Available via license: CC BY 4.0
Content may be subject to copyright.
CRITICAL PAPER
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615-023-00455-5
Politische Vierteljahresschrift
Democracy, Agony, and Rupture: A Critique of Climate
Citizens’ Assemblies
Amanda Machin
Received: 29 March 2022 / Revised: 22 January 2023 / Accepted: 27 January 2023
© The Author(s) 2023
Abstract Stymied by preoccupation with short-term interests of individualist con-
sumers, democratic institutions seem unable to generate sustained political commit-
ment for tackling climate change. The citizens’ assembly (CA) is promoted as an
important tool in combatting this “democratic myopia.” The aim of a CA is to bring
together a representative group of citizens and experts from diverse backgrounds
to exchange their different insights and perspectives on a complex issue. By pro-
viding the opportunity for inclusive democratic deliberation, the CA is expected to
educate citizens, stimulate awareness of complex issues, and produce enlightened
and legitimate policy recommendations. However, critical voices warn about the
simplified and celebratory commentary surrounding the CA. Informed by agonistic
and radical democratic theory, this paper elaborates on a particular concern, which
is the orientation toward consensus in the CA. The paper points to the importance
of disagreement in the form of both agony (from inside) and rupture (from outside)
that, it is argued, is crucial for a democratic, engaging, passionate, creative, and
representative sustainability politics.
Keywords Politics · Sustainability · Climate change · Disagreement · Agonism
Amanda Machin
Department of Sociology and Social Work, University of Agder (UiA),
Universitetsveieen 25, 4630 Kristiansand, Norway
E-Mail: amanda.machin@uia.no
K
A. Machin
Demokratie, Agonie und Disruption: eine Kritik an Klimabürgerräten
Zusammenfassung Mattgesetzt von kurzsichtigen Konsuminteressen, erscheinen
demokratische Institutionen nicht in der Lage, den Klimawandel nachhaltig zu be-
kämpfen. Immer häufiger werden deshalb Bürgerräte als ein Ausweg empfohlen,
um dieser Kurzsichtigkeit der Demokratie zu begegnen. Ziel von Bürgerräten ist
es, eine repräsentative Gruppe von Menschen mit unterschiedlichen Sichtweisen so-
wie Expert*innen aus unterschiedlichen Fachrichtungen zusammenzubringen, damit
sie ihre Perspektiven auf ein komplexes Thema wie den Klimawandel miteinander
austauschen. Indem sie die Gelegenheit für inklusive demokratische Deliberation
bieten, versprechen Bürgerräte nicht nur, das Problembewusstsein zu schärfen, son-
dern auch, aufgeklärte und dadurch legitime Politikempfehlungen hervorzubringen.
Allerdings mehren sich die Stimmen, die diese vereinfachenden und unkritisch posi-
tiven Einschätzungen in Frage stellen. Ausgehend von der agonistischen, radikalde-
mokratischen Demokratietheorie setzt sich diese Arbeit mit der Konsenserwartung
auseinander, die an Bürgerräte gerichtet wird. Der Beitrag verweist auf die Be-
deutung von Meinungsunterschieden und Konflikten in Form von Agonie (intern)
und Disruptionen (von außen), die – so das Argument – für eine demokratische,
engagierte, leidenschaftliche, kreative und repräsentative Nachhaltigkeitspolitik not-
wendig sind.
Schlüsselwörter Politik · Nachhaltigkeit · Klimawandel · Meinungsunterschiede ·
Agonie
There is politics ... because there is a wrong count of the parts of
the whole ... The demos means the majority and not the assembly,
the assembly and not the community, the poor in the name of the
city, clapping their agreement, counting stones instead of taking
decisions (Jacques Ranciere 1999, p. 10).
1 Introduction
How can democracy and sustainability be reconciled? There is no straightforward
answer to this question, and simply asking it immediately instigates a series of
others. Such questions, however, should not be regarded as an impasse for political
theory and democratic environmental policymaking, but can be seen more positively
as an impetus for further debate. The introduction of this special issue calls for new
questions in order to “stimulate a new research agenda” (Dietz, Fuchs, Schäfer, and
Vetterlein 2023, in this issue). As they indicate, many respected scholars argue that
the path to a more sustainable society is one that must be inclusive, participatory, and
democratic (Barry 2002; Eckersley 2004,2020; Fischer 2017). Against the claim that
liberal democracy is simply a tool for the governance of “the condition of sustained
unsustainability” (Blühdorn 2013, p. 18), political theorists as well as environmental
activists suggest that frustration with existing political institutions does not have to
K
Democracy, Agony, and Rupture: A Critique of Climate Citizens’ Assemblies
lead to a complete rejection of democracy but could also be the basis for its radical
transformation (Eckersley 2017).
Various proposals to enhance participation and to “green” democracy have been
promoted (Machin 2022a). But one democratic innovation that has recently been
given copious amounts of attention is the citizens’ assembly (CA). The CA brings
together a representative group of citizens and experts from diverse backgrounds to
exchange their different insights and perspectives on a complex issue such as climate
change, and is therefore expected to facilitate a bottom-up movement of democracy
(Dietz, Fuchs, Schäfer and Vetterlein 2023, in this issue). CAs on climate change are
expected to inform citizens about this complex problem in order to help them imag-
ine different ways of living and to formulate and legitimise robust environmental
policies (Howarth et al. 2020, p. 1113). These forums have therefore been widely
promoted by both environmentalists and political scientists (Dryzek et al. 2019;
Howarth et al. 2020; Smith 2021). As one account states, “Citizen assemblies may
not always generate the results that we expect, but by encouraging collective debate
and decision-making they frequently propose a more positive future and different
ways of getting there” (Howarth et al. 2020, p. 1113). Citizen assemblies on climate
change have either taken place or are scheduled in numerous cities and countries,1
including Budapest2, Camden,3Denmark,4France,5Geneva,6Germany,7Scotland,8
Spain,9Krakow,10 Oxford,11 the United Kingdom,12 Vorarlberg,13 and Washington,14
and a “Global Citizens’ Assembly” took place in connection with the 2021 United
Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) in November 202115 (see Table 1for
a comparison of some of these climate CAs).
However, as we will see, various critics offer important points regarding the lim-
itations, even dangers, of any assumption that a deliberative forum such as the CA
offers a straightforward solution to effectively and legitimately tackle an issue like
climate change. These critics are wary of the suggestion that inequalities and hierar-
chies can be entirely removed from any political arena, and they accuse advocates of
1For a more extensive (but probably not exhaustive) list of citizens’ assemblies on climate change as well
as other topics, see https://www.buergerrat.de/en/background/citizens-assemblies-worldwide/
2https://demnet.hu/en/citizens- assembly- in- budapest- 2020/
3https://www.camden.gov.uk/citizens-assembly- climate- crisis
4https://tekno.dk/project/citizen- assembly- at/?lang=en
5https://www.conventioncitoyennepourleclimat.fr/en/
6https://oidp.net/en/practice.php?id=1285
7https://buergerrat-klima.de/english-information
8https://www.climateassembly.scot/impact
9https://asambleaciudadanadelcambioclimatico.es/
10 https://ipp.expert/krakowski-panel-klimatyczny/
11 https://www.oxford.gov.uk/info/20011/environment/1343/oxford_citizens_assembly_on_climate_change
12 https://www.climateassembly.uk/
13 https://vorarlberg.at/-/bürgerrat-klima- zukunft
14 https://www.waclimateassembly.org/
15 https://globalassembly.org/declaration
K
A. Machin
Tab l e 1 Comparison of four climate citizens’ assemblies (2020–2021)
Participants Meetings Guiding question Topics Input Outcome
Climate
Assembly UK
108 assembly
members,
selected by
sortition
Six week-
ends (three in
Birmingham,
three online)
January–May
2020
How should the UK meet its
target of net zero greenhouse gas
emissions by 2050?
