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179On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?
Chapter 5
The German path to electromobility and its impacts on
automotive production and employment
Martin Krzywdzinski, Grzegorz Lechowski, Jonas Ferdinand and Daniel Schneiß
1. Introduction
The transition from the internal combustion engine to electromobility represents
a fundamental challenge for companies and employees in the automotive industry;
this technological change being primarily driven by the need to achieve the climate
protection targets of the European Union (EU) (Pardi 2021). As part of the Paris
Climate Agreement, the EU is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by
40 per cent compared with 1990 levels by 2030; furthermore, in 2020 the European
Parliament increased this target to 60 per cent. Accordingly, the EU’s CO₂ emission
limits for the transport sector have also been tightened: permissible CO₂ emissions
from passenger cars fell from 130 to 95g CO₂/km in 2020, meaning that the EU has
the strictest emission limits in the world. In addition, the European Commission has
proposed reducing emission limits to zero by 2035.
The EU’s ambitious climate policy goals are currently exerting strong pressure on
the German automotive industry, largely because it has, over a long period, neglected
the development of alternative drive technologies, instead focusing on optimising
the internal combustion engine (ICE). The failure of this strategy, revealed in the
Dieselgate scandal (Mujkic and Klingner 2019), has paved the way for technological
change in the industry. Furthermore, in the context of the Covid-19 crisis, the German
government decided to provide massive support for sectoral innovation processes and
the development of the domestic market for electric cars, providing generous stimulus
programmes (Lechowski et al. 2023). With this, German automotive companies have
started a radical and fast transition to electromobility.
However, this transition, which is now accelerating, will have fundamental implications
for domestic value creation and employment in the industry. By the time of the
Covid-19 pandemic in Europe in 2020, the industry in Germany employed more than
800 000 people – a large number compared with other traditional car manufacturing
countries in the EU, such as France or Italy. However, the production of electric cars is
likely to require signicantly fewer workers than the production of cars with internal
combustion engines (Bauer et al. 2018). Accordingly, fears of signicant employment
losses are currently dominating the public debate in Germany (Blöcker 2021). In this
context, a number of analyses have been published over the last few years that quantify
the potential employment eects of the transition to electromobility in Germany based
on dierent assumptions and scenarios. However, the results of these studies are
ambiguous and oscillate between forecasts of massive employment losses and gains
Martin Krzywdzinski, Grzegorz Lechowski, Jonas Ferdinand and Daniel Schneiß
On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?180
(Bauer et al. 2018; Diez 2017; European Climate Foundation 2017; Kaul et al. 2019;
Mönning et al. 2018; Peters et al. 2013; Schade et al. 2014, 2020)1.
Against this background, our goal in this chapter is to shed light on the employment
implications of the ongoing transition to electromobility in the German automotive
industry. More specically, we want to address the following three sets of exploratory
research questions:
1. How are the strategies of German automotive companies changing regarding
electromobility? What implications may the changing technology and product
strategies have for domestic value creation and employment?
2. What are the forecasts regarding the employment implications of the transition
to electromobility for the automotive industry in Germany? How should the
assumptions and ndings of these forecasts be assessed against the background of
the current strategies of automotive companies?
3. What role does the Covid-19 crisis play in the transition to electromobility? How
can the direct economic impacts of the crisis and crisis-era state interventions in
the industry aect the pace and direction of this transformation?
In the case of the German automotive industry, this chapter examines the transition
processes in the largest national economy in the EU. The industry has been very
successful with a product strategy focusing on the middle, upper and premium market
segments and has been able to reconcile a high level of employment in Germany with
the extensive use of low-wage locations in central eastern and south-eastern Europe
(Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2009; Krzywdzinski 2014). However, Dieselgate blew up
into a dramatic event after which the industry had to reorient its strategies. Here, the
Covid-19 crisis created a window of opportunity for restructuring: the massive slump
in demand and production led to job cuts at a time when the state was responding with
a massive economic stimulus programme to promote and facilitate the transition to
electromobility.
In methodological terms, the study is based on an analysis of company reports and press
material as well as a systematic comparison of available studies on the employment
eects of the transition to electromobility in Germany. The chapter is structured as
follows: Section 2 discusses the German automotive industry’s production model
to date, while Section 3 addresses the hastening reorientation of the strategies of
German automotive companies since Dieselgate and the onset of the Covid-19 crisis.
Section 4 presents a comparison of the selected studies on the eects of this transition
on employment in the industry in Germany. Finally, Section 5 places the described
transition dynamics and employment implications in the current context of the
Covid-19 crisis, which we call an accelerator of technological change in the industry.
1. We review some of the results of these studies in the annex.
The German path to electromobility and its impacts on automotive production and employment
181On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?
2. The productive model of the German automotive industry
During the rst two decades of the twenty-rst century, the key characteristic
distinguishing the German automotive industry in the EU context has been the
country’s large domestic production base. Between the early 2000s and 2018, Germany
managed to maintain a very high volume of domestic passenger car production: at a
level of around ve to six million vehicles per year (OICA 2022). In the same period,
production numbers have not only been much lower but have also signicantly fallen
in other traditional European car-producing countries, such as France and Italy
(cf. Pardi 2020). In France, for instance, production volume almost halved from around
3.3 million in 2002 to 1.7 million in 2018 (OICA 2022).
