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38
Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, Vol. 56, No. 1, March 2023
1 Corresponding Author, Senior lecturer, University of Auckland, Auckland, o.filippova@auckland.ac.nz
2 Professor, University of Auckland, Auckland, k.elwood@auckland.ac.nz (Fellow)
3 Senior Lecturer, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, toni.collins@canterbury.ac.nz
CHALLENGES IN POST-EARTHQUAKE RECOVERY OF
DAMAGED AND NEGLECTED BUILDINGS IN
CHRISTCHURCH CBD
Olga Filippova1, Ken Elwood2 and Toni Collins3
(Submitted February 2022; Reviewed April 2022; Accepted July 2022)
ABSTRACT
More than a decade since the 22 February 2011 earthquake devastated Christchurch CBD, partially
demolished and neglected buildings remain present in the post-earthquake landscape. Christchurch City
Council has made significant progress in recent years to reduce the level of neglected buildings across the
central parts of the city. To encourage remediation of these buildings, the Council initiated the Barrier Sites
programme to keep track of central city sites. This paper documents the current inventory of derelict
properties and investigates issues that are delaying progress on these sites. We explore regulatory levers that
can be used to influence action on these buildings (e.g. provisions in the Building Act and council bylaws).
We also investigate how the local market drivers influence the speed of regeneration. Our review identifies
gaps in the regulatory powers to act on barrier sites. Taking action involves meeting difficult definitions and
tests under legislation and/or taking court proceedings. Specific legislative tools are needed to provide
Councils with the powers they need to ensure action is taken on barrier sites to progress the regeneration of
the city after a disaster. We also find that the delays in removing the cordon and uncertainties of the public
sector anchor projects contained in the Blueprint have led to the loss of private investment and forced central
city developments compete with more affordable commercial and residential offerings outside the CBD. With
the passing of the 10-year anniversary of the earthquakes, this project offers a timely reminder of the
mammoth struggles that the city has overcome evident in the numerous modern and resilient buildings, yet a
few ‘battle sites’ slow the much-needed regeneration towards a resilient city centre.
https://doi.org/10.5459/bnzsee.56.1.38-54
INTRODUCTION
The 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence caused
widespread damage across Christchurch, in particular, the 22
February 2011 Earthquake caused heavy damage in the central
city and eastern suburbs. In the aftermath of the disaster, the
city was faced with a challenge of filling in empty sites that
appeared in place of the approximately 70% of the central city
buildings that came down in demolitions [1]. In the months
following the February earthquake, the central city lost half of
its workforce and two-thirds of inner-city residents were forced
to move out [65]. The rebuild was focused on attracting people
back into the city. The government set plans for major anchor
projects as a catalyst to boost commercial and recreational
activities in the Central Business District (CBD) [2], while
private developers got on with the redevelopment of
commercial buildings as insurance money began to flow and
more land became available as edges of the cordon moved back
[3].
Most recent economic and residential statistics show positive
signs of recovery [4], yet after more than a decade since the
February 2011 earthquake, the central city is still peppered with
vacant sites and derelict buildings which are impacting re-
investment in local infrastructure and are considered as barriers
to successful regeneration [5]. Internationally, evidence exist
that derelict, neglected properties pose significant public health
hazard and can have a negative spillover effect onto
neighbouring properties leading to loss of property values and
slow development [6]. Therefore, to contain negative impacts
of such sites in Christchurch CBD, it is important to understand
factors contributing to slow post-earthquake recovery and
revitalisation. In this paper, we review the Christchurch City
Council’s programme targeted at progressing action on
buildings neglected after the earthquakes, called the Barrier
Sites Programme. The review analyses the range of approaches
adopted by the Council, available enforcement tools and
supplemented with the business and population data from
Statistics NZ and commercial property market reports.
BARRIER SITES
Given the level of damage and destruction in the inner city, and
prolonged access restrictions due to cordon, city centre
revitalisation was among highest priorities for the Christchurch
City Council (the Council) following the earthquakes. In 2016,
the Council began focusing their attention on sites and buildings
where owners have made no effort to remediate damage [7].
This initiative also coincided with the gradual return to local
leadership and decision-making which were limited during the
first five years of recovery by the Canterbury Earthquakes
Recovery Act 2011. In the view of the Council, by then
sufficient time (five years) had passed to resolve insurance
disputes and/or to investigate and commence
reconstruction/refurbishment. Some scholars refer to the
‘window of opportunity’ in post-disaster recovery being around
18-36 months following an event, however the timeframe varies
with the political environment in a given country rather than the
quality of disaster recovery efforts alone [8,9]. The Council
identified properties considered a barrier to positive perceptions
of the city for visitors and investors, this included 1) unoccupied
buildings in a very poor state of repair, 2) damaged buildings
that had containers or other propping to support them, 3)
buildings or cordons that encroached onto public footpaths or
roads affecting movement, and 4) other fenced sites. This is
39
reflected in the term used to describe them - “barrier sites”. At
a meeting in May 2017, the Council considered a report that
outlined a framework and strategies for progressing action on
problematic central city sites and was presented with an initial
list of 30 derelict buildings and vacant sites [10]. The list was
made publicly available [11] and quickly dubbed the ‘Dirty 30’,
receiving wide coverage in the media. The combination of soft
and hard measures developed by the Council were to be applied
progressively/gradually on property owners to encourage
repair, restoration, or redevelopment of their sites (Figure 1).
To encourage compliance, the Council adopted a VADE model
– Voluntary, Assisted, Directed, Enforcement. The intention of
the programme was to operate within the Voluntary and
Assisted part of the VADE spectrum. For example, to assist
owners of heritage buildings, several barrier sites buildings
received council-funded heritage grants ranging $170,000 to
$1.9 million. Once the soft options (voluntary and assisted) are
exhausted, the Council would then resort to directing property
owners to act by issuing notices to fix (breach of the Building
Act 2004) or abatement notices (breach of the Resource
Management Act 1991), with the final step being enforcement
action which would fall in the realm of council bylaws and
various pieces of legislation such as the Building Act, Local
Government Act, and Health Act. From the outset of the barrier
sites programme, as evidenced in the council meeting minutes,
the enforcement route was not prioritised within the Council as
it was perceived to be costly, legalistic and would risk increase
in tensions between property owners and the Council further
delaying progress [7]. Instead, the Council adopted a case
management approach to understand issues delaying
redevelopment on each site (e.g. insurance disputes, availability
of funds). It proved to be effective to seek negotiated outcomes
through support and incentives (e.g. grants, technical advice,
rates rebate) where since the launch of the barrier sites
programme in 2017, the Council was able to achieve action on
majority of the barrier sites operating within voluntary and
assisted spectrum of VADE.
Figure 1: The Council’s Barrier sites framework and VADE model (Source: Christchurch City Council, 2017).
Evolution of the “Dirty 30”
The publication of the original list of neglected properties was
meant to be a living document, with sites removed from the list
as plans for redevelopment were being finalised, while new
‘problem sites’ were added to the list. The original list featured
31 sites and by the end of 2018 a further 14 sites were added.
As evident on the map below (Figure 2), the largest
concentration of barrier sites is in the core of the city centre.