Underpinning principles for the
path to net zero
How we travel on land
How we travel by air
Heat and energy use in the home
What we eat and how we use the
land
What we buy
Greenhouse gas removals
The changed context created by
COVID-19
Additional recommendations
Presentations
from 47 expert
speakers as ei-
ther informants
or advocates
556-page re-
port with key
recommenda-
tions
Scotland’s
Climate
Assembly
105 assembly
members,
selected by
sortition
Seven week-
ends of online
sessions
November
2020–March
2021
How should Scotland change to
tackle the climate emergency in
an effective and fair way?
Diet, land use, and lifestyle
Homes and communities
Travel and work
100 expert
speakers se-
lected by evi-
dence group
204-page re-
port with 81
recommenda-
tions
Bürgerrat-
Klima
(Germany)
160 assembly
members
12 online ses-
sions
April–June 2021
How can Germany achieve the
goals of the Paris Climate Agree-
ment with due consideration to
social, economic, and environ-
mental factors?
Energy
Mobility
Buildings and heating
Food and agriculture
Advised by
experts from
science, politics,
and civil society
101-page
report with
official recom-
mendations
Washington
Climate
Assembly
77 assembly
members,
selected by
sortition
Twice-weekly
online meet-
ings, 5 h per
week, over
7 weeks Jan-
uary–February
2021
How can Washington State eq-
uitably design and implement
climate mitigation strategies
while strengthening communities
disproportionately impacted by
climate change across the state?
Transportation
Buildings
Energy
Natural solutions
Circular economies
Social policies
Education and communication
Governance
Presentations
from experts
and interested
parties
123-page
report with
formal recom-
mendations
K
Democracy, Agony, and Rupture: A Critique of Climate Citizens’ Assemblies
ignoring entrenched power relations as well as the role of passions and the question
of how these forums connect with existing institutions.
This paper will elaborate on a particular concern, which is that climate CAs are
oriented towards seeking consensus on a set of policy recommendations in a forum
that is expected to be fully representative. This orientation, it is argued here, under-
mines the ineradicability and value of political disagreement. Drawing on agonist
and radical democratic theory that sees disagreement as a constitutive feature of
modern democratic societies, the paper will challenge the presupposition that polit-
ical discussion and participation is obstructed by dissent and conflict. Disagreement
in environmental politics allows alternative futures to be imagined, articulated, ne-
gotiated, and demanded, and it prevents the foreclosure of political questions around
climate change (Pepermans and Maeseele 2018; Kenis and Lievens 2014; Machin
2020).
Disagreement, however, is manifested in different ways in democratic politics, and
in this paper I therefore make an analytical distinction between two different—albeit
connected—forms of disagreement. The first is agony, the type of contestation that
potentially appears inside a political space or forum as the conflict between different
demands, perspectives, and identities and that agonist theorists such as Chantal
Mouffe and Bonnie Honig see as an ineradicable feature of politics. The second
is rupture, which I understand as the manifestation of disagreement coming from
outside in the form of a democratic excess, and is perhaps best described by Jacques
Rancière. I target the displacement of disagreement in the outcome of the CA through
the emphasis and celebration of the often fairly high levels of agreement reached in
CAs, and also in the way this leads to its devaluation in the deliberative process itself,
so that disagreement is rendered temporary and obstructive. The paper thus aims to
contribute to theories regarding the nature and value of political disagreement, as
well as to substantiate a critique of climate CAs.
I begin with a brief reminder of the ideals of deliberation followed by a description
of the design of climate CAs. Next, I consider some of the various critiques of CAs
before, focusing more specifically on the problematic preclusion of disagreement in
climate CAs, in which, as I see it, the ultimate goal of consensus renders any form
of dissent as temporary and obstructive. The paper concludes that disagreement in
the form of both agony and rupture, which can contribute to a democratic, engaging,
passionate, creative, and representative sustainability politics, is missing in climate
CAs.
2 Deliberation
It is not too much of an exaggeration to state that the majority of research that seeks
to reconcile democratic participation with sustainability transformation has been in-
formed by the deliberative school of democracy. This school, originating in the work
of Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, aims to base decisions on what Habermas refers
to as “a public use of reason jointly exercised by autonomous citizens” (1994,p.3).
The claim here is that fair, inclusive, equal, and careful deliberation can generate
informed and ethically and politically legitimate policy decisions and recommen-
K
A. Machin
dations better than the strategising and bargaining of political elites. Deliberation
requires citizens to go beyond their private self-interests and orient themselves to
the public common good (Elster 1986;Rose2009).
Some recommend that the interaction between political representatives is made
more deliberative (Lidskog and Elander 2007, p. 88). More commonly, the emphasis
is placed on a widespread change in political participation beyond voting in elections:
“Ordinary people,” it is proposed, can be active participants in meaningful delibera-
tion and are often able to overcome polarisation and heal deep divisions (Dryzek et al.
2019). Deliberative democrats therefore recommend the introduction of genuine op-
portunities for citizens from across society to engage in inclusive and thoughtful
discussion. As John Dryzek and colleagues explain, deliberation involves “inclusive
participation that encompasses citizens and leaders, mutual justification, listening,
respect, reflection, and openness to persuasion” (Dryzek et al. 2019, p. 1145). Such
collective deliberation is believed to be an effective mechanism for assuaging the
“democratic myopia” that apparently renders democratic systems unable to tackle
long-term and complex problems such as climate change (Willis et al. 2022). Numer-
ous political thinkers and environmental activists therefore recommend deliberative
democracy as the pathway towards sustainability (Baber and Barlett 2005; Barry
1999; Blue and Dale 2016; Christiano 2012; Dryzek 2000; Dryzek and Niemeyer
2019; Eckersley 2004; Hammond 2020a; Niemeyer 2013; Pimbert and Barry 2021;
Smith 2003,2021;Vlerick2020; Willis et al. 2022), providing both ethical and
epistemic justifications.
Deliberation is seen, first of all, as ethically valuable because it is supposed to
encourage individuals to transcend their self-interests and become “other regard-
ing.” David Miller refers to the “moralising effect of public discussion” (1992,
p. 61), for narrow self-interest is difficult to defend in the public sphere. By indi-
viduals’ engaging in face-to-face discussions with their fellow citizens, deliberative
democracy is expected to encourage a sense of community and awareness of others,
including those to whom they initially regarded with suspicion or hostility (Vlerick
2020, p. 6). Deliberation encourages, too, an awareness of ecological concerns and
dangers, broadens perspectives, and facilitates the public scrutinising of environmen-
tally unsustainable practices. For Robyn Eckersley, although there is no guarantee
that deliberation, or any other democratic procedure, will generate “green ends”
(2017, p. 994), she nevertheless advocates deliberative democracy that, she states,
“privileges generalizable interests over private, sectional, or vested interests, thereby
making public interest environmental advocacy a virtue rather than a heroic aberra-
tion in a world of self-regarding rational actors” (2004, p. 117, see also Eckersley
2020, p. 220).
Second, and relatedly, deliberation is justified on the epistemic basis that it ed-
ucates citizens and generates “better” decision-making (Estlund and Landemore
2018). As Simone Chambers writes, “[W]e humans ... gain better cognitive results
when thinking interactively and intersubjectively” (2018, p. 148). Participants learn
about each other and themselves and therefore, the decisions they arrive at are sup-
posed to be improved. “In the process of exchanging evidence related to proposed
solutions, individuals discover information they did not previously have ... delibera-
tion is in itself a procedure for becoming informed” (Manin 1987, p. 349). Rebecca
K
Democracy, Agony, and Rupture: A Critique of Climate Citizens’ Assemblies
Willis and colleagues claim that deliberation emphasises “the power of the better
argument” (2022, p. 5) and activates “system 2 thinking,” which is characterised
by “more considered and reflective forms of judgement” (Willis et al. 2022,p.4).
