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The Rationality of Intelligence
... Decision making based on unconscious situational pattern recognition is called intuitive (Klein, 1998(Klein, , 2008Lopes & Oden, 1991;Westcott, 1968;Zsambok & Klein, 1997). Skilled intuitive decision making occurs in many domains of expertise, such as fighting fires, diagnosing infants with disease, and engaging an enemy during combat (Klein, 1998). ...
... Additionally, reasoning problems were solved by children using intuitive recognition of "gist," or pattern information (Brainerd & Kingma, 1984; see also Reyna & Brainerd, 1995;Reyna, 2012). Lopes and Oden (1991) discussed the advantages of pattern recognition-based reasoning and remarked, Rather than involving content-less rules . . . a pattern-based system makes use of rich encodings of situation specifics gleaned from direct prior experience and tends to go relatively directly from data to conclusion. . . . ...
... Due to these methodological problems, the heuristics and biases literature does not actually demonstrate misguided intuition. For other criticisms of the heuristics and biases literature, see L. J. Cohen (1981), Cosmides and Tooby (1996), Einhorn and Hogarth (1981), Gigerenzer (1996), Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995), Lopes (1991), and Lopes and Oden (1991). ...
In the naturalistic decision-making literature, intuitive cognition is at the heart of a pattern recognition-based decision model called the recognition-primed decision model. Given the importance of intuitive cognition in naturalistic decision-making theory, we explore the question of what makes intuitive cognition effective for decision making and, in so doing, present an extended empirical and theoretical foundation for the intuitive component in naturalistic decision making. We theorize that intuitive cognition is effective because it (1) possesses a capability for grounded, situational meaning making (sign interpretation); (2) is operative over extended work intervals involving interruptions; and (3) is instrumental in handling situated complexities of everyday living. Other characteristics of intuitive cognition and its foundations are discussed. We propose that intuitive cognition represents the core of cognition - grounded, situational meaning making - whereas analytical cognition represents a form of an intellectual exoskeleton that provides added capabilities (e.g., working memory).
... If it were true that words with a particular letter in the first position can be produced more easily, as Tversky and Kahneman (1973, p. 211) suggested, both hypotheses predict that all letters are generally judged to be more frequent in the first position, whether or not they actually are. Lopes and Oden (1991) pointed out that in Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) study, each of the five consonants used (JT, L, N, R, and V) was more frequent in the third position in the English language. Therefore, they argued that this sample was atypical, because most consonants (12 of 20) are in fact more frequent in the first position. ...
... We used Lopes and Oden's (1991) critique as a starting point to design an alternative hypothesis of how letter frequencies are judged. What we call the letter-class hypothesis assumes that, in the absence of knowledge about a particular letter, relative frequencies are inferred from knowledge about the phonological class they belong to: consonants or vowels. ...
... From the four hypotheses we now derive predictions for individual letters. We use a larger number of consonants and vowels than were used previously, to take into account the critique by Lopes and Oden (1991). Tversky and Kahneman (1973) let their participants make judgments about letters in the first and third positions of words. ...
How do people estimate whether a particular letter is more frequent in the 1st versus in a later position? The authors tested 2 precise versions of the availability hypothesis, a hypothesis that assumes that frequency processing occurs on the level of the phonological classes of vowels and consonants, and the regressed-frequencies hypothesis, which assumes monitoring of individual letters. Across 3 studies, it was found that (a) judgments of whether a letter is more frequent in the 1st or the 2nd position generally followed the actual proportions and (b) the estimated relative frequencies in the 1st versus the 2nd position closely agreed with the actual rank ordering, except for an overestimation of low and underestimation of high values. These results favor the regressed-frequencies hypothesis and challenge the conclusions about frequency judgments in the heuristics and biases literature.
... On the basis of standards involving the application of statistical norms, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) found that human judgments of probability were irrational. However, such claims of flawed decision making have been seriously criticized based on a lack of external justification for using statistical norms to determine rationality (e.g., Cohen, 1981;Hammond, 2007;Hogarth, 2001;Lopes & Oden, 1991), and a lack of relevance for real-world decision making (Lopes, 1991; see also Cosmides & Tooby, 1996;Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995;Holyoak & Spellman, 1993). Lopes and Oden (1991) suggested that in many cases participants in the Kahneman and Tversky studies were engaged in pattern recognition-based decision making rather than implementing a simplifying heuristic (see De Neys, 2006a). ...