Most of these buildings were inaccessible for longer due to the
cordon being in place for up to two and half years in parts of the
city centre. Pre-earthquakes the core of the CBD was the centre
of commercial activity offering high-quality office
accommodation options. The city’s new high-end office
accommodation is now located in the west end of the CBD
along Cambridge Terrace, outside the edges of the primary
extent of the cordon. As one local property developer explained,
development along the edges of the cordon resulted in ‘unloved
streets’ in the core of the city with rows of vacancies and
abandoned buildings (personal communication, December
2019). Similar views about the impacts of the cordon on the
supply of offices and retail spaces on the periphery of the CBD
are echoed in [12-14].
Table 1 provides the full list of the central city barrier sites as
of February 2021 (ten years after the earthquake). Twenty four
of the 45 sites have been permanently removed from the list
with the owners either completing or being in the process of
redevelopment, including three sites that have been cleared,
tidied, and now held in vacant possession. Most of the buildings
on these sites have been repaired or restored. A cluster of
heritage buildings in High Street – also known as Duncan’s
building - had their facades retained and restored and new
structures built behind. With the numerous heritage buildings
destroyed in the earthquakes, preservation of these buildings is
an important reminder of the city’s rich history for future
generations [15].
The Council is actively pursuing the owners of the remaining
21 sites. Thirteen owners indicated to the Council their plans
for the buildings [10]. Some of the owners have applied or
already received building consents and work on those sites is
imminent. These plans include the development of a new
Catholic precinct in Armagh Street on the sites of the former
PWC building and the adjacent cleared site of the former
Copthorne Hotel. The development will include a replacement
for the damaged Cathedral of the Blessed Sacrament. While
awaiting redevelopment, the PWC site famously became home
to a colony of the endangered black-billed gulls – tarāpuka – for
nearly three years (Figure 3(a)). Work to remove foundations
of the former PWC building began in July 2021 as the birds
40
were relocated in time for their breeding season [16].
Restoration of the Old Municipal Chambers, another prominent
historic building, commenced in April 2021 as the Council
entered into an agreement with a private developer Box 112 to
restore, strengthen and lease the building (Figure 3(b)) [17, 18].
Figure 2: Map of the central city barrier sites as of April, 2021.
More recently, plans for redevelopment of two notorious
buildings featured on the list have been signalled. The first is
the Malvern House – arguably the poster child of the barrier
sites programme – the most tagged building in the city and a
magnet for squatters (Figure 4 (a)) [19, 20]. The physical
condition of the building – with some labelling it an eyesore -
has already delayed improvements on the neighbouring
buildings and sites on the block. The other prominent building
is the former IRD premisses – built in 2007, it sat damaged and
vacant since the 2011 earthquakes (Figure 4 (b)). While
redevelopment of barrier sites is a signal of recovery and
confidence in the city, the Council understands a commitment
to action does not always equate to completed projects. Several
of the sites featured on the list have exchanged owners (some
of them multiple times) since the earthquakes, with each new
owner announcing plans for development, only to then abandon
them.
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE DELAYS IN THE
REGENRATION OF BARRIER SITES
The scale of destruction and loss experienced in the Canterbury
earthquakes was unprecedented for New Zealand. Amidst
fatalities and heavy damage in the CBD, emerged an
opportunity to rebuild a city that is resilient. The city’s
Blueprint – a recovery plan for the central area - made the CBD
more compact through rezoning and strategic land acquisition
[21]. The CBD got a head start with a handful of government-
led anchor projects aimed at generating momentum in post-
earthquake recovery. Several statistics which are discussed in
detail in this section point to the strong recovery of the central
city with workers and residents returning to the CBD. At the
same time many indicators sit below their pre-earthquake levels
requiring more government and private investment to fully
regenerate.
While the decision to redevelop privately-owned barrier sites
mostly rests on the individual property owners, the speed of
progress on these sites is moderated by the specifics of the local
environment including market conditions and degree of the
Council’s powers to enforce action. We have identified several
factors that are contributing to the delays in the regeneration of
barrier sites in the central city. Firstly, specific legislation that
addresses the issue of barrier sites is absent and therefore the
Council must look to a range of legislation for enforcement
powers. Secondly, delays in the delivery of the anchor projects
are often cited as impediment to private investment. In addition,
weak local economy pre-earthquakes and post-earthquake
competition from the suburbs offering affordable, modern
residential and commercial buildings are also delaying recovery
of the CBD.
41
Table 1: List of barrier sites and progress indicators (as of February 2021).
Street address
AKA
Status
Scope of
work/current state
Use
1
124 Worcester St
Former Trinity
Church/Shands Bldg
work completed
repair
commercial
2
152 Oxford Ter
Public Trust Office
work completed
repair
commercial
3
81 Lichfield St
Lincoln House
work completed
repair
commercial
4
167-169 Hereford St
Hereford Chambers
work completed
repair
commercial
5
201-203 High St
Victoria Black
work completed
original façade/new
build
commercial
6
231 High St
Former Work &
Income
work completed
repair
commercial
7
12 Latimer Square
Park Tower
work completed
repair
residential
8
135 High St
High Street
work completed
new build
commercial
9
143-157 High St
High Street
work completed
original façade/new
build
commercial
10
163 High St
High Street
work completed
original façade/new
build
commercial
11
165 High St
High Street
work completed
original façade/new
build
commercial
12
673 Colombo St
Pagoda Court
work completed
new build
commercial
13
143-145 Armagh St
removed from the list
cleared site
Catholic precinct
14
128 Armagh St
Former PSIS building
removed from the list
cleared site
tbd
15
167 High St
High Street
removed from the list
cleared site
tbd
16
79 Hereford St
Former Scorpio
Books
under redevelopment
repair
hotel
17
31 Cathedral Square
Old Post Office
under redevelopment
repair
commercial
18
96 Lichfield St
Living Space
under redevelopment
repair
residential
19
216 Madras St
under redevelopment
cleared site
sport and
recreation
20
155 Victoria St
Spagalimis / 28 Dorset
under redevelopment
new build
residential
21
100 Cathedral Square
Anglican Cathedral
under redevelopment
repair
religious
22
129-133 High St
High Street
under redevelopment
repair
commercial
23
165 Hereford St
Broadlands House
under redevelopment
repair
commercial
24
79 Cambridge Ter
Nuttal Bradley
Building
under redevelopment
repair
hotel
25
235 - 237 High St
235 - Brick, 237 -
vacant site
plans confirmed
repair
commercial
26
92 Lichfield St
Sol Square (part)
plans confirmed
repair
tbd
27
159 Oxford Ter
Our City
plans confirmed
repair
office
28
210-214 Tuam St
Old CCC Offices and
Odeon Theatre
plans confirmed
repair
commercial
29
116 Worcester St
Kaplan/State
Insurance
plans confirmed
repair
residential
30
119 Armagh St
Former PWC
Building
plans confirmed
exposed foundations
Catholic precinct
31
249 Gloucester St
Stonehurst
Hotel/Motel
plans confirmed
cleared site
residential
32
226-234 Cashel St
Former IRD Premises
plans confirmed
repair
medical
33
179 Tuam St
Sol Square (part)
plans confirmed
repair
tbd
42
Table 1: List of barrier sites and progress indicators (as of February 2021).
