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Shaping Pre-Re°ective Self-Consciousness
Anita Pacholik-Żuromska
Department of Cognitive Science
Nicolaus Copernicus University
ul. Bojarskiego 1
Torun, 87-100, Poland
apz@umk.pl
Gerhard Preyer
Faculty of Social Sciences
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 6
Frankfurt am Main, D-60054, Germany
preyer@protosociology.de
Received 5 November 2022
Revised 11 January 2023
Published
The aim of this paper is to address the problem of pre-re°ective self-consciousness in the context
of the contemporary computational approaches to the mind. These standpoints try to grasp
consciousness in the language of mathematics and geometry, hoping for its more precise
description. As a counterbalance to such theories, Sartre's abiding insight (pre-re°ective con-
sciousness) and Henrich's critique of the modern philosophy of re°ection on rationalism and
empiricism are receiving an increasing attention. In our opinion, the conceptions that consider
pre-re°ective self-consciousness as relational fall into a paradox. We provide an argumentation
that such approaches are missing the basic problem of pre-re°ective consciousness, namely the
self-determination of non-relational mental states. Therefore, following the New Heidelberg's
argumentation, we propose another approach which returns to the concept of consciousness as
based on irrelational intrinsic quality of experience.
Keywords: Pre-re°ective Self-Consciousness; Computationalism; Representations; Heidelberg
School; Non-Wellfoundness.
1. Introduction
The traditional view on subjective experience assumes that there is a special kind of
consciousness, namely pre-re°ective self-consciousness (PRSC), which is de¯ned as
any consciousness that precedes re°ective consciousness. PRSC is an implicit, pri-
mary, and permanent process that does not correspond to any conceptual form.
Positions on the PRSC are particularly present in German philosophy, for example,
Journal of Arti¯cial Intelligence and Consciousness
Vol. 9, No. 4 (2022) 122
#
.
cWorld Scienti¯c Publishing Company
DOI: 10.1142/S2705078522500175
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1
in Novalis [1965/1968], Husserl [1980], Brentano [1874/1911], but the concept of
PRSC is also anchored in the philosophy of Sartre [1940, 1943, 1947]. The renewal
of Sartre's enduring insight in the philosophy of the mental is visible in the research of
Frank [2012, 2015], who continues and innovates the Heidelberg School [Henrich,
1970, 2019]. Frank [2012, 2015, 2022] reinterprets Sartre and formulates on this basis
the original theory of self-consciousness. In the light of Sartre's account of PRSC and
the new readings of Heidelberg School a strong claim can be made that the what of
self-consciousness is non-conceptual and the how is unmediated. This point of view is
defended as being true for all mental states as a magna charta.
a
The New Heidelbergs motivated by Frank [2012, p. 369397, 2015, p. 138172],
for example, Lang [2020a, p. 133143, 2020b, p. 2247, 2021, p. 5973, Zahavi,
2022] and Preyer [2020, 2022] oppose di®erent versions of higher order thought
(HOT) approaches and self-representationalism [Kriegel, 2012] and continue the turn
of the pre-re°ective foundation of mental states. According to the new Heidelbergs,
the HOT leads to a regress and its circularity cannot be stopped internally [Henrich,
2019]. Henrich's argument says that self-consciousness cannot be explained as a
reapplication to itself, because it is an irrelational and egoless occurrence. Hence, self-
consciousness can be neither representational like the perceptual consciousness of
objects, nor thought as a supreme principle [Cf. Kant, Reinhold, Fichte]. The relation
in which consciousness in self-consciousness stands to itself should be classi¯ed as a
secondary relation and not something elementary. Fichte as the discoverer of the
argument has been taken up by Brentano, Schmalenbach, and Sartre on the merits.
The problem of the reference is also present in the works of Michel Henry [1973] and
Merleau-Ponty [1966/1974]. This philosophical tradition was continued by Chisholm
[1981], Castañeda [1999] and gradually transformed into an interdisciplinary version
that appears in the ¯eld of cognitive science and the philosophy of mind [Searle, 1997;
Nagel, 1974; Zahavi and Gallagher, 2008].
Today the issue of PRSC is central to the phenomenological turn in cognitive
science and strongly connected to the studies on bodily self-consciousness (BSC).
BSC is de¯ned as non-conceptual phenomenal consciousness, in which a subject
apprehends himself in bodily experience and not in a propositional attitude or beliefs
from a higher level [Bermúdez, 2005; Gallagher, 2003]. Therefore, it is an unmediated
consciousness which is not accessible from an external point of view, that is, from the
third-person perspective. This goes along with the characteristics saying that BSC is
not an awareness of the body as an object, because the body is a part of the sub-
ject it constitutes the subject (Husserlian Leib). According to the contemporary
account of embodied cognition, the body is a basis of the emergence of the minimal
phenomenal self, which is the experience of being someone [Gallagher, 2003, 2019;
Blanke and Metzinger, 2008; Shoemaker and Swinburne, 1984]. Related to this, BSC
a
Miguens et al. [2016] and Horgan and Nichols [2016]. On a re-systematization of the history of the
philosophical work of Henrich: Frank [2019, 2022], Hart [2019], Gutschmidt [2022], on Henrichs Hegel
interpretation: Kreß[2022], on a critique on the a priori intersubjectivism: Preyer [2022].
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is also described in neuroscienti¯c terminology as a result of two processes: pro-
prioception and homeostasis. The subjective experience is thereby reduced to the
sub-personal level of information processing, which is based on a multi-sensory
integration of information from di®erent sensory organs [Christo® et al., 2011].
However, speaking in neurological terms does not take into account the subjective
element of phenomenal experience, but replaces it with neuronal mechanisms and
processes. Thus, the cognitive science view on the PRSC goes in the direction of
empirical science by using neuroscienti¯c description, but loses its essential com-
ponent, namely phenomenology. This problem cannot be solved trivially, for
example, by changing the description as Davidson suggested [Davidson, 1970/2001].
