ArticlePDF Available

When the Whole Is Less Than the Sum of Its Parts: Russian Developmentalism since the Mid-2000s

Authors:

Abstract and Figures

While Russia became widely known in the 1990s for its experiment in shock therapy, by the mid-2000s the Kremlin pioneered a new set of policies that amounted to the national variant of the developmentalist approach. In this article, we take stock of the Russian developmentalism, focusing on the role of ideas, the institution-building by the federal and regional governments as well as specific developmental policies. While state-oriented, interventionist approach to economic development has had some successes on the level of individual industries, regions and projects, on the whole, it failed to achieve transformational developmental outcomes. The economy has stagnated for over a decade and the Russian export basket is less sophisticated than it was 20 years ago. We argue that the failure of the Russian approach to developmentalism cannot be reduced to corruption and rent-seeking: the lack of an effective coordination mechanism and a consistent policy strategy underpinned by a foundation in heterodox economics have also played a role.
Content may be subject to copyright.
Published with license by Brill Schöningh󰎛󰃊󰎛󰂹󰆼󰆻󰂺󰆾󰆻󰇄󰇁󰇀󰃈󰆽󰆿󰇀󰆼󰇃󰇄󰆽󰆼󰄀󰆻󰆻󰇃󰆻󰆼󰆻󰆻󰆿
󰅺󰎛󰂶󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰎛󰃊󰎛󰂹󰆽󰆿󰇀󰆼󰄀󰇃󰇄󰆼󰆾󰃍print󰃎󰆽󰆿󰇀󰆼󰄀󰇃󰇄󰆽󰆼󰃍online)
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
󰂺󰃈
When the Whole Is Less Than the Sum of Its Parts:
Russian Developmentalism since the Mid-2000s
Ilya Matveev | 󰂹󰆻󰆻󰆻󰆻󰄀󰆻󰆻󰆻󰆾󰄀󰆿󰆾󰇀󰇀󰄀󰆾󰆽󰇀󰇂
Public Sociology Laboratory󰂶󰂶
St Petersburg󰂶 Russian Federation
Corresponding Author
matveev.ilya@yahoo.com
Oleg Zhuravlev
󰂶󰂶󰂶
󰂶󰂶
󰂺󰂶
olegzhur@yandex.ru
Abstract
󰆔󰆜󰆜󰆓󰂶
by the 󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆓
󰂺 In this articl󰂶
󰂶 focusing on the role of idea󰂶 the 󰄀building by
󰂺 While
󰄀󰂶󰄀
cesses on the level of individual industrie󰂶 regions and project󰂶 on the whol󰂶 it failed
󰂺
󰆕󰆓ears
ag󰂺
reduced to corruption and 󰄀󰂹󰄀
󰄀
󰂺
Keywords
󰄍󰄍󰄍󰄍
󰇂󰇂
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
1 Introduction
 󰂶
‘greatest prece󰄀
dence to industrial polic󰂶 that i󰂶
   n’s inter󰄀
s’󰂺󰇟󰆔󰆜󰆛󰆓󰆔󰆜󰆜󰆓󰂶
󰂺 Howeve󰂶
 󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆓   
󰂺 Russia led the
wa󰂶 󰄀nationalizing whole industries and launching an array of new policies
󰂺
       󰄀 󰄀
 a’s new policy orientatio󰂺 For Cedric Duran󰂶 
‘t󰄀
ductive apparatus’󰂺󰇠 David Lane noted that ‘T

e’󰂺󰇡󰄀
ca󰂶 howeve󰂺
    󰂶
󰂺󰇢 Many scholars contended that Russia’s turn to
󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆓󰄀 by power󰄀
ful political actors than anything els󰂺 󰄘an asserted that ‘Rent

all levels of authority’󰂺󰇣󰂶‘The capture of the
󰄀
guishing feature of his entire rule’󰂺󰇤 In the eyes of these scholar󰂶 predation and
state capture in Putin’s  
goal󰂶󰂺
󰆞 󰂶  and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975󰂺
󰃍alo Alt󰂹 Stanford University Pres󰂶󰆔󰆜󰆛󰆕󰃎󰂹󰆔󰆜󰂺
󰆟 édric Duran󰂶 “B󰂹
Producing State in Russi󰂶Journal of Innovation Economics Management󰂶 󰂺󰆕 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆛󰃎󰂹󰆔󰆚󰆔󰄀󰆜󰆔󰂺
󰆠 󰂶 “F󰄀 Capitalis󰂶New Political Economy󰆔󰆖󰂶 󰂺󰆕 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆛󰃎󰂹
󰆔󰆛󰆕󰂺
󰆡 󰂶 The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?
󰃍ew Yor󰂹 Portfoli󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆓󰃎󰂺
󰆢  󰄘a󰂶 “The Vicious Circle of 󰄀   󰂶 Post-
Soviet 3󰆕󰂶 󰂺󰆘 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆔6)󰂹󰆗󰆘󰆜󰂺
󰆣  󰂶 Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? 󰃍ew Yor󰂹   󰂶
󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆘󰃎󰂹󰆖󰆖󰆔󰂺
󰇂󰇃 
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
In our vie󰂶󰄀
      
appropriatio󰂺         
󰂶󰄀
growt󰂺󰂶󰂺 Howeve󰂶
        
during Putin’s      
󰂺󰂶󰄀
   󰄀
          󰂺

󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆗   
󰂺 Finall󰂶󰆕󰆗󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆕
󰂹 as we write this articl󰂶 󰄀