Street address
AKA
Status
Scope of
work/current state
Use
34
91 Victoria St
Victoria Mansions,
368 Montreal
plans confirmed
Repair
residential
35
141 High St
High Street
plans confirmed
repair
tbd
36
170 Oxford Ter
Old Rydges Hotel
plans confirmed
vacant building
hotel
37
159 Hereford St
Malvern House
plans confirmed
vacant building
tbd
38
158 High St
Cotters
intentions unknown
cleared site w/
original façade
tbd
39
25 Peterborough St
Peterborough Apts.
intentions unknown
repair
tbd
40
170 Cashel St
Former Holiday Inn
intentions unknown
exposed foundations
tbd
41
137 Cambridge Ter
Harley Building
intentions unknown
vacant building
tbd
42
112-114 Manchester St
2 Fat Indians
intentions unknown
vacant building
tbd
43
66 Oxford Ter
intentions unknown
vacant building
tbd
44
161 Hereford St
Hereford Suites
intentions unknown
vacant building
tbd
45
205 Manchester St
Blue Jean Cuisine
intentions unknown
vacant building
tbd
a) PWC site
b) Old Municipal Chambers
Figure 3: Examples of sites with confirmed plans for redevelopment.
a) Malvern House
b) Former IRD building
Figure 4: Sites sold to new owners with plans for redevelopment.
43
Regulatory Environment
A number of property owners remain disengaged despite the
Council’s efforts to establish a dialogue (Table 1, sites where
owner intentions are unknown) and the Council is considering
the use of enforcement tools. As mentioned earlier, this is not
the favoured approach as the Council wants to maintain the role
of a facilitator rather than enforcer of change. Legal action is
likely to be strongly fought by owners, and would amount to a
significant burden on the resources and finances of an already
overstretched Council. This comes at a time when Council-
Crown entity ‘Regenerate Christchurch’ was disestablished
under the Greater Christchurch Regeneration Act 2016
transferring the responsibility for leading the city’s regeneration
solely to the Council [22]. Despite favouring softer approaches
(voluntary and assisted methods of engagement), the Council
has commissioned a review of enforcement tools which include
a range of acts and council bylaws (Table 2). This review was
presented to the Council at the commencement of the Barrier
Sites Programme in May 2017. While local authorities have
responsibilities to prosecute and can act as a regulator, other
councils in the country also favour non-litigative approaches
working alongside and supporting property owners instead of
exercising legal powers. For example, Wellington City Council
took a case management approach when implementing
Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquakes Recovery (Unreinforced
Masonry Buildings) Order 2017 [23].
Moreover, it has emerged that there is no clear enforcement
pathway in the absence of specific legislation that addresses the
issue of barrier sites. Once all of the attempts to action progress
on the sites are exhausted and with the lack of clear-cut powers,
the Council must look to a range of legislation for powers to
act. Unfortunately, there are a number of difficulties with this
approach; first, the relevant legislation is not directly applicable
to the problem at hand which means they are limited in their
use; second, it can be difficult to locate property owners in order
to serve them with notices; third, enforcement action often
requires Court proceedings and is therefore expensive and
resource intensive; and fourth, not all costs of enforcement
action can be recovered from the property owner. This leaves
the Council with limited options for enforcement action and
explains why the Council has taken the facilitation approach it
has to dealing with barrier sites.
The problem of abandoned buildings and barrier sites has arisen
post-earthquakes. The governance of the recovery has
contributed to the problem in that most of the issues that have
arisen relate back to the early recovery policies and actions
taken in the first five years. Legislation was enacted
responsively and quickly. Within two weeks of the September
2010 earthquake the Canterbury Earthquake Response and
Recovery Act 2010 (CERRA) was enacted and the Canterbury
Earthquake Commission established to coordinate the recovery
process with local and central government. However, this came
to an end soon after the February 2011 earthquake caused
significantly worse damage on a much larger scale giving rise
to a more complex situation requiring an even greater response.
The government argued the scale of the recovery was now
beyond the capability of the existing institutions and therefore
central governance was needed to allow for a high degree of
ministerial control and the exercise of significant powers [24].
The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 (CER Act) was
then enacted and the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery
Authority (CERA) established with broad powers to actively
progress the recovery. This Act put the powers for the recovery
1
The Resource Management Act 1991 and the Historic Places Act
1993.
squarely with the Minister responsible for earthquake recovery
and CERA with a direct reporting line to central government.
CERA was in charge of decision-making about land-use,
building and planning that would ordinarily have been the
domain of the Councils. The CER Act gave the Minister and
CERA further extensive powers including the ability to amend
or revoke Resource Management Act documents and city plans,
demolish buildings to fulfil the blueprint plan, restrict access to
roads and acquire land for anchor projects [25]. This was the
governance structure for the first five years of the recovery until
the expiry of the CER Act in April 2016 and the enactment of
the Greater Christchurch Regeneration Act 2016 which saw
authority over the recovery transition back to the Councils. This
shift in responsibility from local government to central
government and back again has had a huge impact on
policymaking and governance in the eleven years since the
earthquakes and no doubt has played a role in limiting the
Council’s role in being able to deal with abandoned buildings
and barrier sites.
Another issue for Christchurch was the huge number of heritage
buildings that were demolished after the earthquakes. The
decisions to demolish caused tension between heritage
advocates who claimed the buildings were brought down in
haste and those in charge of the city’s recovery who justified
their decisions on the basis that safety was their priority [26]. It
is clear CERA’s extensive emergency powers to demolish
buildings for the city’s recovery were used on heritage
buildings when owners could not get funding to save them [27].
A “section 38 notice” could be issued by CERA on any building
it deemed dangerous and it could be demolished within 10 days
[28, s.38]. Furthermore, emergency legislation gave CERA the
power to overrule the legislation meant for safeguarding
heritage buildings.
1
The main issues were the age of heritage
buildings and how severely damaged they were in the
earthquakes which rendered them unsafe; the cost to rebuild and
make them safe was significant and many owners found their
insurance was insufficient to cover this expense; and the
purpose of the CER Act which was to ensure the city’s recovery
was “focused, timely and expedited” which meant CERA was
not willing to wait for solutions to save the buildings.
Furthermore, many owners chose demolition in order to obtain
compensation from CERA for their buildings. Overall, it
seemed that in the post-earthquake setting “heritage was
regarded as an obstacle to the recovery of Christchurch to be
demolished where necessary” [27]. This sentiment was
cemented by the Minister for CER’s public pronouncement of
heritage buildings as “old dungas” diminishing their relevance
in post-earthquake recovery and paving the way to systematic
loss of heritage through demolition [2014].
Today, the following describes legislation which provides the
Council or other parties with some enforcement powers for
barrier sites; however, as indicated below, it is limited in its
scope.
Building Act 2004
The Building Act 2004 confers powers on the Council to deal
with dangerous or insanitary buildings, or those nearby, that
may be affected by these buildings. The definition of a
dangerous building is one that in the ordinary course of events
(excluding an earthquake) is likely to cause injury or death to
people in it or persons on another property, or damage to a
neighbouring property [30, s.121].
