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Ideologically‐based contact avoidance during a pandemic: Blunt or selective distancing from ‘others’?
Abstract
This project sought to understand when ideology is relevant (or not) to predicting contact avoidance of ‘others’ during the COVID‐19 pandemic. Right‐leaning ideologies (political conservatism, right‐wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation) were not expected to predict greater contact avoidance per se, but rather exhibit selective avoidance of outgroup (vs. ingroup) members. White British participated in one exploratory (Study 1 N = 364) and two pre‐registered (Study 2 N = 431, Study 3 N = 700) studies. As expected, right‐leaning ideologies were significantly stronger predictors of greater preferred personal distance and contact discomfort regarding foreign outgroups (vs. British ingroup) in Studies 1 and 3 (partially supported in Study 2). Ideology rarely predicted ingroup reactions. This Ideology × Target pattern was itself not moderated by the perceived COVID‐19 threat. Pre‐pandemic theorizing that heightened behavioural immune system responses are associated with heightened right‐leaning ideologies appear insufficient for use in actual pandemic contexts, especially when highly politicized.
... Unfortunately, in real life, affectively polarized partisans are not particularly motivated to build connections with each other. If anything, they are highly motivated to avoid interacting with those on the other side (6)(7)(8)(9)(10). With these social forces at work, how can researchers intervene? ...
Affective polarization, or animosity toward opposing political groups, is a fundamentally intergroup phenomenon. Yet, prevailing explanations of it and interventions against it have overlooked the power of ingroup norm perception. To illustrate this power, we begin with evidence from 3 studies which reveal that partisans' perception of their ingroup's norm of negative attitudes toward the outgroup is exaggerated and uniquely predicts their own polarization-related attitudes. Specifically, our original data show that in predicting affective polarization (i.e. how one feels about one's partisan outgroup), the variance explained by ingroup norm perception is 8.4 times the variance explained by outgroup meta-perception. Our reanalysis of existing data shows that in predicting support for partisan violence (i.e. how strongly one endorses and is willing to engage in partisan violence), ingroup norm perception explains 52% of the variance, whereas outgroup meta-perception explains 0%. Our pilot experiment shows that correcting ingroup norm perception can reduce affective polarization. We elucidate the theoretical underpinnings of the unique psychological power of ingroup norm perception and related ingroup processes. Building on these empirical and theoretical analyses, we propose approaches to designing and evaluating interventions that leverage ingroup norm perception to curb affective polarization. We specify critical boundary conditions that deserve prioritized attention in future intervention research. In sum, scientists and practitioners cannot afford to ignore the power of ingroup norm perception in explaining and curbing affective polarization.
Modern theories of authoritarianism have stressed the importance of threat to the expression of authoritarian attitudes and intolerance. Arguably, authoritarian tendencies may have increased during COVID-19 pandemic, a major threat to life and security. One issue arising when comparing mean scores is that of measurement invariance. Meaningful comparisons are only possible, if latent constructs are similar between groups and/or across time. This prerequisite is rarely ever tested in research on authoritarianism. In this study, we aim to analyze the short scale for authoritarianism KSA-3 by investigating its measurement invariance on two levels (three first-order and one second-order factors) and latent mean changes using two German representative samples (N = 4,905). Specifically, we look at differences before and during the pandemic (2017 vs. 2020). While measurement invariance holds across both levels in all conditions, we find a decrease in latent means in 2020, contrary to expectations and established theories. Moreover, latent means differ with regard to gender, education, and east–west Germany. We conclude that analyses of latent means and measurement invariance instead of mean comparisons with composites should become the standard. Future studies should focus on threat as a moderator between authoritarianism and intolerance, and on possible interactions with context variables.
Polling data indicate that in the USA, Republicans, compared to Democrats, have been less inclined to take preventive measures against coronavirus. In three studies (Ns = 380, 430, and 393), we sought to find evidence for partisan motivations and to illuminate how they translate into attitudes, behavioral intentions and actual behaviors. Results revealed a consensus that the Democratic party wants people take coronavirus seriously. Thus, while Democrats thought it was aligned with their political interests, Republicans thought it was in their opponents’ interests. Further analyses suggest that perceived party interests mediated the effect of party allegiance on attitudes about the seriousness of coronavirus, and both attitudes and intentions to preventive behaviors (Studies 1 and 2) and specifically attitudes and intentions to wear masks (Study 3). This relationship also held for mask-wearing behavior. Results suggest that people’s responses to coronavirus may reflect a conformity to the perceived wishes and interests of their political party.