󰂺 In light of thi󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆕

we stud󰂺
      
two decade󰂶󰂺 We continue by investi󰄀
  󰂶  
  󰂺 Finall󰂶   
the new 󰄖ilitant Russia’󰇥󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆗  
speculate on the 󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆕󰂺
2 Outcomes
     󰄍      
󰄍󰃍ogether with Brazil)󰄀
󰂶 grou󰂶 over
the last two decades 󰃍ee 󰆔󰃎󰂺   󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆓󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆓
Russia was 󰆖󰂺󰆗󰈱󰂶󰆕󰂺󰆔󰈱 in Brazi󰂶 󰆘󰂺󰆛󰈱 in India and 󰆛󰂺󰆚󰈱 in Chin󰂺
󰆤  󰂶 “E 󰂺 An Agenda for Militant Russi󰂶Russian Journal of
Economics󰆕󰂶 󰂺󰆕 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆔6)󰂹󰆔󰆔󰆔󰄀󰆕󰆛󰂺
󰇂󰇄
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
        
the country’s 󰂶      󰃍hich
󰂶 󰂺󰂺󰂶 s)󰂺
ésar Hidalgo and Ricardo
󰂺󰃍)󰄀
tion of the country’s   󰂹 ‘the observed
󰃍
country)   󰃍   
that product)󰄘󰂺󰇦 Esteban 󰄀   
behind the 󰂹
󰂶󰂶
ran󰂶󰃍󰂺󰂺󰂶
󰆥 󰂺󰂶 “T   󰂶
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences󰆔󰆓󰆙󰂶 󰂺󰆕6 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆜󰃎󰂹󰆔󰆓󰆘󰆚󰆔󰂺
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Brazil Russian Federaon India China
󰆼  growth 󰃍󰈱󰃎
󰂹󰃍󰈱󰃎󰄍󰂶
󰂶󰂶󰃊󰄘󰂺󰇄󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰂺
󰂹󰃈󰃈󰂺󰂺󰃈󰃈󰂺󰂺󰂺󰂺󰓑
󰈺󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆻󰈺󰄀󰄀󰄀󰈺󰆽󰆻󰆻󰆻
󰇃󰆻 
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
d) and those products that they do
       󰃍󰂺󰂺   
s)󰂺󰂶
   󰂶    

󰂺󰇧
󰂶 the  is directly related to the goal of industrial polic󰂶 which is
  󰂹     󰄀
ing range of sophisticated goods and service󰂺 Russia’s and Brazil’s  have
󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆓󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆓󰂶 India’s  has stagnated 󰃍
in recent years)󰂶  a’s  has grown consistently throughout the
󰃍ee 󰆕󰃎󰂺
󰆦  󰄀   󰂶 “How and Why Should We Study ‘E
y’?” Our World in Data󰂶 󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆛󰂺 http󰂹󰃈󰃈urworldindat󰂺r󰃈󰄀󰄀󰄀
󰄀󰂺
󰆽 
󰂹 󰄙
󰅸󰂺󰇄󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰂺
󰂹󰃈󰃈󰂺󰂺󰂺󰃈
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
ECI
2000
ECI
2001
ECI
2002
ECI
2003
ECI
2004
ECI
2005
ECI
2006
ECI
2007
ECI
2008
ECI
2009
ECI
2010
ECI
2011
ECI
2012
ECI
2013
ECI
2014
ECI
2015
ECI
2016
ECI
2017
ECI
2018
ECI
2019
Brazil Russia India China
󰇃󰆼
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
󰆾 󰂶 Russia and China
󰂹 󰄙󰄛󰅸󰄘󰂺
󰇄󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰂺 󰂹󰃈󰃈󰂺󰂺󰂺󰃈
Russia’s󰄀 added goods 󰃍lectronic󰂶󰄀
er󰂶 vehicles)󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆜
󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆓󰂶 while China’s        
󰃍ee Figure 3)󰂺
     󰄀
󰂺 In principl󰂶
d;󰂺
Russia’s          
decade󰂺󰂶󰄀 of the

󰂶󰂺 As
a resul󰂶󰂶󰂶
󰃍󰂶 Peugeo󰂶 Volvo)󰆕󰆚
   󰂺󰇟󰇞 Howeve󰂶  

   󰂺󰇟󰇟     
󰆕󰆓ear󰂺
󰆞󰆝 Yulia Baronin󰂶 “Tl’nyh 
e”󰂶Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya 6󰆗󰂶 󰂺󰆘 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆓󰃎󰂹󰆜󰆘󰂺
󰆞󰆞 󰂶 󰂑r󰂶 󰃍ondo󰂹
Hachette U󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆜󰃎󰂺
0.0%
0.1%
0.2%
0.3%
0.4%
0.5%
Electronics Machinery Vehicles
Russia 2000 Russia 2019
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Electronics Machinery Vehicles
China 2000 China 2019
󰇃󰆽 
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
3 Ideas
      󰆔󰆜󰆜󰆓      󰄀
       ‘y s’ in charge of
 󰂶          󰄀
    󰂺     
        󰂶 including
󰂹 the Central Institute
    󰃍Tsentral’nii Ekonomiko-Matematicheskii
󰃣I)󰃍Institut
Narodno-Khozhyaistvennogo Prognozirovaniya)󰂺󰇟󰇠    
      󰂶   
󰂶󰂶 chief
󰂺󰂶 Russia’s󰂺󰂶