Likewise, Dryzek and colleagues assert that “properly structured deliberation can
promote recognition, understanding, and learning” (2019, p. 1145). Eckersley ar-
gues that deliberative democracy is particularly appropriate in the case of complex
ecological problems; it makes it possible to expose the policies and interests of
social, political, and economic elites to public scrutiny, and “a case can be made
that deliberative democracy is especially suited to making collective decisions about
long-range, generalizable interests, such as environmental protection and sustainable
development” (Eckersley 2004, p. 118).
3 Assembly
While some deliberative democrats demand a widespread change in public culture
in general (Hammond 2020b), many promote the institution of various types of de-
liberative forums—known as deliberative mini-publics—in which citizens and vari-
ous stakeholders, along with their representatives as well as scientists and different
sorts of experts, are encouraged to exchange insights, perspectives, and knowledge
in a process of mutual learning. As Graham Smith explains, “Deliberative mini-
publics are participatory institutions in which randomly selected citizens learn, re-
flect, and deliberate on often complex and controversial areas of public policy before
they come to make recommendations” (Smith 2021, p. 94). These forums include
deliberative opinion polls, citizens’ juries, consensus conferences, planning cells,
deliberative polling, and town meetings (see Gastil and Levine 2005; Smith and
Setälä 2018; O’Flynn 2022).
These sorts of forums are expected to heighten public awareness of the long-term
impacts of particular policies on the environment and to encourage innovative policy
recommendations: “Such deliberative environments are seen as creative spaces in
which new ideas and options can be fostered” (Hammond and Smith 2017,p.15).
Graham Smith warns that although these are not “a democratic panacea,” they are
nevertheless “worthy of sustained consideration” (Smith 2021, p. 93). In his research,
Simon Niemeyer, for example, has offered evidence that deliberation in a mini-public
“improved the ability of citizens to better deal with the kind of complexity associated
with climate change” (2013, p. 442).
One particular type of deliberative mini-public that has become increasingly
prominent in discussions among both theorists and activists is the CA. Jonathan
Rose provides a helpful definition: “A citizens’ assembly takes a group of random
citizens of diverse ages, ethnic backgrounds, and socioeconomic status and after an
intensive education programme followed by a public consultation and deliberation
phase has them make a policy recommendation” (Rose 2009, p. 215). By bringing
together a large group of ordinary people for lengthy periods, CAs are “extraordinary
experiments” in deliberative democracy (Fournier et al. 2011, p. 13).
The design of the CA, according to Fournier and colleagues, echoes the coun-
cils of ancient Athens: “one of the most important institutions of Athenian direct
K
A. Machin
democracy” (2011, p. 10). A CA typically involves 99–150 people and takes place
over a series of weekends (Smith and Setälä 2018;Table1). Participants are in-
vited randomly by sortition (or “civic lottery”), and then great care is taken to sort
from those who accepted the invitation a group that represents the wider population
as closely as possible in terms of gender, age, ethnicity, class, region, and voting
preference (Renwick 2017; Mellier and Wilson 2020). Participants might be given
financial support to cover travel, accommodation, and childcare costs and access
needs.16 They are then presented with input from experts from the fields of science,
civil society, and industry, and with “carefully designed questions” (Capstick et al.
2020, p. 1). After lengthy deliberation, sometimes in smaller working groups, the
assembly is normally expected to produce policy recommendations, which may then
be handed to politicians or voted on in a referendum (Pal 2012). Some have advo-
cated a CA at a global level (Dryzek, Bächtiger and Milewicz 2011),butmostCAs
take place at the state or local level.
CAs are recommended by political scientists who promote deliberative democracy
as a mechanism that can produce a robust climate policy (Dryzek et al. 2019).
Howarth and colleagues agree that “deliberative engagement mechanisms, such as
citizens’ assemblies and juries, could be a powerful way to build a social mandate
for climate action post-COVID” (2020). Recently, activists too, most prominently
the protest movement Extinction Rebellion, have expressed a strong demand for
“the government to create and be led by the decisions of a citizens’ assembly on
climate and ecological justice” (Extinction Rebellion 2019,p.5),whichtheysay
will “provide an opportunity to explore the views of a broadly representative sample
of people in fair and equitable way” (2019,p.7).
17 Indeed, as the growing list of
climate CAs indicates, there is a definite trend towards the use of CAs by national
and local governments.18
Empirical research has been undertaken on CAs in Canada (Warren and Pearse
2008;Pal2012; Fournier et al. 2011), Ireland (Carolan 2018), Australia (Carson
2007), France (Giraudet et al. 2021), the UK (Flinders et al. 2016; Wells et al.
2021), and the Netherlands (Boogard and Binnema 2017). This body of research
has produced mixed conclusions. The CAs are widely reported to be “a positive
experience” for those involved (Cain and Moore 2019, p. 13), and some suggest
that although CAs are “a significant investment in terms of money, time, energy and
relationship building,” they also should be seen as “a positive social investment that
is likely to increase the efficiency of subsequent policies and decisions” and that can
drive a “broader public debate about an issue, challenge or event” (Flinders et al.
2016, p. 3). Others claim that they often fail to enhance “a wider public conversation”
and that their impact on policymaking is difficult to assess (Wells et al. 2021,p.5).
Certainly, critical voices warn about the simplified and celebratory commen-
tary surrounding the CA (Carolan 2018; Lafont 2015). This type of forum invites
numerous questions not only concerning its most effective design and practical im-
16 For example, the UK and Washington climate CAs gave financial compensation in the form of honoraria
or stipends
17 https://xrcitizensassembly.uk/
18 https://europeanclimate.org/stories/the-growing-traction-of-climate-citizens-assemblies/
K
Democracy, Agony, and Rupture: A Critique of Climate Citizens’ Assemblies
plementation and the way it fits within the political apparatus of liberal democracies,
but also with regard to how such an institution may reinforce specific understand-
ings and processes of democratic participation and undermine others and how this
overlooks, if not reinforces, the authority of certain types of bodies and particular
forms of knowledge. It is to these critiques that I turn to next. In the following
sections, I draw on academic work and also reports of the CAs themselves in order
to illustrate and test critical arguments.
4 Critique
Critics of CAs raise concerns about the quality of political participation that can oc-
cur within deliberative mini-publics. Practical problems of selecting participants and
information aside, there remains the issue of power relations in these forums, which
provokes Albena Azmanova to ask, “How do we know that public deliberations are
really free of power asymmetries, ideological idiom, and various forms of manipula-
tion?” (2010, p. 48). The process is supposed to be neutral, but it normally starts with
a “learning phase” (Willis et al. 2022) in which invited experts are expected to give
presentations that deliver what is described as “foundational knowledge” (Bürgerrat-
Klima 2021, p. 12; Scotland’s Climate Assembly 2021, p. 6). It is at least possible
that participants find it difficult to challenge knowledge claims that are said to be
foundational. Lynn Sanders believes that the deliberative model of democracy “does
not take sufficient account of the ways that status and hierarchy shape patterns of
talking and listening to ensure that all perspectives are considered” (Sanders 1997,
p. 370). Certain types of speaking are given priority in deliberative forums, which
might mean that certain perspectives, communicated in different ways, are not heard
(Young 1996). There is, therefore, a concern that some bodies dominate in a delib-
erative space because habituated expectations and perceptions allocate the authority
of particular bodies over others (Machin 2022b, p. 75). This might not only skew
the discussion but also restrict the possibility for the expression of a diversity of
opinions and lived experiences and the emergence of new ideas.
