No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
Kaliningrad as an isolated zone: the impact of the war in Ukraine on the daily life of the residents of the Kaliningrad region. An introduction to the discussion
Abstract
The Russian authorities’ decision to go to war in Ukraine made Kaliningraders trapped inside the EU and forced them to re-organise their daily activities. Successive restrictions and limitations cut off Kaliningraders from the luxury of living a European life. The semi-exclave’s residents are forced to face the new reality which responds to the role played by the Kaliningrad region regarding Russia, the EU and NATO. Once again, Kaliningraders are experiencing the primacy of the exclave’s military character prevailing over the issues important to local communities. The primary objective of this article is to identify the socio-economic impact of the war in Ukraine. The present article is based on the results of qualitative research conducted with residents of the Kaliningrad Oblast.
... In addition to CBC programs, a special EU local border traffic regime between Poland and Russia took effect in July 2012 and remained operative until 2016. This enabled visa-free travel between Kaliningrad oblast' (KO) in the Russian Federation and an extended border region in Poland (Żęgota 2021), a main benefit for KO residents being favourable shopping opportunities as well as tourism in Poland (Studzińska and Dunaj 2023). This arrangement required a special derogation from the EU's usual definition of border regions to permit all of KO to be included along with a larger than normal area within Poland. ...
... Complaints included reduced economic benefits to border regions in Poland due to lower tourism income and less shopping by Russian visitors (Kurs 2021;Siegień 2019), as well as more limited possibilities for cross-border contacts. Along with COVID travel restrictions introduced in 2020 and restrictions placed by Poland and Lithuania on travel from Russia because of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, opportunities for KO residents to travel to Europe were sharply reduced (Studzińska and Dunaj 2023). A less ambitious local border traffic mechanism had been in place between Latvia and Russia (Staalesen 2012); it remained operative until August 2, 2022, and was suspended by the Latvian side when Russia closed the Latvian consulate in Pskov that issued the permits (Kommersant 2022;Lebedeva 2022). ...
This article explores the hypothesis that geopolitical tensions at the macro-level (e.g., between the EU and Russia) may be mirrored differently at the national and local levels. Despite the general EU freeze in relations with Russia after the Crimean annexation of 2014 until March 2022, the EU continued to provide support for cross-border cooperation programs at the local level between actors in Russia and those EU states that border Russia. The paper examines the manner in which CBC initiatives with the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland) were treated in Russian media in the period following the 2014 Ukraine crisis until 2021. The purpose of the media analysis is to determine the extent to which the Russian side made a linkage between the local cooperation and geopolitical tensions, with Polish media coverage providing a comparative reference point. The analysis finds that while geopolitical events can, under extreme circumstances, severely interfere with local dynamics that may promote cooperation in international relations, in the face of less severe geopolitical tension local cross-border initiatives can proceed relatively undisturbed, particularly if they have a non-political nature. Un répit au milieu des tensions géopolitiques ? La coopération transfrontalière entre la Russie et l’Union européenne dans les médias russes de 2014 à 2021 Cet article explore l’hypothèse que les tensions géopolitiques à grande échelle, par exemple entre l’Union européenne (UE) et la Russie, ne sont pas nécessairement répliquées à l’identique aux niveaux national et local. Malgré le gel des relations entre la Russie et l’UE après l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014, jusqu’en mars 2022 l’UE a maintenu des programmes de coopération transfrontalière à l’échelle locale entre des acteurs en Russie et les États de l’UE qui partagent une frontière avec ce pays. L’article examine comment les médias russes ont couvert les initiatives transfrontalières avec les pays baltes et la Pologne au cours de la période de 2014 à 2021 qui a suivi la crise d’Ukraine. Le but de cette analyse des médias est de déterminer dans quelle mesure les Russes établissent un lien entre la coopération à l’échelle locale et les tensions géopolitiques ; les médias polonais servent à établir un point de référence pour la comparaison. Les résultats de l’analyse concluent que la coopération transfrontalière locale peut se poursuivre sans interruption face à des tensions géopolitiques moindres et ce surtout si elle n’est pas de nature politique. Les dynamiques locales de promotion des relations internationales ne sont impactées sévèrement par les tensions géopolitiques que dans des circonstances extrêmes.