is Andrei Belouso󰂶󰂺

‘conservative
󰄘 that is also present in other 󰄀 state󰂶
󰂺󰂺󰂶󰂺󰇟󰇡
󰄀 󰄀󰂶
centralized coordination of innovative activities in the ‘pioneer’ industries;
and conservative welfare policie󰂶       
󰂺󰇟󰇢
Even though broadly statist and interventionist views are very popular in the
󰂶 the ideational base of the Russian approach to
󰂺 For on󰂶󰄀

poo󰂹 ‘At presen󰂶󰂶󰄀
edge of conventional western theor󰂶󰄀
󰂺 Unfortunatel󰂶󰂶 its contributions

e’󰂺󰇟󰇣 As a resul󰂶
󰆞󰆟  󰂶 󰄙󰄀      
in Putin’s Russi󰂹 The ‘Hollow Paradig󰄘 Perspectiv󰂶 Europe-Asia Studies󰆚󰆖󰂶 󰂺 󰆗
󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆔󰃎󰂹󰆙󰆖󰆘󰂺
󰆞󰆠 󰂶 “C
Europe and Russi󰂶New Political Economy󰆕󰆘󰂶 󰂺󰆗 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆓󰃎󰂹󰆙󰆗󰆕󰄀󰆘󰆜󰂺
󰆞󰆡 Ibi󰂺󰂶󰆙󰆘󰆔󰂺
󰆞󰆢 󰂶 “A󰂶󰂶 and Authoritari󰄀
n’s Russi󰂶Journal of Economic Issues󰆘󰆕󰂶 󰂺󰆕 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆛󰃎󰂹󰆘󰆕󰆔󰂺
󰇃󰆾
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
conservative and authoritarian tendencies in Russian politic󰂺 This led to the
   
󰂺
󰂶 the very role of ideas in the Russian policy process is prob󰄀
󰂺    n’s  󰂶 ‘Ideas hardly
[in Russia]󰂶e’󰂺󰇟󰇤
󰂹󰄀󰂶 howeve󰂶

produces distorted result󰂺󰇟󰇥‘hollow paradig󰄘󰂹
instead of choosing 󰄀 
󰂶 
󰂺󰂶
    
󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆚󰂶‘united
y’󰂺󰇟󰇦
󰄖
in the policy plans’󰂺󰇟󰇧󰂶󰂶󰂶
󰂹 it helps to

󰂺󰂶
󰂶󰂶 in order
to avoid ‘authority shifts usually associated with the change in the guiding pol󰄀
icy paradig󰄘󰂺󰇠󰇞 In other word󰂶 ideological consistency on the part of the gov󰄀
󰂶
to Trenin’s󰄀 proces󰂺
󰆞󰆣  󰂶 “R        󰂶 Washington
Quarterly 3󰆓󰂶 󰂺󰆕 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆚󰃎󰂹󰆜󰆘󰂺
󰆞󰆤 󰂶 󰄙󰄀      n’s
Russi󰂺
󰆞󰆥 Ibi󰂺󰂶󰆙󰆗󰆓󰂺     n’s role in the
󰄀            
Eas󰂺 According to Fortescu󰂶[Putin]     
side󰂶 particularly on issues that he does not see as of the highest priorit󰂺 If that is a valid
󰂶󰂶
y”󰂶󰂶 “Russia’s ‘Turn to
the East’󰂹󰂶Post-Soviet 3󰆕󰂶 󰂺󰆘 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆔6)󰂹󰆗󰆕󰆖󰄀󰆘󰆗󰂺
󰆞󰆦 󰂶 󰄙󰄀      n’s
Russi󰂶󰄛󰆙󰆗󰆓󰂺
󰆟󰆝 Ibi󰂺󰂶󰆙󰆗󰆖󰂺
󰇃󰆿 
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
4 Institutions
Since the 󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆓󰂶       
been the 󰄀 󰂺       󰂶
󰆔󰆓󰆓󰈱󰃍aktsionernoe
obshchestvo)󰂺
state corporation 󰃍gosudarstvennaya korporatsiya)󰂶󰄀
󰄀 organization established by the federal la󰂺
state ownership can be broadly divided into energy producers 󰃍󰂺󰂺󰂶󰂶
Rosneft)󰂶󰃍󰂺󰂺󰂶󰂶 Rosato󰂶 United Shipbuilding
Corporation)󰂶 󰃍berban󰂶 )󰃍󰂺󰂶
Rusnan󰂶y)󰂺
󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆓
󰂹 󰆔󰃎n’s patron󰄀
age networ󰂶 󰆕󰃎p’s󰄀

the national productive capacit󰂺 Putin recognized the need to 󰄀 the
e; howeve󰂶
󰂺󰇠󰇟
󰂶
and red tap󰂶   󰂺 Recognizing
and accelerating this tren󰂶n’s entourage lobbied to
󰂺 The resulting institutional arrange󰄀
‘personalized state ownership’󰂹󰄀

and the oversight of the state’s   󰂺󰇠󰇠 Instea󰂶
󰄀
e; 
󰂺
      󰂺    
    󰄀󰂺    󰄀
      󰂶  󰄀
󰄀 practice󰂺 In
principl󰂶 Putin’s
󰂺 Howeve󰂶
󰆟󰆞 󰂶 󰄙󰂹 institutsional’n󰂶 Pro et Contra󰆔󰆕󰂶 󰂺󰆘󰄀󰆙
󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆛󰃎󰂹󰆚󰆘󰄀󰆛󰆛󰂷 and “P
l’n󰂶Voprosy ekonomiki󰂶 󰂺󰆛 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆓󰃎󰂹󰆗󰄀󰆕󰆚󰂺
󰆟󰆟 󰂶 󰄙󰂹 institutsional’n󰂶󰄛󰆛󰆘󰂺
󰇃󰇀
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
        󰂶 treating
     󰂺
As a resul󰂶󰂺󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆓󰂶
󰂶󰂶
corruption was in ‘trillions of rubles’󰂺󰇠󰇡󰂶 such as
󰄘󰂶 Rosneft’s Igor Sechi󰂶 Roste󰄘
other󰂶   󰂶 particu󰄀
y’s 󰄀 Foundatio󰂺 Howeve󰂶 no such inves󰄀
󰂶
󰂺
󰂺
   󰂶 ‘t t’s   