In addition to large output, Germany has also managed to maintain high employment
levels in the industry. In the years directly following the global nancial crisis of
2007-08, automotive employment in the country only slightly decreased; and, in 2018,
after a few years of continuous growth, it achieved an unprecedented level of over
830 000 jobs. However, at the same time, there are clear indications in the statistical
data that these positive trends were already reversing. As shown in gures 1 and 2
below, in the years directly preceding the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, both
domestic production and employment levels in the German automotive industry started
decreasing. During the two years of the Covid-19 pandemic (2020-21), employment
dropped by nearly 50 000 jobs, from 830 000 to 786 000.
Source: Statista.
Figure 1 Passenger car production in Germany (produced cars), 2010-21
0
1 000 000
2 000 000
3 000 000
4 000 000
5 000 000
6 000 000
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Exports Not exported
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On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?182
The peculiar resilience of the domestic automotive production base during the last
two decades has been related to a number of factors. At rm level, two of these are
particularly important. First, the key German carmakers (OEMs) have successfully
managed to position themselves in the lucrative market segments of ‘premium’ vehicles
– and they have accomplished this not only in Europe but also in a number of other key
global markets (such as the US and China). The focus on premium markets also helped
German automotive OEMs during the Covid-19 pandemic because they concentrated on
the particularly protable SUV and premium car segments, compensating for the loss of
production volumes with increased per car revenues. As Sorge and St reeck (2018) point
out, this specialisation has been based on certain supportive institutional foundations,
including the specic system of innovation (which is based on close cooperation
between OEMs, suppliers, equipment manufacturers and research institutes), the
vocational education system and cooperative labour relations (cf. Krzywdzinski 2014).
Second, many German automotive rms, while maintaining signicant manufacturing
operations in their home country, have simultaneously relocated parts of their production
activities to various low-wage countries – here focusing especially on production sites
in central eastern Europe (Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2009; Krzywdzinski 2017, 2019;
Schwarz-Kocher et al. 2019). This trend has been particularly visible in the automotive
supplier sector. At the end of the 2010s, imports from low-wage countries already
accounted for about half of the entire value of the automotive components imported
to Germany – representing a much higher level than, for instance, the level observed
in the French automotive industry (Frigant and Jullien 2018; Frigant and Layan
2009). The extensive usage of low-wage production has also contributed to the price
competitiveness of the German automotive industry.
Why then did the relocation to low-wage countries not hollow out the German car
industry, as some researchers predicted in the 1990s (Sadler 1999)? Keeping a relevant
production base in Germany has been possible because many of the German supplier
production plants developed a specic strategy, focusing on so-called ‘lead plant’ roles
Source: Statista.
Figure 2 Employment in the German automotive industry, 2005-21
0
100 000
200 000
300 000
400 000
500 000
600 000
700 000
800 000
900 000
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
The German path to electromobility and its impacts on automotive production and employment
183On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?
(Krzywdzinski 2019; Schwarz-Kocher et al. 2019). Lead plants specialise in the most
innovation-intensive technologies, production activities and products. Their advantage
is their ability quickly to introduce new technologies and products. However, as soon as
the products achieve higher maturity, the supplier companies relocate their production
to low-cost countries, putting permanent reorganisation pressure on the German
plants.
3. Changing technology and product strategies
in the post-Dieselgate era
Although the established model of automotive production in Germany has proven to
be very successful over the past two decades or so, its future has become increasingly
uncertain in the context of the ongoing transition to electromobility. One of the key
reasons for this is that, for a long time, the existing domestic production base in
Germany remained critically dependent on internal combustion engine technology.
Both the key German carmakers and suppliers who maintain signicant production
capacities in their home country have long neglected investment in alternative
powertrain technologies and such emerging key value chain segments as electric
batteries. Until the outbreak of Dieselgate in late 2015, the overall strategy adopted
by the German industry to meet the increasingly stringent EU emission standards
was to keep optimising the combustion engine. However, the disclosures that led to
the Dieselgate crisis revealed that these alleged ‘improvements’ were, at least in some
part, achieved through intended technical deception. As a result of the crisis, German
automotive companies suered immense public image problems and had to pay billions
in nes and settlements in some countries. According to company data, VW alone was
forced to pay more than 30 billion euros (Lange 2021; Techxplore 2021). In addition,
the further tightening of EU emission regulations in the years following Dieselgate and
– perhaps especially – the recent introduction of nes for carmakers who do not meet
the standards have further reduced the viability of combustion engine-based business
models in the industry.
Whereas German automotive companies had long neglected electromobility, they have
now shifted to a radical oensive with the aim of transferring the strength of their own
products, particularly in the upper and premium market segments, from the internal
combustion engine to electromobility. In addition, rapid change had to take place if
penalty payments from the tightening of emission limits were to be avoided.
After the crisis of Dieselgate, Covid-19 became another accelerator of change. The
collapse in demand and in production in 2020 brought on by the crisis, the latter because
of the disruption to global supply chains, prompted a decisive response from German
policymakers. After brief deliberations, a major support package for the automotive
industry was passed, with purchase incentives for electric vehicles as its centrepiece.
This involves purchase premiums of 9000 euros for battery electric vehicles (BEVs)
and 4500 euros for plug-in hybrids (PHEVs) over the list price of the vehicles, half being
borne by the government and the other half by the companies themselves. In addition
to the purchase premiums, the state promised a rapid expansion of the charging
Martin Krzywdzinski, Grzegorz Lechowski, Jonas Ferdinand and Daniel Schneiß
On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?184
infrastructure. Added to this was a billion-euro package to support innovation in the
elds of digitalisation and Industry 4.0 (Lechowski et al. 2023).