When deciding whether to eat inside a restaurant or how many health protection items to purchase, individuals in the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) era tend to consider the infection risk of crowds of generalized others. With a field study and four experiments, the present study identifies associations between COVID-19 and friendship (e.g., thinking of a friend while reading COVID-19-related news, perceiving a friend as the source of infection, noting friends' presence during potential COVID-19 exposure) that decrease both infection risk perceptions and protective behaviors. The sense of safety that stems from psychological closeness of friends reduces perceived virus infection risks associated with third-party crowds. The distinction between psychological closeness and safety toward friends versus acquaintances widens with clear in-group/out-group boundaries, such that this friend-shield effect is especially pronounced among people whose group boundaries are well established. Limiting interactions to close friends and family members is a common protective measure to reduce COVID-19 transmission risk, but the study findings demonstrate that this practice also unintentionally creates other issues, in that people tend to perceive reduced health risks and engage in potentially hazardous health behaviors. By identifying this risk and encouraging more holistic responses, this research offers implications for individuals, health officials, and policymakers. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
It has long been proposed that perceptions of threat contribute to greater outgroup negativity. Much of the existing evidence on the threat–prejudice association in the real world, however, is cross‐sectional in nature. Such designs do not adequately capture individual‐level changes in constructs, and how changes in constructs relate to changes in other theoretically relevant constructs. The current research exploited the unique opportunity afforded by the mass COVID‐19 vaccination programme in the United Kingdom to explore whether reductions in pathogen threat coincide with reductions in outgroup prejudice and avoidance. A two‐wave longitudinal study (N1 = 912, N2 = 738) measured British adult's perceptions of COVID‐19 threat and anti‐immigrant bias before and during mass vaccine rollout in the United Kingdom. Tests of latent change models demonstrated that perceived COVID‐19 threat significantly declined as the vaccine programme progressed, as did measures of outgroup avoidance tendencies, but not prejudiced attitudes. Critically, change in threat was systematically correlated with change in outgroup avoidance: those with greater reductions in perceived COVID‐19 threat were, on average, those with greater reductions in outgroup avoidance. Findings provide important and novel insights into the implications of disease protection strategies for intergroup relations during an actual pandemic context, as it unfolds over time.
U.S.-based research suggests conservatism is linked with less concern about contracting coronavirus and less preventative behaviors to avoid infection. Here, we investigate whether these tendencies are partly attributable to distrust in scientific information, and evaluate whether they generalize outside the U.S., using public data and recruited representative samples across three studies (Ntotal = 34,710). In Studies 1 and 2, we examine these relationships in the U.S., yielding converging evidence for a sequential indirect effect of conservatism on compliance through scientific (dis)trust and infection concern. In Study 3, we compare these relationships across 19 distinct countries. Although the relationships between trust in scientific information about the coronavirus, concern about coronavirus infection, and compliance are consistent cross-nationally, the relationships between conservatism and trust in scientific information are not. These relationships are strongest in North America. Consequently, the indirect effects observed in Studies 1–2 only replicate in North America (the U.S. and Canada) and in Indonesia. Study 3 also found parallel direct and indirect effects on support for lockdown restrictions. These associations suggest not only that relationships between conservatism and compliance are not universal, but localized to particular countries where conservatism is more strongly related to trust in scientific information about the coronavirus pandemic.
Authoritarianism emerges in times of societal threat, in part driven by desires for group-based security. As such, we propose that the threat caused by the COVID-19 pandemic was associated with increased authoritarian tendencies and that this can be partially explained by increased national identification. We tested this hypothesis by collecting cross-sectional data from three different countries in April 2020. In Study 1, data from Ireland (N = 1276) showed that pandemic threat predicted increased national identification, which in turn predicted authoritarianism. In Study 2, we replicated this indirect effect in a representative UK sample (N = 506). In Study 3, we used an alternative measure of authoritarianism and conceptually replicated this effect among USA citizens (N = 429). In this US sample, the association between threat and authoritarian tendencies was stronger among progressives compared to conservatives. Findings are discussed and linked to group-based models of authoritarianism.
Changing collective behaviour and supporting non-pharmaceutical interventions is an important component in mitigating virus transmission during a pandemic. In a large international collaboration (Study 1, N = 49,968 across 67 countries), we investigated self-reported factors associated with public health behaviours (e.g., spatial distancing and stricter hygiene) and endorsed public policy interventions (e.g., closing bars and restaurants) during the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic (April-May 2020). Respondents who reported identifying more strongly with their nation consistently reported greater engagement in public health behaviours and support for public health policies. Results were similar for representative and non-representative national samples. Study 2 (N = 42 countries) conceptually replicated the central finding using aggregate indices of national identity (obtained using the World Values Survey) and a measure of actual behaviour change during the pandemic (obtained from Google mobility reports). Higher levels of national identification prior to the pandemic predicted lower mobility during the early stage of the pandemic (r = −0.40). We discuss the potential implications of links between national identity, leadership, and public health for managing COVID-19 and future pandemics.
The objective prevalence of and subjective vulnerability to infectious diseases are associated with greater ingroup preference, conformity, and traditionalism. However, evidence directly testing the link between infectious diseases and political ideology and partisanship is lacking. Across four studies, including a large sample representative of the U.S. population (N > 12,000), we demonstrate that higher environmental levels of human transmissible diseases and avoidance of germs from human carriers predict conservative ideological and partisan preferences. During the COVID‐19 pandemic (N = 848), we replicated this germ aversion finding and determined that these conservative preferences were primarily driven by avoidance of germs from outgroups (foreigners) rather than ingroups (locals). Moreover, socially conservative individuals expressed lower concerns of being susceptible to contracting infectious diseases during the pandemic and worried less about COVID‐19. These effects were robust to individual‐level and state‐level controls. We discuss these findings in light of theory on parasite stress and the behavioral immune system and with regard to the political implications of the COVID‐19 pandemic.
Research has demonstrated that situational factors such as perceived threats to the social order activate latent authoritarianism. The deadly COVID-19 pandemic presents a rare opportunity to test whether existential threat stemming from an indiscriminate virus moderates the relationship between authoritarianism and political attitudes toward the nation and out-groups. Using data from two large nationally representative samples of adults in the United Kingdom ( N = 2,025) and Republic of Ireland ( N = 1,041) collected during the initial phases of strict lockdown measures in both countries, we find that the associations between right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and (1) nationalism and (2) anti-immigrant attitudes are conditional on levels of perceived threat. As anxiety about the COVID-19 pandemic increases, so too does the effect of RWA on those political outcomes. Thus, it appears that existential threats to humanity from the COVID-19 pandemic moderate expressions of authoritarianism in society.