“pilot organization”󰄀
t’󰂺󰇠󰇢 This is arguably caused by political reasons as wel󰂹
within the Russian patronal syste󰂶󰄀
        󰄀
tie󰂺
corporation󰂺󰇠󰇣 Howeve󰂶󰄀
fessional bureaucratic corp󰂶 n’s Ministry of International Trade
and Industry 󰃍)󰂶󰂺󰇠󰇤
resulted in sprawling goal󰂶
󰂺
󰂶󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆓󰄀
taneous proces󰂶        󰂺
Instea󰂶󰄀
󰂺 Putin often repeated that state
n’s󰄀
󰂺󰇠󰇥 Indee󰂶
   v’s tenure as presiden󰂺 Howeve󰂶 the
󰆟󰆠 󰂶 “A󰂹  t’ trillion󰄀
i”󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆓󰂺 http󰂹󰃈󰃈i󰂺󰃈󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆔󰆔󰆗󰃈󰆔󰆘󰆙󰆖󰆖󰆛󰆚󰆘󰆚󰆙󰂺l󰂺
󰆟󰆡  󰂶 State-Led Coercive Takeovers in Putin’s Russia: Explaining the Underlying
Motives and Ownership Outcomes 󰃍npublished PhD Thesi󰂶 The London School of
󰂶 󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆗󰃎󰂺
󰆟󰆢 Which he often doe󰂶 as in the case of the 󰄀standing󰂶 the
largest oil producer in Russi󰂶 and Transnef󰂶󰂺
are headed by Putin’s close associate󰂺
󰆟󰆣 󰂶  and the Japanese Miracle󰂺
󰆟󰆤 󰂶󰂶 󰄙󰄍󰂺’” 󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆚󰆔󰆕󰆔󰆗󰆔󰆗󰆖󰆛󰂺
http󰂹󰃈󰃈i󰂺󰃈󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆚󰆔󰆕󰆔󰆗󰃈󰆜󰆕󰆗󰆛󰆕󰆔󰆛󰆛󰂺l󰂺
󰇃󰇁 
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
previous policy of 󰄀󰄍
    n’s inner circl󰂺 They defeated Medvedev’s
 󰂺 In 󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆕 
frustration with the progress of privatizatio󰂹 ‘T 󰂶 and
then the country’s       
󰄍󰄀
sary at al󰂶e’s   󰂻 g’s d’󰂺󰇠󰇦 Putin

󰂶 so he torpedoed Medvedev’s
refor󰂺󰇠󰇧 󰂶 creeping 󰄀 continue󰂶 cor󰄀

󰃍s)
󰂺
   󰄀

as a whol󰂺 󰄀󰂶 the world’s󰂶 is a paradig󰄀
󰂺 󰂶
regio󰂶 has a long histor󰂹󰆔󰆜󰆖󰆖󰂺󰆔󰆜󰆜󰆕󰂶
 󰂶 a factory vetera󰂶 participated in the privatization of
     󰂺 Howeve󰂶  󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆙󰂶 the controlling
󰂶
󰂶 Putin’s close associat󰂺󰄀
Rostekhnologii
󰃍)󰂺󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆚󰂺
󰂶  󰂶
with strictly 󰄀󰂶 󰄀󰂺󰂶 its previ󰄀
ous private owne󰂶
󰂶
󰂺 This changed with
󰄍󰂺 Rostec’s󰄀
󰂶
spending and closing the pilot shop that had previously helped to introduce
󰆟󰆥 Cited in Ilya Matvee󰂶 “Stat󰂶 Capita󰂶    
n’s Russi󰂶” in Berch Berberogl󰂶 e󰂺󰂶The Global Rise of Authoritarianism
in the 21st Century 󰃍ondo󰂹 Routledg󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆓󰃎󰂶󰆗󰆕󰂺
󰆟󰆦 In fac󰂶 those few privatizations that did happen during Medvedev’s tenure eventually led
󰂶
󰃍 )󰂺󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆕
󰂺 Howeve󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆛
󰂶 including fraud associated with  activitie󰂺
󰇃󰇂
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
󰄀 technological advances to productio󰂺󰇡󰇞   󰂶 this
󰄀
󰂶 a state ban󰂶󰄀
󰂺󰂶y’s previous private owner reproduced
󰂶
while Roste󰄘󰄀
         
with 󰄀󰂺 In our vie󰂶  


󰄀
󰂺
󰄀
󰂶󰄀
italis󰂹 󰂺 󰂺 󰃍
󰃎󰂺󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆚󰂶 this 󰄀
       󰄀
    󰂺 It
󰂺󰄀
󰄀
      󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆗󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆘󰂺󰇡󰇟 ’s    
       󰂺 As a resul󰂶  󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆘 
󰆄󰆕󰆓illion rescue
󰂺󰂶
of ’s󰂺 The ban󰄘󰄀
acteristic of the Russian state sector as a whol󰂹 it engaged in sprawlin󰂶 poorly
      