Although there were calls to extend the purchase premiums to fuel-ecient internal
combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) as well, carmakers backed the demand for
premiums for pure electromobility. It was clear that any postponement of the change
would be expensive because of the threat of penalties at EU level. The strategy proved
successful: the share of BEVs in new registrations in Germany rose from under
1 per cent in 2018 to nearly 18 per cent in 2022; the share of PHEVs rose from just
under 4 per cent to over 31 per cent.
In the remaining part of this section, we take an explorative look at the new
technological and product strategies of the German automotive companies that have
been developed by rms in the post Dieselgate context. In so doing, we highlight the
possible implications of these emerging strategies for the domestic production base
and employment in Germany.
3.1 Electrification strategies of key German OEMs
Focusing rst on the case of German automotive OEMs, although all three rms have
increasingly focused their product and technology strategies on electried powertrain
concepts, some signicant dierences between these strategies are nevertheless visible.
The largest of the three, Volkswagen Group, is pursuing a particularly ambitious
strategy. The company recently set a target of a market share of electric vehicles (EV)
of around 50 per cent of total sales by 2030 (Volkswagen 2021). In addition, some of
the brands within VW Group will pursue even more ambitious goals. One example
is the VW brand, which is aiming for a 70 per cent share of EV sales by 2030. Even
more radical is the strategy of the Audi brand, which plans to launch only EVs from
2026. Audi’s strategy implies that the production of ICEVs in Europe will end around
2032-33 – although it may continue after this date in various low- or middle-income
markets, such as South America.
VW Group has already introduced a dedicated EV platform, Modularer E-Antriebs-
Baukasten (Modular Electric Drive Platform; MEB), which is used to produce dierent
EV models across dierent brands. The MEB will also be oered to other OEMs,
and Ford of Europe has already announced its plans to use the MEB platform for EV
production at its Köln plant. This strategy is meant to produce scale eects which could
make EVs more aordable.
In terms of investment in new technology development and productive capacities,
VW Group wants to build signicant in-house capabilities along the entire battery
supply chain, from the management of raw materials extraction to battery recycling
(Volkswagen 2021). To secure the supply of battery cells for its own production of EVs,
the company plans to build six battery factories with a total capacity of 240 gigawatt
hours (GWh) per year in dierent European locations: in Germany (together with the
The German path to electromobility and its impacts on automotive production and employment
185On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?
Chinese partner Gotion); in Sweden (with Northvolt); and in Spain. By 2030, these
plants are expected to supply 80 per cent of all battery cells for the European production
of VW Group. In cooperation with these partners, VW Group also plans to develop its
own battery cell. In addition, the company is making signicant investments in the
construction of its own charging infrastructures in Europe, China and North America.
The second German automotive OEM by size, Daimler, has also recently intensied
its electrication eorts and has begun pursuing an ‘electric only’ strategy (Daimler
2021). On the one hand, the company is re-emphasising its willingness to focus on the
highest value added ‘premium’ market segments, where prot margins are highest.
On the other hand, by 2025, half of its sales should already be coming from either full
electric or hybrid vehicles. Moreover, in 2021, the company announced its decision to
abandon any further new development of hybrid vehicles (Handelsblatt 2021); it sees
these as too expensive because they have to combine two powertrain technologies.
From a product-architectural point of view, the company introduced its rst full
electric platform in 2021 and, by 2025, all of its new product developments should be
based on dedicated fully electric platforms. Regarding the geographical footprint of its
production activities, Daimler currently produces EVs at seven facilities (Elektroauto-
News 2020): three domestic plants (Sindelngen, Rastatt and Bremen); and four
locations outside Germany (Kecskemét in Hungary, Vitoria in Spain, Beijing in China
and Tuscaloosa in the US).
In Germany, as part of ongoing reskilling programmes, around 20 000 Daimler
employees received training in the eld of electromobility in 2020 (Daimler 2021).
Furthermore, the company is also investing in the development of new capabilities. To
strengthen its own product development competencies, Daimler acquired the British
company YASA, which specialises in electric motors with the aim of obtaining access
to ‘technology in the eld of axial ux motors and expertise for the development of
ultra-high performance axial ux motors’ (Daimler 2021). Mercedes-Benz also plans to
develop and produce battery cells and modules in Europe with the help of new partners.
In the development of battery cells, Daimler is working with SilaNano to achieve an
‘increase in energy density through a signicant increase in the proportion of silicon at
the anode’, which would enable a measurable increase in range and a shorter charging
time.
The company is also expanding its own production capacities. First, in 2021, Daimler
announced its plans to join the government-supported battery cell manufacturing
project Automotive Cells Company (initiated by Stellantis and the French energy
company TotalEnergies/Saft). This joint venture should achieve a production capacity
of 200 GWh by 2030, including a new production facility in Kaiserslautern, Germany
(with a production capacity of c. 20-30 GWh). Daimler’s other investments in the
battery supply chain include its own battery pack production (developed together with
the German machine tools company GROB) and a battery recycling facility to be located
in Germany. Beyond battery manufacture, the company also plans to internalise the
development and production of electric motors (Daimler 2021), increasing its eorts to
build its own charging infrastructures.
Martin Krzywdzinski, Grzegorz Lechowski, Jonas Ferdinand and Daniel Schneiß
On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?186
Finally, the third key German automotive OEM, BMW, made an early entry into the
emerging EV market by establishing a dedicated sub-brand for electric cars (BMW i)
in 2011, introducing its rst purpose-designed fully electric model (the BMW i3) in
2013. Because of its technologically groundbreaking characteristics – such as the
modularised chassis architecture combining a lightweight carbon bre body for the
passenger compartment with an aluminium module for the powertrain area (Alochet
and Midler 2019) – the BMW i3 has been recognised as an example of an exceptionally
‘transformative’ product innovation style in the industry (Sovacool et al. 2019). However,
despite this early lead, BMW’s overall product and technology strategy during the last
decade has not been technologically more progressive than the strategies followed by
VW and Daimler.
