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Media Measurement Matters: Estimating the Persuasive Effects of Partisan Media with Survey and Behavioral Data
... These questions are at the heart of this study, which aims to investigate the effects of online partisan news consumption on vote behavior and social polarization during the 2022 elections in Brazil, a country that has become more ideologically divided in recent years and where politically aligned media content online has sometimes been singled out as a possible contributing factor. Given the traits of Brazilian media and political environments, which combine citizens' weak ties with political parties, mandatory voting, and high reliance on online sources of information, we argue that if the public were generally influenced by partisan news (Wittenberg et al. 2023), this ought to be a case where effects are apparent. This is a key benefit of our research design compared to others focused on democracies where people have strong ties with political parties: when citizens do not have these strong attachments, information-related aspects could be stronger determinants of political outcomes. ...
... It is against this backdrop of a contested election that we consider this case. In a country with relatively high levels of internet penetration and use of digital sources for news, a varied media ecosystem that includes partisan brands both on the left and on the right, and with a tradition of low levels of political engagement but also mandatory voting, we argue that if the public were generally influenced by partisan news (Wittenberg et al. 2023), this ought to be a case in which effects should be apparent. This leads us to propose the following hypothesis: ...
... This may be even more common online where people are often incidentally exposed to news they did not actively select (Fletcher and Nielsen 2018;Kalogeropoulos et al. 2019a). In the US context using tracking data, Wittenberg et al. (2023) previously demonstrated that news consumption of ideologically aligned sources can affect Americans' political attitudes, but many citizens consume a wide variety of media online. There is also evidence that accessing counter-attitudinal sources might reinforce people's previously held beliefs (Garrett et al., 2014;Guo and Chen, 2022), that people's levels of trust in news moderate effects of news consumption (Anspach and Carlson 2022;Mont'Alverne et al. 2024) and that trust can be a stronger predictor of people's attitudes than news consumption patterns (Ejaz et al. 2024). ...
The 2022 elections in Brazil have demonstrated that disinformation can have violent consequences, particularly when it comes from the top, raising concerns around democratic backsliding. This study leverages a two-wave survey to investigate individual-level predictors of holding electoral misinformation beliefs and the role of trust and information habits during the 2022 Brazilian elections. Our findings demonstrate that susceptibility to electoral misinformation is affected by factors such as political ideology, trust in the electoral process and democratic institutions, and information consumption, with those who participate in political groups in messaging apps being more likely to believe in electoral misinformation.
An enormous body of literature argues that recommendation algorithms drive political polarization by creating “filter bubbles” and “rabbit holes.” Using four experiments with nearly 9,000 participants, we show that manipulating algorithmic recommendations to create these conditions has limited effects on opinions. Our experiments employ a custom-built video platform with a naturalistic, YouTube-like interface presenting real YouTube videos and recommendations. We experimentally manipulate YouTube’s actual recommendation algorithm to simulate filter bubbles and rabbit holes by presenting ideologically balanced and slanted choices. Our design allows us to intervene in a feedback loop that has confounded the study of algorithmic polarization—the complex interplay between supply of recommendations and user demand for content—to examine downstream effects on policy attitudes. We use over 130,000 experimentally manipulated recommendations and 31,000 platform interactions to estimate how recommendation algorithms alter users’ media consumption decisions and, indirectly, their political attitudes. Our results cast doubt on widely circulating theories of algorithmic polarization by showing that even heavy-handed (although short-term) perturbations of real-world recommendations have limited causal effects on policy attitudes. Given our inability to detect consistent evidence for algorithmic effects, we argue the burden of proof for claims about algorithm-induced polarization has shifted. Our methodology, which captures and modifies the output of real-world recommendation algorithms, offers a path forward for future investigations of black-box artificial intelligence systems. Our findings reveal practical limits to effect sizes that are feasibly detectable in academic experiments.
Studies have found limited evidence consistent with the theory that partisan and like-minded online news exposure have demonstrable effects on political outcomes. Most of this prior research, however, has focused on the particular case of the United States even as concern elsewhere in the world has grown about political parallelism in media content online, which has sometimes been blamed for heightened social divisiveness. This article investigates the impact of online partisan news consumption on voting behavior and social polarization during the 2022 elections in Brazil, a country where the public’s ties to political parties have historically been more limited or nonexistent but where ideologically aligned news content online has markedly increased in recent years. Drawing on a unique dataset linking behavioral web-tracking data of 2,200 internet users in Brazil and 4 survey waves with the same respondents, conducted before, during, and after the 2022 presidential elections, we find no significant relationship between the use of partisan media on either vote choice or social polarization overall; however, we do find some weak and inconsistent effects of trust in news moderating the impact of partisan media on social polarization.
