Chapter

The Rejection of British Idealism

March 2023

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780192848574.003.0008

In book: Idealism in Modern Philosophy (pp.150-158)

Authors:

This book examines the presence of idealism in modern philosophy from the seventeenth century to the turn of the twenty-first. We define idealism proper as the position that reality is ultimately mental or conceptual in nature, to be contrasted to materialism or physicalism. So defined, idealism has hardly been a popular view, at least in the twentieth century. But we distinguish between metaphysical and epistemological arguments for idealism, and argue that while the former have rarely been popular, the latter are so, and present in many philosophers who would hardly call themselves idealists. We conclude that metaphysical arguments in favor of a reduction of all reality to either mind or matter are highly questionable, because we have no reason to believe that we have arrived at an adequate understanding of either. However, epistemological arguments in favor of idealism that point to some version of conceptual idealism or other are indeed difficult to avoid.

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Chapter

Further into the Twentieth Century

March 2023

This book examines the presence of idealism in modern philosophy from the seventeenth century to the turn of the twenty-first. We define idealism proper as the position that reality is ultimately mental or conceptual in nature, to be contrasted to materialism or physicalism. So defined, idealism has hardly been a popular view, at least in the twentieth century. But we distinguish between ... [Show full abstract] metaphysical and epistemological arguments for idealism, and argue that while the former have rarely been popular, the latter are so, and present in many philosophers who would hardly call themselves idealists. We conclude that metaphysical arguments in favor of a reduction of all reality to either mind or matter are highly questionable, because we have no reason to believe that we have arrived at an adequate understanding of either. However, epistemological arguments in favor of idealism that point to some version of conceptual idealism or other are indeed difficult to avoid.

Article

Is the Mind Real ?

January 1997

Herbert FJ Muller

The mind as a whole escapes objective studies because belief in mind- independent reality is self-contradictory and by definition excludes subjective experience (awareness, 'consciousness') from reality. The mind's center therefore vanishes in studies which imply exclusive objectivism or empiricism. This conceptual difficulty can be counteracted by acknowledging that all mental and world ... [Show full abstract] structures arise within an unstructured origin- and-matrix for knowledge-structures and beliefs. The mind's structure is thus at the center of reality. Use of such a zero-structure reference can also help to clarify some related conceptual difficulties and to bridge the gap between the 'two cultures'.

Chapter

Conclusion

March 2023

This book examines the presence of idealism in modern philosophy from the seventeenth century to the turn of the twenty-first. We define idealism proper as the position that reality is ultimately mental or conceptual in nature, to be contrasted to materialism or physicalism. So defined, idealism has hardly been a popular view, at least in the twentieth century. But we distinguish between ... [Show full abstract] metaphysical and epistemological arguments for idealism, and argue that while the former have rarely been popular, the latter are so, and present in many philosophers who would hardly call themselves idealists. We conclude that metaphysical arguments in favor of a reduction of all reality to either mind or matter are highly questionable, because we have no reason to believe that we have arrived at an adequate understanding of either. However, epistemological arguments in favor of idealism that point to some version of conceptual idealism or other are indeed difficult to avoid.