2
If a building comes within
2
Note that after the earthquakes the definition of “dangerous
building” was amended to include buildings that could collapse or
otherwise cause death or injury in an earthquake. This amendment
only applied to the districts of the Christchurch City Council,
44
this definition, the Council has the power to take action
including putting up fences or barriers to prevent people
approaching the building, issuing a notice requiring the building
owner to carry out work to reduce the danger and demolishing
the building (Building Act 2004, ss. 124, 127). Where a
building poses an immediate danger, the Council can do what
is necessary to remove the danger and recover the costs of the
work from the building owner (Building Act 2004, ss.129, 130).
If the action taken is disputed by the owner, the Council must
apply to the Court for confirmation of the warrant under which
the action was taken (Building Act 2004, s.130). If the building
poses no immediate danger (Building Act 2004, s.127) but the
work required by the notice is not completed by the building
owner within the specified time, the Council may apply to the
Court for an order authorising it to carry out the work (including
demolition of the building) and recover the costs from the
owner (Building Act 2004, ss. 126, 127). A disadvantage of this
approach is that the Council will have to bear the initial upfront
cost of taking action on the building.
While these provisions do give the Council powers to take
action on abandoned buildings they are limited in that not all
abandoned buildings will be “dangerous buildings” as defined
by the Act
3
. Most abandoned buildings are uninhabited (except
for squatters who are illegally in residence) and therefore do not
come within the statutory definition of “dangerous”. It is more
likely that abandoned buildings will pose a danger to a
neighbouring property or people on that property and any in this
category are likely to have been actioned. It is the balance of
abandoned buildings that do not fall within the definition of a
“dangerous building” that are the problem because the Council
does not have the power under these provisions to require
owners to take action or to take action itself.
An insanitary building is defined as one that is offensive or
likely to be injurious to health because it is in a state of
disrepair, is a damp building or does not have a supply of
drinking water or sanitary facilities (Building Act 2004, s.123).
4
All of these matters are likely to be injurious to the health of
occupants. However, , abandoned buildings are not occupied.
The inquiry should be whether abandoned buildings could be
deemed “offensive” owing to their state of disrepair. If they are
determined to be an insanitary building on this basis the Council
then has the power, as it would for a dangerous building, to
require the owner to take action.. Whether or not graffiti and
being unsightly are sufficient grounds to meet the test for
“offensive” under the Act is unclear as there is little case law
on this section. However, it is open to the Council to test this
provision but such a test comes at a cost.
Councils are required, under the Building Act 2004, to have a
Dangerous and Insanitary Buildings policy to set out the
Council’s approach to dealing and managing such buildings
(Building Act 2004, s.131). The Christchurch City Council’s
Waimakariri District Council and Selwyn District Council;
Canterbury Earthquake (Building Act) Order 2010, cl 5. This Order
was revoked in 2016 by the enactment of the Greater Christchurch
Regeneration Act 2016.
3
For discussion on dangerous buildings under Building Act 2004 and
treatment of buildings deemed earthquake-prone see [33]
4
The government has acknowledged it may be difficult to identify a
building’s insanitary status; Department of Building and Housing
“Dangerous and Insanitary Building Provisions of the Building Act
2004, Policy Guidance for Territorial Authorities (2005).
5
The policy states the Council will not actively inspect buildings to
determine if they are dangerous or insanitary but will act on
complaints provided to them.
“Dangerous and Insanitary Buildings Policy 2018” states that
when the Council becomes aware
5
of a dangerous, affected or
insanitary building it will investigate and then work with the
owner to ensure that action is taken to make the building, its
occupants and the public safe. It also states it will use its powers
to take action if required (although cost will again be a factor in
determining what action to take)
The Building Act 2004 also governs buildings that may be
earthquake-prone (Building Act 2004, subpart 6a).
6
It tasks the
Council with the job of identifying and managing buildings that
come within the definition of an “earthquake-prone building”
(EPB). An EPB has a specific legal definition being one that,
owing to the condition of the building or the ground on which
it is built, and its construction, will have its ultimate capacity
exceeded in a moderate earthquake and if it were to collapse it
would likely cause injury or death to persons or damage to other
property (Building Act 2004, s.133AB).
7
The Act requires the
Council to apply an EPB methodology to identify these
buildings which are those with unreinforced masonry, built
before 1976 and three or more storeys or over 12 metres in
height, and those built before 1935 of one or more storeys [31,
ss.1.2.1, 1.2.3]. The Act also divides EPBs into two categories
– priority buildings and others. Priority buildings include those
that house emergency and response services, buildings that are
regularly occupied by at least 20 people for education/training
purposes, those with unreinforced masonry that could fall onto
public thoroughfares, and buildings that might collapse in an
earthquake and impede important transport routes needed in an
emergency response (Building Act 2004, s.133AE). Where a
building is identified as an EPB or a potential EPB the Council
may take steps to ensure the safety of those around it by putting
up fences to prevent people approaching while a plan is put in
place to remediate or demolish the building (Building Act 2004,
s.133AR).
If a building is identified as a potential EPB, the council can
request the owner to provide an engineering assessment of the
building or part of the building that may be earthquake-prone
[32]. If the building owner fails to comply with the request, the
council can treat the building as if it is an EPB and issue an EPB
notice identifying the building or the part of it that could be
earthquake-prone, specifying the earthquake rating and require
the owner to carry out work on the building to comply with the
Building Act 2004. For example, it could require the building
owner to carry out remedial work within a specified deadline
(Building Act 2004, s.133AL).
8
If the owner fails to comply
with the EPB notice, the Council can take the necessary action
to make the building safe or demolish it, and can recover the
costs from the building owner (Building Act 2004, s.133AS).
Finally, the Building Act 2004 also has provisions that govern
the management of buildings located in an area affected by an
6
This subpart was added by the Building (Earthquake-prone
buildings) Act 2016 as a result of a recommendation by the
Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission Report (Canterbury
Earthquakes Royal Commission Te Komihana Rūwhenua o Waitaha
Final Report – Part Two (Volume 4): Earthquake-prone buildings (10
October 2012) https://canterbury.royalcommission.govt.nz/)
7
The terms “ultimate capacity” and “moderate earthquake” are
defined in the Building (Specified Systems, Change the Use, and
Earthquake-prone Buildings) Regulations 2005 cl 7. Note that the
definition of “dangerous building” excludes an earthquake; Building
Act 2004, s121. Also see [33].
8
The EPB notice must be displayed in a prominent place on or near
the building (Building Act 2004, s 133AP). A building owner commits
an offence if it fails to do this and could be liable for a fine up to
$20,000 (Building Act 2004, s 133AU).
45
emergency (Building Act 2004, subpart 6b). The appointed
responsible person
9
has powers to put measures in place to stop
people approaching a building or to protect the building from
damage including by the erection of fences. These powers are
used during an emergency response or transition period from an
emergency and are therefore not powers for use by the Council
to deal with a barrier or vacant site.
Greater Christchurch Regeneration Act 2016
This Act [34] was repealed on 30 June 2021.