Some proponents of deliberative democracy are themselves not convinced by the
growing emphasis on mini-publics. They are concerned that these circumscribed
“experimental” spaces of deliberation that are controlled by governments do not
constitute an instrument for citizens to take the initiative themselves to challenge
the status quo; the topic for discussion, the timing, the material, and other practical
details are entirely arranged “top down” by the authorities. This can force partici-
pants into what deliberative democrat proponent Marit Hammond (nee Böker) calls
“an ominously passive role” (Böker 2017, p. 11). Indeed, observers have noticed
that CAs “do not deliver breakthrough ideas, but are rather in line with previ-
ously adapted policies” (Ufel 2021, p. 88). Hammond emphasises the importance of
a broad deliberative culture and the promotion of “socio-political spaces of inclusive
critical engagement” (Hammond 2020a, p. 188; Hammond and Smith 2017, p. 23),
and it is not clear that this is encouraged by CAs. Likewise, Chambers states that the
“protected sphere” of the forum can only be one part of the picture of the broader
democratic public arena (Chambers 2018). Others highlight the fact that politicians
K
A. Machin
not only influence the process but are able to cherry-pick and simply ignore the
recommendations if they do not fit with their agenda (Ufel 2021, p. 86).
Another critique arises from the putative aim of the CA to create a space for
sober rational reflection and exchange. Deliberative democrats suggest that while
emotions “play an important role in making reasons vivid,” they can “distort our
capacity for careful reasoning and reflection” (O’Flynn 2022, p. 54). It can be asked,
however, whether an emphasis on reason over emotion might undermine the pas-
sionate exchange of ideas that engages participants in politics (Walzer 2004). Cheryl
Hall makes the important point that although a “supreme value” may be placed on
“calm rational discussion” in deliberative forums (2007, p. 81), this actually belies
the passions that underpin deliberation: “[D]eliberation already involves passions”
(Hall 2007, p. 92). As she notes, the privileging of rational discussion “maintains
the power of those who are already dominant because they are the ones who have
perfected the art of appearing rational” (Hall 2007, p. 83). Emotions cannot be
easily bracketed off political exchange, and “the issues that most people want to
talk about are not always easy to articulate in the format of rational reasoned argu-
ment” (Hayward 2020, p. 123). While emotions do clearly pervade and inform the
interactions between assembly members—in their comments, participants refer to
emotions of pride as well as disappointment and to their “impassioned,” “compas-
sionate,” “intensive,” and “inspiring” discussions19—the importance of this aspect of
political interaction does not seem to be acknowledged in the deliberative process of
the climate CAs, which is described as careful and considered (Scotland’s Climate
Assembly 2021, p. 102), and which requires the provision of “a sufficient amount of
time for reflection ... necessary to achieve well-thought-out decisions” (Washington
Climate Assembly 2022,p.4).
But if politics is emotional and passionate, it also unpredictable and unruly. Po-
litical interaction is as prone to tensions and frictions as it is to harmony and accord.
This is not to say that disagreement is irrational or that rationality has to be dis-
passionate, but simply that the portrayal of arriving at a rational agreement through
deliberation offers not only a very insipid picture of politics but also a very distorted
one. Conflicts reveal and heighten the nonrational aspects of political life, and this
does not make them illegitimate or dissolvable but, on the contrary, shows their
durability and their capacity to enliven and engage. To try to overcome disagree-
ment is to misconceive democratic politics, or, in the words of Bonnie Honig, it
is to ultimately displace politics by assuming that success lies in the eradication
of conflict and struggle (Honig 1993, p. 2). In the following section, I offer a cri-
tique of CAs that challenges their orientation towards the goal of consensus and
the way that this dampens the possibility of democratic disagreement in both the
outcome and the process of deliberation. It is disagreement, I argue, that facilitates
a lively, passionate, creative, engaging, and representative sustainability politics. As
Aletta Norval notes, disagreement takes different forms (2007, p. 39). Democratic
disagreement can take the form of agony that enlivens from the inside, and it can
19 These emotions appear in the comments of the participants who are reflecting on their participation,
included, for example, in the reports of the German and Scottish climate CAs (Bürgerrat-Klima 2021;
Scotland’s Climate Assembly 2021) and the analysis of the Camden climate CA (Cain and Moore 2019).
K
Democracy, Agony, and Rupture: A Critique of Climate Citizens’ Assemblies
take the form of rupture, which disrupts from the outside. As I show in the next
sections, climate CAs not only fail to harness these forms of disagreement but tend
to actively work against them.
5 Agony
Often contrasted to the deliberative school of democracy is the agonistic school,
characterised by its emphasis on the plurality, uncertainty, and tragedy of politics
that is constituted by perpetual struggle. Agonists suggest that political disagree-
ment is not only inevitable but can enliven and enrich democratic politics (Connolly
2005,2013; Honig 1993;2009; Mouffe 1999,2005; Tambakaki 2017). They are,
therefore, wary of assertions of the possibility of reaching a full consensus through
deliberation—however inclusive, equal, and fair it is intended to be. Agonism, ex-
plains Paulina Tambakaki, stresses the central role played by contestation between
differences, which sustains openness, pluralises politics, and, as she puts it, ren ews
democracy (2017, p. 579). Agonists do not call for any radical overthrow of liberal
democratic institutions, but they do insist upon the opening up of those institutions to
differences that have hitherto been suppressed (Tambakaki 2017, p. 579). Disagree-
ments should not, therefore, be understood as irrational blockages or lamentable
failures, as they are commonly presented in accounts of deliberative democracy and
CAs, but rather as legitimate expressions of difference that both expose closure and
exclusion and open up the possibility of alternatives. An assertion of consensus can
provide a useful cover for powerful stakeholders who may be loathe to see a change
to the status quo (Ward et al. 2003, p. 287). Scholars of environmental politics,
drawing on the agonistic school of thought, have thus argued against what they see
as depoliticisation and the encroachment of the postpolitical discourse on climate
politics. The invocation of the need for consensus, as Anneleen Kenis and Matthias
Lievens note, is a political manoeuvre that tries to disguise the politics around cli-
mate change (2014). Repoliticisation, on the other hand, “brings different voices to
the fore” and therefore “helps to open the door for real and effective change” (Kenis
and Lievens 2014, p. 545).
Climate change appears to be an issue that is particularly liable to disagreement
between positions that are situated in different lived existences (Machin 2013,2015,
2020). But if consensus is unlikely, it is also not necessarily salutary. It is pos-
sible that democratic debates and forums can be enriched and enlivened through
the clash of perspectives over environmental issues, and further that environmental
policymaking might ultimately be better served through the recognition and appre-
ciation of political disagreement. This “ecological agonism” approach suggests that
the disagreement provoked by environmental hazards can both engage citizens in
political debate and facilitate the emergence and consolidation of socioecological
alternatives. Conventionally marginalised perspectives may contain valid and valu-
able insights and ideas (Machin 2020). After all, as Chantal Mouffe points out, it is
only through political discord that prevailing power structures can be reconfigured
(Mouffe 2005, p. 21).
K
A. Machin
Arguably, then, it is the value placed on political contestation that marks the line
between the deliberative and the agonistic schools. Early theories of deliberation cer-
tainly eschewed conflict and emphasised the importance of its participants’ reaching
consensus. Indeed, for Habermas, it was the “orientation to the goal of communica-
tively reached agreement” that brought participants together to deliberate in the first
people (Habermas 2002, p. 44; see also Estlund and Landemore 2018). Later (or
“second-generation”) theorists have recognised the problem with this ideal and have
moved towards a recognition and even an appreciation of the role of difference and
disagreement and the “unfinished and open-ended aspect that serves as the lifeblood
of democracy” (Ercan and Gagnon, 2014,p.7;Ufel2021,p.80).