COVID-19 skepticism can be conceptualized as the denial of the seriousness of the illness and the perception that the pandemic is overblown or a hoax. In the current study, we examined the association between COVID-19 skepticism and frequency of engaging in COVID-19 prevention behaviors, political ideology, social norms about distancing, COVID-19 information-seeking behaviors, and COVID-19 conspiracy theories. A survey was administered from May 5th–14th. At that time, there were over 1 million COVID-19 cases in the US. Participants were recruited online through MTurk. The three outcome variables were handwashing, mask wearing, and social distancing. Injunctive and descriptive norms were assessed as well as measures of perceived risk to self and others. There were 683 participants in the analyses. In the multiple logistic regression model, those who were of younger age (aOR = 0.97, p < 0.05), better health (aOR = 0.56, p < 0.01), and more politically conservative (aOR = 1.32, p < 0.01) were more likely to endorse COVID-19 skepticism statements. People who reported higher Skepticism were also less likely to that believe people close to them would die from COVID-19 (aOR = 4.2, p < 0.01), engage in COVID-19 prevention behaviors, including spending time inside to prevent coronavirus (aOR = 0.33, p < 0.01) and frequently wear a mask outside (aOR = 0.44, p < 0.01). Those who were more skeptical about COVID-19 were also more likely to believe the conspiracy theory that China purposefully spread the virus (aOR = 6.38 p < 0.01). COVID-19 Skepticism was strongly associated with reduced engagement in COVID-19 prevention behaviors. These findings bolster the arguments for making these public health recommendations mandatory.
It has become received wisdom that the pandemic has “exposed” the political incompetence of far-right parties in government and that far-right parties in opposition have become its (first) “victims.” This is largely based on the generalization of one or two individual cases—most notably US president Donald Trump—who is the exception rather than the rule. This article provides a comparative analysis of far-right responses to the COVID-19 pandemic within the European Union. Based on theoretical insights from previous research, we expect the responses to reflect the main ideology and the internal heterogeneity of the contemporary far right as well as to show the increasing mainstreaming of its positions. We analyze four different, but related, aspects: (1) the narratives about COVID-19 from far-right parties; (2) the proposed solutions of far-right parties; (3) the electoral consequences of the pandemic for far-right parties; and (4) the success of far-right parties in dealing with the pandemic. Finally, in the discussion we shortly look ahead at the possible consequences of a highly likely second outbreak of COVID-19.
Numerous polls suggest that COVID-19 is a profoundly partisan issue in the United States. Using the geotracking data of 15 million smartphones per day, we found that US counties that voted for Donald Trump (Republican) over Hillary Clinton (Democrat) in the 2016 presidential election exhibited 14% less physical distancing between March and May 2020. Partisanship was more strongly associated with physical distancing than numerous other factors, including counties’ COVID-19 cases, population density, median income, and racial and age demographics. Contrary to our predictions, the observed partisan gap strengthened over time and remained when stay-at-home orders were active. Additionally, county-level consumption of conservative media (Fox News) was related to reduced physical distancing. Finally, the observed partisan differences in distancing were associated with subsequently higher COVID-19 infection and fatality growth rates in pro-Trump counties. Taken together, these data suggest that US citizens’ responses to COVID-19 are subject to a deep—and consequential—partisan divide.
Behavioral-immune-system research has illuminated how people detect and avoid signs of infectious disease. But how do we regulate exposure to pathogens that produce no symptoms in their hosts? This research tested the proposition that estimates of interpersonal value are used for this task. The results of three studies (N = 1,694), each conducted using U.S. samples, are consistent with this proposition: People are less averse to engaging in infection-risky acts not only with friends relative to foes but also with honest and agreeable strangers relative to dishonest and disagreeable ones. Further, a continuous measure of how much a person values a target covaries with comfort with infection-risky acts with that target, even within relationship categories. Findings indicate that social prophylactic motivations arise not only from cues to infectiousness but also from interpersonal value. Consequently, pathogen transmission within social networks might be exacerbated by relaxed contamination aversions with highly valued social partners.
COVID-19 threatens lives, livelihoods, and civic institutions. Although restrictive public health behaviors such as social distancing help manage its impact, these behaviors can further sever our connections to people and institutions that affirm our identities. Three studies ( N = 1,195) validated a brief 10-item COVID-19 Threat Scale that assesses (1) realistic threats to physical or financial safety and (2) symbolic threats to one’s sociocultural identity. Studies reveal that both realistic and symbolic threats predict higher distress and lower well-being and demonstrate convergent validity with other measures of threat sensitivity. Importantly, the two kinds of threats diverge in their relationship to restrictive public health behaviors: Realistic threat predicted greater self-reported adherence, whereas symbolic threat predicted less self-reported adherence to social disconnection behaviors. Symbolic threat also predicted using creative ways to affirm identity even in isolation. Our findings highlight how social psychological theory can be leveraged to understand and predict people’s behavior in pandemics.