󰂺󰇡󰇠
 󰂺
          󰂺 For
󰂶 according to one stud󰂶
󰂶
󰆠󰆝 󰄀
󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆜󰂺
󰆠󰆞  󰂶 Igor Popo󰂶   l’󰂶 󰄙eboevye poter󰂹   
poteryat’󰆄󰆔󰆓   󰂶Forbes.ru󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆘󰂺 http󰂹󰃈󰃈w󰂺 orbe󰂺󰃈󰃈󰃈󰆕󰆛
󰆜󰆘󰆛󰆜󰄀󰄀󰄀󰄀󰄀󰄀󰄀󰆔󰆓󰄀󰄀󰄀󰂺
󰆠󰆟  󰂶 “Schetnaya palata zavershila rassledovanie situatsii v e”󰂶
Vedomosti󰂶 󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆚󰂺 http󰂹󰃈󰃈w󰂺󰂺󰃈󰃈rticle󰃈󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆚󰃈󰆓󰆔󰃈󰆓󰆜󰃈󰆙󰆚󰆕󰆔󰆘󰆘󰄀
󰄀󰄀󰂺
󰇃󰇃 
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆓󰂺 Howeve󰂶 these institution󰂶 such as 󰂶
Rusnan󰂶󰂶 eventually signed an agree󰄀
         󰂶  󰄀
ing coordination within this particular part of the state secto󰂺 
institutions have also increasingly focused on supporting innovatio󰂺󰇡󰇡 In a
later stud󰂶󰄀
  󰄀
institution󰂺󰇡󰇢 The response of the entrepreneurs was generally positiv󰂹 they

         
󰄀󰂺
󰄀
󰂺
sector with the ‘big three’ 󰃍berban󰂶  󰃎
󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆕󰂺󰇡󰇣
note󰂶 the creation of the ‘ns’
   󰂶 howeve󰂶 the govern󰄀
         󰂶 such as
      󰂺󰇡󰇤 
        
󰃍s) leads to
󰂶
of a private ban󰂺 The authors conclude that ‘a   
󰂶 either through
     󰂶      
s’󰂺󰇡󰇥 In other word󰂶
󰂺
Stil󰂶
patronage and corruption as other parts of the state secto󰂺󰂶
‘[T]h 󰂹 consolidation and reproduction
of the elit󰂺 It is 󰄀󰄀
crat󰂶󰂶
󰆠󰆠  󰂶  󰂶 and Denis Ivano󰂶 “R   󰄀
vitiy󰂹 vernoi dorogoi?󰂶󰄛Voprosy ekonomiki󰂶 󰂺󰆚 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆕󰃎󰂹󰆗󰄀󰆕󰆜󰂺
󰆠󰆡 󰂶 󰄙󰂹󰄀
󰂶Voprosy ekonomiki󰂶 󰂺󰆖 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆓󰃎󰂹󰆙󰆖󰄀󰆛󰆖󰂺
󰆠󰆢  󰂶󰄖atsional’ny’   
uslu󰂶Voprosy ekonomiki󰂶 󰂺󰆖 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆔3)󰂹󰆜󰂺 http󰂹󰃈󰃈o󰂺r󰃈󰆔󰆓󰂺󰆖󰆕󰆙󰆓󰆜󰃈󰆓󰆓󰆗󰆕󰄀󰆛󰆚󰆖󰆙󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆖󰄀󰆖󰄀󰆜󰆗󰄀󰆔󰆓󰆛󰂺
󰆠󰆣 Ibi󰂺󰂹󰆔󰆔󰂺
󰆠󰆤     󰂶 󰄙 󰂹   
Russi󰂶Journal of Economic Issues󰆗󰆜󰂶 󰂺󰆗 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆘󰃎󰂹󰆔󰆓󰆓󰆔󰂺
󰇃󰇄
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
󰄀󰃍ncluding )󰄘󰂺 󰇡󰇦 Indee󰂶 one journalistic article revealed
󰄀
 󰃍󰂶 󰂶󰂶 󰃎 󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆔󰂺󰇡󰇧 These
󰆔󰂺
  v’s    
󰃍epo)󰄀
󰂺󰂹
󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆓󰂶󰄀
tor and in the accounts of 󰄀
󰂺 Financial
  󰄀
ing to enterprises and the general publi󰂺 Instea󰂶  
󰆠󰆥 󰂶 󰄙atsional’ny”󰂶󰆔󰆔󰂺
󰆠󰆦 󰂶 󰄙olotye deti Rossi󰂶Kommersant Den’gi󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆔󰂺 http󰂹󰃈󰃈w󰂺t
󰂺󰃈o󰃈󰆔󰆘󰆜󰆙󰆙󰆙󰆘󰂺
󰆼 Children of 󰄀
󰄀

󰂶
director of the 
󰂶 senior vice president
󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆔󰄀󰃎

󰂶
󰄀 and

The head of 
󰃍  subsidiary)󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆙󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆖
Sergei Ivanov
The son of Sergei Ivano󰂶

󰂶
of the boar󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆜󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆔

The son of Sergei Ivanov
Deputy head of 󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆕󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆗

󰂶

Deputy head of 󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆚󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆔

󰂶 current

󰂶
boar󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆓󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆛
󰇄󰆻 
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
󰃍ainly 󰄀󰃎 
󰄀󰂺 Repo
󰂺󰇢󰇞
In other word󰂶 instead of serving the state’s  󰂶 󰄀
owned󰂶 that i󰂶 the shift of
y’s 󰄀󰂺
   