And yet this respect for differences and disagreements is not so evident in the
guides, descriptions, and evaluations of CAs. Consensus is generally seen in this
literature as a normative goal of deliberation as well as a practical outcome of the
assemblies, and is the desirable stopping point beyond which discussion does not
have to be pursued.20 The emphasis on consensus is remarkable in explicit statements
such as “the premise of the CA is to look for a consensus” (Gerwin 2018, p. 80),
“the importance of talk that is framed around consensus” (Rose 2009, p. 230), and
“supportive structures to aid consensus-building” (Cain and Moore 2019, p. 36).
Decisions in CAs are expected to be “consensus based” (Rose 2009, p. 216), and
CAs are supposed to help with “forging consensus” (Climate Assembly UK 2022,
p. 4) and allowing governments to forge a “cross-party consensus” (Climate As-
sembly UK 2022, p. 7). The Global Citizens’ Assembly expressed confidence that
it can “build consensus” (Global Assembly Team 2022, p. 2), and the report on the
Scottish Climate CA highlighted the “overwhelming consensus” of participants who
supported the final set of recommendations (2021, p. 7). Analysts reporting on the
climate CA in Camden, London, noticed the changes in the participants’ confidence,
behaviour, and identification, but wrote that “this is not the point of a CA—they are
deliberative processes aiming to build consensus and legitimacy around responses to
contested policy issues” (Cain and Moore 2019, p. 36). A group of scholars analysing
the French Convention noticed the orientation towards consensus: “Reaching a con-
sensus, as measured by the absence of explicit dissent, was systematically favored
over voting by the organizers” (Giraudet et al. 2021,p.12).
Indeed, throughout the literature on climate CAs, despite the occasional acknowl-
edgement of “nuanced discussions” (Climate Assembly UK 2022, p. 5) and of “mak-
ing room for disagreements and differences of opinion” (Scotland’s Climate Assem-
bly 2021, p. 102) and the observation that “disagreements were not uncommon”
(Bürgerrat-Klima 2021, p. 82), there is a greater emphasis placed on “consensus
building” (Scotland’s Climate Assembly 2021, p. 136) and on the achievement of
agreement on the recommendations, which are almost always regarded and cele-
brated as the definite main outcome of the CA. These recommendations come “to-
wards the end of the process” and are “jointly formulated” (Bürgerrat-Klima 2021,
p. 76). The purported goal of the CA in general, then, is definitely not to find, high-
light, and understand the main points of contention over climate change, but rather to
20 Estlund and Landemore (2018) note that in deliberative theories, consensus might be viewed as a goal,
an outcome, or a stopping point. My analysis indicates that this applies in the case of climate CAs.
K
Democracy, Agony, and Rupture: A Critique of Climate Citizens’ Assemblies
seek the principles and recommendations on which the assembly participants could
agree. For example, the Climate Assembly UK stated that “the assembly members’
agreement of their additional recommendations brought the assembly process to its
close” (Climate Assembly UK report 2022, p. 551), and the Washington Climate
Assembly report explains that its goal was to provide “a set of broadly supported
climate mitigation recommendations” for the state legislature (Washington Climate
Assembly 2022, p. 8). Perhaps even more revealingly, the Oxford CA on Climate
Change report states, “There was widespread belief that Oxford should be a leader
in tackling the climate crisis ... However, it’s important to consider the caveats to
this broadly optimistic and positive image ... there was little consensus on when
before 2050 ‘net zero’ should be achieved” (Ipsos MORI 2019, p. 3). Consensus is
regarded as an unquestioned good and a finality, whereas disagreement is seen as
temporary, obstructive, and unfortunate.
To be clear here, my point is not that these reports falsely claim that full consensus
exists (which would simply not be true) but rather that many of them simply make
the assumption that the closer to consensus the assembly gets (or, to be accurate,
the higher the percentage of members who come to an agreement), the better. The
reasons for dissenting are not analysed or differentiated but are lumped together and
relegated to the part of the percentage that is negatively expressed. Consider that the
reports from Climate CAs in Germany, Washington, Scotland, Camden, and the UK
append to their list of recommendations the number or percentage of the Assembly
who had voted for each of them, signalling the preoccupation with the quantity of
agreement on a recommendation, which is presumablymeantasanindicationofits
validity and legitimacy. This quantity rarely, if ever, reaches 100%—it is actually
asserted that 80% qualifies as “almost a complete consensus” (Gerwin 2018,p.22),
which suggests that that differences do persist but are rendered virtually invisible in
the 20% that goes unanalysed.
Consensus, moreover, is seen as a result of the participants becoming more in-
formed by listening to expert presentations and reflecting amongst themselves. As
Giraudet et al. note, in the French Citizens’ Convention for Climate, “the generally
high rate with which measures were approved was sometimes celebrated as evidence
that giving citizens the appropriate scientific background was sufficient to generate
informed and consensual decisions” (2021, p. 13). They make the important point
that the invited experts each gave their presentations in turn and were not given
the opportunity to question each other’s evidence and claims; potential disagree-
ments between the different experts themselves were thereby structurally precluded
(Giraudetetal.2021, p. 12).
To say that greater value is placed on agreement than on disagreement here is
to understate the way in which CAs seek consensus and to displace the possibility
of valid and ongoing disagreement between the assembly members. This goal of
consensus has the effect of underestimating and stifling the tenacity and value of
disagreement in the discussions. There is no space inside the CA for the political
agon, in which opponents vie to articulate and consolidate distinctive positions that
might offer an array of valid alternative strategies and imaginaries for socioecolog-
ical transformation. There is no room for presenting clearly delineated and distinct
options. There is no formal place for opposition. Instead, the participants are ex-
K
A. Machin
pected to be united around a common concern in a shared world. “The deliberative
nature of the CA,” write Geerten Boogard and Harmen Binnema, “... stimulates citi-
zens to look for what they share (common ground) instead of what separates them”
(Boogard and Binnema 2017). In a video about the Global Assembly, the narrator
refers to hearing the “voice of humanity”21—as if this would consist of one single
and unified sound. Azmanova expresses suspicion about the claims of deliberation to
represent the “public voice” and suggests instead that a forum of public deliberation
is more convincingly understood to be “a place where social conflict is communica-
tively enacted” (2010, p. 52). In climate CAs, however, conflicts are generally not
made explicit but are, on the contrary, rendered invisible behind the pursuit of a list
of recommendations; the aim is not to bring to light “the multiple social conflicts
that make up the fabric of the societies we inhabit” (Azmanova 2010, p. 42) but
rather to increase and report the quantification of agreement.
As we can see, then, in the climate CA a group of representative participants
are expected to overcome the agony of differences and to unite around a common
concern in a shared world. But the preselection both of the participants and of
the “common concern” points to the foreclosure of another form of disagreement,
rupture, that I consider in the next section.
6 Rupture
A great deal of care is taken with the sortition process of climate CAs to ensure that
participants are as descriptively representative of society as possible (Willis et al.
2022, p. 6). After invitations have been sent randomly to households, participants
are then selected, from those who accept the invitation, on the basis of criteria—such
as age, gender, ethnicity, disability, household income, educational level, migration
experience, geography, rurality, and attitude to climate change—in order to reflect
the demographic composition of the wider population as a whole. In this way, by
involving people from “all walks of life,” the process creates “a city or country in
miniature” (Gerwin 2018,p.17).