The coronavirus pandemic is one of the biggest health crises of our time. In response to this global problem, various institutions around the world had soon issued evidence-based prevention guidelines. However, these guidelines, which were designed to slow the spread of COVID-19 and contribute to public well-being, are (deliberately) disregarded by some individuals. In the present study, we aimed to develop and test a multivariate model that could help us identify individual characteristics that make a person more/less likely to comply with COVID-19 prevention guidelines. A total of 525 attentive participants completed the online survey. The results of structural equation modeling (SEM) show that COVID-19 risk perception and trust in science both independently predict compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines, while the remaining variables in the model (political conservatism, religious orthodoxy, conspiracy ideation and intellectual curiosity) do so via the mediating role of trust in science. The described model exhibited an acceptable fit (χ²(1611) = 2485.84, p < .001, CFI = .91, RMSEA = .032, SRMR = .055). These findings thus provide empirical support for the proposed multivariate model and underline the importance of trust in science in explaining the different levels of compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines.
Superordinate identities, such as identification with all humanity (IWAH), may be considered the result of situational activation or as individual differences that can be measured using psychometric scales. Our research originates from this second approach. Why do some people feel connected only to narrow social groups like family and friends, while the social identifications of others cross boundaries, extending to people all over the world? We examined the possible psychological characteristics underlying this phenomenon in two cross-sectional studies (N = 334, N = 311). A structural model of the effects of openness to experience, empathy (empathic concern and perspective taking), and universalism-tolerance, mediated by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO), and ethnocentrism upon IWAH is presented and tested. Results showed that openness to experience, empathy, and universalism-tolerance directly enhanced identification with all humanity. RWA, SDO, and ethnocentrism were their partial negative mediators. SDO and ethnocentrism also directly reduced IWAH. These studies offer possible reasons for individual differences in levels of global human identification, by considering its psychological background.
The issue of personality and prejudice has been largely investigated in terms of authontananism and social dominance orientation. However, these seem more appropriately conceptualized as ideological attitudes than as personality dimensions. The authors describe a causal model linking dual dimensions of personality social world view, ideological attitudes, and intergroup attitudes. Structural equation modeling with data from American and White Afrikaner students supported the model, suggesting that social conformity and belief in a dangerous world influence authoritarian attitudes, whereas toughmindedness and belief in a competitive jungle world influence social dominance attitudes, and these two ideological attitude dimensions influence intergroup attitudes. The model implies that dual motivational and cognitive processes, which may be activated by different kinds of situational and intergroup dynamics, may underlie 2 distinct dimensions of prejudice.
The behavioral immune system is a motivational system that helps minimize infection risk by changing cognition, affect, and behavior in ways that promote pathogen avoidance. In the current paper, we review foundational concepts of the behavioral immune system and provide a brief summary of recent social psychological research on this topic. Next, we highlight current conceptual and empirical limitations of this work and delineate important questions that have the potential to drive major advances in the field. These questions include predicting the ontological development of the behavioral immune system, specifying the relationship between this system and the physiological immune system, and distinguishing conditions that elicit direct effects of situational pathogen threats versus effects that occur only in interaction with dispositional disease concerns. This discussion highlights significant challenges and underexplored topics to be addressed by the next generation of behavioral immune system research.
A few weeks prior to the EU referendum (23rd June 2016) two broadly representative samples of the electorate were drawn in Kent (the south-east of England, N = 1,001) and Scotland (N = 1,088) for online surveys that measured their trust in politicians, concerns about acceptable levels of immigration, threat from immigration, European identification, and voting intention. We tested an aversion amplification hypothesis that the impact of immigration concerns on threat and identification would be amplified when political trust was low. We hypothesized that the effect of aversion amplification on voting intentions would be mediated first by perceived threat from immigration, and then by (dis) identification with Europe. Results in both samples were consistent with this hypothesis and suggest that voters were most likely to reject the political status quo (choose Brexit) when concerns that immigration levels were too high were combined with a low level of trust in politicians.
We present, test, and extend a theoretical framework that connects disgust, a powerful basic human emotion, to political attitudes through psychological mechanisms designed to protect humans from disease. These mechanisms work outside of conscious awareness, and in modern environments, they can motivate individuals to avoid intergroup contact by opposing immigration. We report a meta-analysis of previous tests in the psychological sciences and conduct, for the first time, a series of tests in nationally representative samples collected in the United States and Denmark that integrate the role of disgust and the behavioral immune system into established models of emotional processing and political attitude formation. In doing so, we offer an explanation for why peaceful integration and interaction between ethnic majority and minorities is so hard to achieve.
Human spatial behavior has been the focus of hundreds of previous research studies. However, the conclusions and generalizability of previous studies on interpersonal distance preferences were limited by some important methodological and sampling issues. The objective of the present study was to compare preferred interpersonal distances across the world and to overcome the problems observed in previous studies. We present an extensive analysis of interpersonal distances over a large data set (N = 8,943 participants from 42 countries). We attempted to relate the preferred social, personal, and intimate distances observed in each country to a set of individual characteristics of the participants, and some attributes of their cultures. Our study indicates that individual characteristics (age and gender) influence interpersonal space preferences and that some variation in results can be explained by temperature in a given region. We also present objective values of preferred interpersonal distances in different regions, which might be used as a reference data point in future studies.
People who are more avoidant of pathogens are more politically conservative, as are nations with greater parasite stress. In the current research, we test two prominent hypotheses that have been proposed as explanations for these relationships. The first, which is an intragroup account, holds that these relationships between pathogens and politics are based on motivations to adhere to local norms, which are sometimes shaped by cultural evolution to have pathogen-neutralizing properties. The second, which is an intergroup account, holds that these same relationships are based on motivations to avoid contact with outgroups, who might pose greater infectious disease threats than ingroup members. Results from a study surveying 11,501 participants across 30 nations are more consistent with the intragroup account than with the intergroup account. National parasite stress relates to traditionalism (an aspect of conservatism especially related to adherence to group norms) but not to social
dominance orientation (SDO; an aspect of conservatism especially related to endorsements of intergroup barriers and negativity toward ethnic and racial outgroups). Further, individual differences in pathogen-avoidance motives (i.e., disgust sensitivity) relate more strongly to traditionalism than to SDO within the 30 nations.