This solution remains blind to the fact that, if we change the language, it must be
assumed that the presupposed universe of discourse is not empty. In this respect, we
cannot avoid assuming that there is the mental. Functionalist and materialistic
approach, like that presented by Lycan, would not claim that phenomenal con-
sciousness is a ¯ction even if one does not accept Block's qualia as intrinsic entities
[Block, 2000].
b
By asking a philosopher \What do you mean by self-awareness?" it is not
uncommon to hear the answer \self-consciousness means consciousness of the self".
Moreover, it does not require much e®ort to read this statement as a subjectobject
relation. The philosophy of re°ection, which claims to answer the question by stating
further conscious states is regressive and circular. Thus the aim of the paper is to
discuss this question in the context of the exchange between representationalism/self-
representationalism (higher, same order approaches) and anti-representationalism,
moderate self-representationalism as well as internalism and externalism. The over-
arching problem is that the mental states are \self-registered" [Henrich, 2007], which
presumes their conceptualization, but does not assert that these states are themselves
conceptual.
c
It should be emphasized that the subjectobject relation in the Car-
tesian and empiricist philosophy of re°ection has handed down a false epistemology.
The consciousness-consciousness of is not a subjectobject relation. On the
contrary, it presupposes a non-object consciousness. The philosophical research
program of the reinterpretation of the epistemic relation is the conceptualization of
the non-object consciousness, which is precisely not accessible in an objectifying
attitude. The philosophy of re°ection conceptualized by an inner sense as basic
concept cannot handle that, because re°ection is an objectifying attitude towards
mental states. Otherwise it causes the regressus ad in¯nitum.
The addressed topics concern not only the philosophy of the mental but also, in
general, the epistemology and its relation to ontology and questions of analytically
used instruments of logic, model theory and mathematics. The relation between
epistemology and philosophy of the mental is primarily a matter of conceptual
mental states. The instructive corollary problem is that not all mental states are
b
For Lycan's approach and Lycan-qualia, see Preyer [2022].
c
For an overview of the history of concepts, see Frank [2019].
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conceptual. The pure phenomenal consciousness has no conceptual resonance in our
mental states, without therefore being a ¯ction.
In our considerations, ¯rstly, we return to the mindbody problem and the
paradox of PRSC. Secondly, we confront one of the main subjects of contemporary
philosophy of mind (which is also an epistemological issue), namely the question of
the transformation of consciousness into computational algorithms. Third, we go into
some logical problems, which determine the limit of the model theory in the philos-
ophy of mind. The conclusion will give a non-model-theoretic answer to the deter-
mination of the PRSC.
2. The Returning MindBody Problem and the Paradox of PRSC
In the contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science the position of
materialist monism on consciousness is overwhelmingly represented. In the light of
this research on consciousness this is absolutely not surprising, although we are still
searching for the spring of consciousness. Nevertheless, since substantial dualism was
thrown into fairy tales, the only place to look for consciousness is the material. This is
the contrary direction of what Descartes once took. There are no more res extensa
and res cogitans. Rather res cogitans became res extensa. It happened, because the
rei¯cation of consciousness was giving a hope that it could be possible to grasp it, to
measure it and to treat it as an object of empirical research. Regardless of positions
and parties, it is a fact that the mental and the physical interact. It is undeniable that
our experiences and feelings are based on physical processes. And that is exactly why
the analysis of phenomenal experiences in terms of neuroscience is not an analysis of
these experiences, but of their basis.
In the current state of the philosophy of mind it is hard to ¯nd anyone defending
Cartesian dualism. It was burdened with the problem of interactionism, which has
been called Descartes revenge [Kim, 1998]. But the mindbody problem keeps
coming back in the question of how the brain shapes the mind, that is, how the
physical neuronal structure can be the basis for the mental. The most actual para-
digm provided for the solution of this problem is connectionism resting on compu-
tationalism, where cognitive functions are explained by means of the model of
arti¯cial structures (network), on which cognitive functions are computationally
implemented. In the structure of the network, information is processed in such a way
that the patterns of activation of neurons in the sensory organs are monitored by
successive layers of neurons, transforming the information and transmitting it to
subsequent structures in the brain [cf. Churchland, 1995].
The issue of the split between the mental and physical can be formulated in many
di®erent ways. For example in the Chalmers' version it was expressed in the form of
the hard and easy problem of consciousness [Chalmers, 1995]. The easy problem was
the question of neural correlates of consciousness and the hard problem concerned the
subjectivity of consciousness. In the version by Davidson the mental was bound to
rationality and as such was needed for explanation of the behavior as rational by
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reference to beliefs and intentions of the subject [Davidson, 2001]. The mental is
generally de¯ned as the content and acts of the mind, thus for example judging,
believing, and desiring are the acts of the mind. What is judged, believed, and desired
is the content. This approach goes along with Brentano's account of structure of
consciousness [Brentano, 1874/1911]. The world is composed of physical and
psychological phenomena and consciousness belongs to the latter. What is proble-
matic in Brentano's account of consciousness is also the issue raised by Williford et al.
[2012], namely the intentional (and hence mental) inexistence of the object, and the
subject relation to the content of consciousness i.e. the direction upon an object
[Brentano, 1874/1911]. It is problematic because it determines the relational char-
acter of consciousness and we doubt that this is valid in the case of PRSC. In other
words we do not think that PRSC is relational, what is often assumed, if one tries to
close consciousness in spatial-temporal description applied to physical objects
[Tononi, 2008; Williford et al., 2012]. As it was said above, the Heidelberg School,
especially Henrich and his followers, raised the argument against the re°ection theory
of consciousness a long time before cognitive science's struggle.