Regarding its product portfolio, BMW’s much-praised early electric models were
discontinued in 2020 and 2022 because of their rather disappointing market
performance in the face of growing competition. The company did introduce two
other fully electric models in 2021 (iX and i4) and is planning to launch an entire new
generation of purpose-designed fully electric models based on a new vehicle platform
around 2025. However, with the sole exception of the iX, all other electric models
currently produced by BMW rely on multipurpose platforms developed primarily for
ICEV or hybrid powertrains. In addition, although the company plans to reach the
threshold of a 50 per cent share of fully electric vehicles in its overall production by
2030 (Watzke 2021), management has recently rejected the idea of abandoning the
development of new ICEVs altogether. Instead, the company intends to follow a more
technologically open strategy – at least, during the coming 10 years or so.
This perhaps more hesitant stance toward electromobility has also been reected in
BMW’s decisions regarding the development of new production capabilities. For a long
time, the company hesitated to invest in its own full-scale production of battery cells.
Instead, it has relied on external battery cell suppliers, conducting relevant research
and small-scale manufacturing activities in a few German plants simply to specify
component requirements. Only in 2021 did BMW launch series production of battery
modules and packs at its Leipzig and Regensburg plants (Werwitzke 2020).
3.2 Transition processes in the German automotive supplier industry
Although some signicant dierences exist between the key German OEMs regarding
their electrication strategies, the situation is even more complex in the supplier
industry. On the one hand, a recent survey conducted by Deloitte and Verband der
Automobilindustrie (German Association of the Automotive Industry; VDA) (Deloitte
and VDA 2021) suggests that a vast majority of automotive suppliers agree that
electromobility will become the dominant powertrain technology in the passenger car
industry. In addition, more than 80 per cent of the surveyed companies have already
undertaken some kind of measures in response to ongoing technological change.
However, at the same time, the overall pace of restructuring is still rather moderate.
Based on VDA data, although around 30 per cent of total R&D expenditures among
the surveyed suppliers is already spent on products in the eld of electromobility,
The German path to electromobility and its impacts on automotive production and employment
187On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?
only 15 per cent of rms’ turnover is generated by electric drive components. The
VDA study comes to the conclusion that the dominant strategy of German automotive
suppliers is not a strategy of a rapid ‘exit’ from ICE technologies but rather a double-
tracked approach that is focused, rst, on exploiting the existing product market and,
simultaneously, on investing some resources in the development of new technologies.
To gain a better understanding of the strategic dilemmas with which the German
supplier sector is currently being confronted, we take a closer look at the transition
processes taking place in three selected large and well-known companies, all of them
representing supplier rms with signicant but varying levels of dependency on the
ICE technological regime.
The rst company, Bosch – the largest automotive supplier worldwide – will be
strongly aected by the transition to electromobility because of the rm’s dominant
position in the fuel injection systems market. Recently, the company has started
investing in various new technological capabilities which will be of critical importance
in the production of electried and IT-intensive ‘next generation’ vehicles, such as
autonomous driving systems or innovative semiconductor technologies. Bosch wants
to become a supplier of all the critical components for electromobility including electric
engines, batteries and electronic components (Bosch 2018). Management expects that
the internal combustion engine will still represent a relevant market opportunity (e.g.
in the segments of hybrid or commercial vehicles) (Höltschi 2020), but the company
has started implementing signicant employment reduction measures related to its
technological restructuring programme. In 2020 alone, 6800 jobs were to be cut
worldwide (including 2000 in Germany).
Another important German supplier rm, ZF Friedrichshafen, has historically
maintained a powerful market focus on the production of transmission systems for
ICEVs. However, in the last few years, the company has made eorts to shift its business
model to more future-proof component technologies, such as hardware and software
components for automated driving solutions or drivetrain components for electric
cars. In 2020, ZF announced its decision to withdraw completely from the combustion
engine component market (Reichel 2020). The company is developing its own concept
vehicle called EVPlus to demonstrate the performance of its own technologies in terms
of miniaturisation and weight reduction, as well as transmission performance. With its
produc ts, ZF ai ms not only to reach est a b l i shed OEMs but a lso to oer new entra nt s to th e
market a complete platform for developing their own EVs. As part of these conversions,
ZF has established a new division for electromobility. However, the company has also
introduced signicant employment restructuring measures, including 6500 job cuts in
2020 alone with 15 000 more expected in the coming years (Borkert 2021).
Finally, our third selected case, Mahle – Germany’s sixth largest supplier, with strong
capabilities in the production of conventional combustion engine components such
as pistons, cylinders and valve controls – represents the type of company that may
be most severely aected by the ongoing electrication processes. Mahle is currently
attempting to diversify its technology scope toward various low-emission powertrain
technologies, for instance by launching R&D projects focused on innovative
Martin Krzywdzinski, Grzegorz Lechowski, Jonas Ferdinand and Daniel Schneiß
On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?188
combustion engine concepts (including hydrogen engines), fuel cell technologies and
electric motors (Rasch 2021). In 2010, the company had already taken over Behr, thus
acquiring technologies in the eld of air conditioning and thermal management. The
company hopes to use these competences to develop air conditioning systems designed
for EVs. Starting in 2014, the company began developing its own electric motors and
presented its rst product in 2021 (Rasch 2021). However, as part of its continuing
technological restructuring programme, Mahle has already implemented signicant
austerity measures and employment reductions. For instance, in 2020 it announced
7600 job cuts worldwide, including 2000 in German locations.