10
It was enacted
to cover the transition of power from CERA under the CER Act
after its expiration in April 2016 to local government over a
period of five years. Its purpose was to support greater
Christchurch by enabling a focused and expedited regeneration
process after the earthquakes (Greater Christchurch
Regeneration Act 2016, s.3). Regeneration was defined to mean
rebuilding after the Canterbury earthquakes and improving
communities through urban renewal, development, restoration
and enhancement (s.3(2)). “Urban renewal” was defined as the
revitalisation or improvement of an urban area (s.3(2)). These
purposes were important when considering how the powers
under the Act were to be used. If barrier sites were obstructing
urban renewal, then arguably the powers under this Act could
have been used to deal with them.
The Act gave the government’s chief executive broad powers
to carry out or commission work in Christchurch. This work
included the demolition, disposal or removal of a building or
any part of it, on public or private land, with or without the
consent of the owner (s.77). If the building was a “dangerous
building” then the Crown was not liable to compensate the
owner or occupier and it could recover the costs of demolition
from the owner (s.83).
In relation to the problem of abandoned buildings there were
other relevant powers under this Act. First, the chief executive
had the power to direct an owner to act for the benefit of owners
of adjoining or adjacent properties in relation to rebuilding if it
would assist with the implementation of a Regeneration or
Recovery Plan in the properties (s.89). The use of such powers
was only limited by the fact that barrier sites must come within
the relevant Plan but not all would have.
The Act also conferred powers on the chief executive to
purchase or acquire land with the Minister’s approval, and on
the Minister to compulsorily purchase or acquire land
consistent with the Regeneration or Recovery Plan or if there
was none, where the Council had agreed that the land be
compulsorily acquired. These powers were only limited by the
fact that the Minister had to acquire the land in accordance with
the purposes set out in the Act which included the regeneration
of greater Christchurch or where the Minister or chief executive
considered it reasonably necessary.
Although these were extensive powers to require action be
taken on buildings to facilitate the regeneration of Christchurch,
there is no evidence they were used to target individual barrier
sites.
9
A responsible person is someone who has the power to act under a
state of emergency under the Civil Defence Emergency Management
Act 2002 such as the Controller.
10
The Greater Christchurch Regeneration Amendment Act 2020
brought forward the disestablishment of the Crown-Council agency
Regenerate to support and speed up the move to local leadership.
Health Act 1956
Councils have powers and duties under the Health Act 1956
[35, Part 2] and in particular a duty to improve, promote and
protect public health within their districts (s.23). To achieve this
end, Councils must take all proper steps to abate any nuisances
likely to be injurious to health or that are offensive (s.23(c)). A
“nuisance” is defined as arising in a number of listed situations
including premises that may harbour vermin or are in a state or
so situated as likely to be offensive or injurious to health (s.29).
The Council could use its powers under this Act to take action
against the owner of a barrier or vacant site for causing or
permitting a nuisance. However the barriers to the use of these
powers is that the threshold to meet the test for the building to
be a “nuisance” is high and barrier sites are unlikely to meet it,
and the necessity tot obtain an order of the court to require the
owner to abate the nuisance and prohibit its recurrence (s.33).
11
Once a court order is obtained, if the owner fails to do the work
required or the owner cannot be found, the Court may make an
order that the Council attend to the work required and recover
its expenses from the owner (s.33).
12
Litter Act 1979
The Litter Act 1979 [36] gives the Council the power to issue
notices requiring an occupier to clean up litter on their property.
As the provisions of this Act relate to occupiers of private land
(Litter Act 1979, s.10) these powers cannot be used for barrier
sites or vacant sites given they are not occupied.
Resource Management Act 1991
The Resource Management Act 1991 [37] provides that
Councils have a duty to avoid, remedy or mitigate adverse
effects on the environment. There are limited provisions under
this Act that could prove useful for a Council dealing with
barrier or vacant sites.
The Council can serve an enforcement order or abatement
notice asking a person to cease doing something that is likely to
be noxious, dangerous, offensive or objectionable in that it has
or is likely to have an adverse effect on the environment
(Resource Management Act, s.17). It can also serve the same to
require a person to do something to avoid, remedy or mitigate
an adverse effect on the environment caused by that person. The
question is whether a barrier site would meet this test? A state
of disrepair, litter, dust, storm water run-off and vermin are
problems that arise and could potentially have an adverse effect
on the environment; however, the threshold to meet is high and
may not be met by the mere existence of barrier sites. To obtain
an enforcement order the Council will be required to apply to
the court (s.314). If the effects are difficult to prove, the Council
is unlikely to want to expend money and resources on action
that may not be successful.
Public Works Act 1981 and Local Government Act 2002
The government and Councils have powers under these Acts
[38, 39] to compulsorily acquire land but it must be for the
purpose of, or in connection with, a public work. The issue for
the Council is that barrier sites may not meet the requirements
11
The land or building owner could also be convicted of an offence
under this Act; s30.
12
If the Council incurs expense in abating the nuisance this becomes a
debt due to the Council and until it is paid it is deemed to be a charge
on the land; s33(8).
46
to enable them to be purchased, and the Council is unlikely to
want to purchase them nor have the resources to do so.
Council Bylaws, Plans and Policies
The Council has limited powers under bylaws, plans and
policies to take action in relation to barrier sites and vacant
sections.
The Christchurch City Council Public Places Bylaw 2018 and
the Christchurch City Council Traffic and Parking Bylaw 2017
allow the Council to take action should buildings or parts of
them obstruct public places. There is also the Christchurch City
Council Cleanfill and Waste Handling Operations Bylaw 2015
which prohibits land being used for waste operations unless the
owner is licenced.
If the quality of air or water is being compromised by barrier
sites through dust, storm water run-off, litter or other pollutant
the Environment Canterbury Regional Council’s Air and Water
Plans may apply. If a barrier site is creating high levels of
pollution the Regional Council can impose penalties on the
owner.
Council powers to take action on barrier or vacant sites are
contained in a range of legislation, that is not fit for this purpose.
Taking action involves meeting difficult definitions and tests
under legislation and/or taking court proceedings. This leaves
the Council exposed to high costs that may not be affordable or
justifiable. The approach of the Council in trying to work with
property owners to resolve this issue is therefore
understandable. Specific legislative tools are needed to provide
Councils with the powers they need to ensure action is taken on
barrier sites to progress the regeneration of the city after a
disaster.
Table 2: Statutory tools favoured by the Council.
Legislation/bylaw
Relevant section/clause
Form of nuisance/
interference
Building Act 2004
s.123: Building can be insanitary if; hazard to health, in state of disrepair,
lacks moisture penetration protection.
Derelict buildings;
partial building/site
clearance
Health Act 1956
s.29: Nuisance – accumulation or deposit which is offence or injurious
to health, and/or harbours rats or other vermin, and premises which are
offensive (health related)
s.33: Council may issue proceedings in the District Court for nuisance
to be abated. Court may allow Council to recover costs of doing work if
owner/occupier fails to abate nuisance and Court orders Council to carry
out work.
Derelict buildings;
Temporary gravel
carparks
Local Government Act
1974
s.459; Power to require work be done on private land for storm water
drainage. Power to complete work, if not done, and costs recoverable.