This study explores the analysis of public reactions to presidential debates using a largely untapped social media data source—YouTube comments. My findings reveal a striking consistency in topics across YouTube channels, pointing to a shared perspective among viewers that goes beyond ideological differences. These results question the assumption that online behavior mirrors traditional media preferences, suggesting that viewers may not apply ideological biases in their selection of YouTube content, instead influenced by accessibility or algorithmic recommendations. My findings also highlight the potential of leveraging social media for identifying significant voter issues and concerns. Lastly, I highlight the distinctive nature of YouTube data and the potential of researchers to utilize it, especially in light of the limited availability of Twitter data.
Concern over online news echo chambers has been a consistent theme in recent debates on how people get news and information. Yet, we lack a basic descriptive understanding of how many people occupy bounded online news spaces in different countries. Using online survey data from seven countries we find that (i) politically partisan left-right online news echo chambers are real, but only a minority of approximately 5% of internet news users inhabit them, (ii) in every country covered, more people consume no online news at all than occupy partisan online echo chambers, and (iii) except for the US, decisions over the inclusion or exclusion of particular news outlets make little difference to echo chamber estimates. Differences within and between media systems mean we should be very cautious about direct comparisons between different echo chambers, but underlying patterns of audience overlap, and the continued popularity of mainstream outlets, often preclude the formation of large partisan echo chambers.
Previous study demonstrates that partisans perceive in-party news outlets as fair, and out-party news outlets as unfair. However, much of this study relies on one-shot designs. We create an ecologically valid design that randomly assigns participants to news feeds within a week-long online news portal where the balance of in-party and out-party news outlets has been manipulated. We find that sustained exposure to a feed that features out-party news media attenuates Democrats' beliefs that Fox News is unfair, but the same is not true for Republican's perceptions of MSNBC's fairness. Unexpectedly, repeated exposure to in-party news did increase Republicans' beliefs that Fox News is unfair. This study updates our understanding of partisan news effects in a fragmented online news environment.
There is widespread public and academic interest in understanding the uses and effects of digital media. Scholars primarily use self-report measures of the quantity or duration of media use as proxies for more objective measures, but the validity of these self-reports remains unclear. Advancements in data collection techniques have produced a collection of studies indexing both self-reported and log-based measures. To assess the alignment between these measures, we conducted a pre-registered meta-analysis of this research. Based on 106 effect sizes, we found that self-reported media use correlates only moderately with logged measurements, that self-reports were rarely an accurate reflection of logged media use and that measures of problematic media use show an even weaker association with usage logs. These findings raise concerns about the validity of findings relying solely on self-reported measures of media use.
Significance
Popular wisdom suggests that the internet plays a major role in influencing people’s attitudes and behaviors related to politics, such as by providing slanted sources of information. Yet evidence for this proposition is elusive due to methodological difficulties and the multifaceted nature of online media effects. This study breaks ground by demonstrating a nudge-like approach for exploring these effects through a combination of real-world experimentation and computational social science techniques. The results confirm that it is difficult for people to be persuaded by competing media accounts during a contentious election campaign. At the same time, data from a longer time span suggest that the real consequence of online partisan media may be an erosion of trust in mainstream news.
Does the internet facilitate selective exposure to politically congenial content? To answer this question, I introduce and validate large‐N behavioral data on Americans' online media consumption in both 2015 and 2016. I then construct a simple measure of media diet slant and use machine classification to identify individual articles related to news about politics. I find that most people across the political spectrum have relatively moderate media diets, about a quarter of which consist of mainstream news websites and portals. Quantifying the similarity of Democrats' and Republicans' media diets, I find nearly 65% overlap in the two groups' distributions in 2015 and roughly 50% in 2016. An exception to this picture is a small group of partisans who drive a disproportionate amount of traffic to ideologically slanted websites. If online “echo chambers” exist, they are a reality for relatively few people who may nonetheless exert disproportionate influence and visibility.
Significance
Access to diverse news strengthens democratic citizenship. Whether digital technologies have narrowed or widened news diets fosters contentious debates. Previous research shows the abundance of digital news sources might be leading to more fragmented audiences, ideological segregation, and echo chambers. Our study resorts to an unprecedented combination of data to show that the increase in mobile access to news actually leads to higher exposure to diverse content and that ideological self-selection explains only a small percentage of co-exposure to news. We also find that more than half of Internet users in the United States do not use online news. Future research should avoid generalizations from desktop-only data and pay attention to the increasing divide between informed citizens and news avoiders.
Do partisan disagreements over politically relevant facts, and preferences for the information sources from which to obtain them, represent genuine differences of opinion or insincere cheerleading? The answer to this question is crucial for understanding the scope of partisan polarization. We test between these alternatives with experiments that offer incentives for correct survey responses and allow respondents to search for information before answering each question. We find that partisan cheerleading inflates divides in factual information, but only modestly. Incentives have no impact on partisan divides in information search; these divides are no different from those that occur outside the survey context when we examine web‐browsing data from the same respondents. Overall, our findings support the motivated reasoning interpretation of misinformation; partisans seek out information with congenial slant and sincerely adopt inaccurate beliefs that cast their party in a favorable light.