3.3 Conclusion
Overall, since the Covid-19 crisis, the German automotive industry has begun a radical
shift toward electromobility. It seems that this shift has been able to compensate for
the slow and late start of German companies in the BEV market. Given the plans and
announcements of the German manufacturers, it seems relatively realistic that BEVs
could account for a 50 per cent share of automotive production in Germany by 2030,
here under the assumption that the expansion of the charging infrastructure will allow
for such growth.
In addition, automotive companies and suppliers are investing in building up the
skills required for the production of electric motors and batteries and are developing
production sites in Germany and Europe. Thus, it is also not unrealistic that the
previous trend of almost completely importing batteries from Asia will be broken and
that signicant steps in the production of these technologies will be located in Europe
and Germany.
Finally, German carmakers and suppliers are investing in new technologies that can
deliver decisive competitive advantages after the end of the internal combustion engine:
these include technologies in the eld of electromobility but also the connected car,
autonomous driving and others. However, these investments go hand-in-hand with
equally decisive restructuring steps regarding existing production and employment.
4. Employment implications of the turn to electromobility
in Germany: a meta-analysis
The explorative insights into the changing technology and product strategies of the
German automotive industry that have been discussed in the previous section indicate
that, although the ongoing transition to electromobility will aect dierent rms in
dierent ways, the overall risks for employment in automotive production are indeed
signicant. In this section, we complement this picture with an in-depth review of
existing forecasts assessing the impact of the transition in the German industry on
domestic employment. Although an extensive body of such studies exists, the analyses
follow distinctive methodologies and assumptions, hence making a direct comparative
interpretation of their results dicult.
The German path to electromobility and its impacts on automotive production and employment
189On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?
To narrow down the scope of our analysis to those forecasts that rely on relatively up-
to-date assumptions regarding the characteristics and perspectives of EV technologies
and markets, our review focuses on studies published within the last decade (i.e.
since 2012). Furthermore, we only review country-level studies, thus excluding the
numerous forecasts developed for individual federal states in Germany (Malorny and
Linder 2012; Sujata et al. 2020).
Within this narrowed-down eld of search, we could identify two main types of
employment impact analyses in the German debate. First, there are analyses that take
a relatively narrow perspective and discuss the direct employment eects of the switch
from the combustion engine to the electric drive. More specically, these studies usually
depart from quite detailed descriptions of technological change at the level of automo-
tive products (both individual components and entire vehicles) and, building on this,
assess instead the related employment implications in terms of the changing demand
for dierent kinds of production activities and jobs across the automotive value chain.
The second type of study adopts a broader economy-wide perspective. Most such
studies use macroeconomic input-output models to assess the employment shifts
directly related to the changing character of production activities in the traditional
automotive manufacturing industry as well as the employment eects related to the
shifts in demand for various kinds of jobs in the national economy in the context of
the electrication of the car. This includes, for instance, the emerging demand for new
kinds of service work or the labour market eects of the infrastructural investments
necessary for the transition.
In the following, we present the results of our review based on this heuristic distinction
between these two types of study. Table 1 gives a comparative overview of the selected
studies. We provide a summary description of the selected studies and scenarios in
the annex. Although some of these examined analyses formulate multiple scenarios, in
each case we restrict our discussion to one scenario by selecting that which is closest
to the prediction of BEVs having a 50 per cent share of German automotive production
by 2030. Moreover, in cases where the examined studies present various possible
scenarios regarding the localisation of battery production, we focus on the one which
assumes that relevant production activities will indeed be located in Germany. Not all
studies, however, include such a scenario.
The two studies that focus on the direct employment eects of the transition from the
internal combustion engine to BEV (Bauer et al. 2018; Diez 2017) conclude that there
will be employment losses in the automotive industry. These losses amount to up to
80 000 jobs if battery production does not take place in Germany but drop to 16 000
if it proves possible to locate a relevant part of the battery production value chain in
Ger many.
In the studies based on macroeconomic input-output models, a large number of
assumptions come into play, making direct comparisons particularly dicult. If we
disregard the respective specics of the models and focus on those factors related to
the transition, two factors seem to be particularly relevant.
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On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?190
First, employment outcomes again depend on whether it is assumed that battery
production will take place in Germany. Studies that assume that batteries are largely
imported conclude that employment losses in the German automotive industry range
Table 1 Employment effects of electromobility in the German automotive industry
Reviewed study
(and scenario)
Bauer et al. (2018)
(ELAB); scenario 2
Diez (2017);
scenario
‘evolutionary
diusion’
Peters et al. (2013)
Schade et al.
(2014); scenario
‘technological break
(pessimistic)’
European Climate
Foundation (2017);
TECH scenario
Mönning et al.
(2018)
Kaul et al. (2019);
scenario ‘increasing
electrification’
Schade et al.