22 Such representativeness is expected to improve
the quality of the deliberation inside the CA and to create legitimacy for its process
and outcomes. It is also supposed to make CAs more representative of “the people”
than existing governments are. This is precisely why Extinction Rebellion demand
the creation of a CA at the national level: “Deliberative processes, supported by
safeguards against bias, lead to more diverse and informed voices in political debates
than in a purely elected body, such as the House of Commons” (Extinction Rebellion
2019,p.7).
The assumption that a climate CA is fully representative, however, can be chal-
lenged on various grounds. The fact that it is to some extent descriptively repre-
sentative (it “mirrors” the population in its composition of individuals in terms of
features such as gender, ethnicity, and age) does not mean it is necessarily substan-
21 https://globalassembly.org/
22 The CA is described as “a microcosm of the state” (Washington Climate Assembly 2022,p.3)or
a “mini-Scotland” (Scotland’s Climate Assembly 2021, p. 102).
K
Democracy, Agony, and Rupture: A Critique of Climate Citizens’ Assemblies
tively representative (reflecting the various substantive interests of the population).
Organisers of a CA cannot know for sure whether all political positions on climate
have been included. Moreover, the decision about which particular descriptive fea-
tures are to be mirrored is, to some extent, a contingent one. It is not hard to think of
characteristics that are not deemed relevant to be represented (body size, time spent
in prison, IQ, mental health, and so on). And one can list easily enough those indi-
viduals whose opinions and experiences might be highly pertinent but whose voices
are not included (children, future generations, distant others, nonhuman nature).
This is not solely a practical matter of opening up the forum to those whose
exclusion is recognised, but of acknowledging the exclusions that go unrecognised
precisely because of the claim that everyone is included. For Rancière, exclusion
does not consist of being left out; it pertains to “the very invisibility of the parti-
tion” (1999, p. 116). The claim of full representativeness excludes the possibility of
exclusion and stifles any possibility of new claims of representation forming outside
the forum that delineate distinct conceptions of political boundaries and subjects.
But it is actually the disruptive formation of new political subjects that, for Rancière,
constitutes democracy (1999, p. 101, 2004, p. 5). Politics really begins for Rancière
not when the already counted confront each other but when those with “no part”
interrupt the dominant order by “part-taking” (1999, p. 18). He writes, “[P]olitical
subjects are, thus, not representatives of parts of the population but processes of
subjectivation which introduce a disagreement, a dissensus” (2004, p. 6). Disagree-
ment here is not a dispute between already existing parts but rather the disruption
of the established political order that “undoes the given” (Tambakaki 2009, p. 104).
It is this disagreement that I call rupture.
Rupture constitutes a form of disagreement that is distinct, I suggest, from the ag-
onistic contest or struggle between differences inside the political assembly. Theories
of agonism—which tend to focus on renewal of the institutions of liberal democracy
rather than their radical transformation—can be criticised for underestimating the
extent of contestation needed to instigate and sustain substantive change (Tambakaki
2017, p. 587). Rupture, in contrast, disturbs the claims of representation and corre-
sponding social imaginaries that form the foundations of the political assembly from
the outside. Consensus here is rejected, but not in the form of the goal, outcome,
or endpoint of the CA; what is rejected here is the suggestion of consensus as the
starting point of the CA. “What indeed is consensus,” asks Rancière, “if not the pre-
supposition of inclusion of all parties and their problems that prohibits the political
subjectification of a part of those who have no part, of a count of the uncounted?”
(1999, p. 116).
Climate CAs are supposed to themselves actually constitute the demos who can
part-take to rupture the unsustainable status quo. Willis and colleagues point out
that the participants in the CA might “ask the difficult questions” eschewed in
formal policymaking (2022, p. 9). For Extinction Rebellion, the exclusion of many
people from politics is the very problem they seek to rectify with CAs (Extinction
Rebellion 2019, p. 8). This is a hopeful and inspiring claim, but can climate CAs
really challenge the very regime by which they have been instituted? Can they
dissolve the claim of their own representativeness and install a new political subject
who is capable of undermining the dominant framing of the problem of climate
K
A. Machin
change, who can rebuild the stage on which it appears, and who can destabilise the
prevailing common sense that is often steeped in neoliberal capitalist relations and
subsists with human–nature dualism? Is it not significant that the starting questions
for climate CA tend to be questions that ask how, and not if, a policy strategy or target
should be reached, and therefore do not allow for the fundamental challenging of
that strategy or target (see the guiding questions in Table 1)?23 What is at stake here
is the possibility of disagreement coming from outside the CA—political dissent
that might rupture the presuppositions that form the background and the starting
questions to deliberations but that often go unnoticed.
To be clear, I am not claiming that the participants in the CA do not come from
a variety of different socioeconomic backgrounds (which they clearly do).24 Nor am
I suggesting that the disruption of a political space always results in its democratic
and progressive transformation (which it clearly does not). My concern, rather, is
that to the extent that a CA closes off a political space based on the claims that it is
fully representative and disavows the possibility of rupture, it forecloses an important
dimension of democracy. In general, the climate CA is entirely closed; its agenda
and process are predetermined, and rupture is disallowed and delegitimised.25 Thus,
instead of facilitating democratic politics over climate change, CAs can actually end
up working against it.
7Conclusion
In the context of a changing climate that both stems from and exacerbates so-
cioeconomic inequalities and injustices, it seems crucial to attend to the way that
institutions, ideals, and practices of democracy might be reimagined and rebuilt
more sustainably (Fischer 2017,p.3;Machin2022a). The CA is widely promoted
as a new democratic instrument for both enhancing democratic participation and rec-
onciling democracy with sustainability. It is expected to increase public awareness
about environmental concerns as well as to legitimise robust environmental policy.
At the very least, these forums “challenge the myth that people are irredeemably
disengaged from politics” (Flinders et al. 2016,p.2).
I have argued, however, that there are dangers in regarding the climate CA as
a mechanism for a democratic climate politics. The assumption of full representative-
ness makes it difficult to rupture the starting questions, assumptions, and identities of
the CA, and its emphasis on reaching consensus dampens the agony of difference. If
the unsustainable status quo is to be challenged, then environmental politics needs to
offer and support new and distinctive ideas. And it is precisely through rupture and
23 Thanks to Alexander Ruser for this point.
24 But note that the report of the climate CA in Germany admits that people with low educational attain-
ment and people who did not report the issue of climate protection as important to them were underrepre-
sented (Bürgerrat-Klima 2021, p. 82).
25 The Washington climate CA, held online, encouraged the public to observe and make suggestions
(Washington Climate Assembly 2022, p. 20) but although this might make the assembly more “open,”
it still does not allow for the “rupture” of its background rationale and starting point.
K
Democracy, Agony, and Rupture: A Critique of Climate Citizens’ Assemblies
agony, I suggest, that alternative pathways, perspectives, and coalitions on climate
change can circulate, align, and consolidate. The disagreement that arises from the
expressions of difference that emerge from both inside and outside political forums
should be celebrated. But the orientation of the climate CA towards consensus and
the quantification of the agreement as a signal of approval works to construct dis-
agreement in the process of deliberation as a temporary and unfortunate hindrance.
In their present form, by undermining the potential for the emergence of alternatives,
CAs might actually obstruct sustainability transformation.
What might be the alternative to a CA that is oriented towards consensus? One
response might be that CAs can be designed to draw attention to political conflicts
between socioecological alternatives and to detect and communicate, rather than
ignore, the main points of disagreement over climate change. Rather than seeking
and measuring agreement on environmental policies, emphasis would be placed on
locating, highlighting, and grasping the issues on which citizens disagree. A more
radical response is to give up on the construction of artificial deliberative forums
and to instead champion existing social and political movements that themselves
offer alternative imaginaries of democracy and sustainability (Machin 2022c).