Research has prominently assumed that social media and web portals that aggregate news restrict the diversity of content that users are exposed to by tailoring news diets toward the users’ preferences. In our empirical test of this argument, we apply a random-effects within–between model to two large representative datasets of individual web browsing histories. This approach allows us to better encapsulate the effects of social media and other intermediaries on news exposure. We find strong evidence that intermediaries foster more varied online news diets. The results call into question fears about the vanishing potential for incidental news exposure in digital media environments.
Selective exposure is the tendency to gather viewpoint‐congenial versus viewpoint‐uncongenial information. Extant models of selective exposure suggest this tendency occurs because people anticipate reading congenial (vs. uncongenial) information will cause more favourable intrapersonal consequences. However, these models ignore the notion that people's information choices are, in part, symbolic gestures designed to convey identity‐relevant beliefs to an audience through information display. Drawing from perspectives that emphasize human consumption as symbolic and a way to signal one's identity, we suggest that selective exposure pertains not only to information processing but also to conveying identity through information display. Experiment 1 showed that people characterize information display as a way to communicate their views to an audience. Experiments 2–4 showed that people are averse to displaying uncongenial versus congenial information (without processing the information), anticipate feeling more uncomfortable and more inauthentic merely displaying (without processing) uncongenial versus congenial information, and that people's intentions to engage in selective exposure in daily life are a function of their belief that selective‐exposure displays convey their identity. None of these studies or findings can be generated from extant selective‐exposure theories. Thus, selective‐exposure theories are likely incomplete because they ignore people's beliefs and goals regarding information display.
Does media choice cause polarization, or merely reflect it? We investigate a critical aspect of this puzzle: how partisan media contribute to attitude polarization among different groups of media consumers. We implement a new experimental design, called the Preference-Incorporating Choice and Assignment (PICA) design, that incorporates both free choice and forced exposure. We estimate jointly the degree of polarization caused by selective exposure and the persuasive effect of partisan media. Our design also enables us to conduct sensitivity analyses accounting for discrepancies between stated preferences and actual choice, a potential source of bias ignored in previous studies using similar designs. We find that partisan media can polarize both its regular consumers and inadvertent audiences who would otherwise not consume it, but ideologically-opposing media potentially also can ameliorate existing polarization between consumers. Taken together, these results deepen our understanding of when and how media polarize individuals.
While survey research has been at the heart of social science for decades and social scientific research with digital trace data has been growing rapidly in the last few years, until now, there are relatively few studies that combine these two data types. This may be surprising given the potential of linking surveys and digital trace data, but at the same time, it is important to note that the collection and analysis of such linked data are challenging in several regards. The three key issues are: (1) data linking including informed consent for individual-level studies, (2) methodological and ethical issues impeding the scientific (re)analysis of linked survey and digital trace data sets, and (3) developing conceptual and theoretical frameworks tailored toward the multidimensionality of such data. This special issue addresses these challenges by presenting cutting-edge methodological work on how to best collect and analyze linked data as well as studies that have successfully combined survey data and digital trace data to find innovative answers to relevant social scientific questions.
A major point of debate in the study of the Internet and politics is the extent to which social media platforms encourage citizens to inhabit online “bubbles” or “echo chambers,” exposed primarily to ideologically congenial political information. To investigate this question, we link a representative survey of Americans with data from respondents’ public Twitter accounts (N = 1,496). We then quantify the ideological distributions of users’ online political and media environments by merging validated estimates of user ideology with the full set of accounts followed by our survey respondents (N = 642,345) and the available tweets posted by those accounts (N ~ 1.2 billion). We study the extent to which liberals and conservatives encounter counter-attitudinal messages in two distinct ways: (a) by the accounts they follow and (b) by the tweets they receive from those accounts, either directly or indirectly (via retweets). More than a third of respondents do not follow any media sources, but among those who do, we find a substantial amount of overlap (51%) in the ideological distributions of accounts followed by users on opposite ends of the political spectrum. At the same time, however, we find asymmetries in individuals’ willingness to venture into cross-cutting spaces, with conservatives more likely to follow media and political accounts classified as left-leaning than the reverse. Finally, we argue that such choices are likely tempered by online news watching behavior.
Social and medical scientists are often concerned that the external validity of experimental results may be compromised because of heterogeneous treatment effects. If a treatment has different effects on those who would choose to take it and those who would not, the average treatment effect estimated in a standard randomized controlled trial (RCT) may give a misleading picture of its impact outside of the study sample. Patient preference trials (PPTs), where participants' preferences over treatment options are incorporated in the study design, provide a possible solution. In this paper, we provide a systematic analysis of PPTs based on the potential outcomes framework of causal inference. We propose a general design for PPTs with multi-valued treatments, where participants state their preferred treatments and are then randomized into either a standard RCT or a self-selection condition. We derive nonparametric sharp bounds on the average causal effects among each choice-based sub-population of participants under the proposed design. We also propose a sensitivity analysis for the violation of the key ignorability assumption sufficient for identifying the target causal quantity. The proposed design and methodology are illustrated with an original study of partisan news media and its behavioral impact. (194 words)
Despite the importance of news exposure to political outcomes, news consumption is notoriously difficult to measure, and misreporting news exposure is common. In this study, we compare participants’ news behaviors measured on a news aggregator website with their self-reported story selection immediately after exposure. We find that both individual and contextual characteristics—especially the presence of political cues in news headlines—influence reporting of news story selection. As a result, the news audience profiles differ using self-reported versus behavioral measures, creating two different pictures of news exposure. More attention is needed to improve news measurement strategies to address misreporting and to improve the accuracy of news audience profiles.