(2020); scenario
‘e-road’
Analytical perspective
Micro-analysis of direct
employment eects on
automotive production
Micro-analysis of direct
employment eects on
automotive production
Macroeconomic input-
output model
Macroeconomic input-
output model
Macroeconomic input-
output model
Macroeconomic input-
output model
Macroeconomic input-
output model
Macroeconomic input-
output model
Year in which BEVs
reach 50% share
of production *
2030 (40% BEV;
20% PHEV)
2030 (50% BEV;
20% PHEV)
-
2030 (50% BEV +
PHEV)
2040 (49% BEV;
18% PHEV)
- (2035: 23% BEV)
2035 (48% BEV)
2025-30 (2030:
71% BEV; PHEV
21%)
Expected production
volume (number of
cars)
c. 5.75 million (2030)
c. 5.75 million (2030)
c. 5.5 million (2030)
c. 7.3 million (2030)
-
c. 5.0 million (2030)
c. 6.5 million (2030)
c. 5.8 million (2035)
Expected net employment
increase/decrease in the
automotive industry
2030: loss of 90 000 jobs
out of 810 000 in 2016
(battery production mainly
not in Germany)
2030: loss of 16 000
jobs out of 613 000 in
passenger car production
in 2015 (with battery
production mainly in
Germany); or loss of
55 000 jobs (with battery
production mainly not in
Germany)
2030: gain of 17 600
jobs on 700 000 in 2010
(battery production mainly
in Germany)
2030: gain of 192 000
jobs on 700 000 in 2010
(battery production
partially in Germany)
2040: loss of 5000 jobs
from 2016 level [but
considerable increase in
employment in overall
economy]
2030: loss of 50 000 jobs
out of 830 000 in 2018
(battery production mainly
not in Germany)
2035: loss of 130 000
jobs out of 920 000 in
2017 (battery production
mainly not in Germany)
2035: gain of 7000 jobs
on 975 000 in 2018
(battery production in
Germany); [considerable
employment increase in
overall economy]
* Not all studies provide this information; the expected share of BEVs and PHEVs are contained in brackets.
Source: Authors.
The German path to electromobility and its impacts on automotive production and employment
191On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?
from 50 000 jobs (Mönning et al. 2018) to 130 000 (Kaul et al. 2019); input-output
studies that assume the location of a relevant part of battery production in Germany
indicate small employment increases in the automotive industry (Peters et al. 2013;
Schade et al. 2020).
Second, it is crucial to note which assumptions are made regarding the development of
demand and, thus, of the production volume and value added in Germany. Schade et al.
(2014), for example, forecast particularly high employment growth from the transition
but, in their model, this is accompanied by very optimistic assumptions regarding
the development of production volumes. Against the backdrop of the 2020 slump in
demand and production, however, the question arises as to whether the sales volumes
achieved before the Covid-19 crisis will again be reached in the future. Schade et al.
(2020) are more cautious about production volumes but still assume that production
can indeed reach pre Covid-19 levels. However, their result of positive employment
eects from the transition is based on the assumption that the German industry’s
upgrading and premium strategy (e.g. through new value creation in the area of driver
assistance systems and electronics) can be continued and is accompanied by further
export successes.
Therefore, the decisive factors for the future development of employment in the
automotive industry are, on the one hand, the extent to which production volumes can
reach the levels prior to Covid-19, where value creation can be built up in the area
of battery production and electric motors; and, on the other, the extent to which the
technologies surrounding the connected car generate new value creation.
It should also be noted that some of the studies come to the conclusion of very high
positive eects of electromobility on employment and value creation in the overall
economy, even if employment in the industry does not benet from this (European
Climate Foundation 2017; Peters et al. 2013; Schade et al. 2014, 2020). It should be
emphasised, however, that these macroeconomic eects are generated to a considerable
extent from assumptions of large public and private investment programmes in the
expansion of energy grids, the charging infrastructure and (e.g. Schade et al. 2020)
non-automotive transport infrastructure (railways), which will accordingly manifest
primarily in the construction, mechanical engineering and energy sectors.
5. The Covid-19 crisis as an accelerator of change
Regardless of whether the existing forecasts of the impact of electromobility on
employment in the automotive industry conclude that the employment eects will be
negative or positive, they all assume that these will occur in a period up to around
2030-40. Although in the particularly pessimistic scenarios annual employment losses
are higher than natural turnover (caused, for example, by retirements) (Falck et al.
2021), this is nevertheless a period during which such change can certainly be managed
by companies, employees and society.
Martin Krzywdzinski, Grzegorz Lechowski, Jonas Ferdinand and Daniel Schneiß
On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?192
However, the situation changed with the Covid-19 crisis. As Figure 1 showed, the
crisis was accompanied by one of the largest slumps in the history of production of the
German automotive industry. Shortages of microchips and semiconductors, because
of disrupted supply chains, contributed to this (Roland Berger 2021). The result was
that companies intensied their investments in electromobility exploiting, at the same
time, the window of opportunity for employment restructuring that had been opened
by the crisis.
As shown in Figure 2, employment in the German automotive industry reached its
maximum in 2018 and 2019 at around 833 000 jobs. During the two years of the
Covid-19 crisis, nearly 50 000 jobs were lost. However, companies have announced
even more extensive restructuring. Figure 3 shows the employment reductions
announced by companies in dierent European countries and regions over the course
of the crisis. What is projected here are the net losses; that is, the announced level of
employment reduction minus the announced level of job creation (e.g. by the new Tesla
plant in Germany).
The biggest job cuts in absolute terms have been announced in Germany: over
40 000 jobs are in danger. Measured by the size of their automotive industries, France
and the UK have also been signicantly aected. Hardly any net job losses are expected
for central and south-eastern Europe, the intra-European low-wage region that has been
attracting particularly large numbers of production relocations from western Europe.
It is reasonable to interpret that companies are using the Covid-19 crisis to restructure
employment more comprehensively, a period in which they are also making the
necessary adjustments to the transition from the internal combustion engine to
electromobility. The acceleration of these plans amidst a shortening of the adjustment
period represents a challenge for employees, trade unions and society as a whole.
