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The “Urtext” of Jihādi Intelligence Culture
Abstract
Religion and ideology have found their way into the Islamic State’s intelligence structures. If we are to understand what this means to the movement and its operational art, we must first understand the origins of its intelligence culture and the actors and agents who played a key role in that culture. Indeed, some covert operations, methods or even the recent history of Jihādi intelligence may seem familiar and Western, but the Islamic world, which includes the Jihādi interpretation of Islam, does not share the same religious and military traditions or history with the West. Therefore, the ideological, religious and historical roots of a Jihādi intelligence culture must be traced back to the time of the Prophet Muḥammad and even further back to the ancient Near East.KeywordsISIS’s AmniyatDawah OfficesSaddam Hussein’s intelligence servicesInternal controlSurveillanceHisbahBa’athist IraqSpecial security organisationEmni officersShura councilMedia councilMilitary councilSTASIKGBSaladinAncient near eastAssyriansPersian intelligence traditions
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