Person-based factors influence a range of meaningful life outcomes, including intergroup processes, and have long been implicated in explaining prejudice. In addition to demonstrating significant heritability, person-based factors are evident in expressions of generalised prejudice, a robust finding that some people (relative to others) consistently score higher in prejudice towards multiple outgroups. Our contemporary review includes personality factors, ideological orientations (e.g., authoritarianism), religiosity, anxiety, threat, disgust sensitivity, and cognitive abilities and styles. Meta-analytic syntheses demonstrate that such constructs consistently predict prejudice, often at the upper bounds of effect sizes observed in psychological research. We conclude that prejudice theories need to better integrate person- and situation-based factors, including their interaction, to capture the complexity of prejudice and inform intervention development.
A new conceptualization and measurement of social dominance orientation—individual
differences in the preference for group based hierarchy and inequality—is introduced. In contrast to previous measures of social dominance orientation that were designed to be unidimensional, the new measure (SDO7) embeds two theoretically-grounded subdimensions of SDO – SDO-Dominance (SDO-D) and SDO-Egalitarianism (SDO-E). SDO-D constitutes a preference for systems of group-based dominance in which high status groups forcefully oppress lower status groups. SDO-E constitutes a preference for systems of group-based inequality that are maintained by an interrelated network of subtle hierarchy-enhancing ideologies and social policies. Confirmatory factor and criterion validity analyses confirmed that SDO-D and SDO-E are theoretically distinct and dissociate in terms of the intergroup outcomes they best predict. For the first time, distinct personality and individual difference bases of SDO-D and SDO-E are outlined. We clarify the construct validity of SDO by strictly assessing a preference for dominance hierarchies in general, removing a possible confound relating to support for hierarchy benefitting the ingroup. Consistent with this, results show that among members of a disadvantaged ethnic minority group (African Americans), endorsement of SDO7 is inversely related to ingroup identity. We further demonstrate these effects using nationally representative samples of U.S. Blacks and Whites, documenting the generalizability of these findings. Finally, we introduce and validate a brief four-item measure of each dimension. This paper importantly extends our theoretical understanding of one of the most generative constructs in social psychology, and introduces powerful new tools for its measurement.
Known as the source effect, feelings of disgust have been found to differ depending on the source of the disgusting material, with that emanating from oneself and familiar others eliciting less disgust than that of strangers. We tested the source effect on self-report of disgust feelings (Study 1), physiological response in heart rate (Study 2), and behavioral response in terms of approach–avoidance movement (Study 3). The results showed significantly higher levels of disgust feelings, more reduced heart rates, and faster avoidance behavior when processing disgusting material associated with strangers compared to that of familiar persons. Together these findings support the evolutionary view that disgust, as part of the human behavioral immune system to drive avoidance from disease-carrying agents, will likely be activated more intensely and quickly in response to unfamiliar as compared to familiar conspecifics who carry common germs more defendable by our shared physical immunity.
Disgust is a powerful behavioral adaptation, which confers the advantage of reducing the risk of pathogen infection. However, there are situations in which disgust at core elicitors (e.g., feces) must be modulated in the service of other goals (e.g., caring for a close kin). In Study 1, mothers of infants completed a self-report questionnaire about their reactions to changing their baby's feces-soiled diaper compared with the diaper of someone else's baby. In Study 2, mothers of infants were presented with a series of trials in which they smelled concealed samples of their own baby's feces-soiled diaper and those of someone else's baby. In addition, labels were used to identify the source of the sample (correctly labeled, mislabeled, or no label). Both studies provide evidence suggesting that mothers regard their own baby's fecal smell as less disgusting than that from someone else's baby. Furthermore, labeling had relatively little influence on this effect, and the effect persisted when social desirability was controlled.
In this article, we report the results of a randomized controlled experiment that examines how exposure to information about a global pandemic from Asia affects white Americans’ prosocial behavior towards white, black, and Asian Americans. We find that when exposed to a new disease threat from Asia, (1) white Americans donate significantly less money to Asian American recipients than to white or black American recipients, (2) liberals and conservatives are equally likely to discriminate, and (3) a significant spike in media attention about violence against Asians inhibited this discriminatory behavior—at least temporarily. Our experiment allows us to rule out alternative explanations for the unequal treatment of Asian Americans, providing evidence of a causal link between the COVID-19 pandemic and racial discrimination. The study contributes to knowledge about the spillover effects of external threats on race relations and has implications for public health and science communication.
Does a state of emergency necessarily contract human behavior? In times of security crises, for instance, citizens overcome their divides. Our analysis explores the relationship between county-level partisanship in the United States during COVID-19 and mobility. We provide an original theoretical analysis to distinguish pandemic politics from politics in times of emergency as we had known them. Our framework helps reconcile previous contradictory findings about this type of emergency politics. Such a frame is needed as it has been a century since the last major global pandemic and COVID-19 may not be the last. There are five reasons to distinguish COVID-19 from previously familiar types of emergency politics: psychological, national sentiments, policy related, elite related, and time related. Our extensive mobility big data (462,115 county*days from March–August 2020) are uniquely informative about pandemic politics. In times of pandemic, people literally vote with their feet on government actions. The data are highly representative of the U.S. population. At the pandemic outbreak, our exploratory innovative analysis suggests political divides are exacerbated. Later, with mixed messages about the plague from party leadership, such exceedingly partisan patterns dissipate. They make way to less politically infused and more educationally, demographically, and economically driven behavior.