... However, such claims of flawed decision making have been seriously criticized based on a lack of external justification for using statistical norms to determine rationality (e.g., Cohen, 1981;Hammond, 2007;Hogarth, 2001;Lopes & Oden, 1991), and a lack of relevance for real-world decision making (Lopes, 1991; see also Cosmides & Tooby, 1996;Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995;Holyoak & Spellman, 1993). Lopes and Oden (1991) suggested that in many cases participants in the Kahneman and Tversky studies were engaged in pattern recognition-based decision making rather than implementing a simplifying heuristic (see De Neys, 2006a). ...
Objective:
The aim of this study was to provide an analysis of the implications of the dominance of intuitive cognition in human reasoning and decision making for conceptualizing models and taxonomies of human-automation interaction, focusing on the Parasuraman et al. model and taxonomy.
Background:
Knowledge about how humans reason and make decisions, which has been shown to be largely intuitive, has implications for the design of future human-machine systems.
Method:
One hundred twenty articles and books cited in other works as well as those obtained from an Internet search were reviewed. Works were deemed eligible if they were published within the past 50 years and common to a given literature.
Results:
Analysis shows that intuitive cognition dominates human reasoning and decision making in all situations examined. The implications of the dominance of intuitive cognition for the Parasuraman et al. model and taxonomy are discussed. A taxonomy of human-automation interaction that incorporates intuitive cognition is suggested.
Application:
Understanding the ways in which human reasoning and decision making is intuitive can provide insight for future models and taxonomies of human-automation interaction.
... This system makes use of acquired experience and expertise (Klein et al., 2003). According to Lopes and Oden (1991; see also Chase & Simon, 1973a, 1973b, pattern recognition-based decision making has the advantage of reducing the problem of cognitive inference to one of identification and recognition. This system is good for rendering decisions under stressful conditions involving data overload, high uncertainty, time pressure, high risk, high stakes, and ill-defined goals (Klein, 1997(Klein, , 1998(Klein, , 2008Zsambok & Klein, 1997). ...
... Conflicting information can lead to decision priming, whereby a tendency to decide one way is counteracted by subsequent information, a process that delays overall decision making. Therefore, although intuitive decision making based on pattern recognition reduces the problem of cognitive inference to one of identification and recognition (Lopes & Oden, 1991) and thus is highly efficient, it may be vulnerable to conflicting cues and information. ...
Two types of decision-making processes have been identified in the literature: an analytical process and an intuitive process. One conceptual model of the latter is the recognition-primed decision (RPD) model (e.g., Klein, 2008). According to this model, decision making in naturalistic contexts entails a situational pattern-recognition process that, if subsequent expectancies are confirmed, leads the decision maker to render a decision to engage in a given course of action. In this paper, we describe a system dynamics model of Klein's RPD framework that focuses upon the dynamics of the decision-making process. The structure of our RPD model is based on a model of a set of laboratory phenomena called conjunction benefits and costs (e.g., L. R. Fournier, Patterson, Dyre, Wiediger, & Winters, 2007), which was extended to encompass the RPD framework. The results of our simulations suggest that decision priming (a bias toward rendering a given decision based on prior information) is a phenomenon that should occur in many naturalistic settings.
... A person who believes there is a 5% chance of rain can feel more concerned when in London than in Madrid, because rain is more representative of London than Madrid. This person did not purposefully use representativeness as a tool but nevertheless was affected by the rain-London association (see Lopes & Oden, 1991, for a related argument). In the pretesting of base rates for Experiments 3a, 3b, and 4, the pretesting participants may or may not have used representativeness in the classic sense-as a purposefully used tool for estimating their subjective baserate probability. ...