Temporary gravel
carparks
Christchurch City
Council Public Places
Bylaw 2008
- Clause 7: Requires permits for obstructions in public places
- Allows for fees to be charged for permits
- To be read in conjunction with Council ‘s Policy on Structures on
Roads 2010
Public realm
encroachment
Christchurch City
Council Traffic and
Parking Bylaw 2008
- Clause 20: Permits required for use of legal road
- Enables charging for use of public roads and footpaths when
containers/skips/fences and hoardings need to occupy public roads and
footpaths
- Requires TMP to be submitted with application for permit
- s357 of LGA: Offence to put something on the road or allow it to
remain without Council authorisation. Offence to allow water for mud
to flow from land on to a road. In a successful prosecution, defendant
may be ordered to pay Council’s costs in removing materials. To be read
in conjunction with Council‘s Policy on Structures on Roads 2010
Public realm
encroachment
Christchurch City
Council (Operative)
District Plan
Transport - Rule: 7.4.2.3: RD6: (Restricted Discretionary):
Temporary car parking activity – resource consent required, expires 30
April 2018.
Transport - Rule: 7.4.2.3: RD8 (Restricted Discretionary):
Commercial car parking lots.
Transport - Rule: 7.4.2.5 (Non complying if activity doesn’t comply with
7.4.3.1.d)
Transport: Rule: 7.4.3.10 - High traffic generator Transport: Rule:
7.4.4.8 - Illumination of parking areas
Transport: Rule: 7.4.4.9 - Surface of parking areass.17: Duty to
landowners to avoid, remedy or mitigate adverse effects arising from
activity. High threshold/test.
Temporary gravel
carparks
Table adapted from Attachment 2 in the 25 May 2017 Council Meeting agenda [40]
47
Cordon, Blueprint and Anchor Projects
The state of emergency declared on 22 February 2011, resulted
in the cordoning of the CBD for the next 28 months (the
boundaries were gradually moved, see Fig 2). Several authors
have been critical of the prolonged cordon which is thought to
have been detrimental to the recovery of the CBD [for example
see 12, 13, 14]. While the cordon was appropriate in the
immediate aftermath of the February earthquakes and until the
peak of demolitions in the first 12 months, the risk could be
managed effectively by restricting access to individual
buildings (e.g. fencing) [14]. This lack of access and
uncertainty around the cordon boundaries and its removal,
encouraged investors and developers to accommodate replaced
CBD businesses by building new spaces outside of the central
city. Enticing tenants lost to the periphery back to the CBD is
limited since lease terms often are in the range of 5-10 years
and higher rentals and relocation costs means fewer tenants will
be inclined to move back into the city [13].
The much anticipated rebuild blueprint for the quake-damaged
Christchurch city centre was revealed to the public on 31 July
2012. The plan included 12 major anchor projects to be
delivered by 2017. Over the years some projects have been
scaled back (e.g. South Frame) while some have been
considerably delayed (e.g. Canterbury multi-use arena). The
intention of the anchors was to attract new residents, visitors,
businesses, and private market-led redevelopment. However,
protracted decision-making over financing of the anchor
projects between the Council and the central government, lack
of planning details and ambitious agglomeration of land in the
CBD has taken ‘the steam’ out of the rebuild [41]. Concerns
around prolonged delays in turn are putting breaks on the ability
of the city centre to attract private investments in residential and
commercial construction. Timely delivery of the anchor
projects is crucial in the full regeneration of the CBD as this
sends a signal of commitment of the local and central
governments, providing much needed certainty and confidence
to the public. Having a complete picture of the CBD post-
rebuild, helps define plans for private developments to go
around the anchor projects. Remaining barrier sites where no
active work is currently being done (i.e. plans confirmed but no
work started and intentions unknown) tend to be clustered
around future anchor projects such as the East Frame,
Canterbury Multi-Use Arena (CMUA) and South Frame
(Figure 2).
Market Environment
Using Statistics NZ predefined geographic areas, we collected
population and business statistics for analysis in this section.
Statistical area 2 (SA2) geography in urbanised areas usually
has a population of 2,000-4,000 residents and is typically used
to show socio-economic profiles of the
communities/neighbourhoods [42]. Christchurch’s central area
is made up of five such statistical areas (SA2), namely
Christchurch Central, Central-West, Central-East, Central-
North and Central-South. Their boundaries are depicted in
Figure 5.
13
For example, Canterbury Earthquake Royal Commission made
specific recommendations in respect to ground improvement and
foundations design in the CBD (Royal Commission, 2012)
Figure 5: Boundaries of central city’s Statistical Areas 2
(SA2).
Inner-City Living
The council has an ambitious goal of increasing inner-city
population from 8,000 (Census 2018) to 20,000 by 2028 [43].
Project 8011 is the Council’s initiative to create a CBD that is
compelling to ‘live, work and play’ for thousands of people.
The central city is on the back foot when it comes to competing
against the attraction of the suburbs on the fringe of the CBD.
The CBD is relatively small in comparison with other main
urban areas, which means that within a short commute of the
CBD, potential buyers are spoilt for choice with houses priced
about 20% less, offering better parking and access to popular
schools. According to a recent REINZ report [44], buyers
attracted to inner-city living are making a lifestyle choice more
than anything else and the location is more popular among
singles and young couples with preferences for one- or two-
bedroom units. In addition to higher land values in the CBD,
developers are factoring in more strict building requirements
pertaining to central city developments into the cost of
construction
13
, making housing more expensive. In addition to
the barrier sites, as of 2020 around 20% of the land (68.3 ha)
within the four avenues remains vacant [45]. Much of that land
(39 ha) is either unused or occupied by gravel car parks which
are notoriously poorly maintained, source of dust and
contaminated stormwater runoff, and are seen as an eyesore and
a sign of a slow recovery. The combination of negative
externalities created by the buildings on the barrier sites and
empty land put off some of prospective homebuyers [5,46].
Unlike Auckland and Wellington where inner-city living has
quadrupled and tripled respectively between 1991 and 2001,
during the same period Christchurch’s apartment dwellers
increased by only 23% [47]. During the 2006 Census, 12,960
people resided in the central city, representing about 3.7% of
the total population (Figure 6). After the earthquakes and as the
city began to rebuild, the size of the population fell below 6000
(2013). In the latest 2018 Census, this number sits at around
8000 which falls short of population size necessary to support
residential developments planned for the city. The biggest loss
of population was from Christchurch Central SA2, the area with
the highest damage.
48
Figure 6: Inner-city population counts (Source: Stats NZ).
Figure 7: Inner-city population by age group.
Breaking down the population statistics into specific age groups
(Figure 7), we can see that central city is popular among
working age population. School-age children is the least
represented group within the CBD, reflecting the lack of
education and recreation facilities favoured by families. Across
all age groups, there are signs that population is returning to the
city centre but sitting below pre-earthquake levels.