The COVID-19 pandemic has created objectively threatening situations in everyday life (e.g., unemployment, risk of infection), and researchers have begun to ask whether threats from the pandemic are linked to people's political attitudes. However, scholars currently lack a systematic answer to this question. Here, we examined whether objective COVID-19 threats (cases, deaths, and government restrictions) occurring over the initial months of the pandemic (February-June 2020) were associated with seven different assessments of political attitudes among Project Implicit users in the United States (N = 34,581). We did not consistently observe meaningful associations between COVID-19 threats and political attitudes. The lack of consistent meaningful associations emerged regardless of the level of analysis (country, state, and county) or participant's self-identified ideology. Collectively, these findings failed to find evidence that political attitudes were tied to COVID-19 threats in a meaningful way during the initial months of the pandemic.
Echoing the 1960s, the 2020s opened with racial tensions boiling. The Black Lives Matter movement is energized, issuing pleas to listen to Black voices regarding day-to-day discrimination and expressing frustrations over the slow progress of social justice. However, psychological scientists have published only several opinion pieces on racial microaggressions, primarily objections, and strikingly little empirical data. Here I document three trends in psychology that coincide with the academic pushback against microaggressions: concept-creep concerns, especially those regarding expanded notions of harm; the expansion of right-leaning values in moral judgments (moral foundations theory); and an emphasis on prejudice symmetry, with the political left deemed equivalently biased against right-leaning targets (e.g., the rich, police) as the right is against left-leaning targets (e.g., Black people, women, LGBT+ people). Psychological scientists have ignored power dynamics and have strayed from their mission to understand and combat prejudice against disadvantaged populations, rendering researchers distracted and ill-equipped to tackle the microaggression concept. An apparent creep paradox, with calls to both reduce (e.g., harm) and expand (e.g., liberal prejudices, conservative moral foundations) concepts, poses a serious challenge to research on prejudice. I discuss the need for psychology to better capture Black experiences and to “tell it like it is” or risk becoming an irrelevant discipline of study.
Objective
We measure the prevalence of noncompliance with public health guidelines in the COVID-19 pandemic and examine how it is shaped by political ideology across countries.
Methods
A list experiment of noncompliance and a multi-item scale of health-related behaviors were embedded in a comparative survey of 11,000 respondents in nine OCED countries. We conduct a statistical analysis of the list experiment capturing degrees of noncompliance with social distancing rules and estimate ideological effect heterogeneity. A semiparametric analysis examines the functional form of the relationship between ideology and the propensity to violate public health guidelines.
Results
Our analyses reveal substantial heterogeneity between countries. Ideology plays an outsized role in the United States. No association of comparable magnitude is found in the majority of the other countries in our study. In many settings, the impact of ideology on health-related behaviors is nonlinear.
Conclusion
Our results highlight the importance of taking a comparative perspective. Extrapolating the role of ideology from the United States to other advanced industrialized societies might paint an erroneous picture of the scope of possible nonpharmaceutical interventions. Heterogeneity limits the extent to which policymakers can learn from experiences across borders.
Significance
This study investigates whether the COVID-19 pandemic has aggravated prejudice and discrimination against racial/ethnic minority groups. Results from a nationally representative survey experiment about roommate selection suggest that incidents of anti-Asian hostility reported in the media are not isolated acts but signal-amplified racism against East Asians. While popular rhetoric has blamed East Asians for the pandemic, we find that COVID-19–associated discrimination has spilled over to South Asians and Hispanics, suggesting a generalized phenomenon of xenophobia. Prejudice fueled by COVID-19 against Asians has been particularly widespread, but for Hispanics, such negative sentiments are mitigated by respondents’ prior social contact with them. These findings highlight the need to develop a multitargeted approach to address racism and xenophobia associated with COVID-19.
Previous research has related the existence of pathogenic threat to an individual's social cognition, with people avoiding physical interactions with those who have potential contagion risks. These pathogenic induced behavioral responses have broader social consequences, such as avoidance of outgroup members or negative reactions to individuals foreign to one's own group. Specially, higher pathogen threat is associated with xenophobic attitudes and ideological tendencies, such as authoritarianism and political conservatism. The COVID-19 pandemic provides an unprecedented opportunity to investigate the effect of pathogenic threat on the above-mentioned variables in a real-world situation. Collecting data during a low (N = 598) and heightened (N = 309) perceived threat of the COVID-19 pandemic in the US, our results reveal that Right-Wing Authoritarian traits, but not xenophobia, increase with a rise in the number of national pathogenic cases. Moreover, our results replicate previous findings regarding the associations between pathogen threat, political orientation, xenophobia, and Right-Wing Authoritarianism, in an actual pathogen threat scenario.
Significance
Previous work establishes the effectiveness of social distancing for reducing COVID-19 transmission at the aggregate level: Locales in which restrictions were imposed experienced a reduction in spread of the virus. However, we know little about the effectiveness of social distancing at the level of the individual. Do individuals who engage in social distancing reduce their personal likelihood of contracting COVID-19? Or are these effects only evident in the aggregate? A longitudinal investigation involving 2,120 online participants demonstrated that individual differences matter. Participants who exhibited greater social distancing on a virtual behavior measure—simulations presenting graphical depictions of specific real-world scenarios, asking them to position themselves relative to others in the scene—were less likely to contract COVID-19 subsequently.