Article

Thought as a quasi-possibility

December 2021 · Intellect Innovations Investments

Dmitry Ankin

Modal logic determines a lot in modern metaphysics and ontology, which delve deeper and deeper into the realm of the possible, not limited to the analysis of reality. This makes it relevant to study the problems of philosophical argumentation, built on the basis of modal logic. The aim of the work is to prove that thinkability does not necessarily entail a logical possibility. Because of this, ... [Show full abstract] many kinds of modal arguments that involve inference from conceivability to possibility can be flawed. Methodology: the author considers the question of the existence of objects impossible from the point of view of classical logical omniscience as a parallel to the idea of the existence of impossible possible worlds by J. Hintikka. The main idea of this article is the assertion that the gap between conceivability and possibility is generated by the intellectual limitations of the epistemic agent. The agent consistently — within the framework of the information available to him, and not in the absolute sense - considers logically possible that which is logically impossible from the point of view of logical omniscience. It turns out that we are able to think not only of something non-existent (to have empty intentions), but even quite capable of thinking the logically impossible. The conceivability of the impossible is somewhat analogous to the conceivability of impossible objects that are constructed by contemporary artists. The paper draws a parallel between the tautological thinkability of such an equation that is not tautological and the thinkability as a theorem of something that is not a theorem (S. Kripke’s modal arguments). As a particular example, the author criticizes the argument of the zombie by D. Chalmers, which is popular in modern philosophy of consciousness. It is shown that the conceivability of a zombie does not exclude the possible inconsistency of a zombie from an absolute point of view. In the second part, various types of the a priori are also considered, the opposition is built between the classical idea of logical omniscience and the agent-based approach using the categories of semantics of possible worlds. The main result of the proposed work is to prove that both formally contradictory and conceptually contradictory can be outside the framework of the epistemic attainability of the final agent. The author introduces a new philosophical category of the quasi-possible.

Article

Leibniz and the Natural World: Activity, Passivity, and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz's Philosophy...

January 2007 · Journal of the History of Philosophy

Michael Futch

Leibniz's metaphysics has long been viewed as one of the more noteworthy systems of idealism in early modern philosophy. At the ground-floor level of his austere ontology, the standard view maintains that the world is not populated by bodies in space and time, but rather by immaterial, mind-like entities: monads. All the rest is a kind of ontological construction from these simple substances. In ... [Show full abstract] this book, Pauline Phemister seeks to overturn the idealist reading of Leibniz and to show that "the true immaterial substances in Leibniz's philosophy" are "monads that exist as animated corporeal creatures" (76). What is ontologically basic for Leibniz are not immaterial monads but "living corporeal substances" with "both mental and physical characteristics" (3). If Phemister is right, one wonders what to make of Leibniz's many endorsements of idealism, as, for instance, when he says that "the explanation of all phenomena solely through the perception of monads . . . with corporeal substances to be rejected, [is] useful for a fundamental investigation of things" (Leibniz to Bartholomew Des Bosses, June 16, 1712). This programmatic summary is only one of numerous statements from the late period where Leibniz asserts that ultimate reality is composed of immaterial monads. One possible option would be to posit an indecisive vacillation in Leibniz's late philosophy. Rejecting this, Phemister's strategy for dealing with texts such as these—including the "New System," the "Principles of Nature and Grace," and the "Monadology"—is to dismiss them as the rhetorical subterfuge of a Leibniz who is only exoterically, not privately, a Cartesian (15, 163). Leibniz is a public Cartesian in that he "invites comparison of his rational monads with Cartesian minds" by suggesting that the former, like Cartesian minds, are immaterial and incorporeal (13). This is ostensibly only a ruse Leibniz used to ingratiate himself to a Cartesian audience, hiding from them his real view that genuine substances are always corporeal. We are not told why Leibniz would have expected an idealist philosophy that explains mind-body interaction in terms of a pre-established harmony to be well received by Cartesians, but with this hermeneutical principle in hand, Phemister has deftly insulated her criticism from textual refutation. A more pressing concern is Phemister's principle thesis that "the monad is a corporeal substance" (73). Phemister argues that monads are not complete substances unless they comprise not only a soul-like entelechy, but also primary and secondary matter: a monad is not substantially complete "without the subordinate monads that comprise its organic body" (41). What is important to note in this account is that for monads to be complete substances, they must consist of both a "soul-like aspect" and secondary matter, an organic body (133). This organic body is itself an aggregate of other corporeal substances, which are themselves combinations of entelechies and primary and secondary matter (81). The clear consequence of this is that the monad's existence as a complete substance is dependent upon the existence of other substances, namely, those substances that aggregate to form its organic body, the secondary matter that completes the monad as substance. Hence, the existence of complete substances—the only genuine substances—is ontologically derivative. This conclusion flatly contradicts Leibniz's repeated assertions that substances are ontologically basic, not depending for their existence on the existence of other substances, the very cornerstone of Leibniz's metaphysics. This account is also beset by a vicious circularity. For there to be complete substances, there must first be secondary matter, as secondary matter is a constituent of complete substances. As Phemister puts it, "both primary and secondary matter complete the dominant entelechy," making it a genuine substance (71). Without secondary matter, the dominant entelechy does not exist as a substance. But the existence of secondary matter is itself dependent upon the existence of complete substances, for secondary matter just is an aggregate of corporeal substances (84). Accordingly, complete substances are metaphysical constructions from secondary matter just as secondary matter is a metaphysical construction from complete substances. That is, complete substances are metaphysically prior to secondary matter, and secondary matter is metaphysically prior to complete substances. Phemister denies any such circularity on the grounds that the complete corporeal...