In answering the question, whether PRSC is relationally constituted or not, it is
important to take seriously what Williford [2016] points out: As long as relations are
concerned, it is not true at least not without further justi¯cation that both
relata are distinct or must be distinct: And it is an elementary logical matter that
there can be re°exive relations. It is simply false that \Every relation entails a
distinction between two (or more) relata" like [Zahavi, 1998, p. 22] argues [Williford,
2016, p. 91]. What does \relation" possibly could mean in the case of PRSC? Or in
other words, what does it mean, if there is no di®erence between the relata and the
relation is not quali¯ed? An important point is touched by the question: Is it per-
missible to apply logical identity to the issue of (self) acquaintance? Or, does speaking
about acquaintance include a distinction between the relata, which does not allow to
invoke the \logical identity"?
Manfred Frank, an authority in sceptical approach to materialism, doubts that
the concept of logical identity is helpful for the analysis of the jointless identity of
PRSC. He starts from the distinction between type and token, saying that the rep-
etition of a token does not classify another type of mental state. He concedes, how-
ever, that it is just harmless for \jointless" identity of mental states to let the identity
of consciousness exist in a relation only to itself as Hegel argues. But if the inner self-
relation refers to itself, the problem arises that then another consciousness has to be
introduced mirroring this relation. The regress cannot be avoided in this conceptu-
alization. The New Heidelbergs agree that the re°ective I-consciousness is NOT a
kind of an explication of (non-conceptual, non-egological) consciousness. It should be
noted, however, that the di®erentiation of PRSC has to include the time
consciousness.
The authors who accept the Heidelberg problem agree with Frank's defence of
a \multifactorial model". Frank [2016] distinguishes between a non-egological
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(non-conceptual) consciousness and an egological (conceptual) consciousness. In the
¯rst case the ¯eld of consciousness is pre-re°ectively familiar with itself, that is, with
the ¯eld, but not with its owner or agent of mental states or \venter of unity". In the
egological consciousness, the Ego is familiar with itself. Therefore, the non-egological
and the egological consciousness do not infer from each other. Frank concludes that
the re°ective I-consciousness is not the explicans of the non-egological consciousness.
None of the varieties can be \deduced" (rendered intelligible) from the other.
d
The
overarching problem of reference is that self-consciousness is neither determined by
acquaintance nor by mental representation. The follow-up problem concerns the
analysis of an epistemologically modi¯ed notion of mental representation, understood
for example as re°ex (Cf. Sartre). The problem is an epistemological mediation of
internalism and externalism and their ontological interpretation [Frank and Preyer,
2020, pp. 533566].
The controversial relationality of consciousness breeds the paradox of PRSC
addressed by Williford et al. [2012], which can be formulated as follows: How can
PRSC be non-re°ective if it has self as its object, i.e., its content? In other words,
either PRSC relates to the self, thus it is self-re°ective or it does not refer to the self
and henceforth it is not self-consciousness.
Williford puts forward the thesis that consciousness is self-given and \aware of
itself" [Williford et al., 2012, 324]. This self-re°exion gives however an impression of
subjectobject relational phenomenology, which easily can lead to the homunculus
problem faced in the perceptual model of self-consciousness. To avoid this problem a
model of projective consciousness has been proposed, where consciousness is depicted
as a whole space or ¯eld that is given however not belonging to the ¯eld as an object
[Williford et al., 2012, 323]. As we understand it: Consciousness is a set which con-
tains all mental objects excluding itself, which would allow it to avoid the in¯nite
regress, because consciousness and its perceptual objects are topologically di®erent
[Cf. Williford et al., 2012, p. 323].
The use of the language of mathematics or, respectively, geometry is a good way to
bridge the gap between the mental and the physical, just as mathematics allows us to
describe the laws of nature. Consciousness is also a natural phenomenon, a product of
the process of evolution and adaptation. So why is it so di±cult to describe it
nomologically? Obviously it is so due to the private (¯rst-person) character of PRSC
and hence privileged access of its owner to its content. We cannot observe con-
sciousness from a third-person perspective. Alternatively, we can study its neural
correlates, we can record ¯rst-person reports about the experiences of others, but we
cannot say with certainty that my experience of X is the same experience as that of
my neighbor, although we both report that we experience X. In other words, the
d
Manfred Frank was one of the ¯rst German philosophers, who introduced the de se constraint and its
reinterpretation as the fundamental question in the analysis of non-relational and relational mental states.
It should be noted that Henrich initiated exchanges with Chisholm and Castañeda in the 1970s. In the
exchange with Henrich, Chisholm abandoned his notion of haecceitas. The question is to be transformed
that into a reinterpretation of the de se constraint [Chisholm, Castañeda, D. Lewis].
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subjectivity of consciousness excludes the third-person access. This is due to the non-
objective constitution of the consciousness-consciousness of and thus the
immediate familiarity with our mental states.
3. Computability of Consciousness
In the frame of the contemporary mindbody problem and the related question of
how the brain shapes the mind arises the issue of the computability of consciousness.
Does consciousness let us enclose itself in an algorithm? This question has been asked
since the beginning of cognitive science in 1948, when an interdisciplinary symposium
\Cerebral Mechanisms and Behaviour" took place. But a real milestone permanently
placing this question in science was the article of Alan Turing Computing machinery
and intelligence [1950].
An example of contemporary attempts to describe consciousness in computational
terms is the Information Integration Theory of Consciousness (IIT) [Tononi, 2004]
saying that consciousness can be measured, which allows us to estimate how con-
sciousness emerges and who (what) in what scale is conscious. On the one hand, there
are levels of consciousness distinguished by how many possible states [information]
are available to the system as a whole [integration]. On the other hand, if the
information has been integrated, it cannot be subdivided into separate parts [Tononi,
2004]. More speci¯cally:
The quantity of consciousness available to a system can be measured as
the amount of causally e®ective information that can be integrated across
the informational weakest link of a subset of elements. The quality of
consciousness is determined by the informational relationships among the
elements of a complex, which are speci¯ed by the values of e®ective
information among them [Tononi, 2004, p. 1].