Source: Authors, based on the European Restructuring Monitor.
Figure 3 Announced net job reduction in the European automotive industry
(press reports 1 March 2020 – 1 November 2021)
0
10 000
20 000
30 000
40 000
50 000
GermanyFrance UK Southern
Europe
Northern/
Western
Europe
Central/
Southeastern
Europe
46
4951
6892
6160
7620
43642
The German path to electromobility and its impacts on automotive production and employment
193On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?
As part of its Covid-19 stimulus package, the German government created the
Zukunftsfonds (Automotive Industry Future Fund) to support the transition between
2021 and 2025 (Fuchs and Sack 2022; Lechowski et al. 2021). The funds’ resources are
to be used to support (a) regional collaborations to adapt companies and employees
to the transition, with a focus on small and medium-sized enterprises; (b) innovation
projects by companies in the areas of digitalisation and manufacturing technology,
but also battery cell and electric motor production; and (c) further training concepts
for employees. Tenders for the funds’ resources were launched in 2021 but analyses of
their impact are not yet available.
For IG Metall, the trade union representing workers in the automotive industry, the
transition to electromobility represents a challenge. First, IG Metall must represent
the interests of employees in job security. Secondly, it must also represent the
interests of its members as users of mobility but also as citizens with an interest in
and responsibility for a healthy environment. This results in considerable tensions, as
Strötzel and Brunkhorst (2019) describe.
These tensions resulted from the trade union having long called for an ambitious
climate policy and then for a realistic setting of automobile emission standards that
would not overtax the innovative capacity of companies while allowing for the further
development of ICE technologies (IG Metall 2015). The background was a considerable
dierence of opinion within the union since the works councils of automotive suppliers
specialising in combustion engine components opposed a clear positioning of the
trade union in favour of electromobility. In its paper ‘Fit for 55’ (IG Metall 2021),
however, the union changed its position. It now clearly supports the rapid expansion of
electromobility but calls for a number of measures to facilitate the transition: supporting
the demand for electric vehicles; expanding the charging infrastructure and renewable
energies; locating battery production and raw material supply in Germany or Europe;
and securing employment, for example through regional reskilling programmes and a
conversion of the current Kurzarbeitergeld (short-time working allowance; KuG) to a
Transformation-KuG (short-time transformation allowance) (Strötzel and Brunkhorst
2019).
IG Metall is active at various levels in pursuit of these goals. At national level, the union
is involved in the Nationale Plattform Zukunft der Mobilität (National Platform Future
of Mobility; NPM) in which it works with the government, companies, environmental
associations and experts. Here, the union is pushing for the coordination of industrial,
infrastructural and labour policies. One of the union’s additional initiatives is the ‘Best
Owner Group’ an investor fund which seeks to secure jobs threatened by the phasing-
out of combustion technology.
At company (and also plant) level, the union is trying to secure employment through
collective bargaining and reaching pacts with management. Here, OEMs currently nd
themselves in two worlds: existing electromobility plants have full order books and are
associated with long delivery times; the production lines for ICEVs, on the other hand,
are severely underutilised, a state which is expected to last for a long time.
Martin Krzywdzinski, Grzegorz Lechowski, Jonas Ferdinand and Daniel Schneiß
On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?194
Under these conditions, German automotive companies have turned to a bargaining
pattern used in the past, one in which they oer employment guarantees and new
investment in exchange for concessions on the labour side (Greer 2008; Kädtler
and Sperling 2002; Krzywdzinski 2014; Zagelmeyer 2013). Given the pressure on
employment, these pacts are, however, ‘expensive’ for labour. An important subject of
such negotiations is the increase in in-house production for e-components to secure
new jobs (Strötzel and Brunkhorst 2019).2
BMW has announced that it will cut 6000 of its 128 000 jobs worldwide (90 000 of
which are in Germany). For the German BMW plants, however, there is an employment
guarantee until 2026 negotiated with the works councils which means that there
will be no compulsory dismissals. In addition, agreements have been negotiated at
individual plants. The Munich plant will be completely converted to electric cars while
that at Leipzig will be expanded into a competence centre for battery cell production.
At Dingolng, management has promised a new production line for electric motors. In
return, employees will forgo the payment of some wage supplements in exchange for
eight additional days leave. In white collar areas, 40-hour contracts will be reduced
to 38 hours. BMW is also oering termination agreements on a voluntary basis which
have been accepted by 1300 employees (as of February 2022).
Daimler has announced a reduction of 10 000-15 000 of its 300 000 jobs worldwide.
Several thousand of these are to be eliminated in Germany, with ICE production in
particular to be relocated to Daimler’s partner Geely, whose production sites are in
China. However, as part of the company’s split into Mercedes-Benz and Daimler Trucks,
an employment guarantee was negotiated until 2029 in which redundancies are ruled
out. The company has also pledged to invest 35 billion euros in German plants and it
was agreed that the issues of sourcing components in-house or externally (i.e. decisions
on vertical integration) would be negotiated with the works councils – an important
extension of the inuence of the labour side.
In view of the dicult market situation, the company’s 2020 collective agreement was
adjusted. First, working hours were reduced by 5.71 per cent (two hours in the case of
a 35-hour week) to save labour costs. Second, the employees waived the prot-sharing
scheme. In addition, as with BMW, certain wage supplements will not be paid but
converted into eight additional days leave. In return, the company has promised to
expand the Untertürkheim engine plant into a centre of excellence for electric drives
while the engine plant in Berlin-Marienfelde, despite losing employment, will gain
the production of electric motors. A digital factory competence centre will also be
established in Berlin-Marienfelde to secure the future of the plant.