Chapter

The German Response to Idealism II: Neo-Kantianism without Idealism

March 2023

This book examines the presence of idealism in modern philosophy from the seventeenth century to the turn of the twenty-first. We define idealism proper as the position that reality is ultimately mental or conceptual in nature, to be contrasted to materialism or physicalism. So defined, idealism has hardly been a popular view, at least in the twentieth century. But we distinguish between ... [Show full abstract] metaphysical and epistemological arguments for idealism, and argue that while the former have rarely been popular, the latter are so, and present in many philosophers who would hardly call themselves idealists. We conclude that metaphysical arguments in favor of a reduction of all reality to either mind or matter are highly questionable, because we have no reason to believe that we have arrived at an adequate understanding of either. However, epistemological arguments in favor of idealism that point to some version of conceptual idealism or other are indeed difficult to avoid.

Article

Is Intuition Necessary for Defending Platonism?

January 2015

D. Xu

Gödel asserts that his philosophy falls under the category of conceptual realism. This paper gives a general picture of Gödel's conceptual realism's basic doctrines, and gives a way to understand conceptual realism in the background of Leibniz's and Kant's philosophies. Among philosophers of mathematics, there is a widespread view that Platonism encounters an epistemological difficulty because we ... [Show full abstract] do not have sensations of abstract objects. In his writings, Gödel asserts that we have mathematical intuitions of mathematical objects. Some philosophers do not think it is necessary to resort to intuition to defend Platonism, and other philosophers think that the arguments resorting to intuition are too naïve to be convincing. I argue that the epistemic difficulty is not particular to Platonism; when faced with skepticism, physicalists also need to give an answer concerning the relationship between our experience and reality. Gödel and Kant both think that sensations or combinations of sensations are not ideas of physical objects, but that, to form ideas of physical objects, concepts must be added. However, unlike Kant, Gödel thinks that concepts are not subjective but independent of our minds. Based on my analysis of Gödel's conceptual realism, I give an answer to the question in the title and show that arguments resorting to intuition are far from naïve, despite what some philosophers have claimed.

Article

"I THINK" AND THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PRESENCE OF THE SOUL IN DESCARTES

October 2022 · Kafkas Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi

Fatih ÖZGÖKMAN

In the Meditations, Descartes offers three arguments for the human soul or mind to exist separately from the body. In the first, with "I think, therefore I am", he realizes that the most basic form of existence is thinking, that is, the consciousness of himself, and based on the undoubted certainty of this, he concludes that he is different from the body, which is doubtful like other sensible ... [Show full abstract] things. In the second, Descartes argues that because the mind and body can be considered conceptually separate from each other, they are also separate in reality. Because there is no reason why our thinking should not conform to reality. In the third, Descartes appeals to the Platonic argument of the simplicity of the soul. Accordingly, while the soul is indivisible in all its mental activities, the body can be divided and therefore diminished because it is extended. However, with the decrease of the body, there is no decrease in the soul. This indicates that the soul or mind is separate from the body. Keywords: Descartes, Soul, Mind, Body, Simplicity.