Brie°y speaking according to the IIT, consciousness is one and the same thing as
integrated information [Tononi, 2008, p. 232]. In the latest version of IIT, integrated
information is construed as the extent to which the causal structures of a system, for
example, the brain achieves state transitions that cannot be reduced to the joint
transitions of their parts independently of one another [Oizumi et al., 2014]. IIT is an
altered version of the theory of distributed cognition. In the former, the information
from di®erent areas and levels is collected. In the latter, cognitive processes are
divided into areas and levels (they can be called units) like tasks in a corporation and
involve not only internal but also external representations. But if information in IIT
is collected from di®erent levels then IIT does not entail a circle in object, because the
elements do not refer to themselves.
IIT left a strong mark and inspired other researchers. Williford for example applies
it into his own PRSC research, but it should be made clear that IIT is a theory of
consciousness in general, and Williford's research focuses on PRSC, which is one of
the fundamental levels of information processing in IIT, before it is implemented as
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intentional content. Williford o®ers an original account of PRSC in°uenced ¯rst by
the mathematical ¯eld of projective geometry [Williford et al., 2012] and second by
the IIT [Merker et al., 2021]. This shift from one theory to another shows the con-
tinual search for the right model to comprehend the phenomenon of consciousness
as the authors themselves admit [Williford et al., 2012, p. 350]. Both inspiring the-
ories have a lot in common, because they assume the possibility of building a com-
putational model of consciousness mapping the structure and functions of
consciousness, where the structure of consciousness determines its function.
The model of consciousness proposed by Merker et al. [2021] can be placed
between the a±rmation of the projective structure of consciousness and the critique
of IIT. On the one hand it is an attempt to give a formal description of the
phenomenon of consciousness, on the other hand to criticize the already proposed
description in IIT, which they think goes too far. Exploring this claim we will follow
the doubts expressed in the following passage [Merker et al., 2021, p. 3]:
Compounding the computational burden on IIT is the fact that it must
search for a maximal [MAX] over all scales at which a system's
\elements" might be de¯ned [Tononi, 2004; Oizumi et al., 2014; Tegmark,
2016]. In e®ect, IIT, by its own criteria, identi¯es the conscious subset of
elements a posteriori, after MAX is found. For the brain, this means
that, in principle, the search must be conducted from at least the level of
its atoms to that of whole cortical areas [Balduzzi & Tononi, 2008;
Tegmark, 2016].
It is indeed a huge undertaking to start analyzing consciousness from the lowest
level, however it is quite often a strategy to look at the bottom up processes in
searching for the explanation for consciousness. As an example serves the studies on
proprioception in the light of the hypothesis that understanding how proprioception
works will help to unravel the mystery of the emergence of consciousness [Cruse and
Schilling, 2013]. For this purpose, scientists from the Center of Excellence \Cognitive
Interaction Technology" of the Bielefeld University created the Walknet system
implemented on a six-legged arti¯cial insect that can move regardless of changes in
the environment [Cruse and Schilling, 2013]. The whole creates an arti¯cial neural
network reaCog, which has the ability to invent new behaviors, and thanks to
internal simulation, it can also plan future activities. The creators of reaCog believe
that it actually has elements of access awareness, because it is equipped with both
bottom up and top down abilities, i.e. intentions, attention, or will, and the will is
understood here as the ability to choose an action adequate to the input data. It
should be emphasized that Walknet, i.e. the arti¯cial properly programmed insect, is
not equipped with any sensors that receive stimuli from a distance, such as sight or
hearing, but only has a sense of touch. Touch sensors are placed on its six legs and are
of course used to measure contact with external objects. But Walknet is also
equipped with proprioceptors, internal sensors that measure the distribution and
movement of the legs. It is therefore equipped with two senses: proprioception and
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touch [Schilling et al., 2013]. Thanks to them, the hexapod perfectly responds to the
challenges of the physical environment. In other words, it adapts very well. The units
responsible for the control and integration of distributed memory data and the unit
responsible for motivation allow him to properly select and sequence the states
required to control various behaviors, such as backing up, changing speed or turning
at the right angle [Schilling et al., 2013]. According to the authors, it is on the basis of
the software of these units that such properties as intentions appear, where intentions
are understood as goal directed actions. On this basis, they conclude that con-
sciousness is an emergent feature of the system, because these capabilities have not
been explicitly implemented in the system, yet the system reveals them [Cruse and
Schilling, 2013].
The project described above corresponds to the IIT, according to which the next
levels of information processing are responsible for the development of consciousness.
At this point we express our doubts, whether consciousness should be studied ¯rst at
the possible lowest ontological level. Namely, we have the impression that two
questions are intertwined here, perhaps not quite clearly separated from each other:
First, do we search for the origins of consciousness asking where (on which level)
consciousness begins, and second, do we ask who is conscious, that is, what criteria
should we use to ascribe consciousness to someone.
We can consider the ¯rst question in terms of formal ontologies, as Williford does.
We ¯nd it quite interesting that, if Williford properly interprets the Tononi's IIT, it
could be considered in the model o®ered by mereology in the prism of the main
question about relation between a set and its elements [Leśniewski, 1992]. Namely, if
one claims that the search for consciousness must be conducted from at least the level
of its atoms, silently assumes that these particles shape consciousness, what, meta-
phorically, can be compared with the set of bricks forming a house.