Past research has demonstrated that interpretations of vague verbal forecasts (e.g., "likely") differ as a function of the context to which they refer Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that precise numeric forecasts (e.g.,'"70%") are also susceptible to such context effects. Participants read descriptions of target events and experts' numeric forecasts. Perceptions of certainty, expressed on nonnumeric: scales, differed as a function of context manipulations. The results of Experiments 3a, 3b, and 4 indicate that these effects can be mediated by perceptions of an event's representativeness independently of subjective base rates. The results are also consistent with the idea that two types of semi-independent processing-associative and rule based-can have important influences on perceptions of certainty. Implications of this dic;tinction for research on judgments and decisions under uncertainty are discussed.
... These claims have been criticized on a number of points. In particular, it has been argued that this research has (a) lacked generalizability and relevance for realworld decision making (Lopes, 1991); (b) imposed statistical norms without taking into account the content of the problem or situation (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981;Gigerenzer, 1996;Lopes & Oden, 1991; see also Kahneman & Tversky, 1996); (c) presented heuristics that were too vague to count as explanations (Gigerenzer, 1996); (d) taken probability theory as a norm for single events (i.e., Bayesian), which would be considered misguided by many statisticians, who hold that probability theory concerns repeated events (Gigerenzer, 1994; see also Lopes, 1981); and (e) inappropriately used simple probability models as norms in situations calling for induction (Lopes, 1982). ...
Implicit learning involves the largely unconscious learning of dynamic statistical patterns and features, which leads to the development of tacit knowledge. This kind of learning is a ubiquitous, robust phenomenon that likely occurs in most, if not all, tasks in which individuals engage throughout their lives. In this paper, we argue that implicit learning and its end state, tacit knowledge, may assist in the acquisition, retention, and transfer of expertise and thus provide a form of tacit scaffolding for expertise development. The notion of tacit scaffolding represents a novel and interesting area of future research for the field of naturalistic decision making and naturalistic cognition.
... The latter provides the top-down component and is the basis for the recognition response. This kind of pattern recognition is a ubiquitous and robust process that underlies intuitive decision making [43,[71][72][73] and possibly the development of expertise [74]. ...
We present a human cognition framework for information visualization. This framework emphasizes how top-down cognitive processing enables the induction of insight, reasoning, and understanding, which are key goals of the visual analytics community. Specifically, we present a set of six leverage points that can be exploited by visualization designers in order to measurably influence certain aspects of human cognition: (1) exogenous attention; (2) endogenous attention; (3) chunking; (4) reasoning with mental models; (5) analogical reasoning; and (6) implicit learning. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
... Decision making based on situational pattern recognition is called intuitive (Klein, 1998(Klein, , 2008Lopes & Oden, 1991;Westcott, 1968;Zsambok & Klein, 1997). Intuitive decision making is seen as one of two forms, or modes, of decision making in the dual-process framework (Evans, 2003(Evans, , 2008Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1997;Hogarth, 2001;Kahneman & Frederick, 2002;Kahneman & Klein, 2009;Sloman, 1996). ...
We investigated whether naturalistic, intuitive (pattern recognition-based) decision making can be developed via implicit statistical learning in a simulated real-world environment.
To our knowledge, no definitive studies have actually shown that implicit learning plays a causal role in the development of intuitive decision making when the latter is defined as pattern recognition of real-world, or simulated real-world, environmental situations.
The simulated environment was presented dynamically so as to induce a sense of simulated locomotion through the scene and over sequences of objects on the ground. During training, participants passively viewed the objects sequences; during test, participants made intuitive decisions about related or unrelated sequences.
Intuitive decision making can be developed via implicit learning. Articulatory suppression, which affects working memory, exerted a significant inhibitory effect on the training of intuitive decision making. Intuitive decision making trained in the simulated environment fully transferred to a flat display (but not vice versa).
Intuitive decision making is developed by an implicit learning process that is engaged by the meaning inherent in naturalistic scenes.
Implicit learning can be used for training intuitive decision making.
... The specification of a normative model is important because in psychological research deviance from such models is often seen as an index of irrationality (see Gigerenzer, 1991;Hilton, 1995;Lopes & Oden, 1991). Such an assessment, however, tends to be too hasty if one finds that the problem is underdescribed to the participants. ...