Council commissioned research into the attraction of inner city
living [48], identifies that the population targets set by the
Council appear unrealistic. Developers operating in the market
expressed concerns that the 2028 timeframe was too
compressed for the current level of demand. Some suggestions
included greater effort in the delivery of major economic
initiatives aimed at attracting businesses and people; for
example, delivery of the Multi-Use Arena and Metro Sports
Facility, both would boost hospitality offerings and provide
convenient recreation options for residents. In addition, the
commissioned report suggests that the Council should consider
placing restraints on the residential developments outside of the
city centre and offering greater incentives for inner-city
building. Nevertheless, since the start of the COVID-19
pandemic the central city has seen a renewed interest from
investors and households relocating to Christchurch seeking
more affordable housing options [49].
Working in the CBD
Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch are New Zealand’s
major business and government hubs attracting large firms and
public service departments to the CBD and as a result these
cities contain significant amount of commercial building stock
(office and retail). To add context to the analysis, we compared
the size of the central areas of these cities (Table 3 and Figure
8). One of the obvious trends is the increased demand for office
space in Auckland and, less so, Wellington, while in
Christchurch available office stock is lagging behind the pre-
earthquake levels.
Table 3: 2020 survey of commercial building stock.
CBD
Building stock (000’s m2)
Auckland
1,200
Wellington
1,150
Christchurch
370
Figure 8: Number of people with a workplace address in Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch CBDs, 2006, 2013, and
2018 Censuses.
64,656 65,022
36,018
72,489 75,021
14,946
99,420
76,269
26,472
AUCKLAND WELLINGTON CHRISTCHURCH
2006 2013 2018
49
Figure 9: Central city workers by SA 2, 2000 – 2020. [54]
The impact of the 2008-09 global financial crisis, combined
with the 2011 earthquake, significantly altered the business
landscape of the central city’s economy. Just after the
earthquake, the CBD lost all of the additional workers it gained
in the previous decade contracting to pre-2000 level (Figure 9).
As the CBD began to re-open, the size of the labour market in
the city centre was hovering around 22,000 in 2012, a decrease
from the peak of 49,400 in 2005. With their premises
inaccessible due to damage or cordon, central city businesses
dispersed into the suburbs [50]. This pattern of dispersion is
evident in the latest 2018 Census, that shows a new trend of
falling proportion of employed people commuting into
Christchurch CBD from outlying suburbs and districts. For
example, nearly half of working population from the
neighbouring districts of Selwyn and Waimakariri worked in
the CBD in 2013, this proportion fell to 38% and 32%
respectively [51]. In other words, like housing, commercial
property market in the CBD is forced to compete with suburbs
in a post-earthquake environment.
Table 4: CBD office construction.
Year
New stock added (m2)
2014
106,901
2015
142,507
2016
94,485
2017
32,637
2018
9,542
2019
1,452
2020
0
Source: [55]
Early in the rebuild, property developers re-entered the CBD,
helped by insurance settlements from damaged buildings,
starting on the fringes of the centre as cordons progressively
moved back. First developments went up along the riverfront
and Victoria Street. Building in these areas are now
experiencing the highest level of demand. Replacement of the
commercial building stock seemed like an impossible task, with
the city centre being a near blank canvas. The pace of
reconstruction was unprecedented – with the damaged and
demolished stock accumulated over a century replaced in a span
of a decade (Table 4). With developments completed over the
last 10 years, the stock is now at 85% of the 2010 level (Figure
10), but now appears to have plateaued. One of the factors that
contributed to the fast recovery of the building stock is the
historical ownership of commercial property within the CBD
being heavily skewed towards locally-based high net worth
investors which collectively owned over 80% of buildings and
two thirds of the total stock [52]. Earlier research suggests that
these investors had strong place attachment to the city and that
this emotional attachment played a significant role in deciding
to rebuild as opposed to taking insurance payouts to other
markets in the country or overseas [53].
It is important to keep in mind that any recovery in the
commercial market is not going to be fast. To put the speed of
current recovery in prospective, leading up to the earthquakes
the local market experienced only moderate growth from the
1990’s. At that time, vacancy rates reached 30% (Figure 11).
Between 1990 and 2007 the amount of available office space
remained relatively flat with the only significant new building
added to the market was a building at 250 Oxford Terrace. By
then vacancies had reduced but this was achieved by the
removal of older office stock through conversions to hotels.
Office rents achieved in 1989 for premium grade office spaces
were at $225 per sqm, by 2010 net rents only increased to $270
per sqm, which equates to an annual growth rate of less than 1%
[52]. With very few new offices added to the supply, the CBD
office market was dominated by B and C grade buildings (65%
of the total stock). Pre-earthquakes, rental rates ranged between
170-200 $/m2 and 220-240$/m2 in C and B grade buildings
respectively [52]. New structural design requirements
introduced after the earthquakes and the added risk margin of
the uncertain outlook for the central city rebuild, meant that
financial viability of new developments required rental income
at $460 per sqm, on par with premium rents achieved in
Auckland at that time [52]. While businesses expressed their
desire to return to the CBD, the pre- and post-earthquake rent
gap was out of reach for the vast majority of tenants. The CBD,
however, is beginning to look more attractive to tenants who
relocated to the suburbs after the earthquakes. Since the post-
earthquake high of $450 per sqm, CBD rental rates have settled
at $320 per sqm (Figure 12). As post-earthquake leases
approach expiry, tenants in suburban locations would possibly
be considering a shift back into the CBD [13, 42]. Those tenants
would have leased properties in the suburbs in 2012/13 at rent
levels not too dissimilar to the rents charged in central office
50
precincts presently (Figure 12). Another driver stimulating
additional demand for offices in the CBD is the expiring June
2021 deadline that allowed displaced businesses to take up
temporary accommodation in the suburbs after the earthquake
established by the Canterbury Earthquake Order. At the time
the council issued around 1,000 permits for temporary
accommodation that would otherwise not comply with the
District Plan
14
. The council estimates that 148 permits are still
in use and if businesses continue to operate past the deadline,
the council can consider enforcement action. [56].
While the current available stock is absorbed, abundant
suburban office space will continue to keep CBD rent at
moderate levels, meaning that rents are unlikely to increase
significantly. Since development projects are assessed on their
ability to generate favourable financial returns, as discussed
earlier, high construction costs coupled with high land values
demand rents higher than what is currently achieved in the
market. In addition, the Reserve Bank’s quantitative easing
aimed at stimulating the economy during COVID-19, including
the lowering and commitment to keep for at least 12 months the
Official Cash Rate at 0.25% and implementation of other
monetary policies aimed at bringing down long-term interest
rates[57], resulted in low property holding costs for owners (i.e.
low/affordable lending interest rates) removing pressure to
redevelop barrier sites Therefore, the underlying focus on
population and economic growth that in turn increases demand
for retail, offices and people will be instrumental in creating
conditions for property owners to contribute to the regeneration
of the CBD.
Figure 10: Inventory of Christchurch CBD office stock.
(No data available for 2011) [55]
Figure 11: Survey of office vacancies in Christchurch CBD
[55].
Figure 12: Comparison of suburban and CBD office rents for
A-grade buildings [55].
Resilient CBD
It has been acknowledged before, that unlike other developed
markets, New Zealand has a wide insurance penetration which
enabled much of the reconstruction [59]. This is in contrast to a
similarly damaging 1994 Northridge earthquake where the bulk
of building repair was financed through the city-administered
14
Following the 2011 earthquakes, the Council granted 950
businesses temporary accommodation permits to carry out activities
in areas they would not normally be allowed to operate under the
district plan. For example, a business relocating to a residential
housing and commercial loan programmes which eventually
had to be repaid by the owners [60]. The scale of the Canterbury
pay-out and reassessment of risks have seen new insurance
policy premiums post-earthquakes increase up to 300% 61].