VW Group had already launched a major cost-cutting programme in 2016 in response
to Dieselgate. The plan had been to cut 30 000 jobs by 2025, including 23 000 jobs in
Germany although, in the negotiation of the Zukunftspakt (Pact for the Future) with the
company works council, this gure was reduced to a net 14 000 jobs by 2020: 23 000 jobs
would be cut using severance programmes or partial retirement while, at the same
2. The following overview is based on research by Antje Blöcker (Blöcker 2022).
The German path to electromobility and its impacts on automotive production and employment
195On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?
time, 9000 jobs would be created in future technologies. The agreement also included
detailed commitments for new products for German plants: the Wolfsburg plant was
promised a new generation of EVs, including the Trinity project – a completely new EV
plant; the Kassel plant was promised lead plant role in electric drive transmissions; for
the engine plant in Salzgitter, there was the promise of the establishment of battery cell
development and series production, along with the development and production of fuel
cells (together with Audi); for the components plant in Braunschweig, an e-mobility
competence centre and responsibility for battery systems were promised; for the
Zwickau plant, there was the promise of the conversion to EV production; and, for the
Hanover plant, there will be component production for EVs.
Overall, the employment pacts illustrate the enormous pressure on employment in
the German automotive industry: thousands of jobs are at risk. At the same time,
these pacts do show how companies and works councils are using tried-and-tested
concession bargaining to try to secure the future of the sites and put them on a new
technological path.
6. Conclusion
Our goal in this chapter was to shed light on the implications of the ongoing transition
from combustion engines to electromobility for value creation and employment in the
German automotive industry. The starting point of our analysis was a reection about
the distinctive characteristics of the ‘German model’ of automotive production in the
EU context. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Germany has managed to maintain
much higher volumes of domestic production and much higher employment levels in
the automotive industry compared with other traditional European car-producing
countries, such as France and Italy. This development has been based on a combination
of several factors: on top of favourable regulation (Pardi 2021), it is the specialisation
in the upper and premium market segments, combined with the considerable
globalisation of production networks, that has allowed these to gain a strong presence
in markets like China and South America and to benet from low-wage component
imports to improve price competitiveness (Krzywdzinski 2014). However, the viability
of the German automotive production model has become increasingly uncertain in the
context of ongoing technological change. Our analysis provides exploratory insights
into how companies have managed this transition.
Although for a long time German carmakers relied on their specic competitive
advantages linked to their technological strength in the eld of internal combustion
engine technologies, crisis has led to a rapid reorientation of the industry. Carmakers
are now focusing on a rapid transition to EVs and are trying to gain competitive
advantages in this area by developing their own product development competencies
and engaging in new alliances. This turnaround by carmakers is also leading suppliers
to reorient themselves and develop new products and business models geared toward
electromobility. Given that German companies were hesitant over a long period about
investing in electromobility, this turnaround has been astonishingly fast and spurred
by crises: Dieselgate shook the industry’s faith in diesel technology and led it to
Martin Krzywdzinski, Grzegorz Lechowski, Jonas Ferdinand and Daniel Schneiß
On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?196
withdraw support from it; while the Covid-19 crisis created a window of opportunity,
rst because companies could now legitimise major restructuring plans by citing it and
second because of the German government’s massive EV subsidy programme.
It is clear that this transition will cost thousands of jobs, even if the exact employment
consequences are dicult to estimate. We compared a number of studies, with all the
diculties related to the use of dierent methodologies and assumptions. It becomes
evident that massive negative employment eects in the automotive industry can only
be avoided:
– if at least a relevant part of battery production (and the electric powertrain) will be
located in Germany
– the added value per vehicle produced in Germany increases signicantly, in
continuity with the upmarket and premium strategy of German manufacturers
– production volumes return to their levels prior to Covid-19.
At least in the short term, scepticism is warranted as to whether these conditions can
be met. Since 2020, many automotive companies have begun to reduce employment
signicantly. Nearly 50 000 jobs had already been lost in the German industry by
2021, while severe cuts have also been announced for the following years. In our
estimation, companies have at least partially started to realise the structural eects of
the transition with this reduction in employment.
In the long term, however, the situation is less clear. The massive investments made by
companies could put the growth model of the automotive industry in Germany back
on its traditional path. Several employment pacts in the industry – whose particular
goal is to buy time – oblige companies to invest in new technologies in their German
plants. These company-level eorts are supported by the policy measures launched
by the German government in consultation with companies and trade unions. These
include not only purchase subsidies for EVs and substantial innovation assistance for
companies, but also regional funds for small companies and for further training for
employees. All of this represents a classic response in terms of corporatist concertation
in the German automotive industry (Fuchs and Sack 2022) – even if labour is obviously
in a weak position given the pressure on employment (Hopp et al. 2022; Strötzel and
Brunkhorst 2019).
These employment pacts continue the tradition of negotiated change in the industry.
Works councils have accepted a reduction in employment as long as it does not mean
layos but is, instead, achieved through natural labour turnover, severance programmes
and early retirement. In view of the dicult situation of companies, works councils
and IG Metall have also had to accept cuts in pay, with employees gaining in return
additional days leave or shorter working hours. In addition, carmakers have pledged to
invest in the production of EVs and components in Germany. Whether enough time has
been bought for the transition remains to be seen.
The German path to electromobility and its impacts on automotive production and employment
197On the way to electromobility – a green(er) but more unequal future?
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