Should one be more confident when predicting the whole (or an event based on a larger sample) from the part (or an event based on a smaller sample) than when predicting the reverse? The relevant literature on judgment under uncertainty argues that such predictions are symmetrical but that, as an empirical matter, people often fail to appreciate this symmetry. The authors show that symmetry in prediction does not necessarily hold. In addition to an empirical study involving predictions about soccer games, they develop a theoretical model showing that, at least for the ranges of numerical values usually found in everyday judgment problems, symmetry in predictions is uncommon when 2 different sample sizes are involved. The complexity of the theoretical model used in this analysis raises questions about model specification in judgmental research.
... In fact, we believe that our implementation of the fluency heuristic offers a definition of availability that interprets the heuristic as an ecologically rational strategy by rooting fluency in the informational structure of the environment. This precise formulation transcends the criticism that availability has been only vaguely sketched (e.g., Fiedler, 1983; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Lopes & Oden, 1991). In the end, how one labels the heuristic that we have called fluency is immaterial because, as Hintzman (1990) observed, " the explanatory burden is carried by the nature of the proposed mechanisms and their interactions, not by what they are called " (p. ...
Some theorists, ranging from W. James (1890) to contemporary psychologists, have argued that forgetting is the key to proper functioning of memory. The authors elaborate on the notion of beneficial forgetting by proposing that loss of information aids inference heuristics that exploit mnemonic information. To this end, the authors bring together 2 research programs that take an ecological approach to studying cognition. Specifically, they implement fast and frugal heuristics within the ACT-R cognitive architecture. Simulations of the recognition heuristic, which relies on systematic failures of recognition to infer which of 2 objects scores higher on a criterion value, demonstrate that forgetting can boost accuracy by increasing the chances that only 1 object is recognized. Simulations of the fluency heuristic, which arrives at the same inference on the basis of the speed with which objects are recognized, indicate that forgetting aids the discrimination between the objects' recognition speeds.
Rater‐mediated assessments exhibit scoring challenges due to the involvement of human raters. The quality of human ratings largely determines the reliability, validity, and fairness of the assessment process. Our research recommends that the evaluation of ratings should be based on two aspects: a theoretical model of human judgment and an appropriate measurement model for evaluating these judgments. In rater‐mediated assessments, the underlying constructs and response processes may require the use of different rater judgment models and the application of different measurement models. We describe the use of Brunswik's lens model as an organizing theme for conceptualizing human judgments in rater‐mediated assessments. The constructs vary depending on which distal variables are identified in the lens models for the underlying rater‐mediated assessment. For example, one lens model can be developed to emphasize the measurement of student proficiency, while another lens model can stress the evaluation of rater accuracy. Next, we describe two measurement models that reflect different response processes (cumulative and unfolding) from raters: Rasch and hyperbolic cosine models. Future directions for the development and evaluation of rater‐mediated assessments are suggested.
While the intention behind the use of information displays may be the inducement of different forms of perception, high-level cognitive processes are always engaged when viewing information displays. Cognitive Engineering, which involves the meaning of display content, should be considered when designing display systems. In this chapter, we present an overview of human reasoning and decision making, which we believe is most relevant to the future of information display design including wearable displays. In this perspective, we discuss how displays may be categorized to interface either with the analytical reasoning system via content involving symbology or with the intuitive reasoning system that may require some level of immersion and more advanced levels of display hardware to achieve cognitive engineering.
We provide a review and analysis of much of the published literature on decision making that is relevant to the design of immersive environments. This review draws from the basic and applied literature in order to provide insight for the design of such synthetic environments. Included in this review are articles and books cited in other works, and articles and books obtained from an Internet search. Issues discussed are (a) an overview of immersive decision environments; (b) dual-process decision making; (c) training robust intuitive decision making; (d) combining analytical and intuitive processing in immersive environments; and (e) concluding remarks. For the development of robust decision making in immersive environments, intuitive reasoning should be emphasized by creating an immersive situation and by providing for the development of automatic processing through implicit learning, with the latter reinforced by explicit thought processes. Considerations of the literature on decision making will provide insight for future design solutions for immersive decision environments. © 2009, Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. All rights reserved.