Changes in the affordability of insurance coupled with the
societal expectations of re-occupiable buildings (i.e. avoiding
long-term cordons and minimising large scale property
damage) are driving the demand for resilient buildings. Bruneau
& MacRae [61] show that the Christchurch experience is
making tenants rethink business continuity and the advantages
that certain structural systems offer in terms of limiting
disturbance to their operations. This has led to a significant
uptake of low-damage seismic design in the central city rebuild.
Similarly, in the US, there are initiatives to improve the
performance of buildings in terms of re-occupancy and
functional recovery [62]. Central city rebuild forced
modernisation on the majority of commercial buildings in
Christchurch CBD. The CBD now outperforms Auckland and
Wellington in the ratio of high-quality accommodation having
over 60% of A-grade office space vs 47% for Auckland and
29% for Wellington [63]. The CBD provides a natural
laboratory to test the benefits of low-damage solutions in an
event of another major earthquake (as some experts say it is a
matter of when, not if). Ability to return to the CBD and repair
damaged buildings minimises economic and social disruptions,
retains character of the area and sense of place, and reduces the
recovery time and cost of demolition and reconstruction (in
other words, limiting the scale of any future barrier sites).
dwelling may find that their premises were not appropriately zoned
for their activity [58].
51
CONCLUSIONS
The Canterbury earthquakes caused tremendous disruption to
the region causing human suffering and bringing widespread
physical damage. The fabric of the central city changed
following the loss of nearly 70% of the buildings that were
damaged or destroyed in the earthquakes. Although we cannot
diminish the tragedy of the 185 lives lost in the February 2011
event, most of the building occupants were able to evacuate
safely, thus meeting the overarching life-safety performance
objective of the current building code. Although the buildings
served their purpose of protecting lives, many were deemed
unsafe to re-occupy. A significant number of heritage buildings
were also lost which has dramatically changed the city’s
heritage landscape. Buildings left unrepaired and abandoned
are a blemish on the urban landscape leading to longer term
social-economic issues and slow regeneration.
From the analysis of the delays in the regeneration of
Christchurch’s central area, it is apparent that much of the
private-led rebuild of the Barrier sites has been in response to
increased demand in the market and financial feasibility as
opposed to being the result of the Council’s enforcement
actions. Property owners who are waiting for the right market
conditions to remediate their sites require certainty in the
greater rebuild programme defined in the blueprint and depend
on the timely delivery of the public sector anchor projects.
While the Council has a cost-sharing agreement with the Crown
on the delivery of the anchor projects, the Council’s leadership
and clearly defined timeframes are important signals to
investors and the public in ensuring the key assets for the city
are on track. The completion of these projects will determine
the speed at which the city is fully regenerated [5, 64]. The
distraction of the barrier sites, undoubtedly, takes away
council’s focus and resources from the anchor projects. The
majority of barrier site owners have completed or are
progressing action on the rebuild; however, a minority of
owners continue to delay progress on their sites. As the city
moves towards full recovery, abandoned buildings stick out as
a sign of reversing fortunes. Therefore, the Council should
prioritise resources to ensure that the negative impacts of the
neglected buildings are contained. In addition, while the
pandemic is driving a renewed interest among investors and
homebuyers, the long-term trends in the residential and
commercial markets show slower speed of recovery due to
competition from the more affordable suburbs and rapidly
increasing construction costs.
Despite the need to continue with progress towards
regeneration of the city, this research has demonstrated that the
Council is limited in its legal powers to deal with barrier sites.
Although the Building Act should govern this problem it does
not do so adequately. The definition of “dangerous building”
presumes it is occupied. If unoccupied, then it must pose a
danger to neighbouring properties. It is only if there is the threat
of immediate danger that the Council can take action itself to
demolish the building or make it safe. If there is no immediate
danger, the Council is left to work with the owner and an
uncooperative owner means the only way a Council can take
action on the building is to apply for a court order. Furthermore,
not all abandoned buildings meet the definition of “dangerous”
which means the Council cannot act. The other option is for the
Council to examine whether the building is insanitary under the
Act. If it is offensive because it is in a state of disrepair, this
may mean the Council can take action as it would for a
dangerous building. However, whether the abandoned
buildings meet the test of being “offensive” is unclear and any
testing of this provision is likely to be expensive. If the building
comes within the definition of an “earthquake-prone building”
then the Council can work with the owner to remediate or
demolish the building. The Building Act provides the Council
with some powers to act on barrier sites, but they are limited in
that they apply to buildings that have the potential to cause harm
to people or neighbouring property and therefore do not cover
all abandoned buildings post-earthquake.
The other various pieces of legislation that could potentially
assist the Council to deal with abandoned buildings and barrier
sites either do not apply or have tests with high thresholds that
are difficult to meet or require court proceedings which limits
their use. Any enforcement action is likely to require Court
proceedings which are expensive and resource intensive.
Moreover, not all costs of enforcement action can be recovered
from the property owner. These are clear reasons why the
Council has taken the approach of working with the owners of
barrier sites to achieve its desired outcomes. The extensive
powers in emergency legislation seem to provide the solution
for dealing with barrier sites. It is clear that if these powers are
not used for this purpose during the emergency and transition
period, the opportunity is lost because the problem does not fit
squarely within the parameters of the ordinary legislation.
While emergency legislation, such as the Canterbury
Earthquakes Recovery Act 2011 and Greater Christchurch
Regeneration Act 2016 (now repealed), can help address short-
and mid-term recovery, it is clear that specific long-term
legislative tools combined with a comprehensive survey of the
local governments’ recovery management capabilities [66] are
needed to support the local councils and give them the
necessary power needed to take action against owners of barrier
sites who refuse to cooperate, as they works to regenerate the
city.
The review also demonstrated that institutional powers alone do
not force action of barrier sites. Development projects require
the right set of market conditions to test their feasibility.
Unfortunately, valuable rebuild opportunities were missed
early on while the cordon was in place. In hindsight, the Crown
should have exercised its CER Act powers to freeze or limit
construction activity in the commercial sector outside of the
CBD. Unconstrained by the blueprint, developers on the
periphery of the CBD and nearby suburbs met the newly created
demand from the displaced central city’s prime tenants
(financial services, law firms etc). This has set back demand for
the CBD premisses by at least 5-10 years, i.e., a full lease cycle.
Implementation of the blueprint was criticised for uncertainties
it created due to lack of details and progress on the public sector
anchor projects which resulted in developers delaying their
rebuild or taking their investments elsewhere. Therefore,
private sector-led regeneration of the CBD can happen
“naturally”, if the government (central and local) can identify
factors that may hinder the recovery at the time when plans are
put in place.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This project was (partially) supported by QuakeCoRE, a New
Zealand Tertiary Education Commission-funded Centre. This is
QuakeCoRE publication number 0736.
Toni Collins would like to thank Eve Boister for her research
assistance.
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