Certainly, if there is to be a genuine sustainability politics, then democrats should
refrain from demanding consensus, quantifying agreement, and reducing political
participation to deliberation. Instead, they should call for an agonistic and disruptive
politics in which participants are passionate, the remainder are remembered, and the
assembly is animated by disagreement.
Funding Open access funding provided by University of Agder
Conflict of interest A. Machin declares that she has no competing interests.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not
permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly
from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.
0/.
References
Azmanova, Albena. 2010. Deliberative conflict and ‘the better argument’ mystique. The Good Society
19(1):48–54.
Baber, Walter F., and Robert V. Barlett. 2005. Deliberative environmental politics: democracy and ecolog-
ical rationality. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Barry, John. 1999. Rethinking green politics: nature, virtue and progress. London, Thousand Oaks, New
Delhi: SAGE.
Barry, John. 2002. Vulnerability and virtue: democracy, dependency, and ecological stewardship. In
Democracy and the claims of nature: critical perspectives for a new, ed. Ben A. Minteer, Bob
Pepperman Taylor, 133–152. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.
Blue, Gwendolyn, and Jacquie Dale. 2016. Framing and power in public deliberation with climate change:
Critical reflections on the role of deliberative practitioners. Journal of Public Deliberation 12(1):2.
K
A. Machin
Blühdorn, Ingolfur. 2013. The governance of unsustainability: ecology and democracy after the post-demo-
cratic turn. Environmental Politics 22(1):16–36.
Böker, Marit. 2017. Justification, critique and deliberative legitimacy: the limits of mini-publics. Contem-
porary Political Theory 16:19–40.
Boogard, Geerten, and Harmen Binnema. 2017. Aristotle meets Rousseau: recent citizens assemblies
(G1000s) in the Netherlands. University of Bristol Law School Blog. https://www.bristol.ac.uk/law/
dbe/blog/2017/15/. Accessed 13 Jan 2022.
Bürgerrat-Klima. 2021. Citizens’ Climate Report: Recommendations for German climate policy. https://
buergerrat-klima.de/english-information. Accessed 13 Jan 2022.
Cain, Lizzie, and Gemma Moore. 2019. UCL evaluation of Camden Council’s citizens’ assembly on the
climate crisis. https://www.camden.gov.uk/citizens-assembly-climate-crisis. Accessed 31 Jan 2022.
Capstick, Stuart, Christina Demski, Catherine Cherry, Caroline Verfuerth, and Katharine Steentjes. 2020.
Climate change citizens’ assemblies. CAST briefing paper, Vol. 03
Carolan, Eoin. 2018. Ireland’s citizens’ assembly on abortion as a model for democratic change?: Reflec-
tions on hope, hype and the practical challenges of sortition. IACL-AIDC Blog (28 november). https://
blog-iacl- aidc.org/debate- the-citizens- assembly- in-ireland/2018/11/28/irelands- citizens- assembly-
on-abortion- as-a-model- for-democratic-change-reflections-on-hope-hype- and- the-practical-
challenges-of-sortition. Accessed 13 Jan 2022.
Carson, Lyn. 2007. Creating democratic surplus through citizens’ assemblies. Journal of Public Delibera-
tion 4(1):5.
Chambers, Simone. 2018. Democratic in the open. The Good Society 27(1–2):146–154.
Christiano, Thomas. 2012. Rational deliberation between citizens. In Deliberative systems: deliberative
democracy at the large scale, ed. John Parkinson, Jane Mansbridge, 27–51. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Climate Assembly UK. The path to net zero: Climate assembly UK full report. https://www.climateassembly.
uk/index.html. Accessed 13 Jan 2022.
Connolly, William. 2005. Pluralism. Durham and London. Durham: Duke University Press.
Connolly, William. 2013. The fragility of things: self-organizing processes, neoliberal fantasies and demo-
cratic activism. Durham, London: Duke University Press.
Dietz, Thomas, Doris Fuchs, Armin Schäfer, and Antje Vetterlein. 2023. Introduction: Mapping the re-
search field on the democracy-sustainability nexus. Politische Vierteljahresschrift. Online First.
Dryzek, John S. 2000. Deliberative democracy and beyond: liberals, critics, contestations. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Dryzek, John S., and Simon Niemeyer. 2019. Deliberative democracy and climate governance. Nature
Human Behaviour 3:411–413.
Dryzek, John S., André Bächtiger, and Karolina Milewicz. 2011. Toward a deliberative global citizens’
assembly. Global Policy 2(1):33–42.
Dryzek, John S., André Bächtiger, Simone Chambers, Joshua Cohen, James N. Druckman, et al, 2019. The
crisis of democracy and the science of deliberation. Science 363(6432):1144–1146.
Eckersley, Robyn. 2004. The green state: rethinking democracy and sovereignty. Cambridge, London: MIT
Press.
Eckersley, Robyn. 2017. Geopolitan democracy in the anthropocene. Political Studies 65(4):983–999.
Eckersley, Robyn. 2020. Ecological democracy and the rise and decline of liberal democracy: looking
back, looking forward. Environmental Politics 29(2):214–234.
Elster, John. 1986. The market and the forum: three varieties of political theory. In Foundations of social
choice theory, ed. Jon Elster, Aanund Hylland, 104–132. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ercan, Selen, and Jean-Paul Gagnon. 2014. The crisis of democracy: Which crisis? Which democracy?
Democratic Theory 1(2):1–10.
Estlund, David, and Hélène Landemore. 2018. The epistemic value of democratic deliberation. In The
Oxford handbook of deliberative democracy, ed. Andre Bächtiger, John S. Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge,
and Mark Warren. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Extinction Rebellion. 2019. The extinction rebellions guide to citizens’ assemblies. https://extinction
rebellion.uk/go-beyond-politics/citizens-assembly/. Accessed 16 Jan 2022.
Fischer, Frank. 2017. Climate crisis and the democratic prospect: participatory governance in sustainable
communities. New York: Oxford University Press.
Flinders, Matthew, et al. 2016. Democracy matters: Lessons from the 2015 citizens’ assemblies on English
devolution. http://citizensassembly.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Democracy- Matters- 2015-
Citizens-Assemblies-Report.pdf. Accessed 22 Jan 2023.
K
Democracy, Agony, and Rupture: A Critique of Climate Citizens’ Assemblies
Fournier, Patrick, et al. 2011. When citizens decide: Lessons from citizen assemblies on electoral reform.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gastil, John, and Peter Levine. 2005. The deliberative democracy handbook: Strategies for effective civic
engagement in the twenty-first century. San Francisco: Wiley.
Gerwin, Marcin. 2018. Citizens’ Assemblies: Guide to democracy that works. Kraków: Otwarty Plan.
Giraudet, Louis-Gaëtan, Bénédicte Apouey, Hazem Arab, Simon Baeckelandt, Philippe Begout, et al.
2021. Deliberating on climate action: Insights from the French citizens’ convention for climate.
https://hal-enpc.archives- ouvertes.fr/hal- 03119539. Accessed 22 Jan 2023.
Global Assembly Team. 2022. Report of the 2021 Global Assembly on the Climate and Ecological Crisis,
Earth. Available at http://globalassembly.org. Accessed 22 Jan 2023.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1994. Three normative models of democracy. Constellations 1(1):1–10.
Habermas, Jürgen. 2002. The inclusion of the other: Studies in political theory. Cambridge, Oxford: Polity
Press.
