders would also interact with relationships
and cause further impacts on people’s moral judgment.
The studies reviewed are very rigorous, but some limitations still exist. In the experiments
assessing the influence of relationships on moral judgment, the scenarios participants need to respond
to are all proposed and hypothesized. The unauthenticity of scenarios has a possibility of casting
unknown impacts on participants’ responses. Furthermore, the studies about gender differences and
moral judgment only divide the participants by their biological genders. Thus, the validity of results
for people with gender dysphoria still needs to be investigated.
In future studies, instead of using proposed stories, researchers should show participants scenarios
with more authenticity. For instance, experimenters could hire actors to perform moral transgressions
or show participants footage of their close ones committing moral violations. For studies related to
gender differences, researchers may divide participants by both biological genders and gender
identities. The correlation between biological gender and moral judgment and the correlation between
gender identity and moral judgment could be analyzed to determine which factor is more influential.
This review could assist in the design and improvement of courses regarding moral development.
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Contemporary deontology
  • Davis Nancy
Davis Nancy. Contemporary deontology. In P. Singer (Ed.), A companion to ethics. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1993, 205-218.