Right–left political views can be decomposed into distinct economic and social dimensions that bear differing relations with external criteria. In three community samples (total N = 1,487), we identified replicable suppressor situations in which statistically controlling for either social or economic political ideology increased the other ideology dimension’s relations with variables reflecting cognitive rigidity, authoritarianism, dangerous worldview, and lethal partisanship. Specifically, positive bivariate relations between social conservatism and these outcomes were enhanced after controlling for economic conservatism, whereas, after controlling for social conservatism, positive bivariate relations between economic conservatism and external criteria became negative and negative bivariate relations were enhanced. We identified similar, albeit less consistent, suppressor phenomena for general personality. Taken together, our results suggest that social and economic conservatism differ substantially in their psychological implications, and that following statistical control, these differences emerge in samples in which social and economic conservatism are highly positively correlated.
Proponents of the ‘ideological symmetry thesis’ claim that liberals and conservatives are equally prejudiced — but against different groups. Whereas conservatives are said to be more prejudiced against ‘left-leaning’ groups (such as racial, religious, and sexual minorities), liberals are said to be prejudiced against ‘right-leaning’ groups (such as racial, religious, and sexual majorities). We identify several problems with scholarship in this area: (1) evidence for ideological symmetry with respect to intolerance, prejudice, and discrimination is unconvincing; (2) it is based on shaky conceptual foundations, including a problematic definition of prejudice; and (3) the ideological symmetry hypothesis is contradicted by much of what we know about intergroup relations in society. For instance, in the U.S, FBI hate crime statistics — cataloguing violent crimes motivated by race, religion, sexual orientation, and gender identity — show that members of racial/ethnic minority groups (African Americans, Latinx, Asian Americans, Native Americans, and mixed race individuals) are dozens of times more likely to be victims of hate crimes than European Americans, adjusting for population base rates. Muslims are dozens of times more likely and Jews are hundreds of times more likely than Christians to be victims. LGBTQ people are thousands of times more likely to be victimized than heterosexuals. After considering several interpretations of these and related facts, we conclude that twentieth century theories of authoritarianism, prejudice, and ideological asymmetry account for the totality of evidence much better than recent theories stressing moral and ideological equivalence.
The present research examined the relationship between political ideology and perceptions of the threat of COVID-19. Due to Republican leadership’s initial downplaying of COVID-19 and the resulting partisan media coverage, we predicted that conservatives would perceive it as less threatening. Two preregistered online studies supported this prediction. Conservatism was associated with perceiving less personal vulnerability to the virus and the virus’s severity as lower, and stronger endorsement of the beliefs that the media had exaggerated the virus’s impact and that the spread of the virus was a conspiracy. Conservatism also predicted less accurate discernment between real and fake COVID-19 headlines and fewer accurate responses to COVID-19 knowledge questions. Path analyses suggested that presidential approval, knowledge about COVID-19, and news discernment mediated the relationship between ideology and perceived vulnerability. These results suggest that the relationship between political ideology and threat perceptions may depend on issue framing by political leadership and media.
Many studies have investigated the relationship between ideological attitudes and aggressive tendencies. The present meta-analytic integration of research on this relationship included data of 177 samples (total N = 47,933 participants). The results revealed that this relationship was substantial, r =.31, 95% CI [.27 to.35], p <.001. Such a relationship emerged for both attitudes towards violence and behavioural indicators, although the former relationship was stronger. Moreover, with respect to the different types of attitudes towards violence, we obtained equally strong relationships for attitudes towards war and military action, intergroup hostility and aggression, punitive attitudes, and intimate violence. Among the behavioural measures, context-specific aggression bore out a stronger effect size than chronic aggressive behaviour. Finally, type of right-wing attitude did not moderate the relationship under study. In the discussion, we argue that the pattern of results indicates that the greater aggressive tendencies among right-wing individuals are manifested both attitudinally and behaviourally.
In two quasi-experimental vignette studies, we have analyzed how societal threat to safety moderates the relation between right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and psychological distress. In Study 1 (Italian community sample, N = 343), we focused on depressive symptoms (measured with the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale and the General Health Questionnaire). Two moderated regressions showed that the relation between RWA and both measures of depressive symptoms was positive and significant only among people exposed to a socially threatening scenario. In Study 2 (Italian student sample, N = 219), we focused on state anxiety and replicated Study 1's results. The findings indicated that, in conditions of societal threat to safety, RWA is a risk factor for psychological distress. Strengths, limitations, and possible developments of this research are discussed.
This revised book provides a thorough explanation of the foundation of robust methods, incorporating the latest updates on R and S-Plus, robust ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) and regression. It guides advanced students and other professionals through the basic strategies used for developing practical solutions to problems, and provides a brief background on the foundations of modern methods, placing the new methods in historical context. Author Rand Wilcox includes chapter exercises and many real-world examples that illustrate how various methods perform in different situations. Introduction to Robust Estimation and Hypothesis Testing, Second Edition, focuses on the practical applications of modern, robust methods which can greatly enhance our chances of detecting true differences among groups and true associations among variables. * Covers latest developments in robust regression * Covers latest improvements in ANOVA * Includes newest rank-based methods * Describes and illustrated easy to use software.