... A number of cultural and language centres that supported cultural and humanitarian ties with Germany, Poland, and Lithuania have been closed. The new 'Iron Curtain' is cutting off Kaliningrad's youth from education and careers in the EU, increasing their deprivation and frustration (Studzińska & Dunaj, 2023). ...
As Russia’s westernmost exclave, the Kaliningrad region faces unique demographic challenges exacerbated by the ongoing geopolitical crisis and Putin’s war against Ukraine. This study analyses the region’s population dynamics, fertility, mortality, and migration trends in the post-Soviet period, focusing on the impact of recent events. Despite initial successes in stabilising its population and improving demographic indicators, the region now confronts a growing threat of depopulation due to deteriorating age structure, declining fertility, slowing mortality reduction, and diminishing migration attractiveness. The devastating consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine have accelerated negative demographic trends, manifesting in reduced births, increased deaths, and intensified migration outflows, particularly among the youth and skilled professionals. In the new geopolitical landscape, the Kaliningrad region risks falling into a trap of peripherality and isolation, with severed ties to European partners, logistical constraints, technological lag, and shrinking markets. Overcoming confrontation with the West and restoring good-neighbourly relations are crucial for the region to regain its role as a bridge between Russia and Europe. The demographic future of the Kaliningrad region largely depends on national trends and the chosen vector of the country’s development, necessitating a reassessment of regional demographic and migration policies to create an environment conducive to the realisation of human potential.
... 3 However, prices for hotel services, rented accommodation, and food increased over this period, especially in the city of Kaliningrad and the seaside resorts. Kaliningraders had no opportunity to holiday in neighbouring countries, whilst increasingly expensive local resorts became overcrowded with tourists from mainland Russia [35]. As a result, both the local residents and, later, tourists shifted their focus to the eastern part of the region, visiting towns like Gusev, Chernyakhovsk, and Zheleznodorozhny. ...
This paper aims to study how geopolitical shifts affect regional economies and their structures. Border functions and regimes act as tools for the economy and society to adapt to the redistribution of political influence, movements of people, goods, capital and information between integration associations, individual countries and their cores. A changed environment may slow down the development of some industries (and even cause them to decline) and give a boost to others, with these two processes constituting economic restructuring. In the exclave of Kaliningrad, heavily dependent on international trade and transit trade with mainland Russia, geopolitical changes have naturally had an exceptionally strong effect. The relationship between border functions and economic restructuring was investigated over four periods. The study utilised data from Rosstat and the Federal Customs Service, departmental statistics and findings from expert interviews conducted by the authors. The extent and direction of changes are assessed by examining the ratios between major economic sectors, the structure of foreign trade relations, and the volume and sectoral distribution of investments. Four main ways are identified in which the sharp increase in the barrier nature of the borders between the Kaliningrad region and neighbouring countries since 2014 and especially February 2022 has influenced the region’s economy. The significance and effectiveness of the agro-industrial complex have risen, with an increased focus on domestic tourism, and the adoption of advanced public administration practices in collaboration with businesses. This includes implementing mechanisms such as Free Economic Zones and industrial parks, along with a shift towards proactive measures to adapt to the changing environment.
... Las repúblicas bálticas, definitivamente incorporadas a los proyectos de cooperación regional occidentales, presentan los perfiles más defensivos frente al desafío ruso en Ucrania dada la proximidad geográfica e histórica a este Estado. Territorios como la franja de Suwalki o el enclave de Kaliningrado (Studzińska y Dunaj, 2023) hacen de su membresía en la OTAN ampliada (con las incorporaciones de Suecia y Finlandia) un buffer securitario imprescindible. Moldavia, Georgia y la propia Ucrania son ejemplos de fragmentación territorial provocados por Moscú como consecuencia directa de sus intereses geoestratégicos en la región (Toal y O´Loughlin, 2016). ...
