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Coercive advantage

March 2023
The Review of Austrian Economics 37(4):457-476

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This paper seeks to explain the persistence of entangled systems of political economy. It does so by introducing the concept of “coercive advantage.” Coercive advantage refers to the benefits, privileges, and rights conferred to certain actors engaging in political exchanges. The form of advantages obtained are varied, and may include financial transfers, capital returns, rents, and non-material benefits, such as recognition and prestige. The heterogeneity of coercive advantage is owing to the emergent complexity of political arrangements, presenting manifold opportunities for political entrepreneurship in the quest to attain such benefits. Distributional questions also come to the fore, with coercive advantages potentially reflected in upward redistribution benefiting a host of actors, such as interest group representatives, bureaucrats, and politicians themselves. A key proposition of this paper is that the arrangements giving rise to coercive advantages may register broad support under majoritarian political decision rules. Elites capturing the most lucrative rents, and other advantages attributed to coercion, may successfully co-opt non-elites into registering support for such activity. They do this by providing transfer payments, infrastructure, and other programs, together with communicating rhetorical and symbolic justifications for status quo practices. This paper considers key implications of the coercive advantage notion for political economy.

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The Review of Austrian Economics (2024) 37:457–476

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-023-00622-2

Abstract

This paper seeks to explain the persistence of entangled systems of political econo-

my. It does so by introducing the concept of “coercive advantage.” Coercive advan-

tage refers to the benets, privileges, and rights conferred to certain actors engag-

ing in political exchanges. The form of advantages obtained are varied, and may

include nancial transfers, capital returns, rents, and non-material benets, such as

recognition and prestige. The heterogeneity of coercive advantage is owing to the

emergent complexity of political arrangements, presenting manifold opportunities

for political entrepreneurship in the quest to attain such benets. Distributional

questions also come to the fore, with coercive advantages potentially reected in

upward redistribution beneting a host of actors, such as interest group representa-

tives, bureaucrats, and politicians themselves. A key proposition of this paper is

that the arrangements giving rise to coercive advantages may register broad support

under majoritarian political decision rules. Elites capturing the most lucrative rents,

and other advantages attributed to coercion, may successfully co-opt non-elites into

registering support for such activity. They do this by providing transfer payments,

infrastructure, and other programs, together with communicating rhetorical and

symbolic justications for status quo practices. This paper considers key implica-

tions of the coercive advantage notion for political economy.

Keywords Capital · Elite theory · Coercion · Distribution · Networks · Political

process

JEL codes B53 · D63 · D72 · P10 · Z13

Accepted: 21 March 2023 / Published online: 29 March 2023

2023

Coercive advantage

MikaylaNovak1

Mikayla Novak

mnovak@mercatus.gmu.edu

1 F. A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, Mercatus

Center at George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

1 3

Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

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