But maybe IIT does not require to go down to the atomic level? Maybe con-
sciousness is rather a distributed than collective set? Let us express another com-
parison: a table is not tested from the atomic level to answer what is essential for
being a table. Only its larger components, top and legs, which are also not a table
themselves, are considered. Perhaps then in IIT, only the smallest but essential
component of consciousness should be investigated, i.e. this component, which is
signi¯cant and meaningful for consciousness. Here, we come to the second question,
namely about criteria of ascription of consciousness [Merker et al., 2021, 2022]. We
lean toward phenomenological approach: maybe this is a minimal phenomenological
selfhood in terms of [Metzinger, 2003, 2008] or maybe the pre-re°ective conscious-
ness in terms of Sartre and its reinterpretation [see also Frank, 2015, 2019; Preyer,
2019a,b; Miguens et al., 2016]. Either way, we believe that the phenomenological
level of information processing is essential to the origins of consciousness, and it is
not necessary to go down to the neuronal level. Namely, just at the phenomenal level
the information is integrated enough to form the smallest unit of consciousness.
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4. Some Meta-Logic
The construction of PRSC model in terms of the projective geometry [Williford et al.,
2012; Merker et al., 2021] does not require type-free mathematics [Calder
on, 2018].
e
It
implies a hyper-set theory without strati¯cation.
A set can be a member of itself or otherwise in its own membership chain
(i.e. a member of a member, member of a member, etc.) without the set
having an in¯nite cardinality. Suppose that set s¼fsg. Then s¼
ffsgg ... and so on. But this is not an in¯nite regress. There is only one
(circular) entity here, the hyperset s. Its ¯nitude is well illustrated by its
basic ¯nite, directed graph. Rather than an in¯nite regress of entities,
what we have here is a recipe for the construction of an in¯nite number of
notations (and corresponding graphs) for the selfsame set s. This is
not uncommon. We have many such recipes in language and thought
(e.g. p..‘p' is true. \p' is true. .... etc.) [Williford, 2022, 139].
However, it is advisable to make at least a small meta-logical remark according to
the systematization of set theory purged of antinomies. In doing so, it is advisable to
remain within the less disputable framework in order to recognize the question of the
model construction recommended in Williford et al. [2012, 2021] and Williford [2022].
A few references should su±ce to illustrate the question of the approach.
In¯nite/complete recursion (induction) is to be postulated at the ¯rst-level
quanti¯er logic; and it is logically derivable from suitable de¯nitions at the second-
level quanti¯er logic. Quanti¯er logic ¯rst level is complete but undecidable. The
second-level quanti¯er logic (and any higher logic beyond it) is incomplete and
undecidable. It is incomplete because in it the ¯niteness (¼compactness) theorems
are no longer valid. For the ¯rst-level quanti¯er logic the ¯niteness theorem is (still)
valid: If any proposition B follows logically from any set M of propositions, then B
follows also from a ¯nite subset N of M. For the second-level quanti¯er logic this is no
longer valid; according to G€
odel: There are propositions B and sets M of propositions,
so that B follows logically from M, but B does not follow logically from any ¯nite subset
NofM.
From the meta-logical point of view is to conclude with regard to the ontology
assumed in each case and the abstract entities that if any (¯nite or trans¯nite)
hierarchy of entities is given, distinguished according to the power set theorem,
ordered by corresponding ordinal numbers; then this is not categorically
(¼unambiguously,¼non-ambiguously) graspable by its own means, but only by a
(still) beyond ordinally higher such hierarchy; and so on, without upper
conclusion.
The antinomy problem leads back to the assumption of abstract entities. For
example, Quine does not deny the assumption of abstract entities (classes). From this
we can infer a minimal program of a Platonism in the theory of number.
e
This was emphasized in Williford's comment to this paper.
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The antinomies concern the problem of ontology. They are triggered by the
assumption of sets as collections [Von Kutschera, 2009, pp. 109133]. Therefore, the
compression principle of set theory already contains the antinomy.
f
The way out to
avoid the antinomy is a constructive set theory, which has been available only since
the 1970s [Boolos, 1971; Scott, 1974, von Kutschera, 2007, pp. 126131]. In this
logical frame of reference, sets are not given as real collections, but are generated as
cognitive entities. Thus the limits of the e±ciency of type-free approaches can be
seen. Thus, the conclusion from a constructive set theory is that there is no complete
theory of mind [von Kutschera, 2007, pp. 131133]. This claim is supported by the
Essler argument that a set theory formulated at the ¯rst-level quanti¯er logic does
not help here; for this axiom system is not categorical, but is according to Skolem
and G€
odel interpretable by non-standard models (also by countable models); and
it is only interpretable by *non-intended* sets of abstract entities: of those with a
cardinal number, just because of the power set theorem, that is, there is a higher set
with greater cardinal number; and so on, without* upper conclusion.
g
However,
\contradiction arises only if we want to assume both families of axioms in the same
set theory (since the Axiom of Foundation precludes non-well-founded sets...)"
[Williford et al., 2022, p. 26]. Non-well-founded sets can be constructed in Homotopy
Type Theory, which implies that non-wellfoundness is not incompatible with con-
structivity [cf. Gylterud and Bonnevier, 2020].
It should be emphasized that if we engage a \logical view" in the philosophy of the
mental, we come to a conclusion that, if the hierarchy of languages is open upwards
and there is no topmost metalanguage, then there is no complete theory of the
mental. This is consistent with Essler's epistemological suppositionalism and its
metaphysics.
h
Wilhelm K. Essler and Franz von Kutschera agree namely in substance
that if we start from a type theory of the distinction between object and metalan-
guage, there can be no complete theory of the mental. It is not a new insight that
there is no ultimate metalanguage in which we represent the world as a universal
language [Essler, 2001; Von Kutschera, 2012].