In a high-choice media environment, there are fears that individuals will select media and content that reinforce their existing beliefs and lead to segregation based on interest and/or partisanship. This could lead to partisan echo chambers among those who are politically interested and could contribute to a growing gap in knowledge between those who are politically interested and those who are not. However, the high-choice environment also allows individuals, including those who are politically interested, to consume a wide variety of media, which could lead them to more diverse content and perspectives. This study examines the relationship between political interest as well as media diversity and being caught in an echo chamber (measured by five different variables). Using a nationally representative survey of adult internet users in the United Kingdom (N = 2000), we find that those who are interested in politics and those with diverse media diets tend to avoid echo chambers. This work challenges the impact of echo chambers and tempers fears of partisan segregation since only a small segment of the population are likely to find themselves in an echo chamber. We argue that single media studies and studies which use narrow definitions and measurements of being in an echo chamber are flawed because they do not test the theory in the realistic context of a multiple media environment.
Scholars have questioned the potential for incidental exposure in high-choice media environments. We use online survey data to examine incidental exposure to news on social media (Facebook, YouTube, Twitter) in four countries (Italy, Australia, United Kingdom, United States). Leaving aside those who say they intentionally use social media for news, we compare the number of online news sources used by social media users who do not see it as a news platform, but may come across news while using it (the incidentally exposed), with people who do not use social media at all (non-users). We find that (a) the incidentally exposed users use significantly more online news sources than non-users, (b) the effect of incidental exposure is stronger for younger people and those with low interest in news and (c) stronger for users of YouTube and Twitter than for users of Facebook.
Recent research suggests that more and more citizens select news and information that is congruent with their existing political preferences. This increase in political selective exposure (PSE) has allegedly led to an increase in polarization. The vast majority of studies stem from the US case with a particular media and political system. We contend that there are good reasons to believe PSE is less prevalent in other systems. We test this using latent profile analysis with national survey data from the Netherlands (n = 2,833). We identify four types of media use profiles and indeed only find partial evidence of PSE. In particular, we find that public broadcasting news cross-cuts all cleavages. This research note offers an important antidote in what is considered a universal phenomenon. We do find, however, a relatively large segment of citizens opting out of news consumption despite the readily available news in today’s media landscape.
Exposure to news, opinion and civic information increasingly occurs through social media. How do these online networks influence exposure to perspectives that cut across ideological lines? Using de-identified data, we examined how 10.1 million U.S. Facebook users interact with socially shared news. We directly measured ideological homophily in friend networks, and examine the extent to which heterogeneous friends could potentially expose individuals to cross-cutting content. We then quantified the extent to which individuals encounter comparatively more or less diverse content while interacting via Facebook's algorithmically ranked News Feed, and further studied users' choices to click through to ideologically discordant content. Compared to algorithmic ranking, individuals' choices about what to consume had a stronger effect limiting exposure to cross-cutting content.
Copyright © 2015, American Association for the Advancement of Science.
Do users tend to consume only like-minded political information online? We point to two problems with the existing knowledge about this debate. First, the measurement of media preferences by the typical means of surveys is less reliable than behavioral data. Second, most studies have analyzed only the extent of online exposure to like-minded content, not the users’ complete web-browsing repertoire. This study used both survey data and real-life browsing behavior (661,483 URLs from 15,976 websites visited by 402 participants) for the period 7 weeks prior to the 2013 Israeli national elections. The results indicate that (1) self-report measurements of ideological exposure are inflated, (2) exposure to online ideological content accounted for only 3% of total online browsing, (3) the participants’ media repertoires are very diverse with no evidence of echo chambers, and (4) in accordance with the selective exposure hypothesis, individuals on both sides are more exposed to like-minded content. The results are discussed in light of the selective exposure literature.
Selective exposure has been studied for more than half a century, but little research has systematically analyzed the implications of various methodological choices inherent in these designs. We examine how four choices affect results in studies of selectivity in political contexts: including an entertainment option, including or excluding moderates, post-hoc adjustment of the subjects through a question about likelihood of selecting content in the real world, and assessing selectivity on the basis of issue attitudes or political ideology. Relying on a large experimental survey (N = 2,300), we compare the effects of these choices on two results: probability of selective exposure to like-minded political news and predictors of selective exposure (attitude strength, political interest, knowledge, and participation). Our findings show that probability estimates and, to a lesser extent, predictors of selective exposure are sensitive to methodological choices. These findings provide guidance about how methodological choices may affect researchers' assessments and conclusions.