Chapter

German Idealism

March 2023

This book examines the presence of idealism in modern philosophy from the seventeenth century to the turn of the twenty-first. We define idealism proper as the position that reality is ultimately mental or conceptual in nature, to be contrasted to materialism or physicalism. So defined, idealism has hardly been a popular view, at least in the twentieth century. But we distinguish between ... [Show full abstract] metaphysical and epistemological arguments for idealism, and argue that while the former have rarely been popular, the latter are so, and present in many philosophers who would hardly call themselves idealists. We conclude that metaphysical arguments in favor of a reduction of all reality to either mind or matter are highly questionable, because we have no reason to believe that we have arrived at an adequate understanding of either. However, epistemological arguments in favor of idealism that point to some version of conceptual idealism or other are indeed difficult to avoid.

Article

On the Conceptual, Psychological, and Moral Status of Zombies, Swamp‐Beings, and Other ‘Behaviourall...

July 2004 · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

JULIA TANNEY

In this paper 1 argue that it would be unprincipled to withhold mental predicates from our behavioural duplicates however unlike us they are “on the inside.” My arguments are unusual insofar as they rely neither on an implicit commitment to logical behaviourism in any of its various forms nor to a verificationist theory of meaning. Nor do they depend upon prior metaphysical commitments or to ... [Show full abstract] philosophical “intuitions”. Rather, in assembling reminders about how the application of our consciousness and propositional attitude concepts are ordinarily defended, 1 argue on explanatory and moral grounds that they cannot be legitimately withheld from creatures who behave, and who would continue to behave, like us. I urge that we should therefore reject the invitation to revise the application of these concepts in the ways that would be required by recent proposals in the philosophy of mind.

Article

Full-text available

Hilary Putnam And Immanuel Kant: Two `Internal Realists'?

April 2000 · Synthese

Dermot Moran

Since 1976 Hilary Putnam has drawn parallels between his `internal'',`pragmatic'', `natural'' or `common-sense'' realism and Kant''s transcendentalidealism. Putnam reads Kant as rejecting the then current metaphysicalpicture with its in-built assumptions of a unique, mind-independent world,and truth understood as correspondence between the mind and that ready-madeworld. Putnam reads Kant as ... [Show full abstract] overcoming the false dichotomies inherent inthat picture and even finds some glimmerings of conceptual relativity inKant''s proposed solution. Furthermore, Putnam reads Kant as overcoming thepernicious scientific realist distinction between primary and secondaryqualities, between things that really exist and their projections, adistinction that haunts modern philosophy. Putnam''s revitalisation of Kantis not just of historical interest, but challenges contemporary versions ofscientific realism. Furthermore, Putnam has highlighted themes which havenot received the attention they deserve in Kantian exegesis, namely, theproblematic role of primary and secondary qualities in Kant''s empiricalrealism, and the extent of Kant''s commitment to conceptual pluralism.However, I argue that Putnam''s qualified allegiance to Kant exposes him tosome of the same metaphysical problems that affected Kant, namely, thefamiliar problem of postulating an absolute reality (Ding an sich), while atthe same time disavowing the meaningfulness of so doing. In conclusion Isuggest that Putnam might consider Hegel''s attempts to solve this problem inKant as a way of furthering his own natural realism.

Chapter

Copyright Page

March 2023

This book examines the presence of idealism in modern philosophy from the seventeenth century to the turn of the twenty-first. We define idealism proper as the position that reality is ultimately mental or conceptual in nature, to be contrasted to materialism or physicalism. So defined, idealism has hardly been a popular view, at least in the twentieth century. But we distinguish between ... [Show full abstract] metaphysical and epistemological arguments for idealism, and argue that while the former have rarely been popular, the latter are so, and present in many philosophers who would hardly call themselves idealists. We conclude that metaphysical arguments in favor of a reduction of all reality to either mind or matter are highly questionable, because we have no reason to believe that we have arrived at an adequate understanding of either. However, epistemological arguments in favor of idealism that point to some version of conceptual idealism or other are indeed difficult to avoid.