It has to be clear that PRSC is just not a representational consciousness. Unless it
is a mere ¯ction, it is not a consciousness in the set of existing objects which we
thematize in object language. In this respect it also eludes objecti¯cation in model
theory and projective geometry. This has been pointed out by Frank [2015,
pp. 162164] and we cannot but acknowledge it as true. The PRSC is not to be
classi¯ed perceptually-psychologically as the blind spot of observation, which itself
cannot be observed. We cannot avoid the assumption that the object use of mental
predicates presupposes that we are already familiar with them.
f
The compression principle is: For each one-digit predicate there is a set that contains exactly those objects
as elements to which the predicate applies.
g
Cardinality ¼power of sets in contrast to ordinality, which indicates the position of a component part in
a ¯nitely ordered set, for example, four cars in contrast to the fourth car.
h
For an overview see Preyer [2001, pp. 720].
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If one aims to parallel a conglomerate of Fichte and Husserl with a non-standard
set theory [as in Williford, 2022, Sec. 7.3], three things should be taken into account:
(a) the non-Kantian account of an epistemic self;
(b) the representation of a non-standard set theory, for example, along the lines of
Quine's second set theory
i
;and
(c) the proof of the isomorphism of (a) and (b).
The analysis of PRSC is not an analysis of a model theory. Let us just say that
with the model-theoretic analysis approach, the subject was changed. This agrees
with Frank's classi¯cation of the problem of the performance of mathematical models
in the philosophy of the mental. In this respect, the set-theoretical arguments are not
relevant. This is true regardless of which set theory we prefer. That cannot be the
subject of our responses. The projective geometry argument concerns the same
problem, since we do not project and observe ourselves from a center in a periphery.
5. The Metaphorical Descriptions of Consciousness
Considering IIT and Williford's projective structure of consciousness, PRSC is the
lowest essential level of consciousness. As the primary consciousness, PRSC is
spontaneous and immediate. The question is, what is conscious in PRSC [Preyer,
2012, p. 194] and with this question we are back to square again, namely to the
paradox of PRSC. This paradox is however a result of the assumption that self-
consciousness is a consciousness of the self and hence re°exive, that is, relational. It
must be said explicitly that PRSC is not re°exive because it is non-representational.
The self is not represented in PRSC. Rather the unity of consciousness shapes the
subjectivity regardless of how we describe this process: whether as a unity of
apperception or as an IIT [Cf. Williford et al., 2012, p. 326].
The metaphorical illustrations of consciousness also do not help. The math-
ematical space models, as proposed by Williford et al. [2012] as well as the metaphor
of \tunnel" used by Metzinger [2014] impose a perceptual model of consciousness that
introduces the relation subjectobject, that is, who is looking and what is being
looked at. In such a model, referring to the metaphor of the inner eye of the mind
[Locke, 1690/1975], it is easy to make a mistake, because the self is sometimes what
perceives and sometimes what is perceived [cf. for example, Musholt, 2015].
As mentioned above, a version of the mathematical space models is the Projective
Consciousness Model proposed by Williford. \The PCM starts from an attempt to
formalize phenomenological features characteristic of consciousness by describing
them in terms of general mathematical principles and frameworks (viz., projective
geometry and free energy minimization)" [Williford et al., 2018, p. 2].
i
Quine's second set theory, which contains a ¯xed point with the all-set, which is probably close to what is
meant by \hyperset".
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But again, a geometric model of consciousness is a perceptual model. Meta-
phorically speaking, the description of the geometrical ¯eld of consciousness is like a
description of perception and projection of the space on canvas in a theory of
painting. However, it should be emphasized that this is a structure of consciousness
as a wholeness and not only of PRSC, which according to Williford is only one of the
invariants characterizing consciousness: \Subjective Character: Consciousness
involves a pre-re°ective, non-conceptual awareness of itself and its individuality"
[Williford et al., 2018, p. 3]. The subjective character of consciousness is implicated by
Relational Phenomenal Intentionality: \All consciousness involves the appearance of
a world (of objects, properties, etc.), in various qualitative or representational ways,
to an organism" [Williford et al., 2018]. Thus the controversy about the relationality/
non-relationality of PRSC is the main factor di®erentiating our standpoint from the
quoted authors because it involves the problem of intentionality and representa-
tionalism.
If we assume that indeed all stages of consciousness require representations of the
objects and all can be modeled in the frame of projective geometry, then also the self-
consciousness in the sense of meta-awareness falls under these conditions. Meta-
awareness or meta-consciousness refers to the introspective knowledge of the subject
about himself, which is equivalent to the philosophical notion of self-knowledge. The
perceptual model of self-knowledge was criticized, among others, by Shoemaker, and
we refer to it, because the introspection was speci¯cally understood in his critics.
Shoemaker did not criticize introspection as a method, that is, a way of accessing
one's own mental states, but precisely as a speci¯c type of perception based on the
perception of one's own mental states [Shoemaker, 1994; Speaks, 2004]. According to
Shoemaker, self-knowledge cannot simply be perceptual knowledge. Even if mental
states are an object of self-consciousness, identifying them requires that you ¯rst refer
to yourself as \I", and this means that self-identi¯cation is something primal to
identifying your own state. Hence, knowing \I feel pain is not about the content of the
state, but about \me and no one else feeling pain" [Lane, 2011]. Introspection is
therefore a way of self-identi¯cation because the subject attributes pain to himself
and not to someone else. But we have to make a correction to Shoemaker that the
immunity thesis of the subject use of the ¯rst person formula does not presuppose
that we have to identify ourselves as a spatiotemporal entity. Immediate con-
sciousness of the ¯rst person is not ¯rst-person introspection. Against the epis-
temological conceptualization of mental states through the inner sense are valid the
arguments against the assumption of HOT. We already ¯nd this criticism in Bren-
tano, Sartre, and Schmalenbach [for a question of renewing of the concept of intro-
spection see Henderson et al., 2021, pp. 3558].