󰄀building on the regional leve󰂺󰇢󰇟 In fac󰂶
       󰂺  󰂶
󰂶󰂶 󰄀
    󰃍  t) in
the local industr󰂺  󰂶 a
locall󰄀󰂶 and
󰂶 a consultancy for investors operated by the
󰂺 This set of institutions allowed the region to attract sus󰄀
t;
󰄖e’󰂺󰂶a’s regional
    󰂺 Heavy infrastructure spending coupled
        󰂺 During the
󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆗󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆙󰄀
󰂶
in the social spher󰂶 particularly in educatio󰂺󰇢󰇠
5 Policies
While the 󰄀     󰂶
particularly on the federal leve󰂶 has been largely unsuccessfu󰂶󰄀
 󰂺 One area in
󰂺
󰆡󰆝 󰂶 “The Rise of 󰄀 Finance under State
󰂶Post-Communist Economies 3󰆗󰂶 󰂺󰆔 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆔󰃎󰂹󰆖󰆚󰂺
󰆡󰆞 e’s wor󰂶 󰄙󰄀
a’s Electricity Sector Liberalizatio󰂶Studies in Comparative
International Development󰆗󰆚󰂶 󰂺󰆔 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆕󰃎󰂹󰆚󰆘󰄀󰆔󰆔󰆗󰂶 and Post-Soviet Power: State-led Develop-
ment and Russia’s Marketization 󰃍󰂹󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆘󰃎󰂺
describes the ‘ds’ in the electricity sector on the regional level that
󰂺
󰆡󰆟 Ilya Matvee󰂶 “Bs?󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆗󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆚󰂶
East European Politics 3󰆚󰂶 󰂺󰆖 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆔󰃎󰂹󰆘󰆖󰆗󰄀󰆘󰆔󰂺
󰇄󰆼
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
󰃍ubsidies and credits) as
well as trade restrictions 󰃍
 󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆗󰃎󰂺   󰂺󰂶    t’s highly interventionist
󰂹
have steadily increase󰂺󰇢󰇡 Indee󰂶  󰆗    
Russian’s󰆕󰆓ear󰂹󰄀
tion of cheap carbs 󰃍read and potatoes) has decrease󰂶󰄀
󰃍󰂶 the
increase is particularly pronounced)󰂺󰂶
󰂹
󰆔󰂺󰆔󰆚󰈱󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆓󰆔󰂺󰆜󰆕󰈱󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆓󰂺󰇢󰇢
󰆡󰆠 󰂺 egre󰂶󰂶 and Christel Elvesta󰂶 “T 
        󰂶 Eurasian Geography and
Economics󰆘󰆚󰂶 󰂺󰆙 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆔6)󰂹󰆙󰆚󰆔󰄀󰆜󰆜󰂺
󰆡󰆡 “T y”󰂶@H󰂺  󰆜  󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆖󰂺
http󰂹󰃈󰃈tla󰂺i󰂺arvar󰂺d󰃈󰂺
󰆿 s, kg
󰂹 
󰆓󰆑󰆓󰆑 󰃍󰂹󰄘
󰂶󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆼󰃎󰂶󰂏/󰂞󰂐󰂐󰂞
󰂞󰂞󰄾󰄾󰃖󰆓󰆑󰆓󰆑󰂐
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2000 2020
󰇄󰆽 
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
Policies in other areas have been less successfu󰂶 howeve󰂺  󰂶
      a’s strategy of ‘turning to the
East’
     󰂹 󰄖󰄀 
of the  [Russian Far East]󰂶󰄙eep Asia at ba󰂶
󰂶
󰂺󰇢󰇣
󰂶   󰄀
tion led to the generally unsuccessful result󰂺
6 Militant Russia: Developmentalism after 2014
󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆗 
    
󰄖ilitant Russia’󰂶󰇢󰇤‘sy’ in Ira󰂺
󰂺 In additio󰂶 the gov󰄀
 ‘a      
good󰂶 technolog󰂶 and capital’      󰂺󰇢󰇥

󰂶 particularly Chin󰂺

󰂺 In principl󰂶 󰄀
country’s󰄀
󰂶 high 󰄀󰄀

󰂺 The dange󰂶 howeve󰂶󰄀
󰄀
cal gap with the rest of the worl󰂺 There are opportunity costs associated with
 󰂹 
󰂶 resulting in subpar product󰂶
    
󰂺  
     󰂹  󰂶 restricting foreign direct
󰆡󰆢 Stephen Fortescu󰂶 “Russia’s ‘Turn to the East’󰂹    󰂶 Post-Soviet
 3󰆕󰂶 󰂺󰆘 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆔6)󰂹󰆗󰆕󰆖󰄀󰆘󰆗󰂺
󰆡󰆣 Mall󰂶 “E󰂺 An Agenda for Militant Russia”󰂹󰆔󰆔󰆔󰄀󰆕󰆛󰂺
󰆡󰆤 Richard Connoll󰂶 Russia’s Response to Sanctions: How Western Economic Statecraft Is
Reshaping Political Economy in Russia 󰃍󰂹󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆛󰃎󰂹󰆔󰆜󰆖󰂺
󰇄󰆾
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
‘strategic’󰄀
cal transfe󰂺
󰂶 politically
driven allocation of credi󰂶󰂺󰇢󰇦
Russia’s         
 󰂺 󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆚
‘c󰂶󰄀
s’󰂺󰇢󰇧󰂶
  ‘i  󰂶 we did
󰂺
󰂶t’󰂺󰇣󰇞 Howeve󰂶
󰂺󰂶 Manturov’s
󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆚󰆄󰆔󰂶󰆖illio󰂶 yet
󰆄󰆖󰆗󰆓illio󰂶󰆚󰆗󰈱 les󰂺󰇣󰇟
In any cas󰂶         
󰂺 has been
essentially stable for the last ten years as is shown in 󰆘󰂺
 󰄀
  󰂶
   󰂺     
recover󰂶 howeve󰂶        
 󰂺 󰂶      󰂶 practically
󰂺
     󰆔󰆜󰆜󰆛󰂶󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆛  󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆗󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆙󰂺
note󰂶 howeve󰂶󰄀󰄀
  󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆗󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆙󰂶 possibly indicating the
󰂺󰇣󰇠
     󰂶 
          