Rusia ha supuesto históricamente un desafío estratégico para el sistema regional e internacional en términos de seguridad. Como imperio, o durante el periodo de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas (URSS), ha considerado la expansión de su territorio como la mejor forma de defensa de sus fronteras, y la lejanía de ellas del Kremlin favorecía la preservación del poder político de corte autoritario o totalitario. Ambos rasgos se retroalimentaban; Catalina II justificaba la necesidad de un control férreo en una extensión territorial tan vasta (Figes, 2022). Sin embargo, la URSS también colaboró de manera decisiva —con un coste humano brutal— en la derrota de la Alemania nazi en 1945, lo que alimentó el imaginario de la Gran Guerra Patriótica, que está siendo manejado instrumentalmente por parte de Putin durante estos últimos años (Núñez Seixas, 2022).
Although Russia’s economy appears immune to any actions taken by countries supporting Ukraine in its struggle to preserve its sovereignty, the sanctions project directed against Russia continues to evolve. The sanctions policy pursued by the European Union, the United States, and their allies is isolating the Russian economy, gradually leading to its ‘Sovietisation’. The primary purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of the sanctions on the economic situation of the Russian Federation. The paper is based on available statistical information provided by the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) and Russian news media.
The Kaliningrad region is a socio-economically developed area with a steadily increasing population. Its economy is predominantly influenced by manufacturing industries, whose growth is supported by the region’s strategic geographic position on the Baltic coast and the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) regime. However, the region’s exclave status, which makes it reliant on external factors, hinders its development. Any change in these external factors could necessitate a restructuring of manufacturing industries. The severing of former foreign economic and social ties, the discontinuation of cross-border cooperation due to the actions of unfriendly countries, and the imposition of eleven packages of unlawful anti-Russian sanctions have had a more pronounced impact on the regional economy compared to the country’s inland regions. Logistics between the region and the main part of the country have been significantly complicated. Manufacturing industries have faced disruptions in the supply of essential foreign-made semi-finished products. The exports of several regionally-produced goods have been restricted, and transit through the Baltic States has become more difficult. This article aims to assess the impact of these restrictions on the development of manufacturing industries in the region. Another goal is to provide a rationale for the restructuring of specialization and changes in the geography of external relations in these increasingly complex external circumstances. Recommendations based on the findings obtained will contribute to the region’s sustainable development, characterized by dynamic growth and proportional development.
Research into the identity of residents of Kaliningrad Oblast is characterized by a combination of close attention to the ideologically significant factors of its formation and its deficit in personal belief and mindset issues. At best, researchers talk about stereotypes of public opinion and enduring mythologems. The authors seek to fill this gap by offering a look at identity as a reflective project supported by narratives and controlled by social practice. The purpose of the article is to show shifts in the understanding of the surrounding reality that took place in Kaliningrad society at the beginning of the 21st century and to the nature of their influence on the self-identification of Kaliningrad residents. The authors relied on a series of interviews conducted in the summer of 2020. The results of content analysis of text materials were compared with findings by other researchers and sociological survey data. The analysis showed that Kaliningrad society is characterized by opposing cultural phenomena: "Delays," i.e., comprehension of ongoing changes in categories relevant to the previous era, and "getting ahead," the use of narratives and practices characteristic of postmodernity. The authors suggest that the level of pluralism achieved by Kaliningrad society, based on a combination of modern and traditional values, provides the identity of the oblast's residents with the necessary stability. However, the contradiction between identity retention policy within traditional statist ideas and the reflexivity of modern society, in which an individual is not bound by traditions and ascriptive relations, can upset the existing equilibrium.