Prior research has identified selective exposure (i.e., the tendency to consume information that is
consistent with one’s existing beliefs) as a phenomenon that may reduce the likelihood that individuals
are exposed to diverse information or perspectives. However, weaknesses associated with
techniques commonly used to measure selective exposure have led to ambiguity in the interpretation
of past results and inconsistency in findings across studies. This paper provides a review of previous
research that has investigated selective exposure, particularly in a political context, by measuring participants’ retrospective reports of exposure to prior information, by assessing behavioral intentions
to consume information in the future, by observing selective exposure behavior directly, or by investigating
aggregated behavioral information recorded over a period of time. These prior methods are
critically evaluated and recommendations are made which should improve the measurement of selective
exposure and consequently the validity and reliability of downstream findings stemming from
research in this area.
The effect of Internet use on political information exposure is investigated using representative survey data from Japan and the USA. Internet users can simply choose political information that is consistent with their political attitudes. This selectivity in information exposure via the Internet might have serious consequences on the democratic social system, such as fragmentation of shared information and a decrease in political tolerance. Three research questions were empirically investigated as to the presence of selective exposure in political web browsing, the effect of political web browsing on political tolerance, and the contingencies on which selective exposure occurs. Multivariate quantitative analyses show that web browsing, as a form of Internet use for seeking political information, facilitates exposure to arguments that are consistent with one's attitudes. However, selective avoidance, which suppresses exposure to heterogeneous arguments, is not empirically supported. Moreover, although Internet use as a source of information facilitates exposure to homogeneous arguments under certain conditions, it does not have a negative effect on political tolerance. This is because selective exposure to homogeneous arguments takes place if and only if the perceived issue's importance is high. That is, even if selective exposure has an effect on a few issues perceived as highly important, there is no such bias in other less-important issues, which attenuates the effect of selective exposure on the homogeneity of the information environment surrounding each person. It is concluded that the fear of a fragmented society due to selectivity in using the Internet seems to be empirically groundless.
We report the results of the first large-scale experiment involving paid political advertising. During the opening months of a 2006 gubernatorial campaign, approximately $2 million of television and radio advertising on behalf of the incumbent candidate was deployed experimentally. In each experimental media market, the launch date and volume of television advertising were randomly assigned. In order to gauge movement in public opinion, a tracking poll conducted brief telephone interviews with approximately 1,000 registered voters each day and a brief follow-up one month after the conclusion of the television campaign. Results indicate that televised ads have strong but short-lived effects on voting preferences. The ephemeral nature of these effects is more consistent with psychological models of priming than with models of on-line processing.
Measures of news exposure are common in research that tries to explain political knowledge, political engagement, opinion formation and, more generally, media effects. Much of that research employs self-reported measures obtained with surveys, known to suffer from accuracy problems. Observational measures, however, also suffer from limitations derived from data collection and instrumentation. Here we offer new comparative evidence on the nature of those problems. We show that commonly used self-report measures of digital news consumption are problematic for three reasons: they only pay attention to a small fraction of all available sources; they underestimate audience share; and they distort the relative position of news sites in visibility rankings. Measurement problems, however, also exist in observational studies, especially when mobile access is excluded from data collection. Our analyses quantify the magnitude of these problems, offering unprecedented comparative evidence of online news consumption that spans nine countries and a period of five years. We discuss the implications of our findings for future research on news exposure.
Persuasion is a vital part of politics—who wins elections and policy disputes often depends on which side can persuade more people. Given this centrality, the study of persuasion has a long history with an enormous number of theories and empirical inquiries. However, the literature is fragmented, with few generalizable findings. I unify previously disparate dimensions of this topic by presenting a framework focusing on actors (speakers and receivers), treatments (topics, content, media), outcomes (attitudes, behaviors, emotions, identities), and settings (competition, space, time, process, culture). This Generalizing Persuasion (GP) Framework organizes distinct findings and offers researchers a structure in which to situate their work. I conclude with a discussion of the normative implications of persuasion.
Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Political Science, Volume 25 is May 2022. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
Surveys are a vital tool for understanding public opinion and knowledge, but they can also yield biased estimates of behavior. Here we explore a popular and important behavior that is frequently measured in public opinion surveys: news consumption. Previous studies have shown that television news consumption is consistently overreported in surveys relative to passively collected behavioral data. We validate these earlier findings, showing that they continue to hold despite large shifts in news consumption habits over time, while also adding some new nuance regarding question wording. We extend these findings to survey reports of online and social media news consumption, with respect to both levels and trends. Third, we demonstrate the usefulness of passively collected data for measuring a quantity such as “consuming news” for which different researchers might reasonably choose different definitions. Finally, recognizing that passively collected data suffers from its own limitations, we outline a framework for using a mix of passively collected behavioral and survey-generated attitudinal data to accurately estimate consumption of news and related effects on public opinion and knowledge, conditional on media consumption.