 󰂺󰂶 Adnan Vatansever has shown that the
           
󰆡󰆥 Ibi󰂺󰂶󰆔󰆛󰆜󰄀󰆔󰆜󰆓󰂺
󰆡󰆦 Cited i󰂹  󰂶 “C    󰂶 Vedomosti󰂶 󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆛󰂺
http󰂹󰃈󰃈w󰂺󰂺󰃈opinio󰃈rticle󰃈󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆛󰃈󰆓󰆗󰃈󰆕󰆖󰃈󰆚󰆙󰆚󰆗 󰆘󰆖󰄀󰄀󰄀󰄀
󰂺
󰆢󰆝 Ibi󰂺
󰆢󰆞 Matvee󰂶 “Stat󰂶 Capita󰂶     
Putin’s Russi󰂶” 3󰆖󰄀󰆘󰆓󰂺
󰆢󰆟 󰂶 “V󰂶Voprosy eko-
nomiki󰂶 󰂺󰆗 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆔󰃎󰂹󰆘󰆛󰄀󰆚󰆛󰂺
󰇄󰆿 
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
󰇀 Russia’s
󰂹 󰄙󰃍󰈱)󰄍
󰄛󰂺󰇄󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰂺
󰂹󰃈󰃈󰂺󰂺󰃈󰃈󰂺󰂺󰂺󰓑󰈺󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆻
󰈺󰈺󰆽󰆻󰆻󰆻
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
response to the Western sanction󰂺󰇣󰇡 In essenc󰂶
󰂺󰂶

its securitization goal󰂺󰂶
󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆗󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆙󰂶
       
󰆔󰆗󰈱󰂺󰇣󰇢t’s desire to
󰂺
󰆕󰆓󰆔󰆗󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆕
         
sanctions in response to Russia’s󰆕󰆗󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆕󰂺 By
the end of the yea󰂶 Russia’s󰂺
󰂶        
for any successful lon󰄀󰂺 The growth of innovation
󰆢󰆠 Adnan Vatanseve󰂶 “Put over a barrel? ‘St’ sanction󰂶    
Russia”󰂶 Energy Research & Social Science 󰆙󰆜 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆓󰃎󰂹 󰆔󰆓󰆔󰆙󰆓󰆚󰂺 http󰂹󰃈󰃈o󰂺r󰃈󰆔󰆓󰂺󰆔󰆓󰆔󰆙󰃈
󰂺rs󰂺󰆕󰆓󰆕󰆓󰂺󰆔󰆓󰆔󰆙󰆓󰆚󰂺
󰆢󰆡 Connoll󰂶 Russia’s Response to Sanctions󰂶󰆔󰆔󰆕󰄀󰆔󰆔󰆖󰂺
󰇄󰇀
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
󰄀
󰂺
󰃍 t)󰂶
year󰂶 if not decade󰂺󰂶
󰂺
7 Conclusion

󰂺 On the one han󰂶
tools needed to achieve its goal󰂹󰄀
󰂶 vast federal bureaucrac󰂶
󰂶   󰄀
tries as well as private businesses ready to do the state’s biddin󰂺 The country’s
󰂹
󰂶 diversifying production and achieving
sustainable lon󰄀 growt󰂺󰂶 the stron󰂶 interventionist state is
part and parcel of the Russian political cultur󰂺󰇣󰇣 And ye󰂶 despite all thi󰂶 suc󰄀
󰃍󰂺󰂺󰂶
agriculture)󰂶󰃍󰂺󰂺󰂶a) and projects 󰃍󰂺󰂺󰂶
gas plant in 󰄀 Siberia)󰂺 󰂶      
󰂺
In this articl󰂶  󰂺 One has
     󰄀
󰂺 Another is the design of
the state sector which is essentially divided between Putin’s cronie󰂶 encour󰄀
󰂺      
󰂶
the state secto󰂺
󰄀 󰄀
   󰃍     y)󰂶  
drown in lavish state funding 󰃍
al󰂶‘hung up’ on
s)󰂺
󰆢󰆢 󰂶 for instanc󰂶 where the general aversion to state intervention
‘he’󰂶󰂶 “S
against the Curren󰂹           s”󰂶
Politics & Society 3󰆙󰂶 󰂺󰆕 󰃍󰆕󰆓󰆓󰆛󰃎󰂹󰆔󰆙󰆜󰄀󰆕󰆓󰆙󰂺
󰇄󰇁 
󰇃󰃍󰆽󰆻󰆽󰆾󰃎󰇂󰇁󰄀󰇄󰇁
󰂺 The state sector
n’s patronage networ󰂶󰄀
󰂶 not connection󰂺 The role of the
private sector should be increased;