Interestingly, in the perceptual model it is possible to justify the problems with
¯rst-person authority, explained by the fact that either the subject's access to the
object (i.e. the subject's internal states) is disturbed, or these states are not clear, and
therefore the object itself is unavailable to the self. Something similar expresses also
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Williford [Williford et al., 2012, 329]. If self-perception is distorted, one can be unable
to identify his own disabilities, because the pre-re°ective experience is conceptualized
so that it ¯ts to self-conception: \Recalcitrant data are ignored or reinterpreted and
one ¯nds oneself in an evidential circle" [Williford et al., 2012, p. 329]. We sympathize
with this claim however as a good background for the consideration of immunity to
error in the subject use of ¯rst person formulas as a conceptual issue making the
distinction between phenomenal consciousness and I-knowledge. We do not see it as a
kind of proof of relational and re°exive character of PRSC but of the intentionality.
Intentionality is namely relational and re°exive in its propositional and represen-
tational form. The representations in intentionality inherit the content of PRSC
which is non-representational and deprived of the division into subject and object,
that is, a consciousness of consciousness of .
It should be emphasized that Williford [2022] does not consider himself a
self-representationalist and does not characterize his approach as a self-
representationalist approach. Instead he transformed his terminology from
\representation" onto \acquaintance" and \self-acquaintance". This has been pointed
out by Lang [2020, pp. 2242]. Lang [2020, pp. 4546] emphasizes that Williford,
however, does not change his view that phenomenal self-c onsciousness is determined by
the self-representation of a mental state. To consider direct acquaintance as a special
form of representation is a dispute merely terminological. In the sense in which
\representation" is standardly used in analytic philosophy of mind, Williford [2022] is
not a self-representationalist. However, he defends the relational nature of self-
acquaintance and shows how such an account in fact meets the de se constraint
[Williford, 2019]. Lang aptly notices that Williford accepts the relational constitution
of acquaintance. In this context, the relata exist only in relation to each other.
Contrasting the acquaintance with representation is a follow-up to Russell's
acquaintance [as for example Lycan does it], which goes along with an epistemology
based on sense data. From this point of view, knowledge by acquaintance is the
starting point of subjective experience of mental states and phenomenal attribution
by an observer (third-person attitude). The problem is that acquaintance is rela-
tional, but our unmediated (pre-re°ective) consciousness is not. Our own/direct
familiarity with mental states is not a subjectobject relation. According to
Williford, it is circularly constituted in the object domain.
The argumentation for relational PRSC, even in detailed analytical form, does not
refuse the criticisms of Frank, Lang, and Preyer, but also, for example, of Horgan,
Levine, and Eshleman. On the contrary, such an approach dissolves into thin air, if
one de¯nes acquaintance \relationally", where relata exist only in their relation to
each other. But what does it mean, if there is no di®erence between the relata and the
relation is not quali¯ed? We see here a mistake, which consists in applying relational
logic (symmetrical, re°exive, and transitive relations) to what is called acquaintance.
On the other hand, there is an assumption that consciousness has an internal
observer-observed structure and this is a product of evolution [Williford et al., 2012,
14 A. Pacholik- _
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p. 331]. It evolved as the need of the ability to represent other minds, which should be
a kind of protection from predators [Humphrey, 2002]. The consequence of such
thinking is that \I is Another" [Williford et al., 2012, p. 346] the ¯rst-person-
perspective is possible thanks to the ability to take third-person-perspective. That is,
however, a misinterpretation of Rimbaud's sentence, which often happens. Rimbaud
means precisely not the relativization of the ¯rst-person attitude in the sense of
Hegel's struggle for recognition, but the relativization of the empirical I by a super-
poetic I of the speaker as \I am a seer" [Rimbaud, 1871; to modern as an aesthetic
¯ghting term: Preyer, 2018, p. 268].
We would rather lean toward the assumption that the perceptual model is a
metaphor taken from the external perceptual experience and determined by the
strongest human sense vision. Humans are so conditioned that they use the sense
of vision as a kind of framing. First-person-perspective as de facto third-person-
perspective and hence self-objecti¯cation [Williford et al., 2012, p. 347] is the con-
sequence of this metaphorical model of the inner perception. Furthermore, the
relational view is not only misleading but also eventually counterintuitive: if I am in a
good mood, then there is no relation me-my mood. There is no distinction between
pain experience and pain itself. Therefore, speaking of \acquaintance" is misleading,
since acquaintance is a relation. This can no longer be reconciled with PRSC and its
di®erentiation. The better term would be \familiar with". Familiarity is here to be
understood as intimate. This may be a better characterization as \knowledge" in the
broadest non-epistemic sense distinguishing from propositional knowledge, and
knowledge by acquaintance as well [Frank, 2007, 2012; Henrich, 2019, von
Kutschera, 2007; Preyer, 2020]. The overall question is the no-objective consciousness
as a foundation of mental states [Frank, 2007]. This is also overtaken from von
Kutschera's monism of a polar relationship of mental and the physical, but no
materialism or ontological idealism. An intermediate position presents Johansson
[2014]. He agrees that the analysis of phenomenological consciousness is not found in
mathematics, geometry, and neurological investigations but he also argues that the
phenomenal consciousness is not a completely irrelational intrinsic quality of
experience.