Does the consumption of ideologically congruent news on social media exacerbate polarization? I estimate the effects of social media news exposure by conducting a large field experiment randomly offering participants subscriptions to conservative or liberal news outlets on Facebook. I collect data on the causal chain of media effects: subscriptions to outlets, exposure to news on Facebook, visits to online news sites, and sharing of posts, as well as changes in political opinions and attitudes. Four main findings emerge. First, random variation in exposure to news on social media substantially affects the slant of news sites that individuals visit. Second, exposure to counter-attitudinal news decreases negative attitudes toward the opposing political party. Third, in contrast to the effect on attitudes, I find no evidence that the political leanings of news outlets affect political opinions. Fourth, Facebook’s algorithm is less likely to supply individuals with posts from counter-attitudinal outlets, conditional on individuals subscribing to them. Together, the results suggest that social media algorithms may limit exposure to counter-attitudinal news and thus increase polarization. (JEL C93, D72, L82)
Polarization is a key area of interest for media and communication scholars. We develop a way of measuring how polarized news audience behaviour is at the national level. Then, we analyze survey data from twelve countries and find (1) that cross-platform (online and offline) news audience polarization is highest in the United States, and within Europe, higher in polarized pluralist/southern countries than in democratic corporatist countries. Furthermore, (2) in most countries, online news audience polarization is higher than offline, but in a small number it’s lower. Taken together, our findings highlight that, despite the well-documented fears associated with algorithmic selection, news audience polarization is not inevitable in environments that are increasingly characterized by digital news consumption, and that the historical, economic, and political factors emphasized by the comparative tradition remain critically important for our understanding of global trends.
Whether people live in echo-chambers when they consume political information online has been the subject of much academic and public debate. This article contributes to this debate combining survey and web-tracking online data from Spain, a country known for its high political parallelism. We find that users spend more time in outlets of their political leanings but, generally, they engage in considerable cross-partisan media exposure, especially those in the left. In addition, we use a quasi experiment to test how major news events affect regular patterns of news consumption, and particularly, selective exposure. We find that the nature of news explains changes in users’ overall consumption behaviour, but this has less to do with the type of event than with the interest it arouses. More importantly, we find that users become more polarized along party lines as the level of news consumption and interest for news increases.
Much of the US public acquires political information socially. However, the consequences of acquiring information from others instead of the media are under-explored. I conduct a “telephone-game” experiment to examine how information changes as it flows from official reports to news outlets to other people, finding that social information is empirically different from news articles. In a second experiment on a nationally representative sample, I randomly assign participants to read a news article or a social message about that article generated in Study 1. Participants exposed to social information learned significantly less than participants who were exposed to the news article. However, individuals exposed to information from someone who is like-minded and knowledgeable learned the same objective facts as those who received information from the media. Although participants learned the same factual information from these ideal informants as they did from the media, they had different subjective evaluations.
Cambridge Core - Media, Mass Communication - Frenemies - by Jaime E. Settle
To what extent do partisan media sources shape public opinion? On its face, it would appear that the impact of partisan media is limited, given that it attracts a relatively small audience. We argue, however, that its influence may extend beyond its direct audience via a two-step communication flow. Specifically, those who watch and are impacted by partisan media outlets talk to and persuade others who did not watch. We present experimental results that demonstrate this process. We therefore show that previous studies may have significantly underestimated the effect of these outlets. We also illustrate that how the two-step communication flow works is contingent upon the precise composition of the discussion group (e.g., is it consistent of all fellow partisans or a mix of partisans?). We conclude by highlighting what our results imply about the study of media, preference formation, and partisan polarization.
The move to high-choice media environments has sparked fears over audience fragmentation. We analyze news audiences across media platforms (print, television, and online) in 6 countries, going beyond platform-specific, single-country studies. We find surprisingly high levels of news audience duplication, but also that cross-platform audiences vary from country to country, with fragmentation higher in Denmark and the United Kingdom than in Spain and the United States. We find no support for the idea that online audiences are more fragmented than offline audiences, countering fears associated with audience segmentation and filter bubbles. Because all communication exists in the context of its audience, our analysis has implications across the field, underlining the importance of research into how trends play out in different contexts.
Explanations of error in survey self-reports have focused on social desirability: that respondents answer questions about normative behavior to appear prosocial to interviewers. However, this paradigm fails to explain why bias occurs even in self-administered modes like mail and web surveys. We offer an alternative explanation rooted in identity theory that focuses on measurement directiveness as a cause of bias. After completing questions about physical exercise on a web survey, respondents completed a text message–based reporting procedure, sending updates on their major activities for five days. Random assignment was then made to one of two conditions: instructions mentioned the focus of the study, physical exercise, or not. Survey responses, text updates, and records from recreation facilities were compared. Direct measures generated bias—overreporting in survey measures and reactivity in the directive text condition—but the nondirective text condition generated unbiased measures. Findings are discussed in terms of identity.