󰄍󰄖utual hostages’ situatio󰂺 The coordina󰄀
 󰂶
󰄀
      󰂺 Finall󰂶 institutional and policy

󰄀
ing over the contradictions and inconsistencie󰂺
 󰂶 howeve󰂶    
the desired results in the conditions of Russia’s international isolatio󰂺
         
response to Russia’s    
othe󰂺 󰂶 Russia’s 󰄀 into the global trade and tech󰄀
       󰂺 This
opportunity should be seize󰂶󰄀
󰂺
Acknowledgement
The article has been produced as part of the research project ‘C
Protest Actions in Soviet and 󰄀 Spaces’󰂶  

󰂺
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
Article
Full-text available
This article traces the evolution of the neoliberal policy paradigm in Putin's Russia. It deals with an apparent paradox: while Putin's rule has always been based on a sharp rhetorical break with the disastrous first decade of Russia's post-Soviet history, he nevertheless continued many of the neoliberal policies of his predecessor, in some areas carrying them out far more consistently than Yeltsin ever could. Despite his crticism of the oligarchs, Putin allowed them to expand their wealth on an unprecedented scale. Since the mid-2000s, the government has increasingly experimented with dirigiste policies, yet this divergence from neoliberalism did not fundamentally threaten the position of the oligarchs. Eventually, the government settled on a combination of neoliberalism and dirigisme that enhances the political stability of the regime at the expense of economic growth. However, lack of growth itself undermines stability, as the unpopular reforms, such as the increase of the retirement age, erode the regime's legitimacy. At the same time, Kremlin's standoff with the West since 2014 puts a serious strain on its relationship with big capital, which is highly integrated into the global economy. These multiple tensions make the future of Russian politics highly uncertain.
Article
Full-text available
This paper argues that Russia has embarked on a difficult path to economic sovereignty and heightened security to withstand rising antagonism from the West that culminated with the application of punitive sanctions against Russia's positioning on Ukraine. With the aim of lessening economic dependence on trade with the EU, its major trade partner for decades, Russia tries to work out a patriotic model of growth based on two vectors: import and trade partner substitution. The pursuit of self-sufficiency in foodstuffs adds an important pillar to security concerns as reflected earlier in the 2010 Doctrine on Food Security. But import substitution will be costly and difficult to manage. Fiscal balances and exchange rates will need to adjust to the new challenges. Finding new partners eastwards is also complicated. Trade with China, in hydrocarbons or other commodities, requires massive infrastructural work that neither the government nor private investors can afford in a situation of financial stringency. Investment from China is slow to materialize as the economic slowdown also impinges on China's projects. Nonetheless important deals on gas and infrastructure have been agreed and are pursued despite difficulties. A favourable institutional framework aimed at attracting investors to the Far East is in place. It will be up to the local administrations to make the best of it and venture capital to run the risk. The outlook is long-term, but both Russia and China have learnt from history to be patient.
Article
With the rise of “smart” sanctions in international politics, the oil sector of some of the world’s leading oil exporters has emerged as a key target. Russia’s oil sector presents a recent case. Much of the scholarly discourse on sanctions has focused on whether and under what conditions sanctions work as intended. Much less has been the attention on the process through which sanctions are having an impact. This article aims to further deepen our understanding of this less explored area by focusing on a target country’s response. It argues that the statecraft of developing a response to sanctions could have substantial role in determining their impact. The paper provides an in-depth case study of how Russia responded to sanctions on its petroleum industry during the five-year period after 2014. It analyses in detail Russia’s response with respect to three key structural constraints for the oil industry: the tax regime, the industry’s organisational setup, and its chronic technological lag. The response in each area has presented opportunities to neutralise or mitigate the impact of sanctions. The paper highlights the limited extent of the Russian government’s response to this end, and provides possible explanations about its choices.
Book
Cambridge Core - International Economics - Russia's Response to Sanctions - by Richard Connolly
Article
Russia's recent reorientation “to the East” has gained increased urgency given events in Ukraine. Here the policymaking process surrounding the “turn to the East” is examined. The focus is on the economic dimension – the economic development of the Russian Far East and engagement with the Asia-Pacific region – rather than geostrategic and security issues. Policymaking is evaluated in terms of general approach and process, with the implications of the evaluation for Russian policymaking more generally then being explored. “Turn to the East” policymaking exhibits a strong commitment to strategic planning that is characteristic of Putin, and which in this case struggles not only with process issues but also with contradictions within the strategy and the challenging realities of the region. Regarding process, a far more institutionalized policy process than the currently dominant personalist view would lead us to expect is found, with relevant bureaucratic and non-state actors well represented in an elaborate and relatively formal process. However a considerable weakening of sign-off procedures is noted, which has lead to policy inconsistency and indeed “policy irresponsibility” among participants. The author attributes the weakening of sign-off procedures to Putin's frustration with the gridlock tendencies of strict sign-off regimes, rather than a desire to create a personalist regime of hands-on management. This suggests that improvement of the Russian policy process requires structural and procedural change, rather than simply leadership change.
Chto ne tak s importozameshheniem
  • Roman Ruvinskij
Cited in: Roman Ruvinskij, "Chto ne tak s importozameshheniem," Vedomosti, 2018. https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2018/04/23/767453-ne-tak-s-importozamesc heniem.
Vklad importozameshheniya v ekonomicheskii rost Rossii
  • Alexei Gotovsky
Alexei Gotovsky, "Vklad importozameshheniya v ekonomicheskii rost Rossii," Voprosy ekonomiki, no. 4 (2021): 58-78.