Article

Populism: Drivers, measurements and protectors

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Abstract

Populism is a fairly young concept. It does not have a single definition, neither does it have a single ideology. Populists can operate in a wide spectrum — from the extreme left to the extreme right. They gain popularity by focusing on issues important to large groups of the population that are avoided by the political elite. In Europe it is immigration issue, in the USA it is the loss of jobs in industry; in Ukraine it is low income, unequal opportunities, unfair distribution of wealth, and corruption. Recently, there has been growing support for populist parties and politicians. Populists, in particular, support traditional social values, nationalism, and oppose immigration. Populists can influence politics, for example, the populist United Kingdom Independence Party initiated a referendum in June 2016 on the UK's membership in the European Union, which resulted in the victory of the supporters of Brexit - the exit of the UK. As Professor Inglehart notes, populism is spreading as a response to the transformation of values, populism expresses a "rollback" from post-materialist values. Populist politicians are unsuccessfully trying to find a solution to the new challenges that have arisen as a result of globalization and the formation of an artificial intelligence society. Thus, Donald Trump's proposals are predominantly xenophobic and authoritarian in nature. Another American politician, Bernard Sanders, notes the solution to the acute problem of economic inequality, but the reforms he proposes are ineffective. In this article, the author try to understand what this phenomenon is, what forms and drivers it has, and most importantly, how populism is measured in Europe and what examples of measurement there are in Ukraine. The results of a study in Ukraine presented in the article make it possible to identify trends of populism growth and find ways to oppose it.

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Воно не має чіткого визначення, не означає єдиної ідеології. В політиці популісти можуть діяти у широкому спектрі -від ультралівого до ультраправого. Вони завойовують прихильність, фокусуючись на важливих для великих груп
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Популізм -досить молоде поняття. Воно не має чіткого визначення, не означає єдиної ідеології. В політиці популісти можуть діяти у широкому спектрі -від ультралівого до ультраправого. Вони завойовують прихильність, фокусуючись на важливих для великих груп