It is widely thought that news organizations exhibit ideological bias, but rigorously quantifying such slant has proven methodologically
challenging. Through a combination of machine-learning and crowdsourcing techniques, we investigate the selection and framing
of political issues in fifteen major US news outlets. Starting with 803,146 news stories published over twelve months, we
first used supervised learning algorithms to identify the 14 percent of articles pertaining to political events. We then recruited
749 online human judges to classify a random subset of 10,502 of these political articles according to topic and ideological
position. Our analysis yields an ideological ordering of outlets consistent with prior work. However, news outlets are considerably
more similar than generally believed. Specifically, with the exception of political scandals, major news organizations present
topics in a largely nonpartisan manner, casting neither Democrats nor Republicans in a particularly favorable or unfavorable
light. Moreover, again with the exception of political scandals, little evidence exists of systematic differences in story
selection, with all major news outlets covering a wide variety of topics with frequency largely unrelated to the outlet’s
ideological position. Finally, news organizations express their ideological bias not by directly advocating for a preferred
political party, but rather by disproportionately criticizing one side, a convention that further moderates overall differences.
The media environment is changing. Today in the United States, the average viewer can choose from hundreds of channels, including several twenty-four hour news channels. News is on cell phones, on iPods, and online; it has become a ubiquitous and unavoidable reality in modern society. The purpose of this book is to examine systematically, how these differences in access and form of media affect political behaviour. Using experiments and new survey data, it shows how changes in the media environment reverberate through the political system, affecting news exposure, political learning, turnout, and voting behavior.
Fox News, MSNBC, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Rush Limbaugh Show, National Public Radio-a list of available political media sources could continue without any apparent end. This book investigates how people navigate these choices. It asks whether people are using media sources that express political views matching their own, a behavior known as partisan selective exposure. By looking at newspaper, cable news, news magazine, talk radio, and political website use, this book offers a look to-date at the extent to which partisanship influences our media selections. Using data from numerous surveys and experiments, the results provide broad evidence about the connection between partisanship and news choices. This book also examines who seeks out likeminded media and why they do it. Perceptions of partisan biases in the media vary-sources that seem quite biased to some don't seem so biased to others. These perceptual differences provide insight into why some people select politically likeminded media-a phenomenon that is democratically consequential. On one hand, citizens may become increasingly divided from using media that coheres with their political beliefs. In this way, partisan selective exposure may result in a more fragmented and polarized public. On the other hand, partisan selective exposure may encourage participation and understanding. Likeminded partisan information may inspire citizens to participate in politics and help them to organize their political thinking. But, ultimately, the partisan use of niche news has some troubling effects. It is vital that we think carefully about the implications both for the conduct of media research and, more broadly, for the progress of democracy.
We estimated ideological preferences of 3.8 million Twitter users and, using a data set of nearly 150 million tweets concerning 12 political and nonpolitical issues, explored whether online communication resembles an "echo chamber" (as a result of selective exposure and ideological segregation) or a "national conversation." We observed that information was exchanged primarily among individuals with similar ideological preferences in the case of political issues (e.g., 2012 presidential election, 2013 government shutdown) but not many other current events (e.g., 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, 2014 Super Bowl). Discussion of the Newtown shootings in 2012 reflected a dynamic process, beginning as a national conversation before transforming into a polarized exchange. With respect to both political and nonpolitical issues, liberals were more likely than conservatives to engage in cross-ideological dissemination; this is an important asymmetry with respect to the structure of communication that is consistent with psychological theory and research bearing on ideological differences in epistemic, existential, and relational motivation. Overall, we conclude that previous work may have overestimated the degree of ideological segregation in social-media usage.
© The Author(s) 2015.
Research has shown that humans are biased information processors. This study investigates an important potential example of biased information processing: when ex ante assessments of a media outlet's ideological orientation cause individual's to perceive bias in balanced news coverage. We conduct an experiment in which participants evaluated the content of a news report about the 2004 presidential election identified as originating from CNN, FOX or a fictional TV station. Our results suggest that in an increasingly fragmented media marketplace, individuals not only distinguish between media outlets but, more importantly, outlet brand names, and the reputations they carry, function as heuristics, heavily influencing perceptions of bias in content. As a result, individuals sometimes create bias, even where none exists.
We investigate how selective exposure to various types of media shapes hostile media perceptions. We use an innovative experimental design that gauges the influence of viewers’ preferences for entertainment, partisan cable news, or mainstream broadcast news on their reactions to media content. This design represents a modification to the participant preference experiment used elsewhere, expanding a laboratory-based media environment to include partisan and mainstream news options, alongside entertainment programming. We find that people’s viewing preferences shape their reactions to news media content.