While the intention behind the use of information displays may be the inducement of different forms of perception, high-level cognitive processes are always engaged when viewing information displays. Cognitive Engineering, which involves the meaning of display content, should be considered when designing display systems. In this chapter, we present an overview of human reasoning and decision making, which we believe is most relevant to the future of information display design including wearable displays. In this perspective, we discuss how displays may be categorized to interface either with the analytical reasoning system via content involving symbology or with the intuitive reasoning system that may require some level of immersion and more advanced levels of display hardware and cognitive engineering.
While the intention behind the use of information displays may be the inducement of different forms of perception, high-level cognitive processes are always engaged when viewing information displays. Cognitive Engineering, which involves the meaning of display content, should be considered when designing display systems. In this chapter, we present an overview of human reasoning and decision making, which we believe is most relevant to the future of information display design including wearable displays. In this perspective, we discuss how displays may be categorized to interface either with the analytical reasoning system via content involving symbology or with the intuitive reasoning system that may require some level of immersion and more advanced levels of display hardware to achieve cognitive engineering.
The Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) community defines intuition as based on large numbers of patterns gained through experience, resulting in different forms of tacit knowledge. This view contrasts with Fast and Frugal Heuristics (FFH) researchers, who view intuition in terms of general purpose heuristics. The NDM view also differs from the Heuristics and Biases (HB) community, which sees intuitions as a source of bias and error. Seven suggestions are offered to assist the FFH and H&B communities in improving intuitive decision making and in conducting research that has greater potential for application.
Rather than trying to help people analyze which option to choose, the NDM community recommends that intuitions be strengthened by providing a broader experience base that lets people build better tacit knowledge, such as perceptual skills and richer mental models, as a means of achieving better decisions.
I report on the fate of three methodological and metatheoretical ideas introduced by Brunswik roughly half a century ago. All were greeted with more than the usual hostility because they challenged the conventional beliefs of the time. All have survived in unexpected ways. I also address certain sins of commission and omission made during the neo-Brunswikian phase of the development of Social Judgement Theory. My hopes and fears for the future are mentioned
In two experiments, involving over 900 subjects, we examined the cognitive correlates of the tendency to viewP(D/∼H) and base rate information as relevant to probability assessment. We found that individuals who viewedP(D/∼H) as relevant in a selection task and who used it to make the proper Bayesian adjustment in a probability assessment
task scored higher on tests of cognitive ability and were better deductive and inductive reasoners. They were less biased
by prior beliefs and more datadriven on a covariation assessment task. In contrast, individuals who thought that base rates
were relevant did not display better reasoning skill or higher cognitive ability. Our results parallel disputes about the
normative status of various components of the Bayesian formula in interesting ways. It is argued that patterns of covariance
among reasoning tasks may have implications for inferences about what individuals are trying to optimize in a rational analysis
(J. R. Anderson, 1990, 1991).
The author's purpose is to urge the constructive convergence of two current judgment and decision-making research paradigms. He shows why the heuristics-and-biases approach and the lens-model approach should be placed in the context of two very different metatheories, the coherence metatheory and the correspondence metatheory. The differences between the two research paradigms thus become apparent; they speak to different problems and appeal to different criteria for evaluating performance. Bringing the two into a constructive relationship to one another, however, will not only double the store of knowledge regarding diagnostic judgment and decision making, but also enhance efforts to achieve a cumulative discipline. Isolating these research paradigms from one another--as is done now--stifles theoretical generality, fragments knowledge, and confuses medical decision makers. An example of how convergence can be achieved is provided.
This chapter reviews selected findings in research on reasoning, judgment, and choice and considers the systematic ways in which people violate basic requirements of the corresponding normative analyses. Recent objections to the empirical findings are then considered; these objections question the findings' relevance to assumptions about rationality. These objections address the adequacy of the tasks used in the aforementioned research and the appropriateness of the critical interpretation of participants' responses, as well as the justifiability of some of the theoretical assumptions made by experimenters. The objections are each found not to seriously impinge on the general conclusion that people often violate tenets of rationality in inadvisable ways. In the process, relevant psychological constructs, ranging from cognitive ability and need for cognition, to dual process theories and the role of incentives, are discussed. It is proposed that the rationality critique is compelling and rightfully gaining influence in the social sciences in general.
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