An exclave position makes the economic security problems of the Kaliningrad region more complex as compared with other Russian territories. Deteriorating relations between Russia and the West compound the situation. This has been especially so since 2014 when economic sanctions were imposed against Russia, and the country retaliated. Global geopolitical instability adds to the conundrum. This study aims to assess the economic security of the Kaliningrad region. Its objectives include defining the concept of regional economic security and measuring its level in the Russian Baltic exclave. Possible ways to improve the economic security of the region are considered as well. Official statistics on the dynamics of industrial production and GRP and 28 other socio-economic indicators are used to assess the level of economic security. The region performs well on nine indicators and much worse on 19. Proposals for economic restructuring aimed at more intensive exploitation of regional natural and labour resources are examined along with the region’s prospects as part of the Great Eurasia (Bolshaya Eurasia) project and as an ‘international development corridor’.
Poland's accession to NATO in 1999 undermined Russian-NATO relations. A similar contestation occurred before the EU's eastern enlargement when the transit of Russians to and from Kaliningrad was a contentious topic in EU-Russian diplomacy. Currently Russia's deployment of missiles in Kaliningrad has become a security concern. This article argues that NATO's security concerns replaced EU-Russian contestation about visa liberalisation as the main source of conflict in their relationship. It demonstrates that the case of Kaliningrad reflects a dual shift from a contested to a fluid boundary in EU-Russian relations, and from a contested to a solid boundary in NATO-Russian relations.
The Kaliningrad issue has always been part of several contexts of Lithuanian foreign policy and security assurance. That is why it is significant to look at what relationship models Lithuania has tried to implement with Kaliningrad and what opportunities and threats it has created for Lithuania. This article analyses the Kaliningrad factor, which became apparent during Vladimir Putin’s rule, in Russia’s relations with Lithuania, the EU, and NATO, and assesses the aspects of both “hard” and “soft” security. We argue that it is important to consider what Kaliningrad Oblast means to Russia, what role it plays in its foreign policy, how it is changing and what the dynamics of the EU and Lithuania’s relations with Kaliningrad has recently been, and what the possible and desirable scenarios of Lithuania’s cooperation with Kaliningrad could be.
The article considers the role of Russian border controls in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, including its impacts on immigration and customs controls and on cross-border social and economic activities. Although in March 2020 Russian border controls proved to be insufficient, they still were used as one of the main tools for immobilizing people. The sanitary bordered order contributed to social exclusion of marginalized groups. Meanwhile, those who had money, access to decision-making, eligible immigration status, ability to make their voices heard, or access to advanced knowledge on travel logistics still had some options to move across the “closed border.”
This paper takes a bottom-up perspective on the “boundary issues” that emerged between the EU and Russia with and since the end of the Cold War: the mobility of people and goods, energy and natural resources, security, and protection of minorities. This paper compares three zones of contact: Estonia, Moldova and Kaliningrad. Our starting point is that there is not a European-Russian relationship, but Russian European relations that vary according to interests and representations on the ground. We argue that cooperation and conflict are not tightly coupled with the geopolitical level but also shaped by the local dynamics of symbolic boundary making.
Since the crisis over Ukraine erupted, relations between Russia and the EU have been characterised by the coexistence of competition and cooperation. How can we explain this ambiguity? First, a distinction is made between the multi-actor structure of low politics versus polarised discursive positions in high politics. Construal-Level Theory is invoked to explain how low politics is characterised by concrete images, while high politics is characterised by abstract, ideologised images. Second, the article considers the interaction between both levels and argues that the contagion from more cooperative low level practices to the defrosting of EU-Russia relations is unlikely.
Cross-border shopping and tourism are worldwide phenomena, appearing at any border with at least some degree of permeability. The authors investigate the range of cross-border shopping and tourism activities practised by Russians at two of the EU’s external borders, one between Finland and the Leningrad Oblast, and the other between Poland and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast. The study is based on research conducted in the Polish–Russian and Finnish–Russian border regions between 2013 and 2015, when the authors held interviews, administered survey questionnaires, and engaged in participant observation. The information was supplemented with data from the Finnish and Polish Border Guard services. Based on the results of the fieldwork, the authors argue that cross-border shopping and tourism are often combined during the same trip, and thus constitute a specific form of cross-border activity. Their study sheds light on how cross-border shopping tourism depends on and is interconnected with more than just the factor of the non-availability of goods and services. They conclude that cross-border shopping at the Polish–Russian border and the Finnish–Russian border has become more like a Western European practice, namely shopping for pleasure.