Previous research has consistently documented a hostile media effect in which people see bias in balanced reporting on political controversies. In the contemporary fragmented media environment, partisan news outlets intentionally report political news from ideological perspectives, raising the possibility that ideologically biased news may cause viewers to become increasingly suspicious of and antagonistic toward news media—which we call oppositional media hostility. However, the fragmented media environment also gives television viewers ample opportunities to tune out news outlets with which they disagree as well as the news altogether, and this should moderate oppositional media hostility. We investigate the effects of partisan news shows on media perceptions across six laboratory-based experiments. We find that counterattitudinal news programming is more likely to induce hostile media perceptions than proattitudinal programming, but that the presence of choice blunts oppositional media hostility. We explore possible mechanisms that underlie the moderating effects of selective exposure.
Scholars of political communication have long examined newsworthiness by focusing on the news choices of media organizations (Lewin, 194734.
Lewin , K. 1947. Frontiers and group dynamics. Human Relations, 1: 143–153. [CrossRef], [Web of Science ®]View all references; White, 195056.
White , D. M. 1950. The “gate keeper”: A case study in the selection of news. Journalism Quarterly, 27: 383–390. View all references; Sigal, 197347.
Sigal , L. V. 1973. Reporters and officials, Lexington, MA: Heath. View all references; Gans, 197919.
Gans , H. J. 1979. Deciding what's news, New York: Vintage Books. View all references). However, in recent years these traditional arbiters of the news have increasingly been joined or even supplanted in affecting the public agenda by “new media” competitors, including cable news, talk radio, and even amateur bloggers. The standards by which this new class of decision makers evaluates news are at best only partially explained by prior studies focused on professional journalists and organizations. In this study, we seek to correct this oversight by content analyzing five online news sources—including wire services, cable news, and political blog sites—in order to compare their news judgments in the months prior to, and immediately following, the 2006 midterm election. We collected all stories from Reuters' and AP's “top political news” sections. We then investigated whether a given story was also chosen to appear on each wire's top news page (indicating greater perceived newsworthiness than those that were not chosen) and compared the wires' editorial choices to those of more partisan blogs (from the left: DailyKos.com; from the right: FreeRepublic.com) and cable outlets (FoxNews.com). We find evidence of greater partisan filtering for the latter three Web sources, and relatively greater reliance on traditional newsworthiness criteria for the news wires.
We propose a model of motivated skepticism that helps explain when and why citizens are biased-information processors. Two experimental studies explore how citizens evaluate arguments about affirmative action and gun control, finding strong evidence of a prior attitude effect such that attitudinally congruent arguments are evaluated as stronger than attitudinally incongruent arguments. When reading pro and con arguments, participants (Ps) counterargue the contrary arguments and uncritically accept supporting arguments, evidence of a disconfirmation bias. We also find a confirmation bias—the seeking out of confirmatory evidence—when Ps are free to self-select the source of the arguments they read. Both the confirmation and disconfirmation biases lead to attitude polarization—the strengthening of t2 over t1 attitudes—especially among those with the strongest priors and highest levels of political sophistication. We conclude with a discussion of the normative implications of these findings for rational behavior in a democracy.
This essay examines if the emergence of more partisan media has contributed to political polarization and led Americans to support more partisan policies and candidates. Congress and some newer media outlets have added more partisan messages to a continuing supply of mostly balanced news. Although political attitudes of most Americans have remained fairly centrist, evidence points to some polarization among the politically involved. Proliferation of media choices lowered the share of less interested, less partisan voters and thereby made elections more partisan. But evidence for a causal link between more partisan messages and changing attitudes or behaviors is mixed at best. Measurement problems hold back research on partisan selective exposure and its consequences. Ideologically one-sided news exposure may be largely confined to a small, but highly involved and influential segment of the population. There is no firm evidence that partisan media are making ordinary Americans more partisan. Expected final...
We show that the demand for news varies with the perceived affinity of the news organization to the consumer’s political preferences. In an experimental setting, conservatives and Republicans preferred to read news reports attributed to Fox News and to avoid news from CNN and NPR. Democrats and liberals exhibited exactly the opposite syndrome—dividing their attention equally between CNN and NPR, but avoiding Fox News. This pattern of selective exposure based on partisan affinity held not only for news coverage of controversial issues but also for relatively ‘‘soft’’ subjects such as crime and travel. The tendency to select news based on anticipated agreement was also strengthened among more politically engaged partisans. Overall, these results suggest that the further proliferation of new media and enhanced media choices may contribute to the further polarization of the news audience.
Survey research is necessary to understand media effects, but seriously impeded by considerable overreporting of news exposure, the extent of which differs across respondents. Consequently, apparent media effects may arise not because of differences in exposure, but because of differences in the accuracy of reporting exposure. Drawing on experiments embedded in two representative surveys, this study examines why many people overstate their exposure to television news. Analysis indicates that overreporting results from unrealistic demands on respondents’ memory, not their motivation to misrepresent or provide superficial answers. Satisficing and social desirability bias do not explain overreporting. Instead, imperfect recall coupled with the use of flawed inference rules causes inflated self-reports. To lower reports of news exposure and improve the validity of conclusions about media effects, researchers should help respondents with the estimation by providing population frequencies and encouraging comparison with others.