Hall, Cheryl. 2007. Recognizing the passion in deliberation: Toward a more democratic theory of deliber-
ative democracy. Hypatia 22(4):81–95.
Hammond, Marit. 2020a. Sustainability as a cultural transformation: the role of deliberative democracy.
Environmental Politics 29(1):173–192.
Hammond, Marit. 2020b. Democratic deliberation for sustainability transformations: between construc-
tiveness and disruption. Sustainability: Science, Practice and Policy 16(1):220–230.
Hammond, Marit, and Graham Smith. 2017. Sustainable prosperity and democracy: A research agenda.
With Joost de moor, Philip Catney, and Brian Doherty. CUSP working paper. https://cusp.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/WP08-Sustainable-Prosperity-and- Democracy.pdf. Accessed 22 Jan 2023.
Hayward, Bronwyn. 2020. Children, citizenship and environment. London, New York: Routledge.
Honig, Bonnie. 1993. Political theory and the displacement of politics. Ithaca, London: Cornell University
Press.
Honig, Bonnie. 2009. Emergency politics: paradox, law, democracy. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Howarth, Candice, et al, 2020. Building a social mandate for climate action: Lessons from COVID-19.
Environmental and Resource Economics 76:1107–1115.
Ipsos MORI. 2019. Oxford citizens’ assembly on climate change. https://www.oxford.gov.uk/downloads/
file/6871/oxford_citizens_assembly_on_climate_change_report_- _november_2019. Accessed 22
Jan 2023.
Kenis, Anneleen, and Matthias Lievens. 2014. Searching for “the political” in environmental politics. En-
vironmental Politics 23(4):531–548.
Lafont, Cristina. 2015. Deliberation, participation, and democratic legitimacy: Should deliberative mini-
publics shape public policy? The Journal of Political Philosophy 23(1):40–63.
Lidskog, Rolf, and Ingemar Elander. 2007. Representation, participation or deliberation? Democratic re-
sponses to the environmental challenge. Space and Polity 11(1):75–94.
Machin, Amanda. 2013. Negotiating Climate Change: Radical Democracy and the Illusion of Consensus.
London: Zed Books.
Machin, Amanda. 2015. Rethinking Political Contestation Over Climate Change. Working Paper for
WRR—The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy. Available at: https://english.wrr.
nl/publications/working-papers/2015/06/10/rethinking-political-contestation- over-climate- change.
Accessed 22 Jan 2023.
Machin, Amanda. 2020. Democracy disagreement disruption: agonism and the environmental state. Envi-
ronmental Politics 29(1):155–172. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2019.1684739
Machin, Amanda. 2022a. Climates of democracy: Skeptical rational and radical imaginaries. WIREs Cli-
mate Change.https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.774
Machin, Amanda. 2022b. Bodies of Democracy: Modes and Moments of Embodied Politics. Bielefeld and
London: Transcript Press.
Machin, Amanda. 2022c. Green Democracy: Political Imaginaries of Environmental Movements. In The
Routledge Handbook of Environmental Movements, ed. Marco Giugni and Maria Grasso, 552–563.
London and New York: Routledge.
Manin, Bernard. 1987. On legitimacy and political deliberation. Political Theory 15(3):338–368.
Mellier, Claire, and Rich Wilson. 2020. Getting climate citizens’ assemblies right. Carnegie Europe.
(5 november). https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/11/05/getting- climate-citizens-assemblies-right-pub-
83133. Accessed 22 Jan 2023.
Miller, David. 1992. Deliberative democracy and social choice. Political Studies 40:54–67.
Mouffe, Chantal. 1999. Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism? Social Research 66(3):745–758.
K
A. Machin
Mouffe, Chantal. 2005. On the political. London: Routledge.
Niemeyer, Simon. 2013. Democracy and climate change: What can deliberative democracy contribute.
Australian Journal of Politics and History 59(3):429–448.
Norval, Aletta J. 2007. Aversive democracy: Inheritance and originality in the democratic tradition.Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
O’Flynn, Ian. 2022. Deliberative democracy. Cambridge, Medford: Polity.
Pal, Michael. 2012. The promise and limits of citizens’ assemblies: Deliberation, institutions and the law
of democracy. Queens law Journal 38(1):259–294.
Pepermans, Yves, and Pieter Maeseele. 2018. Manufacturing consent: Rereading news on four climate
summits (2000–2012). Science Communication 40(5):621–649.
Pimbert, Michel P., and Boukary Barry. 2021. Let the people decide: citizen deliberation on the role of
GMOs in Mali’s agriculture. Agriculture and Human Values https://doi.org/10.1007/s10460-021-
10221-1.
Rancière, Jacques. 1999. Dis-Agreement: politics and philosophy. Minneapolis, London: University of
Minnesota Press. Translated by Julie Rose.
Rancière, Jacques. 2004. Introducing disagreement. Angelaki 9(3):3–9.
Renwick, Alan. 2017. Citizens’ assemblies: a better way of doing democracy? Political Insight 8(3):24–27.
Rose, Jonathan. 2009. Institutionalizing participation through citizens’ assemblies. In Activating the cit-
izen dilemmas of participation in Europe and Canada, ed. Joan DeBardeleben, Jon H. Pammett.
Hampshire, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Sanders, Lynn M. 1997. Against deliberation. Political Theory 25(3):347–376.
Scotland’s Climate Assembly. 2021. Scotland’s climate assembly: Recommendations for action report.
https://www.climateassembly.scot/full-report. Accessed 12 Jan 2022.
Smith, Graham. 2003. Deliberative democracy and the environment. London, New York: Routledge.
Smith, Graham. 2021. Can democracy safeguard the future? Cambridge, Medford: Polity Press.
Smith, Graham, and Maija Setälä. 2018. Mini-publics and deliberative democracy. In The Oxford handbook
of deliberative democracy, ed. André Bächtiger, John Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge, and Mark E. Warren,
300–314. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tambakaki, Paulina. 2009. When does politics happen? Parallax 15(3):102–113.
Tambakaki, Paulina. 2017. Agonism reloaded: Potentia, renewal and radical democracy. Political Studies
Review 15(4):577–588.
Ufel, Wojciech. 2021. Are citizens’ assemblies a good strategy for climate activists? Interfere.(2).https://
interferejournal.files.wordpress.com/2021/11/5.-ufel.-are- citizens-assemblies-a- good- strategy- for-
climate-activists- 1.pdf. Accessed 12 Jan 2022.
Vlerick, Michael. 2020. Towards global cooperation: the case for a deliberative global citizens’ assembly.
Global Policy 11(3):305–314.
Walzer, Michael. 2004. Politics and passion: Towards a more egalitarian liberalism.NewHaven:Yale
University Press.
Ward, Hugh, Aletta Norval, Todd Landman, and Jules Pretty. 2003. Open citizens’ juries and the politics
of sustainability. Political Studies 51:282–299.
Warren, Mark, and Hilary Pearse (eds.). 2008. Designing deliberative democracy: the British columbia
citizens’ assembly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Washington Climate Assembly. Washingtonians finding solutions together: Washington climate assembly
final report. https://www.waclimateassembly.org/. Accessed 15 Jan 2022.
Wells, Rebecca, Candice Howarth, and Lina I. Brand-Correa. 2021. Are citizen juries and assemblies on
climate change driving democratic climate policymaking? An exploration of two case studies in the
UK. Climatic Change 168(5):1–2.
Willis, Rebecca, Nicole Curato, and Graham Smith. 2022. Deliberative democracy and the climate crisis.
WIRES Climate Change 13(2):e759. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.759.
Young, Iris Marion. 1996. Communication and the other: Beyond deliberative democracy. In Democracy
and difference, ed. Seyla Benhabib, 120–135. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
K