Kaliningrad Oblast is one of the most telling examples related to practical implementation by the Russian Federation of the US-coined concept that came to be known as Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD). This westernmost Russian region, which has been detached from the rest of the country since 1991, used to be one of the most heavily militarized spots in the world in 1945–1991. After 1991, it lost much of its military potential yet has now regained it, becoming Russia’s most advanced military stronghold. This article analyzes the essence of this transformation through tackling the issue from three different angles. First, it provides theoretical discussion on the essence of the A2/AD concept and its applicability to Kaliningrad. Secondly, it discusses the main historical milestones related to the transformation of Kaliningrad Oblast into Russia’s military stronghold. Thirdly, it assesses the impact of the post-2014 events on Kaliningrad in terms of military buildup.
Two U.S. political geographers examine a range of geopolitical issues associated with the shifting sovereignty of Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast (a part of the former German province of East Prussia) during the 20th century, as well as the region's evolving geopolitical status as a consequence of the European Union's enlargement to embrace Poland and Lithuania. They argue that Kaliningrad today can be considered a "double" borderland, situated simultaneously on the European Union's border with Russia as well as physically separated from Russia, its home country, by the surrounding land boundaries of EU states. Although technically neither an exclave nor an enclave, they posit that in many ways it resembles both, and as such presents a unique set of problems for economic development and interstate relations.
This article engages the recent studies that have treated the European Union (EU) in geopolitical terms, as an empire engaged with enlargement. The article introduces the meta-concept of geopolitical subjectivity. This meta-concept enables us to situate such imperial interpretations of the EU into a theoretically informed, comparative setting. The meta-concept is defined as goal-oriented ordering of territories and political spaces, extending from one's own sphere of sovereign rule to broader regional contexts. It is used to study the EU-Russian interaction in creating order to the Kaliningrad region that is set to become a Russian enclave/exclave within the enlarged EU. The article concludes by arguing that in this case, the EU's geopolitical subjectivity is constituted more strongly by Russia's recognition of this status than by the EU's own identity and interest projects.
Kaliningrad’s advantageous location inside the European Union has not been fully utilized.Kaliningrad’s advantageous location inside the European Union has not been fully utilized.
Kaliningrad, a penurious exclave on the Baltic Sea, geographically separated from Russia and the Confederation of Independent States, remains a largely ignored legacy of World War II. The imminent accession of Lithuania and Poland into the European Union underscores the anomaly of its situation. Disproportionate militarization and neglect in Soviet times left a graphic legacy of social and economic decay. Many principal questions remain to be settled: the status and role of the territory, its relationship with Russia, with the surrounding region, and with the European Union as a whole. These issues are greatly compounded by the lack among its residents of a clear historically formed self-perception. However, a new local identity appears to be germinating.The absence of experience among Moscow bureaucrats with genuine federalism and their instinctive distrust of decentralization has so far only produced stillborn solutions of the problem of the status and role of the territory within the Russian Federation. The expansion of the European Union in the region presents an imperative for Russia to determine its future relationship with the Union. In so doing, Russia also needs to redefine itself. The eventual emergence of some unorthodox form of genuine local autonomy of the territory seems likely. Its appearance may serve as a catalyst for positive political development in Russia.
Kaliningrad is argued to raise profound questions regarding the role, power and influence of marginal actors in EU–Russian relations as well as international politics at large. Such entities may have to confine themselves to a totally subordinated position but they can also gain, as seems increasing to have been the case with Kaliningrad, considerable influence. As spaces in-between, or as potentially emergent third spaces that significantly problematise the idea of territorial sovereignty, they do not only influence – by blurring borders and various conceptual categories – the setting of local or regional agendas. They may also impact upon the very constitution of subjectivity, in the cases of both the EU and Russia. In this essay these processes are tackled, above all by scrutinising how margins are understood in both common and theoretical discourses with the departures unfolding then explored in the case of Kaliningrad.