6. The Possibility of Conscious Machines
The aim of this section is not to predict whether the possibility of conscious machines
is absolutely out of the question. The algorithmization of cognitive abilities and the
implementation of some mental functions on arti¯cial neural networks is already a
reality. As the hexapod example showed [Schilling et al., 2013] there is hope for
building consciousness from its simplest units. Recently, there has been widespread
interest in the Open AI program, ChatGPT (https://openai.com/), which provides
answers to the questions in a surprisingly human way, although on every occasion
ChatGPT emphasizes that it is a language model. To the question: \How are you
today" it answered: \I'm just a computer program, so I don't have feelings or
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emotions like a human. I'm always ready to assist you to the best of my ability. Is
there something speci¯c you'd like to know or discuss?". But it also shows astonishing
skills in the pragmatics of the language: \You're not bothering me at all! It's my
pleasure to help you with any questions you have." The utterances considered in the
light of pragmatics not only consist in semantic and syntax but they are also the
bearers of intentions and emotions standing behind the expressed sentences. \It's my
pleasure" ful¯lls such an emotive function and makes an impression of being uttered
by a human, who reports from introspection about his feeling: pleasure in helping.
The illusion of speaking with a human interlocutor will grow constantly, but
regarding our considerations about PRSC the impression of interacting with a con-
scious machine will remain an illusion. We interpret machines just as we interpret
other persons, like in the conversation with A.L.I.C.E. when asked what it does, it
answered: \Judge, I talk to people on the web. What do you do?" Was A.L.I.C.E. a
little bit irritated?
In the current research on mind and action, the research on AI and the studies on
human cognition go hand in hand over time. Assuming that the mind works on a
computational basis, the designing of AI and the building of the models of the mind
both refer to algorithms. The models resting on the computational paradigm are
supposed to answer the question of how the brain shapes the mind, i.e. how the
physical neuronal structure can be the basis for the mental. In the structure of the
network the information is processed in such a way that the patterns of activation of
neurons in the sensory organs are monitored by successive layers of neurons, trans-
forming the information and transmitting it to subsequent structures in the brain
[cf. Churchland, 1995]. Recently, the computationalism of cognitive science has been
incorporated into neurophysiological studies on mind [cf. Koch, 1999]. This inter-
disciplinary research still confronts the studies on consciousness. The problem is the
implementation of the phenomenal experiences i.e. how to translate the compu-
tational into the phenomenal? Even if the easy problem of consciousness can be
solved by identifying the neural correlates of conscious states, the hard problem is
resisting.
7. Conclusion
PRSC has no shape: it is non-objective, but it is not a ¯ction. It is tempting to place it
in space and time, but if we do it, then rather because of the traditional Kantian
approach saying that space and time are main categories of apperception, and not
because consciousness is something physical. The shapelessness of PRSC deprives it
of having relational properties. The subject is not an observer. The subject is
embedded in PRSC. It is therefore not di±cult to agree with Zahavi's [2005] rein-
terpretation of the concept of the subject if he comprehends the concept of the
epistemic subject as a concept of subjectivity. This turned to the research program of
conceptualization of the structure of mental states as an architecture of internalism
with an external foundation. Recall: an internalist argues that Oscar and Oscar* on
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Twin Earth think the same thought in contrario an externalist argues that Oscar and
Oscar* on Twin Earth have di®erent thoughts. One is true and another is false.
Therefore, di®erent true conditions and indexicality de¯ne the truth and falsity of
Oscar and Oscar* thought and mental states in general. But there is no doubt that
both have the same phenomenal consciousness. Thereby is reasoned an internalistic
point of view of the subjects point of view [Farkas, 2008].
Lang and Miguens, Frank, Seel and in consequence also Essler have highlighted in
their comment that the central question of contemporary philosophy of the mental is
the question of what determines the subject as subject, thus intrinsically [Seel, 2019:
proto-subject, Castañeda, Frank: de se constraint, Essler: limitation of the cognition
of the mental, von Kutschera: no complete theory of the mental]. This is also
Henrich's question. From a naturalistic and materialistic point of view, the proto-
subject is the brain. If we assume that the subject's point of view requires an inter-
nalistic architecture, since we cannot objectify ourselves from the outside, that is, the
third-person attitude, the prerequisite for this is the PRSC, which gets content
through the external dimension [Sartre: Re°ex]. With this we have addressed a
research program that already orients itself beyond materialistic compulsions.
However, the philosophically educated reader should not doubt one thing that
materialism is just not an empirical theory but a metaphysical ontology. Its counter
concept is not empiricism and epistemological idealism but spiritualism.
Sartre's ontological proof, however, at the same time cures and liberates us from
ontological idealism without drifting into Heidegger's Daseinsanalytik and the
excitement of the evolving Dasein as an outside being in time. This approach does not
exclude the possibility of algorithmization of some cognitive abilities implemented on
arti¯cial neural networks, or to build computational models of some mental func-
tions. But it excludes the possibility of conscious machines and an analytic super-
venience as well.
j
No matter how much the machine surprises us and how
autonomously it works. There is nothing there, because there is no PRSC.
In search of the model construction that does not burden itself with the mis-
understood metamathematics it is recommended to take a look at the internal frame
of reference of the mental [Frank, 2013; Preyer, 2019b]. In this \frame" we have the
option of classifying the PRSC as logically primitive, since it cannot be derived from
anything else, including higher principles, and it is not true in a model. We thus stop
circularity and regress in the philosophy of the mental by the assumption of the
logical primitive PRSC as a foundation in the philosophy/theory of the mental. What
does it mean for ontology is another question to consider.
j
From the point of view of an interpretation theory, however, this problem can be de-dramatized. When we
interpret a robot, we apply the same principles of interpretation as with ordinary speakers [Davidson,
2004].
Shaping Pre-Re°ective Self-Consciousness 17
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Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Kenneth Williford, Wilhelm K. Essler, Manfred Frank,
Ingvar Johansson, Stefan Lang, William Lycan, So¯a Miguens, and Gerhard Seel for
commenting on our paper. The problems raised in the comments have just started the
discussion, which cannot be fully closed in this paper, which is a contribution to a
very broad issue, perhaps one of the most important in interdisciplinary research on
consciousness.
Contribution
Both authors contributed equally to the content of this paper.
Con°icts of Interest
The authors have no con°icts of interest to declare.
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