Generalized prejudice (GP), biases expressed toward multiple outgroups, is typically explained by two aspects of authoritarianism: ‘bowing’ in the form of submission (i.e., right-wing authoritarianism, RWA); and ‘kicking’ in the form of dominance (i.e., social dominance orientation, SDO). Whereas contemporary approaches treat RWA and SDO as separate GP predictors, we statistically model the commonality between RWA and SDO reflecting an underlying tendency toward generalized authoritarian (GA). Re-analyzing data from an existing meta-analysis (Study 1), and modelling meta-analytic data from studies containing clear GP-relevant information (Study 2), we compare: (a) the standard approach of predicting GP based on RWA and SDO as unique predictors (Model 1); with (b) an alternative approach based on a latent GA factor indicated by RWA and SDO (Model 2). The alternative model provided stronger (and near-perfect) prediction of GP, along with specific associations between RWA and two types of prejudice (sexism, homophobia). These findings have fundamental implications for understanding authoritarianism and prejudice-proneness.
The "behavioral immune system" is a motivational system that evolved as a means of inhibiting contact with disease-causing parasites and that, in contemporary human societies, influences social cognition and social behavior. In this chapter, we provide an overview of the behavioral immune system and how it works, along with a review of empirical research documenting its consequences for a wide range of social psychological phenomena-including person perception, interpersonal attraction, intergroup prejudice, social influence, and moral judgment. We also describe further consequences for health, for politics and public policy, and for cultural differences. Finally, we discuss a variety of broader implications-both practical and conceptual-and identify some important directions for future research.
Over the past few decades, researchers have become increasingly interested in the adaptations guiding the avoidance of disease-causing organisms. Here we discuss the latest developments in this area, including a recently developed information-processing model of the adaptations underlying pathogen avoidance. We argue that information-processing models like the one presented here can both increase our understanding of how individuals trade-off pathogen avoidance against other fitness relevant goals and elucidate the nature of individual differences in pathogen avoidance. With respect to pathogen disgust in particular, we show how contact avoidance can be traded-off against other tasks, including food choice, cooperation, and mate choice.
Part I. From There to Here - Theoretical Background: 1. From visiousness to viciousness: theories of intergroup relations 2. Social dominance theory as a new synthesis Part II. Oppression and its Psycho-Ideological Elements: 3. The psychology of group dominance: social dominance orientation 4. Let's both agree that you're really stupid: the power of consensual ideology Part III. The Circle of Oppression - The Myriad Expressions of Institutional Discrimination: 5. You stay in your part of town and I'll stay in mine: discrimination in the housing and retail markets 6. They're just too lazy to work: discrimination in the labor market 7. They're just mentally and physically unfit: discrimination in education and health care 8. The more of 'them' in prison, the better: institutional terror, social control and the dynamics of the criminal justice system Part IV. Oppression as a Cooperative Game: 9. Social hierarchy and asymmetrical group behavior: social hierarchy and group difference in behavior 10. Sex and power: the intersecting political psychologies of patriarchy and empty-set hierarchy 11. Epilogue.
What are the root causes of intolerance? This book addresses that question by developing a universal theory of what determines intolerance of difference in general, which includes racism, political intolerance, moral intolerance and punitiveness. It demonstrates that all these seemingly disparate attitudes are principally caused by just two factors: Individuals’ innate psychological predispositions to intolerance (“authoritarianism”) interacting with changing conditions of societal threat. The threatening conditions, particularly resonant in the present political climate, that exacerbate authoritarian attitudes include, most critically, great dissension in public opinion and general loss of confidence in political leaders. Using purpose-built experimental manipulations, cross-national survey data and in-depth personal interviews with extreme authoritarians and libertarians, the book shows that this simple model provides the most complete account of political conflict across the ostensibly distinct domains of race and immigration, civil liberties, morality, crime and punishment, and of when and why those battles will be most heated.
This book shows that many ordinary people today are highly susceptible to hate literature and are psychologically disposed to embrace antidemocratic, facist policies. Many of our biggest problems, seemingly unrelated, are found to have common authoritarian roots. This book gives insight into how authoritarian minds are created and how they operate, and how their failings and vulnerabilities produce submission and aggression. A search for authoritarians on the left finds very few. Instead, studies reveal a strong concentration of authoritarians among religious fundamentalists and conservative politicians. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)(jacket)
G*Power (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) was designed as a general stand-alone power analysis program for statistical tests commonly used in social and behavioral research. G*Power 3 is a major extension of, and improvement over, the previous versions. It runs on widely used computer platforms (i.e., Windows XP, Windows Vista, and Mac OS X 10.4) and covers many different statistical tests of the t, F, and chi2 test families. In addition, it includes power analyses for z tests and some exact tests. G*Power 3 provides improved effect size calculators and graphic options, supports both distribution-based and design-based input modes, and offers all types of power analyses in which users might be interested. Like its predecessors, G*Power 3 is free.
We performed a multilevel, multinational test of Stenner's model on authoritarianism using the 2008 European Values Survey dataset (N = 55 199, nested in 38 nations). We focussed on the effects exerted on four authoritarian manifestations (racial intolerance, political intolerance, negative attitudes towards immigrants, and moral intolerance) by the cross-level interaction between participants' authoritarian predispositions (assessed in terms of childrearing values) and their country's crime rate. Associations between authoritarian predispositions and racial intolerance, political intolerance, negative attitudes towards immigrants, and moral intolerance were significantly stronger among participants living in countries characterised by high crime rates than those among participants living in countries with low crime rates. Limitations, implications, and future directions of this study are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.