The Russian oblast' (meaning 'region' in Russian) of Kaliningrad has gained significance in recent years. It is located where Russia is exposed not just to the forces of European integration but also to globalisation at large. The oblast' also stands out as a special case because of its geographic separation from the rest of Russia. It is cut off from the mainland by three foreign states, Belarus, Lithuania and Poland, which exacerbates Kaliningrad's political, economic, security and psychological challenges. More importantly, in the next few years when Poland and Lithuania accede to the European Union (EU), Kaliningrad will become not just a Russian oblast' outside Russia but also a Russian oblast' geographically within the EU. Its problems will become EU's problems too and EU actions will have a huge impact upon Kaliningrad.
Contributing empirical evidence in a rather neglected research field, this article examines the emergence of a regional identity in the Russian Kaliningrad oblast since Soviet times by analysing the composition and the views of the population, official symbols, place names, architecture, history-writing as well as economic and political strivings. It is concluded that the region has developed from a militarized, closed anonymous part of the Soviet Russian empire into an exclave separated from Russia, still Russian by nationality but more open and Western than the country at large. The inhabitants are coming to terms with the region's German past and realize that they have specific political and economic interests. This emerging regional identity has so far been compatible with a wider Russian identity. But if the economic situation in the region continues to worsen in comparison with the surrounding states, and the federal centre in Moscow cannot support the region, calls for more autonomy and even separatism may grow.
This article is a case study of Kaliningrad's political elite's attempts to make Kaliningrad the ‘Baltic Republic within the Russian Federation’, and the fact that this regional programme was perceived by observers from Moscow and neighbours as leading to the creation of the ‘Fourth Baltic Republic’. The geopolitical and historical peculiarities of Kaliningrad, and their impact on Kaliningrad's regional programme, are also discussed. The article will conclude by arguing that although the Baltic Republic slogan is fading, Kaliningrad's ambitions and desire to remain an ‘actor’ are not.
The Kaliningrad region has developed from being a military bastion of the Soviet Union threatening the West to being an exposed Russian exclave with much reduced forces mainly serving defensive functions. Russia strongly resisted NATO's enlargement and encirclement of Kaliningrad, but had to accept it as Russia was weak and could not stop it. When Russia became stronger under Putin, Kaliningrad was again brought under central control and the conditions in the Baltic Fleet were improved. The protection of Russia's sea communications and of its energy exports became the most important tasks apart from defending the region. However, as an effect of the war in Georgia and the US base agreement with Poland in 2008, Russia threatened to use Kaliningrad as a staging area for new Russian missiles, and the problem of military transit across Lithuania was again exacerbated. At the same time the global financial crisis hit Russia. Kaliningrad well reflects the ups and down in Russian relations with the West in this part of Europe.
Full-text of this article is not available in this e-prints service. This article was originally published following peer-review in Geopolitics, published by and copyright Routledge.
EU Restrictive Measures Against Russia Over Ukraine (Since
- European Council
European Council. 2023. "EU Restrictive Measures Against Russia Over Ukraine (Since 2014)." European
Council Website. Accessed 4 November 2022. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/policies/sanc
tions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/
Ruch graniczny oraz przepływ towarów i usług na zewnętrznej granicy unii europejskiej na terenie Polski w latach
- Urząd Statystyczny
Urząd Statystyczny, G. 2022. "Ruch graniczny oraz przepływ towarów i usług na zewnętrznej granicy unii
europejskiej na terenie Polski w latach 2020-2021, 2011-2022." Statistics Poland Website. https://stat.
gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ceny-handel/handel/
Fortress Kaliningrad: Ever Closer to Moscow
- M Domańska
- S Kardaś
- M Menkiszak
- J Rogoża
- A Wilk
- I Wiśniewska
- P Żochowski
Domańska, M., S. Kardaś, M. Menkiszak, J. Rogoża, A. Wilk, I. Wiśniewska, and P. Żochowski. 2019. Fortress
Kaliningrad: Ever Closer to Moscow. Warsaw: OSW.
Kaliningradskaya oblast' pervoi vstretila udar sanktsii i gotova s nimi spravit'-sya
- E Mukhametshina
Mukhametshina, E. 2022. "Kaliningradskaya oblast' pervoi vstretila udar sanktsii i gotova s nimi spravit'-sya." Vedomosti, July 18. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2022/07/18/931908-kaliningradskaya-oblast-vstretila-sanktsii?fbclid=IwAR1yv2q1l9SYXSR-cjPuKyEYihkklUNY_
0EVmq5nh51nOV2e772vczux9D0.
Wyspa Kaliningrad: Litwa ogranicza tranzyt do rosyjskiej eksklawy
- T Powszechny
Powszechny, T. 2022. "Wyspa Kaliningrad: Litwa ogranicza tranzyt do rosyjskiej eksklawy." Tygodnik
Powszechny, June 23. https://www.tygodnikpowszechny.pl/wyspa-kaliningrad-litwa-ograniczatranzyt-do-rosyjskiej-eksklawy-175657.
Obwód Kaliningradzki 2016: społeczeństwo, gospodarka, armia
- I Wiśniewska
- M Domańska
- J Strzelecki
- P Żochowski
- A Wilk
- M Menkiszak
Wiśniewska, I., M. Domańska, J. Strzelecki, P. Żochowski, A. Wilk, and M. Menkiszak. 2016. Obwód
Kaliningradzki 2016: społeczeństwo, gospodarka, armia. Warsaw: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich.
Kaliningrad Oblast Closer to Its Ever-Distant Masters
- M Cordes
Cordes, M. 2022. "Kaliningrad Oblast Closer to Its Ever-Distant Masters." Pulaski Policy Paper 17: 1-7.
Border Location and the Attractiveness of Kaliningrad
- V Kolosov
Kolosov, V. 2022. "Border Location and the Attractiveness of Kaliningrad." Baltic Rim Economies 3: 4.
Litwa dokręca śrubę Rosji: obowiązują kolejne sankcje
- Money
Money. 2022. "Litwa dokręca śrubę Rosji: obowiązują kolejne sankcje." Money Website July 11. https://
www.money.pl/gospodarka/litwa-dokreca-srube-rosji-obowiazuja-kolejne-sankcje
-6789281871866528a.html.
Tranzyt do Kaliningradu - napięcia rosyjsko-litewskie.” Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich Website
- I Wiśniewska
Największy pracodawca w Kaliningradzie upada na skutek sankcji
- Euractiv
Euractiv. 2022. "Największy pracodawca w Kaliningradzie upada na skutek sankcji." Euractiv Website
November 4. https://www.euractiv.pl/section/gospodarka/news/kaliningrad-awtotor-rosja/.
Duma nadelila kabmin RF pravom priostanavlivat' publikatsiyu statisticheskikh dannykh
- Interfax
Interfax. 2023. "Duma nadelila kabmin RF pravom priostanavlivat' publikatsiyu statisticheskikh dannykh." Interfax Website February 22. https://www.interfax.ru/russia/887349.
Alichanov -o vozobnovlenii sotrudnichestva s Evropoi: vopros dvukh-trech let
- Klops
Klops. 2022. "Alichanov -o vozobnovlenii sotrudnichestva s Evropoi: vopros dvukh-trech let." Klops
Website November 14. https://klops.ru/news/2022-11-14/261314-alihanov-o-vozobnovleniisotrudnichestva-s-evropoy-vopros-dvuh-tryoh-let.
Tranzyt do Kaliningradu -napięcia rosyjsko-litewskie
- I Wiśniewska
Wiśniewska, I. 2022. "Tranzyt do Kaliningradu -napięcia rosyjsko-litewskie." Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich
Website, June 21. https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2022-06-21/tranzyt-do-kaliningradu
-napiecia-rosyjsko-litewskie.